CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN BRITAIN AND INDIA
The Transfer
of Power 1942—7
Volume XII The Mountbatten Viceroyalty
Princes, Partition and Independence
7 1
8 July — 15 August 1947
Editor-in-Chief
NICHOLAS MANSERGH, Litt.D, F.B.A.
Editor
PENDEREL MOON, M.A.
HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE
This, the concluding volume in the Series, provides a graphic account of
events and controversies surrounding the last momentous days of the
British Raj. It is chiefly based upon the records of the India Office, the
Cabinet and its India Committee and, like the two immediately
preceding volumes, draws freely upon the wealth of material in the
Mountbatten archive. Most of the documents it contains are published
for the first time.
The documentary narrative opens with the resolution of two
outstanding questions — the appointment to the Governor-Generalship
of India and the reconstitution of the Interim Government. On the first,
the Viceroy informed his Staff Meeting on 9 July that taking into account
the messages encouraging acceptance which he had received from the
King, the Prime Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition, he had
finally, though with condnuing unease, decided to accept the
Governor-Generalship of India alone. On the second, which the
Viceroy described as ‘my worst headache to date’, a plan was devised
and subsequently implemented on 19 July, the day after the enactment
of the Indian Independence Bill, which provided for the creation of two
provisional governments, ministers in each holding separate portfolios
for their future jurisdictional areas.
The volume contains substantial documentation on problems of law
and order, principally relating to the Punjab. Amidst mounting
communal tension one factor constantly underlined was the likelihood
of violent protest by the Sikhs as the seemingly inevitable division of
their homeland drew nearer. As a precautionary measure, the Viceroy
instructed the Commander-in-Chief to prepare a plan to deal with
disturbances in the neighbourhood of the boundaries of the two
dominions. A Boundary Force was established on 1 August but on
12 August, after the outbreak of serious disorders in Lahore, the
Governor reported that its strength was ‘not adequate to present and
future tasks’. The Governor’s gloomy assessment, together with his
reports that terrorist activities were on the increase and that the police
in Lahore and Amritsar were unreliable, gave a forewarning of the
magnitude of the impending crisis in the Punjab.
The documents shed new light on various aspects of the work of the
Boundary Commission, notably the Viceroy’s dissociation from the
Commission’s proceedings and the requests submitted by the Governors
of Bengal and the Punjab for advance information on the date and
contents of the provincial awards. The report of the Commission may be
read in conjunction with the minutes of the meeting on 16 August over
which Lord Mountbatten presided and at which the awards were
disclosed to the representatives of the new governments.
With the encouragement, specially of the Congress leadership, the
future relationship of the Princely States with the successor dominions
became a major preoccupation of the Viceroy in the last weeks before
transfer. Late in July he addressed a conference of Rulers and
Representatives of the States and explained why it was in the Princes’
interests to accede to the neighbouring dominion on Defence, External
Affairs and Communications. Subsequent documentation reveals how
Travancore succumbed in the face of pressure from the local States’
People’s movement, how a number of Princes prevaricated (the Viceroy
describing their behaviour as ‘extraordinary’) before signing the
Instrument of Accession, how, in the c^se of Kashmir, Nehru was
persuaded to forego a visit in favour of Gandhi and the Maharaja,
having dismissed his Dewan, decided to defer a decision on accession,
and finally how the question of Hyderabad remained unresolved when
paramountcy lapsed on 15 August.
The reader will find an outline narrative of these and other key
events in the Viceroy’s weekly Personal Reports. The last Report, dated
16 August, includes a vivid account of the tumultuous scenes which
accompanied the Independence Day celebrations in Delhi, an occasion
which moved the Viceroy to write that 15 August had turned out to be
‘the most remarkable and inspiring day of my life’.
For a list of the Volumes already published see back . £70 net
V
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
1942-7
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Midnight 14-15 August 1947. Pandit Nehru addressing the Indian Constituent Assembly. Document 489, para. 61.
CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN BRITAIN AND INDIA
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
1942-7
Volume XII The Mountbatten Viceroyalty
Princes, Partition and Independence
8 July — 15 August 1947
Editor-in-Chiej
NICHOLAS MANSERGH, Litt.D., F.B.A.
Fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge
Editor
PENDEREL MOON, M. A.
Assisted by
DAVID M. BLAKE, M.A., M.Litt. and STEPHEN R. ASHTON, B.A., Ph.D.
LONDON
HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE
© Crown Copyright 1983
f First published 1983
CANCELLED
ISBN 011 580087 5*
Printed in England for Her Majesty’s Stationery Office
by Eyre & Spottiswoode Ltd, Thanet Press, Margate, Kent
CONTENTS
Foreword Page vii
Introduction to Volume XII xi
Abbreviations xxxiii
Principal Holders of Office xxxv
Chronological Table of Principal Events xxxix
Summary of Documents xli
Documents i
Glossary 784
Appendix I Supplementary Documentation 787
Appendix II Errata et Corrigenda 808
Index of Persons 813
Index of Subjects 838
ILLUSTRATIONS
Frontispiece
Midnight 14-15 August 1947. Pandit Nehru addressing the Indian Constituent
Assembly. Document 489, para. 61. ( Nehru Memorial Museum and Library )
Between pages 330 and 331
Lord Mountbatten as Crown Representative addressing a Conference of Rulers
and Representatives of Indian States, 25 July 1947. Document 234. (Press
Secretary to the President of India )
Mr Jinnah and Lord Mountbatten leaving the Pakistan Constituent Assembly,
Karachi, 14 August 1947. Document 489, para. 57. ( Trustees of the Broadlands
Archives Settlement)
MAPS
At end oj volume
India before Partition
Partition Boundaries in the Punjab
Partition Boundaries in Bengal and Assam
Foreword
On 9 March 1966 the Prune Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, announced in the
House of Commons that the closed period for official records was to be reduced
from fifty to thirty years. He stated that the Government also proposed that
the range of Official Histories, which had hitherto been confined to the two
great wars, should be extended to include selected periods or episodes of peace¬
time history and considered that there was scope for extending to other Oversea
Departments the Foreign Office practice of publishing selected documents
relating to external relations. The Prime Minister hoped that both of these
subsidiary proposals, supplementing the reduction in the closed period to
thirty years, would be acceptable in principle to the Opposition parties, who
would be associated with their implementation.1
On 10 August 1966 the Prime Minister announced that a standing inter¬
party group of Privy Counsellors was to be appointed to consider all such
proposals2 and on 8 June 1967 that its members were, for the Government and
to act as Chairman, the Right Hon. Patrick Gordon Walker, Minister without
Portfolio ; for the Official Opposition, the Right Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home ;
and for the Liberal party, Lord Ogmore.3
A project to publish documents from the India Office Records had been
under discussion for some years and on 30 June 1967 the Prime Minister, in
replying to a written question in the House of Commons, announced that the
first of the new series of selected documents to be published was to relate to the
Transfer of Power in India. His statement was as follows:
As I informed the House on the 9th of March 1966, the Government have
decided to extend to other Oversea Departments the Foreign Office practice
of publishing selected documents concerned with our external relations,
subject to inter-party agreement through the Group of Privy Counsellors
whose composition I announced on the 8 th of June. I am happy to inform
the House that the Group have agreed that in view of the great interest now
being shown in historical circles in the last days of British rule in India the
first selection of documents to be published under the new arrangements
should be documents from the India Office records on the Transfer of
Power and the events leading up to it.
The scheme will follow closely the lines of the Foreign Office series of
Documents on British Foreign Policy from 1919 to 1939, and, as in that series,
the editors will be independent historians who will be given unrestricted
access to the records and freedom to select and edit documents for publication.
Professor P. N. S. Mansergh, Smuts Professor of the History of the British
Commonwealth at Cambridge, has expressed willingness to accept appoint-
1 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 725, Written Answers to Questions, cols. 561-3.
2 Ibid., vol. 733, cols. 1706-7. 3 Ibid., vol. 747, col. 1291.
Vlll
FOREWORD
ment as Editor-in-Chief and die scheme will be in full operadon by die end of
die year.4
Mr E. W. R. Lumby was appointed Assistant Editor and fulfilled the duties
of that office until his death on 23 January 1972, by which time the first three
volumes in the Series had been published and the fourth was in an advanced
stage of preparation.
Sir Penderel Moon, O.E.E., sometime Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford,
has served as Editor since September 1972 when Volume IV was about to go
to press and the editing of Volume V to begin.
Mr D. M. Blake, who from the time of his appointment in March 1968,
assisted in the assembly, selection and preparation of documents for publication
resigned in July 1981 to take up appointment as Senior Research Assistant,
European Manuscripts Section in the India Office Library and Records. The
Editors would like to place on record their warm appreciation of Mr Blake’s
many contributions to the work of the Historical Section, which included the
preliminary selection of documents for inclusion in this as in earlier volumes,
in the thirteen years in which he was a member of it.
Dr S. R. Ashton joined the Historical Section in March, 1981, and in respect
of this last volume in the series, has taken over responsibilities earlier discharged
by Mr Blake or Dr Carter. The Editors would like to place on record their
indebtedness to him.
The Editors have pleasure in thanking Miss L. Atkin and Mrs C. F. Catlow
who have done the typing necessary for the production of the Volume.
The series covers the period 1 January 1942 to 15 August 1947. The subtitles
and dates of publication of earlier volumes are as follows :
Volume I
Volume II
Volume III
Volume IV
Volume V
Volume VI
Volume VII
Volume VIII
The Cripps Mission January- April 1942
‘Quit India’ 30 April-21 September 1942
Reassertion of authority, Gandhi’s fast and
the succession to the Viceroyalty 21 September
1942-12 June 1943
The Bengal Famine and the New Viceroyalty
15 June 1943-31 August 1944
The Simla Conference: Background and
Proceedings 1 September 1944-28 July 1945
The post-war phase: new moves by the Labour
Government 1 August 1945-22 March 1946
The Cabinet Mission 23 March-29 June 1946
The Interim Government 3 July-i November 1946
(1970)
(i97i)
(i97i)
(i973)
(i975)
(1976)
(i977)
(i979)
FOREWORD
ix
V olume IX The fixing of a time limit 4 November 1946- (1980)
22 March 1947
Volume X The Mountbatten Viceroyalty : Formulation of a (1981)
Plan 22 March-30 May 1947
Volume XI Tha Mountbatten Viceroyalty : Announcement (1982)
And Reception of the 3 June Plan 31 May-7 July 1947
The principles of selection, the arrangement of documents — which is in
chronological order throughout in so far as that has been ascertainable —
together with other details of presentation were explained in the Foreword to
the first Volume (pp. vi-x) with some further comments on particular points
added in the Foreword to Volume III (pp. viii-xii). There is no need, therefore,
to recapitulate what has been written on these matters here.
Two appendices relating to the Series as a whole have, however, been in¬
cluded in Volume XII. The first, entitled Supplementary Documentation ,
contains documents which, had they been available to the Editors at the time,
would almost certainly have been reproduced at the appropriate places in the
appropriate volumes as indicated in the footnotes appended to them; the title
of the second, Errata et Corrigenda , sufficiently explains its purpose.
Finally it may be worthwhile restating the purpose of the Series and its
scope. The former may be briefly defined. It has been to make available to
scholars in convenient printed form documents relating to the formulation and
execution of policies on the transfer of power from the India Office, the
Cabinet’s India Committee and the Cabinet’s records at the London end, and
from those of successive Viceroys and their advisers in New Delhi. The latter,
the scope of the series, may be thought to require more elaboration. The
phrase, ‘the Transfer of Power and the events leading up to it’ used by the
Prime Minister, Mr (now Sir) Harold Wilson, on 30 June 1967, 5 while re¬
quiring construction by the editors in respect of the point of historical departure
[see Volume I, pp. v-vi] imposed no such responsibility upon them in respect
of a closing date. That was determined with a precision rare in history by the
time of Transfer, midnight on 14-15 August 1947. This is something to which
the editors in this last volume have paid rigorous regard. While for purposes
of clarification or the rounding off of the record of some transactions, a
few footnotes, an annexure [see No. 264] and three documents — the minutes
of the meeting; of Lord Mountbatten with the India and Pakistan leaders on
16 August to receive the awards of the Boundary Commission [No. 487], the
Viceroy’s last weekly letter to the Secretary of State and his last Personal
Report [Nos. 488 and 489] covering the week ending 15 August but dated
1 6 August — have been added, the editors have otherwise observed the
t> 1
4 Pari Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 749, Written Answers to Questions, cols. 147-8.
5 See above, note 4.
X
FOREWORD
limitation in time implicit in their brief. The documentary narrative which
opens with a Governor’s report dated i January 1942 on heightened Indian
anticipation of internal political developments following upon the Japanese
entry into the war [Vol. I, No. 1], accordingly ends with the last Viceroy’s
account of the tumultuous scenes that ushered in the day of transfer. With that,
and after fifteen years, the task which the Prime Minister assigned to the Editors,
and those who have assisted them, is fulfilled.
N. MANSERGH
Historical Section
Lidia Office Records
June 1982
Introduction to Volume XII
The concluding volume in the Series runs from 8 July to the midnight hour
on 14-15 August, 1947 and the reader will find what the Secretary of State
described [No. 402] as an ‘immensely valuable’, ‘enthrallingly interesting’
outline narrative of events in the Viceroy’s weekly Personal Reports [Nos. 65,
162, 328, 302, 385 and 489].
At the outset of the period an early transfer of power on the basis of dominion
status and partition, as outlined in the 3 June Plan [see Vol. XI, Nos. 23 and 39],
had been accepted, or acquiesced in, by the principal Indian parties and leaders
(Gandhi’s attitude, however, remaining equivocal) [Vol. XI, Nos. 24, 27, 35,
36 and 38] : at its close, power was duly transferred on the appointed day into
Indian and Pakistani hands. In the intervening weeks many things needed to be
done to prepare not merely for transference but for transference with all the
complications of partition of territory and division of resources, while coin¬
cidentally government at the centre and in the provinces, at a time of heighten¬
ing tension in the areas likely to be most closely affected, had to be carried on.
Of basic importance on the longer term were the passing of the necessary
legislation for transfer of power at Westminster, matters related to it and the
Report of the Boundary Commission (not published till 16 August); on the
middle ternr the restructuring of government at the centre, in the provinces,
the Punjab and Bengal, that were to be divided and possibly also in the North-
West Frontier Province, whose future allegiance still remained to be deter¬
mined by referendum; while looming very large on the near horizon were
grave decisions on the provision to be made for the maintenance of law and
order at a time when the armed forces were being divided and British troops
about to be withdrawn.
Before indicating the nature of the documentation on these and other topics
arising directly or indirectly from the 3 June Plan, mention should be made of
another matter of importance that lay outside its scope, namely the future
relationship of the Princely States with the successor dominions on the lapse
of paramountcy on 1 5 August. Hitherto this was something that had remained
on the perimeter of discussion, the Viceroy noting on n July: ‘I must freely
admit that I have not been able to grip this States problem before’ [No. 65,
para. 34]. Now, with the imminence of transfer, it moved towards the centre
of the stage and, as will be later elaborated, up to one fifth of the documenta¬
tion in this volume bears upon it.
The draft Indian Independence Bill, with the amendments made as a result
of the comments submitted by the Indian leaders, was reprinted in Volume XI
[No. 428]. There were further exchanges of view on a proposal by Sir Benegal
Ran, who entertained apprehensions more especially about the position
of the petty States, for the amendment of the proviso to section 7(i)(b) of
Xll
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
the Bill relating to the powers of the States on the lapse of paramountcy,
as well as one from the Congress pressing for a widening of the scope of the
proviso by the inclusion of matters not already therein. The Viceroy, however,
after discussion at his Fifty Fifth Staff Meeting on 9 July, at which Pandit Nehru
indicated Congress party views, concluded that the arguments against
amendment at that stage were ‘overriding’— ‘morally indefensible’ and
‘politically inexpedient’ were the terms used by the Political Adviser as repeated
in the Viceroy’s telegram to the Secretary of State [Nos. 30 and 37, Item 2; for
background see Vol. XI, Nos. 513, 559, 560 and, in this volume, No. 9]. The
Secretary of State indicated his agreement with the Viceroy on 15 July
No. 123], while on 17 July the Prime Minister wrote to Nehru saying that he
lad discussed the suggested amendment to the clause in the Bill about the States
with Krishna Menon, news of whose appointment as Fligh Commissioner in
London [No. 74] he welcomed, but ‘with the best of good will could not
accept what was proposed’ [No. 152]. There was complaint from another
quarter, that of the Nizam of Flyderabad who, recalling that he had at no time
been consulted about Clause 7, registered a protest at the proposed unilateral
repudiation of Flyderabad’ s treaties with the Crown [No. 33; see also No. 39
for a proposal by the Secretary of State that the Prime Minister should make a
statement on the position of the Princes].
It was accepted that there was need for a clarifying statement in respect of
another provision of the bill. Members of Parliament, in the Prime Minister’s
opinion as expressed in Cabinet on 8 July, would assume from the terms of
section 5 that at the outset the new Dominions would share a common
Governor-General. Since this was not to be the case [see Vol. XI, pp. xxix-xxx
and No. 564] explanations would be needed, Lord Mountbatten furthermore
being ‘most anxious’ that the position should be made known so that he would
not be accused of partiality if he accepted the Congress invitation and so served
as Governor-General of India alone [No. 10; for Ismay’s account of his meeting
with the Prime Minister and members of the India Committee, see No. 14].
On 8 July the Prime Minister, who had already had consultations with Opposi¬
tion leaders and received a message encouraging acceptance from Churchill for
Mountbatten [No. 26], sent a personal telegram to the Viceroy saying that he
understood ‘very fully’ his (the Viceroy’s) feelings, that ‘obviously’ it would
have been ‘much better if you had held both offices’ but in the situation as it was
asking him ‘most earnestly’ to accept the Governor-Generalship of India as
he (Attlee) believed ‘this to be essential if the transition is to go through
smoothly’ [No. 27; see also No. 31 reporting the King’s conviction that
Mountbatten should serve]. There followed the text of the relevant passage in
the Prime Minister’s impending Statement to the House [No. 28]. The follow¬
ing day, 9 July, the Viceroy told his Staff Meeting that taking into account the
messages he had received from the King, the Prime Minister and the leader of
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
Xlll
the Opposition he had finally, though with continuing unease, decided to
accept the Governor-Generalship of India alone [No. 37, Item 1 ; see also No. 35
for his letter to Cripps]. This was duly conveyed to the Prime Minister with an
expression of gratitude for all the thought the King, the Prime Minister, the
Cabinet and the Opposition had given to the question [No. 42]. The Prime
Minister replied with a telegram in which he said ‘we are all delighted’ [No. 48]
and in a later letter he remarked: ‘We are all very grateful to you for carrying
on for this next stage. I am very conscious I put you in to bat on a very sticky
wicket . . . few, if any, could have pulled the game round as you have’
[No. 153].
The Indian Independence Bill received the Royal Assent on 18 July, two days
ahead of time, as Krishna Menon noted in his letter to the Viceroy [No. 167],
and with both Secretary of State and Prime Minister paying tribute to the
co-operative attitude of the Opposition in making this possible [Nos. 153, 166,
para. 15 and, for Mountbatten’s reaction, see No. 237]. The text of the Act is
reprinted in No. 164 and the Royal Assent reported in No. 165.
The passing of the Act and the determining of the date thereof had a bearing
upon government at the Centre. The Congress had already strongly urged that
the Interim Government should be forthwith restructured, preferably on the
‘Bengal model’ [see Vol. XI, pp. xxiii-xxiv and Nos. 354, 367, Case No. P.C.
1/1/47, 409, 410], a course to which the League was vehemently opposed on the
dual ground that it would be ‘humiliating’ for them as well as legally un¬
tenable, contending per contra that the Interim government should remain in
existence till the time of the transfer ‘a few weeks hence’ [see Vol. XI, pp.
xxiii-xxiv and ibid., Nos. 367, Case No. P.C. 1/1/47 and 506, paras. 9 and 10].
The Viceroy, confronted by Congress-League differences which, he later re¬
marked, made the reconstitution of the Interim Cabinet ‘my worst headache
to date’ [No. 162, para. 10], accepted that ‘the later I could put this [reconstitu¬
tion] off the easier for Jinnah but the worse for Nehru’ and concluded that it
could be deferred but not beyond the date of the enactment of the Indian
Independence Bill [No. 8].
Reconstitution of the Interim Government required the resignations of
existing members and on 4 July the Viceroy had asked for them [Vol. XI,
No. 493, Case No. 171/33/47]. By 8 July he had received those of the Congress
members : from the League, some of whose members were away because of the
referenda in the North-West Frontier Province and Sylhet, only an enquiry as
to the nature of the new proposals [Nos. 8, 12, Item 3, and 21]. There followed
a rather difficult interview’ with Jinnah that evening (8 July), the Viceroy
reporting Jinnah as having said that ‘all League Members of Cabinet are
extremely bitter at this deliberate humiliation being inflicted on them ... by
the Congress’ and ‘are considering refusing to resign in order to force me to
dismiss them’ but that they had not yet decided their courses of action [No. 24;
1
XIV
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
see also No. 21]. On 9-10 July the Viceroy, sensitive to his own position should
he, the Governor-General designate of the new India, be forced to dismiss the
League members and redistribute their portfolios to Congressmen, instructed
his staff to look into ways in which two completely separate governments
might hold office, each for the areas to come under its future jurisdiction, for
the three weeks remaining before 15 August [Nos. 32 and 51]. Patel, who had
asked that ‘the Muslim officials in the government of India should be got rid
of as soon as possible’, was reported as not unfavourable to such a solution
[Nos. 53 and 63], while Krishna Menon sent a note on how it might
work [No. 54 and its note 1]. On 11 July the Viceroy conveyed to Pandit
Nehru and Patel his intention of proceeding with reconstitution on this
basis, ie with two groups of ministers representing the two successor govern¬
ments, each holding separate portfolios for their future jurisdictional areas.
Were both parties to agree ‘we shall’, the Viceroy reported the same day, ‘have
got over by far the most difficult hurdle we have had to jump so far’ [Nos. 63,
65, para. 18 and 76, Item 1 for Nehru’s and Patel’s reactions]. The following day
he discussed the proposed reconstitution, which would avoid the need for
League resignations, with Jinnah who, however, ‘did not appear particularly
grateful’ [No. 82].
The purposes to be served by reconstitution were indicated at a Staff Meeting
on the morning of 14 July [No. 99] and the draft of an Order in Council
authorising it was laid before a further Staff Meeting that evening [No. 108,
Item 1]. The Order provided formally for the immediate constitution of a
Provisional Government for each of the new dominions by which the Viceroy
might be advised on matters affecting each of them. On 15 July the Viceroy
made known to Jinnah and Liaquat his intention of proceeding in this way,
pointing out that he was empowered to do so under clause 9 of the Indian
Independence Bill [No. 112]. The last meeting of the old Interim Government
took place on 16 July, the Viceroy explaining to members that he thought it
proper that each of the new dominions should have its own embryo govern¬
ment immediately on enactment of the Indian Independence Bill [see No. 116
for an explanatory note by the Viceroy, together with the text of the draft
Order and the draft communique to be issued with it; No. 127 for the discussion
(on 16 July) at the Indian Cabinet; No. 147 for the reactions and detailed
comments of the Secretary of State; No. 155 for the text of the communique
as issued and No. 170 for that of the Executive Council (Transitional Provisions)
Order, 1947].
On 19 July Nehru, after consultation with his colleagues, conveyed to the
Viceroy recommendations, described as provisional, for the members of the
Congress-India part of the reconstituted government [No. 172] and Liaquat
Ali Khan duly confirmed League nominations for portfolios in the provisional
Government of Pakistan [No. 173].
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
XV
The volume contains substantial documentation on problems of law and
order, principally relating to the Punjab, which the Viceroy wrote of on n
July as a ‘most unsettled’ province, though there had been an ‘unexpected’
outbreak of disorder in Calcutta in early July [No. 65, paras. 2 and 3]. The
Governor of Bengal, who had taken certain precautionary measures, none¬
theless remained hopeful that he would be able to jolly along’ with his ‘odd
ministry’ until 15 August [No. 65, paras. 5-7]. On 16 July the Viceroy, having
received enquiries from Nehru, asked for an appreciation of the situation in the
province bearing in mind Congress fears lest the League might wreck Calcutta
before handing the city over to the dominion of India [No. 138]. The
Governor sent a cautiously reassuring reply on 18 July [No. 161], the substance
of which was conveyed to Nehru on 21 July [No. 193]. The Viceroy visited
Calcutta on 30-31 July chiefly to discuss matters before the Bengal Separation
Committee which, in Abell’s opinion, had started work ‘amicably and well’
[No. 16] but had since got into difficulties [No. 203, para. 4]. He also had con¬
sultations with the Premier, H.S. Suhrawardy, P.C. Ghosh (representing the
embryonic government of West Bengal) and Army and District Commanders
on security arrangements in the course of which reassurances were given in
particular about their ability to protect Calcutta [Nos. 287, 289, 290 and 291;
see also No. 364].
The situation in the Punjab, which continued under Governor’s rule, despite
intermittent proposals for the formation of a Ministry which the Governor
deemed too risky in the circumstances to adopt, gave rise to altogether more
disturbing reports, one factor constantly underlined being the possibly violent
reactions of the Sikhs as the seemingly inevitable division of their homeland
drew nearer. On 8 July Reuter’s Indian Service carried reports of the Sikhs’
‘protest day of prayer’ with congregations approving a resolution that any
‘partition that did not secure the integrity and solidarity of the Sikhs would be
unacceptable’ and with Baldev Singh saying — though he later disputed this
without, however, carrying conviction to the Viceroy [No. 65, para 9] — that
the Sikhs should be prepared to make ‘all sacrifices’ if ‘the verdict of the
Boundary Commission went against them’ [No. 17]. On 10 July the Governor
sent the Viceroy an account of a conversation with Giani Kartar Singh who
was ‘extremely frank about the intentions of the Sikhs . . . what he said con¬
firms my view that they mean to make trouble if the decision based on the
Boundary Commission’s Report is not to their liking’, and he concluded that
with ‘everyone behaving as though they had just been at war and were going
to have a new war within a few weeks’ there was little prospect of the only
solution that would give the two new provinces a peaceful start, namely ‘a
settlement out of court’ [No. 56; see also No. 67 for further expressions of
Sikh views].
On 12 July Sir George Abell, after a long talk with the Governor, reported
XVI
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
on the situation in the Punjab remarking, inter alia , 'there is no doubt the Sikhs
are in a dangerous mood’. With regard to other matters he expressed surprise
at the extent the representatives of the successor authorities were ‘already
consulted and allowed to have their way about all matters other than law and
order’, felt that partition work, though proceeding slowly, was more advanced
than in Bengal, and remained convinced that there should be no attempt to
form a Ministry [No. 8 1] . An appreciation by the Governor was attached.
On 13 July the Governor, in his capacity as Chairman of the Punjab Partition
Committee, submitted memoranda prepared by the representatives of West
and East Punjab on matters on which they had been unable to agree, of which
the most important was the question whether the East Punjab Government
should leave Lahore if the Boundary Commission award had not been published
and the notional boundary still prevailed on 15 August, and which they desired
to have laid formally before the Viceroy for decision by the Partition Council
[Nos. 89 and 90]. This was done on 17 July, the Viceroy indicating that he
would shortly visit Lahore to help the Provincial Partition Committee on how
best to deal with the matters in dispute [No. 148, Case No. P.C. 56/6/47].
At its meeting the Central Partition Council also had before it a plan prepared
by the Commander-in-Chief at the request of the Viceroy [No. 102; see No. 88
for a record of a discussion between Nehru and General Sir A. Smith] to deal
with possible clashes or disturbances along the boundaries of the two Dominions
after 15 August. The plan envisaged that a Joint Defence Council would have
the authority of both the Indian and Pakistan governments to declare any
affected districts ‘disturbed areas’ and, when this had been done, the Supreme
Commander on the request of the Joint Defence Council would appoint a
British Commander vested with military control and supplied with a suffi¬
ciency of forces to restore order. Similar arrangements were proposed for the
period before 15 August and to apply in Bengal, where very serious trouble
was not anticipated apart possibly from Calcutta, as well as in the Punjab
[No. 102]. The Partition Council approved these recommendations and agreed
that Major General Rees be appointed as Joint Commander on behalf of both
dominions controlling all forces in such disturbed areas and that the Joint
Defence Council should be constituted so as to meet in a preliminary way by
the first week of August [No. 148, Case No. P.C. 47/6/47 — in fact the Council
met for the first timeon 26 July and again on 29 July, see below pp. xvii and xxv] .
The Viceroy deemed it essential that the two Dominions should make it clear
they took full responsibility for the association of British officers in this task
and said he would have a draft statement prepared on this point and also giving
assurances to minorities [No. 148; see also Nos. 283 and 339].
The Viceroy’s visit to Lahore took place on 20 July and at a meeting with the
Punjab Partition Committee it was agreed in respect of unresolved questions
that the Government of East Punjab should move all unessential personnal to
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
XVII
Simla by io August with the remnant to follow by midnight on 14-15 August,
were Lahore to be placed in West Punjab. On his return to Delhi the Viceroy
further reported to the Partition Council on 22 July that all the members of the
Committee had declared their parties would accept and abide by the decision of
the Boundary Commission and had agreed to issue and sign a statement
reassuring minorities and warning against disturbances [No. 228, paras. 6-14;
but see Nos. 272, 292, end., 302, para. 10, 305 and 306 for Sikh failure to do so].
The Council itself approved the draft of a Statement declaring the determination
of the new dominion governments to establish peaceful conditions and re¬
affirming earlier assurances of Congress and League on fair and equitable
treatment of minorities after transfer. To safeguard peace in the Punjab during
the period of change-over, the members of the Council confirmed their
agreement to the setting up of a special military command from 1 August to
cover listed civil districts in the Punjab under the command of Major-General
Rees who after 15 August would be responsible through the Supreme Com¬
mander and the Joint Defence Council to the two Governments. Both
Governments pledged themselves in advance, to accept the Boundary Com¬
mission’s awards ‘whatever these may be’ [Nos. 205, Case Nos. P.C. 74/8/47
and 81/8/47 and 224].
Despite military provision and the strongly worded declaration, information
from the Punjab was no more reassuring. The Governor, concerned at news of
a forthcoming Diwan at one of the Sikh shrines, Nankana Sahib (in fact it
‘fizzled out’, No. 272), advised Swaran Singh that the Sikhs should dismiss from
their minds any idea of large territorial gains [No. 238]. But on 27 July in¬
formation was received of Sikh intentions of starting trouble on a big scale if
Nankana Sahib were not included in East Punjab, together with reports of
Muslim counter-preparations and of an attempt to subvert troops, all of which
were referred to the Provisional Joint Defence Council on 29 July. In the mean¬
time the Governor had telegraphed on 27 July that the general situation was
worsening and had followed this up with a detailed report in the course of
which he commented that ‘feeling in Lahore is perhaps worse than it has ever
been’ [Nos. 250, 254, 276, Case No. J.D.C. 11/2/47 and 292]. On 30 July the
Viceroy, in the light of the Provisional Joint Defence Council discussion on
29 July, informed the Governor that he had been asked to instruct him to declare
districts likely to be affected on either side of the Boundary ‘disturbed areas’
for the period 1 to 15 August, 1 August being the day on which the Boundary
Force was to come into being [Nos. 286 and 299]. ‘There is going to be trouble
with the Sikhs’ the Governor’s Secretary telephoned that day (1 August),
adding ‘when and how bad the Governor cannot yet say [No. 306]. On 4
August Nehru made certain suggestions which the Viceroy passed on to the
Governor and wrote of the apprehension with which, in the ‘very tense’
atmosphere in Lahore, 15 August was awaited [No. 331; for the Governor’s
XV111
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
rejoinder endorsed by the Viceroy, see No. 34]. The same day the Governor
sent to the Viceroy a detailed memorandum, for which the Viceroy had asked
on 20 July, refuting the criticisms [see eg Vol. XI, Nos. 218 and 338, Case No.
1 5 5/32/47] which had been levelled at the Punjab government for their
handling of the disturbances in the Province in 1947 [No. 337; for the Viceroy’s
observations, see No. 408].
A fresh issue was opened for decision with the Governor’s despatch of a
cryptic message to the Viceroy on 4 August [No. 338] followed on 5 August
by a meeting at which Jinnah, Liaquat and Patel were present together with a
Police Officer from the Punjab who conveyed information allegedly impli¬
cating Tara Singh in terrorist activities. The Viceroy with the concurrence of
those present concluded that he should recommend to the Governor of the
Punjab the arrest of Master Tara Singh and other ringleaders about the time of
the Boundary Commission’s Award [Nos. 345, 346, 359, para. 2 and 361].
Jinnah, who favoured immediate action, agreed by way of compromise
[No. 379]. The recommendation was not acted upon for reasons which were
set out in a letter of 9 August from the Governor to the Viceroy [No. 403].
With the situation ‘most serious’ the Governor, who was satisfied ‘everything
possible is being done with the resources available’, asked for reinforcements of
a specific nature for the Punjab Boundary Force to which the Viceroy re¬
sponded helpfully [Nos. 382 and 404].
The outbreak of serious disorders on 12 August in Lahore where ‘feeling is
now unbelievably bad’ led the Governor to report bleakly that the strength of
the Boundary Force is ‘not adequate to present and future tasks’. He further
reported that police in Lahore and Amritsar were now unreliable and that the
railways would not be safe unless the army could take over ‘war Department’
lines [Nos. 437 and 448]. On the following two days he sent reports of attacks
on two trains and of a deteriorating and most unsatisfactory situation [Nos.
466 and 484]. Finally on 14 August Field Marshal Auchinleck visited Lahore
and reported on the situation in the Punjab Boundary Force area to the Joint
Defence Council [No. 486].
In the North-W est Frontier Province threats to law and order, discounted by
the Viceroy [No. 228, para. 5] were associated by the Congress with the holding
of the referendum to determine the future allegiance of the Province [for
background, see Vol. XI, pp. xxi-xxii and documents referred to therein].
According to the 3 June Plan the choice was two-fold — the participation of the
Province in the existing Indian or in the contemplated Pakistani Constituent
Assembly. Renewed representations made to the Governor by Abdul Ghaffar
Khan and Dr Khan Sahib, the premier, for the addition of a third option,
namely an autonomous Pathan State, [see Voll XI, p. xxii and, in this volume,
No. 130] were not taken up by the Viceroy and the Redshirt intention to
abstain from voting remained. Expressions of Afghan interest were consistently
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
XIX
discountenanced [Nos. 70, 132, 136, 142; also 177, 321 and 348 for an account
of the Foreign Secretary’s conversation with the Afghan Prime Minister]. In
anticipation of the outcome of the referendum the Acting-Governor outlined
on 9 July in the light of discussions with party leaders, the courses likely to be
open to him after the outcome was known. Given Dr Khan Sahib’s ‘emphatic’
view that there could be no question of a coalition — ‘his party could never
work with the Muslim League’ — and so allow ‘a correct constitutional solution’,
the Acting-Governor indicated he would seek the Viceroy’s permission to
dismiss the Ministry and govern under Section 93 [No. 45]. The Viceroy,
however, was clear that in this matter he should act on the advice of the
embryo government of Pakistan [No. 76, Item 5]. On 12 July he sounded
out Jinnah, who favoured dismissal of the Ministry and Section 93, the
Viceroy himself being ‘dead against’ Section 93 [No. 82]. In replying to
the Acting-Governor the Viceroy further noted that ‘the whole context’
had been altered by the fact that Jinnah would be Governor-General of
Pakistan [No. 101].
The result of the referendum, with members of Congress abstaining, was 289,
244 votes for Pakistan, 2,874 for India, the votes for Pakistan being 50.49 per
cent of the total electorate [No. 187]. The Viceroy recorded his satisfaction
that in fact there had been no violence and also that, with over half the electorate
in favour of Pakistan, the result was clear cut [No. 228, paras, 2-4]. On 20 July
the Acting-Governor sought permission, if Ministers refused to resign, to
dismiss them and himself to assume power under Section 93 [No. 188]. The
Viceroy, however, adhered to his decision to seek the advice of the Pakistan
Executive Council and did so on 1 August [No. 301]. The Viceroy was invited
by the Council either to ask the existing ministry to resign and to call on the
leader of the Muslim League to form a new Ministry or to approve the Province
being placed under Section 93. The Viceroy responded by saying that which¬
ever course he adopted he would first have to satisfy himself as to its constitu¬
tionality and, on 5 August, he sought advice from the Secretary of State
[No. 342; see also Nos. 363, 374 and 381]. On 8 August the Secretary of State
replied casting doubt on the constitutionality (as distinct from the legality) of
either course and favoured leaving the problem to be resolved after 15 August
[No. 387]. There the new Governor, Sir George Cunningham, taking office
on 13 August, persuaded Jinnah to let the matter rest [Nos. 481 with end. and
489, para. 28].
A referendum was also held in Sylhet on the question of joining East Bengal
or remaining in Assam, the result of which showed a majority of 55,578 in
favour of the former [No. 92]. There were allegations of irregularities made to
Nehru and passed on by him to the Viceroy and the Governor into which the
Governor made enquiry, Nehru being satisfied as a result that such as they
were, they were not on a scale to have affected the result [No. 94, 95, 98 and
XX
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
107]. The Viceroy had also received complaints of interference from Jinnah
[No. 98].
As had already been mentioned the future relationship of the Princely
States to the new dominions became a major preoccupation of the Viceroy and
the party leaders in the last weeks before transfer. The States, as may be recalled,
[for background see Vol. XI, pp. xxvii and xxviii] lay outside the scope of the
3 June Plan, but the Cabinet Mission’s memorandum of 12 May, 1946, was,
as the Viceroy later noted, specifically quoted in the Statement and publicly
accepted by both parties [Vol. VII, No. 262 and, in this volume, No. 65, para.
26] while members of the States Negotiating Committee were told by the
Viceroy that evening, ie of 3 June, that paramountcy would lapse on transfer
thereby rendering negotiations with the new dominions possible ‘on a basis
of complete freedom’ [Vol. XI, No. 43]. At a meeting on 13 June with the
Indian leaders it was agreed that a new ‘States Department’ should be set up to
deal with matters arising and of common concern [Vol. XI, Nos. 175, Item I
and 197]. This was approved by the Indian Cabinet on 25 June [Vol. XI, No.
338, Case No. 152/32/47] with Patel being appointed as Member in charge,
V.P. Menon as Secretary and Akhtar Hussain as ‘Pakistan’ Deputy Secretary
[No. 65, para, 27]. On 9 July it was further agreed that Sardar Nishtar should
have access to the Secretary of the States Department [No. 37, Item 2], an
arrangement which laid the groundwork for the Pakistan States Department,
the establishment of which would be facilitated, as the Viceroy advised
Nishtar on 17 July, by the splitting up of the government [No. 150; see also
No. 15 1 for a note by V.P. Menon on the States with which Pakistan was
concerned and in which it was noted that Kalat, a frontier state, ‘ought really
to go into Pakistan’ while Kashmir represented ‘some difficulty’].
The British Government welcomed the setting up of the States Department
because, as the Secretary of State put it on 9 July in the draft of a statement to
be made by the Prime Minister when introducing the Indian Independence
Bill in the House of Commons, it was H.M.G.’s hope that all States would ‘find
their appropriate place within one or other of the new Dominions within
the British Commonwealth’ and its belief that it would be retrograde and
contrary to the interests of the two successor Dominions, as of the States
themselves, were they to become islands cut off from India of which they were
a geographical part. At the same time, so the Secretary of State suggested in his
draft, the Prime Minister might remind the House of the terms of the Cabinet
Mission’s memorandum of 12 May 1946 to the effect that since H.M.G. would
not and could not in any circumstances transfer paramountcy to an Indian
government, it would be necessary to terminate paramountcy and the
suzerainty of the Crown over the Indian States and might further outline the
consequent international position of non-acceding States after 15 August
[No. 39]. V.P. Menon, however, was much disturbed by the possibility of the
. u
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
XXI
Prime Minister making any such statement. ‘The present plan to which we are
working’, he wrote ‘is that at the forthcoming conference of States representa¬
tives the first proposal which we intend to make is that the States should join
immediately on three subjects, namely External Affairs, Defence and Com¬
munications’. Several states had already done so while important negotiations
were pending with the major states of Hyderabad, Mysore and Travancore.
Even ‘an inkling’, such as the Secretary of State’s draft might afford, thatH.M.G.
might accord independent recognition would make ‘infinitely more difficult’
all attempts to bring the States and the new Dominions together and would be
regarded in India as an attempt to retain British influence over the States
[No. i]. On 8 July, Menon received reassurance that the paragraphs concerning
the international position of the States would not be included in the Commons
Statement [No. 23; see also No. 39]. On 12 July the Viceroy advised the
Secretary of State that any attempt by Parliament to define the international
position of non-acceding States would be premature [No. 85].
At this juncture there were expressions of concern from Congress about
the future of the States, with Gandhi urging the Viceroy to do everything in his
power to ensure that the British did not leave a legacy of Balkanisation [No. 43 ]
and Baldev Singh raising the problem of the supply of arms to the States
[No. 66]. Upon enquiry from Nehru and Patel as to ‘what he was going to do
to help India in connection with her most pressing difficulty — relations with the
States’, the Viceroy replied that he would now make the cause of agreement
his own, the more so as the Indian leaders had stated that the States need only
join the Centre on the three main central subjects listed in the Cabinet Mission
Plan [Nos. 37, Item 2 and 65, paras. 29 and 30]. At the invitation of the
Congress leaders he assumed responsibility for the conduct of negotiations
with the Princes in the first instance, as he made clear to Sir Walter Monckton,
the Nizam’s adviser, on 8 July and also to Gandhi [Nos. 11, 37, Item 2 and 43].
States were informed on 8 July that accession on the three subjects would be
on the Agenda for the meeting of Rulers and their Representatives to be held
later in the month, 25 July being the date subsequently determined [No. 2;
see also No. 75]. In the period between the Viceroy was active in seeking to
persuade the rulers of States individually to consider the action they should take
in their States’ and their own individual interests.
In conference with the representatives of Hyderabad on 11 July, the Viceroy
agreed that there was ‘no shadow of doubt that the legal position was that the
States would be absolutely free after 15 August’, but on behalf of H.M.G. he
ruled out the possibility on practical and political grounds of Dominion
Status for Hyderabad, as had been sought, and urged, per contra , acceptance
by Hyderabad of adherence on the three central subjects. While Sir Walter
Monckton and the Nawab of Chhatari emphasised that the Nizam would have
great difficulty in taking any course likely ‘to compromise his independent
XXII
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
sovereignty’ the Viceroy prophesied disastrous results in five or ten years if his
advice were not taken [No. 61]. On 13 July Jinnah, with special reference to
Kashmir, reiterated his opinion that the Indian States were free to join either
Constituent Assembly or to remain independent [No. 87]. On the same day the
Dewan of Travancore, Sir C.P. Ramaswami Aiyer, to some of whose earlier
observations Nehru had reacted sharply [No. 6], conveyed a message to the
State Department to the effect that the problems of the State being special
and individual, there could be no question of any accession to either dominion
and no point in its representatives participating in the meeting called for
2 5 July [No. 93 ; see also the earlier and less uncompromising letter of 9 July,
No. 58, and V.P. Menon’s reply, No. 104].
The Secretary of State circulated a memorandum to members of the India
and Burma Committee on 14 July documenting the Travancore situation
[No. 106] while on the passage of the Indian Independence Bill through both
Houses the Dewan so interpreted what was happening as to conclude that
'in law as well as in fact Travancore will become an independent country’ from
1 5 August but would do its utmost to agree on functional cooperation over a
wide range of practical matters with India [No. 146]. V.P. Menon indicated in
a letter of 20 July to Abell his views on how the arguments for accession might
best be deployed by the Viceroy [No. 185], while Sir C.P. Ramaswami Aiyer’s
concern with economic factors emerged in the record of an interview with the
British Deputy High Commissioner [No. 192; see also No. 202 for comments
by Corfield], There is a lively account of the Viceroy’s talk with the Dewan on
21 July in the Viceroy’s Personal Report dated 25 July [No. 228, paras. 16-19].
On 22 July the Viceroy further wrote to the Maharaja setting out the case for
accession [No. 203]. The terms were those he felt in a position to offer to the
States generally, namely accession on the three central subjects but ‘without any
interference in internal autonomy or jurisdiction or any financial implications’
which seemed to him most attractive by comparison with earlier prospects.
Furthermore he felt ‘positive’ that if he could bring in ‘a basket-full of states
before 15 August Congress will pay whatever price I insist on for the basket’
[No. 228, paras. 24 and 25].
The Conference of Rulers and Representatives of Indian States in the
Chamber of Princes on 25 July enabled the Viceroy to bring home to his
audience the imminence of change and the need for decision — though he
complained that the representatives of the smaller States scarcely seemed to
grasp what he was saying [Nos. 234 and 302, para. 44]. The Viceroy explained
that with the passage of the Indian Independence Act, the States were released
from all their obligations to the Crown and proceeded to emphasise that the
link that subsisted in the British period, with Viceroy and Crown Representa¬
tive one and the same person, was to be broken. If nothing were to be put in its
place ‘only chaos can result’ and, with chaos, the States would suffer first. To
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
XX111
avert this States’ departments had been set up within the two successor govern¬
ments under Sardar Patel and Sardar Abdur Nishtar respectively. They would
negotiate with the Princes about the future with this difference in procedure,
that while Pakistan was prepared to negotiate with each State individually —
indeed it seems Jinnah insisted on this [see No. 228, para. 26] — India, because of
the large number involved, would do so only on a general basis of signature of
the draft Instrument of Accession [for text in final form, see No. 313, Enclosure
1] which was circulated to the Rulers. The essence of the transaction was the
surrender by the States to the Central Government concerned of three subjects
— Defence, External Affairs and Communications — with an explicit provision
that in ‘no other matters has the Central Government any authority to encroach
on the internal autonomy or the sovereignty of the States’. In the Viceroy’s
view this would be a ‘tremendous achievement’ for the States: he urged their
Rulers to accede, reminding them that they could not ‘run away from the
Dominion Government which is your neighbour’ and advising them ‘if you
are prepared to come [in], you must come before 15 August’ No. 234].
On 1 August the Viceroy listed the States that had been seriously holding out
— Travancore, Hyderabad, Dholpur, Indore and Bhopal. The first and in the
Viceroy’s opinion, the one of critical importance, Travancore gave in under
pressure from the States’ People’s movement and after an assault on the Dewan,
the Maharaja conveying his acceptance of the Instrument of Accession per¬
sonally to the Viceroy on 30 July [Nos. 284 and 302, paras. 45-46]. Of the
remainder, Dholpur and Indore may be dealt with together. The Maharaja of
Dholpur, imbued with a deep conviction of the divine right of Kings, received
from the Viceroy an uncompromising response when, in an attempt to main¬
tain his dignity, he suggested a treaty relationship as an alternative to accession
[Nos. 242 and 265]. It was not until the last allotted day, 14 August that he
came and signed the Instrument of Accession [No. 489, para. 50]. The Maharaja
of Indore, who had earlier received a stern rebuke from the Viceroy for his
irresponsibility and discourtesy to the Crown Representative [No. 335],
failed to deliver his Instrument of Accession until 15 August but then back¬
dated his signature to 14 August [No. 489, para. 49]. The Nawab of Bhopal,
the Viceroy’s ‘second best friend’ in India [No. 302, para. 52] disclosed his state
of mind, his thoughts on abdication, his pessimism about the future in a series
of letters and personal talks with the Viceroy [Nos. 160, 201, 239, 297, 302,
para. 52, 325 and 366] all of which and a good deal more caused the Viceroy
to reflect that he supposed he had ‘spent more time on Bhopal’s case than on all
the other States put together’ [No. 385, paras. 7 and 8]. The outcome was not
without its curious interest. On 10 August the Nawab, contemplating abdica¬
tion, asked for an extension of ten days [No. 412] from 15 August which inter
alia would enable him to see what decisions were taken by Hyderabad and
Kashmir [No. 426, note 1]. On 11 August, by which time the Viceroy had
XXIV
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
secured the agreement of the Indian Cabinet to an extension for Hyderabad,
the Viceroy suggested a compromise agreeable to Patel, by which Bhopal
would sign and date an Instrument of Accession by midnight on 14 August
which, however, would not then be delivered to the States Department but be
retained by the Viceroy until 25 August, unless otherwise instructed by
Bhopal [Nos. 435, 482 and 489, paras. 47 and 48]. The Nawab decided further
not to abdicate for the present [No. 482].
Hyderabad and Kashmir remained. The situation within Hyderabad was
described by the Resident on 28 July [No. 264]. On 26 July, in response to the
Viceroy’s invitation to the Nawab of Chhatari to represent Hyderabad on the
States Negotiating Committee, the setting up of which was announced at the
meeting on 25 July [No. 234], the Nawab stated that it would be inappropriate
for him to participate because Hyderabad had not joined the Constituent
Assembly and was ‘not interested’ in the problem of accession [No. 241].
Representatives of Hyderabad did, however, attend the meeting and asked
questions designed to indicate their attitude [No. 240]. On 1 August the Viceroy
wrote that although everybody else appeared to have given up hope of
Hyderabad coming in, he (the Viceroy) still thought Monckton had ‘a sporting
chance’ of managing it [No. 302, para. 47]. There followed a fruitless meeting
on 3 August [No. 329] of which Monckton’s seems to be the only surviving
record. On 8 August the Nizam wrote at length to the Viceroy to make the
position of the State clear and to indicate that he was prepared to contemplate
only a Treaty relationship [No. 376]. On 12 August, after two further
interviews with Monckton [Nos. 420 and 434], the Viceroy, while noting that
he would no longer be Crown Representative, conveyed to the Nizam the
concurrence of the future government of India in his continuing negotiations
for a further period of two months after 15 August in which he hoped
‘we shall be able to reconcile our views’ [No. 440; see also No. 489,
para.51].
On Kashmir, to which State the Viceroy had paid a visit in June [see Vol.
XI, No. 369, para. 30], there is substantial documentation only on the plans
about a visit either by Nehru or by Gandhi to the State. It was finally decided
that Gandhi should go [see Nos. 129, 149, 249, 259, 260, 269, 302, paras. 25-33
where the story is told as seen by the Viceroy, and 385, para. 19]. In his con¬
cluding Report the Viceroy seemingly had no news of Kashmir other than that
the Maharaja had decided to dismiss his Dewan, Pandit Kak, and that he was
now said to be contemplating a referendum provided the Boundary Com¬
mission gave him land communications with India [No. 489, para. 51].
Mention should also be made of the extended negotiations between Pakistan
and Kalat in which the Viceroy played an active part [Nos. 174, 228, para. 15,
263, 303, 317, para. 6, 330, 351, 360, 375, 384, paras. 1-3, 385, para. 2 and 396].
‘It appears’, the Viceroy concluded on 16 August, ‘as if this great problem of the
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
XXV
States has been satisfactorily solved within the last three weeks of British rule’
[No. 489, para. 51].
In London there were misgivings on the part of the Secretary of State and
his advisers on the pressure, especially in respect of the rigid time-table imposed
by the Viceroy upon the Princes which, after consultation with the Prime
Minister, the Secretary of State conveyed to the Viceroy. The latter reacted
sharply: the former withdrew unreservedly [Nos. 262, 275, 307, 340, 383 and
401].
Meanwhile as the day of partition and transfer neared pressure of work
increased and friction became ‘more intense’ though the Viceroy also felt ‘more
than ever convinced that if the date of transfer had been 1 October there would
have been a serious risk of a complete breakdown’ [No. 302, para. 1]. In these
circumstances the instrumentalities devised to effect the necessary change ie the
Partition Council, its Steering Committee and the expert Committees that
worked to it at the Centre [see Vol. XI, pp. xv-xvii for background] had
unusually exacting assignments. In respect of the Provinces some indication
of the task and the difficulties that arose was given in respect of Bengal on the
occasion of the Viceroy’s visit on 30-31 July to help resolve differences in the
Separation Committee [see above p. xv and Nos. 287 and 302, paras. 4-8] and,
in respect of the Punjab, in the Governor’s letters of 13 July already alluded
to [Nos. 89 and 90] to be read perhaps in conjunction with the comment in
the Governor’s last report to the Viceroy to the effect that the Punjab Partition
Committee completed such work as it was able to do by 11 August but the
Committee really agreed about very little and most important questions were
left to arbitration or for the new governments to settle [No. 459, para. 7
On the other hand the Viceroy reported a very successful meeting wit
the Committee on 22 July [Nos. 205, Case No. P.C. 80/8/47 and 228,
paras. 6-13].
The working of the machinery at the Centre where, the Viceroy reported to
the Secretary of State, the Partition Council was meeting three times a week in
mid and late July [Nos. 162, para. 1 and 228, para. 1] was acknowledged to be
very dependent upon the high quality of the Steering Committee composed
of H.M. Patel and Chaudri Mohammad Ah [No. 162, para. 18]. As already
mentioned, it had been agreed that a Joint Defence Council, which upon
transfer would supersede the Partition Council, should be constituted so as to
meet in a preliminary way by the first week of August. In fact it came into
being to meet a felt need during the last week of July [No. 302, para. 1]
though it was not formally constituted by Order until 11 August [No. 425].
On some occasions the meetings were tense and unproductive, the Viceroy
reporting that on 3 1 July to have been ‘the most difficult Joint Defence Council
and Partition Council meeting that we have had so far’ [No. 302, para. 12] ; on
others they went smoothly and profitably — as on 15 July when seven items were
XXVI
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
disposed of in under twenty-five minutes [No. 162, para. 18; see also No. 385,
para. 27].
There remained the constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal and the appointment
of its Chairman on which much was thought likely to depend. The purpose of
the Tribunal was to determine issues on which either the Partition Council
or the provincial partition committees had failed to reach agreement and both
the Secretary of State and Viceroy were anxious to establish it as soon as
possible so as to speed the resolution of disputed issues [Nos. 73 anci 96]. A
first proposal for Chairman was Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a second that of the Chief
Justice, Sir Patrick Spens, but when Radcliffe took over the chairmanship of
the Boundary Commission and Spens was approached, he ruled that the
Chairmanship would be incompatible with the Chief Justiceship of the Federal
Court [cf. Vol. XI, pp. xvii-xviii]. In the end he decided to resign from the
latter and serve in the former capacity [Nos. 65, para. 13 and 148, Case No.
P.C. 55/6/47]. A Hindu and a Muslim judge were appointed to assist him.
The aim and object of the Partition Council was, in the Viceroy’s words, ho
avoid referring matters to the Arbitral Tribunal whenever possible, and when¬
ever a common sense solution could be found’ [No. 287]. By 8 August the
Viceroy reported that no case had so far to be decided by the Tribunal.
The nature of the problems that arose in respect of the division of liabilities
and assets, in so far as that had proceeded by 15 August, may be gathered from
the reports of the provincial partition committees, not least those alluded to in
another context above, and the Central Partition Council. The minutes of the
Viceroy’s Twenty Fourth Miscellaneous Meeting on 30 July add some realistic
detail about the general issues and respective standpoints [No. 287] while
Sardar Patel’s letter and a note by Mr Cooke, both of 6 August [Nos. 354 and
355], bring out the possible consequences of failure to agree in respect of the
division of certain material assets and the sharing of responsibility for the
public debt [see No. 369, Item 4; for subsequent discussion at the Viceroy’s
Staff Meeting on 7 August, the formulation of the Viceroy’s proposals and,
Jinnah’s ‘flat refusal’ to agree to them, see No. 385, paras. 31-38 and ‘midnight
stop press’; for Patel’s exposition of Indian views on 11 August, see No. 423
and, for the Viceroy’s resolution of the issues involved, see No. 489, paras.
30-32].
Of major importance was the division of the armed forces and the associated
questions of the date of the withdrawal of British forces and of the negotiation
of any defence treaty with the new dominions before the 15th August, all of
which were reviewed at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 9 July
with Lord Ismay present [No. 41; see also No. 49]. British Armed Forces, the
Prime Minister stated, would start to be withdrawn on 15 August and their
withdrawal was expected to be completed by the end of the year [No. 50; see
also No. 489, note 53], Mountbatten on 9 July confirming that this would not
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
XXV11
affect the ability of the Indian Army to protect the North-West Frontier
[No. 44]. On 10 July a directive was issued by the Chief of the General Staff to
Regional Commands on the Reconstitution of the Armed Forces [No. 57]. On
11 July Pandit Nehru wrote to the Viceroy and urged upon General Sir A.
Smith more rapid nationalisation of the Forces with Indian Officers promoted
to the highest ranks more quickly than General Smith thought practicable at a
time when the Armed Forces were being divided and reconstituted [Nos. 69
and 88]. The Viceroy with the concurrence of the party leaders issued a
circular notice encouraging British officers to serve, if invited, in the forces of
the new dominions [Nos. 64, 69, 79 and 80; for numbers who volunteered, see
Nos. 385, para. 56 and 489, para. 35].
The Viceroy advised on 15 July that a public announcement should be made
to the effect that British Forces would not be used operationally or be available
to intervene in internal disorder after 15 August and the Secretary of State
concurred [Nos. 124, 169 and 283]. A directive with instructions to this
effect was issued by General Sir Arthur Smith on 29 July [No. 267; see also
No. 276, Case No. J.D.C. 9/2/47]. The division of the Armed Forces provoked
controversy [No. 302, paras. 13-15] and in process of so doing hardened
Congress feeling, notably against Auchinleck [Nos. 247, 270, 302, para. 15
and 385, paras. 44-47; for a note on the position of the Supreme Commander
and his Staff during reconstitution, see No. 304]. The Prime Minister, as Ismay
reported from London, had decided that it would be most untimely to discuss
Britain’s long-term strategic requirements with Indian leaders [No. 49; see
also Nos. 219, 352, Case No. J.D.C. 47/7/47, 385, para. 41, 402, para. 28, 443
and 488, paras. 12 and 13].
The Chairman of the Boundary Commission, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, arrived in
Delhi on 8 July. Two days later he left for visits to Bengal and the Punjab and
his favourable impressions of the other members of the Commission in both
Provinces were reported by the Viceroy [Nos. 65, para. 8 and 162, paras. 4 and
5, while for enquiries by the Governor of the Punjab on supply of information
for the Commission, see Nos. 3, 12, Item 1 and 19]. It was agreed among the
Viceroy’s staff on the day of Radcliffe’s arrival that neither the Viceroy nor
members of his staff should receive any representations about the new Provincial
boundaries — that was 'entirely a matter for the Boundary Commission’
[No. 5]. At the meeting of the Partition Council on 10 July it was agreed that
no directive should be given to the Boundary Commission and that it should
be left to their discretion to interpret the terms of reference [No. 52, Case No.
P.C. 26/4/47]. On 23 July the Viceroy caused it to be made known that it
would be most improper for him to receive any representations affecting the
Boundary Commission’s work [No. 210]. 'It is for the Boundary Commission
to interpret their terms of reference’, he told Hydari on 24 July, ‘I have been
asked more than once to define them but have had to refuse’ [No. 220]. He
XXV111
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
replied in similar terms to an enquiry from Radcliffe arising from a difference
of opinion among members of the Bengal Boundary Commission as to the
scope of their duty under the terms of reference in respect of Sylhet, saying
that while he agreed with Radcliffe’s view ‘he must leave it to Sir Cyril Radcliffe
to decide the matter for himself. . . ’ [No. 318]. Nor was the Viceroy prepared
to respond other than negatively to the Sikh rulers, from all of whom he had
received representations, explaining that he was in no way able to influence
the Commission’s findings [Nos. 367 and 378]. This attitude was consistently
adhered to. On 10 August he advised Nehru that it was most important that
he (the Viceroy) should do nothing to prejudice the independence of the
Boundary Commission and wrong therefore for him even to forward a
memorandum as Nehru wished [Nos. 395, 406 and 449]. And on 11 August, in
response to representations from the Maharaja of Bikaner, he said the Boundary
award was a matter in which he could neither intervene nor seek to influence
the Chairman — ‘I have absolutely nothing to do with the findings of the
Boundary Commission’ [No. 427]. An allusion to ‘special factors’ by the
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State as reported in the Press led to violent
protests by Jinnah and Liaquat [No. 121]. The official report sent by the Secre¬
tary of State to the Viceroy on 16 July differed in respects deemed significant
from those published in the newspapers [No. 144; see also Nos. 206 and 216].
A matter of moment to all likely to be affected was the date of completion
of the Boundary Commission Report. It was first raised on the day of Radcliffe’s
arrival when the Viceroy at a Staff Meeting, at which Sir Cyril was present,
emphasised the desirability of the work of the Boundary Commission being
finished by 14 August [No. 12, Item 1]. On 11 July in his Personal Report
[No. 65, para. 8] the Viceroy emphasised that ‘Nehru, Jinnah and the Boundary
Commissions have all agreed that the work should be completed by the
15 August and Sir Cyril Radcliffe has concurred’. O11 16 July the Governor
of the Punjab caused a special request to be made ‘for as much advance
intimation not only of the date of the award but also of its contents as can be
given’, in view of the precautions it would be necessary to take in the districts
‘likely to be affected, particularly those in the Central Punjab [No. 13 1], and
on 21 July he repeated this request during the Viceroy’s visit to Lahore,
saying that ‘even a few hours warning would be better than none’ [No. 190].
On 21 July Nehru conveyed to the Viceroy his reflections on the frontiers
likely to emerge [No. 195] and Baldev Singh further commented on them
[No. 199]. On 22 July the Punjab Partition Committee enquired whether
there was any chance of announcing the award by 10 August to which
Radcliffe replied that the time schedule was a ‘fine one’, that he did not think
he could manage 10 August but thought he could promise 12 August [Nos. 200
and 209; see also No. 359, para. 5]. On 8 August Abell sent Abbott, Secretary
to the Governor of the Punjab, a map showing ‘roughly the Boundary which
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
XXIX
Sir Cyril Radcliffe proposes to demarcate in his award’, which Abell said, was
expected within 48 hours [No. 377]. On the same day the Governor reiterated
his wish for the earliest possible information of it [No. 382, para. 5]. The
Viceroy’s Staff Meeting on 9 August was told that Radcliffe ‘would be ready
by that evening to announce the award of the Punjab Boundary Commission’.
The Viceroy observed that it was for reconsideration whether it would in
fact be desirable to publish it right away upon the grounds that the earlier it
was published, the more the British would have to bear the responsibility for
the disturbances which would undoubtedly result [No. 389]. Further
requests for at least 24 hours notice of the award followed from the
Governors of the Punjab and Bengal [Nos. 391 and 414). On 12 August it
was decided at a Staff Meeting to inform the two Governors that it appeared
impossible to publish the awards as early as had been hoped [Nos. 436, 446
and 453]. On 14 August the Viceroy informed the Secretary of State of a
‘crisis’ that had arisen over the Boundary Commission Awards, underlining
at the outset that he himself had scrupulously avoided all connection with the
Boundary Commission, including interpretation of its terms of reference
or transmission of representations. The crisis arose because of complaints
received from Liaquat about a ‘political decision’ in the rumoured allocation of
a large part of Gurdaspur to the East Punjab and vehement protest from Patel
about the reported inclusion of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in East Pakistan.
In view of the strong feelings aroused the Viceroy decided not to publish
the awards himself but to have a meeting of representatives of the two
governments to decide upon timing and method of publication. The meeting
was fixed for the morning of 16 August [Nos. 428, 452, 454, 472 and 485]. The
awards were finally ready by noon on 13 August, ‘just too late’, the Viceroy
later observed, ‘for me to see before leaving for Karachi’ [No. 489, para. 1 1 ] .
The reader will find a narrative account of most of these developments in the
Viceroy’s seventeenth and last Personal Report [No. 489, paras. 2-18]. The
reports of the Boundary Commission are attached as appendices to the Viceroy’s
last weekly letter to the Secretary of State [No. 488] while the minutes of the
Joint Defence Council Meeting of representatives of the governments of India
and Pakistan over which the Viceroy presided on the morning of 16 August
and at which the Boundary awards were disclosed, relating as they do, to an
event outside the period but providing, as they also do, a natural climax to one
part of the transfer process, are reprinted at No. 487.
Some considerable thought was given not least by the Viceroy, to the cere¬
monies appropriate to transfer. In connection with them the Viceroy enquired
of the Secretary of State as early as 17 July whether it would be the case that he
ceased to be Governor-General as from one minute past midnight on 14/15
August and should therefore be sworn in again before proceeding to the Con¬
stituent Assembly on the morning of the 15 th. The answer was in the affir-
XXX
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
mative and the form of the oaths of allegiance and of office duly supplied
[Nos. 145, 204, 215, 251, 252, 273 and 274]. I11 his Personal Report No. 13,
dated 18 July, the Viceroy gave an account of the progress made in planning
the ceremonies to take place in Karachi on 14 and in Delhi on 15 August
[No. 162, paras. 24-29]. On 26 July the Secretary of State had circulated to the
India and Burma Committee an outline of the official ceremonies in mind for
Delhi — it was for Mr Jinnah to arrange those for Karachi — [No. 243] and this
was discussed by the Committee on 28 July with enquiries subsequently sent
to the Viceroy about the form of the Royal message and about the flag to be
flown by Provincial Governors in India [No. 261 ; see also No. 308]. There had
been discussion also about the flags for the dominions, the Viceroy himself
submitting a design for each, neither of which, however, was deemed appro¬
priate [Nos. 162, paras. 25 and 26, 228, para. 28 and 279, para. 7]. The
planning, however, was far surpassed by the events of two memorable days.
Of them the Viceroy in his final Report [No. 489] has left a graphic account,
(to which the texts of his address to the India and Pakistan Constituent
Assemblies are appended) that needs no editorial gloss. The sequel to indepen¬
dence and partition lies outside the scope of British documentation and the
editorial brief.
By far the greater part of the hitherto unpublished documents reproduced
in this volume, are drawn from the official archives of the India Office in the
custody of the India Office Records or from the Mountbatten Papers.
The documents reproduced from the India Office Records are from the
following series of which the three most important are asterisked :
L/E/8
L/F/y
L/I/i
*L/PO
L/P &J/5
L/P &J/7
L/P &J/8
*L/P &J/10
L/P &S/12
L/P &S/13
L/S &G/7
L/WS/i
R/i
*R/3/i
Economic Department Files (including Communications and
Overseas Department)
Financial Department Collections
Information Department Files
Private Office Papers
Political Department Miscellaneous (including Governors’
Reports)
Political Department Files
Political Department Collections
Political Department Transfer of Power Papers
External Department Collections
Political ‘Internal’ Department Collections
Services and General Department Collections
War Staft Files
Crown Representative’s Records
Papers of the Office of the Private Secretary to the Viceroy1
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
XXXI
Every document in these series is referred to in the text by the appropriate
series notation followed by the number assigned to the particular file, collection,
or volume in which the document is filed or bound. Thus the notation
L/P &J/10/40 refers to the fortieth file in the series called Political Department
Transfer of Power Papers. Each document in a file, collection, or volume is
identified by a folio reference.
The Editors are indebted to the Trustees of the Broadlands Archives Settle¬
ment for the loan of their microfilms of those official and demi-official Indian
Papers of the Earl Mountbatten of Burma which are in their custody and for
permission to make copies of documents from those microfilms. Documents
from this source are cited in the present Volume as the 'Mountbatten Papers’.
Some documents, not in any of these archives, have been obtained from
elsewhere, notably the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister’s Office.2 The
Editors have also consulted those papers of Sir Walter Monckton which are now
in the keeping of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, and a number of documents
from this source have been included. They are reproduced by kind permission
of Balliol College, Oxford. We are indebted to Dr Kanwar Sain for the text
of Document 405.
The most important categories of telegraphic communications between the
Secretary of State and the Viceroy were classified in the following ways. One
category of telegrams from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State carried the
letter ‘S’, or ‘S.C.’ if the Viceroy was at Simla or in Camp, ie on tour. During
the Viceroy’s visit to Karachi telegrams sent from there carried the suffix ‘K’
while those sent from Delhi by the Viceroy’s staff continued to carry the suffix
'S’. Another category consisted of ‘U’ telegrams, which were reserved for the
most secret and personal matters, the letter 'U’ indicating the nature of the
telegram, irrespective of whether it did, or did not, carry a 'Secret’ or ‘Private’
prefix. ‘U’ telegrams could be enciphered or deciphered only in the Private
Offices of the Secretary of State or the Viceroy. Some ‘S’ or 'S.C.’ telegrams
were marked ‘Superintendent Series’ which indicated to Superintendents of
Telegraph branches that especial care should be taken to safeguard their security.
Certain changes in the channels of communication between the Viceroy and the
Secretary of State, made at the beginning of Lord Wavell’s Viceroyalty, may be
studied in the Appendix to Volume IV, and a small alteration in these arrange¬
ments — made with regard to the likely wishes of the members of an Interim
Government — is recorded in the Appendix to Volume VIII.
It may also be helpful to mention that of the Papers and Minutes of the India
and Burma Committee of the Cabinet those relating solely to Burma are
excluded as treating of matters outside the scope of this Series.
1 This series includes three files (R/3/1/176-8) from the Office of the Secretary to the Governor of the
Punjab.
2 A file (R/30/1/12) containing copies of these documents can be consulted in the India Office Records.
XXX11
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XII
Ill conclusion the Editors desire to acknowledge once again the friendly
assistance and advice they have received from the officials at the India Office
Library and Records, among whom they would like to mention the Director,
Mr B.C. Bloomfield, and the Deputy Archivist, Mr Martin I. Moir.
N. MANSERGH
PENDEREL MOON
Abbreviations
A.D.C.
A.F.P.F.L.
A.F.R.
A.F.R.C.
A.G.G.
A.O.C.-in-C.
A.O.P.
A.P.I.
Aide-de-Camp
Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League
Armed Forces Reconstitution (Reorganisation)
Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee
Agent to the Governor-General
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief
Air Observation Post
Associated Press of India
B.D.S.T.
B.O.A.C.
British Double Summer Time
British Overseas Airways Corporation
C.G.S.
C.I.D.
vH.G.S.
C.-in-C.
C.O.S.
C.P.
Chief of the General Staff
Criminal Investigation Department
Chief of the Imperial General Staff
Commander-in-Chief
Chiefs of Staff
Central Provinces
D.B.S.T.
D.G.C.A.
D.I.B.
D.I.G.
D.P.S.V.
Double British Summer Time
Director General of Civil Aviation
Director of the Intelligence Bureau
Deputy Inspector-General
Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy
E.A. and C.R.
External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
G.C.M.G.
Knight Grand Commander of St. Michael and
G.H.Q.
G.O.C.
St. George
General Fleadquarters
General Officer Commanding
H.E.H.
H.E.P.
H.E.P.M.
H.M.
H.M.D.
H.M.G.
H.Q.
H.R.H.
His Exalted Highness
His Excellency the President
His Excellency the Prime Minister
His Majesty or Honourable Member
Honourable Member for Defence
His Majesty’s Government
Headquarters
His Royal Highness
XXXIV
ABBREVIATIONS
I. and B.
I.C.S.
I.G.
I.M.F.
I.M.S.
I.N.A.
I.S.T.
Information and Broadcasting
Indian Civil Service
Inspector-General
International Monetary Fund
Indian Medical Service
Indian National Army
Indian Standard Time
K.C.
King’s Counsel
M.C.S.
M.L.A.
M.S.V.
M.T.
Member of the Council of State
Member of the Legislative Assembly
Military Secretary to the Viceroy
Motorised or Military Transport
N.W.F.P.
N.W.R.
North-West Frontier Province
North-W estern Railway
P.B.F.
P.S.V.
Punjab Boundary Force
Private Secretary to the Viceroy
R.A.F.
R.I.
R.I.A.F.
R.I.E.M.E.
R.I.N.
R.N.
R.S.S.S.
Royal Air Force
Rex Imperator
Royal Indian Air Force
Royal Indian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
Royal Indian Navy
Royal Navy
Rashtriya Sway am Sewak Sangh
S.G.P.C.
Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee
U.K.
U.N.O.
U.P.
U.S.A.
U.S.S.R.
United Kingdom
United Nations Organisation
United Provinces
United States of America
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V.C.O.
V.C.P.
V.P.R.
Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer
Viceroy’s Conference Paper
Viceroy’s Personal Report
Principal Holders of Office
United Kingdom
Cabinet
Members of the India and Burma Committee are italicised.
i
Prime Minister and First Lord of the
Treasury
Lord President of the Council and
Leader of the House of Commons
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Minister without Portfolio
Chancellor of the Exchequer
President of the Board of Trade
Minister of Defence
Lord Chancellor
Secretary of State for the Home
Department
Secretary of State for Common¬
wealth Relations and Leader of the
House of Lords
Secretary of State for Scotland
Secretary of State for the Colonies
Secretary of State for India and for
Burma
Minister of Labour and National
Service
Minister of Fuel and Power
Minister of Health
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries
Minister of Education
Lord Privy Seal
Mr Clement Attlee
Mr Herbert Morrison
Mr Ernest Bevin
Mr Arthur Greenwood
Mr Hugh Dalton
Sir Stafford Cripps
Mr A. V. Alexander
Viscount Jowitt
Mr J. Chuter Ede
Viscount Addison
Mr J. Westwood
Mr A. Creech Jones
Earl of Listowel
Mr G. A. Isaacs
Mr E. Shinwell
Mr Aneurin Be van
Mr T. Williams
Mr George Tomlinson
Lord Inman
OTHER MINISTERS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME
Minister of Food Mr John Strachey
Minister of Supply Mr John Wilmot
1 In addition the following were also members of the Committee : Mr Hugh Dalton (for financial questions
only), Mr C. P. Mayhew (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), Mr A. G.
Bottomley (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations), Mr Arthur
Henderson (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India and for Burma), and Lord Chorley.
P.R.O. CAB. 21/1739.
XXXVI
PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF OFFICE
Attorney-General Sir Hartley Shawcross
Parliamentary Secretary to the Mr W. Whiteley
Treasury and Chief Whip
Secretary of State
Permanent Under- Secretary
Parliamentary Under-Secretary
Deputy Under-Secretary
Assistant Under-Secretaries
Private Secretary to the Secretary
of State
INDIA OFFICE
Earl of Listowel
Sir Archibald Carter
Mr Arthur Henderson
Sir William Croft
Sir Paul Patrick
Mr G. H. Baxter
Mr R. M. J. Harris
India
Viceroy, Governor-General and
Crown Representative
Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff
Principal Secretary to the Viceroy
Private Secretary to the Viceroy
Reforms Commissioner
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten
of Burma
Lord Ismay
Sir Eric Mieville
Sir George Abell
Mr V. P. Menon
INTERIM GOVERNMENT (up until 19 JULY 1 947)
External Affairs and Commonwealth
Relations
Finance
Home, Information and Broad¬
casting and States
Commerce
Food and Agriculture
Communications
Education and Arts
Industries and Supphes
Transport
Health
Defence
Labour
Works, Mines and Power
Law
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Mr I. I. Chundrigar
Dr Rajendra Prasad
Mr Abdur Rab Nish tar
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad
Mr C. Rajagopalachari
Dr John Matthai
Mr Ghazanfar Ali Khan
Sardar Baldev Singh
Mr Jagjivan Ram
Mr C. H. Bhabha
Mr Jogendra Nath Mandal
For lists of members of the provisional governments of India and Pakistan
after 19 July, see Documents Nos. 172, 173 and 332.
PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF OFFICE
XXXV11
PARTITION COUNCIL
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mr Mohammad Ali Jinnah
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Dr Rajendra Prasad
PROVISIONAL JOINT DEFENCE COUNCIL
(as constituted on 26 July 1947)2
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck
Mr Mahomed Ah Jinnah
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
Dr Rajendra Prasad
Sardar Baldev Singh
GOVERNORS
Madras
Bombay
Bengal
United Provinces
Punjab
Central Provinces and Berar
Assam
Bihar
North-W est Frontier Province
Orissa
Sind
OF PROVINCES
Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald
Nye
Sir John Colville
Sir Frederick Burrows
Sir Francis Wylie I.C.S.
Sir Evan Jenkins I.C.S.
Sir Frederick Bourne I.C.S.
Sir M. S. A. Hydari I.C.S.
Sir Hugh Dow I.C.S.
Lieutenant-General Sir Rob Lockhart
(acting from 26 June 1947)
Sir George Cunningham (from
13 August 1947)
Sir Chandulal Trivedi I.C.S.
Sir Francis Mudie I.C.S.
PRIME MINISTERS (PREMIERS) OF PROVINCES
Madras
Bombay
Bengal
United Provinces
Central Provinces and Berar
Assam
Mr O. P. Ramaswamy Reddiar
Mr B. G. Kher
Mr H. S. Suhrawardy
Pandit G. B. Pant
Pandit R. S. Shukla
Mr Gopinath Bardoli
2 The Joint Defence Council as officially constituted by Order on 1 1 August consisted of the above
members with the exceptions of Mr Jinnah and Dr Prasad.
XXXV111
PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF OFFICE
Bihar
North-W est Frontier Province
Orissa
Sind
Mr Sri Krishna Sinha
Dr Khan Sahib
Mr Harekrishna Mahtab
Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah
The Punjab was administered by the Governor under Section 93 of the
Government of India Act 1935.
Chronological Table of Principal Events
July
8
8
9
10
11
H
1 6
1 6
17
17
18
19
20
20
22
22
25
30
30-31
1947
Sir Cyril Radcliffe arrives in Delhi
Sikhs mount protest day of prayer against the threat to split their
community under partition plan
Mountbatten advises Attlee of his decision to accept the
Governor-Generalship of India
Radcliffe leaves Delhi for visits to Calcutta and Lahore
Mountbatten meets Hyderabad delegation
Result of Sylhet referendum announced in favour of East Bengal
Last meeting of the Interim Government
Special request from Governor of the Punjab for as much advance
intimation of date and content of Boundary Award as possible
Sir Patrick Spens accepts appointment as Chairman of the
Arbitral Tribunal
Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer, Dewan of Travancore, declares
Travancore will be an independent country from 15 August
Indian Independence Bill receives Royal Assent
The Executive Council (Transitional Provisions) Order, re¬
constituting the Interim Government into two separate groups
representing the two successor governments of India and
Pakistan, published
Result of referendum in North-West Frontier Province
announced in favour of Pakistan
Mountbatten visits Lahore
Partition Council on behalf of successor dominion governments
approves statement pledging them to accept the awards of the
Boundary Commission ‘whatever these may be’
Partition Council approves the setting up of a Special Military
Command under Major-General Rees from 1 August to safe¬
guard the peace in the Punjab
Mountbatten as Viceroy and Crown Representative addresses the
Princes
Maharaja of Travancore accedes to the dominion of India
Mountbatten visits Calcutta
August
1-5 Gandhi visits Kashmir
8 Map showing ‘roughly’ the boundary Radcliffe proposes to
demarcate in his award sent to the Punjab Governor’s Secretary
xl
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS
8 Nizam of Hyderabad offers to negotiate treaty with dominion
of India
9 Viceroy’s Staff Meeting informed that Radcliffe would be ready
to announce the Punjab award ‘that evening’; Viceroy
questions desirability of publishing it ‘straight away’
9 Governor of the Punjab, after consultation with Governors-
designate of East and West Punjab, advises against arrest of
Sikh leaders implicated in terrorist activities
io Derailment of Pakistan special train at Bhatinda in East Punjab
10 Governor of Bengal says it is essential to have twenty four hours
notice of Boundary Award
1 1 Joint Defence Council Order published
1 1 Jinnah elected President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan
12 Arbitral Tribunal Order published
13 Radcliffe submits Boundary Commission Awards to Viceroy
13 Mountbatten writes to Nehru and Jinnah suggesting that findings
of Boundary Commission should be discussed on 16 August
between representatives of India and Pakistan before awards
are published
13 Mountbatten leaves for Karachi
14 Pakistan Independence Celebrations in Karachi ; Viceroy addresses
Pakistan Constituent Assembly
14-15 Midnight; Power transferred
15 Jinnah sworn in as Governor-General of Pakistan
15 Mountbatten sworn in as Governor-General of India; Inde¬
pendence Day Celebrations in Delhi
Summary of Documents
Chapter Page
1 Preparations for Transfer and Partition. The Governor-Generalship, xlii
the supersession of the Interim Government and the passing of the
Indian Independence Act: 8 to 19 July 1947
2 Preparations for Transfer and Partition. Problems of law and order; Ixi
Formation of the Punjab Boundary Force: 20 July to 8 August
1947
3 The Report of the Boundary Commission and the Transfer of Power: lxxxvi
9 to 15 August 1947
4 The States. Negotiations on Accession: 8 July to 15 August 1947 xciv
xlii
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
CHAPTER I
Preparations for Transfer and Partition. The Governor-Generalship, the
supersession of the Interim Government and the passing of the Indian
Independence Act: 8 to 19 July 1947
Name and Number Date Main subject or subjects Page
1947
J',lY
3 Jenkins to Mountbatten 8
Telephone message
5 C. P. Scott to 1. D. Scott 8
Minute
6 Record of Interview between 8
Mountbatten and Nehru
(extract)
7 Mountbatten to Ismay 8
Tel. 1830-S via India Office
8 Mountbatten to Ismay 8
Tel. 1832-S via India Office
to Cabinet C. M. (47) 60th 8
Conclusions
Minute 1
12 Minutes of Viceroy’s 8
Fifty Fourth Staff:
Meeting
Items 1 and 3
13 Mountbatten to Ismay 8
Tel. 1836-S via India Office
Discusses arrangements for supply 2
of information to Boundary Commission,
composition of its staff, his own functions
in relation to it, and financial
arrangements
Neither Viceroy, nor members of his 6
staff:, can receive deputations in
connection with the work of the
Boundary Commission
Nehru agrees that Mahbub Ali should
be shown a copy of Mr Justice Clarke’s 6
findings
Communicates text of letter from 7
Jinnah stating that if future Govt
of India will permit Mountbatten to
act as independent and impartial
Chairman of Joint Defence Council,
he (Jinnah) will be glad to agree
on behalf of Dominion of Pakistan
Explains position in relation to 8
reconstitution of central govt ;
considers that it would be an
embarrassment if Indian Independence
Bill went through much earlier than
21 or 23 July
Attlee outlines position regarding 9
appointment of Governors-General ;
Cabinet approves terms of statement
to be made
(1) Boundary Commissions — Mountbatten 12
emphasises desirability of their
work being finished by 14 August;
(3) Parliamentary Question and
Answer on the subject of the
reconstitution of the Central Govt
Nehru will not object if it is 14
mentioned in debate that Colville
and Nye, together with a British
C.-in-C. and a number of senior
British commanders, are being asked
to stay on
CH. I PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION
xliii
Name and Number Date
July
14 Ismay to Mountbatten 8
Tel. 8737 via India Office
15
Listowel to Attlee
Minute 116/47
8
16
Abell to Turnbull
Tel. 192-C
8
17
Report from Reuter
8
Indian Service
18
Scott to Turnbull
8
Tel. 1834-S
19 Mountbatten to Jenkins 8
Tel. 1839-S
20 Williams to Clauson 8
Tel. 1841-G
21 Mountbatten to 8
Liaquat Ali Khan
Letter 1446/36
22 Mountbatten to Ismay
Tel. 1845-S via India Office
24 Mountbatten to Ismay
Tel. 1847-S via India Office
25 Mountbatten to Ismay
Tel. 1848-S via India Office
Main subject or subjects Page
Refers to Vol. XI, No. 564; Cabinet 14
Committee in favour of Mountbatten
becoming Governor-General of India;
timing of statement to this effect
Withdrawal of British troops from 16
India
Composition of Bengal Partition 16
Council and question of Arbitration
Tribunal
Sikhs mount protest against proposed 17
partition of Punjab which they fear
will split their community
Refers to No. 16, note 1; Partition 18
Committee not Council has been
established in Lahore; no proposal
yet to set up Provincial Arbitration
Tribunal
Refers to No. 3 ; staff for Boundary 19
Commission and functions of Governor in
relation to Commission
Content of treaty providing for matters 20
arising out of transfer of power
Refers to Vol. XI, No. 549; 20
Mountbatten had to consult with Jinnah
before answering ; League members
of Interim Govt may take Viceroy’s
letter as a dispensation not to tender their
resignations until they can do so as a
body following their return from
referenda in N.W.F.P. and Sylhet
mentioned in debate that some of
the provincial governors of Pakistan,
together with some of its senior
military personnel, will be British
8 Refers to No. 8; Jinnah and League 22
members of Interim Govt feel they
are being humiliated over issue of
reconstitution; Liaquat believes Congress
wants League members to resign in order
to ‘pull a fast one’ over Pakistan by
removing assets ; Jinnah will not
respond to request for resignation
until all League members have returned
from referenda in N.W.F.P. and Sylhet
8 Suggested Parliamentary Question and 23
Answer on the subject of the
reconstitution of the Interim Govt
for use should the need arise
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
July
26 Isinay to Mountbatten 8
Tel. 80 via India Office
27 Attlee to Mountbatten 8
Tel. 81 via India Office
28 Attlee to Mountbatten 8
Tel. 82 via India Office
29 Mountbatten to Listowel 9
Tel. 1846-S
3 1 Ismay to Mountbatten 9
Tel. 84 via India Office
32 Minutes by Scott 9
and Brockman
34 Mountbatten to Jmnali 9
Letter 746/16
35 Mountbatten to Cripps 9
Letter
Main subject or subjects Page
Reports on meeting with Opposition; 24
encloses message from Churchill in
which he outlines reasons why
Mountbatten should accept Governor-
Generalship of Indian Dominion
Urges Mountbatten to accept Governor- 25
Generalship of India
Transmits extract from speech he 26
will make to Commons explaining
situation with regard to appointment
of Governors-General
Jinnah’s nominations for Governors 28
of Pakistan provinces
King wishes Mountbatten to accept 30
Governor-Generalship of India ;
Chiefs of Staff being somewhat
sticky about withdrawal of British
troops and future defence arrangements
in India; Slim disinclined to accept job
as C.-in-C. of Army of Indian Union;
Cunningham having qualms about his
rejection of position as Governor of
N.W.F.P.
Reconstitution of central Govt; in 30
order to avoid a political crisis,
it is suggested that two completely
separate Govts each having freedom
to decide only those matters which will
affect its own territory, should be
formed as soon as Independence Bill
is passed; future Govt of India should have
control over existing departments and
new Govt of Pakistan would have its
own embryo departments under as
many ministers as it liked to appoint ;
Scott’s minute briefly outlines
advantages of scheme
Seeks Jinnah’s good offices in 33
persuading Bihar Muslim League not
to press for an inquiry into Bihar
riots of last November
Although he has accepted the 3 3
position, is uneasy about becoming
Governor-General of India after 15
August; Viceroy’s private information
is that Jinnah’s attitude has
horrified his followers and Viceroy
believes that it is the result of his
chronic megalomania; Nehru shares
this view but Vallabhbhai Patel
ascribes more sinister motives to Jinnah
CH. I PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION
Name ami Number
36 Mountbatten to Jenkins
Letter
37 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty
Fifth Staff Meeting
Item 1
38 Ismay to Churchill
Letter
40 Christie to Abell
Letter
41 Chiefs of Staff Committee
C.O.S. (47) 86th Meeting
Minute 2, Confidential Annex
42 Mountbatten to Attlee
Tel. 1851-S via India Office
43 Record of Interview between
Mountbatten and Gandhi
44 Mountbatten to Li stowe 1
Tel. 1867-S
45 Lockhart to Mountbatten
Letter GFI-i 16
Main subject or subjects
Partition of the Armed Forces in the
Punjab
Viceroy wishes it to be placed on
record that he is still uneasy about
accepting Governor-Generalship ;
Nehru and Patel have seen draft of
Prime Minister’s Commons statement
and have approved it
Refers to Vol. XI, No. 536 and
Enclosure to No. 548 and expresses
view that Jinnah’s requests are quite
impracticable
Refers to points raised by Nehru in
Vol. XI, No. 535; India Committee
are of opinion that no further
amendments can be made to Bill
Withdrawal of British troops from
India; Defence Chiefs express concern
that negotiations on Britain’s defence
requirements will not begin until after r5
August; Ismay explains delicacy of
situation but agrees to convey
their views to Prime Minister and
Viceroy; Enclosure: note by First Sea
Lord outlining reasons why he considers
Viceroy’s objections to negotiations
beginning before 15 August ‘have no
weight’
Refers to Nos. 27 and 28; agrees,
with some misgivings, to liis name
being submitted to King for
appointment as Governor-General of
Indian Dominion; suggests amendments
to text of Prime Minister’s statement
Refers to Vol. XI, No. 382;
Mountbatten outlines steps being
taken to ensure peaceful transfer
of power; Gandhi urges that States
should not be encouraged to declare
independence; Mountbatten indicates
the negotiations in view to ensure the
States joining one Dominion or the other
Confirms that withdrawal of British
troops will not affect ability of Indian
Army to protect the North West
Frontier
Reviews the post-referendum problem
in the N.W.F.P.; seeks Viceroy’s
permission to govern under Section
93 if it proves impossible to form a
coalition ministry
Date
July
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
xlvi
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
Date
Main subject or subjects
Page
46 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter 693
July
9
47 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1872-S
48 Attlee to Mountbatten
Tel. 85 via India Office
49 Ismay to Mountbatten
Tel. 8840 via India Office
50 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8841
51 Mountbatten to Ismay
Tel. 1874-S via India Office
10
52 Partition Council Meeting
Case Nos. P.C. 26/4/47,
28/4/47, 30/4/47 and 31/4/47
10
59
60
Sikhs are sore about partition ; 5 8
suggests that British troops should
be withdrawn from Punjab before end
of July in case trouble starts when
Boundary Commission reports
Refers to Vol. XI, Nos. 79 and 256;
has called for resignations of all
provincial governors
Refers to No. 42; expresses delight
that Mountbatten is willing to
become Governor-General of Indian
Dominion
Refers to his meeting with Chiefs 60
of Staff (No. 41) and reports that
Prime Minister has decided that it
would be untimely to discuss Britain’s
long-term strategical requirements
with Indian leaders at present
Refers to Vol. XI, No. 51 1; outlines 61
views of Cabinet Committee on
withdrawal of British troops from
India and communicates announcement
to be made by Prime Minister in
Commons
Refers to Nos. 24 and 25 ; points 62
out that he will be in a difficult
position if League members do not
resign and he is forced to dismiss
them and give all portfolios to
Congress members of his own future
govt; is therefore investigating
mechanism whereby two future govts
can hold separate portfolios for their
future areas
(1) Addition of new sub-clause to 63
clauses 3 and 4 of Bill to make it
clear that award of a Boundary
Commission means ‘decision of
Chairman’; (2) Question of King’s title;
(3) Boundary Commission to use their
discretion in deciding whether to take
account of natural features for purpose of
fixing boundaries; (4) Mountbatten can
receive a Sikh deputation only if it is
made clear that no questions regarding
boundaries can be raised; Mountbatten
reaffirms his hope that Sikh leaders will
be able to use their influence to
persuade Sikh community to accept
Boundary Commission award
CH. I PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION xlvii
Name and Number
53 Minutes of Viceroy’s
Fifty Sixth Staff
Meeting
Item 4
54 Unsigned papers on the
reconstitution of the Interim
Government
55 Mountbatten to Krishna Menon
Letter
56 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter 694
57 Chief of the General Staff to
Regional Commands
Directive 6385/150/SD1
59 G. of I. External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations
Dept to S. of S.
Tel. 5350
60 Isnray to Mountbatten
Tel. 8919 via India Office
62 Krishna Menon to Mountbatten
Letter
63 Mountbatten to Nehru
Letter
64 Mountbatten to Nehru
Letter 38/17
65 Viceroy’s Personal
Report No. 12
Date Main subject or subjects Page
July
10 Mountbatten reports that Sardar Patel, 66
who has already written asking
that Muslim members of interim govt
‘be got rid of as soon as possible’, has
reacted favourably to idea that two
separate govts should be established
10 (1) Draft Press Communique; (2) Note 66
on Reconstruction of the Government
10 Expresses thanks for Menon’s help 70
and advice
10 Expresses his view that Boundary 71
problem in Punjab cannot be settled
in rational way and that a settlement
negotiated by parties involved is
only way to give two new provinces
a peaceful start ; encloses record of
interview with Giani Kartar Singh during
which latter remarked that Sikhs
would be obliged to fight if their
claims were not met
10 Reconstitution of the Armed Forces 75
10 Refers to Vol. XI, No. 344; future 78
relations with Tibet
10 Suggests that Short, who has great 78
influence with Sikhs and who has
been invited to go to India by Sikh
leaders, should be attached to his
(Ismay’s) staft as a temporary measure
for two months
1 1 Expresses thanks for sentiments 89
expressed in No. 55; comments on
other matters including States
11 Reconstitution of Interim Govt; 89
Viceroy proposes to reconstitute govt
along lines suggested in No. 54 on
morning of 1 8 July
1 1 Proposed statement asking for 91
British personnel to stay on for
interim period during reconstitution
of Armed Forces
11 Communal violence in Calcutta; work 92
of reconstituted Cabinet and progress
made by partition council in
Calcutta; Nehru, Jinnah and Boundary
Commission have agreed that latter’s
xlviii
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
65 [cont.)
67 Record of Interview between
Jenkins and Jathedar Mohan
Singh and Sardar Harnam
Singh
68 Hydari to Mountbatten
Letter (extract)
69 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter
Date Main subject or subjects Page
July
work should be completed by
15 August and all are pleased that
Bill will make findings of Commission
an Award; Mountbatten has doubts
about Baldev Singh’s denial of press
reports that he urged Sikhs to resist
decision of Boundary Commission if
it went against them; Maharaja of
Patiala has agreed to use his
influence to restrain Sikhs ; appeal
to British Service personnel to
stay on with the defence forces
of two new Dominions ; future of
Federal Court; composition of
Arbitral Tribunal; reconstitution of
armed forces; acerbity between
Congress and League at Cabinet
meeting over final destination of
22 million ounces of silver; B.O.A.C.
application to inaugurate their new
line to Karachi, Bombay and Ceylon;
plan for reconstitution of Interim Govt;
acceptance of Governor-Generalship
of India; reception for representatives of
Indian Press ; official dinner parties
on national occasions; has persuaded
Nehru and Patel to give him ‘a fairly free
hand’ in negotiations with States ;
meeting with Hyderabad delegation ;
admits that he has not been able to
‘grip this States problem before’
11 Jathedar Mohan Singh (1) claims that 103
Jenkins is responsible for seeing that
Sikhs get justice; (2) sees a ‘very
substantial exchange of population’
as the only solution to the Sikh claim;
(3) sees little point in kind of disturbances
Sikhs have in view but regards them as
more or less inevitable
11 Discussions with representatives of ten 104
Naga tribes at Kohima; has visited
Sylhet to obtain first-hand information
of referendum; allegations of breakdown
of law and order are false ; officers
presiding have done good job of work
11 Replies to No. 64; welcomes services 105
of British officers and specialists in
interim period but takes exception to
sentence in proposed statement about
‘large numbers’ of British personnel
staying on; expresses desire to see
CH. I PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION
xlix
Name and Number Date
July
69 ( cont .)
70 H.M. Minister Kabul to 11
Secretary of State
Tel. 61
71 Turnbull to Carter n
Minute
72 Listowel to Mountbatten 11
Tel. 8975
73 Listowel to Mountbatten 11
Tel. 8974
74 Nehru to Attlee 11
Letter
76 Minutes oi Viceroy’s Fifty 12
Seventh Staff Meeting
Items 1 and 5
77 G. of I., Press Information 12
Bureau to India Office
Tel. B496
79 Baldev Singh to Mountbatten 12
Letter
80 Mountbatten to Liaquat Ah Khan, 12
Patel, Prasad, Baldev Singh and
Jinnah
Letter
81 Note by Abell 12
82 Record of Interview between 12
Mountbatten and Jinnah
Main subject or subjects Page
nationalisation of armed forces and
promotions of Indian officers pushed ahead
as rapidly as possible; suggests that
time has come for all persons who have
opted for Pakistan to transfer their
services immediately
Reports discussion with Afghan 107
Foreign Minister concerning Afghan
claims to N.W.F.P.
Omission of Arbitral Tribunal from 108
Bill; expresses reservations about
statement he has prepared for use in
response to Butler’s question
Transmits amended version of 108
statement referred to in No. 71
Asks Viceroy to consider making an no
order to establish an Arbitral Tribunal
before 15 August
Appointment of Krishna Menon as no
High Commissioner for India in London
(1) Reconstitution of the Interim 112
Govt; (5) Post-Referendum problem
in N.W.F.P.
Transmits text of Communique 113
announcing decisions reached by
Partition Council regarding
reconstitution of Indian Armed Forces
Refers to No. 64, note 1; has no 115
objection to issue of proposed statement
regarding retention of British personnel
of Armed Forces; in order to meet
Nehru’s views (No. 69) suggests that
new terms of service should be released
simultaneously with statement
Forwards copy of statement (see 116
Enclosure) to be issued to all British
officers and men serving
in India
The Punjab: (1) Possibility of a 117
Ministry; (2) Partition work;
(3) References to Arbitration;
(4) Boundary Commission;
(5) Recommendations: no attempt should
be made for present to form a
Ministry; Mountbatten or member of
his staff should ask Jinnah whether
League would not be prepared to
negotiate out of court with Sikhs;
Enclosure: Governor’s appreciation
Reconstitution of Interim Govt; 121
Jinnah not particularly grateful
when Mountbatten gives him copy of
1
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name ami Number Date
July
82 ( cont ).
83 Bourne to Mountbatten 12
Letter D.O. N.16/G.C.P.
(extract)
84 Burrows to Mountbatten 12
Tel. 202-C
86 Mountbatten to Listowel 12
Tel. 1926-S
88 Record of Interview between 13
Nehru and Sir A. Smith
89 Jenkins to Mountbatten 13
Letter 695
Main subject or subjects Page
Enclosure to No. 63 ; Jinnah says
Muslims throughout India would rise
to defend oldest Muslim dynasty if
Congress exerted pressure on
Hyderabad; Jinnah agrees to
Mountbatten calling a meeting with
Khan of Kalat to suggest that he
should join Pakistan; governorships
of Pakistan provinces ; candidates for
future Flag Officer of Royal Pakistan
Navy and question of Pakistan’s
Dominion flag; Jinnah explains why he
cannot accept honour of G.C.M.G. ;
Mountbatten refers to P.S.V.’s brief
(No. 81) and urges Jinnah to try for out
of court settlement with Sikhs ;
discussion of ministry in N.W.F.P.
following referendum; Mountbatten
says he is dead against Section 93 ;
question of King’s signature
Expresses view that apprehensions of 125
Muslims of Central Provinces and
Berar resorting to direct action are
baseless and that if anything danger
is other way round; explains that
ministry still regard every Mushm as a
‘Pakistani’ with result that all senior
Muslim officers in civil service and
police are being transferred from Berar
Calcutta Disturbances; Enquiry 126
Commission will never complete its
work; both sides of Bengal Cabinet
have agreed to its dissolution
Jinnah has told draftsmen preparing 127
adaptation orders that he would
prefer order for Pakistan to be
based on Ninth Schedule rather than
on Part II of 1935 Act; Mountbatten
feels this will give Jinnah position
of dictator; seeks advice as to what he
should do in event of Jinnah insisting
on adaptation order based on Ninth
Schedule
Refers to No. 69; nationalisation of the 129
Armed Forces ; plan for control
of any ‘disturbed area’ after
15 August; Armed Forces Reorganisation
Committee
Points at issue between members of 13 1
the Punjab Partition Committee
CH. I PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION
li
Name and Number
Date
Main subject or subjects
Page
July
90
Jenkins to Mountbatten
13
Elaborates on points raised in No. 89
134
Letter 696
and suggests appointment of a
‘Boundary Administration’ to see that
final boundary in Punjab is
demarcated and that award is enforced
91
Jayakar to Attlee
13
Congratulates Attlee on role he has
137
Letter
played in giving India independence
92
Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1932-S
13
Transmits Sylhet referendum result
138
94
Nehru to Hydari
13
Has received numerous complaints
139
Tel. 5483
about referendum in Sylhet ; asks
Hydari to investigate
95
Nehru to Mountbatten
13
Outlines alleged malpractices during
140
Letter
Sylhet referendum; asks for a brief
enquiry
96
Mountbatten to Listowel
13
Refers to No. 73 ; hopes to have
141
Tel. I937-S
agreement on points to be referred to
Arbitral Tribunal by first week of August
97
Mountbatten to Listowel
13
Refers to No. 72; agrees to draft
142
Tel. 193 8-S
reply; in response to any supplementaries
98 Mountbatten to Nehru
Letter
99 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty
Eighth Staff Meeting
Item 1
100 Mountbatten to Bhopal
Letter
1 01 Mountbatten to Lockhart
Letter 1446/3
13
14
14
14
feels it would not be unfair to point out
that as most of assets are in Indian
Dominion, Congress agreement to
common Govenor-General was a generous
gesture to Pakistan; Congress are sore
at being misled by Jinnah over a matter
in which they were seriously trying
to help him
Refers to No. 95; says he has also
received complaints of interference
from Jinnah; rejects idea of enquiry
Reconstitution of Interim Govt ;
Mountbatten explains that one of
main reasons why this was necessary
was to enable provisional govts to be
able to advise him on Orders-in-Council
to be issued dealing with each future
Dominion
Refers to Vol. XI, No. 561 ; explains
why he has accepted Governor-
Generalship of India ; urges Bhopal
to accept three subject accession
and not to say ‘No’ without a further
talk
Refers to No. 45 ; post-referendum
problem in N.W.F.P. ; whole context
has been changed by fact that
Jinnah will be Governor-General of
Pakistan and because Pakistan Cabinet
will advise on N.W.F.P. once Central
Govt has been reconstituted; has
142
143
144
145
lii
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name ami Number
ioi (cont.)
102 Auchinleck to Mountbatten
Letter
103 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter 697 (extract)
107 Hydari to Nehru
Tel. 959/C
108 Minutes of Viceroy’s
Fifty Ninth Staff Meeting
Items 1 and 3
109 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1951-S
no Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1958-S
Date Main subject or subjects Page
J“h
discussed matter with Jinnah (No. 82)
and impressed on him aversion to
going into Section 93 ; praises
work in connection with referendum
un- Recommends that, in event of 146
dated clashes in neighbourhood of boundaries
after 15 August, these districts should
be designated ‘disturbed areas’, and that
Supreme Commander, acting upon request
of Joint Defence Council, should
appoint a British Commander, with
adequate troops allotted by the
Commanders-in-Chief of the two
Dominions, to take control of the area[s]
14 Reports that progress made by 147
Partition Committee has not been
very good; boundary problem
‘is a very live issue — it may even be a
casus belli’; non-Muslims are nervous
about residing or serving in West
Punjab and Muslims are far from happy
about their position in East Punjab;
anticipates that transfer of power will be
accompanied by disorders but finds
it impossible to say whether they
will break out before or after
15 August or how serious they will be
14 Refers to No. 94; transmits 155
breakdown of referendum result in
Sylhet; figures demonstrate that
there could not have been intimidation
on a large scale
14 (1) Reconstitution of the Interim Govt; 157
(3) The Punjab
14 Confirms that Baldev Singh was present 160
at meetings at which personnel of
Boundary Commission and amendments
to clauses 3 and 4 of Bill were agreed;
at a meeting to discuss terms of reference
of Boundary Commission Baldev Singh
signified that though not content
he accepted them
14 Reconstitution of Interim Govt; 161
Spence and Menon have produced
an ‘ingenious means’ of avoiding
necessity for League members to resign;
Mountbatten intends to go ahead with
it irrespective of League reactions ;
Draft Order has been drawn up; when
CH. I PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION
liii
Name and Number Date
July
no (cont.)
in Note by Mountbatten un¬
dated
1 12 Record of Interview between 15
Mountbatten and Jinnah
and Liaquat Ali Khan
1 13 Record of Interview between 15
Mountbatten and Auchinleck
(extract)
1 14 Nehru to Mountbatten 15
Letter F-7(7)-P.S./47
Main subject or subjects Page
it is issued, Mountbatten intends to put
out a Press Note explaining its necessity
Submits for consideration by Partition 162
Council issues raised by Jenkins in
Appendix ‘A’ to No. 89; explains
that Radcliffe has agreed to see that
report of Boundary Commission is
presented before 15 August but that
there will be no time to implement
decision before 15 August if there are
major changes from notional boundary
(1) Reconstitution of Interim Govt; 163
(2) Pakistan flag; (3) C.-in-C.
of Pakistan ; (4) retention of Ismay
on Mountbatten’s staff; (5) Pakistan
nomination for Arbitral Tribunal ;
(6) successor body to Partition Council ;
(7) possibility of accommodation for
Pakistan High Commission in Red Fort
(1) C.-in-C. reports result of interview 165
between C.G.S. and Nehru (No. 88);
(2) Baldev Singh’s accusations against
British officers; (3) future residence for
British Embassy or High Commissioner;
(4) position of British officers in command
of Dominion troops in event of frontier
clashes or offensive against a State
like Travancore; (5) C.-in-C.
expresses concern that he has not
yet had official ruling about
Gurkhas; (6) arrangements for departure
from India of first contingent of
British troops; (7) question of ‘Charter
of Liberty’
Refers to No. 107 and accepts that 167
Sylhet referendum result could not have
been materially affected by irregularities;
points out that India Bill is not as clear
as 3 June Statement on Sylhet; argues
that process of transfer must be a single
one and suggests that easiest way to
arrange this is to get report of
Boundary Commission before 15 August;
problem arises in similar form in regard
to notional division of Bengal and Punjab;
in view of fact that Commission is likely
to approach question of Sylhet more
from point of view of Bengal than
Assam, suggests means by which
Assamese interests can be represented
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
ii 6 G. of I. Cabinet
Secretariat
No. 1456/C.N./47
1 17 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 125/47
1 19 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 9090
120 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 9107
1 21 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1979-S
122 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 9108
Date Main subject or subjects Page
July
15 Circulates following papers on 170
reconstitution of Central Govt;
(1) Note by Viceroy; (2) Draft
Communique on the reconstitution
of the Govt; (3) Draft Order
15 Refers to No. 86; Jinnah’s proposal 173
stems from Viceroy’s insistence that
1935 Act should remain in force in each
of two Dominions; that Constituent
Assembly of Pakistan can rescind orders
of Governor-General and make a new
constitution is most suitable response
to charge that H.M.G. is helping to
set up a dictatorship ; only other
alternative is to amend Bill at very short
notice in Lords
15 Transmits message from Attlee in 177
which latter says Nehru may be
assured that H.M.G. is approaching
matter of India’s balance of payments
deficit sympathetically
15 Decision to appoint separate High 178
Commissioner to Pakistan; Sir
L. Grafftey-Smith selected; Sir
T. Shone will remain as High
Commissioner in India; Indian leaders
should be approached accordingly
15 Jinnah and Liaquat have protested 179
violently against a statement made
by Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State in which, when explaining
terms of reference of Boundary
Commission, he is alleged to have
said that ‘special factors’ were being
allowed to take account of location of
religious shrines of Sikhs in Punjab; has
told Jinnah that he will send a copy of
this protest to Radcliffe
15 Refers to No. 86; explains that Jinnah 179
is entitled to proceed under 9th
Schedule and that it is useless to resist
his wishes now; considers that Governor-
General’s power to override his Council
should be excluded in Adaptation Order
on ground that this was part of
machinery of British control ;
authorises Mountbatten to prepare
Order in form desired by Jinnah subject
to exclusion of overriding power
15 Refers to No. 50; Auchinleck and 181
Mountbatten are in agreement that,
124 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1983-S
CH. I PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION
lv
Name and Number Date
July
124 [cont).
125
Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1980-S
16
126
S. of S. to G. of I.,
16
External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations Dept
Tel. 9106
127
Meeting of Indian Cabinet
Case No. 180/35/47
16
128
Abell to Harris
Tel. 1985-S
16
130 Lockhart to Mountbatten 16
Letter D.O. No. GH-127
13 1 Abbott to Abell 16
Letter D.O. No. G.S. 438
132 FLM. Minister Kabul to G. of I., 16
External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations
Dept
Tel. 64
133 Ismay to Carter 16
Minute
134 Notes by Scott and Abell 16
Main subject or subjects Page
in order to allay possible suspicion,
statement should be issued to effect
that British forces will not be available
to intervene in internal disorder
after 15 August; suggests that, in view of
shortage of air-crews, number of
squadrons should be reduced from
three to two and that one of them
should be located in India
Jinnah turns down G.C.M.G. in view 182
of League Working Committee’s
opposition; Mountbatten requests
permission to offer him a Privy
Councillorship
Refers to No. 59; future relations with 183
Tibet and Bhutan
Reconstitution of Central Government 1 84
Refers to No. no, note 5; 186
Mountbatten understands that Congress
intention is not to introduce any new
members of Cabinet but to double up
portfolios; matter is being discussed
today in Cabinet
Reports talk with Abdul Ghaffar Khan 1 87
and Dr Khan Sahib on Congress
proposals for dealing with post¬
referendum problem in N.W.F.P. ;
suggests meeting between Abdul Ghaffar
Khan and Jinnah
In view of fact that precautions will be 19 1
necessary, especially in districts likely
to be particularly affected, Governor of
Punjab requests as much advance
intimation as can be given not only of
the date of the Boundary Commission
Award but also of its contents
Reports talk with Afghan Prime 19 1
Minister about Afghan interest
in N.W.F.P. ; has urged Prime
Minister to see Jinnah in Delhi
Desirability of an early announcement 192
to effect that Nye and Colville have
been asked by Congress to continue
in office
Comments on C.-in-C.’s plan to deal 193
with possible clashes or disturbances
in neighbourhood of boundaries between
two Dominions after 15 August
lvi
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
Date
July
135 Note by Mountbatten
un¬
dated
136 Ismay to Mountbatten
16
Tel. 90 via India Office
137 Listowel to Shone 16
UKRI 453 via Cabinet Office
138 Mountbatten to Burrows 16
Tel. I993-S
139
Mountbatten to Hydari
16
Tel. 2000-S
140
Mieville to Ismay
16
Tel. 1996-S via India Office
142
G. off, External Affairs and
16
and Commonwealth
Relations Dept to S. of S.
Tel. 5574
143 Ismay to Mountbatten
16
Tel. 89 via India Office
144 Listowel to Mountbatten
16
Tel. 9156
145 Mountbatten to Listowel 16
Tel. 1999-S
147 Listowel to Mountbatten 17
Tel. 9189
148 Partition Council Meeting 17
Case Nos. P.C.47/6/47, 55/6/47,
56/6/47 and 57/6/47
Main subject or subjects Page
Withdrawal of British Forces from 195
India and proposal for temporary
retention of RAF transport squadron
Suggests that Mountbatten might use 196
‘ridiculous claims’ of Afghan
Govt to point out to Partition Council
or to leaders individually how essential
it is for India and Pakistan to have
unified defence policy
Transmits instructions to negotiate with 196
Indian leaders standstill agreement
for continued provision of military
aircraft transit facilities
Seeks appreciation of situation which will 197
arise in Calcutta when result of Boundary
Commission is announced in order to
reassure Nehru; has no doubt
Congress fear that League will
carry out their threat to wreck city
before they turn it over to Indian
Dominion
Refers to Nos. 94, 95 and 98; considers 198
that Sylhet referendum has been
efficiently and impartially run
Question of appointment of Sir A. 198
Rowlands as Jinnah’s Chief Adviser
Rejects suggestion that Afghan Govt 200
should send suitable emissary to discuss
matter of N.W.F.P. with Viceroy
or any Indian political leaders
Reports meeting with Chiefs of Staff 200
on subject of strategic requirements
Refers to No. 121; transmits relevant 201
passage from Henderson’s speech
which differs in some important respects
from version given to Mountbatten by
Jinnah and Liaquat
Requests guidance as to whether he will 202
cease to be Governor-General as from
one minute past midnight on night of
14/15 August and asks for form of oath
to be taken on morning of 15th
Refers to No. no; comments on 204
the Draft Order for the reconstitution
of the Interim Govt
(1) Agreed that in the event of possible 206
clashes or disturbances in the
neighbourhood of the boundaries
between the two Dominions after
15 August, plan of action should be
on lines indicated in No. 102;
CH. I PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION
lvii
Name and Number
Date
Main subject or subjects
Page
July
148 {cont).
(2) Arbitral Tribunal; (3) Issues connected
with the Partition work in the Punjab;
(4) Replacement of present Partition
Council after 15 August
152
Attlee to Nehru
17
Explains why suggested amendment
214
Letter
to clause in Bill about States
which he has discussed with Krishna
Menon could not be accepted;
expresses inter alia admiration for
courage and statesmanship of Nehru and
Patel
153
Attlee to Mountbatten
17
Debates on Bill went well and
215
Letter
opposition played their part in helping
to get it through; tributes to
Mountbatten were well deserved
and it is also recognised that Edwina
has played great part in creating new
atmosphere; expresses appreciation of
Mountbatten’s decision to carry on for
next stage; royal engagement
155
Mountbatten to Listowel
17
Transmits text of Communique on
216
Tel. 2010-S
reconstitution of Interim Govt
156
Mountbatten to Listowel
17
Transmits text of background press
217
Tel. 201 i-S
note on reconstitution of Interim Govt
U7
Cabinet India and Burma
17
(1) Continued service of British Officers
218
Committee
in the Armed Forces in India;
I.B. (47) 42nd Meeting
(2) Position of Judges of the Indian
Minutes 1-2
Federal and High Courts
M
LA
OO
Mountbatten to Listowel
17
Jinnah is anxious to make Baluchistan
220
Tel. 201 8-S
a Governor’s Province and Mountbatten
has urged on him advantage of
appointing a British Governor; suggests
Listowel should talk to Weightman
who has been approached in this context
to try to remove any doubts he may have
159
Record of Interview between
18
Jinnah has assured Mountbatten that
221
Mountbatten and Nishtar
Govt of West Punjab will not interfere
and Akhtar Hussain
with rights or irrigation from rivers of
Punjab and Mountbatten will ask Menon
to secure similar assurance from
Congress; Pakistan policy on accession of
States; Nishtar asks that at forthcoming
meeting with States there should be
separate representation for those
States included in groups of which
majority want to join Indian Union
but do not wish to join themselves;
Pakistan’s representation abroad;
question of tariffs in Instrument of
Accession; Pakistan Govt will claim
to succeed to treaty obligations and
lviii
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
159 (cont).
1 61 Burrows to Mountbatten
Tel. 210-S
162 Viceroy’s Personal Report
No. 13
Date Main subject or subjects Page
July
rights of H.M.G. in regard to Kalat;
meeting with Kalat delegation
18 Refers to No. 138; Congress fears about 224
security of Calcutta ; examines
likelihood of trouble and outlines
precautions being taken; has urged
Army Commander to provide three
additional Indian Army battalions
for critical period in August; does
not believe that Muslim leaders intend
to attempt destruction of city though
there is possibility that some
Muslim elements may get out of hand ;
Nehru may be assured that ‘Calcutta
shall not be destroyed’
18 Little change in general state of affairs 225
in country ; Jenkins’ note on points in
dispute in Punjab Partition Committee;
intends to visit Punjab to study situation
and urge agreement on administration of
three Districts seriously in dispute ;
Radcliffe’s views on Bengal and
Punjab Boundary Commissions;
Sikh threats to resort to violent action
if they are not satisfied with Boundary
Commission’s award; establishment of
unified military command in potential
disturbed areas; joint statement giving
full assurances to minorities; referendum
in Sylhet and complaints in relation
to it ; reconstitution of Interim Govt
has been worst headache to date ;
reactions of political leaders to new
formula for reconstitution which has now
been accepted; Liaquat has been made
aware that Mountbatten cannot make
Orders-in-Council amending the
1935 Act for Pakistan on advice
of Jinnah as latter is going to become
constitutional Governor-General of
Pakistan; appeal to British service
personnel in India to stay on for
transitional period; pays credit to Steering
Committee of Partition Council ;
reduction in personal staff after transfer of
power; has suggested to Nehru that
he should appoint an official Secretary
to the Governor-General ; Mountbatten’s
accommodation; dinner parties to celebrate
Bastille Day and Mountbatten’s silver
wedding; official ceremonies on transfer
CH. I PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION
lix
Name and Number
162 (cant.)
164 Indian Independence Act, 1947
165 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 9261
166 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter
Date
Main subject or subjects
Page
July
of power; new dominions have not
accepted the Union Jack in upper
canton of their flags ; arrangements for
dominions to fly Union Jack,
white ensign of navy and Dominion
Governors-General flag; Jinnah’s
court circular in Dawn
18 An Act ‘to make provision for the
setting up in India of two independent
Dominions’, to substitute other
provisions for certain provisions
of the G. of I. Act 1935, which
apply outside those Dominions, and
to provide for other consequential or
connected matters
18 Royal Assent has been given to Bill
1 8 Impossible to convince Burmese of
advantages of remaining in
Commonwealth ; Colonial Office have
agreed in principle to appointment of
Indian Agents in E. Africa, W. Indies,
Fiji and Mauritius as requested by Nehru;
announcement about partition of
Armed Forces ; praises Mountbatten’s
handling of question of Governor-
Generalships ; is sorry that it was not
possible to announce appointments to
Governorships during passage of Bill
through Parliament and comments
on Cunningham and Killearn, Slim’s
refusal to accept invitation to be
C.-in-C. of Army of Indian Dominion ;
expresses hope that latest device for
future of Interim Govt will bridge
time remaining before 15 August; is
arranging for Krishna Menon to meet
Opposition leaders and need for
someone at India House with organising
and administrative ability; strain on
Viceroy and his staff; appreciates
political importance of providing Indian
navy with cruiser; Ismay will explain
new set-up in Commonwealth Relations
Office on his return; completion of
work of Boundary Commissions and
reactions of Sikhs; need to avoid
statement giving Travancore leverage
in asserting its independence or
economic autonomy; discussions with
representatives of Hyderabad; Bill has
lx
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
July
166 ( cant .)
167 Krishna Menon to Mountbatten 18
Letter
168 Mountbatten to Listowel 18
Tel. 2036-S
169 Listowel to Mountbatten 18
Tel. 9305 (extract)
170 Gazette of India Extraordinary 19
Notification by Secretariat
of the Governor-General
(Reforms)
171 Partition Council Meeting 19
Case No. P.C. 69/7/47
172 Nehru to Mountbatten 19
Letter
173 Abell to Liaquat Ali Khan 19
Letter
Main subject or subjects Page
received Royal Assent, its passage
through Parliament; Ismay’s departure;
Nehru’s failure to respond to Smuts’s
efforts to secure detente about Indians
in S. Africa and desirability of avoiding
repetition of last year’s controversy at
next meeting of U.N.O. Assembly;
Jagjivan Ram’s visit to London ;
suggestion that someone versed in
Dominion procedures should be attached
to Mountbatten’s staff during next few
months.
Bill is now law and H.M.G. have been 255
better than their word on time-table ;
discussion with Attlee, Law Officers and
Henderson about States; Jinnah has
overplayed his hand; Listowel,
Henderson and Cripps have promised
to do what they could in speeches to
indicate that H.M.G. would not welcome
Balkanisation or Dominion Status for
Princes
Refers to No. 147; replies to Listowel’s 256
comments on the Draft Order for the
reconstitution of the Interim Govt
Refers to No. 124; agrees that statement 257
should be made to effect that British
Forces will not be used operationally
after 15 August and will not be available
to intervene in internal disorder; as far
as possible families should move with
units concerned
The Executive Council (Transitional 257
Provisions) Order, 1947
Future economic relations between 259
the two dominions ; flight of capital
from Pakistan and possible remedial
measures
Composition of Indian Cabinet ; 260
existing members will continue and
five will double up to take charge of
portfolios and departments vacated by
Muslim League nominees ; stresses that
arrangements are provisional only and
subject to change in future
Requests confirmation of distribution 261
of portfolios in provisional govt of
Pakistan
CH. I PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION
lxi
Name and Number Date
July
177 G. of I., External Affairs and 19
Commonwealth Relations
Dept to H.M. Minister Kabul
Tel. 166
178
Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 9329
19
180
Abell to Carter
Tel. 205 2-S (extract)
19
Main subject or subjects Page
In view of Shah Mahmud’s more 266
reasonable attitude and on understanding
that he will not in any sense be regarded
as official emissary of Afghan Govt, G. of
I. agrees that there might be advantage in
establishing informal contact with
Shah Mahmud in Delhi
Refers to No. 158; explains reasons why 267
proposition to make Baluchistan a
Governor’s Province seems doubtful
Jinnah is most anxious to have 269
Cunningham but is embarrassed at any
suggestion that one Governor should be
treated in special way; need to seize
every vacancy for Governorships offered
to British is of paramount importance and
prospects of Pakistan remaining within
Commonwealth may partly depend on
this
CHAPTER 2
Preparations for Transjer and Partition. Problems of law and order; Formation
of the Punjab Boundary Force: 20 July to 8 August 1947
Name and Number
1 81 Mountbatten to Nehru
Letter 1446/16
Date
Main subject or subjects
Page
1947
July
20
Refers to No. 114; admits there is
270
apparent contradiction between para. 13
of 3 June Statement and clause 3(3) of
India Bill on Sylhet but can recollect
no intention of treating Sylhet district
differently from Muslim majority districts
of Bengal ; has always been understood
that in event of Sylhet referendum
being in favour of amalgamation with
East Bengal, provisional boundaries
of that province will include Sylhet
district subject to final decision of
Boundary Commission; appreciates
difficulty in transferring and
retransferring territory but, as Nehru
realises, similar problem arises in regard
to division of Bengal and Punjab; explains
why Nehru’s suggestions for representing
Assamese interests are not feasible
lxn
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
July
182 Mieville to Jinnah 20
Letter 90/11
183 Mieville to Jinnah 20
Letter
184 Minutes of Viceroy’s 20
Twenty First
Miscellaneous
Meeting
187
Mountbatten to Listowel
20
Tel. 543-GT
188
Lockhart to Mountbatten
20
Tel. CA/149
189 Note by Abell 21
190 Abell to Beaumont 21
Letter 1446/17
191 Minutes of Viceroy’s 21
Sixty First Staff Meeting
Items 2, 4 and 6
193 Mountbatten to Nehru 21
Letter
Main subject or subjects
Page
Present information indicates that
271
Frontier ministry has no intention
of resigning but Dr. Khan Sahib has
indicated that he would resign
if he could be assured that general
election would be held in reasonably
near future
Asks if Jinnah would be prepared to 271
meet Abdul Ghaftar Khan to negotiate
agreement on basis of (1) complete
provincial automony for N.W.F.P. in
all matters except defence, external
affairs and communications; (2) right
for Province to secede from Pakistan;
(3) that contiguous Pathan areas should be
allowed to join N.W.F.P.
(1) Military measures in the Punjab; 272
(2) The retention of British Officers
in the Indian Armed Forces; (3) Posting
of officials in the Punjab; (4) Muslim
officials
Transmits result of North West 277
Frontier Province Referendum
Refers to No. 45; assumes Mountbatten 278
will regard result of referendum
in N.W.F.P. as decisive vote for
Pakistan and therefore of policy contrary
to present Ministry’s; reviews position and
requests permission, if he cannot
persuade present Ministry to resign and
accept League Ministry, to dismiss
Ministers and assume powers under
Section 93
Mountbatten agrees with general 278
policy of letting Sikhs blow off
steam and not attempting to put
their leaders in jail
Jenkins would appreciate advance 279
information of general purport of
Boundary Commission Award when time
comes ; even a few hours warning
would be better than none
(2) Issues connected with the 279
partition work in the Punjab;
(4) The North-West Frontier Province;
(6) Baluchistan
Refers to Nos. 138 and 161; Congress 282
fears about security of Calcutta;
reports Governor’s views and his
assurance that everything possible will
be done to prevent Calcutta being
CH. 2 PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION
lxiii
Name and Number
Date
193 ( cont .)
July
194 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter
21
195 Nehru to Mountbatten 21
Letter
196 Secretaries to Punjab Boundary 21
Commission to Abell
Tel. unnumbered
Main subject or subjects Page
destroyed; asks Nehru to use his influence
to prevent any provocation by Hindus
on 15 August
Tension between Hindus and Muslims 283
in Calcutta; process of administrative
separation in Bengal should begin
before Boundary Commission Award is
given; continued retention in W. Bengal
and Calcutta of officers who have opted
for Pakistan and E. Bengal only leads
to friction; these officers,
together with their counterparts in
E. Bengal who have opted for
W. Bengal, should be transferred
immediately; Punjabi Muslims in
battalions in Calcutta, about whom
there have been serious complaints,
should be transferred once sufficient
Indian troops have been sent; if
situation deteriorates in Calcutta
there will be immediate repercussions in
other parts of Bengal and thus separation,
subject to decisions of Boundary
Commission, should be completed by
3 August
Refers to No. 181 ; only solution is to 285
expedite decision of Boundary
Commission so that there is only one
transfer involving Sylhet after
Commission has reported; close
analysis of voting figures in
referendum will assist Commission
in determining how Sylhet should be
divided; trusts that every facility
will be given to Assam Govt to present
their views ; presses for simpler
frontier based on some natural barrier
and asserts that national frontiers
should be determined by reference to
national rather than to sectional
interests; has instructed Baldev
Singh to depute some senior Indian
officers to present defence point of
view to Boundary Commissions
Refers to Vol. XI, No. 59; requests 286
that plan submitted to Mountbatten
on behalf of Sikhs and map he
studied should be forwarded to
Punjab Boundary Commission
immediately
]xiv
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
Date
July
197 Chiefs of Staff: Committee
21
C.O.S. (47)90^ Meeting
Minute 1
198 Listowel to Mountbatten
21
Tel. 9386
199 Baldev Singh to Mountbatten 22
Letter
200 Mountbatten to Radcliffe 22
Letter 1446/17
204 Listowel to Mountbatten 22
Letter
205 Partition Council Meeting 22
Case Nos. P.C. 74/8/47, 80/8/47,
81/8/47, 82/8/47
206 Secretaries to Punjab Boundary 22
Commission to Abell
Tel. unnumbered
Main subject or subjects
Page
Services Staff Colleges ; Admission
287
of Indian Students
Refers to paras. 1 and 2 of No. 132,
288
Tribal Agreements, in view of
Section 7(I)(c) of Independence Act
no formal assurances can be given to
Afghans that existing agreements will
continue to be honoured; as N.W.F.P.
is to be included in Pakistan,
provisional govt should approach
tribes on lines corresponding to
negotiations being undertaken with
States ; continuity of policy will
have stabilising effect; trusts Jinnah can
give Shah Mahmud some comforting
reassurance as to future relations between
Pakistan and Afghanistan
Agrees with views expressed by Nehru 289
(No. 195) that it is necessary to have a
natural boundary line as far as possible
and that defence point of view should
be put before Boundary Commission;
Indian Officers should get their orders
today in order to enable them to prepare
their cases
Punjab Partition Committee have 290
stated that they will accept Boundary
Commission Award but feel risk of
disorder would be greatly increased
if Award had to be announced at very
last minute before 15 August; asks if
there is any chance of announcing
Award by 10 August
Desirability of issuing formal Instruments 300
of Instructions to Governors-General and
Governors
(1) Plan of action in the event of 301
possible clashes or disturbances in
the neighbourhood of the boundaries
between the two Dominions after
15 August; (2) Issues connected with
the partition work in the Punjab;
(3) Draft Statement by Partition
Council; (4) Partition Council to
function temporarily as Joint Defence
Council
Refers to Nos. 121 and 144; 303
requests that communications exchanged
between Viceroy and Secretary of
State on subject of Henderson’s
CH. 2 PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION lxv
Name and Number Date
July
206 (cant.)
207 Mountbatten to Baldev Singh 23
Letter
208 Mountbatten to Nehru 23
Letter
209 Radcliffe to Mountbatten 23
Letter
210 C. P. Scott to Jawand Singh 23
Letter
21 1 Lockhart to Mountbatten 23
Letter (extract)
212 Rowan to Harris 23
Letter
214 Note by Jenkins 23
Main subject or subjects Page
speech in Commons explaining terms
of reference of Boundary Commission
should be forwarded to Punjab
Boundary Commission immediately
Refers to No. 199; point has already 304
been raised in Partition Council and
Mountbatten thinks that Council would
not be in favour of reconsidering their
decision; explains that it would be
embarrassing either for G. of I. as a whole
to put point of view to
Boundary Commission or for the two
Provisional Govts to put opposite
views through representatives who are
still members of a single Army
Refers to No. 195; has explained to 304
Mr Bardoloi that, in relation to
Sylhet, it is now too late to consider
altering position of Commission or
appointing assessors to assist it ; has written
to Baldev Singh concerning question of
putting defence point of view before
Boundary Commissions
Refers to No. 200; appreciates 305
importance of earliest possible
date for Award; explains why he does
not think he can manage 10 August;
thinks that he can promise 12 August
and will do the earlier date if he possibly
can
Explains why Mountbatten cannot 305
receive a deputation on behalf of
military grantees of Montgomery
District in connection with the
boundary to be determined between
India and Pakistan
Post-referendum problem in N.W.F.P.; 306
risk of disturbances and activities
of Faqir of Ipi
Matters referred to in No. 125 are of some 308
importance and delicacy Prime Minister
feels that answer should set out position
fully and plainly and has approved draft
reply (No. 225)
Large Sikh Diwan has been advertised 309
to be held at Nankana Sahib,
Sheikhupura district, where public meetings
are prohibited, on 27 July; outlines
measures which will be adopted to
prevent meeting taking place
Ixvi
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
215 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 9507
216 Abell to Secretaries to
Punjab Boundary Commission
Tel. 563-GT
218 Subbarayan to Attlee
Letter
219 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 131/47
220 Mountbatten to Hydari
Tel. 291 8-S
221 Mountbatten to Attlee
Tel. 2912-S via India Office
222 Record of Interview
between Ismay and Jinnah
223 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 2915-S
224 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 2916-S
Main subject or subjects
Refers to No. 145 ; confirms that
Mountbatten will cease to be
Governor-General immediately after
midnight on 14 August; transmits
form of oath of allegiance and oath
of office taken by Governors-General
of Dominions
Refers to No. 206; explains that
Henderson’s remarks were wrongly
reported in Indian Press and transmits
relevant passage from his speech ;
claims privilege for correspondence on
subject but says this has been made
available to Radcliffe who will show it in
confidence to his colleagues
Congratulates Attlee on passage of
Independence Act; remarks that
introduction of separate electorates in 1909
sowed seeds of bitterness
between two communities
Submits for approval enclosures
prepared under the aegis of the
Chiefs of Staff on (1) India — Defence
Requirements : brief for negotiations ;
and (2) British Defence Requirements in
India
Explains that it is for Boundary
Commission to interpret their terms of
reference; has been asked more than
once to define them but has had to refuse
Expresses thanks for No. 119; India
appreciates H.M.G’s difficulties but
any repudiation of debts will have worst
possible effect ; if question comes up in
discussion H.M.G. should adopt line
that it admits obligation even though
no large payments can be made at present
Ismay specifies a number of incidents
which have led Mountbatten almost to
despair about possibility of friendly
co-operation with Jinnah; Jinnah replies
and ends by saying he will always be
Mountbatten’s friend and that he should
be judged by deeds not words
Indicates that he has secured agreement
of Partition Council to publication of
statement in No. 224 and requests that
Attlee should be informed
Transmits Press Note and text of
statement referred to in No. 223 in
which representatives of two future
Date
July
23
23
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
CH. 2 PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION
lxvii
Name and Number
224 ( cont .)
225 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 92
226 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 9551
227 Mountbatten to Listowel
Letter
228 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 14
Date Main subject or subjects Page
July
Govts reaffirm assurances to minorities,
pledge themselves to accept awards of
Boundary Commissions, emphasise that
violence will not be tolerated and explain
agreement to establish as from 1 August
a special military command in Punjab
24 Refers to No. 125 explains why 327
possibility of a Privy Councillorship
should not be mentioned to Jinnah
24 Refers to No. 144; transmits two 329
parliamentary questions which have been
put down on terms of reference of
Boundary Commission and seeks
concurrence in or suggestions on
proposed reply
24 Burmese decision to leave Commonwealth; 330
concern that India may also wish to
leave and possibility of some looser
form of Commonwealth association ;
Aung San’s death; partition of Armed
Forces ; Jinnah’s offer of E. Bengal governorship
to Killearn; Slim’s decision not to
accept appointment as C.-in-C. ; Krishna
Menon has been a valuable contact;
official telegram about cruiser; Smuts
and Indian position in S. Africa;
Jagjivan Ram’s visit to England;
welcomes idea of having an expert on
Dominion procedure; expresses
admiration at way in which Independence
Bill went through Parliament and
congratulates Listowel and members
of Govt
25 Referendum in N.W.F.P.; visit to Lahore 333
and meeting with Punjab Partition
Committee; all members of the Punjab
Partition Committee declared their parties
would abide by decision of Boundary
Commission; special military measures to
be taken in twelve of fourteen disputed
districts in Punjab; Partition Council
are delighted at solution of Punjab
deadlock; Partition Council Statement;
meeting with Kalat delegation; meetings
with Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar; has told
Hyderabad delegation that Nizam must
accede and has co-ordinated plan of
campaign with Monckton to bring
Nizam in; importance of Hyderabad and
Travancore in determining attitude of
other States; honorary military ranks and
Ixviii
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
July
228 ( cont .)
229 Jinnah to Mieville
25
Letter
230 Tara Singh to Attlee
25
Letter E/101
231 Listowel to Mountbatten
25
Letter
233 Weightman to Listowel
25
Letter (extract)
235 Listowel to Mountbatten
25
Tel. 9616
236 Listowel to Mountbatten
25
Tel. 9607
237 Moutitbatten to Attlee 25
Letter
Main subject or subjects Page
military decorations for Rulers ; offer of
three subject accession is tremendous
advance for States ; question of Congress
agreement to terms of accession for
States ; Jinnah will offer States Treaties
of Accession on same lines but
insists on dealing with each State
separately; tension between Pakistan
and India officials; Dominion
Governors-General Flag and White
Ensign ; Lady Mountbatten has visited
hospitals and Punjab Public Health
School at Lahore; press comments about
destruction in Lahore are exaggerated
Refers to No. 183; is unable to meet Abdul 340
Ghaftar Khan to discuss an agreement as
matters involved can be dealt with only
by Constituent Assembly of Pakistan
Asks Attlee to receive a Sikh deputation 340
from the Shiromani Akali Dal
Partition Council Statement; trusts 341
solution of problem of Interim Govt
is working satisfactorily in practice ;
retention of Mountbatten’s staff
officers during transition period; flags;
tragic events in Rangoon; U.S. State
Dept attitude towards States ;
attitude of French Govt in
regard to Hyderabad; question of
applying Pensions (Increase) Act, 1947
to Indian pensioners in U.K. ; official
telegram about cruiser; inaugural
luncheon for association of Indian
Journalists in London; luncheon for
Krishna Menon
Explains why he is unable to accept 346
Jinnah’s offer of the post of Governor of
Baluchistan
Refers to Nos. 223 and 224; transmits 352
congratulations from Prime Minister
Refers to No. 226; explains that M.P. is 352
agreeable to making his questions
non-oral on condition that reference is
made in reply to shrines of other
communities which puts them on same
footing as Sikh shrines; transmits
proposed reply and asks for Mountbatten’s
views
Refers to No. 153 ; masterly way in
which H.M.G. managed to get Bill
through in record time saved breakdown
353
CH. 2 PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION
lxix
Name and Number
237 (cont.)
238 Record of Interview between
Jenkins and Swaran Singh
243 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
Paper I.B. (47)147
245 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 2957-S
246 Rumbold to Williams
Tel. 9701
247 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter
248 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 2963-S
Date
Main subject or subjects
Page
July
over reconstitution of Interim Govt;
unanimous advice of King and Cabinet
has made a difhcult decision to stay on
easy; negotiations with States and meeting
in Chamber of Princes; royal engagement
25 Jenkins states that Swaran Singh 354
should tell leaders of his party to
discourage Diwan at Nankana Sahib
(No. 214); Swaran Singh is still anxious
to get whole or part of Montgomery
district and Nankana Sahib but Jenkins
says Sikhs must dismiss from their minds
any idea of large territorial gains ; Jenkins
says it is not his business to advise
members of Boundary Commission or to
make any recommendations
26 Memorandum by Listowel on Ceremonies 361
in India on 15 August and Flags
26 Partition Council have agreed that 364
maintenance of independence of Judiciary
is ot paramount importance and that right of
proportionate pension should be
granted in certain circumstances;
has sent telegram to this effect to all
Governors
26 Refers to No. 20; so far as arrangements 365
before transfer of power are concerned,
all matters regarding content of treaty
are being covered either by provisions
of Act or in separate correspondence
26 Expresses surprise at attitude of C.-in-C. 365
and conduct of Mohamad Ali regarding
appointment of Joint Financial Advisers
to Supreme Commander; states that
general attitude of C.-in-C. is not in
keeping with position as it has
developed and asserts that Supreme
Commander will not be free to carry
out administration in accordance with
his own ideas; set-up of future Joint
Defence Council will have to be
reconsidered if there is any doubt
regarding position of Indian Govt and
its defence forces
26 Transmits personal message from Jinnah 367
to Cunningham in which former says
he is glad latter has agreed to serve as
Governor of N.W.F.P.
lxx
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date Main subject or subjects Page
July
250 Viceroy’s Conference Paper 27
V.C.P. 140
251 Mountbatten to Listowel 27
Tel. 2970-S
252 Mountbatten to Listowel 27
Tel. 2971-S
253 Mountbatten to Listowel 27
Tel. 2973-S
254 Jenkins to Mountbatten 27
Tel. 195-G (extract)
256 Minutes of Viceroy’s 28
Sixty Fifth Staff
Meeting
Items 2-3, 6-8
261 Cabinet India and Burma 28
Committee
LB. (47)43rd Meeting
Minute 2
267 Directive from Sir A. Smith 29
afs/34
268 Abell to Morris-Jones 29
Letter 1996/5
270 Record of Interview 29
between Mountbatten
and Nehru (extract)
272 Jenkins to Mountbatten 29
Tel. 197-G
The possibility of disturbances in 369
the Punjab; attempts to subvert troops
in areas concerned
Transmits text of Oath of Office for 370
Ministers
Refers to No. 204; Instrument of 370
Instructions and forms of oath
Appointment of Commanders of the 371
armed forces of two new Dominions
Situation worsening owing to Sikhs’ 372
refusal to await Boundary Commission
award and their apparent reluctance
to accept it
(2) the reconstitution of the Interim 373
Government, C.-in-C’s misunderstanding
of new situation; (3) principles to
govern employment after 15 th August
of British Officers serving with the
Armed Forces of the two new
Dominions; (6) the Government of the
future Dominion of India ; (7) the
retention of India within the
Commonwealth; (8) the possibility of
disturbances in the Punjab
Refers to No. 243 ; Ceremonies in India 381
on 15th August and Flags
for new Dominions
Use of British Troops after 14 August 394
1947; issued to selected British
commanders on Top Secret and personal
basis
Conveys request from Mountbatten for 397
Morris-Jones to examine question how
there can be looser form of
Commonwealth association allowing
India to remain a member even if it
becomes a Republic
Confusion over C.-in-C. and 399
reconstitution of Govt; assures Nehru
that he has complete faith in
Auchinleck’s integrity and that latter
had not seen order splitting Govt when
minutes were written ; explains that
Auchinleck is asking Trivedi to visit
him and says that Trivedi should help
to clear up confusion
Punjab Partition Committee has not 401
yet made promised statement; draft
has been prepared by Daultana but
Swaran Singh says he does not know
CH. 2 PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION
lxxi
Name and Number Date
July
272 ( cont .)
273
Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 3011-S
29
274
Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 3012-S
29
276
Provisional Joint Defence
Council Meeting
Case Nos. J.D.C. 9/2/47, 1 1/2/47
29
278
Minutes of Viceroy’s
Twenty Third Miscellaneous
Meeting
29
Main subject or subjects Page
what to do in view of Giani Kartar
Singh’s statement that Sikhs would
not accept Boundary Commission’s
award unless they considered it just;
has advised Swaran Singh to contact
Baldev Singh and suggests Mountbatten
should ask Baldev Singh to put
pressure on Giani to make statement
accepting award; demonstration at
Nankana Sahib has fizzled out
Oaths of Office and Oath of Secrecy 401
Refers to No. 273 ; transmits text of Oath 402
of Office for Governors and text of Oath
of Office for Ministers
(1) Position of British Troops after 403
15 August; (2) Situation in the Punjab
boundary areas
Mountbatten, Jinnah, Liaquat and 405
Lockhart discuss post-referendum
problem in N.W.F.P. ; agreement
that papers should be prepared for
meeting of Pakistan Executive Council
on (1) form of instructions which
Viceroy should issue to Governor of
N.W.F.P. on future government of
that province; (2) problem arising from
resignation of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad
as a member of the Constituent Assembly
279 Record of Interview between
Mountbatten and Jinnah and
Liaquat (extract)
283 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 3039-S
286 Mountbatten to Jenkins
Tel. 3041-S
29 (4) Bihar; (5) Arbitral Tribunal; (6) Amnesty 409
to be declared on 15th August;
(7) Flags
30 Provisional Joint Defence Council 413
agrees that Statement should be made
on role of British Forces and prefers
question and answer in Parliament
to announcement by Govt; transmits
suggested question and answer ; Partition
Council accepts that no RAF squadrons
will be available for operational use
30 Explains that Partition Council have 415
been discussing action to prevent
disturbances in neighbourhood of
boundaries between Dominions before
and after 15 August; to cover period
up to 15 August has been asked to instruct
Jenkins to declare districts likely to be
affected as ‘disturbed areas’ under
Punjab legislation as from 1 August;
asks Jenkins to take action now to cover
period before 15 August
lxxii
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
July
287 Minutes of Viceroy’s 30
Twenty Fourth Miscellaneous
Meeting
289 Record of Interview between 30
Mountbatten and Tuker and
Ranking
290 Record of Interview between 30
Mountbatten and Ghosh and
Suhrawardy
291 Record of Interview 30
between Mountbatten and
Suhrawardy
Main subject or subjects Page
Meeting between Mountbatten and 416
Provincial Separation Committee in
Bengal on (1) the Arbitral Tribunal ;
(2) the continuation of the Partition
Council after 15 August; (3) Internal
security; (4) the inclusion of roads, etc.
among the assets to be divided;
(5) Electrical fittings, Typewriters, etc;
(6) method of assessing present value of
Government buildings and lands ;
(7) money for East Bengal; (8) Building
Materials; (9) Food; (10) the posting of
officials
Mountbatten asks whether it is necessary 422
to establish in Bengal a system of joint
command similar to the one in the Punjab
and also whether there is confidence that
military authorities can deal with
likely disturbances in Calcutta; Tuker,
supported by Burrows and Ranking,
says joint command is not necessary;
Tuker anticipates larger disturbances than
before in and around Calcutta but says
army is ready to deal with them; Tuker
asks that steps be taken to expedite
provision of H.Q. for E. Bengal;
Mountbatten agrees to take matter up
upon his return to Delhi
Ghosh and Suhrawardy confirm that 423
they will issue joint statement similar
to one put out by Central Partition
Council; Mountbatten reports discussion
at No. 289 to effect that joint command
organisation is not necessary in Bengal ;
Suhrawardy indicates grounds for concern
which are discounted by Ghosh; the
Governor’s reassurance; money available
for move of E. Bengal Govt to Dacca;
future of Punjabi Mussulmans in
Calcutta armed police ; choice to be
offered to Govt servants ; communal
proportions in educational institutions
Suhrawardy suggests that E. and W. 424
Bengal should exchange representatives
after transfer of power; Mountbatten
welcomes suggestion and undertakes
to put it to Partition Council ;
Suhrawardy adds that he and Ghosh
have arranged weekly visits to each
other; Suhrawardy is enthusiastic when
Mountbatten divulges that Jinnah has
CH. 2 PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION lxxiii
Name and Number
Date
July
291 (cont.)
292 Jenkins to Mountbatten
30
Letter 698
293 Listowel to Mountbatten 30
Tel. 9857
294 Notes by Mohammad Ali 30
and Spence
298 Ismay to Mountbatten
Minute
Main subject or subjects Page
asked for Rowlands to come out as
Governor of E. Bengal
No improvement in communal situation 425
at Lahore and feeling in that city is
perhaps worse than it has ever been;
bomb outrages at Amritsar; situation
in Amritsar and Gurdaspur villages
gives cause for considerable anxiety;
Sikhs seem to be aggressors in rural
areas and they have made certain
preparations some of which have been
disclosed prematurely; Sikh meeting
at Nankana Sahib ; partition work is
making slow progress and a considerable
muddle on 15 August cannot be avoided;
shortage of rain and prospect of
poor harvests ; expects to relinquish
office on 14 August and to leave for
Karachi on 15 August; Enclosure:
note of interview with Giani Kartar
Singh; Jenkins insists that Sikhs have
no option but to accept Boundary
Commission award and that Sikhs are
doing themselves no good by their
demonstrations and outrages; Giani
says that Sikhs will not accept an
unjust award and that he will not
agree to make statement similar to
one made by Partition Council ; Giani
explains that Sikhs favour amalgamation
of non-Punjabi speaking districts with
U.P. or with any new Province and
would try to organise the rest of
E. Punjab, along with Sikh States, into a
Sikh majority province
Asks whether it is proposed that 43 1
Pakwasa should be appointed
Governor of Central Provinces and
Berar; explains that Berar Agreement
of 1936, under which Governor is
appointed after consultation with Nizam,
will lapse on 15 August; suggests that
Nizam be urgently consulted and says
that pending reply Pakwasa’s name will
not be submitted to king
The effect of the referendum in the 432
N.W.F.P. on the position of the
Ministry in that Province
Explains that Abell and Short consider
that it would be useless and impolitic
to press Baldev Singh to persuade Giani to
3i
439
lxxiv
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
298 (1 cont .)
299 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Tel. 203-G
300 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 95
301 Pakistan Cabinet Meeting
Case No. 1/1/47
302 Viceroy’s Personal Report
No. 15
Date Main subject or subjects Page
July
make statement as suggested in No. 272;
if Mountbatten agrees, a reply will be
sent to Jenkins accordingly
31 Refers to No. 286; whole of Punjab was 440
declared a disturbed area under Punjab
Disturbed Areas Act 1947 on 31 May;
presumes that notification of 3 1 May and
Punjab Disturbed Areas Act continue
in force automatically after 15 August
31 Transmits message from Attlee in 440
which latter states intention, on occasion
of end of Mountbatten’s ‘short but
great’ Viceroyalty and transfer of power,
to submit Mountbatten’s name to King
for Earldom; if King approves,
announcement will be made in U.K. on
15 August; asks if proposal is agreeable
to Mountbatten
August
1 The effect of the referendum in the 441
N.W.F.P. on the position of the
Ministry in that Province
1 Pressure of work and formation of Joint 443
Defence Council; disturbances in the
Punjab; rumours that Sikhs intend to
make trouble after announcement of
Boundary Commission award and
evidence that new Dominions will be
firm in dealing with disturbances ; meeting
with Bengal Separation Council;
meeting with Burrows and Army and
Area Commanders in Bengal; meeting
with Ghosh and Suhrawardy and issue of
joint statement similar to one made
by Central Partition Council; Sikhs
have ‘ratted’ on undertaking to issue
similar statement ; erection of temporary
buildings and repairs to old buildings
at Dacca and supplies for E. Bengal;
date for Muslim League departure from
Calcutta; difficult Joint Defence Council
and Partition Council meeting on, in
particular, division of air squadrons
between new Dominions ; Indian
contingent in Japan ; question of Ministry
in N.W.F.P. and advice given by
Pakistan Cabinet; Nehru’s desire to visit
Kashmir and decision, after meeting with
Gandhi, Nehru and Patel, that Gandhi
should go instead; interview with Nehru on
Commonwealth defence arrangements;
CH. 2 PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION lxxv
Name and Number Date
Main subject or subjects
Page
302 (cont.)
304 Note by Steering Committee
305 Abell to Abbott
Tel. 3094-S
306 Telephone message from Abbott
308 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 9962
August
continuation of Mountbatten’s personal
reports and composition of Indian
Cabinet; Nehru’s interview with
Elmhirst about command of Indian
Air Forces; visit of Dr Shariar;
Mountbatten’s address to Chamber of
Princes; attempt on Sir C. P.’s life and
accession of Travancore; Monckton’s
difficulties in Hyderabad; attempts to
persuade Dholpur to accede; negotiations
with, and behaviour of, Indore;
correspondence with Bhopal whose
extraordinary attitude is making his
position more difficult; luncheon party
for Rulers and announcement of accessions ;
I.N.A. prisoners; conditions in Indonesia;
postcript ; impending arrival of Indore
and Bhopal
1 Circulates draft statement by chairman 457
of A.F.R.C. on ‘Position of Supreme
Commander and his staff during
reconstitution’; recommends that Joint
Defence Council should accept statement
in principle
1 Refers to No. 272; Mountbatten is 458
convinced that Kartar Singh should
not be pressed; Tara Singh’s
statement suggests that there may
be no serious trouble for moment ;
asks whether Jenkins feels that statement
by Partition Committee would be
suitable
1 Refers to No. 305 and Enclosure to 459
No. 292; Jenkins confirms that Kartar
Singh should not be pressed to make
statement; there is going to be trouble
with Sikhs and raids on Muslim villages
have begun; cites casualties in Amritsar
rural area ; statement by Punjab
Partition Committee would have no effect ;
Jenkins will consult Committee again
1 Seeks confirmation of press reports 461
indicating that Constituent Assembly
will, at midnight on 14 August,
authorise Nehru to ask Mountbatten to
accept Governor-Generalship and to
submit names of new Cabinet; asks
Mountbatten to inform Attlee immediately
if revision of procedure is
contemplated
Ixxvi
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
August
309 Listowel to Mountbatten 1
Tel. 9980
310 Listowel to Mountbatten 1
Letter
3 11 Commonwealth Relations Office 1
to British High Commissioners
in Canada, Australia, New
Zealand and South Africa
Tel. 65
312 Patel to Mountbatten 2
Letter
314 Abell to Harris 2
Letter 1446/5
315 Christie to Tyson 2
Letter 1299/2
316 Listowel to Attlee 2
Minute 138/47
Main subject or subjects Page
Refers to No. 198, note 3 ; expresses 462
regret that Afghan Prime Minister
was unable to see Jinnah but is glad
that Pakistan Government is considering
its attitude towards tribes; is sending
memorandum on possibility of promoting
exchange of views between Pakistan and
India (and H.M.G. if invited) on
problem of frontier defence and
relations with Afghan tribes
Refers to No. 309 and forwards 463
memorandum on ‘North West Frontier
Tribal Area and Afghanistan’ ; H.M.G.
appreciate danger of intervening without
being asked and recognise that
initiative in this respect must come
from Pakistan ; trusts that Pakistan
Govt will appreciate wider aspects
outlined in para. 3 of memorandum
Refers to Vol XI, No. 203 ; proposed 466
alteration of King’s title by omission
of term ‘Emperor of India’
Composition of Joint Defence Council 466
requires reconsideration in view of
fact that, if original composition is
adhered to, Pakistan would be
represented by both its Governor-
General and its Defence Member
whereas India would be represented
only by its Defence Member; difference
is further accentuated by attitude
recently displayed by C.-in-C. ;
suggests strengthening Indian
representation by addition of another
Minister and requests early consideration
of this matter
Forwards letter from Rau giving 474
opinion about secession from
Commonwealth and particularly the
point whether there is any difference
as between India and the Dominions
under the Statute of Westminster
Disposal of Governors’ letters and 477
provincial records
Succession to present Indian membership 478
of U.N.O.; refers to Indian and
Burma Committee agreement (Vol. XI,
No. 244, Minute 2) that India should be
regarded as continuing international
personality of former ‘India’ ; Congress
CH. 2 PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION lxxvii
Name and Number Date
August
316 ( cont .)
317 Listowel to Mountbatten 2
Letter
318 RadclifFe to Abell 2
Message
319 Minutes of Viceroy’s Sixty 2
Sixth Staff Meeting
Item 13
320 Record of Interview between 2
Mountbatten and Nehru
Main subject or subjects Page
accept this interpretation but it has yet to
be accepted by League ; submits telegram
to Mountbatten asking him to acquaint
Jinnah with position
Refers to Nos 227 and 228; announcement 479
about appointments of Governors-
General and Governors; Dominion
Governors; provision of Dominions
expert; sentiments expressed by
Mountbatten upon passing of Act ;
Mountbatten’ s meeting with Kalat
delegation and his talks with Dewan of
Travancore and Hyderabad Delegation;
reiterates reservations about some of
Mountbatten’s comments in No. 234
and expresses view that if it is impossible
to secure accession of key States before
15 August, H.M.G. will be satisfied if
these and rest agree to be represented
internationally by appropriate Dominion;
Pakistan has simpler problem in dealing
with smaller number of States; Kashmir’s
terms for accession to Pakistan ;
Resolution on Services; report of
Union Constitution Committee of
Constituent Assembly; possibility
of reunion of Bihar with W. Bengal ;
messages for publication on 15 August;
Mountbatten’s visit to Bengal
Explains difference of opinion among 483
members of Bengal Boundary Commission
as to scope of their own duty in
respect of Sylhet; gives his own view
and asks whether any further instruction
can be given so as to put matter beyond
dispute ; Enclosures : message for Abell
and note by same explaining that
Mountbatten agrees with Radcliffe’s view
but that RadclifFe himself must decide
matter
The North West Frontier Province; 485
question of dismissing Ministry
Party for representatives of three parties 486
from Lords and Commons to meet
Krishna Menon; jail releases; I.N.A.
prisoners ; Governors’ fortnightly letters ;
Nehru’s proposal to call for personal
letters from Governors and Prime
Ministers and Mountbatten’s proposal
to invite Governors to conference;
lxxviii
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
320 (cant.)
321 H.M. Minister Kabul to G.O.I.,
External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations
Dept
Tel. 75
322 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 3100-S
323 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 3108-S
324 Mountbatten to Wylie
Tel. 3118-S
326 Short to Cripps
Letter (extract)
327 Lockhart to Mountbatten
Tel. CA-158
Date Main subject or subjects Page
August
recommendation that Sir Fazl Ali’s
appointment as permanent Judge of
Federal Court should be made before
15 August; appointments of Pakistan
High Commissioner for India and
Indian High Commissioner for Pakistan;
Enclosure: Note by Erskine Crum on
discussion of Gurkha question between
Mountbatten and Nehru
2 Resumption of articles in Afghan Press 488
on frontier problems
2 Has sent three telegrams on Service matters 489
suggesting in each case that liability
should be accepted by H.M.G. without
further attempt to negotiate with Patel
who is ‘tired’ of discussions about
protection of Services ; stresses that
financial implications are nothing
compared with importance of avoiding
friction with Patel
2 Refers to No. 308; no question of 490
altering procedure concerning
appointment of Governors; resolution
has been framed so as to avoid
embarrassment ; issue of announcement
about Central Provinces and Berar
should await clearance from
Mountbatten ; significance of midnight
on 14/15 August is that astrologers
consider this is an auspicious time
2 In response to enquiries from Muslim 490
League, asks if Wylie would be
prepared to consider accepting
Governorship of E. Bengal
3 Jinnah has made first major blunder 492
by asking for Governor-Generalship ;
feels that ‘powder magazine’ is among
armed forces massed to keep peace on
border; asserts that nothing will shake
Indians from their ‘obstinate popular
belief’ that Radcliffe will award as
Mountbatten dictates
3 Reviews position in light of Khan Sahib’s 493
refusal to resign voluntarily and likelihood
that League will make trouble if Ministry
remains in office after 15 August; dismissal
without dissolution would be
unconstitutional and inexpedient;
CH. 2 PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION lxxix
Name and Number Date
August
327 (cent.)
328 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 10078
331 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter
332 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter
333 Anderson to Harris
Minute
334 Govt of Australia to
Commonwealth Relations
Office
Tel. 211
336 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 3138-S
Main subject or subjects Page
advocates that retention of Ministry
should be conditional upon their
maintaining reasonable attitude towards
Pakistan Dominion and new Governor-
General ; says that choice between
dismissal and/or dissolution should not be
made and requests authority to put
conditions to Khan Sahib
3 Pakistan membership of U.N.O.; 494
explains position as stated in No. 316
and suggests that Muslim leaders should
be advised, if they wish to obtain early
election, to put forward provisional
application at once; recommends method
of approach and points out that both
India and Pakistan might have to apply
for membership if Muslim theory of
two co-equal States is pressed too far
4 Has been informed by members of 501
E. Punjab Ministry that situation in
Lahore continues to be tense and that
advent of 15 August is looked upon with
apprehension; requests action to
implement suggestion that military
pickets be kept in Lahore
4 Submits names of colleagues in new 501
Cabinet; explains position regarding
distribution and arrangement of
portfolios
4 Submits note on what attitude of H.M.G. 502
should be to a proposition that, in view
of balance of payments emergency, U.K.
should now suspend or greatly reduce
availability of sterling balances
4 Understands that H.M.G. intend to 504
negotiate with G.O.I. on establishment
of bases on Andaman and Nicobar
Islands; asks to be kept informed and
trusts that full consideration will be
given to ‘vital concern’ of Australia in
Indian Ocean line of communications
4 Refers to No. 309; Jinnah has put out 509
statement assuring tribal areas that
Pakistan Govt wishes to continue
treaties after 15 August and seeks
friendly relations with Afghan Govt ;
Jinnah and Nehru have agreed that Joint
Defence Council should discuss
Commonwealth defence problems, which
will probably include N.W.F., with
Chiefs of Staff
lxxx
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
Main subject or subjects
Page
August
337 Jenkins to Mountbatten 4
Letter 699
338 Jenkins to Abell 4
Letter
339 Cabinet India and Burma 4
Committee
I.B. (47) 44th Meeting
Minutes 3 and 4
341 Jenkins to Mountbatten 4
Tel. 214-G
342 Mountbatten to Listowel 5
Tel. 3170-S
343
Viceroy’s Conference Paper
5
V.C.P. 153
344
Partition Council Meeting
5
Case No. P.C. 120/15/47
345
Record of Interview between
5
Mountbatten, Jinnah, Liaquat,
Patel and Savage
346 Abell to Jenkins 5
Letter 592/98
Submits memorandum on the main 510
criticisms against the Punjab Govt
for its handling of the 1947 disturbances;
leaves it to Mountbatten to decide
whether there is any foundation for
allegations of partiality made against him
by Congress and League
Is sending Savage with papers which 527
Mountbatten should see or know of ;
question of arresting principal character
mentioned
(3) Role of British Troops in India; 528
(4) Messages for Indian Independence
Day
Refers to No. 331, note 2 and outlines 531
strength of troops in Greater Lahore ;
Commander of Boundary Force hopes to
establish more platoon posts but
emphasises that present arrangements
are a great strain on men employed
Refers to No. 302, paras. 19-24; reports 532
advice of Pakistan Provisional Cabinet
and attitude of Congress and League
leaders ; indicates course he might best
follow
Paper by Morris-Jones on ‘The Position 533
of India and Pakistan within the
Commonwealth’
Indian Independence (Rights, Property and 536
Liabilities) Order
Savage reports that certain individuals 537
arrested by Punjab C.I.D. Control have
implicated Tara Singh in terrorist
activities including production of bombs,
a Sikh plan to attack headworks and
a plan to blow up the Pakistan Special ;
after discussion Mountbatten decides to
recommend to Jenkins that Tara Singh
and other ringleaders should be arrested
at about the time of the Boundary
Commission’s award
Refers to No. 338 and conveys decision 539
reached in No. 345; Mountbatten is of
opinion that Jenkins should discuss
matter with Trivedi and Premiers of
E. and W. Punjab; Jenkins might wish
for more time to consider and possibly
after his discussions to make other
recommendations
CH. 2 PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION lxxxi
Name and Number
Date
August
347
Cabinet Paper
C.P. (47) 213
5
348
Bevin to Squire
Despatch II
5
349
G. of I., External Affairs and
5
Commonwealth Relations
Dept to H.M. Minister
Kabul
Tel. 183
350 G. of I., External Affairs and 5
Commonwealth Relations
Dept to H.M. Minister Kabul
Tel. 182
352 Provisional Joint Defence 6
Council Meeting
Case Nos. J.D.C. 44/7/47, 47/7/47
353 Partition Council Meeting 6
Case Nos. P.C. 142/16/47,
146/16/47
354 Patel to Mountbatten 6
Letter
355 Note by Cooke 6
Main subject or subjects Page
Memorandum by Dalton on ‘Indian 540
Sterling Balances’
Reports conversation with Afghan 541
Prime Minister on question of
Afghanistan’s interest in N.W.F.P.
Transmits text ofjinnah’s press statement 542
(see No. 336) and requests that paras. 3
and 4 be referred to Afghan Govt
Refers to No. 349, note 1, explains 543
legal view of tribal agreements which
may, subject to comments of H.M. G.,
be communicated informally to Afghans
(1) Terms of service for British officers 545
and men volunteering to stay
on after the 15 th August 1947;
(2) Statement by the Chief of Staff to His
Excellency the Viceroy; Ismay’s account
of his meeting with Chiefs of Staff on
subject of long-term defence arrangements
(1) The juridical position regarding 547
international personality and treaty
obligations; (2) Titles
Refers to Partition Council Meeting 549
at No. 344, note 1 and says that it was
not appreciated what consequences
would be of failure to agree to issue
the Properties, Rights and Liabilities
Order; explains why, in regard to
vesting of responsibility for Public Debt,
consequences would be extremely grave
and put in jeopardy peaceful
implementation of partition; suggests
that, until 15 August, it is
Mountbatten’s responsibility to issue
Order, irrespective of what parties
concerned may think
The Indian Independence (Properties, 551
Rights and Liabilities) Order; refers to
No. 344, note 1 and maintains that
Mountbatten has three options: (1) to
decide not to make an Order; (2) to make
an Order in terms contended for by
Indian Dominion in sense that material
assets would be vested according to
location and Indian Dominion would
assume responsibility for whole of
public debt; (3) to make an Order in
terms contended for by Pakistan
Dominion in sense that material assets
XXX!!
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
355 (cant.)
] 57 Mountbatten to Bourne
I el. 3197-S
3 5 8 Anderson to I lams
Minute
359 Mountbatten to Jenkins
Letter
361 Abell to Mountbatten
Minute
36.1 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 3205-S
363 Mountbatten to Lockhart
Pel. 3206-S
Date Main subject or subjects Page
August
would be vested jointly in two
Dominions who would also assume
joint responsibility for public debt;
suggests that least unsatisfactory of three
options is second and that should
Mountbatten decide on this course he
should first explain his decision to
Jinnah and Patel
6 Jinnah has asked whether Bourne would 555
serve temporarily as Governor of E.
Bengal; Mountbatten hopes Bourne will
agree
() Refers to No. 333; Sterling Balances; 556
says it is impossible to press Dalton to do
more for India and expresses fear that
Ministers may feel that Dalton has gone
too far
6 Refers to No. 292; difficult task 557
confronting existing and successor
govts in Punjab in maintaining security;
meeting with Savage; suggestion that
Spence should serve as Chairman of
Partition Council after 15 August;
regrets that partition work in Punjab is
not going well; will try to secure advance
warning about Boundary Commission’s
award; assumes that Mamdot’s election
as leader of League party for W. Punjab
means that he will be premier
6 1 las spoken to Jinnah who is in favour of 559
arresting more extreme Sikhs at once;
Jinnah thinks that Patel would welcome
trouble from Sikhs in Central Punjab
and that he (Patel) only accepted
arrangement agreed in No. 345 because
he had no alternative; Abell thinks
matter is important enough to get
Jenkins down for discussion
(> Refers to No. 328; Jinnah and Liaquat 559
have recognised necessity for Pakistan
to apply for membership of U.N.O.
and have asked that H.M.G. should put
in application on their behalf
6 Refers to No. 327; N.W.F.P. Ministry; 560
conveys advice tendered by Pakistan
Provisional Cabinet; has promised
to accept advice provided he is satisfied
he can do so constitutionally ; Congress
maintain that either proposed course of
action would be constitutionally improper;
is consulting Listowel about
constitutional position
CH. 2 PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION lxxxiii
Name and Number Date
August
364 Burrows to Mountbatten 6
Tel. 235-C
365 Lockhart to Mountbatten 6
Tel. CA-162
367 Patiala to Mountbatten 7
Letter
368 Cabinet C.M. (47) 70th 7
Conclusions
Minute 7
369 Minutes of Viceroy’s Sixty 7
Eighth Staff Meeting
Items 1 and 4
370 Mountbatten to Listowel 7
Tel. 3237-S
371 Foreign Office to Permanent U.K. 7
Representative to U.N.O.
Tel. 2513
372 Political Agent Jaipur to 7
Secretary to Crown
Representative
Tel. 1133/2
373 Govt of Pakistan External 7
Affairs and Commonwealth
Relations Dept to S. of S.
Tel. 6420
374 Mountbatten to Listowel 8
Tel. 3265-S
Main subject or subjects Page
Refers to discussion of internal security 561
in No. 287; Suhrawardy disputes having
agreed to having no joint command
organisation and, together with
Nazimuddin, presses strongly for such an
organisation to control troops in
Calcutta area; Ghosh strongly disagrees;
Burrows states that his views remain
unchanged
Khan Sahib has learned that Ministry 561
might be dismissed before 15 August
and so his party has decided to keep
away from celebrations on that date ;
Khan Sahib reiterates that his party
is prepared to accept Pakistan provided
(1) N.W.F.P. is autonomous on all
matters except External Affairs, Defence
and Communications and (2) no
prohibition is placed on party programmes
conducted in constitutional manner
Explains his views on boundary line of 563
division in Punjab
Indian Sterling Balances 565
(1) Astrology; (4) The Indian 5 66
Independence (Properties, Rights and
Liabilities) Order
Transmits text of communique outlining 569
agreement reached between Govts
concerned about future of Gurkha
units which form part of Indian Army
Explains that Muslim leaders have asked 570
that U.K. should submit immediate
application on behalf of Pakistan;
suggests method of approach and
requests views on same
Reports on disturbances in Alwar 571
Govts of U.S.A., China, Iran, Afghanistan 572
and Egypt have been approached with
proposal for exchange of Ambassadors
with Pakistan; Australia and Canada have
been approached for appointment of High
Commissioners
Submits programme for Frontier Province 572
following talks with Jinnah and Liaquat;
Liaquat on Khan Sahib’s intentions
lxxxiv
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
Main subject or subjects
Page
377 Abell to Abbott
Letter
378 Notes by Abell and C. P. Scott
3 79 Mountbatten to Jenkins
Tel. 3269-S
381 Lockhart to Mountbatten
Tel. CA/166
3 82 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Tel. 219-G
3 84 Mountbatten to Listowel
Letter
385 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 16
August
8 Refers to map showing roughly boundary 579
which Radcliffe proposes to demarcate
and note by Beaumont describing it ;
explains that there will not be great
changes from this boundary and that
award is expected within next 48 hours
8/1 1 Abell’s note refers to Patiala’s letter at 580
No. 367 and suggests that it would be
best not to reply; Scott’s note explains
that Mountbatten is now inclined to send
a reply pointing out that he is in no way
able to influence findings of Boundary
Commission
8 Jinnah would like immediate action 5 80
on Sikh conspirators and only agrees
to arrests being made when results of
Boundary Commission’s award are
known as compromise; Trivedi confirms that
Patel would like to postpone action ;
Jenkins is best judge of situation and
Mountbatten will agree if he advises
waiting to see reactions to award
8 Refers to No. 374; suggests that Governor 582
should invite League leaders to form
new Ministry immediately he dismisses old
8 Reports that situation is now serious 583
with organised raids, in most of which
Sikhs are aggressors, in the rural
areas of some central districts; requests
reinforcements and earliest possible
advance information of Boundary
Commission’s award
8 Kalat; cession of Darjeeling; speech to 588
Chamber of Princes ; terrorist activities
amongst Sikhs; Mutiny Memorials in
U.P. ; invitations to some Princes and
Dominion Prime Ministers to attend
Princess Elizabeth’s wedding
8 Meeting with Khan of Kalat ; League 590
pressure on States with Muslim rulers
who are geographically linked with
Indian Dominion; Rampur; Bhopal’s
threat to abdicate; interview with
Indore; extended date for Hyderabad;
Gandhi’s visit to Kashmir; Gandhi’s
absence from 1 5 August celebrations
and his decision to spend rest of his
life in Pakistan looking after
minorities; astrologers; Governor
for E. Bengal; meetings of Joint Defence
Council and Partition Council ;
CH. 2 PREPARATIONS FOR TRANSFER AND PARTITION lxxxv
Name and Number Date
Main sub iect or subjects
Page
August
385 ( cont .) statement on Refugees; Union Jack to
be flown with Dominion Flag on public
buildings on certain days of year ;
honours for Princes ; Draft Properties,
Rights and Liabilities Order;
Chairmanship of Partition Council ;
abolition of Auxiliary Force (India) ;
Ismay’s statement on conversations
with Chiefs of Staft ; division of
R.I. A.F. ; military situation in
Pakistan after 15 August; Defence
Member; attitude of Congress towards
Auchinleck; composition of Indian
Cabinet; Bose’s attack on
Rajagopalachari; problem of N.W.F.P. ;
correspondence with Nehru on Personal
Staff and accommodation ; Indian
contingent in Japan; British personnel
in Indian Army who have volunteered
to stay on; ‘titbit’ of the week;
Jinnah’s offer to Jodhpur and intrigues
of Bhopal ; Jinnah’s refusal to agree to
proposals on Properties, Rights and
Liabilities Order; Appendices:
(1) Statement by Partition Council;
(2) Proposed dates on which the Union
Jack will be flown on public buildings ;
(3) Extract from Minutes of a meeting
of the Partition Council on Wednesday,
6 August 1947
Mountbatten 8 Refers to Nos. 362 and 371; explains that 607
Pakistan itself should submit
application for membership of U.N.O.
on 15 August
Mountbatten 8 N.W.F.P. ; considers that alternatives 608
proposed in para. 2 of No. 342 would
be unconstitutional ; is inclined to leave
problem to be resolved after 15 August
without intervention of Mountbatten
3 86 Listowel to
Tel. 10280
387 Listowel to
Tel. 10278
or H.M.G.
lxxxvi
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
CHAPTER 3
The Report of the Boundary Commission and the Transfer oj Power: 9 to 15 August
1947
Name and Number
389 Minutes of Viceroy’s Sixty
Ninth Staff Meeting
Item 1
391 Abbott to Abell
Tel. 221-S
Main subject or subjects
392 Lockhart to Mountbatten
Tel. CA/167
393 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 3284-S
394 Lockhart to Mountbatten
Letter GH-151 (extract)
395 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter
397 Flarris to Principal
Ganga Singh
Letter
Date
1947
August
9 (1) The Punjab: publication of Boundary
Commission award, seriousness of
situation
9 Refers to No. 377; Jenkins trusts final
version of Boundary Commission’s award
will be very precise and would like
document in its final form 24 hours
before release
9 Area Commander and Inspector-General
of Police are gravely perturbed at
prospect of dismissal ; explains that
preparations to act at once are going
ahead but recommends delay with
Jinnah being asked to urge patience on
League
9 Refers to No. 387; proposes to inform
Jinnah of Listowel’s view that dismissal
would be unconstitutional and to ask
him to discuss with Cunningham what
action should be taken about a change
of Ministry on or after 15 August
9 Reviews general situation in N.W.F.P.
9 Submits note by Khosla on canal system in
Punjab ; Mountbatten to decide whether
it should be sent on to Radclifte
9 Refers to No. 230 and its note 1 ; matter is
out of Listowel’s hands and he could
only repeat what has already been said
by Patrick
Page
610
615
615
616
616
618
621
398
Listowel to Azad
Letter
9
Question of return to India of certain
articles of historical interest in U.K.
622
399
Listowel to Attlee
Minute 144/47
9
Submits memorandum on ‘The future
of the India Office and its contents’
622
400
Bevir to Helsby
Minute
9
The future of the India Office and its
contents ; asks if it is worth trying to get
Mountbatten to settle this matter
628
402
Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter
9
Commends Mountbatten’s Personal
Reports; appeals to Privy Council;
looser form of association within
629
Commonwealth; citizenships; Burma
and the Commonwealth; honours for
Princes ; luncheon for Krishna Menon ;
civilian ex-service clerks serving in
G.H.Q. (1); governorship of E. Bengal and
CH. 3 THE REPORT OF THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION lxxxvii
Name and Number Date
August
402 ( cont. )
403 Jenkins to Mountbatten 9
Letter 703
404 Mountbatten to Jenkins 9
Tel. 3290-S
405 Bikaner to Mountbatten 10
Tel.
406 Mountbatten to Nehru 10
Letter 1446/17
407 Mountbatten to Liaquat 10
Ali Khan
Letter
408 Mountbatten to Jenkins 10
Letter
409
Wylie to Mountbatten
10
Letter U.P.-89 (extract)
410
Wylie to Mountbatten
10
Letter U.P.-90 (extract)
414
Burrows to Mountbatten
10
Tel. 249-C
Main subject or subjects Page
establishment of new capital at Dacca ;
Nehru’s urge to visit Kashmir;
readiness of Nehru andjinnah to receive
Chiefs of Staff ; Mountbatten’s first and last
contact with Chamber of Princes ;
problem of Hyderabad; I.N.A. prisoners;
amalgamation of India Office staff'
with that of Commonwealth Relations
Office; Resolution on the Services;
messages for Independence Day; pays
tribute to achievements of
Mountbatten and his staff
Refers to No. 379; matter has been 636
discussed with Trivedi and Mudie
and agreement reached (a) that arrests
would not improve and might worsen
immediate situation; (b) that it would
be better to leave new Govts of
W. and E. Punjab to deal with Sikhs if they
give serious trouble
Refers to No. 382; reinforcements for 638
Punjab Boundary Force
Explains why he is concerned by rumours 638
that Boundary Commission is likely to
award Ferozepur Tehsil to W. Punjab
and asks Mountbatten to see his Prime
Minister and Chief Engineer Irrigation
Refers to No. 395; explains that it would 639
be wrong for him to forward
any memorandum to the Boundary
Commission
N.W.F.P. Ministry; refers to advice 640
in No. 301 and explains that Listowel
has sent instructions that both courses of
action would be unconstitutional ; action
to be taken is a matter which Liaquat and
Jinnah will wish to discuss with
Cunningham
Expresses thanks for No. 337 and its 641
Enclosure; says that criticism could
not have been avoided in the circumstances
and that ‘this admirable record’ will
protect reputation of British in last
period of their rule in India
Confirms that there will be no jubilant 641
pulling down of ‘the old flag’ in the U.P.
Comments on work of British Governors 642
in Indian Provinces during last year
Essential to have 24 hours notice of 646
Bengal Boundary Commission award
lxxxviii
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date Main subject or subjects Page
August
416 Mountbatten to Listowel 10
Tel. 3311-S
417 Hydari to Mountbatten 10
Tel. 175-MSG
418 Abell to Governor’s 10
Secretary, Sind
Tel. 3312-S
422 Mountbatten to Listowel 10
Tel. 3322-S
423 Patel to Mountbatten 11
Letter
425 Gazette of India Extraordinary n
Notification by Secretariat of the
Governor-General (Reforms)
427 Mountbatten to Bikaner n
Tel. 646— GT
428 Ismay to Liaquat Ali Khan 11
Letter
429 Ismay to Messervy 11
Letter
430
Note by Morris-jones
11
431
Attlee to Listowel
11
Minute M3 07/47
432
Note by Hawthorn
11
433
Lockhart to Mountbatten
11
Tel. CA/172
Transmits form of combined oath of 647
Allegiance and Office for Governor-
General and alterations in oaths of
Allegiance and Office and Secrecy for
Governors and Ministers as suggested by
Jinnah
Sylhet Boundary Commission; submits 647
representation from Govt of Assam
and explains why he supports it
Transmits details of derailment of 648
Pakistan special train
Refers to No. 385, paras. 31-38; explains 651
position concerning vesting of assets
and liabilities and asks Listowel to
instruct him to issue an Order on same
Explains briefly lines on which India 652
proposes to deal with question of
responsibility for the present National
Debt and the allocation of cash balances
The Joint Defence Council Order, 655
1947
Explains that he has nothing to do with 662
findings of Boundary Commission
Says he was ‘dumbfounded’ to receive 662
message from Liaquat to effect that,
on political as opposed to judicial
grounds, Gurdaspur or a large portion
of it has been given to E. Punjab by
award of Boundary Commission; asserts
that Mountbatten has from outset
made it clear that he has nothing
to do with Boundary Commissions ;
explains that he is at a loss to know what
action Liaquat wishes him to take
Explains, inter alia , that in present state 663
of feelings there is no hope of India
recognising that it has any share of
responsibility for security of North
West Frontier
Note on the Right of Secession 664
[from the Commonwealth]
Future of India Office and its contents 666
Summarises report from Commander of 66 7
Punjab Boundary Force
Refers to Nos. 374 and 387; Khan Sahib 668
has given assurances that press
reports of proposal to declare Pathanistan
on 15 August are nonsense and that there is
CH. 3 THE REPORT OF THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION lxxxix
Name and Number Date
August
433 (cont.)
436 Minutes of Viceroy’s 12
Seventieth Staff Meeting
Item 4
437 Jenkins to Mountbatten 12
Tel. 228-G
438 Gazette of India Extraordinary 12
Notification by Secretariat of the
Governor-General (Reforms)
439 U.K. High Commissioner 12
in India to Cabinet Office
IRKU 600
441 Mountbatten to Patiala 12
Letter
443 Listowel to Attlee 12
Minute 147/47
444 United Nations Secretariat 12
Memorandum
445 Govt of Pakistan, 12
External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations
Dept to S. of S.
Tel. 6617
446 Mountbatten to Jenkins 12
Tel. 3366-S
447 Listowel to Mountbatten 12
Tel. 1 049 1
448 Jenkins to Mountbatten 12
Tel. 230-G
Main subject or subjects Paye
no question of this or any other
unconstitutional action
The Boundary Commissions 673
Accounts for outbreak of serious disorders 674
in Lahore; says that strength of Boundary
Force is inadequate
The Arbitral Tribunal Order, 1947 675
Transmits text of telegram from H.M. 678
Minister, Nepal indicating that Maharaja
has no objection to eight Gurkha units
named in communique at No. 370
being earmarked for transfer to British
Army
Emphasises why it has been impossible 680
for him to consider forwarding to
Boundary Commission Patiala’s
representation in No. 367
Arrangements for discussions between 683
Joint Defence Council and representatives
of the Chiefs of Staff on Commonwealth
Defence problems
Effect of Indian Independence Act, 1947 685
on Membership and Representation of
India in the United Nations
Govt of Pakistan would be grateful 686
if U.K. Ambassador and not his
Indian colleague would represent
Pakistan after 15 August at Washington
and other posts where there are U.K. and
Indian Embassies
Awards for Punjab and Bengal will 687
not be ready for publication till 15th
evening or 16th morning; Govts of
E. and W. Punjab must take charge
according to notional boundaries on 15th
and adjust later
Refers to No. 422; matter will be discussed 688
with Cooke; suggests that Pakistan’s
objections might be reduced if question
of cash balances is dealt with
simultaneously and requests views as to
how much of same should be allocated to
Pakistan if he decides to divide them
Reports that Police in Lahore and 688
Amritsar are now unreliable and that
railways will not be safe unless Army
can take over ‘War Department’
xc
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date Main subject or subjects Page
August
448 ( cont .)
449 Nehru to Mountbatten 13
Letter
450 U.K. High Commissioner in 13
India to Cabinet Office
IRKU 596
451 U.K. High Commissioner in 13
India to Cabinet Office
IRKU 597
452 Patel to Mountbatten 13
Letter
453 Mountbatten to Burrows
and Jenkins, repeated
to Christie
Tel. 2097-S
454 Mountbatten to Nehru
Letter 1446/7
455 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter
457 Meeting of Indian Cabinet
Case No. 212/38/47
459 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter 704
lines; Muslim League National guards
are now very active in Lahore city
Refers to Nos. 395 and 406; 689
appreciates Mountbatten’s point of view
Reports view of French Charge d’ Affaires 689
on French Establishments in India
Reports conversation with Secretary 690
General of External Affairs Dept
on French and Portuguese possessions
in India
Deputation of Chittagong Hill Tribes 691
have expressed ‘grave apprehension’
that their area is to be included in
E. Bengal under Boundary Commission
Award; has told deputation that
proposition is ‘monstrous’ and that
should it happen they could count on
‘our maximum support’ in resisting it;
points out that there have been complaints
about procedure adopted by Radcliffe ;
Enclosure: copy of letter from
Chairman of Advisory Committee of
Constituent Assembly to Chairman of
Bengal Boundary Commission
13 Informs Burrows and Jenkins that 693
there is no objection to their
announcing that since award of
Boundary Commission is unlikely to
be ready for publication before 16 August,
Govts of E. and W. Bengal/Punjab will
take charge up to notional boundary
pending publication and implementation of
award; asks Christie to make similar
announcement in Delhi after securing
Nehru’s concurrence
13 Suggests that findings of Boundary 693
Commission should be discussed between
representatives of India and Pakistan
before award is published
1 3 Encloses copy of message he is sending on 695
occasion of departure of first contingent
of British troops from India
13 The India (Provisional Constitution) 697
Order, 1947
13 Reports on communal disturbances 700
during first half of August; difficult
task of Punjab Boundary Force; Punjab
Partition Committee has completed such
work as it was able to do on 1 1 August ;
harvest prospects
CH. 3 THE REPORT OF THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION
XC1
Name and Number
Date
Main subject or subjects
Page
August
460
Telephone Message from
13
Situation in E. Punjab is bad and
704
Messervy and Rees
postponement of Boundary
Commission’s award is causing
uncertainty
461
Cabinet Office to U.K.
13
Transmits text of message, to be delivered
705
High Commissioner in India
UKRI 556
on 15 August, from Attlee to Nehru
462
Mountbatten to Listowel
13
Refers to No. 447; explains why it is out
706
Tel. 7-K
of question for Listowel to decide allocation
of cash balances
464
Mountbatten to Listowel
13
Pakistan Cabinet have urged retention
707
Tel. 14-K
in modified form of Section 93 in
Pakistan Adaptation Order; explains
views of Pakistan colleagues and
Reforms Secretariat and seeks advice
on constitutional position
465
Mountbatten to Listowel
13
Refers to No. 464; transmits text
708
Tel. 15-K
of suggested provision for retention
of Section 93 in Pakistan Adaptation
Order
466
Jenkins to Mountbatten
13
Reports casualties in Lahore, Amritsar and
708
Tel. 231-G
Gurdaspur; general situation deteriorating
467
Jenkins to Mountbatten
13
Refers to No. 466; reports that Lahore
709
Tel. 232-G
urban area and Amritsar district are out of
control
468
Listowel to Mountbatten
13
Understands that there is no question
710
Tel. 10595
of fixing by Order Pakistan’s
contribution in respect of national debt
or Pakistan’s share of cash balances ;
agrees that, subject to amendments,
Mountbatten should issue Order vesting
assets and liabilities and emphasises
importance attached to amendment
about pensions
469
Listowel to Mountbatten
13
Mountbatten will doubtless explain
711
Tel. 10598
to Jinnah factors which have influenced
470 Gazette of India
Notification by
the Governor-
471 Gazette of India
Notification by
the Governor-
472 Mountbatten to
Letter
Extraordinary
the Secretariat of
-General (Reforms)
Extraordinary
the Secretariat of
-General (Reforms)
Nehru
him in regard to Order vesting assets and
liabilities ; agrees that Order of this sort is
essential and that it is in Pakistan’s
interests that Dominion of India should
assume responsibility for public debt
14 The Indian Independence (International
Arrangements) Order, 1947
14 The Indian Independence (Rights,
Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947
14 Refers to No. 454; has prevailed upon
Jinnah to send Liaquat and one other
representative to attend this'vital meeting’
on 1 6th; explains that he is proposing to
711
70
720
XC11
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date Main subject or subjects Page
August
472 ( cent .)
473
Smith to Abell
Letter 190/CGS
14
476
U.K. Fligh Commissioner in
India to Cabinet Office
IRKU 618
14
477
Wylie to Mountbatten
Teh unnumbered
14
478
Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
Paper I.B. (47) 156
14
479
Listowel to Mountbatten
Teh 10633
14
480
Listowel to Mountbatten
Teh 109
14
481
Cunningham to Mountbatten
Letter
14
483
Listowel to Mountbatten
Teh no
14
484
Jenkins to Mountbatten
Teh 234-G
N
485
Mountbatten to Listowel
Teh 3408-S
14
486
Note by Auchinleck
15
487
Minutes of Meeting between
16
Mountbatten and representatives
of India and Pakistan
488 Mountbatten to Listowel 16
Letter
call a meeting of Joint Defence Council
on same day to hear Auchinleck’s report
on his visit to the Punjab; Mountbatten,
Auchinleck and Baldev Singh will
leave meeting once report is over,
leaving Nehru and Patel to have their
discussion with Liaquat and his colleague
Refers to No. 448; reinforcements 721
for the Punjab Boundary Force
Refers to No. 461 and transmits text of 724
Nehru’s reply
Lowering of Union Jack on Lucknow 725
Residency
Note by Listowel circulating letter 725
he has received from Lady Mountbatten
Refers to No. 464; amendment of 726
Section 93 in way desired by
Pakistan Govt is of doubtful legality;
correct course is for Pakistan Govt to
seek such powers as they need from
Pakistan Constituent Assembly
Transmits personal message 726
Encloses note on talks with Khan Sahib 727
and Abdul Qaiyum and says there is no
doubt that Jinnah will order dismissal of
Ministry on 16-18 August
Transmits personal message from Attlee 731
Most unsatisfactory situation in Lahore 732
and Amritsar district ; responsibility for
attacks on two trains; reassignment of
personnel completed
States that crisis has arisen over awards of 732
Boundary Commissions and submits
brief outline of facts of case and action
he has taken
Note on situation in Punjab Boundary 734
Force Area for Joint Defence Council
The Awards of the Boundary Commissions 737
Question of applying Pensions (Increase) 740
Act, 1947, to pensioners of Indian Services
in U.K.; Nehru’s request in relation to
Peruvian Orders; Messervy’s paper on
problems facing Pakistan Army;
memorandum on North-West Tribal
Area and Afghanistan; Jinnah’s press
CH. 3 THE REPORT OF THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION
XC111
Name and Number
Date
Main subject or subjects
Page
488 (cotit.)
August
statement on Frontier ; need for new
Govts to feel impact of events before
they can shape their foreign policy;
consultation about Frontier policy;
communique on negotiations between
Kalat and Pakistan; Ismay’s statement
to Joint Defence Council ; Chiefs of Staff
Mission; has asked Nehru’s concurrence to
attend Princess Elizabeth’s wedding ;
Listowel’s farewell telegram; strain on
‘operational staff ’ during last few weeks;
pays tribute to Abell and his ‘gallant
P.S.V. team’; honours for Viceroy’s
staff ; expresses appreciation of work of
India Office ; Enclosures : Appendix I :
award of Punjab Boundary Commission;
Appendix II: award of Bengal Boundary
Commission; Appendix III: report of
Bengal Boundary Commission relating to
Sylhet District and the adjoining
districts of Assam
489 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 17 16 Crisis over Boundary Commission 757
awards; summary of Auchinleck’s
account to Joint Defence Council of his
visit to Punjab; arrangements for meeting
with Rees; arrival of Cunningham and
discussions on Khan Sahib Ministry;
crisis concerning proposed Order vesting
assets and liabilities; Tara Singh’s reported
involvement in terrorist plans and
decision to defer arrests ; latest figures tor
British personnel in Indian Army
volunteering to stay on; Indian Air
Force flag ; Baldev Singh and Auchinleck ;
Partition Council has decided not to choose
an independent Chairman; organisation
of Cabinet Secretariat and its relations
with Nehru’s personal Secretariat;
extraordinary behaviour of some of
Rulers of Indian States ; Jodhpur’s
flirtation with Jinnah and Patel’s response;
Baroda giving difficulty; private
arrangement with Bhopal who has decided
, not to abdicate at present; Indore
‘almost missed the bus’ ; accession of
Dholpur; no outstanding States (taking
extensions to Hyderabad and Bhopal into
account) beyond Kashmir where
Maharaja talks of holding a referendum;
constitutional reforms in States and advice
to Rewa; visit to Karachi on 13 th to bid
XCIV
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
Date Main subject or subjects
Page
489 ( cont .)
August
godspeed and farewell to Pakistan ;
meeting of Pakistan Cabinet; State
banquet; address to Pakistan
Constituent Assembly and State
procession; midnight session of [India]
Constituent Assembly; 15 August — ‘the
most remarkable and inspiring day of my
life’ ; the ceremonies and crowd scenes ;
Prasad’s message and Nehru’s toast to the
King; party at Government House;
meeting to discuss Boundary Commission
awards and steps contemplated by new
Govts; Nehru’s message to British troops;
last ‘tail piece’; postscript: departure of
British troops from Bombay; Enclosures:
Appendix I ; text of Mountbatten’s address
to India Constituent Assembly;
Appendix II: text of Mountbatten’s
address to Pakistan Constituent Assembly
CHAPTER 4
I
2
4
The States: Negotiations on Accession: 8 July to 15 August 1947
Name and Number Date Main subject or subjects
Page
Menon to Patrick
Tel. 1823-G
Secretary to Crown Representative
to Residents
Tel. 1810-P
Kashmir to Mountbatten
Letter
1947
Ju,y
8 Urges that no inkling be given that
H.M.G. might be prepared to accord
independent recognition to any State
not joining one of new Dominions
8 Refers to Vol. XI, No. 287; Residents
to inform States that proposal for
immediate accession of States on three
central subjects will be included in agenda
for States Department meeting later in
the month
8 Refers to Vol. XI, No. 386; Kashmir Govt
will not establish military links with
either of Dominions or send representatives
to a Constituent Assembly until it sees
how situation develops; in view of risk of
untoward incidents asks Viceroy to
dissuade all political leaders including
Gandhi from visiting Kashmir at this time;
encloses letter, which Mountbatten may
show to Gandhi, explaining the
situation in Kashmir and why it will not
be possible for Gandhi to meet Sheikh
Abdullah
1
2
3
CH. 4 THE STATES
XCV
Name and Number Date
July
6 Record of Interview between 8
Mountbatten and Nehru
(extract)
9 Cripps to Rajagopalachari 8
Letter
1 1 Record of Interview between 8
Mountbatten and Monckton
23 Patrick to Menon 8
Tel. 8755
30 Mountbatten to Listowel 9
Tel. 1850-S
33 Hyderabad to Mountbatten 9
Letter
37 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty Fifth 9
Staff Meeting
Item 2
Main subject or subjects Page
Nehru complains about Sir C. P. 6
Ramaswami Aiyer’s ‘insulting’
remarks; indicates that Congress is now
prepared to accept accession of States to
Indian Dominion on basis of three subjects
of Defence, External Affairs and
Communications
Refers to Vol. XI, No. 459; H.M.G.
cannot go beyond new proviso to
clause 7 of Bill without breaking faith
with Princes
Question of Hyderabad joining Dominion 1 1
of India ; in order to help in negotiation
with Nizam, Mountbatten allows
Monckton to hint that Nizam’s second
son might be granted title and rank of ‘His
Highness’
Refers to No. 1; confirms that H.M.G. 21
will not include paragraphs concerning
international position of States in Commons
statement on States; given that it might
not be possible to avoid statement
during Lords debate, India Office
would appreciate early information
about forthcoming conference with
States representatives
Refers to Vol. XI, No. 559, para 2; 28
encloses Corfield’s views on problem
of petty States in relation to lapse of
paramountcy; Corfield feels
apprehensions of Sir B. N. Rau are
exaggerated
Complains that clause 7 of Independence 3 1
Bill has been discussed with British
Indian leaders but not with himself or any
of his representatives ; protests about
unilateral repudiation of Hyderabad’s
treaties with British Crown; says that he
will negotiate with new Dominions in
order to reach practical arrangements for
transition period but adds that he still
hopes that he will be allowed to retain
direct relations with H.M.G. when
British withdraw; retains right to publish
letter should it be deemed necessary in the
interests of his State
No further action to be taken on 35
suggestion to revise clause 7 of proviso
to Independence Bill to include matters
other than those contained therein ;
Viceroy has assured Congress leaders that
CO
XCV1
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
Main subject or subjects
Page
37 (cont.)
39 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 118/47
4 o Christie to Abell
Letter, para. 4
43 Record of Interview between
Mountbatten and Gandhi
58 Ramaswami Aiyar to Resident lor
Madras States
Letter
61 Minutes of Viceroy’s Nineteenth
Miscellaneous Meeting
62 Krishna Menon to Mountbatten
Letter
65 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 12
paras. 26-34
66 Viceroy’s Conference Paper
V.C.P. 125
75 States Dept to Residents
Tel. i-S
Julr
he will now give priority to States
problem; Congress leaders have accepted
Viceroy’s suggestions for conducting
negotiations with States ; in view of
Nishtar’s complaint, Congress leaders
have agreed that he should have access
to Secretary of States Department
9 Outlines agreement reached with Viceroy 39
on what should be said in Commons
debate concerning international position
of States after 15 August; encloses note on
States for use during debate
9 Refers to point raised by Nehru in Vol. XI, 42
No. 535; India Committee are of
opinion that no further amendment can
be made to Bill
9 Gandhi urges that States should not be 50
encouraged to declare independence;
Mountbatten indicates the negotiations in
view to ensure the States joining one
Dominion or the other
10 Refers to Resident’s letter following 76
receipt of No. 2; explains that
Travancore has decided to retain its
independent status; relations to be
established with new dominion(s)
must therefore be subject of separate
negotiations and agreements
1 1 Meeting between Mountbatten and 79
Hyderabad delegation on
(1) Secunderabad Cantonments; (2) Railway
Lands; (3) future of Berar; (4) Standstill
Agreements ; (5) adherence on the three
central subjects; (6) adherence to the
Legislative Assembly of India
11 Expresses thanks for sentiments expressed 89
in No. 55; comments on other matters
including States
11 Has persuaded Nehru and Patel to give 92
him ‘a fairly free hand’ in negotiations
with States ; meeting with Hyderabad
delegation ; admits that he has not been
able to 'grip this States problem before’
11 Issue of Arms and Ammunition to States 100
11 Refers to Vol. XI, No. 287 and No. 2 111
of this Vol.; transmits agenda for
conference between States representatives
and States Dept to be held in Delhi
on 25 July and following days
CH. 4 THE STATES
XCV11
Name and Number Date
July
78 Mountbatten to Gandhi 12
Letter
82 Record of Interview between 12
Mountbatten and Jinnah
85 Mountbatten to Listowel 12
Tel. 1920-P
87 Extract from India News 13
93 Resident for Madras States to 13
Secretary to Crown
Representative
Tel. 58-P
100 Mountbatten to Bhopal 14
Letter
104 Menon to Ramaswami Aiyar 14
Letter
105 Record ot Interview between 14
Mountbatten and Mitter and
Jodhpur (extract)
106 Cabinet India and Burma 14
Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)139
1 15 Trivedi to Mountbatten 15
Report 4 (extract)
Main subject or subjects Page
Refers to Enclosure to No. 4; Gandhi’s 114
proposed visit to Kashmir
Jinnah says Muslims throughout India 121
would rise to defend oldest Muslim
dynasty if Congress exerted pressure on
Hyderabad; Jinnah agrees to Mountbatten
calling a meeting with Khan of Kalat to
suggest that he should join Pakistan
Explains that conference between States 126
Dept and representatives of States will
take place on 25 July; first item on
agenda will be three subject accession;
States Dept consider it will assist
negotiations if H.M.G. make it clear that
States must come to arrangements with
appropriate Dominion
In statement on Kashmir situation Jinnah 128
says that States are free to join either
Assembly or to remain independent and
calls upon Kashmir Govt to release Muslim
Conference Leaders in Kashmir
Travancore Govt do not intend to accede 138
to either Dominion and feel there is no
point in sending representatives to
meeting on 25 July but are ready to
negotiate with Dominions on all other
matters
Urges Bhopal to accept three subject 144
accession and not to say ‘No’ without a
further talk
Refers to No. 58; outlines background 148
to establishment of States Dept and three
subject accession; explains why
Mountbatten is anxious that negotiations
with representatives of States should
take place before 15 August; earnestly
requests him not to take any precipitate
decision
Mitter and Jodhpur express delight at 150
setting up of States Department
and are optimistic about outcome of
future discussions; Mitter feels that so long
as Congress demands accession on three
central subjects only most States will
voluntarily surrender a number of: other
subjects to Dominion Central Govt
Memorandum by Listowel on Travancore’s 15 1
claim for Independence
Standstill Arrangements with States; 169
princes of Orissa States will find
XCV111
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
1 15 ( cont .)
1 18 Chiefs of Staff Committee joint
Planning Staff
J.P. (47)89 (Final)
123 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 9109
129 Gandhi to Mountbatten
Letter
1 41 Menon to Patrick
Tel. 5577
146 Statement by Ramaswami Aiyar
149 Mountbatten to Gandhi
Letter 2954
150 Mountbatten to Nishtar
Letter 1446/32
151 Menon to Scott
Letter
152 Attlee to Nehru
Letter
Date Main subject or subjects Page
July
themselves in trouble unless they reform
their administrations
15 Question of provision of British aircraft and 174
personnel for a Hyderabad
State Air Force
15 Refers to Vol. XI, No. 559 and No. 30 180
of this Vol.; agrees with Political
Adviser that Rau’s fears are exaggerated
and that amendment of existing proviso
to Clause 7(1) is undesirable; reports
points raised by Krishna Menon concerning
States during interview with Prime
Minister
16 Conveys his decision, reached after long 187
talk with Nehru, to go to Kashmir ‘as
a private visitor’
16 Reactions of representatives of States with 199
whom informal talks have been held on
three subject accession have been
favourable; draft Instrument of Accession
has been prepared and handed over to
representatives of certain major States
un- Travancore will become an independent 202
dated country from 15 August but will try its
utmost to work in cooperation with rest
of India on matters of common concern
17 Refers to No. 129; suggests that it 21 1
would be courteous and wise if Gandhi
and Nehru have talk with Kak before
deciding on precise date and details of
visit to Kashmir
17 Problem of consultation in matters relating 212
to States has now been solved by
splitting up of Govt and Pakistan members
will be able to create own States Dept ;
explains purpose of recent conference
with representatives of Hyderabad ;
expresses willingness to tackle question
of practical settlement between Kalat and
future Dominion of Pakistan
17 Encloses brief on States with which 213
Dominion of Pakistan is concerned for
Mountbatten’s use in his talk with
Nishtar
17 Explains why suggested amendment 214
to clause in Bill about States which he
has discussed with Krishna Menon
could not be accepted; expresses, inter alia,
admiration for courage and statesmanship
of Nehru and Patel
CH. 4 THE STATES
XCV1X
Name and Number
154 Cripps to Ramaswami Aiyar
Letter
159 Record of Interview between
Mountbatten and Nishtar and
Akhtar Hussain
160 Bhopal to Mountbatten
Letter
163 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
Paper I.B. (47) M3
1 66 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter, para. 14
167 Krishna Mellon to Mountbatten
Letter
174 Minutes of Viceroy’s Twentieth
Miscellaneous Meeting
175 Rumbold to Davies
Letter POL. n 112/47
176 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 9298
Date
July
17
18
18
18
18
18
19
19
19
222
23-
Main subject or subjects Page
Refers to his [Cripps’ | speech about States at 216
third reading of Bill and expresses
his conviction that India must not be
split up further as an international
personality
Pakistan policy on accession of States; 221
Nishtar asks that at forthcoming meeting
with States there should be separate
representation for those States included
in groups of which majority want to join
Indian Union but do not wish to join
themselves; question of tariffs in
Instrument of Accession; Pakistan
Govt will claim to succeed to treatv
J
obligations and rights of H.M.G. in
regard to Kalat; meeting with Kalat
delegation
Encloses his reply to the Govt’s
invitation to attend conference with
representatives of States on 25 July
Memorandum by Wilmot on Travancore;
H.M.G. should, within limits of general
policy, avoid action which would
give dominions leverage 111 combating
Travancore’s claim for independence
as this will strengthen Dewan’s
bargaining position in discussion with
H.M.G. on monazite agreement
Need to avoid statement giving Travancore 250
leverage in asserting its independence or
economic autonomy and discussions with
representatives of Hyderabad
Discussion with Attlee, Law Officers and 255
Henderson about States; Listowel,
Henderson and Cripps to do what they
could in speeches to indicate that H.M.G.
would not welcome Balkanisation or
Dominion Status for Princes
Meeting between Mountbatten and Kalat 262
delegation on (1) undisputed areas of
Kalat; (2) disputed areas; (3) the legal
position of Kalat; (4) the leased areas;
(5) the future of Kalat as a whole
Trade between Ceylon and Travancore; 265
attempts by Dewan of Travancore to
get trade discussions going on a govt to
govt basis should be resisted
Hyderabad Trade Commissioner in 2 66
London has approached French Embassy
in London and proposed establishment
in Paris of Hyderabad Diplomatic
c
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
176 (amt.)
179 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 2051-S
185 Menon to Abell
Letter
186 Nishtar to Mountbatten
Letter
Date Main subject or subjects Page
July
Mission after 15 August to cover whole of
Europe
19 Outstanding indents for supply of arms 268
and ammunition to States have been
suspended by Defence Member; though
action is based on Cabinet Standstill
Order, believes it is also a political
one related to attempt to persuade States to
federate with Indian Dominion ; any
attempt to amend Standstill Order will be
regarded as deliberate sabotage of
accession negotiations with States; doubts
if he can secure actual delivery of arms
before 15 August and proposes to keep
matter pending for moment
20 Refers to Nos. 104 and 58; Union 274
Constitution Committee of Constituent
Assembly has proposed to divert to
Union Centre revenues from customs,
import and export duties; Sir C. P.’s
objection to accession is that Travancore,
as a maritime State, would be reduced
to a fifth-rate State; has explained to
Sir C. P. that States are to be asked to
accede on three central subjects only and
that Mountbatten’s plan has nothing to
do with new constitution; has also
reiterated arguments in favour of
accession; suggests that when Mountbatten
meets Sir C. P. he should tie him down on
question of accession only ; he should also
play on danger of communist menace and
emphasise that accession of Travancore
will be hailed throughout India as great
act of statesmanship ; exercise of federal
authority by State officers is not
unreasonable for major States and if
matter is raised Mountbatten could say
this is a matter which can be adjusted by
negotiation
20 Suggests that members of Congress and 276
League who normally attend Partition
Council should attend conference with
representatives of States on 25 July as
representatives of two future Dominions ;
in their absence discussion may not prove
fruitful because occasions may arise when
an authoritative declaration on behalf of
Dominion concerned becomes
necessary; refers to No. 195 and
reiterates that there should be separate
CH. 4 THE STATES
Cl
Name and Number
Date
186 (rent.)
July
192 Record of Interview between
21
Synion and Ramaswami Aiyar
(extract)
201 Bhopal to Mountbatten 22
Letter
202 Corfield to Mountbatten 22
Letter
203 Mountbatten to Travancore 22
Letter
213 Mountbatten to Listowel 23
Tel. 2900-S
Main subject or subjects Page
representation for those States which
have not joined Indian Constituent
Assembly
Sir C. P. complains about lack of 281
consideration and time given to States
by H.M.G. ; states that Travancore
has no quarrel with India or
Pakistan but wishes to be left alone; is
convinced that civil war is more or less
inevitable; is determined to reject
proposal to enter Indian Union at
forthcoming meeting with Mountbatten ;
is concerned about threats of economic
boycott and has entered into agreement
with Jinnah for supply of foodstuffs from
Pakistan; arrangements to import from
other sources if Indian boycott extends
to steel, cement etc; agreement has
been reached to exchange representatives
with Pakistan and representatives will be
sent to other countries, for example
Turkey; hopes that ultimately H.M.G. will
extend recognition and that trading
arrangements between Travancore and
U.K. will be continued
Explains, at great length, why he will not join 291
the Indian Dominion; seeks clarification on
the financial implications for Bhopal of
the three subject accession and asks
whether there will be a common defence
agreement between Hindustan and Pakistan
in the event of foreign aggression
Farewell letter in which he says he has 298
spoken to Sir C. P. but was unable to
shake his firm determination; Sir C. P.
seems in no way attracted to possible
Dominion Status at price of immediate
accession
Expresses admiration for manner in which 298
Sir C. P. has conducted negotiations on
behalf of Travancore; explains
advantages of three subject accession and
states that he will be in a position to
negotiate that there should be no
interference with customs, tariffs or
internal financial arrangements if
Travancore accedes on three central subjects
Representation from certain States claiming 308
from H.M.G. either return of ceded
territories or cash compensation; in view
of Section 2 of Independence Act return of
Cll
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
Main subject or subjects
213 ( cont .)
217 Mountbattcn to Nishtar
Letter 592/89
218 Subbarayan to Attlee
Letter
228 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 14
paras. 15-26
231 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter, para. 8
232 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
Paper I.B. (47)146
July
ceded territory is out of question; on
alternative of cash compensation
Political Dept feel that successor
Dominion Govt might entertain these
claims on principle that it will inherit
both assets and liabilities of its predecessor;
States Dept point out that all obligations
of His Majesty are extinguished as from
15 August; Dominion Govt will resist
States’ claims on this unassailable legal basis
after 15 August; discusses H.M.G’s position
and seeks agreement for view that it is not
practicable to do anything before 15 August
24 Refers to No. 186; explains that his 312
intention is to meet representatives of
States separately in his capacity as Crown
Representative and that Patel will not
be present at conference; may put
States’ representatives in touch with
Nishtar and Patel, and if necessary with
Partition Council, if he is unable to obtain
agreement on terms which two States
Depts want; explains that representation of
States at conference will not be based on
grouping for purposes of Constituent
Assembly
24 Discusses States’ problem and trusts that 313
British Govt will do what it can to help
without coercing States
25 Meeting with Kalat delegation; meetings 333
with Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar; has told
Hyderabad delegation that Nizam must
accede and has co-ordinated plan of
campaign with Monckton to bring Nizam
in; importance of Hyderabad and
Travancore in determining attitude
of other States ; honorary military ranks
and military decorations for Rulers ; offer
of three subject accession is tremendous
advance for States ; question of Congress
agreement to terms of accession for
States; Jinnah will offer States Treaties
of Accession on same lines but insists on
dealing with each State separately
25 U.S. State Dept attitude towards States 34T
and attitude of French Govt in regard to
Hyderabad
25 Memorandum by Listowel on Hyderabad 344
CH. 4 THE STATES
cm
Name and Number Date
July
234 Press Communique of 25
Mountbatten’s Address to
Conference of Rulers and
representatives of Indian States
237 Mountbatten to Attlee
25
Letter
239 Bhopal to Mountbatten
26
Letter
240 Note by Ali Yawar Jung 26
241 Cbhatari to Mountbatten 26
Letter
Main subject or subjects Paye
Mountbatten explains why he had to deal 347
with British Indian problem first ;
Independence Act releases States from
obligations to Crown but chaos will result
and States will be hurt unless arrangements
are made to replace co-ordinated
administration on matters of common
concern; explains establishment of
States Depts; States are free to join
either Dominion but must take account
of geographical considerations ; clause in
Act continuing essential agreements gives
breathing space but does not replace need
for standstill agreements ; Patel’s
Statement; explains advantages of three
subject accession; accession will not
involve financial liability or loss of
internal autonomy; G. of I. has yet to be
persuaded to accept scheme and time is
short ; States cannot run away from
neighbouring Dominion; proposes
committee for consideration of items on
agenda and trusts other representatives
will remain in daily contact with it
Negotiations with States and meeting in 353
Chamber of Princes
Has read in press that his name has been 355
included on a Committee formed to
discuss terms of Accession and standstill
arrangements; explains that his State is not
prepared to accept federation but will
accept standstill arrangements on basis of
equality of status and reciprocity in matters
of common concern; asks Mountbatten to
arrange separate negotiations for Bhopal or
failing that to form a separate Committee
of those States who have not yet joined
Constituent Assembly; recent cowardly
attempt on Sir C. P.’s life cannot help
in bringing about an understanding
between Congress and States
Gives background to Hyderabad delegation’s 356
participation in, and the purpose of their
questions at, conference with representatives
of States on 25 July
Expresses thanks for nomination as 3 59
Hyderabad representative on Negotiating
Committee but explains that he cannot
participate because Hyderabad would like
to negotiate standstill agreements
separately or with States which have
CIV
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date Main subject or subjects Page
July
241 (cont.)
242 Menon to Abell 26
Letter D2586
244 Menon to Symon 26
Letter
249 Nehru to Mountbatten 27
Letter
255 Gandhi to Mountbatten 28
Letter
256 Minutes of Viceroy’s Sixty Fifth 28
Staff Meeting
Item 4
257 Monckton to Mountbatten 28
Letter
joined Constituent Assembly; assures
Mountbatten that Hyderabad will
co-operate with rest of India in
avoiding administrative breakdown after
15 August
Refers to letter from Maharaja of Dholpur 360
in which latter suggests that separate
Negotiating Committee should be
appointed consisting of Rulers who do not
wish to execute Instrument of Accession
but who are ready to enter into a treaty
with Indian Union on matters of common
concern; explains that there can be no
question of two Committees based on
participation or non-participation of
States in Constituent Assembly; Indian
Dominion cannot contemplate separate
treaty relations with individual States and
will negotiate only upon basis of three
subject accession; regrets that Rulers have
not been given more time to consider
these important issues ; time-table is
governed by date for transfer of power
and as most other States have come to
decision about Instrument of Accession it
should not be difficult for Dholpur to
do so ; Griffin concurs in these remarks
Trusts that sentiments of G. off will be 363
respected in matter of U.K. High
Commission in India appointing Political
Officers ; G. of I. will feel embarrassed if
they use their influence or establish direct
relations with any Indian State
Kashmir; states that Mountbatten’s visit 368
was not a success, that Kashmir has become
a ‘first priority’ for him and that he
has decided to visit the State as a private
individual about 4 August and to stay
there four or five days
Explains that as Nehru has decided to visit 373
Kashmir he is free to go to Bihar and
then Noakhali after spending two days
in Punjab; will see Mountbatten if latter
so desires before leaving Delhi
The States; Hyderabad, Travancore and 373
Indore
Has had talks with Nizam who has made 377
up his mind not to accede to Indian
Dominion; not even visit from
Mountbatten will modify his attitude and
Muslims in Hyderabad would revolt if he
CH. 4 THE STATES
CV
Name and Number Date
July
257 (cent.)
258 Record of Interview between 28
Mountbatten and Khan of Kalat
259 Mountbatten to Gandhi 28
Letter
260 Mountbatten to 28
Resident at Kashmir
Tel. 2989-S
262 Minutes by Rumbold, Patrick and 28/9
Henderson
Main subject or subjects Page
acceded now; believes that Nizam would be
prepared to offer by treaty all that is
reasonable but explains that he cannot
commit him to this ; is under pressure
from local Ittehad and ‘our mutual friend’
from Delhi ; association of Hyderabad with
Indian Dominion is inevitable but can
not be rushed
Kalat expresses delight that Jinnah has 378
got Pakistan; thanks Mountbatten for
obtaining recognition of Pakistan Govt
that Kalat is an independent State in treaty
relations with British Govt; leased
territories are main bone of contention and
Mountbatten gives his opinion that
Pakistan Govt will inherit leases ;
Mountbatten points out that British and
Indian Govts have sunk a lot of money in
Quetta and Wazirabad; Mountbatten
welcomes suggestion that he should see
Kalat with Jinnah to discuss their draft
treaty and agreement; Kalat is anxious that
Jinnah should not import a Pathan A.G.G.
into Baluchistan and says that if Prior
leaves he should be replaced by a
Britisher if Jinnah wants peace
Refers to No. 255; explains that Kak has 379
told him that the risk of violence will be
reduced if Gandhi visits Kashmir instead of
Nehru ; urges that he should impress
this upon Nehru and says he does not
know how future Prime Minister of India
can be spared from Delhi with only
eighteen days left before he takes over
power
Instructs Resident to inform Maharaja that 380
Kak has succeeded in dissuading Gandhi
from visiting Kashmir with result that
Nehru intends to visit State on 4 August
as private individual with object of
meeting friends and, if permission is
granted, Sheikh Abdulla; Mountbatten will
make one more effort to stop Nehru;
holds Kak responsible for visit; Maharaja
should be urged to declare accession to
one of Dominions before Nehru’s arrival
and should ensure that latter is decently
treated
Question of response to points made in 3 82
Mountbatten’s speech (No. 234) to
representatives of States which seem to be
CV1
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
July
262 ( cent .)
263
Minutes by India
28/9
Office
264
Resident at Hyderabad to Griffin
Letter D.O. No. 84-R
28
265
Mountbatten to Dholpur
Letter 592/89
29
2 66 Mountbatten to Indore 29
Letter
269 Record of Interview between 29
Mountbatten, Gandhi, Nehru
and Patel
271 Griftrn to Abell 29
Letter D.O. No. F63-R (S)/4 6
275 Listowel to Attlee 29
Minute 134/47
Main subject or subjects Page
inconsistent with what was said on this
subject in Parliament
Status of Kalat; Mountbatten and 385
Pakistan representatives are wrong in
accepting Kalat’s claim to be regarded as
separate international entity (No. 174);
question of informing Mountbatten
Hyderabad Affairs: Annexure Minutes 387
on report
Refers to letter from Dholpur which is 391
discussed in No. 242; says that most of
points have been covered verbally or by
actual events and that he is in touch with
representatives of all points of view from
States; explains why accession is necessary
by 14 August and says he will be grieved
along with King if Dholpur refuses
Expresses disappointment that he did not 393
have benefit of Indore’s counsel during
discussions with States’ representatives;
explains that there is still time to make
up for this and sends invitation to Indore
through rulers of Baroda, Gwalior and
Kolhapur to visit Delhi for frank talk
Mountbatten explains why Nehru should 397
not visit Kashmir; Gandhi agrees and
volunteers to go instead; Patel considers
that neither should go but that visit by
Gandhi ‘would be the lesser evil’ ; Nehru
defends his visit but accepts Gandhi’s offer;
agreement that Gandhi should leave on
following night
Patiala’s request for return of records of 400
interest to States in Political Dept ; in
view of agreements reached at meeting
with party leaders on 13 June it is not
possible to transfer records to States ;
Patiala is wrong to speak of records
being returned to States since no one
has taken records from them; States have
no more right to Political Dept records
than Political Dept has to records of
States
Refers to Mountbatten’s speech at No. 234; 403
two points in speech seem to be
inconsistent with what was said on subject
of States in Parliament and it is desirable to
draw Mountbatten’s attention to them
so that he may avoid emphasising them in
subsequent discussions with States’
representatives
CH. 4 THE STATES
CV11
Name and Number
Date
Mountbatten to Resident at
July
29
Kashmir
Tel. 3020-S
280 Resident at Kashmir to Abell 29
Tel. 73
281 Symon to Menon 30
Letter
282 Menon to Symon 30
Letter
284 Travancore to Mountbatten 30
Letter
285 Abell to Patiala 30
Letter 1299/2
288 Resident for Madras 30
States to Abell
Tel. 73-P
Main subject or subjects Page
Instructs Resident to inform Maharaja that 405
with greatest difficulty he has persuaded
Nehru to stand down in favour of Gandhi ;
latter will arrive Srinagar on 1 August
and stay with friends privately;
Mountbatten feels visit will not give rise
to trouble if properly handled and asks
Resident to submit brief daily reports
Has conveyed Mountbatten’s message in 410
No. 260; Maharaja says visit of either
Gandhi or Nehru not only inadvisable
but dangerous; Kashmir Govt will do best
to prevent untoward incidents but are not
prepared to give guarantee in this respect ;
Maharaja says no decision has been
reached as yet regarding accession to a
Dominion
Refers to No. 244; explains circumstances 41 1
in which U.K. High Commission has
arranged to employ three ex-Political
Dept officers and conveys High
Commissioner’s assurance that there is no
intention to use officers to influence
Indian States or to maintain direct
relations with them; High Commissioner
and staff will continue to respect
sentiments of G. of I.
Refers to No. 281 ; has shown letter to 412
Patel who is satisfied with assurance given
in para. 6
Refers to contents of No. 203 and to Sir 414
C. P.’s discussions with Mountbatten;
upon basis of latter’s assurances has
decided, though not without hesitation,
to accede to Indian Dominion subject to
conditions stated in Mountbatten’s letter;
mentions that States have been given
option to reconsider position when final
constitution of Dominion is formulated
Question of Political Dept records; 414
explains that he has been asked by
Mountbatten to inform Patiala that
Residents have been instructed to
transfer to individual States Residency
records of administrative value ;
understands that Resident for Punjab
States is transferring a number of such
records to Patiala Govt
Transmits message for Mountbatten from 421
Sir C. P. ; direct action and civil
disobedience threatened by State Congress
CV111
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
288 ( cont .)
293 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 9857
295 Indore to Mountbatten
Letter
296 Chhatari to Mountbatten
Letter
297 Mountbatten to Bhopal
Letter
Date Main subject or subjects Page
July
as from 1 August ; in view of
Travancore’s accession, such action should
be discountenanced
30 Asks whether it is proposed that Pakwasa 431
should be appointed Governor of Central
Provinces and Berar; explains that Berar
Agreement of 1936, under which
Governor is appointed by King after
consultation with Nizam, will lapse on
15 August; suggests that Nizam be
urgently consulted and says that pending
reply Pakwasa’s name will not be
submitted to King
31 Refers to No. 266; regrets that his absence 434
from discussions on matters of common
concern has caused disappointment but
explains that he did not attend because he
felt States had free hand in deciding
their future and that those not wishing
to join one of Dominions should continue
connection with British on basis of
separate Dominion status; will visit Delhi
and trusts Mountbatten will agree to
meet him with Nawab of Bhopal
31 Refers to No. 241, note 1 ; Hyderabad 435
delegation feels no useful purpose would
be served by his presence on Negotiating
Committee; suggests appointment of
second Negotiating Committee for
States which have kept out of Constituent
Assembly
31 Refers to No. 201; explains that he 436
speaks as a friend and not as Viceroy
still less as future Governor-General of
India; statement by Patel should be taken
by Princes as official policy of Indian
Dominion towards States; communist
danger can be averted only if States
and Indian Dominion stand together ;
accession involves no financial
commitment on part of States ; States
will get a second chance as regards
accession when constitution is framed;
draft Instrument secures freedom from
interference in internal affairs;
reiterates that Princes cannot run away
from Dominions or from responsibility
for welfare of their subjects; trusts that
Bhopal will not regard his advice as
intimidation or pleading; adds
postscript referring to No. 239; outlines
CH. 4 THE STATES
C1X
Name and Number
297 ( cont .)
302 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 15
paras. 25-33, 43~ 53 * postscript
303 Khan of Kalat to Mountbatten
Letter
307 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 9947
313 Menon to Patrick
Letter
Date Main subject or subjects Pa%e
July
negotiations with Travancore and
expresses regret at attempt on Sir C. P.’s
life; accepts Bhopal’s offer to talk things
over
August
1 Nehru’s desire to visit Kashmir and 443
decision, after meeting with Gandhi,
Nehru and Patel, that Gandhi should go
instead; Mountbatten’s address to
Chamber of Princes ; attempt on Sir
C. P.’s life and accession of Travancore;
Monckton’s difficulties in Hyderabad;
attempts to persuade Dholpur to accede ;
negotiations with, and behaviour of,
Indore; correspondence with Bhopal
whose extraordinary attitude is making
his position more difficult ; luncheon party
for Rulers and announcement of accessions ;
impending arrival of Indore and Bhopal
1 Refers to No. 258 and to subsequent 456
meetings with representatives of Pakistan
as a result of which ‘we are where we
were before I arrived here’ ; regrets that
Pakistan authorities are in no mood to
admit his right to retrocession of
territories or to surrender possession of
any of them to him; sees no point in
staying on and requests further interview
before returning home
t Refers to No. 234; Mountbatten is right 459
to urge States to accept Patel’s offer of
federation but care must be taken not to
add to pressure on States; expresses
reservations about statements in No. 234
to effect that States will cut themselves
off from supplies of arms and weapons
if they do not link up with one of
Dominions and that they must accede
before 15 August; explains how H.M.G.
propose to reply if asked in Parliament
whether No. 234 implies a departure from
policy regarding States; asks if
Mountbatten has any comments
2 Explains that a number of States have 467
expressed a desire to accede; first ‘bag’ of
States to accede is encouraging and fact
that Travancore was practically the first
is a ‘great triumph’ for Mountbatten;
is certain that with exception of
Hyderabad, Bhopal, Indore and ‘one or
two waverers’, all States will accede;
cx
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number
313 (cont)
317 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter, paras. 6- 9
325 Bhopal to Mountbatten
Letter
329 Notes of Meeting between
Mountbatten, Chhatari,
Monckton and, for part of the
time, Menon
330 Minutes of Viceroy’s
Twenty Fifth Miscellaneous
Meeting
Date Main subject or subjects Page
August
Enclosures: (1) Instrument of Accession;
(2) Communique (3) Standstill Agreement
2 Mountbatten’s meeting with Kalat 479
delegation and his talks with Dewan of
Travancore and Hyderabad Delegation;
reiterates reservations about some of
Mountbatten’s comments in No. 234 and
expresses view that if it is impossible to
secure accession of key States before
15 August, H.M.G. will be satisfied if
these and rest agree to be represented
internationally by appropriate Dominion ;
Pakistan has simpler problem in dealing
with smaller number of States ; Kashmir’s
terms for accession to Pakistan
3 Expresses gratitude for references in 491
No. 297; trusts that Patel will respond
genuinely if he extends a hand of
friendship to him; will meet
Mountbatten with Indore tomorrow
and later, he hopes, alone
3 Indian Army Troops in Secunderabad; 495
Berar; Menon asserts that States
Dept will accept standstill agreements
only with acceding States ; Monckton
urges that Nizam ought not to be
rushed or coerced; Mountbatten says he
will try to secure extension from Congress ;
Monckton says that Nizam might decide
to make satisfactory offer by treaty but
Menon is emphatic that any treaty would
be unacceptable; Mountbatten emphasises
that if Nizam does not join Dominion,
Hyderabad will be ruined and he will
lose his throne; Menon, during
Mountbatten’s absence, elaborates on
prospects if Hyderabad does not come in ;
Monckton’s conclusions
4 Meeting between Mountbatten and 498
Kalat Delegation; Jinnah’s attitude;
need for decision on legal position
whether or not Pakistan will inherit
treaties with Kalat; need for Standstill
Agreement and understanding on
Defence, External Affairs and
Communications; statement by Crown
Representative recognising Kalat’ s
independent status is not possible;
draft communique outlining present
stage of negotiations agreed to in principle
by Kalat Delegation and also by Jinnah
and Liaquat who enter at end
CH. 4 THE STATES
CXI
Name and Number Date
August
335 Record of Interview between 4
Mountbatten and Bhopal
and Indore
340 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 3161-S
351 Jinnah to Ismay
Letter
356 Indore to Nehru 6
Letter
Main subject or subjects Page
Mountbatten explains that he has recently 505
devoted a major part of his time to
his duties as Crown Representative of
looking after interests of States and says
that Indore is only State which has
failed to respond; denies that his letter
at No. 266 represents a threat and resents
this ‘deliberate misrepresentation’ ;
challenges Indore on his failure to reply
to invitation to attend discussions in
Delhi and considers that behaviour of
Indore should be ‘recorded’ ; explains why
he has ‘gone to battle’ on behalf of States
and says that with Patel he is being
attacked as ‘Pro-Prince’ ; emphasises why
it is in the interests of the States to accede
before 15 August
4 Refers to Nos. 307 and 313 with 529
Enclosures; explains that States have seen
whole picture and that with exceptions of
Hyderabad, Indore, Bhopal and
Dholpur, all States will join Indian
Dominion before 15 August; says that
Listowel has misunderstood purport
of speech at No. 234 and that there is no
question of applying pressure on States; is
trying to make States see advantages
of present offer and is under no illusion
as to what will happen to them if they
stand out after 15 August; explains that
there has been press criticism that
Instrument of Accession is weighted in
favour of States and expresses conviction
that these terms would not have been
offered had he not taken a hand in the
matter; is trying to create an integrated
India which will secure stability and
ensure friendship with Britain and is
confident of success if he is allowed a free
hand; warns of serious consequences if
H.M.G. supply arms and ammunition to
non-acceding maritime States; cannot
subscribe to suggested reply to
Parliamentary question
5 Refers to No. 330, note 7 and proposes 544
amendments to draft communique on
negotiations between Pakistan and Kalat
Explains that States have yet to see 554
Pakistan’s terms for an Instrument
of Accession and that it is only fair that
they see Pakistan’s attitude first before
CX11
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
August
356 {cant.)
360 Khan of Kalat to Ismay 6
Letter
366 Bhopal to Mountbatten 7
Letter
369 Minutes of Viceroy’s 7
Sixty Eighth Staff Meeting
Items 6 and 8
372 Political Agent, 7
Jaipur to Secretary to Crown
Representative
Tel. 1133/2
375 Mountbatten to Jinnah 8
Letter
376 Hyderabad to Mountbatten 8
Letter
Main subject or subjects Page
reaching a decision about entering
Constituent Assembly; maintains that it
is equally important that States should be
aware of joint policy between two
Dominions on defence and foreign
relations; suggests that States should
enter into Standstill Agreements until
such time as constitutions of new
Dominions emerge; denies that he is
being obstructionist and requests a
written assurance from Nehru and Patel
to clear way for co-operation on lines
suggested; suggests that Patel should write
a similar letter to Bhopal
Expresses his surprise at, and explains his 558
objections to, Jinnah’s comments
(No. 351) on draft communique; insists
that existing treaty with British Govt has
little to do with Pakistan and that future
relations between Kalat and Pakistan
will be governed by a separate treaty;
requests that there should be no mention
of treaties in communique and trusts that
Jinnah will agree
Expresses gratitude for personal trouble 562
Mountbatten has taken with his affairs ;
appreciates that it is difficult for Patel to
make alterations in Bhopal’s Instrument
of Accession; is anxious to await decision
of Kashmir and Hyderabad before taking
fmal decision
(6) Bhopal; (8) Hyderabad 566
Reports on disturbances in Alwar 571
Explains that he is ‘exercised’ that no 573
agreement has been reached about terms of
Pakistan-Kalat communique and hopes
that Jinnah will accept Ismay’ s
suggestions; Enclosures: (1) letter from
Ismay to Jinnah explaining amendments
to communique; (2) Notification to be
issued on 15 August 1947 by the Head
of the Baluchistan Administration
Explains that he will not be able to 575
contemplate organic union with either
Dominion until he has more information
about how they intend to co-operate on
CH. 4 THE STATES
CX111
Name and Number Date
August
376 ( cont .)
380 Cabinet Office to U.K. High
Commissioner, New Delhi
UKRI 540
383 Mountbatten to Listowel
Letter
384 Mountbatten to Listowel
Letter, paras. 1-5, 8
385 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 16
paras. 2-19, 30, 58-60
388 Hyderabad to Monckton
Letter
389 Minutes of Viceroy’s
Sixty Ninth Staff Meeting
Item 3
390 Monckton to Churchill,
Salisbury, Eden and Butler
Letter (not delivered)
Main subject or subjects Page
matters of common concern; refers to
recognition of difficulties confronting
States such as Hyderabad in parliamentary
debates on Independence Bill; explains that
he is prepared to enter into a treaty with
Indian Dominion and states conditions;
records his astonishment that Indian
Dominion has refused to negotiate on
Standstill Agreements and Berar unless
Hyderabad agrees to accede and regards
refusal as coercion and pressure; explains
that he will deem it necessary to publish
letter should Indian Dominion prove
unwilling to enter into treaty
negotiations
8 Transmits text of Foreign Office 581
circular which explains that H.M.G.
are not prepared to define their attitude
towards Indian States which claim
independence and maintains that it would
be unfortunate if any other Power gave
such recognition at this stage to any State
8 Refers to Nos. 307 and 340; explains 584
considerations which have influenced
his policy towards States; concludes
it is States that stand to lose if they do
not come under one or other Dominion
by 15 August, regard being had to
‘the explosive situation’ within them
8 Kalat; cession of Darjeeling; speech to 588
Chamber of Princes; invitations
to some Princes to attend Princess
Elizabeth’s wedding
8 Meeting with Khan of Kalat; League 590
pressure on States with Muslim rulers
who are geographically linked with
Indian Dominion; Rampur; Bhopal’s
threat to abdicate; interview with Indore;
extended date for Hyderabad; Gandhi’s
visit to Kashmir; honours for Princes;
Jinnah’s offer to Jodhpur and intrigues
of Bhopal
9 Explains why he considers it essential to 610
publish No. 376 by 12 or 13 August at
latest
9 Hyderabad 610
9 Explains why Nizam cannot accede to 613
Indian Dominion and expresses
apprehension that Congress Govt
CX IV
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
August
390 (cont.)
396 Jinnah to Mountbatten
Letter
401 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter
402 Listowel to Mountbatten 9
Letter, paras. 9-14, 27, 29-30
41 1 Baroda to Mountbatten 10
Letter
413 Bikaner to Mountbatten 10
Letter
415 Resident at Hyderabad to to
Secretary to Crown
Representative
Tel. 87/P
419 Record of Interview between 10
Monckton and Ismay
420 Record of Interview between to
Monckton and Mountbatten
421 Monckton to Hyderabad 10
Tel.
424 Kolhapur to Mountbatten 1 1
Letter D.O. No. H-4 (2^47
Main subject or subjects Page
will treat this as a ‘hostile act’ and will
apply ‘all-out economic sanctions’ against
Hyderabad on and after 15 August
Refers to No. 375; has accepted draft 620
agreement between Pakistan and Kalat
and communique may now be issued
accordingly
Refers to Nos. 340 and 307; expresses
admiration for Mountbatten’s handling 628
of States; had not seen draft Instrument of
Accession and agrees that it was right to
advise States to accede by 15 August;
explains that it is not the intention to
supply arms from U.K. to States without
consulting Dominions
Honours for Princes; Nehru’s urge to visit 629
Kashmir; Mountbatten’s first and last
contact with Chamber of Princes ;
problem of Hyderabad
Returns signed copies of Instrument 643
of Accession and requests assurances
from Mountbatten that Baroda’s
accession will be subject to limitations
as indicated and that there will be no
financial liability on acceding States
Thanks Mountbatten for action he has 645
taken in regard to protection of interests
of States in matter of their agreements
with British India
Hyderabad State Forces and State Police 646
have yet to receive ammunition for which
they have forwarded indents ; considers
Hyderabad Govt’s apprehension of
widespread disorder in State to be well
founded and is passing on present indent to
Secunderabad Sub-Area for compliance
Monckton explains that Congress refusal 648
to negotiate unless Hyderabad agrees to
accede has made position intolerable
Mountbatten gives assurance that he will 649
not be party to any improper pressure on
Llyderabad; continuation of status quo in
Berar and of existing administrative
arrangements ; Mountbatten proposes to
refer to ‘special problems’ of Hyderabad
in his broadcast
Refers to No. 376; suggests no publicity 650
for letters until he has had further
interview with Mountbatten
Confirms Kolhapur’s accession to Indian 653
Dominion; suggests that Mountbatten
CH. 4 THE STATES
CXV
Name and Number Date
August
424 ( cant .)
426 Memorandum by Mountbatten 1 1
434 Record of Interview between 11
Monckton and Mountbatten
435 Mountbatten to Bhopal 11
Letter
440 Mountbatten to Hyderabad 12
Letter
442 Wylie to Mountbatten 12
Letter U.P.-91
456 Resident at Kashmir to Abell 13
Tel. 86
458 Listowel to Mountbatten 13
Tel. 10502
Main subject or subjects Page
should make a statement confirming that
O
there will be no financial obligations for
acceding States
Record of interview with Bhopal ; 659
question of Mountbatten’s reply to
Bhopal’s letters dealing with extension of
time-limit and his possible abdication;
Bhopal’s version of his discussions with
Jodhpur and Jinnah and subsequent
developments
Monckton says he will ‘go in’ for 669
Dominion Government beginning with
Mountbatten if attempt is made to blockade
Hyderabad; Mountbatten reiterates that
he will never be party to improper
pressure or coercion and outlines what he
proposes to say in his speech on
15 August and in his reply to Nizam;
Monckton considers Mountbatten’s
behaviour ‘more sympathetic’ as compared
with previous interviews
Explains that Patel cannot himself grant 671
extension to Bhopal; advises Bhopal (1) to
sign Instrument of Accession and
Standstill Agreement and give them to
Mountbatten to keep until he (Bhopal)
has made up his mind; (2) to defer
abdication, if he decides to do this, until
October; Enclosure: official letter to be
published in event of Bhopal deciding to
abdicate on or about 15 August
Refers to No. 376; explains that he 679
has secured extension of two months for
negotiations with Hyderabad; gives
assurance that Dominion of India are
agreeable to continuance of status quo in
Berar and to continuance of existing
administrative arrangements; is satisfied
that leaders of new Dominion have no
intention of applying pressure
Gives background to Corfield’s 681
appointment as Political Adviser;
admires Mountbatten’s ‘realistic
approach’ to States problem and indicates
his own
Gives background to Kak’s resignation 696
and says that Kashmir is not likely to
join either Dominion at present as to do so
would result in serious trouble
Refers to No. 213 ; agrees with 699
Mountbatten’s view but suggests that it
CXV1
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS
Name and Number Date
August
458 jcont.)
463 Mountbatten to Listowel 13
Tel. 3384— S
474 Hyderabad to Mountbatten 14
Letter
475 Griffin to Shone
14
Letter 467/47/R/4
482 Bhopal to Mountbatten
14
Letter
488 Mountbatten to Listowel
Letter, para. 10
489 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 17
paras. 41-52
Main subject or subjects Page
should be put on record with States Dept
that H.M.G. consider that Dominion of
India should take cession of territory into
account when negotiating final
financial settlement with States
Refers to No. 11, note 4; requests 706
immediate submission to King
recommending that second son ot Nizam
be given title of ‘His Highness’
Acknowledges No. 440; reiterates that he 721
is not prepared to execute an Instrument of
Accession but shares Mountbatten’s wish
to find a satisfactory solution
Explains position regarding Crown 722
Representative records
Refers to No. 435; accepts Mountbatten’s 729
advice and forwards a sealed envelope
containing, inter alia , his Instrument of
Accession and Standstill Agreement
signed and dated before midnight on
14 August with instructions that it shall
not be opened or delivered to States Dept
until 25 August unless he directs
otherwise; explains that he has decided not
to abdicate at present and that he will let
Mountbatten know his final decision
in regard to accession on or before
25 August
16 Communique on negotiations between 740
Kalat and Pakistan
1 6 Extraordinary behaviour of some of Rulers 757
of Indian States; Jodhpur’s flirtation with
Jinnah and Patel’s response; Baroda giving
difficulty; private arrangement with
Bhopal who has decided not to abdicate at
present ; Indore ‘almost missed the bus’ ;
accession of Dholpur; no outstanding
States (taking extensions to Hyderabad
and Bhopal into account) beyond Kashmir
where Maharaja talks of holding a
referendum; constitutional reforms in
States and advice to Rewa
I
Mr V. P. Menon to Sir P. Patrick
Telegram , R/j/ 1 1 138: ff 99-100
immediate new Delhi, 8 July 1947, 1.00 am1
secret Received: 7 July , 11.50 pm
No. 1823-G. Reference telegram from Corfield in reply to your No. 8648
dated 5th July.2 The present plan to which we are working is that at the forth¬
coming conference of States representatives the first proposal which we intend
to make is that States should join immediately on three subjects, namely
External Affairs, Defence and Communications. We are adapting the Govern¬
ment of India Act 1935 with this purpose in view. Several States have joined
existing Constituent Assembly with intention of joining new Constitution on
these three subjects. Some States are still wavering. Important negotiations with
major States of Hyderabad, Mysore and Travancore are impending. A
statement on the lines proposed would prejudicially affect the attitude of the
States towards the Constituent Assembly and negotiations. Even an inkling
that H.M.G. would accord independent recognition would make infinitely
difficult all attempts to bring the States and the new Dominions together on all
vital matters of common concern. Public opinion in India cannot but regard it
as an attempt to retain British influence over States. I would therefore strongly
urge that no statement should be made on the lines proposed. You will see that
His Excellency’s reaction is similar: he has suggested omission of paragraphs
7-9 from the statement contained in your telegram 8628. 3
2. An unequivocal statement reiterating H.M.G’s view that States should
in these and similar matters make their arrangements through one or other of
the Dominions will make all the difference in the delicate negotiations now
before us. If political stability in India is the objective, it is essential that H.M.G.
1 Time of despatch taken from recipient’s copy.
2 In these telegrams Sir P. Patrick and Sir C. Corfield had a preliminary exchange of views on some of
the problems (i.e. the matters referred to in No. 39, paras. 2-3) regarding the ‘position of States in
relation to the outside world after August 15th’, Sir P. Patrick noting that ‘our general approach to this
subject’ was set out in the draft Parliamentary statement (see Enclosure to No. 39). L/P &S/13/1839:
R/3/1/138.
3 Lord Listowel’s telegram No. 8628 of 4 July transmitted the draft of a statement (see Enclosure to No.
39) which it was intended to make concerning the States in the Commons debate on the Bill. The
points mentioned in paragraphs 7 to 9 of this telegram are referred to in paragraph 2 of Listowel’s
minute at No. 39. For Lord Mountbatten’s reaction, see No. 39, note 2.
2
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
should make this position clear beyond all doubt as Cabinet Delegation had
done in their Memorandum of 12th May.4
4 Vol. VII, No. 262.
2
The Secretary to the Crown Representative to All Residents
Telegram , f 93
IMMEDIATE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, 8 July 1Q47, 10 am
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 1810-P. Continuation Polindia Express Letter F.46-R(S)/47 June 21st.1
Discussions regarding standstill arrangements.
2. Please inform all States that proposal for immediate accession of States to
Dominion on three subjects, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications,
will be included in agenda for discussions later this month. States Department
will send copies of agenda and intimate actual date of meeting as soon as
1 Vol. XI, No. 287.
3
Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Telephone Message , R^/i / 137: Jf 130-31
8 July ig47
Boundary Commission at initial meeting on 5th July called for great mass of
information from:
(1) Financial Commissioner Revenue (Mr Ram Chandra).
(2) Governor.
(3) Governor’s Secretary.
The Commission also asked for Staff consisting of one Secretary, one Super¬
intendent, 5 stenographers, 5 typists assistants, one junior clerk and 8 peons.
This is somewhat in excess of staff mentioned in your telegram No. 1753-S
of 5 th July.1
JULY 1947
3
2. Mamdot now demands that if Financial Commissioner is Hindu, Muslim
officer should be associated with him in preparation and submission of all
information. Constitutionally, Boundary Commission should make all
demands for information on me, and information would normally be sub¬
mitted by various Secretaries to Government according to subjects. I have no
objection to constitution of Board as proposed by Mamdot if Your Excellency
has none, and would make it responsible for collection and preparation of all
material.
3. Mamdot also demands the appointment of two Secretaries to the
Commission, one Muslim and the other non-Muslim, to be selected by the
parties. He has already selected and nominated his man. This is a much more
controversial matter bince I understand from your telegram 1753-S, that the
Commission is to have a European ICS officer as Secretary, and in any case,
I doubt if Commission composed of Sir Cyril Radchffe and four High Court
Judges would wish for a staff to be selected for them by politicians. I should
be grateful for instructions.
4. I suggest that my functions in relation to Commission be more clearly
defined. So far I have taken them to be
(a) provision of office accommodation, and such Secretariat and clerical
assistance as the Commission may require, the selection of persons
available being made by Commission;
(b) provision of official information on demand by Commission.
Mamdot seems to think that I have powers of administrative control, and some
Sikhs regard my powers as even wider. My own view is that my function
should be as above, and I shall be grateful if this can be confirmed or modified.
5. Financial arrangements also need clarification. Commission asks for funds.
Are they to be provided centrally or provincially, and who gives formal
sanction for expenditure?
1 This telegram described the staff which it was proposed to give to Sir C. Radclitfe which included an
I.C.S. Secretary (Mr Beaumont). R/3/1/157: f 119.
4
The Maharaja of Kashmir to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten oj Burma
Rfal1 194: ff 26-8
CONFIDENTIAL THE PALACE, SRINAGAR, KASHMIR, 8 JulyiQ47
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
Thank you for your letter dated 27th June 1947.1
I am sorry for the delay in sending a reply which was due to the fact that
1 Vol. XI, No. 386.
4
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
there were rumours that Mahatma Gandhi was not immediately coming to
Kashmir — rumours which have now been confirmed by the A.P.I. As for
writing to Mahatma Gandhi direct, I feel it would be inappropriate for me to
send him a letter in reply to a letter from you. I am enclosing an official letter
in reply to your official letter of the same date which you may show to
Mahatma Gandhi.
With regard to the second paragraph of your letter the position generally
is as you have stated, though we do not — at least for the time being — consider
the question of linking ourselves from the Military point of view with either
one or the other of the Dominions or of sending representatives to a Constituent
Assembly. A decision in these matters will be taken when we see how things
turn out and in the light of circumstances as they develop.
Visits of outside leaders who know little of the circumstances prevailing here
beyond what they hear from interested parties are embarrassing even in normal
times but they have grave potentialities under the present conditions. As I told
you, though we have been successful in our endeavour to maintain peace in
this State under very trying circumstances, we make no secret of the fact that it
is only by hanging on by the skin of our teeth and a measure of luck that we
succeeded. Visits of prominent political leaders in an atmosphere surcharged
with suspicion and passions such as prevails nowadays keep the country in a
ferment and are far from conducing to the maintenance of peace. Moreover
the trouble is that if a leader of one political denomination arrives he is bound to
be followed by a leader of another denomination, and people therefore
constantly live in a state of tension. The political situation in India having
developed as it has I would repeat with all the emphasis at my command that
it will be extremely difficult in the present conditions to guarantee that as a
result of the visit the situation will not deteriorate with consequences that cannot
be contemplated with equanimity. That we succeeded in avoiding any un¬
toward incident during Pt. Nehru’s second visit last year is true, but conditions
then were different. The fever resulting from the partitioning of India and the
division of certain Provinces has thrown most people off their balance. He
would be a bold man indeed, who could say with any confidence that in the
present circumstances a visit of a leader of Mahatma Gandhi’s high standing
will not produce untoward incidents.
All things considered, I would earnestly request Your Excellency to dissuade
all political leaders from visiting Kashmir during 1947. If, however, Mahatma
Gandhi is unable to cancel his visit I suggest that it would be in the best interests
of this country and of India as a whole that the visit should take place only
towards the end of the autumn. But I must emphasise the fact that it is im¬
possible for us to guarantee the prevention of any untoward incident, circum¬
stanced as we are, though we will, I need hardly assure you, try with all our
JULY 1947
5
might and main to safeguard against any such occurrence. I must add that
what applies to Mahatma Gandhi, applies to all political leaders of similar
standing with equal it not greater force.
Yours sincerely,
HARISINGH
Enclosure to No. 4
THE PALACE, SRINAGAR, KASHMIR, 8 July I947
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I write to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency’s letter dated 26th June.2
It is true that we have had comparative peace here during the recent months
and in spite of the fact that massacre and arson on an unprecedented scale have
raged over the country there has been no bloodshed here. But as I told you,
this has been the result of a policy of firmness and impartiality which, if I may
say so, has been the guiding principle of the administration in this State. It
would, however, be foolish to assume that because we have succeeded in so far
maintaining peace, amidst the terror raging in the neighbouring territories, we
can in all circumstances be equally successful. The present is a very inopportune
time for political leaders to come to Kashmir as the position is most delicate. A
tiny spark, in spite of the best intentions in the world, may set alight a con¬
flagration which it would be impossible to control.
In the circumstances I would say that it would be advisable from all points
of view for Mahatma Gandhi to cancel his projected visit to Kashmir this year.
If, however, for reasons of his own he is not in a position to do so, I should still
say that his visit should take place only towards the end of the autumn.
I note that he has given you his firm assurance that “he will make no
political speeches or carry out any form of propaganda”.
We have no objection whatsoever to his seeing Mrs. Abdulla but I am
afraid it will not be possible for him to see Sheikh Abdulla.3 There are political
considerations which render such a meeting most inadvisable.
I need hardly say that if Mahatma Gandhi would like to stay as my guest
during his visit here, I should feel very glad. I would, however, again strongly
advise that he or any other political leader should not visit the State until
conditions in India take a happier turn.
Yours sincerely,
HARISINGH
2 Ibid., Enclosure to No. 386.
3 Sheikh Mohamed Abdullah, the President of the Kashmir National Conference, had been arrested on
20 May 1946 by the Kashmiri Government in consequence of the ‘Quit Kashmir Movement’ which he
had launched in March of the same year in an attempt to bring down the princely government. See
Vol. VII, No. 364 and L/P &S/13/1266: ff 188-96.
6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
5
Mr C. P. Scott to Mr I. D. Scott
Minute, R/^/ 1/157: fi^y
d.p.s.v. 8 July 1947
Wazir Ali rang me up this morning, saying that two scheduled castes’ leaders
from West Punjab — Chaudhari Soklal and P.S. Raindasia — wish to see H.E.
and present a memorandum about the boundary to be fixed by the Commis¬
sion in the Punjab. I told Wazir Ali that I did not think they had a hope of
seeing H.E. and he said that they quite understood that H.E. was very busy
but, failing him, would like to see P.S.V.
I don’t think we should see people who wish to make representations about
new Provinicial boundaries. This is entirely a matter for the Boundary Com¬
mission and, since Sir Cyril Radcliffe is going to stay in the Viceroy’s House,
it would, I think, create a bad impression if H.E. or his staff were to entertain or
receive any such representations. If you agree, I propose to tell Wazir Ali that
neither H.E. nor any of the staff can see these two gentlemen, and suggest that
they should make any representations they wish to the Boundary Commission
when it is set up.1
c. P. SCOTT
1 Mr I. D. Scott noted: ‘I agree. IDS 8/7.’ Sir G. Abell noted: ‘Same. GA 8/7/47/
Record oj Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
and Pandit Nehru (Extract)
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy's Interview No. 157
secret 8 July 1947, 11 am-12.15 pm
1. I told him that Sir Olaf Caroe had written asking whether Pandit Nehru
would agree that Mahbub Ali should be shown a copy of Mr Justice Clarke’s
finding,1 and would further agree that he might be given a copy to keep with
his own records. Nehru was very generous about it and said that he had already
given personal publicity to this finding and was only too glad that Mahbub
should have it.
★ ★ ★
4. Nehru complained about Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer’s gratuitously
insulting remarks about India having established diplomatic relations with
JULY 1947
7
Soviet Russia.2 I told him it was my intention to invite Sir C.P. to come and
see me in the near future to try and persuade him to join the Dominion of
India on the basis of the three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Com¬
munications, which Pandit Nehru had told me at yesterday’s interview3 that
the Congress party were now prepared to accept as a basis of relationship
between the Dominion of India and such States. I said I would certainly take
up this question with Sir C.P. then. Pandit Nehru said that the basic difficulty
with Sir C.P. was that he had a very inflated opinion of his own importance,
was always taking offence unless he was played up to, and seemed to want to
get into the news gratuitously. I promised to try and get hold of Sir C.P. as
soon as I could without making it a matter of urgency.
1 Exonerating him from the charges relating to his conduct during Nehru’s visit to Malakand in Novem¬
ber 1946. See Vol. IX, No. 11, note 4.
2 c. Enclosure I to No. 106.
3 Not traced.
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Lord Ismay (via India Office )
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Governors-General and Governors of Provinces,
Appointment of— Part (i)
most immediate 8 July 1947, 1. 35 pm
No. 1830-S. Following letter received from Jinnah this morning.
Begins: With reference to the question as to who should take the chair at the
meeting of the Joint Defence Council,1 which is to be set up according to the
decisions of the Partition Council dated 30th June,2 I have considered your
suggestion and wish to state that if you decide to accept the Governor-
Generalship of the "Dominion of India” and if your future Government will
permit you to act as an independent and impartial Chairman of the Joint
Defence Council, I would be glad to agree on behalf of the Dominion of
Pakistan to your acting in this capacity. Ends.
2. You will note that he consistently refrains from committing himself in
writing to asking me to do anything. He merely agrees in a form that implies
that I asked for his agreement.
1 See Vol. XI, No. 533, para. 4.
2 Ibid., No. 416.
8
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
8
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Lord Ismay ( via India Office)
Telegram, Rff/i \i6o: f 97
immediate 8 July 1947 , 2.30 pm
SECRET
No. 1832-S. 1 have now received resignations from the nine Congress
Members. The five Muslim League Members have for the present refrained
from handing in theirs, and Liaquat has written1 asking for details of my plan
of reconstitution because the Muslim League can only decide whether to send
in their resignations, when they know the full proposals.
2. I fear this may be the beginning of a further obstructive move by Jinnah
and have sent for him this afternoon.
3. Meanwhile I saw Nehru this morning, who agreed that I need take no
steps to reconstitute the Government until the normal Cabinet meeting on
23 rd July, but he said he could not possibly afford to allow it to be held beyond
this.
4. Of course the later I could put this off the easier for Jinnah but the worse
for Nehru. I shall therefore probably have to fix on the 23 rd July and hope
the Bill will be through by the 21st or 22nd. You will realise that it would
be an embarrassment if it went through much earlier.2
1 Vol. XI, No. 549.
2 In tel. 8799 of 9 July Mr Christie replied that every effort had been made to secure early passage of the
Bill which was due to receive the Royal Assent on 17 July, and asked what date Lord Mountbatten had
in mind, adding that it would ‘be very awkward here if Royal Assent is delayed after strenuous efforts
to get Bill through Lords quickly’. Sir G. Abell replied in tel. 1884-S of 10 July that ‘the 17th would
do but Viceroy would prefer 18th if possible’. R/3/1/1 54 : ff 114, 128. In his minute No. 123/47 of 11
July to the Prime Minister, Lord Listowel explained that as 18 July was convenient from the point of
view of the House of Lords and the King, he was arranging for the Royal Assent to be given at 12.30 pm
on 18 July. Mr Attlee minuted ‘Yes’. L/PO/6/122: ff 46 and 45.
9
Sir S. Cripps to Mr Rajagopalachari
Public Record Office. CAB 127/146
BOARD OF TRADE, MILLBANK, SW.I, 8 July I947
My dear Rajagi,
Thank you for your letter of the 2nd July.1 I fully appreciate the difficulty and
we have done our utmost to meet it by the new proviso to section 7 of the Bill.2
JULY 1947
9
This is as far as we can possibly go without breaking all faith with the States
Rulers and that we cannot do as we have made clear — and as I personally have
made clear ever since 1942.
I am sorry we can’t do more but it is the best we can do.
All good wishes,
Yours,
STAFFORD CRIPPS
1 Vol. XI, No. 459.
2 For insertion of the proviso, see correspondence concluding with No. 513 in Vol. XI. For the Act as
passed, see No. 164 in this Vol.
10
Cabinet C.MJ47) 6oth Conclusions, Minute 1
R\3o\i\i2: 2-3
Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.W.i, on 8 July ig4y at
11 am were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Ernest Benin,
Mr Arthur Greenwood, Mr Hugh Dalton, Sir S. Cripps, Mr A. V. Alexander,
Viscount Jowitt, Viscount Addison, Mr J. Westwood, Mr A. Creech Jones, the Earl of
Listowel, Mr G. A. Isaacs, Mr E. Shinwell, Mr Aneurin Sevan, Mr T. Williams,
Mr George Tomlinson.
Also present during discussions of Item 1 were: Mr John Strachey, Mr William
White ley.
INDIA
Constitutional Changes
(Previous Reference: C.M.(47) 58th Conclusions, Minute 6)1
the prime minister informed the Cabinet that difficulties had arisen over
the appointment of Governors-General for the new Indian Dominions. The
Indian Independence Bill had been drafted on the assumption that, at least for
an initial period, it would be found convenient for India and Pakistan to share a
common Governor-General and that the present Viceroy would continue to
? serve] in India in this post in order to help the new Dominion
service
Governments through the difficult period of transition. The Congress leaders
had invited Lord Mountbatten to accept nomination as the Governor-General
of India, but the Muslim League had now put forward Mr. Jinnah’s name for
the post of Governor-General of Pakistan. The Muslim League leaders had,
however, expressed the strong hope that Lord Mountbatten would become
1 Vol. XI, No. 443 ; see also No. 564, Minute 1 and Confidential Annex,
10
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Governor-General of India; and the Congress leaders, on learning of the Muslim
League’s proposal, had renewed their invitation to him.
Lord Mountbatten was in some doubt whether to accept the Congress
invitation. He was afraid that, if he should decide to associate himself in this way
with the Union of India, his impartiality as Viceroy might be subsequently
impugned, and he had had in mind the attitude adopted by the Governors of
Bengal and the Punjab, each of whom had announced that he would not be
prepared to accept office in one part of his Province after partition. On the
other hand, it was clear that Lord Mountbatten’s departure from India on 15th
August would seriously endanger the process of transferring power. If Lord
Mountbatten were not available it seemed inevitable that a Hindu would be
appointed Governor-General of India, and the prospects of conflict over such
matters as the division of assets between the two Dominions would thus be
greatly increased. It was, moreover, in the interests of Pakistan that Lord
Mountbatten should remain, since it seemed likely that he would be able to
ensure a fairer division of assets.
It would be necessary to make some statement on this matter on the Second
Reading of the Indian Independence Bill. In particular, Lord Mountbatten was
himself most anxious that the earliest opportunity should be taken to make
public the development of events so that, if he accepted the Congress invitation,
he could not legitimately be charged with partiality. Moreover, Parliament
would reasonably assume from the terms of the Bill that, at the outset, the two
new Dominions would share a common Governor-General, and it ought not
to be left under a misapprehension. In these circumstances, the best course
seemed to be to make a statement on the Second Reading to the effect that
both Congress and the Muslim League had made recommendations regarding
the Governors-General of the new Dominions which had been conveyed to
The King by His Majesty’s Government. While a formal announcement
would have to await the enactment of the Bill, His Majesty had intimated that
he would be prepared to accept these recommendations as soon as the Bill had
been passed. The names could then be given. The Prime Minister said that he
had felt it advisable, after discussing the matter at the India and Burma Com¬
mittee, to consult the Opposition leaders about this procedure, and he intended
to submit the proposal to His Majesty later in the day.
The Cabinet —
Took note, with approval, of the Prime Minister’s statement.
JULY 1947
II
II
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
and Sir W. Monckton
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy s Interview No. 138
8 July 1947, 3-3-3° Pm
I informed Sir Walter that Pandit Nehru had informed me at his interview
yesterday1 that the Congress Party were prepared to accept any Indian State
as a full member of the Dominion of India if they would adhere for the three
Central subjects (Defence, External Affairs and Communications) which were
laid down in the Cabinet Mission plan of May 16. He had pointed out to me that
all States had declared their willingness to accept these three subjects and that
provided the difficulty of the partition of India could be accepted, he saw no
reason why they should not join on those terms. I said that I had instructed
the Political Department to put this on the Agenda for the meeting of the
25 th July.2
I told Sir Walter that Pandit Nehru had agreed that I should conduct
negotiations in the first instance and subsequently the States Department; and
that I had arranged to keep him personally informed and thought that in that
case he would not find it necessary to attend the meetings himself.
Sir Walter pointed out that if a decision had to be taken at the meeting with
the Hyderabad delegation this weekend,3 that would leave insufficient time for
the Nizam either to make up his own mind or to put over this policy to his
people.
I pointed out that although it had been my original intention to try and
complete all negotiations with Hyderabad at this one series of meetings, I was
quite prepared to confine the agenda for this week to Berar and Secunderabad
and provisional standstill agreements, and put the main question of adherence
to the Dominion of India back to July 25th when all other States would be
coming up to discuss this.
Sir Walter said he was sure this would give the Nizam enough time to think
it out and prepare his people.
I told Sir Walter that if the Nizam behaved really well and if he thought
it would help him in his negotiations to hint that his second son might be
granted the title and rank of “His Highness”, then he could throw out
Not traced; cf. No. 6.
I
2 See No. 2.
3 See No. 61.
12
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
such hints now and I would telegraph to the Secretary of State accordingly.4
I also empowered Sir Walter to discuss my visit and say that I would be
perfectly willing to come either before the 25th July (provided Sir Walter was
able to assure me that the Nizam intended to accept these three subjects and
join the Dominion of India), or immediately after the meeting of 25th July
when I should come down more or less to express my appreciation of his
attitude.
4 In tel. 1887-S of 10 July Lord Mountbatten expressed the hope that he would have the Secretary of
State’s agreement if he decided to make a formal proposal to this effect. Lord Listowel replied in tel.
9385 of 21 July that the King would be prepared to accept a recommendation if made that the second
son of the Nizam be granted the title of His Highness. Listowel added: ‘As Hyderabad would pre¬
sumably not have acceded until after 15th August formal submission to the King would have to be made
by you on advice of your Ministers and you will doubtless consider whether you should not consult
Patel before carrying matter further if you have not already done so.’ Mountbatten Papers, Official
Correspondence Files: Hyderabad, Part 1(a).
12
Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty-Fourth Staff Meeting , Items l and 3
Mountbatten Papers
SECRET
Those present during discussion of Items 1 and 3 of this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s
House , New Delhi , on 8th July 1947 at 4 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mountbatten of Burma, SirE . Mieville , Sir C. Radclijfe (Item 1 ), Captain Brockman,
Mr I. D. Scott, Mr Beaumont (Item 1), Commander Nicholls, Lieutenant-Colonel
Erskine Crum.
Item 1
BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS
HIS EXCELLENCY the viceroy explained to Sir Cyril RadclifFe how the
composition of the Boundary Commissions had been finally agreed to by all
parties, and the great difficulty which had been experienced in deciding upon
a Chairman. He emphasised the desirability of the work of the Boundary
Commissions being finished by 14th August.
The Meeting considered a telephone message1 which had been received from
the Governor of the Punjab concerning certain difficulties which had arisen as a
result of the initial meeting, on 5th July, of the Punjab Boundary Commission.
A draft reply to this message was circulated.
his excellency the viceroy: —
(i) directed D.P.S.V. to despatch the draft reply to the Governor of the
Punjab, subject to amendments agreed in discussion;2
JULY 1947
13
(ii) directed D.P.S.V. to despatch a telegram to the Governor of Bengal
containing instructions similar to those sent to the Governor of the
Punjab ;
(iii) directed D.P.S.V. to arrange for Sir Cyril Radcliffe to meet Mr Jinnah,
Pandit Nehru, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Patel, Sardar Baldev Singh
and Dr Rajendra Prasad.
Item 3
THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
HIS excellency the viceroy stated that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan had
written3 to him to say that he did not wish to send in his resignation until he
knew more details of the form which the reconstitution of the Interim Govern¬
ment was to take.
his excellency said that he had explained to Pandit Nehru the difficulty
that, if he expelled the Muslim League members of the Interim Government,
it would appear that his first act, after the announcement that he was going to
stay on as Governor-General of the Dominion of India alone, was taking sides.
Pandit Nehru had insisted that the reconstitution, as planned, was in the best
interests of Pakistan. He had also explained the reason why Congress were so
keen that this reconstitutionshould take place before the end of August f ? July] .
Congress had originally acceded to the Muslim League request to join the
Interim Government on the condition that the latter should join the existing
Constituent Assembly. The failure of the League to join the Assembly had so
much prejudiced the reputations of the Congress leaders that Pandit Nehru
felt that they would stand little chance of being returned in fresh elections. In
fact, their candidates had been soundly defeated in a recent bye-election.
The meeting then considered a draft “Question and Answer” on this subject,
which, it was suggested, should be made in Parliament, his excellency
said that he would decide finally on this draft after seeing Mr Jinnah that
evening. He intended to point out to Mr Jinnah that it would take at least three
weeks for him to move the Pakistan Government to Karachi. He would offer
to make himself responsible for Pakistan’s interests. Also the date of the recon¬
stitution of the Interim Government should be allied to that, (July 22nd), on
which the reports of the Partition Sub-Committees were due to be rendered.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —
directed Pers. Sec. to ensure that the draft “ Question and Answer” were
shown to Rao Bahadur Menon; and that they were despatched to the
Secretary of State by telegram after his meeting with Mr Jinnah that
evening.4
1 No. 3. 2 See No. 19. 3 Vol. XI, No. 549.
4 Draft not printed, for tels. as sent see Nos. 24 and 25.
14
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
13
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Lord Ismay (via India Office)
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files :
Governors-General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of—Part ( 1 )
IMMEDIATE NEW DELPII, 8 July 1947, 5.15 pm
SECRET
No. 1836-S. I have seen Nehru who confirms that he has no objection whatever
to it being mentioned in debate1 that Colville and Nye have been asked to stay
on and that a British Commander-in-Chief and a number of British senior
commanders are also being asked to stay on.
2. I am seeing Jinnah this afternoon.
1 In tel. 8719 of 7 July Lord Ismay asked for confirmation that Congress would raise no objection to it
being mentioned in debate that they had requested the retention of these officials. I11 the same tel. Ismay
asked for similar confirmation in relation to Mr Jinnah’s request that Pakistan should have four British
provincial governors and British commanders for its Army, Navy and Air Forces. Mountbatten
Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Governors-General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment
of — Part (2).
Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma ( via India Office )
Telegram, Rffifi fi62: Jf 53-5
MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 8 July I947, 2.43 pm
secret Received: 8 July, 9.00 pm
No. 8737. 1 saw Prime Minister alone directly I arrived for an hour. After dinner
I attended a Cabinet Committee meeting1 which lasted two hours at which
I explained background and position now reached and read out Liaquaf s
letter.2 There was unanimity that despite the difficulty of the situation created
by Jinnah’s overwhelming egotism, your continuance as Governor-General
of India must be secured provided your own position can be fully covered.
There was no doubt about the advantage to India and as Prime Minister said
you can see this through and no one else can.
2. The fact that Jinnah will welcome your remaining as Governor-General
of India weighed strongly and it was felt that if his agreement to your being
Chairman of the Defence Committee could be confirmed before debate that
would clinch the matter. Only qualifying doubts expressed were by :
(a) Alexander who insisted that you must not be let down in any way;
(b) by Cripps who was anxious about the effect on your personal position of
JULY 1947
15
change from an arbitral to a partisan position if differences should develop
between the two Dominions over partition;
(c) by Listowel who felt that assurance was necessary that Congress left
wing would make no difficulties.
I said that Congress felt confident that they were masters in their own house
and Cripps who had just seen Jai Prakash Narain’s right hand man confirmed
that they would keep in with Congress until after first election.
3 . A difficulty which we had overlooked arose about time factor. No formal
announcement about Governor-General can be made before the Bill is passed.
Until then there is no basis for a submission of names to the King. The Prime
Minister felt that this could be overcome by seeing Opposition and then
securing contingent approval of the King with a view to making a statement in
the House on the following lines.
Begins. The Moslem League and Congress have made representations about
persons who should be Governors-General of the two Dominions if the Bill is
passed. These have been conveyed to His Majesty. Formal announcement must
await passage of the Bill but His Majesty has intimated that as soon as the Bill
is passed he would be prepared to approve appointments of yourself and
Jinnah. It is clear that Congress earnestly desire you to be their Governor-
General and Jinnah too has countenanced prospect of your becoming Governor-
General of India. This is an expression of highest confidence in you by all the
people in India and a great tribute to the services you have rendered. Ends.
4. Despite doubts expressed by the Dominions Secretary it was provisionally
agreed that names must be announced in this way in order to forestall leakage
and prevent speculation or press campaign which might make your position
difficult.
5. Normal procedure would be for the Dominions Prime Ministers to make
submissions but as there must be Governors-General on August 15th and there
will be no new Dominions until that date H.M.G. must in the special circum¬
stances act as agents on their behalf.
6. It was also provisionally agreed that you should have authority to take
Nehru into confidence after you had received H.M.G’s views and had made
up your own mind.
7. Above is to let you know general trend of discussion but nothing should
be regarded as definitely settled.
8. Your 1802-S just received.3 I have of course not circulated either paper
nor have I mentioned any of the points on which you comment. I have
1 See Vol. XI, No. 564, Minute 1 and Confidential Annex.
2 Ibid., No. 509.
3 Ibid., No. 557.
i6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
concentrated on giving background and allowing Ministers to judge for
themselves.
9. Prime Minister is seeing Opposition both Conservative and Liberal on
Tuesday morning4 and the King at 6 p.m. same day. I am attending former
meeting and am myself seeing His Majesty at 6.30 p.m.
4 8 July.
15
The Earl of Listowel to Mr Attlee
L/WS lij 1091: f 6
India office, 8 July 1947
Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 116/47
Prime Minister,
I attach, for your appproval, a draft telegram1 to the Viceroy about the with¬
drawal of British troops from India, based on the decisions reached at last
night’s meeting of the India and Burma Committee.2 The draft incorporates
certain amendments proposed by the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defence
but the Chiefs of Staff nevertheless do not find themselves able to concur in
its terms. As I understand it, this means that the Chiefs of Staff are not in
agreement with the decisions reached by the India and Burma Committee.
LISTO WEL
1 Not printed. For the telegram as sent, see No. 50.
2 See Vol. XI, No. 564, Minute 2.
16
Sir G. Abell to Mr Turnbull
Telegram, L\P &Jj 10 / 1 18: f 3
important Calcutta, 8 July 1947, 6.20 pm
confidential Received: 8 July, 6.20 pm
No. 192-C. Your telegram 1827-S (sic).1 Partition Councils. As I am in Calcutta
I am replying direct about Bengal. Reply about Punjab will go from Delhi.2
2. Information as to partition procedure in Bengal was sent to Harris by air
mail several days ago. Separation Council has been set up corresponding to
Partition Council at centre and consisting of two high ranking representatives
JULY 1947
17
of each side, i.e., Suhrawardy, Kwaja Nazim-Ud-Din, Mukherji and N.R.
Sarkar, with Governor as Chairman.
3. Council has started work amicably and well. It is served by steering
committee of one Hindu and one Moslem official and this committee controls
expert committees in various Departments.
4. Physical difficulties of setting up a new capital at Dacca and splitting up
provincial administration are great but Governor and Ministry are determined
that everything possible in time shall be done.
5. There is no talk in Bengal at present of arbitration but if as is probable
both high commands accept composition of arbitral tribunal now under
consideration at Delhi, i.e., one judge nominated by Congress, one judge
nominated by League and Chief Justice of India as Chairman, and if they agree
to accept decisions of such tribunal these are likely to be accepted as binding
in Bengal also.
1 In tel. 8707 of 7 July (to which this reference presumably refers), Mr Turnbull asked Sir G. Abell if the
Partition Councils in Bengal and the Punjab had been established and if the parties concerned had agreed
upon arbitration and, if so, whether agreement had been reached on the composition and terms of
reference of an Arbitration Tribunal. L/P &J/10/118: f 14.
2 See No. 18.
Report from Reuter Indian Service
L/P &JI8I663: ff 64-5
SIKHS WEAR BLACK ARMBANDS IN PROTEST AGAINST PARTITION
NEW DELHI, 8 July 1Q47
India’s 5,700,000 Sikhs, most of whom hve in the Punjab, wore black armbands
as they prayed in their Gurdwaras (temples) today1 in protest against the threat
to split their community under the British Plan for India.
In growing alarm at the possibility of their people being split by partition of
the Punjab, Sikh leaders West of the provisional partition line are urgently
endeavouring to impress about 1,500,000 Sikhs in rural areas with what they
consider a danger to the existence of the community.
The protest day of prayer passed quietly in the Punjab, according to reports
so far received.
Gurdwara congregations approved a resolution declaring that “any partition
that did not secure the integrity and solidarity of the Sikhs would be unaccep¬
table and create a difficult situation”.
1 In his official stituation report tel. 167-G of 8 July, Sir E. Jenkins referred to this event as follows:
‘Sikh protest day appears to have passed off peacefully but meetings in Guruka Bahawalpur Amritsar
numbered 10,000 and were addressed by Hindus as well as Sikhs’. L/P &J/8/663: f 66.
i8
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Leaders of the Shiromani Akah Dal, leading Sikh religious and political
organisation which sponsored the protest day, said that though they did not
wish to disturb the Punjab’s precarious situation they felt something must be
done to arouse the Sikhs to effective protest before the Boundary Commission
declares its findings.
Black-bearded, blue-turbaned, carrying three-foot curved swords like
walking canes, the Organisation’s Acting President, Amar Singh Dosanj, and
General Secretary Amar Singh Ambalvi, said there could be no peace in the
Punjab if the Sikhs were dissatisfied by the partition.
They declared a boundary on the River Chenab was their minimum demand
adding that when the Sikhs asked for partition of the Punjab they had in mind
the separation of preponderently Moslem areas from the rest of the Punjab.
Hindu and Sikh shops in Old and New Delhi remained closed today as a
mark of protest.
Addressing a meeting Sardar Baldev Singh, Defence Member of the Interim
Goverment said Sikhs should be prepared to make all sacrifices if the verdict
of the Boundary Commission went against them.
Sikhs had accepted the British statement of June 3 but acceptance never
meant they should acquiesce in decisions which threatened their very existence,
he declared.
Sikhs had a great stake in the fertile canal zone in the Moslem majority area,
he said, and in their sacred Gurdwaras.
The percentage of taxes they paid and the property they held should be
taken into account before the boundaries were fixed, he added.
The Referendum whether to join the new Pakistan Constituent Assembly
or the existing India Constituent Assembly began today in four more districts
of the North West Frontier Province — Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat and Bannu.
In the other two districts, Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan, it start [s] on Sunday.
The Referendum is proceeding peacefully.
18
Mr I. D. Scott to Mr Turnbull
Telegram , L/P&//10/11#:/ 4
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 8 July I947 , 7. 00 pm
confidential Received: 8 July , 6.30 pm
No. 1834-S. Your telegram No. 8707 July 7th.1
2. Partition Committee not Council hab been set up in Lahore consisting of
two representatives of Moslems and two of non-Moslems. It has been informed
JULY 1947
19
that an arbitral tribunal was being set up at the Centre and that services of this
tribunal would be available to partitioned provinces. The Partition Committee
has made no comment on this and is not proposing at present to set up its own
arbitration tribunal. The Committee has been informed by the Governor that
its work will not be carried on by majority vote but must be by agreement.
3 . Abell is in Calcutta and has been asked to reply to you direct2 concerning
para No. 2.
1 See No. 16, note i. 2 No. 16.
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab )
Telegram , Rfe/i I157: f 134
confidential 8 July 1947
BY TELEPHONE
No. 1839-S. Boundary Commission.1
2. I think that Commission should be allowed whatever staff they wish to
have.
3. I agree that a Muslim officer should be jassociated with Financial Com¬
missioner for preparation of papers. These two officials could perhaps act as
Steering Committee for Commission.
4. Radcliffe himself will have a European ICS officer as Secretary. Since the
High Court Judges have been selected by politicians, I see no reason why their
two Secretaries should also not be selected by political parties, but wish them
to be appointed in agreement with members of the Commission.
5. I confirm your own view of your functions in relation to Commission,
but consider that all official information should be passed to the Commission
through the Steering Committee of two above-mentioned officials.
6. Expenses of Radcliffe and his personal staff will be borne by Central
Government. All other expenses of the Boundary Commission will be a charge
on Provincial revenues. I suggest that someone from your Finance Department
be associated with them to look after sanctions etc.
See No. 3.
1
20
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
20
Mr Williams to Mr Clauson
Telegram , R^/i/ioy: f 214
important new Delhi, 8 July 1947, 1 9.00 pm
confidential Received: 9 July , 4.30 pm
No. 1841-G. Secretary of State’s letter to Viceroy dated May 19th2 regarding
content of treaty or agreement which I am handling. We deferred further
examination when it appeared likely that some subjects would be affected by
draft Bill. Broad position now is that (a) guarantee to maintain certain condi¬
tions of service for Secretary of State’s officers is included in draft Bill3
(b) agreed statement regarding European officers in Central and Provincial
Services will be made in Parliament during debate on Bill4 (c) certain military
arrangements have been agreed to by Partition Council.
2. Grateful for early information as to present position at your end. Can
you say what matters it is now considered necessary to make subject of agree¬
ment before transfer of power and on what lines it is thought they should be
handled.
1 Date of despatch on recipient’s copy given as 9 July 1947. L/P &J/10/92: f 14.
2 This letter enclosed a memorandum which contained the preliminary conclusions reached by the India
and Burma Committee on proposals put to them by Lord Pethick-Lawrence concerning the content
of a treaty to provide for matters arising out of the transfer of power, and asked the Viceroy for his
comments. For the discussion in the India and Burma Committee upon which the memorandum was
based, see Vol. X, No. 288, Minute 2.
3 See correspondence concluding with Nos. 429, part III, and 484 in Vol. XI.
4 See Vol. XI, No. 546.
21
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
Rl3liji6o: f 94
no. 1446/36 8 July 1947
Dear Mr Liaquat Ali Khan,
Thank you for your letter of the 7th July,1 which I felt raised such a difficult
issue for me that I must discuss it personally with Mr Jinnah before giving you
an answer.
I think I have convinced Mr. Jinnah of my bona fides in this matter and my
desire to play fair with the League Members, and he has promised me to have a
discussion with you and your colleagues and let me have his answer later on.
JULY 1947
21
In the meanwhile you may take this letter as dispensation for the League
Members not to send me their resignations until you can do so in a body on the
return of your colleagues from attending the referendums.2
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 Vol. XI, No. 549.
2 The Indian Cabinet was informed of this by Lord Mountbatten on the following day. R/3/1/160: f 109.
22
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Lord Ismay ( via India Office)
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Governors-General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of— Part (i)
MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 8 July I947, 9.3O pm
confidential Received : 8 July, 8.33 pm
No. 1845-S. I have discussed your telegram No. 87191 with Jinnah. He has no
objection to use being made in the debate of the fact that some of the Provincial
Governors of Pakistan will be British for the time being though exact details
have not yet been settled. He also authorises me to say that the C-in-C of
Pakistan and several of the senior officers retained will similarly be British.
1 No. 13, note i.
23
Sir P. Patrick to Mr V. P. Menon
Telegram, LjP &J/ 10/102: f 28
IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 8 July 1947, 6.30 pm
Received: 9 July, 2.00 am
No. 8755. Your telegram of 8th July 1823-G.1 For your personal information
it is being suggested to Ministers that statement on lines of paras. 7 to 9 of
Secretary of State’s telegram 86282 should not be made during Commons
debate. If it becomes necessary to reply to enquiries about international
position of States it should be sufficient to say that in view of conference
with States representatives H.M.G. desire to say nothing which might pre¬
judice favourable outcome.
1 No. 1.
2 Ibid., note 3.
22
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
2. It may not be possible to avoid a statement in Lords debate which will
occur in following week in light of outcome of conference and we should be
grateful for very early information about its progress.
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
to Lord Ismay (via India Office )
Telegram , jR/j/i ji6o: JJ 98-Q
important new Delhi, 8 July 1947, 11,00 pm
secret Received: 9 July , 2.30 am
No. 1847-S. Further to my telegram 1832-S of 8th July.1 I have had a very
long and rather difficult interview with Jinnah on this subject this evening.2 He
says that all League Members of Cabinet are extremely bitter at this deliberate
humiliation being inflicted on them in the last three weeks by the Congress and
they have not yet decided their course of action.
2. They are considering refusing to resign in order to force me to dismiss
them, and refusing to accept fresh portfolios in order to indicate that they have
been deliberately deprived of their fair share of government in the last three
weeks.
3. Liaquat went so far as to say to jinnah that he presumed that this was a
manoeuvre to enable Congress to pull a fast one over Pakistan, in removing
assets.
4. I think I persuaded Jinnah that this was not the case and got him to see
why Congress were so keen to be masters in their own house at the earliest
possible moment.
5. I pointed out how I had fought his battles step by step; how I had pre¬
vented this issue from coming to a head before I went to London; that I had on
return postponed the date from June 4 to July 4 and finally to July 23. This
final date was within three weeks of the setting up of the new Government in
Karachi and I suggested that most of the three weeks would be required for the
move. I appealed to him that his Members should resign and that he and I
could together phrase an announcement which would take the sting out of this
reconstitution and make it appear a reasonable move.
6. He said he could not give me an answer until all his Members returned
from the referenda on the 17th.3
7. He then said in that affectionate tone which he has recently begun to use
JULY 1947
23
with me: “I appreciate your difficulty and you can rely on me to make every¬
thing in your path as smooth and easy as possible’’.
8. It has however occurred to me that this matter might arise in the debate,
and in my next following telegram I am transmitting a possible question with a
suggested reply. In view, however, of the prospects of my getting Jinnah to
accept this peacefully I would prefer that this measure should not be used unless
a genuine question arises or I telegraph at a later date asking for the question to
be asked.
1 No. 8. 2 Not traced.
3 A reference to the referenda in the North-West Frontier Province and Sylhet.
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Lord Ismay (via India Office)
Telegram , R fa/ 1/154: f 110
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 8 July I947, 9. 00 pm
secret Received: 9 July, 2.30 pm
No. 1848-S. My telegram. No. 1847-S.1 Following is possible question and
suggested reply. Not to be used except as stated in my previous telegram.
Begins. Question. Clause 9 sub-clause (e) of the Bill authorises the Governor-
General to carry on the business of the Governor-General in Council other than
in accordance with the provisions of the 9th Schedule to the Government of
India Act: what is the intention underlying this provision?
Suggested reply. It is obviously necessary that the two new Dominion Govts of
India and Pakistan should be established and be ready to take over their res¬
pective functions on the 15th Aug. In particular the Pakistan Dominion
Government will have to get its whole Secretariat machinery properly func¬
tioning by that date. H.M.G. therefore consider that as soon as the Indian
Independence Bill is passed into law the Viceroy should reconstitute his Execu¬
tive Council.
2. The resignations of all members of the present Executive Council have
already been called for by the Viceroy. He will reconstitute his Executive
Council on the basis of 9 members who will form the future Government of
India and 9 members who will form the future Government of Pakistan. The
existing portfolios will be allotted among the Members for the Dominion of
India. The Members of the Pakistan Government will take over the necessary
files and set up their governmental organisation ready to move to Karachi
1 No. 24.
24
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
a week or two later. They will also in the meanwhile hold a watching brief on
all matters affecting their Dominion.
3. A complete standstill policy will be in force in relation to the Pakistan
area except at the request of any Member of the future Pakistan Government
who can have any action taken through his opposite number. Ends.2
2 In his minute Serial No. 121/147 of 10 July to the Prime Minister, Lord Listowel stated his personal
preference for avoiding a Commons statement on this matter. If, however, a statement had to be made,
he felt that it should be kept ‘to the bare minimum’. In his tel. 8857 of 10 July to Lord Mountbatten,
Lord Ismay conveyed Listowel’s thanks for the material which the Viceroy had sent and explained that
it was hoped that the need to use it would not arise. L/P &J/10/81 : ff 38-9 and R/3/1/160: tin.
Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma (via India Office )
Telegram , Rffi/i 1 162: ff 52-3
MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 8 July 1947, 9-00 pill1
secret Received: 10 July , 3.00 am
No. 80. The Prime Minister met following leaders of Opposition at 9.30 a.m.
this morning: Salisbury, Macmillan, Butler, Samuel, Clem Davies. I was
present at the meeting and gave them confidentially background.
2. Samuel was anxious to revive idea of a Viceroy presiding over the two
Governors-General but rest of meeting turned this down as impracticable,
probably unacceptable to Congress and too late. There was obvious unanimity
that you should be asked to remain as Governor-General of India especially
from Liberal side but Conservative Members said that they wished to consult
Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden who was unable to be present at the meeting
before committing themselves.
3. The Prime Minister asked me to go and see Mr. Churchill who was at
Chartwell and I have just got back. Mr. Churchill was completely undismayed
by Jinnah’s action and thought position remained unaltered. He dictated a
message which I might send to you which seems to me to be a masterly apprec¬
iation of the situation. The message is as follows. Begins. Mr. Churchill did not
think that exact balance and symmetry ot the appointments at the top was
important. What mattered was to find what worked best in the circumstances if
Mr. J became Governor-General of Pakistan. This would not make him more
unfriendly to our country or less dependent upon it. Such solution for Pakistan
would make it all the more important that all possible guidance should be
given to Hindustan.
JULY 1947
25
Under British constitution which is much in vogue in India at present time
the King reigns but does not govern. He has however an unlimited right to
receive information and to give advice which Ministers may take or reject on
their responsibility. On this basis Lord Mountbatten might be of great help to
Hindustan (or Indian) Government in the next year or so and in Mr. Churchill’s
opinion he ought not to withhold that aid. He can strive to mitigate quarrels
between Hindu and Moslem, safeguard position of Princes when that is
involved and preserve such ties of sentiment as are possible between the
Government of Hindustan and that of other Dominions (or Commonwealth)
of the Crown. It will be for Lord Mountbatten himself alone to decide whether
any point is reached where his conscientious or patriotic loyalty is involved or
when his usefulness is exhausted. Ends.
4. I am just off to Palace and am seeing Prime Minister after I return. I hope
we may send you a further message either tonight or early tomorrow morning.
1 Date and time of despatch have been taken from the India Office register of outward telegrams. On
recipient’s copy, date and time of despatch are given as 9 July, 8.05 pm.
Mr Attlee to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma (via India Office)
Telegram , R/j/ 1/162: f 54
most immediate India office, 8 July ig47, 10.03 pm
secret Received: 9 July, 3.40 am
No. 81. Following is private and personal message for Viceroy from Prime
Minister.
We have considered very carefully position which has arisen from Jinnah’s
determination to be Governor-General. I understand very fully your feelings.
Obviously it would have been much better if you had held both offices but as
this is not now possible we must accept the situation. I would ask you most
earnestly to accept Governor-Generalship of India during this period of
transition. I believe this to be essential if transition is to go through smoothly.
You have the trust of both Parties in India and of all Parties here. You need have
no fear that anyone would think it improper for you to be Governor-General
of new Dominion or that it would reflect on your impartiality. Everyone
knows that you have made and are making a great sacrifice in doing this work.
I have seen Opposition who agree that you should stay. You will receive a
message from Winston.1
My following telegram gives for your private information a passage which
1 No. 26, para. 3.
2 6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
I should propose to include in my speech on Thursday. I should like your
comments and suggestions at your earliest. I shall desire particularly to know
if reference to Moslem League’s approval of your appointment will be all
right with Congress.
Mr Attlee to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma (via India Office )
Telegram , JR/j/i/ifo: ff 33-6
most immediate India office, 8 July ig47, 11.30 pm
secret Received: 9 July , 3.40 am
No. 82. Private and personal. For Viceroy from Prime Minister. My immed¬
iately preceding telegram.1 Following is text of passage for my speech. Begins .
“Clause V of the Bill provides for appointment by the King of a Governor-
General for each of the new Dominions with proviso however that until
provision is made to the contrary by either of the new Dominions the same
person may be Governor-General of both.
That is a pretty clear clause and normally it would be both unnecessary and
inexpedient for a Minister here to say anything more about it. The blouse is
aware that the appointment of a Governor-General is made by the King on the
advice of his Ministers in the Dominion concerned and it would be wholly
improper for H.M.G. in the United Kingdom to be in any way concerned.
But it is necessary for me to make some further comments because the
position in relation to the appointment of the Governor-General of the new
Dominions is exceptional. In the first place there is the procedure. It is not
possible to follow normal procedure in this case. Under the Bill Governors-
General will have to be appointed as from August 15 th and although the two
Countries become Dominions as from that date there can be no Ministers
formally to advise the Crown until a Governor-General has been appointed
and Ministers have taken office.
In these circumstances it was agreed with Indian Leaders and King’s approval
was obtained that Viceroy would consult recognised leaders of Congress and
Moslem League as to whom they would wish to recommend for appointment
as Governors-General. Then their advice would be tendered formally to the
King by H.M.G. in U.K. This procedure would of course only apply in present
case. I wish to emphasise fact that although appointments would be made on
formal advice of Ministers here they were in fact recommendations of Indian
leaders themselves.
JULY 1947
2?
So much for exceptional procedure in present instance. But Viceroy has
represented that it would be in the interests of all if some statement could be
made at an early date about persons who are to be recommended for these
posts. This again is most unusual procedure and I should inform the House that
I have received the King’s specific authority for referring to recommendations
which are before him and to which assent cannot of course be given until Bill
has become law.
It had been intimated to us that it would be most convenient to all concerned
to have one Governor-General at least in initial stages and for some time we
proceeded on this assumption. It has recently become clear however that
Muslim League was in favour of a separate Governor-General to be appointed
for Pakistan. It is obviously very desirable for this matter to be settled at the
earliest opportunity in order that position may be understood in India and so
that new Governors-General can prepare themselves to take over after August
15th. Both Congress and Muslim League who have been recognised in Bill as
successor authorities have made recommendations which have been conveyed
by H.M.G. to His Majesty.
While formal announcement must await the passing of the Bill His Majesty
has intimated that he will be prepared to accept these recommendations as soon
as Bill is passed. The recommendations are in favour of the present Viceroy as
Governor-General of India and Mr. Jinnah as Governor-General of Pakistan.
I wish to add that recommendation of Lord Mountbatten is also welcomed by
Muslim League.2 I am also informed that Muslim League have agreed that he
should be Chairman of the Joint Defence Council, which will be responsible
for Central Administration of the Armed Forces until such time as India and
Pakistan are in a position to administer themselves. I am quite sure that the
House will agree with me that this recommendation shows that Lord
Mountbatten has carried his duties in India with complete impartiality and has
won the confidence of all peoples of India.
I wish here and now to pay my tribute to Lord Mountbatten. Great benefits
to the future of the whole continent of India would have followed from his
appointment as Governor-General of both the new Dominions. However this
is not to be. As a constitutional Governor-General his powers would not be as
great as they were. He will act on the advice of Ministers in all matters. Never¬
theless he has built up a remarkable position for himself with both parties in
India and his wise counsel and great devotion to public cause without any
thought of his own personal position will undoubtedly prove a most beneficial
factor in the future development of India. Ends.
1 No. 27.
2 See Vol. XI, No. 509.
28
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram, .Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Governors-General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of— -Part (/)
immediate new Delhi, p July 1947, oo.io am
secret Received: p July, 3.30 am
No. 1846-S. I have now received Jinnah’s nominations for Governors of
Pakistan Provinces, which are as follows.
Sind Mr Ghulam Hussein Hidayatullah.
West Punjab Sir Francis Mudie.
N.W.F.P. Sir George Cunningham.
Baluchistan A new Governor to be appointed in place of the present A.G.G.,
Prior. Name will be telegraphed later.
East Bengal. Lord Killearn.1
2. Request permission to telegraph invitation to Lord Killearn to visit me
immediately in Delhi to discuss this proposal with Jinnah.
3. Please use your best endeavours to persuade Sir George Cunningham to
accept this appointment as Jinnah feels, in view of the great experience he
already has, having been a successful Governor for five years, his acceptance
would be invaluable.
1 Lord Killearn eventually declined the governorship of East Bengal, see Vol. XI, No. 478, note 3.
30
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram, LIP &J/ 10/102: f 16
immediate new Delhi, p July 1947, 3. oo am
confidential Received: p July, 6.13 am
No. 1850-S. My telegram No. 1805-S1 ofjuly 7th paragraph No. 2. Following
are Political Adviser’s remarks.
Paragraph No. 3 of telegram No. 1803-S.
The consequences of lapse of paramountcy on attached units in Western
India (the total population of which is less than 1,000,000) have been under
constant examination in Political Department ever since the Cabinet Mission’s
memorandum2 on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy was published. I myself
JULY 1947
29
discussed question with Rau more than a year ago and explained to him how,
in practice, the constitutional lacuna which distressed him so much would be
filled by the building up of groups of States to which attached units could
adhere if they wished to terminate their present affiliation to an attaching
State. He does not know, perhaps, that such groups have now been formed.
Paragraph No. 4 of telegram No. 1805-S.
The insertion of “as” between the words “functions” and “exercisable” in
Clause 7(i)(b) of Indian Independence Bill3 seems pointless unless it is a device
to give legal cover to assumption by Indian Dominion of paramountcy
functions in relation to States. In view of paragraph No. 18 of H.M.G.’s
Statement of June 3rd,4 the insertion of this would be morally indefensible.
It would also, in my opinion, be politically inexpedient.
Telegram No. 1806-S5
H.M.G. cannot transfer to a Dominion Government control over foreign
relations of Indian States — vide paragraph No. 2 of Cabinet Mission’s mem¬
orandum of May 1 2th 1946 on States Treaties and Paramountcy. The future of
Chitral and other States on North-West Frontier of India is, in practice,
inseparably bound up with that of neighbouring tribal areas and will neces¬
sarily be governed by whatever arrangements Pakistan makes with these areas.
In regard to petty States attached to larger States, the constitutional 6 position
is that the Crown has absolutely no right to determine their future. The
proposed provisos, apart from being ultra vires of British Parliament, would
constitute a flagrant violation of H.M.G’s policy and pledges reaffirmed in
a paragraph No. 18 of their Statement of June 3rd.
In regard to practical position, Rau’s apprehensions are exaggerated. The
practical alternatives before these petty States are —
(A) Continued association with attaching State;
(B) Affiliation with recently constituted States groups in Gujarat or
Kathiawar; or
(C) Incorporation in what is now British India.
It is inconceivable that these petty State units, which have been and will
continue to be attached to larger States until August 15th, can succeed in
isolating themselves, when even these larger States find themselves forced by
economic and other factors to combine into groups.
1 Vol. XI, No. 559. 2 Vol. VII, No. 262. 3 Vol. XI, No. 428, p. 785.
4 Ibid., No. 45. 5 Ibid., No. 560.
6 Words in italics underlined in original.
30
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
31
Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma (via India Office)
Telegram , Rf^f 1 / 162: f 62
immediate India office, 9 July 1947, 4-5° am
secret Received: 9 July, 1.00 pm
No. 84. The King received me this afternoon1 after seeing Prime Minister.
His Majesty is convinced that you should accept Governor General of India and
is I believe writing or wiring you himself.
2. On return from Palace I called on Prime Minister who showed me
drafts of his two telegrams2 to you. They seem to cover most points but Prime
Minister would of course welcome your comments.
3. Am meeting Chiefs of Staff tomorrow morning.3 They are being some¬
what sticky about withdrawal of British troops and future defence arrangements
in India.
4. Am also seeing Slim who is apparently disinclined to accept the job.4
5. Cunningham originally refused Governor, NWFP5 but has since felt
qualms that he is being selfish.6 He arrives from Scotland to see me on Friday.
I will then wire his final decision.7
1 i.e. the afternoon of 8 July. 2 Nos. 27 and 28. 3 See No. 41.
4 See Vol. XI, No. 519; see also No. 227, para. 7 in this Vol.
5 See Vol. XI, No. 478, item 5.
6 The reasons why Sir G. Cunningham originally declined the governorship of the N.W.F.P. but then
had second thoughts are explained in his letters of 4 and 7 July to Sir A. Carter on L/P &J/7/12362 :
if 134-5, 130-1.
7 Sir G. Cunningham decided to accept the governorship of the N.W.F.P. after a discussion with Lord
Ismay in London on 11 July. Cunningham’s acceptance, together with the terms he suggested, were
conveyed by Sir A. Carter to Sir G. Abell in tel. 8962 on the same day. Ibid., if 127, 124, 121-2.
Minutes by Mr I. D. Scott and Captain Brockman
RI3I1/160: f 103
9 July 1947
H.E’s draft telegram below.1
2. In order to avoid a political crisis, it is suggested that two completely
separate Governments should be formed as soon as the Bill is passed. The
Government of the future India would have control over the existing
JULY I947
31
Departments, and the new Government of Pakistan would have its own
embryo (not shadow) Departments under as many Ministers as it liked to
appoint.
3. Each Government would have complete freedom to decide matters (in
anticipation of 15th August) which affected only its own territory. In actual
practice, this would not mean a great deal, because until the division of assets,
etc. is agreed, there would be little of substance which could be decided without
agreement between the two Governments. On the other hand, Nehru could
have his head, and issue any instructions he liked about planning etc. to his
Provincial Governments, proceed forthwith to make any appointments he
likes, and set up any Committees or Boards, etc. It may be that the psycho¬
logical effect would be all that Nehru wishes for, and the Pakistan embryo
Government could in turn make its own preparations, only it would be
sitting in New Delhi instead of Karachi for a fortnight or so. Not only would
this scheme avoid a crisis, but it would also have positive merits.
I. D. SCOTT
H.E. wants this scheme thought out. I am discussing with V.P. Menon
R.V.B.
1 Not printed. For telegram as sent see No. 5r.
The Nizam of Hyderabad to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
RI3I1I138 : ff 113-16
CONFIDENTIAL HYDERABAD, DECCAN, g July lg^J
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I have during the last few days seen Clause 7 of the India Independence Bill as
reported in the Press. I regret that (as has so often happened in recent months)
the clause, though it was closely discussed with British Indian leaders, was never
disclosed to, much less discussed with me or any representative of my State.
I am distressed to see that that Clause not only contains a unilateral repudiation
by the British Government of the treaties which have for so many years bound
my State and my dynasty to the British, but also appears to contemplate that,
unless I join one or other of the two new Dominions, my State will no longer
form part of the British Commonwealth. The treaties, by which the British
Government many years ago guaranteed the protection of my State and my
dynasty against external aggression and internal disorder, have been constantly
and solemnly reaffirmed in recent years, notably by Sir Stafford Cripps in
1942.1 I have been taught that I could safely rely on British arms and the
1 cf. Sir S. Cripps’s answer to Question 5 at his meeting with the Indian States Delegation on 2 April 1942
(Vol. I, p. 649).
32
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
British word and I have been persuaded, in consequence, right up to the present
to refrain from increasing my army and from establishing in my State factories
for the manufacture of arms and equipment. Nevertheless, the repudiation in
Clause 7 of the Bill has been made not only without my consent but without
any consultation with me or with my Government.
(2) As Your Excellency knows, both before you went to England and while
you were there, I asked that my State should be accorded Dominion Status
when the British should leave India.2 I have always hitherto felt assured that
after more than a century of faithful alliance, during which I have reposed all
my confidence in the British, I should certainly be able to remain without
question within the family of the British Commonwealth.3 Clause 7 appears to
deny me even that. I still hope that no difficulty will be allowed to impede
direct relations between me and His Majesty’s Government. I was recently
informed that Your Excellency had undertaken to ensure a pronouncement in
Parliament to establish that such relations can be entertained.4 My hope is that,
once established, these relations will develop into closer union between my
State and the British Crown to which, for so many years, I have been tied in
faithful alliance.
(3) Meantime, I shall undertake and continue active negotiations with the
new Dominions in order to reach sensible, practical arrangements for the
transition period, so that the future of Indian States and India generally can be
assured, so far as possible, in an orderly fashion.
(4) I feel bound to make this protest to Your Excellency against the way in
which my State is being abandoned by its old ally, the British Government,
and the ties which have bound me in loyal devotion to the King Emperor are
being severed. I hope that Your Excellency will place my letter before His
Majesty’s Government.5 I shall, for the present, refrain from publishing it,
lest I should in any way embarrass my old friends and allies in the eyes of the
world. I must, nevertheless, retain my right to publish it at a later stage, if it
should become necessary in the interests of my State.
Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN
2 See Vol. X, No. 548. 3 cf. Vol. XI, Nos. 112 and 199.
4 See Vol. XI, No. 261, also Nos. 326 and 360, minute 2.
5 On 9 July Sir W. Monckton forwarded a copy of this letter to Sir E. Mieville as the original had been
delayed in transit. Monckton urged that it should be placed before the Viceroy immediately and
explained, with reference to No. 11, that there was no inconsistency between the Nizam’s protest and
his readiness to negotiate upon matters of common concern. R/3/1/138: f 114. On 10 July a copy of the
Nizam’s letter was sent by P.S.V. to the India Office. O11 12 July Sir C. Corfield advised Sir G. Abell
that he had discussed the question of a reply with Lord Mountbatten and that they had agreed that a
detailed reply could be postponed until after the passage of the Indian Independence Bill. Accordingly
on 15 July Lord Mountbatten acknowledged the letter stating that he had forwarded a copy to H.M.G.
and that he hoped to let the Nizam ‘have a reply shortly’. Ibid., ff 133 and 141. Subsequent noting
on this file indicates that, whether by intent or oversight — it is not clear which — no further reply was
sent. Ibid., f 221.
JULY I947
33
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Jinnah
Rbl1 11^: f 58
no. 746/16 9 July 1947
Dear Mr Jinnah,
The Governor of Bihar has reported to me that his Ministry is under consider¬
able pressure to set up an inquiry committee into the Bihar riots of last
November;1 and he has suggested to me that such a committee would not be
in the best interests of the local Muslim minority.
2. I should, therefore, like to enlist your good offices in persuading the
Bihar Muslim League not to press this demand.2 I am sure a committee of
inquiry at this late stage, and in view of the present political developments
would be bound to cause more injury to Muslims of that province.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 See Vol. IX, No. 77.
2 In tel. 80-S of 3 July Sir H. Dow had suggested to Lord Mountbatten that Mr Jinnah’s influence should
be used to persuade the local Muslim League to withdraw its demand for an inquiry which he was
convinced would lead to a revival of communal trouble. In tel. 1854-S of 9 July Mountbatten informed
Dow that he was writing to Jinnah along the lines suggested. R/3/1/148: ft' 53, 57.
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir S. Cripps
Mountbatten Papers. Demi-Official Correspondence Files:
Cripps
personal 9 July 1947
My dear Stafford,
Thank you so much for your really charming and most encouraging letter of
June 6,1 which I only received yesterday since it came by all sea route. I return
the envelope, since you may care to follow up the muddle by which a letter
initialled personally by the President of the Board of Trade and marked ‘‘By
bag” should have been sent by sea route.
I have today received the Prime Minister’s and Pug Ismay’s telegrams2 about
the Governor-Generalship of India. I am bowing to the advice and wishes
of the Cabinet, the Opposition leaders, and The King; and incidentally to the
wishes of both the Congress and the League leaders, and I am accepting — at all
events pro tern.
1 Not printed.
2 Nos. 26, 27, 28 and 31.
34
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
I must, however, emphasise that I am most uneasy at joining up with one of
the two sides after the 15th August when hitherto I have been at such pains
to be completely impartial.
I am afraid there will be a lot of criticism of my action by one section of the
community; although I realise that there would have been probably an equal
amount of criticism from another section of the community if I had refused.
I am afraid I have not been very clever over handling this particular situation;
and freely admitted my fault in my letter3 to the Prime Minister. The only
excuse I have to offer is that where one’s own personal future is concerned one
is more apt to slip up than in dealing with entirely impersonal matters.
My private information is that Mr Jinnah’s immediate followers and advisers
are horrified at the line he has taken; and it seems almost incredible that a man’s
megalomania should be so chronic as to cause him to throw away such material
advantages to his own future Dominion for the sake of becoming 4 ‘His
Excellency” some eight months earlier than he would in any case have assumed
that title.
Jawaharlal Nehru is convinced of this view; but Vallabhbhai Patel ascribes
more sinister motives to Mr Jinnah and thinks that he wishes to set up a form
of Fascist dictatorship with ultimate designs against the Dominion of India.
The one satisfactory feature is that Mr Jinnah has not only pressed me to be
the Chairman of the joint Defence Council, but assured me that the Muslim
League Press would welcome the new arrangement.
Curiously enough only Edwina, my own Secretary and myself felt that I
would be doing wrong in accepting this arrangement; the whole of the rest
of my Staff were emphatic that I should accept.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
3 Vol. XI, No. 523.
36
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab)
Rbl 1/175: f 242
THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, £ July I947
Dear Jenkins,
You will have seen in the Press the scheme for the partition of the Defence
Services. The Commander-in-Chief has asked me urgently to impress on all
Governors that, in order to carry out the proposed reconstitution of the
Armed Forces, it is necessary that as many troops as possible should be released
JULY I947
35
from their duties in aid of the civil power so that they can be concentrated in
their normal locations.
2. I realise, of course, that you have the most difficult Province in India to
handle at the moment, and that you may well be unable to allow any units
to leave. It may, however, be possible for something to be done within the
limits of the Punjab itself by way of transferring units from one area to
another. I know I can rely on your co-operation with the Army Commander
to do whatever is possible in this direction.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
37
Minutes of Viceroy s Fifty-Fifth Staff Meeting, Items 1 and 2
Mounthatten Papers
SECRET
Those present during discussion of Items 1 and 2 of this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s
House, New Delhi, on 9 July 1947 at 12.15 Pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mounthatten of Burma, Sir E. Mieville, Sir C. Corffeld ( Item 2), Rao Bahadur
V. P. Menon ( Item 2), Captain Brockman (Item 1), Mr Sundaram ( Item 2),
Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
Item 1
GOVERNORS- GENERAL
The meeting considered two telegrams1 which had been received that morning
from the Prime Minister. The following was an extract from the first:
“I would ask you most earnestly to accept the Governor-Generalship of
India during this period of transition.”
The second contained the draft of a statement on the nominations of
Governors-General for India and Pakistan, which the Prime Minister intended
to make the following day in the House of Commons.
A draft reply to the Prime Minister, which had been prepared at a meeting
of members of the staff earlier that day, was handed round.
his excellency stated that he had finally decided to accept the Governor-
Generalship of the Dominion of India alone during the period of transition. He
wished it now to be put on record, though for the last time, that he was still
most uneasy and unhappy about this decision. He considered, however, that,
in view of the overpowering advice which he had received from London, he
was choosing the lesser of two evils. He felt that it had been essential to send
1 Nos. 27 and 28.
36
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Lord Ismay home, because His Majesty’s Government had, in a way, been
misled.
his excellency stated that he had that morning shown Pandit Nehru and
Sardar Patel2 the draft statement which the Prime Minister intended to make.
They could not have been more charming, and had made no criticism — in fact
they had thought it admirable. He had told them that he considered that he was
under an obligation to them to stay on and had only asked them to facilititate
making clear the fact of his impartiality. They had replied that no-one would
imagine that he was being partial. They had further agreed to reference, in the
Prime Minister’s speech, to the Muslim League’s approval of his appointment.
his excellency stated that the Congress leaders had said that they wanted
him to stay on as long as he would, but he had insisted on retention of the
formula ‘‘at all events for the transition period” because this meant that it
would be possible to select, nearer the time, the date on which it would be
possible to depart with honour. They had accepted this formula.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY
(i) approved, subject to amendments which he indicated, the draft reply to
the Prime Minister; and directed Pers. Sec. to despatch it;
(ii) directed Con. Sec. to draft, for his approval, a telegram to Lord Ismay
asking him to obtain the Prime Minister’s overall authority for him
(Lord Ismay) and Sir Eric Mieville to stay on, and continue to be paid
by H.M.G., after the transfer of power.
Item 2
THE STATES
rao bahadur menon and mr sundaram put forward the suggestion,
which had originally been made by Sir George Spence, that the proviso to
Clause 7 of the Indian Independence Bill should be amended to include agree¬
ments other than only those which related to customs, transit and communi¬
cations, posts and telegraphs, or other like matters.3
sir conrad c orfield said that he would have had no objection to such
an amendment if it had been incorporated in the Bill before issue. However, to
make the amendment now would be likely to cause suspicion and lead to
difficulties.
his excellency the viceroy said that at his interview, just before
the present meeting, with Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel, they had asked him
what he was going to do to help India in connection with her most pressing
difficulty — relations with the States. He had replied that he had already started
to help in this matter and would now make the cause of agreement his primary
consideration. He had said that he wished to pay tribute to Pandit Nehru for
having agreed that States need only join the Centre on the three main central
subjects; and to Sardar Patel for the statement which the latter had issued three
JULY 1947
37
days previously.2 3 4 He had said that, if the task could be tackled on that basis, he
would throw himself heart and soul into the cause of obtaining agreement.
He had made the point that, in meetings with representatives of the States, it
would be desirable for him to see the States’ representatives alone first, accom¬
panied only by his own staff. He would then have discussions with the States
Department, and if necessary also Pandit Nehru, unilaterally. He would then
hold further meetings with each side to narrow down the points of disagree¬
ment ; and it was only when he was confident that agreement would be reached
that he would bring the parties together. Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel had
agreed to this proposal.
his excellency said that he had received a letter from Sardar Nish tar5
and a verbal complaint from Mr Jinnah to the effect that the former was not
being associated, as had been intended, with the work of the States Department.
He had pointed out to Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel that they had
agreed that some States would have to go to Pakistan; and they had now
agreed to his suggestion that Sardar Nishtar should have access to the
Secretary of the States Department. He would therefore reply to Sardar
Nishtar to this effect and add the point that the Deputy Secretary of the
States Department was a Muslim officer.
his excellency, reverting to Rao Bahadur Menon’s suggestion to amend
the proviso to Paragraph 7 of the Bill, said that he would be prepared, if this
was done, to inform States’ representatives that it had been done not under
Congress pressure but on his own personal responsibility. He would offer also
to give them all the help they required in denouncing such provisions as they
wished to.
sir conrad corfield said that he was still of the opinion that any
amendment at the present stage would make the States suspicious. He would
prefer the wider matters to be covered by standstill agreements.
rao Bahadur menon emphasised that all standstill agreements might
not be completed by 15th August, especially if, as he recommended, His
Excellency made it his first object to persuade the States to accede to the Centre
for the three central subjects, his excellency agreed that this should indeed
be his primary object.
After further discussion, and consideration of the various points of view
his excellency decided that the arguments in favour of not amending the
proviso to Clause 7 were overriding.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:
(i) decided that no further action should be taken on the suggestion to
2 No record of this meeting has been traced.
3 See Vol. XI, Nos. 559 and 560, also No. 30 in this volume.
♦ See Vol. XI, No. 528
5 Not traced.
38
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
amend the proviso to Clause 7 of the Indian Independence Bill;
(ii) decided that he would reply to the letter which he had received from
Sardar Nishtar to the effect that Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel had
agreed that Sardar Nishtar should have access to the Secretary of the
States Department; and by pointing out that the Deputy Secretary of
that Department was a Muslim officer.
38
Lord Ismay to Mr Churchill
Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Indian
Independence Bill — Draft Bill , Part 11(h)
India office, 9 July 1947
My dear Mr Churchill,
The Viceroy has, in the last day or two, received two Notes1 from Mr Jinnah,
with the request that they should be communicated to the Prime Minister and
to yourself. These Notes were telegraphed to me at the India Office, but I
quite forgot to bring them with me to Chartwell yesterday.2
I am sending them down today by a special messenger, who has instructions
to wait for any message you may have to send back.
If I may add my own comment on these requests of Mr Jinnah, it is that
both of them are quite impracticable.
Yours ever,
PUG
1 See Vol. XI, No. 536 and Enclosure to No. 548.
2 In a letter dated 8 July 1947 to Mr Harris at the India Office, Mr Rowan explained that the Prime
Minister had discussed Mr Jinnah’s notes at a meeting with the Opposition leaders that morning and
that he had been instructed by the Prime Minister to ask Lord Ismay, who was going to Chartwell, to
deliver copies to Mr Churchill. L/PO/6/122: f 53.
JULY 1947
39
The Earl of Listowel to Mr Attlee
L/P &J 1 10 1 102: ff 2g~34
India office, 9 July ig47
Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 118/47
Prime Minister,
I think that it would be desirable if, in the course of your speech introducing
the Indian Independence Bill in the House of Commons, you said something
about the position of the Indian States and I attach a note, which has been agreed
with the Viceroy, indicating the points which it would be desirable to make.
2. It may be that in the course of the Debate questions will be asked as to the
relationship of the States after 15th August with the world at large, the applica¬
tion to them of international engagements entered into in the past on their
behalf as part of India, and whether we propose to continue to treat Indian
Rulers and their subjects as British protected persons by giving them passports.
My view on this, with which the Foreign Office concur as well as the Board of
Trade and the Board of Customs and Excise as regards the treatment of Indian
States, is that, as we do not propose to recognise the independence of the
Indian States, what happens on 15th August makes no change in their inter¬
national status and that, while we should do nothing to discourage the States
from associating themselves for international purposes with one or other of the
new Dominions, we should, during what we hope will be a short interval,
continue to give them the benefits of international engagements, admit their
goods into the United Kingdom at British preferential rates, give diplomatic
protection to Indian Rulers and their subjects abroad, and arrange for the
United Kingdom High Commissioner in India to give them passports insofar
as they are unwilling to accept such facilities from the Indian Dominions.1
3. There is some advantage in giving publicity to our intentions in these
matters, as this would serve to discourage Foreign Powers entering into direct
relations with the Indian States. The Viceroy has, however, urged2 that we
should make no public statement on these points and they are therefore omitted
from the attached note. A Conference between Sardar Patel and representatives
1 In tel. 1822-P of 9 July Sir C. Corfield informed Sir P. Patrick that he had consulted the Viceroy and
V.P. Menon and ‘We consider that issue and renewal of passports by U.K. High Commissioner would
constitute a continuation of direct relations of Crown with Indian States contrary to provisions of
Clause 7(i)(b) of Indian Independence Bill. Proposal would embarrass High Commissioner and would
cause grave suspicion in minds of successor authorities. It would also remove inducement to States to
associate themselves with new Dominions.’ R/ 3/1/138 : f 98.
2 In telegram 1826-P of 7 July Lord Mountbatten suggested that these points should be omitted as they
raised controversial issues which had already been adequately covered in the introductory paragraphs
of the proposed Statement on the States. R/3/1/138: f 102.
40
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
of the States will take place at Delhi on nth July3 about the future relations
between the States and the new Dominions and the chance of the States agreeing
to associate themselves with the new Dominions in matters of common
concern might be prejudiced if, at this stage, we made a public statement of our
intentions.
4. In these circumstances I suggest that if questions on these points are made
in the Debate in the House of Commons, Mr. Henderson, in replying for the
Government, should remind the House that, as was explained in the Cabinet
Mission's memorandum of 12th May 19464 on the position of the States, it is
our hope that the States will either enter into a federal relationship with the
new Dominions or, failing this, enter into particular political arrangements
with them, that a meeting to discuss these matters has been arranged to take
place on nth July at Delhi between representatives of the Indian States and of
the Indian political parties and that he does not wish to add anything to what
you will have said earlier in the Debate regarding the Indian States at the
moment.
5. At the same time I have warned5 the Viceroy that we may find it im¬
possible to avoid dealing with these matters in the House of Lords next week,
by which time the results of the meeting at Delhi on 1 ith July will be available.
LISTOWEL
Enclosure to No. 39
NOTE REGARDING INDIAN STATES FOR USE IN
DEBATE ON INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL6
The Cabinet Mission in their memorandum of 12th May 1946 informed the
States that His Majesty’s Government could not and will not in any circum¬
stances transfer paramo untcy to an Indian Government. With the transfer of
power to two Indian Dominions it is necessary to terminate the paramountcy
and suzerainty of the Crown over the Indian States, and with them the Political
engagements concluded under paramountcy and the mutual rights and
obligations of the Crown and the States which derive therefrom.
2. An important element of these rights and obligations concerns the
protection of the States against external aggression or internal subversive move¬
ment, and the methods whereby the Paramount Power has in the past in¬
fluenced the policy of the States so as to enable it and them to fulfil such under¬
takings. A feature running through all our relations with the States has been
that the Crown has conducted their foreign relations. They have received no
international recognition independent of India as a whole.
3. The States are part of geographical India and their rulers and peoples are
imbued with a patriotism as no less than that of their fellow Indians in the
JULY 1947
41
Provinces of British India. It would be retrograde and contrary to the interests
oi the two Dominions now to be constituted, as well as of the rulers and
peoples of the States, if owing to the formal severance of their paramountcy
relations with the Crown they were to become islands cut off from the rest of
India, with no share in the policies or development of the new Dominions
or in their relations with the world at large. The termination of their
existing relationship with the Crown need have no such consequences.
4. His Majesty’s Government firmly hope that all the States will in due
course find their appropriate place within one or other of the new Dominions
within the British Commonwealth. Until the Constitutions of the Dominions
have been framed in such a way as to include the States as willing partners,
there must necessarily be a less organic form of relationship between them
and there must be a period before a comprehensive system can be worked out.
The immediate establishment of a standstill arrangement between the States
and the two Dominions, in order to ensure continuance in particular of existing
financial and economic arrangements vital to India, such matters as posts,
telegraphs, customs, communications and similar matters, must be the first
requirement. The proviso to Clause 7(1) of the Bill is designed to secure the
continuance of the existing arrangements in this field until there has been time
for detailed negotiations between the parties.
5 . After the transfer of power more detailed and binding arrangements will
need to be concluded between the Dominions and States Governments. It may
well be that these arrangements will in their turn be superseded by a more
organic cooperation between the States and the Dominions, whereby the
States will become elements of their Constitutions when perfected by their
respective Constituent Assemblies. These later arrangements will, of course,
take time to conclude and the transition of the States from lapse of para¬
mountcy into a free association with the new Dominions is a process naturally
requiring proper discussion and deliberation.
6. His Majesty’s Government welcome the active steps being taken to set up
States Departments of the new Dominions to handle negotiations with States
Governments and we trust that this will facilitate the negotiation of the
arrangements to which I have referred.
7. If I am asked what would be the attitude of His Majesty’s Government
to any State which, having weighed all the considerations, has decided to cut
adrift from its neighbours and assert its independence, I would say to that
3 The Conference was in fact scheduled for 25 July. 4 Vol. VII, No. 262.
5 See No. 85, note 1; cf. also No. 23.
6 For Mr Attlee’s subsequent statement, which did not follow the wording of this draft exactly, see Pari
Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 439, 10 July 1947, cols. 2451-2. See also No. 262, notes 3 and 4.
42
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
State "Take your time and think again. We shall not be content to accept your
decision and its consequences until we are satisfied that you are fully seized of
the conditions offered and have irrevocably decided to reject them.’
40
Mr Christie to Sir G. Abell
Rl3li/i54:f 116
India office, g July ig4 7
My dear George,
I enclose Nehru’s letter to Lord Ismay,1 which was handed to him just as he was
leaving Delhi. I gather you must have had a copy, at any rate of the enclosure,
as that has been already telegraphed to the India Office.2
2. The answer here is that, unless H.E. has any comments, nothing further
can be done to meet Congress on the points raised. The note enclosed with
Nehru’s letter has been circulated to the Cabinet Committee, who have, so far,
made no comments, and are not likely to make any.
3. The India Committee were absolutely clear that they could not alter the
Bill further to meet the Congress request to emphasise more strongly that
India is the international successor State.3 It was felt that this was ultimately a
matter for U.N.O. and foreign powers to decide, that the Bill gave them a lead,
and that if we went further in the Bill there might be trouble with the Muslims.
It is difficult to take seriously the point in paragraph 3 of the Congress note.
4. The proviso about States Agreements was inserted after a long discussion,
and with a good deal of reluctance. It was felt to be vital that it should say
that the States could repudiate the Agreements whenever they wanted to. In
paragraph 4 of the Secretary of State’s telegram No. 8653 of the 5th July4 the
reasons were given why the Congress request about Clause 19(3) could not be
entirely met.
5. Would you very kindly let Nehru have a suitable acknowledgment to his
letter?
Yours sincerely,
JOHN CHRISTIE
1 See Vol. XI, No. 535, note 1. 2 Ibid., No. 535. 3 J/u'c/., No. 486, Minute 3.
4 Ibid., No. 514.
JULY 1947
43
Chiefs of Staff Committee: C.O.S.(47)86th Meeting , Minute 2 ,
Confidential Annex
L/WSlili046:ff 220-6
Those present at this Meeting held on 9 July 1947 at 11 am were: Admiral Sir John
H. D. Cunningham (in the Chair), Lieutenant-General Sir Frank E. W. Simpson,
Air Marshal Sir William Dickson, Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie C. Hollis
The following were also present for Minute 2: Mr A. V. Alexander, Lord Ismay,
General Geoffry A. P. Scoones
2. INDIA
Previous Reference: C.O.S. (47)85^1 Meeting, Minute 3)1
sir john Cunningham referred to a Secretary’s minute covering a copy
of a letter2 which had been sent to the India Office concerning a draft reply3 to
a telegram4 from the Viceroy about the withdrawal of British forces from
India. He handed round a note5 setting out the reasons which had led him to
withhold concurrence from the draft reply to the Viceroy. He emphasised the
importance he attached to negotiations with the Indian leaders on defence
matters being opened before the 15th August 1947, and felt strongly that until
those negotiations were opened, no further concessions should be made by
H.M.G. He considered that otherwise there was a grave danger that, before
negotiations on defence matters were opened, all possible concessions would
have been made to the Indian leaders, and we should therefore be left with no
bargaining counter to offer in exchange for the granting of defence facilities in
India.
sir frank simpson said he was in general agreement with the note
circulated by the First Sea Lord. He referred to paragraph 5 of the latest
telegram6 from the Viceroy containing his advice on the method of negotia¬
tion on defence matters and said he had seen no other assurance that the new
Dominion Governments would be in a position to protect British lives in
India.
As regards defence against external attack, he questioned whether the
Indian Army would be in a position to repel aggression on the North West
frontier at a time when it would be in the process of re-organisation. He
thought that Mr Jinnah might well be forced to call on us for help in this matter
and that if such help were forthcoming, there would be more chance of
obtaining his agreement to our other defence requirements. Further, Mr
Jinnah had recently stated his wish that discussion regarding the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands be started before the 15th August. He did not understand,
1 L/WS/1/1091: ff 9-1 1. 2 Ibid., f 7. 3 Not printed. For the reply as sent, see No. 50.
4 Vol. XI, No. 511. 5 See Enclosure, 6 Vol. XI, No. 556,
44
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
therefore, why the Viceroy advised against opening again negotiations with
Indian leaders on defence matters before the 15 th August.
sir william Dickson was also in general agreement with the note
circulated by the First Sea Lord. Since it had been decided, for political reasons,
that no reference should be made to our defence requirements in the Indian
Independence Bill, he too felt it was most important that negotiations on our
defence requirements should begin with Indian leaders before the 15 th August.
As regards the withdrawal of British troops from India being completed by
the end of December 1947, as advised by the Viceroy, he pointed out that the
only transport aircraft available in India at present, and until the new
Dominions were properly equipped, were Royal Air Force Transport
Squadrons in the area of Karachi and Mauripur. If it was intended that these
transport squadrons should be withdrawn by the end of this year, movement
would have to begin at an early date. He thought it was most inadvisable both
from our and the new Dominions’ points of view, however, to withdraw these
squadrons, since they provided the only means by which internal air com¬
munications in India could be maintained, and by which British personnel
could, in an emergency, be evacuated by air. Further, by retaining Royal Air
Force Transport Squadrons in India, the transit facilities we required in
connection with air routes to the Far East could best be assured. He suggested,
therefore, that this point should be made to the Viceroy in replying to his
telegram regarding the withdrawal of British troops.
lord ismay said that partition of the Indian Army was being carried out in
two phases. The first phase, which it was hoped to complete by the 15th
August, consisted of the transfer of units down to company and squadron level
between the two Dominions on a communal basis. The second stage, which
would be a much longer term operation, was to re-distribute individuals to the
Dominion they preferred. Thus, it would be possible for a Hindu to be a
member of the Army of Pakistan by his own wish, if, for family reasons, he
wished to be stationed in that Dominion.
It was envisaged that each of the new Dominions would have their own
Commanders-in-Chief, who would be British Officers electing to serve with
the Dominion forces. Other senior appointments would be filled by British
Officers who similarly elected to serve in those forces.
After the 15 th August, there would be a Joint Defence Council, at which the
Governor-General would take the Chair in his personal capacity, and which
would consist of the two Defence Members of the Dominions and General
Auchinleck. Administration of the two Armies would continue to be the
responsibility of General Auchinleck and G.H.Q., India until the Dominions
were in a position to provide for the administration of their own forces, but
operational control over the two Armies would, after the 15th August, cease
to be centrally controlled.
JULY I947
45
As regards the withdrawal of British forces, he thought the Viceroy wished
to draw attention to the anomalous position which British forces would be
placed in after the 15th August. There would, after that date, remain in India,
6 brigades distributed throughout the main cities in India. In the event of there
being a flare-up on the North West frontier, these forces would be quite
inadequate substantially to alter the course of operations, since they were not
trained in frontier warfare, nor were they in sufficient numbers ; to be of use
several divisions would be required. He thought that if the North West frontier
was threatened Pakistan would have to approach India for assistance. Similarly,
as regards internal security, British forces would be inadequate to protect
British lives. Nor was it possible, in advance, to make workable plans for the
evacuation of British personnel who elected to remain in India at their own
risk. He emphasised that on the 15th August, India and Pakistan were to be
established as independent Dominions, and the entire responsibility for internal
security measures in India would thereafter be their responsibility.
It was envisaged that as soon as the new Dominions were in a position
to negotiate, discussions would be carried out simultaneously on defence,
economic and fiscal matters. Until the 15th August, the Governments of
India and Pakistan would not be in existence, and such negotiations with them
could not therefore take place. The two Indian leaders were already fully
occupied and Mr Jinnah had no Government or body to which he could
refer for advice or authority. After the 15th August, however, each Govern¬
ment would have its own Service advisers. He emphasised that the Viceroy was
most anxious to build up a feeling of goodwill in India, and did not therefore
wish to take any steps which might upset the already delicate situation
obtaining there. He quoted, as an example of the improvement of the
position, the recent unexpected request by Pandit Nehru for British officials
to remain in the two biggest Provinces in India.
He (Lord Ismay) appreciated the reasons which prompted the Chiefs of
Staff to press for negotiations to begin before the 15 th August, and he suggested
that the Viceroy be informed of their views, and of our detailed defence
requirements in India. He emphasised that these defence requirements could not
be obtained by compulsion, and could not therefore be safeguarded except by
treaty or arrangement; it was only by establishing goodwill that these re¬
quirements could be obtained. He thought the method of presentation to
Indian leaders of considerations affecting Commonwealth defence, required
most careful consideration, and he suggested that this should be left to the
judgment of the Viceroy.
the minister of defence (who entered the meeting at this stage) said
that at a meeting7 of the India and Burma Committee earlier in the week, he
7 Vol. XI, No. 564, Minute 2.
46
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
had presented the views of the Chiefs of Staff on our defence requirements in
India, with which he was in general agreement. During discussion at that
meeting, he had raised the question of responsibility for the defence of India
against external attack after the 15th August. It had been stated that this would
become the entire responsibility of the Indian forces and a telegram8 had
subsequently been despatched asking for the views of the Commander-in-
Chief as to the probable capacity of the Indian forces to provide for defence
against external aggression.
lord ismay said he had not yet seen any reply from the Commander-in-
Chief on this question. The Indian Army had for some time held responsibility
for operations on the North West frontier, and he did not think that the
capacity of the Indian Armed Forces to deal with frontier troubles would be
substantially lessened by the withdrawal of 6 British brigades from India. He
emphasised that there was only one British battalion within reasonable access
of the frontier, namely in Peshawar. Further, it was hoped that if the North
West frontier came under Mussulman domination, there would be less chance
of trouble. He also pointed out that during the interim period, no steps would
be taken to continue demobilisation of the Indian Armed Forces, and national¬
isation would be halted. It was hoped that sufficient British Officers would
volunteer to serve in the Indian forces at least until re-organisation was
complete.
the minister of defence, referring to paragraph 6 of the latest tele¬
gram9 from the Viceroy, said he fully realised the difficulties confronting the
Viceroy, and the reasons, therefore, why he had urged that no statement should
be made in Parliament on defence matters. He thought, however, the Govern¬
ment might be placed in a position during the coming debate in the House of
Commons, in which they would be forced to make some statement. He was
anxious that some formula should be drawn up which, with the approval of the
Chiefs of Staff and the Viceroy, could, if necessary, be made during that debate.
In the circumstances he thought it might be sufficient to say that H.M.G. were
not unmindful of the effect on Commonwealth defence matters of the granting
of Dominion status to India and Pakistan. He supported the view of the Chiefs
of Staff that Indian leaders should at least be informed of the general nature of
our defence requirements but agreed that detailed discussion could await the
establishment of the two Dominions. He thought it might be advisable to
include some statement to this effect also in any statement which it might be
necessary to make in the House of Commons. He would agree, therefore, to the
Viceroy being approached on this matter and to be informed of the details of
our defence requirements on the lines suggested in a report,10 at present under
consideration by the Chiefs of Staff.
lord ismay undertook to submit, for the consideration of the Prime
Minister, a draft telegram to the Viceroy on the lines suggested by the Minister
JULY I947
47
of Defence. He emphasised that India and Pakistan could not be compelled to
co-operate in defence matters, and that the method of presentation of our
case to the Indian leaders was a matter best left to the judgment of the Viceroy.
He also considered it most important to include, in any statement made on the
subject, reference to H.M.G’s wish that any agreements concluded with India
and Pakistan on defence matters should, in principle, be identical.
At this point, the minister of defence left the meeting.
In discussion, the chiefs of staff were in agreement that the action
suggested by the Minister of Defence would meet their immediate requirements
and that, therefore, they were prepared to concur in the terms of the draft
reply8 * * 11 to the telegram from the Viceroy on the withdrawal of British troops,
prepared by the India Office, subject to the incorporation of amendements12
attached to a Secretary’s minute and the inclusion of the point made above by
the Vice Chief of the Air Staff regarding the inadvisability of withdrawing
Royal Air Force Transport Squadrons from India by December 1947.
lord ismay undertook to convey to the Prime Minister the views of the
Chiefs of Staff expressed in discussion, and to recommend that two telegrams
be despatched to the Viceroy, one dealing with the withdrawal of British
forces, and the other with negotiations regarding our defence requirements
including the text of a proposed statement which might be made during the
course of the second reading of the Indian Independence Bill in the House of
Commons in case of necessity.
sir frank simpson suggested that the Principal Administrative Officers
Committee be invited, in consultation with the India Office and the Ministry
of Transport, to examine the implications of the accelerated withdrawal of
British forces from India, as suggested in the Viceroy’s telegram,13 on this
subject.
There was general agreement with this suggestion.
the committee:
(a) Took note that Lord Ismay would inform the Prime Minister of their
views above and would recommend the action referred to at ‘X’
above.14
(b) Invited the Principal Administrative Officers Committee to examine,
in consultation with the India Office and the Ministry of Transport, the
8 See No. 44 and its note i. 9 Vol. XI, No. 556.
10 See ibid., No. 554 and its note 1. 11 See note 3.
12 These amendments referred to the retention of British transport squadrons in India beyond the date of
the transfer of power. L/WS/1/1091 : ff* 4—5. In all other respects the telegram sent to the Viceroy (No.
50) was the same as the draft that had been prepared.
13 Vol. XI, No. 51 1. »♦ See L/WS/1/1091 : ff 4-5, also Nos. 49 and 50 of this Volume.
48
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
administrative implications of the accelerated withdrawal of British
forces from India, and to report.
(c) Expressed general agreement with a report by the Joint Planning Staff
containing a review of our strategic requirements in India.15
Enclosure to No. 41
INDIA. DEFENCE
NOTE BY THE FIRST SEA LORD
9 July 1947
The Chiefs of Staff requirements on this subject were sent to the India Office
in October 1946. 16 These were reconsidered from time to time, and at the end
of June the India Office held a meeting to consider the methods to be put in
hand to obtain British military requirements in India. On the 3rd July, the
Secretary of State for India telegraphed to the Viceroy with a view to initiating
talks with the Indian leaders.17
2. The Viceroy has raised objections18 to discussing our requirements, for
reasons which I consider to have no weight. His principal reason is an objection
to negotiating merely with Indian party leaders, until they have assumed
responsibility. Answers to this objection are easily seen in the fact that he is
prepared to discuss transit facihties for military aircraft, and that he has dis¬
cussed the sale of a Cruiser to the Indian Cabinet, while the C.I.G.S. has had
serious discussions with Jinnah and Nehru on the future employment of British
troops in India and on the acceleration of the withdrawal of British troops.
3. Meanwhile, our defence requirements appear to be going by default.
One such decision has led to our abandoning the bargaining position respecting
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Recent telegrams from India emphasise the
acceleration of the withdrawal of our troops and also emphasise that they are
to have no role, whether of internal security or external defence.
4. This method of dealing with such subjects piecemeal in practice only
means concessions to Indian sensitivity, while no attempt has been made to
raise any questions on which the Indian leaders might bargain, or to press
considerations to which they would not immediately agree. An example of the
way this attitude works is the argument in the Viceroy’s telegram 1744-S,
paragraph 6(a),19 to the effect that British forces must be withdrawn early from
Pakistan, because Mr Jinnah hopes to be able to use them, while they must
equally be withdrawn from India, because the Viceroy is convinced that
Nehru wants them to go, although Nehru has not said so.
5. I do not suggest we should attempt to reconsider the various matters that
have been discussed in recent telegrams, but I do suggest the time has come to
JULY 1947
49
cease piecemeal decisions, and to clear the desk of such correspondence.
Instead, it is urgently desirable that our defence requirements in India, as
set out in J.P. (47)90, 20 should be considered as a whole, and secondly that
negotiations be opened with the Indian leaders on defence questions, equally
regarded as a whole.
6. There are two fundamental reasons why these negotiations should be
opened before, not after, August 15th —
Firstly, the more we delay, the more the Indian leaders would be in a position
to say that we cannot have regarded these as of great importance, because we
only put them forward at a late hour.
Secondly, before August 15th, the Viceroy is the supreme authority, and both
sides sit at his table, after that date he, and the British Service representatives,
are outsiders.
15 See Vol. XI, No. 554 and its note 1.
16 See Vol. VIII, No. 408. ” Vol. XI, No. 487. 18 Ibid., No. 556.
19 Ibid., No. 511. 20 See ibid., No. 554 and its note 1.
42
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Attlee ( via India Office)
Telegram, R ffij 1/162: ff 64-3
MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, p July 1947, 3. 00 pm
secret Received: p July, 2.33 pm
No. 1851-S. Personal and Private for Prime Minister. Your 81 of July 8th.1 I
am most grateful for all the thought that the King, yourself, the Cabinet and the
Opposition have given to this question. In view of your personal appeal and
the overwhelming advice of all parties I feel, in these special circumstances,
that I cannot but agree to have my name submitted to His Majesty for appoint¬
ment as Governor-General of the new Dominion of India during the transition
period, although I must confess I still have some misgivings.
2. Your 82 of July 8th.2 I have discussed the whole matter with Nehru and
Patel and have read them the statement you propose to make. They agree
entirely with the text and also have no objection to the reference to the Muslim
League’s approval of the appointment.3
3 . I have the following amendments to suggest to the text :
(a) Penultimate paragraph — add new sentence: “He has expressed his
1 No. 27. 2 No. 28.
3 On 10 July Lord Mountbatten sent Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel and Mr Jinnah a copy of an extract from
the speech which Mr Attlee was making in Parliament that afternoon during the debate on the second
reading of the Independence Bill. R/3/1/162: ff 67-9.
50
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
willingness in the special circumstances to serve in this capacity, at all events
during the transition period.”
(b) Last paragraph — delete fourth and fifth sentences and substitute: “As
constitutional Governor-General he will, of course, act on the advice of his
Ministers in all matters.”
(c) Last words of last sentence should perhaps read : “The future development
of the whole continent of India.”
4. I consider it essential that a Press announcement should be made here
concerning the appointment of the two new Governors-General at the same
time as you make your announcement in the House of Commons. I should be
grateful if you would telegraph me most immediately text of such announce¬
ment and time it should be released.
43
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
and Mr Gandhi
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy’s Interview No. 159
9 July 1947 , 4-5-45 pm
I think and hope that I have satisfactorily cleared up the misunderstanding
referred to in his letter of the 27th/28th June, 1947. 1 I told him that my sole
object up to 15 th August was to ensure a peaceful and efficient transfer of power
to the two Dominions in accordance with the will of the people of India and
their respective future Governments. He next raised with me the fear which he
had expressed consistently in his recent post prayer meetings that the British
would leave a legacy of war, and that the partitioned armies would be left in a
state in which there was every likelihood that they would be used for making
war on each other.
2. I told him that of course I shared his view that nothing should be left
undone which would ensure the removal of the threat of war between two
neighbouring members of the British Commonwealth.
3 . I told him in confidence that Lord Ismay was this day seeing the British
Chiefs of Staff to discuss the future Commonwealth defence arrangements
with particular reference to India. While I could not prophesy what would be
the outcome of those discussions, I hoped that they would result in defence
discussions between the United Kingdom, Pakistan and India taking place
after the 15th August and before 31st March.
JULY I947
51
4. I pointed out that the institution of the Joint Defence Council which
would last until at least that date, would remove all risk of war before that
date, and that this gave us eight months in which to arrange some form
of agreement which would reduce the chances of the two Countries fighting
each other.
5. I pointed out that the greatest guarantee for the future peace of the Indian
Sub-Continent lay in both nations remaining members of the British Common¬
wealth. He reproved me for using the word ‘nations’ and invited me to use
States or Countries instead.
6. I further pointed out that so long as Pakistan and India remain within the
Commonwealth, there was no reason why a Commonwealth Conference
should not be called to Delhi since this was the most central capital in the whole
Commonwealth, and at such a meeting arrangements could be discussed which
which would ensure other members of the Commonwealth devising means to
prevent Pakistan and India from making war on each other.
7. We next discussed the question of the Indian States. He asked me to do
everything in my power to ensure that the British did not leave a legacy of
Balkanisation and disruption on the 15th August by encouraging the States
to declare their independence, or by leaving the arrangements between the
States and the Dominions of India and Pakistan in a state of chaos.
8. He further went on and said that H.M.G’s decision about Berar returning
to the Nizam was a crime.
9. I told him that I had already invited H.E’s representatives to meet me on
the nth to discuss the questions of Berar and Secunderabad. I told him that
on the 25th July all States including Hyderabad would send representatives
to discuss the stand-still agreement, and I hoped also the terms under which
they would join one or the other Dominion.
10. I told him that since Pandit Nehru had authorised me2 to negotiate in the
first instance alone with the States representatives on the basis of their being
granted full membership of the dominion on adhering only to the three
Central subjects mentioned in the Cabinet Mission plan, I felt very hopeful of
being able to bring in almost every State including even Travancore.
11. I made it a condition however that no leaders must make any more
threatening or provocative speeches.
12. I told Mr Gandhi “You always talk about wooing people, and yet in
the case of the States, you threaten. Would you woo a girl you wanted to
marry with a stick and expect her to accept?” He laughed and admitted the
1 Vol. XI, No. 382.
2 See No. 37, Item 2.
52
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
truth of this statement, and said he would make no statements that would
embarrass my negotiations.
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram, R/^/i/82: f 42
immediate new Delhi, 9 July 1947, 7. oo pm
private Received: 9 July, 6.33 pm
No. 1867-S. Your Private telegram No. 83 of July 9th.1 Commander-in-Chief
points out that for a long time past we have relied on Indian Army for the
defence of the N.W. Frontier. There is only one British Battalion now on the
Frontier and that is purely for Internal Security purposes in Peshawar. He adds
that it is a completely outworn idea that British troops are needed on the
Frontier provided that the Indian Army remains reliable and efficient as they
are today.
Commander-in-Chief is therefore satisfied that withdrawal of British troops
will not affect ability of Indian Army to protect N.W. Frontier.
1 In tel. 83 of 9 July Lord Listowel had asked Lord Mountbatten to confirm that the withdrawal of
British troops would not affect the ability of the Indian Army to protect the North West Frontier.
L/WS/1/1092: f 260.
Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart ( North-West Frontier Province) to
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rl3Ml65: ff 3-io
TOP SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PESHAWAR,
no. GH-116 9 July 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten.
THE POST-REFERENDUM PROBLEM IN THE N.W.F.P.
1. I have been trying to foresee the situation which will arise after the
declaration of the result of the Referendum, which should be on 19th July.
There is little time left, and I must be clear as to what action I shall have to take.
That action must of course have Your Excellency’s approval.
JULY 1947
53
2. The object, as I see it, is to ensure peaceful and orderly conditions in this
Province until we hand over power on the ‘appointed day’, and to hand over
in such a way as to give the successor Government a fair and reasonable start.
3. Before outlining the courses open there are certain factors I wish to
mention :
(i) RE-ACTIONS TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT
(a) It seems to me that a Coalition Government would offer the best
prospects of achieving the object. I have had discussions, separately and
privately, on the subject with Dr. Khan Sahib and Mr. Chundrigar. I put the
various alternatives which I list in para 4 below to each of them. I mention
their specific reactions to these points later, in the appropriate sub-paras of
para 4. Here I deal only with the general reactions of Dr. Khan Sahib and Mr.
Chundrigar to the idea of a Coalition Government to cover the period between
the announcement of the result of the Referendum and either the appointed
day or the holding of a General Election under the new Pakistan Constitution.
(b) Dr. Khan Sahib when I first put the problem to him on 5th July was
emphatic that there could be no question of a Coalition. His party could never
work with the Muslim League. On 7th July however, while declaring that he
himself could never participate in a Ministry which stood for Pakistan, he said
that he would not rule out the possibility of some of his colleagues being willing
to take their place in a temporary Coalition Ministry on the grounds that
Pakistan was temporarily inevitable, i.e. they would perhaps accept portfolios
until a new General Election was held.
He did however say that, should there be a clear vote in favour of Pakistan,
he himself would certainly resign and thought that his colleagues would too,
though he could not say for certain what the decision of the party would be.
I am not sure what he would regard as a ‘clear vote’. I am however informed
that he told a press representative that he would regard a vote of 3 1% of the
electorate in favour of Pakistan as decisive.
Apropos of this about 65% of the electorate voted at the last election.
Voting in the Referendum has so far been heavy.
(c) Mr. Chundrigar, whom I also saw in private, later, on 7th July, and
again on 8th July, was adamant that there could be no Coalition Government
unless the Congress Party accepted Pakistan, a contingency which he regarded
as impossible. He said that the real object of the present Ministry and the
Congress Party in general was to sabotage Pakistan. On no account, he said,
should the present Ministry be allowed to remain in office after the Referen¬
dum; otherwise they would squander the Province’s finances, stir up trouble
through Ipi, with whom they were in close touch, and generally create such
chaos that the Muslim League, when they took over on the appointed day,
would be faced with an impossible situation. I think he exaggerates the risks
54
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
of Ipi’s interference. It may be that Ipi is in touch with Congress, but his
influence extends only over a portion of the tribes.
Incidentally the chaos Mr. Chundrigar fears would equally result from any
violent reaction of the Muslim League to the results of the Referendum or the
action taken after it.
Mr. Chundrigar repeated what Firoz Khan Noon had said to me, namely
that after 'the appointed day’ Jinnah would appoint a Government to rule the
Province until new elections were held. I fear that the League may have
totalitarian ideas and intend to victimise their opponents.
(ii) FUTURE POLICY OF EACH PARTY
(a) I asked both Dr. Khan Sahib and Mr. Chundrigar what the policies of
their respective parties would be after the Referendum. As I saw it, I said,
the League had hitherto stood for Pakistan. That, and that alone, had been
their policy. They had now got Pakistan. What were they going to stand for in
future? Mr. jinnah had told me that, exept for defence, foreign affairs, com-
munications and perhaps one or two other subjects common to all Provinces
which would have to be controlled from the Centre, Provinces would have
complete provincial autonomy. This, I believed, is what the Congress really
had in mind in their demand for Pathanistan. I did not believe that they
seriously contemplated an independent Path an State.
(b) As for the Congress policy, I said that it seemed to me that they realised
that Pakistan was initially inevitable, that at heart they did not believe in an
independent State, but desired complete provincial autonomy. Where then
was the real difference between the two parties if it were not individual enmity?
(c) Mr. Chundrigar’s reply was not very definite. I cannot say what he really
thought the League’s future policy would be.
(d) Dr. Khan Sahib however stated that in his opinion the position was that
the Muslim League would be the Conservative Party, supporting the land¬
lords and capital ; while the Congress Party would be the Labour Party standing
for a socialist and democratic Province. He spoke, too, of the Province forming
a separate third Dominion working in close co-operation with the other two
Dominions. I think he must have got this idea from an article by Sir W.
Barton which appeared recently in some journals.
I consider that the future policy of each party has an important bearing on
the possibility of any co-operation between the two parties during what one
might call the interim period, as well as on the future generally.
(iii) ARMS AND THE PRIVATE ARMIES
(a) The prospects of future peace in the Province would be greatly improved
if we could restore enforcement of the Arms Act and disband the four private
armies — Red Shirts, Zalmai Pakhtun, League National Guards and Ghazi
Pakhtun.
JULY I947
55
(b) To take the arms problem first. Both sides have many arms, a large
proportion of them unlicensed. These arms have been bought at considerable
expense by the owners. They would hate to have to give them up. To enforce
the Arms Act would therefore be hkely to require a definite plan involving the
employment of a considerable number of police and soldiers, and possibly
taking 2 or 3 months to complete.
I should like very much to do it, but my advisers, including the GOC
Peshawar Area but with the exception of my Inspector-General of Police,
are against it. They consider that we are not strong enough to carry out the
necessary measures in the time available. An important factor in this regard is
the coming re-shuffle of Army units and the possible reorganisation of their
class composition. These steps will undoubtedly affect the efficiency and readi¬
ness of the Army. I feel therefore very reluctantly disposed to agree with the
advice which has been given to me.
(c) Much the same arguments apply to the private armies. In any case I
think that we should have to wait until it was obvious that one or other private
army intended to break the peace before we acted.
We must, I suggest, await developments before we can declare these "armies’
unlawful associations or otherwise deal with them, whether piecemeal or
together.
(iv) GOVERNMENT UNDER SECTION 93
(a) An obvious disadvantage of this will be that it will have to come to an
end on the appointed day. This means that should Section 93 be invoked from,
say, 20th July, there would not be a running governmental organisation to pass
on to the successor Government on 15th August.
This is perhaps not vital, but is I consider obviously desirable.
On the other hand Government under Section 93 appears to offer certain
advantages. The Congress Party if dismissed might more readily accept such
Government in preference to a League Ministry, and the Leage would I think
much prefer it to either a Coalition (of any sort) or to the Congress Ministry
remaining in office until the appointed day. They would certainly expect to
take over on that day.
(b) There remains the question whether we would be able to exercise
authority under Section 93. There is a risk that Congress would on dismissal
resort to Civil Disobedience. I have just received a report that they are already
considering it and collecting the names of Red Shirts who are prepared to
“make any sacrifice”. We might well be faced with a difficult situation. Our
cadre of officials is very weak. A large proportion of the Services have Muslim
League sympathies, and might not be staunch. There is therefore a risk that we
should have more on our hands than we could cope with, and would either
have to retreat or resort to martial law.
56
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Nevertheless I believe that if the present Ministry has to be dismissed Govern¬
ment under Section 93 until the appointed day offers the best prospect of success.
(v) THE TRIBES
Unless the situation should deteriorate I believe the tribes will continue to hold
their hand. Should the situation ‘go bad’ then I fear they would appear
wherever there was an opportunity for loot.
(vi) To sum up the main factors are:
(a) The extremely slender prospects of forming a Coalition.
(b) The future policy of each party.
(c) The problem of arms and private armies.
(d) The question of the desirability of Government under Section 93 and
our ability to exercise it.
(e) The possibility of tribal trouble.
4. THE COURSES OPEN
(i) The result of the Referendum may be such as to make it obvious that the
bulk of the electorate is in favour of Pakistan. In that case Dr. Khan Sahib and
his Ministry might resign, accept the defeat, go into opposition, and work
constitutionally to win the General Election, which would presumably have
to take place not long afterwards, on some policy different from that of the
League’s.
This of course would be the correct constitutional action. I would then call
on the leader of the opposition to form a Government. Although he does not
command a majority in the Provincial Assembly that body is not in session and
would not normally be due to [?for] re-assembly until February 1948. I think
therefore he could form a Ministry and carry on.
This would be the easiest and most desirable solution. I am however by no
means sure that it will happen.
(ii) The present Ministry might argue that the Referendum was either not a
vote against their policy or had not been decisive. They could say that they had
not voted; that they had never wanted to join Hindustan, so the real issue at
stake had never been put to the electorate, and so on. They would then not
offer to resign.
If I allowed the present Ministry to continue in office the League would I am
sure be furious. They would argue that the Referendum had clearly shown that
the people supported their policy and to allow the present Ministry to remain
in office, even if only till the appointed day, would only give them more time
to sabotage the League’s chances and to prepare for some form of non-co-
operation. They themselves might therefore well resort to non-co-operation,
probably in violent form.
JULY 1947
57
Unless Mr. Jinnah could be persuaded to induce the League to hold its hand
until ‘the appointed day’ and agree to Dr. Khan Sahib’s Ministry remaining
in office until that day I do not see how it will be possible to allow the present
Ministry to continue in office. It will therefore have to be replaced by some
other form of Government.
(iii) The first alternative would then be to dismiss it and put in a League
Ministry or form a Coalition Government or govern under Section 93. Dis¬
missal would probably produce a strong and probably violent Congress
reaction. The Red Shirts are well disciplined. The majority of them would in
all probability respond to a call for a campaign of any sort.
Dismissal I should if possible like to avoid, but may be compelled to resort to.
(iv) The next alternative would be a League Ministry. This I believe would
lead to violent reaction by Congress and the creation of a situation which I
should like to avoid. League Government in some form will however be
inevitable after the appointed day. Not to appoint a League Ministry at once
might therefore only be to postpone their having to deal with active Congress
resistance. On the other hand some other form of Government, even for only
three weeks, might enable one to establish more favourable conditions for the
League to take over in on 15th August.
(v) A possible alternative would be a Coalition. I have explained in para
3 (b) above how slender are the hopes of forming a Coalition. But I should like
Your Excellency’s authority to work for it. Would it be possible to induce
Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru to support the idea? Perhaps if you agree with the
proposal Your Excellency would consider trying yet again to bring that diffi¬
cult trio together.
(vi) The last alternative I can suggest is Government under Section 93. It is,
as I have stated above, possible that it might be more acceptable to both parties
than any other, in spite of its disadvantages.
(vii) Finally should Section 93 fail owing to non co-operation by either or
both parties or because of an outbreak of violence by one of them — probably
the Congress — occurring immediately after the result of the Referendum is
declared I see no solution but resort to Martial Law. The soldiers will not I
think like it, but I see no alternative in the last resort.
(viii) To sum up the alternatives are:
(a) A correct constitutional solution, i.e. resignation by the present Ministry
and the formation of a League Ministry.
(b) Refusal by the present Ministry to resign, followed either by
(i) dismissal and the formation of a League Ministry and probable trouble,
or
58
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(ii) the formation of a Coalition Ministry of which I do not altogether
despair, but am not very sanguine,
(iii) dismissal and Government under Section 93,
(iv) Martial Law.
5. PLAN
I seek Your Excellency’s permission, failing the constitutional solution, to
work first for a Coahtion Ministry and if that fails to dismiss the present
Ministry and govern under Section 93. It will be necessary to maintain our
present strength and degree of readiness in Armed Forces in both the settled
districts and tribal territory.
In any case I request Your Excellency’s guidance and instructions.
6. I have not yet had an opportunity to discuss all this with Messervy. He
is coming here on Thursday, 10th, and I will give him a copy of this letter and
and discuss it then, but I feel time is too short to allow of my any longer
delaying sending this letter to you.
7. All this may sound like taking counsel of my fears, but I wish to avoid
the charge that “the outlook of the leader on whose decision fateful events
depend is usually far more sanguine than the brutal facts admit”. I am however
by no means without hope that there will be a constitutional change of
Ministry.
Yours sincerely,
R. M. LOCKHART
4 6
Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rl3til176:f 24
secret 9 July ig47
no. 693
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I discussed with the Army Commander on 7th July, and have again discussed
with the Lahore Area Commander this evening, the question of the relief of
British troops.1 I understand that they are likely to be moved during the first
half of August, and that decisions may be taken by G.H.Q. about 17th July.
2. It is not easy to say how things will go, but my opinion is that the most
dangerous period will be 15th July to about 15th October. There is great
soreness in the Punjab about partition, especially among the Sikhs, and if they
intend to make trouble, they may do so (a) when the Boundary Commission
JULY I947
59
reports, if it reports before 15th August, or (b) immediately after the 15th
August, if the Boundary Commission has not reported by then. The Sikh
member of my Partition Committee actually proposed this morning that we
should stay effective proceedings until orders had been passed on the report of
the Boundary Commission; he also indicated that the Sikhs would not wish
the Government of the Eastern Punjab to leave Lahore until the fate of Lahore
had been decided. These matters will probably be referred to the Central
Partition Council with a view to arbitration, but Swaran Singh’s attitude
illustrates the Sikh view.
3. On the whole, I think it will be wise to avoid postponing the relief of
British troops for too long. It would be awkward if trouble on a large scale
started while the relief was in progress. My own advice would therefore be to
make the change before the end of July, if it can be made so soon. I have
thought it right to give this opinion to Your Excellency as the Commander-
in-Chief will no doubt discuss the matter with you.
Yours sincerely,
E. M. JENKINS
1 cf. No. 36.
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Governors-General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of— Part (i)
immediate new Delhi, p July 1947, p.55 pm
secret Received: p July, 8.15 pm
With reference to my letter of the 5th June1 and para. 6 of your telegram No.
7840 of the 1 8th June,2 I have called for the resignations of all Provincial
Governors and am so informing Nehru and Jinnah. Not only will this make it
easier for them to make their nominations but I feel that by suitable publicity
in due course, we shall be able to obtain some credit from these resignations.
1 Vol. XI, No. 79-
2 Ibid., No. 256.
6o
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
48
Mr Attlee to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
( via India Office )
Telegram , R/j/ 1/162: f 66
MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, p July 1947, 7.38 pm
secret Received: 10 July , 1.13 am
No. 85. Private and personal from Prime Minister.
Thank you for your 1851-S.1 We are all delighted that you have agreed to
accept. You know what my feelings are on this.
As regards my statement in the House of Commons I accept all the amend¬
ments you propose. In addition there are two further small amendments, both
in penultimate paragraph : —
(a) In second sentence for ‘‘It has recently become clear” read “It recently
became clear”.
(b) At the end of penultimate sentence for “India and Pakistan are in a
position to administer themselves” read “India and Pakistan are themselves in
position to administer”.
This passage will form part of my speech, and will be delivered in the House
at about 4.30 BDST. I suggest that you should release it at that time.
1 No. 42.
Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma ( via India Office )
Telegram , jR/3/1 / 161: f 17
IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, p July 1947 , 8.33 pm
secret Received: p July , 3.30 am
No. 8840. As a result of long meeting1 with Chiefs of Staff this morning a
telegram2 about withdrawal of British troops has now been approved and
despatched.
2. I was under great pressure to send you long list of voluminous military
requirements for immediate discussion with Indian Leaders, the idea being that
Prime Minister would be able to say in debate that these requirements had been
sent to you and were being communicated to Indian Leaders. I undertook to
send message to you but pointed out that presentation and timing must be left
entirely in your hands, and that in all probability you would refuse to have
anything to do with it at this stage.
JULY I947
6l
3. However, have just had a further meeting3 with Prime Minister, Minister
of Defence, Secretary of State for India and First Sea Lord, in the course of
which Prime Minister emphasised that it would be most untimely to raise these
long-term strategical requirements with Indian Leaders at present and that if he
were pressed in debate on this question he would simply say that negotiations
would of course be undertaken on Defence, Fiscal, Economic and other
questions when the two Governments were in a position to discuss these
matters.
1 No. 41. 2 No. 50.
3 At the same meeting, which was held on the evening of 9 July, Mr Attlee decided that a telegram which
had been drafted for despatch by Lord Ismay to Lord Mountbatten on the subject of negotiations
regarding Britain’s defence requirements (see No. 41, sideline ‘X’) should not be sent. L/WS/1/1046:
f 204.
50
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma 1
Telegram, L/WS / 1 jiog2: f 274
MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, p July 1947 , 11. 45 pm
Received: 10 July, 5.30 am
No. 8841. Your telegram dated July 4, 1744-S.2 Withdrawal of British Forces
has been considered by Cabinet Committee.
Para. 2. We agree as regards fighting troops and combatant R.A.F. units
but see paragraph 7 below regarding Transport Squadrons. Indian leaders can
of course be informed privately of our conception of role of British Troops
during withdrawal but no formula should be published.3
Para. 3. It should be left to Indian leaders to raise this with us if they want to.
We do not desire to be the first to offer to pay since they may possibly be quite
ready to assume that existing financial arrangements will continue for the few
months in question despite the changed position.
Para. 4. Proposals are being examined. Our preliminary view is that they
are satisfactory.
1 A note on the file by the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary shows that Mr Attlee and Lord Listowel had
discussed the latter’s minute, Serial No. 116/47 (No. 15), and had ‘finally approved’ the text of the
telegram to be despatched. L/WS/1/1092: f 273.
2 Vol. XI, No. 51 1-
3 In conveying Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck’s views on this paragraph in his letter to Sir E. Mieville
dated 11 July, Sir A. Smith remarked: ‘He [i.e. the C.-in-C.] disagrees that “no formula should be
published”. On the contrary he thinks it important that it should be publicly stated that the responsi¬
bility for maintaining law and order will rest from 15 August with the two Dominion Governments,
and, therefore, British forces will NOT be available to intervene in internal disorder.’ Mountbatten
Papers, Viceroy’s Conference Papers, V.C.P. No. 123.
6 2
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Para. 5. We agree that British troops shall take only their personal arms and
equipment and such stores as they need for their journey and on arrival at their
destination. The shipment of stocks of British equipment and stores from
India will be the subject of further telegrams. There are complications affecting
Royal Air Force equipment however, and this will be the subject of a further
telegram.
Para. 6. We agree that withdrawal should be completed, if possible, by the
end of December. We consider that, at any rate, their families should be
evacuated before the withdrawal of British troops is completed. No firm
decision can be given until the practicability of completing move by end of
December has been established. Shipping may be limiting factor. Prime
Minister will make following announcement in course of his speech on
Thursday. Begins. On transfer of power on August 15, British Army Forces
will immediately start to be withdrawn from India. This withdrawal will be
carried out as rapidly as shipping permits, and is expected to be completed by
about the end of this year. Ends.
Para. 7. We think that there will be mutual advantage to Dominion Govern¬
ments and to ourselves in retention, for time being, of Royal Air Force Trans¬
port Squadrons and their maintenance organisation in Karachi — Mauripur
area. If we agree to withdraw these units earlier we should have no means of
moving British nationals in an emergency or of sending reinforcing Squadrons
for this purpose. We think that both Indian leaders might agree that these
units would be of assistance to them in maintaining internal military communi¬
cations. They could also be available in a non-operational role in the event of
serious internal unrest, bearing in mind that neither Dominion will themselves
be able to provide such facilities for some time to come. Presence of these
R.A.F. units in India will enable us to assist both Governments in providing air
transport facilities and maintenance of routes in and through India, which are
essential not only to us but also to India.
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Lord Ismay ( via India Office)
Telegram , Rffi/i [160: f 102
immediate new Delhi, 101 July 1947, 00.1 3 am
secret Received: 10 July, 01.30 am
No. 1874-S. In continuation of my telegrams No. 1847 and 1848, 2 I need
hardly point out that my position would be extremely difficult having
accepted to stay on with the Dominion of India if the League refused to send in
JULY 1947
63
their resignations and forced me to dismiss them and give all portfolios for the
whole of India to Members of what will be my own future Government.
2. I am therefore now investigating the mechanism whereby these two
future governments could hold separate portfolios for their future areas for the
three weeks before the actual transfer of power.3 1 believe I may be able to per¬
suade Congress to accept such a scheme and I feel that Jinnah would welcome
it provided the mechanics present no insuperable problems.
3. Will telegraph again as soon as preliminary discussions are completed.
1 Date of despatch has been taken from the India Office register of inwards telegrams. On sender’s copy,
date of despatch is given as 9 July.
2 Nos. 24 and 25. 3 cf. No. 32.
Meeting of the Partition Council , Case Nos. P.C. 26/4/47 ,
28/4/47, 1 3o\4l47 and 31/4/47
Mountbatten Papers. Partition Council Minutes
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held on 10 July 1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , Mr Jinnah , Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , Sardar Patel ,
Dr Rajendra Prasad, Sardar Baldev Singh, Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck,
Sir E. Mieville , Mr H. M. Patel, Mr Mohamad Ali, Brigadier Elliott, Lieutenant-
Colonel Erskine Crum
Case No. P.C. 26/4/47
His Excellency circulated the following note2 which had been handed him
by Sir Cyril Radcliffe, Chairman of the Boundary Commissions and said that
he would like approval to sending a cable to H.M.G. immediately to effect the
necessary amendment to the Bill.
“I think that the provisions of the Indian Independence Bill3 (clauses 3 and 4)
dealing with the “awards of Boundary Commissions” need clearing up.
The Bill, as drawn, does not say what is to be represented by an “award”.
We have to envisage not merely that it may have to be arrived at by a majority,
dependent on the Chairman’s casting vote, but that it may in fact consist of a
1 This item, which is not included in the Partition Council Minutes in the Mountbatten Papers, has been
taken from R/3/1/154: f 129.
2 The text of this note was transmitted in Lord Mountbatten’s tel. 1875-S of 9 July to Lord Listowel.
R/3/1/154: f 120.
3 Vol. XI, No. 428.
64
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
series of decisions, some of them arrived at by a majority on one side, some by
a majority on the other.
Unless there is something in the Bill covering this explicitly, I think that
dissatisfied people might afterwards maintain that majority decisions did not
amount to a valid award at all.
I suggest adding a new sub-clause to clauses 3 and 4 on these lines —
‘For this purpose the award of a Boundary Commission shall mean the
recommendations of the Chairman of that Commission contained in his
Report to the Governor-General at the conclusion of the Commission’s
proceedings.’”
Points in discussing the note were that the expression ‘'casting vote” was
inaccurate in that it implied that the Chairman had two votes, a casting vote in
addition to his own. It was accepted that this was not the intention, and that the
Chairman would have only one vote. After some discussion the position was
clarified as being that the members of the Commissions, were akin to assessors
and the Chairman would act in the role of Umpire and give his awards.
It was agreed that the draft circulated should be communicated to H.M.G.
with this amendment that the first two lines should read
“For this purpose the award of a Boundary Commission shall mean the
decisions of the Chairman . ”4
Case No. P.C. 28/4/47
His Excellency pointed out that His Majesty the King would with the passing
of Independence Bill renounce the title of “EMPEROR” which would there¬
after disappear from all coinage, official documents etc. He felt that it would be a
a graceful act if he could convey to His Majesty the intimation that he should
continue, when signing official documents, to write “GEORGE R.I.”. He felt
that very few people would notice or understand the significance of the letter
“I”. It was pointed out that this would be inconsistent with the actual position
and His Excellency undertook to discuss the matter further with Mr Jinnah.
Case No. P.C. 30/4/47
His Excellency mentioned that Sir Cyril Radcliffe had enquired whether in the
decisions of the Boundary Commissions account should be taken of natural
features, providing defensible boundaries and markings for general adminis¬
trative convenience. The Commander-in-Chief said that considerations of
defence could be ignored but pointed out that rivers, which might appear to
form suitable natural boundaries, in India frequently changed their courses and
would not therefore provide a fixed boundary.
The general view was that so long as the Boundary Commission do nothing
inconsistent with or in violation of the fundamental principles laid down in the
terms of reference, they can do what they consider best.
JULY I947
65
It was agreed, however, that no directive in addition to the terms of reference
should be given to the Boundary Commission; it should be left to their
discretion to interpret the terms of reference.
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan drew attention to a misprint in clauses 3 and 4 of the
Bill which referred to the awards of the Boundary Commission in the plural
when it should be in the singular. The correction would be communicated to
H.M.G. telegraphically.5
Case No. P.C. 31/4/47
His Excellency said that he had received a communication from His Highness
the Maharaja of Patiala6 asking him to receive a deputation of Sikh V.C.O’s
and soldiers, many of whom had served under him in South East Asia Com¬
mand. He felt that the deputation might bring up questions affecting the
Boundary Commission, though it was possible that they would perhaps be
more anxious to get an assurance that grants of land already made would not
be disturbed. He realised the danger of allowing the deputation to raise the
question of boundaries as the whole matter was now out of his hands.
Mr Jinnah pointed out that although he was doing everything in his power
to retain a hold over the Muslim sections of the population concerned to
honour the undertaking given that the findings of the Boundary Commissions,
whatever they were, would be accepted, he had noticed that the Sikh leaders
were still reported to be inciting their followers to offer active resistance to
decisions which they might regard as unfavourable. It was reported that active
preparations for resistance were being made and that oaths to resist were being
taken. The impression on the Muslim mind was that the Sikhs were carrying
on this agitation in order to influence the decisions of the Boundary Commis¬
sion. In consequence any suggestion that a Sikh deputation was being received
to raise the question of boundaries would have a most undesirable effect.
His Excellency reiterated that he had made it abundantly clear to His
Highness the Maharaja of Patiala, S. Baldev Singh, Master Tara Singh and all
other Sikh leaders, with whom he had had interviews,7 the consequence of any
attempt to offer active resistance. No responsible government would tolerate
for a moment such action, which would be met by the regular armed forces of
India. In view of the superiority in aeroplanes, tanks, artillery etc. that the
armed forces enjoy, such action would inevitably result in very severe
losses being inflicted on those who would only be armed with rifles and out of
date weapons. He reaffirmed his hope therefore that the Sikh leaders would be
4 In his tel. 1877-S of 10 July to Lord Listowel, Lord Mountbatten urged that this amendment to the bill
should be introduced immediately. R/3/1/154: f 122.
5 Lord Mountbatten asked for the necessary amendment to the bill to be made in his tel. 1878-S ol 10 July
to Lord Listowel. R/3/1/154: f 123.
6 Not traced.
7 See eg, Vol. X, Nos. 324 and 354, paras. 22-5.
66
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
able to restrain their followers. His Excellency said he had been assured by
Sir Cyril Radcliffe that he will be able to submit his reports by the 14th August.
In conclusion His Excellency said that he would communicate with H.H. the
Maharaja of Patiala, and make it clear that if he received the deputation no
questions regarding boundaries could be brought up ; and if the deputation were
received this fact would be made very clear in a press note.
Minutes of Viceroy's Fifty Sixth Staff Meeting, Item 4
Mountbatten Papers
SECRET
Those present during discussion of Item 4 of this Meeting held at the Viceroy's House,
New Delhi, on 10 July 1947 at 3.45 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten
of Burma, Sir E. Mieville, Sir G. Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Captain
Brockman, Mr I. D. Scott, Commander Nicholls, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
Item 4
RECONSTITUTION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
his excellency stated that he had received a long letter1 from Sardar Patel,
asking that the Muslim officials in the Government of India should be got rid of
as soon as possible. In an interview2 that morning he had suggested to Sardar
Patel that two separate Governments should be set up as soon as possible.
Sardar Patel’s initial reactions had not been unfavourable. Both these Govern¬
ments would have to work in Delhi to begin with. Mr Krishna Menon was
was coming to see him that afternoon with Pandit Nehru’s ideas on this
suggestion.
1 and 2 Not traced.
54
Unsigned papers on the reconstruction of the Interim Government1
Rfe/i 1 160: ff 127-31
10 July 1947
1. Draft Press Communique
The Governor-General announces that the resignation of the Interim Govern¬
ment shall take effect on ... . July 1947.
On . . . .July 1947 the Interim Government will be replaced by the Pro vis-
JULY 1947
67
ional Government of India and the Provisional Government of Pakistan. The
two said governments will have their respective and exclusive jurisdiction and
competence over the territory notionally demarcated as the territory of the
two future dominions subject to the reservations which the Governor-General
deems necessary to make in the interests of a peaceful transition.
A Pakistan secretariat will be established forthwith, in part at Karachi and in
part at New Delhi and the said Secretariat shall move progressively to Karachi
before the 15th August. All civil servants and other employees of the govern¬
ment who have opted to join the Pakistan Service shall be drafted forthwith
into the secretariat and the other services of Pakistan.
The Governor-General reserves to himself the right to require a joint
meeting of the two governments, and to deal with any matters relating to the
provinces, subject to partition or referendum, within his own discretion in the
interests of a peaceful transition.
The replacement of the interim government by the two independent
Regional governments does not affect the arrangements made in regard to
partition which will proceed according to plan.
The Governor-General will promulgate the necessary Orders in Council
and make the requisite rules to effect the aforesaid changes.
2. Note on Reconstruction of the Government
Section I
1. The tasks before the political parties represented in the Government, and
of the members of the Government themselves are three-fold :
(i) Implementing Partition.
(ii) Carrying on administration as efficiently as possible.
(iii) Preparing for two separate Governments of two distinct States to operate
as independent governments on August 15th.
2. (i) Implementing Partition: (a) Partition work is now being carried on
under arrangements, which include the method of resolving disputes by the
intervention of the Governor-General and other means. These arrangements
are accepted on both sides and will not be affected by the reconstruction of
the Government. The creation of the new Partition Council as distinct from
the previous Partition Committee took the central direction of partition
outside the strict competence of the Governor-General’s Council, though no
doubt its legal authority may rest with the Governor-General in Council.
There is no suggestion whatsoever that the reconstruction of the Government
should involve any revision of the arrangements made in this respect.
1 A note on the tile copy by Sir G. Abell dated 14 July states that these suggestions were banded to Lord
Mountbatten by Krishna Menon. It is not certain whether Menon had written them himself. The first
paper is undated, the second is dated 10 July. R/3/1/160: f 127.
68
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(b) It is a fact on the other hand that a reconstruction involving as set out
below the creation of two governing units for the territories of each of the
the new States respectively will make the composition, the work and the
approach of the Partition Council and Committee correspond more with
the actual realities of the situation (a country already partitioned).
(c) Under the arrangements proposed below the “Partitioned” officials
(they have all opted by now) can assist with greater directness in the process
of partition. At present at least on one side they are reported to be
functioning as a secretariat already. The arrangement proposed only
regularises this fact.
(ii) Administration: For carrying on the administration with some sort of
efficiency (without prejudice to such standstill arrangements as the Governor-
General prescribes) it is necessary that the Member of any department:
(a) has the loyalty of his staff;
( b ) is concerned with the part of present India which will be his after
August 15th;
(c) is free from political manoeuvering and desire to obstruct.
(iii) Separate Governments: For the successful inauguration of the two
separate States on August 15th it is vitally necessary that the time between
now and that date should provide the opportunity for “rehearsals” of the two
sides as independent governments. In fact they have to be “dress rehearsals”.
Pakistan cannot be expected to produce a government at Karachi on the
15th August while until the fourteenth their side is carrying on as now.
(1 a ) The Pakistan secretariat must be set up now, composed of the civil
servants who have opted for Pakistan.
( b ) All portfolios of government must be held by the Ministers of the two
future States “in duplicate” but each only concerned with his region.
( c ) Pakistan secretariat will move progressively to Karachi from the day
of reconstruction of the Government and complete the move by midnight
on the 14th August.
(d) After the midnight of the 14th August or from the moment “the
appointed day” begins, all Pakistanis are aliens or near aliens in India and the
continued presence of their leaders would place great strain upon the
Government of India and its security departments and create embarrassments.
Section II
3. It is, therefore, necessary to reconstruct the government so as to effect the
peaceful transference, which is H.M.G’s policy, and the deadlock inside the
government and the country, to end which partition was agreed to, is resolved.
JULY I947
69
4. It is important to point out that the Government of India as at present
constituted comes to an end on ... . July and its place is taken by two Regional
Provisional2 Governments set up by the Governor-General by order in council
and by the invocation of the latitude given to him under Sec 9 of the Act of
1947.
(1 a ) Lord Mountbatten will, from that date, be dealing with the two
Governments separately.
(b) Lord Mountbatten has no longer a “Coalition” Council as now.
(c) The last vestige of the Wavell regime disappears.
Section III
5. Therefore on the .... day of July the Governor-General will reconstitute
the Government as follows for the purpose of implementing H.M.G’s policy
now placed on the Statute Book by the Act of 1947.
(i) There shall be two “sets” of Ministers for (a) India ( b ) Pakistan.
(ii) The leader of each side will inform the Governor-General as to the
composition of his Cabinet for his region and the distribution of portfolios
etc.
(iii) Each group of Ministers form a Regional Government respectively
called The Government of India and The Government of Pakistan, and the
Governor-General of India thus carries on the government of the country
through two regional ministries.
Explanation: If the Governor-General did not thus continue, but instead
‘reconstituted’ himself as the Governor-General of India and Governor-
General of Pakistan, Mr Jinnah might take offence at being prevented from
being the first Governor-General of Pakistan.
(iv) From the date of the reconstruction, all expenses incurred are debited
to the respective sides, for the purposes of partition allocations.
(v) Each Government shall have jurisdiction only over its own region,
wherein it shall have no interference from the other government. All
officials who have opted for Pakistan shall be withdrawn as from the date of
the reconstruction and be absorbed into the Pakistan secretariat, which will
move progressively to Karachi.
Section IV
6. For the purposes set out in (5) above, the Governor-General will by order
in council and availing himself of Sec 9 of the Act of 1947 constitute
(a) Two Regional Governments.
2 Emphasis in original.
70
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(b) Authorise the making of rules for the conduct of the governments.
(c) Authorise the necessary expenditure (if any).
(d) Authorise the necessary transfers of civil servants.
7. Provided that the Governor-General reserves to himself the right
(1 a ) to require the attendance of the members of the two governments to a
joint meeting of the two;
(b) to reserve to himself the right to stop, veto, rescind and otherwise deal
with any matters in relation to or in respect of the Provinces, which have
become subject to partition or referendum under the June 3 arrangement
and subsequently by Statute;
(c) he shall exercise the powers in respect of ( a ) and (b) above entirely at his
own discretion.
8. Nothing in the aforesaid arrangements shall be deemed to affect
(a) Partition arrangements as already made;
(b) the constitution of the two Dominions on the appointed date;
(c) arrangements consequential to H.M.G’s Statement of June 3 and the
provisions of the subsequent Statute.
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Krishna Menon
Mountbatten Papers. Demi-official correspondence files: Menon , V. K. Krishna
10 July 1947
I enclose letters for the Prime Minister1 and the Secretary of State,2 which are
unsealed. Please read them and then seal them down and deliver them on
arrival.3 I hope they will be helpful to you.
I cannot let you leave India without giving you my warmest personal thanks
for the way you have helped me in all these difficult negotiations. I feel that
history will show that you have helped the future of India very much by the
advice that you gave me.
I am glad to think that I shall have a personal friend as the first High Com¬
missioner in London.
All good wishes to you in your new and very responsible post.
1 Not printed. In this letter dated io July Lord Mountbatten confirmed V.K. Krishna Menon’s appoint¬
ment and mentioned that he would be able to provide a ‘good idea of what is in the minds of the
present Congress leaders’. Mountbatten Papers, Demi-official Correspondence files: Attlee, C.R.
2 Not printed, a letter of introduction only. POL Dept File 9067/47.
3 See No. 74.
JULY 1947
71
56
Sir E. Jenkins [Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rl3li/i76:ff 243-8
secret 10 July 1947
no. 694
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I think Your Excellency may be interested in the enclosed record of a conversa¬
tion I have just had with Giani Kartar Singh. The Giani was extremely frank
about the intentions of the Sikhs, and what he said confirms my view that they
mean to make trouble if the decision based on the Boundary Commission’s
report is not to their liking, or if the new Governments are set up before the
decision is given. According to a recent Press report,1 Baldev Singh is taking
the same line in public, which seems odd in view of his acceptance of the Plan.
2. My personal view is that the Boundary problem cannot be solved in any
rational way, and that the only solution which will give the two new Provinces
a peaceful start will be one negotiated by the Parties — in other words a settle¬
ment out of court. I believe that there is quite a lot in the claim of the Sikhs —
and for that matter of other residents of the Eastern Punjab — for a share in the
canal colonies, and the Giani’ s idea that the Montgomery district should be
allotted to the East is by no means as ridiculous as it sounds. The district, if
so allotted, could be “recolonized” so as to concentrate the non-Muslims there
and to transfer Mushms to Lyallpur, which is agriculturally on the whole a
better proposition. But with the Sikhs demanding the Chenab as the Western
boundary and the Muslims hoping to stretch their tentacles as far east as
Ambala, and everyone behaving as though they had just been at war and were
going to have a new war within a few weeks, I see little hope of any solution
of this kind.
Yours sincerely,
E. M. JENKINS
Enclosure to No. 36
Record of Interview between Sir E. Jenkins and Giani Kartar Singh
10 July 1947, 4.43 pm
Giani Kartar Singh came to see me today at 4.45 p.m. at his request. He was to
have come at 3 p.m., but he seems to have had some trouble with his car
driving in from Nankana Sahib.
1 See No. 17.
7-
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
2. He said that he had come to see me about the India Independence Bill
and the Boundary Commission. The Bill made it clear that if orders were not
passed on the recommendations of the Boundary Commission by 15 th August,
two new Governments would be set up on the basis of the ‘‘notional” bound¬
ary. The Sikhs did not believe that fresh orders about the Boundary would
be enforced after 15th August, and wanted to know what the enforcement
arrangements would be. The Sikhs would not accept the “notional” boundary
even provisionally, and if an attempt were made to set up two new Govern¬
ments on the basis of this boundary on 15th August, the Sikhs would refuse to
join the Government of the Eastern Punjab and would refuse also to have
anything to do with the Union Government of India. They would have to
take other measures.
3. Proceeding, the Giani said that there must be an exchange of population
on a large scale. Were the British ready to enforce this? He doubted if they
were, and if no regard was paid to Sikh solidarity, a fight was inevitable. The
British had said for years that they intended to protect the minorities, and what
had happened now was a clear breach of faith by the British.
4. I said I thought it certain that the Boundary Commission’s recommend¬
ations as accepted by the Governor-General would be enforced after 15th
August. The enforcement would necessarily be by the two Dominion Govern¬
ments, whose representatives had, I understood, pledged themselves to accept
the final orders. I realised that the Sikhs were dissatisfied, but when in¬
dependence came to any country, some classes which had formerly regarded
themselves as protected inevitably suffered. For example, I well remembered
the complaints of the loyalists in Southern Ireland when Eire became a
Dominion. At the same time I felt that the Sikhs had themselves to blame for
their present position. The Giani had himself insisted on partition, and Sardar
Baldev Singh had accepted the Plan.
5. The Giani at once countered with an account of S. Baldev Singh’s
attitude during the negotiations. He said that he had urged S. Baldev Singh
to publish the letter2 in which he had communicated his acceptance of the
Plan to the Viceroy. Sardar Baldev Singh had made it perfectly clear on
behalf of the Sikhs that he was merely accepting the principle of the Plan,
and that there could be no partition based on population alone. The Sikhs were
entitled to a homeland just as much as the Muslims and the Hindus.
6. The Giani then elaborated the Sikh claim. He said that they must have at
least one canal system; they must also have Nankana Sahib ; finally the arrange¬
ments must be such as to bring three-quarters or at least two-thirds of the Sikh
population into the Eastern Punjab. An exchange of population on a large
scale was essential — he thought that at least 400,000 Sikhs should be moved to
JULY 1947
73
the East and 400,000 Muslims to the West (later in the conversation he said that
the number of Sikhs would be 500,000, or 600,000 and the number of Muslims
about one million. Property as well as population should be taken into account
in the exchange, and the Sikhs are on the whole better off than the Muslims).
The Giani asserted that unless it was recognised by H.M.G., the Viceroy and
the Party Leaders that the fate of the Sikhs was a vital issue in the proceedings
for the transfer of power, there would be trouble.
7. I asked how the Giani proposed to effect his large transfer of population,
and what he meant by “one canal system”. Did he mean in concrete terms
that if the Sikhs got a part of the Montgomery district, from which Muslims
could be transferred to Lyallpur and to which Sikhs could be transferred from
Lyallpur, the Sikhs would be content? The Giani said that the Sikhs would
be content with the whole of the Montgomery district and Nankana Sahib,
and that if this could be effected, the exchange of population would be more
or less automatic. On my pointing out that the inclusion of Nankana Sahib in
the Eastern Punjab would be an extremely difficult operation, he gave me a
long and rather involved account of the communal distribution of population
in parts of the Lyallpur and Sheikhupura districts, and said that the transfer
of Nankana Sahib to the Eastern Punjab was practicable.
8. I thought it was time to mention the Boundary Commission again, and
said that these matters would be dealt with by the Commission. Surely
four Punjabi High Court Judges and one eminent Englishman could be
expected to take a reasonable view of any properly stated claim. The Giani
said that the Judges were not Judges, but Advocates; that the Sikh Judge could
do little for his community; and that the Sikhs expected no justice from the
Commission.
9. I then reverted to the somewhat minatory remarks of the Giani about the
attitude of the Sikhs should the new Governments be established on the basis
of the “notional” boundary. I asked exactly what he meant by “other
measures”. The Giani replied that the Sikhs would be obliged to fight. I
retorted that this would be very foolish and enquired how they expected to
fight against trained troops. The Giani said in quite a matter of fact way that
the Sikhs realised that they would be in a bad position and would have to fight
on revolutionary lines — by murdering officials, cutting railway lines and tele¬
graph lines, destroying canal headworks, and so on. I reiterated that this
seemed to me a very foolish policy, to which the Giani retorted that if Britain
were invaded, he had no doubt that my feelings would be much the same as his.
10. I enquired when the fight would begin. The Giani said that protests
would continue from now on. The Sikhs felt that it would be useless to wait
^ Vol. XI, No. 36.
74
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
for two or three years before taking violent action, and the execution of their
plan would start with the departure of the British.
11. I pointed out that violent action would hardly endear the Sikhs to the
Congress, with whom the Panthic Party was now allied. The Giani replied
that he had never trusted and did not now trust the Congress. Rather illo-
gically he added that Mahatma Gandhi and Sardar Patel had been sympathetic
to the establishment of a Sikh homeland with the Jat districts separated and
joined to the U.P. For such a homeland the Sikhs must have a reasonable
boundary in the West and their population mainly concentrated east of that
boundary. He saw the final Sikh State as a kind of buffer-state between Pakistan
and the Union of India.
12. I said that the real solution was a reasonable settlement between the
representatives of the future Governments of the West and East Punjab. I
asked whether such a settlement was quite out of the question (I have always
felt that the boundary problem is really a political problem which can be
settled only “out of court”). The Giani said that there was no one among the
Muslims big enough to take a decision that might seem detrimental to the
Muslim community. Personally he thought any discussion with a view to a
settlement quite useless. The Sikhs would not abate their claim, and the
Muslims would go on hoping to secure territory as far east as Ambala. The
Muslims were now putting out some conciliatory propaganda but their in¬
tention was that of a sportsman who is careful not to disturb the birds he intends
to shoot. He believed that the Muslims would try to make the Sikhs in the
Western Punjab feel secure and would then set about them in earnest.
13. Finally, the Giani appealed to me to do all that I could to help the Sikhs
during a period of great trial. Having served in the Punjab for so many years,
I could not wish to abandon it to misery and bloodshed; but there would be
misery and bloodshed if the boundary problem were not suitably solved.
14. The Giani was matter of fact and quiet throughout our conversation,
but wept when he made his final appeal. This is the nearest thing to an ulti¬
matum yet given on behalf of the Sikhs. They are undoubtedly very puzzled
and unhappy, but I see no reason to suppose that they have lost the nuisance
value which they have possessed through the centuries.
JULY I947
75
57
Chief of the General Staff to Headquarters , Northern Command ,
Southern Command , Eastern Command and Delhi District
Directive, L/lVS/i /ioo6: f 21
SECRET GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, NEW DELHI,
no. 6385/150/sDi 10 July 1947
RECONSTITUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES
1. With effect from 15 Aug 47 it is intended that the Governments of the
Dominions of India and Pakistan shall take over responsibility for the govern¬
ment of their respective territories. On that date the Army Headquarters of each
Dominion will become responsible for the operational control of all
Indian formations and units within their respective territories. Indian units over¬
seas will remain under the Supreme Commander.
2. The present Armed Forces Headquarters will continue to exist and will
become Supreme Headquarters. The present General Headquarters will
remain responsible for the majority of administrative matters until Army
Headquarters, India and Army Headquarters, Pakistan, are in a position to
assume responsibility. The devolution of responsibility is likely to be a gradual
process spread over some time.
3. British units will be withdrawn from India and Pakistan over a period
commencing in July 47.
4. With effect from 15 Aug, British formations will come under command
of the Major General British Troops in India, who will be responsible direct
to the Supreme Commander. From that date British units will not be available
to the local commander for Internal Defence. General Headquarters will
continue as at present responsible for the general administration, and local
commanders will remain responsible for such matters of local administration
as may be laid down.
5. The Orders of Battle of India and Pakistan will be published shortly. It is
intended to move units now in India allotted to Pakistan and units now in
Pakistan allotted to India to their correct Dominions as early as possible.
6. The boundaries of Northern Command will be adjusted in due course to
coincide with the frontiers of Pakistan. Those portions of the present Northern
76
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Command which will be outside Pakistan will be incorporated in Eastern
Command.
7. Detailed instructions on all the above matters will be issued.
ARTHUR SMITH
LT. GEN.
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
58
Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar to the Resident for the Madras States
Rfal1l144: ff 55S6
HUZUR CUTCHERRY, TRIVANDRUM, 10 July 1Q47
Subject: Formula for Standstill Arrangements on the lapse of Paramountcy
Reference: Your letter1 No. 2452/47 dated 9th July, 1947.
Sir,
This Government have carefully considered the proposal to include in the
agenda for discussion2 on the subjects noted above, the question of ‘immediate
accession of States to Dominion on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communica¬
tions’ by which I presume is meant a proposed accession to one or other of the
Dominions.
The Dominions formed under the Indian Independence Act comprise terri¬
tories which had formed part of British India and the constitution relating to
such Dominion Governments is presumably framed so as to apply only to
British India. In fact, Parliament has no legal authority to legislate in respect of
Indian States whose connections have been exclusively with the Crown as
distinguished from Parliament. The idea of possible accession of any Indian
State to a Dominion constituted under the Indian Independence Act is difficult
to follow as it is fundamentally opposed to the declarations hitherto made by
the British Government and accepted by the major political parties in India,
namely, that with the lapse of paramountcy, it will be open to the States to
establish relations with the rest of India either by entering into a federal rela¬
tionship with the Union Government that may be constituted as a result of the
deliberations of the Constituent Assembly or by entering into particular
political arrangements with the Union Government or Governments to be so
formed.3
The relations to be established by the States with these two Dominions can
only be by separate negotiations and agreements and not by accesssion 4 to either
Dominion with respect to any subject.
JULY 1947
77
Further, the Indian Independence Bill expressly provides that effect shall
continue to be given to such agreements as are in force between His Majesty’s
Government and the Ruler of an individual State in relation to Customs,
Transit and Communications, Posts and Telegraphs or other like matters
until they are denounced by the Ruler of the Indian State or by the Dominion
concerned or are superseded by subsequent arrangements. It is thus clear
that pending action by the States or by the Dominion Governments concerned
on the lines indicated above, no question of accession can arise with respect to
any of these matters.
The scope and extent of the jurisdiction of the Dominion with respect to
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications have yet to be defined and if the
report of the Union Powers Committee contains an indication as to the scope
of the authority exercisable by the Dominion with reference to these three
subjects, then Tranvancore will inevitably have to make special reservations and
provide for adequate safeguards to maintain herself as an Independent entity.
Any arrangements that can be entered into on these subjects between a
Dominion and Travancore, which has decided to maintain its independent
status, can only be in the nature of treaties or agreements entered into between
an independent Sovereign State and the Dominion Government for the time
being. Such treaties or agreements may have to be ratified or reviewed when
the new Union Governments under the new Constitutions that are being
framed by the Constituent Assembly come into existence.
While the Government of His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore have
expressed their readiness to negotiate and settle the terms of agreements where¬
by mutual co-operation can be secured in respect of defence, foreign affairs,
communications and other matters with the two Dominions, yet it cannot be
forgotten that this co-operation has to be attained by specific and individual
negotiations between Travancore Government and the representatives of the
Dominion Governments.
Yours faithfully,
C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYAR
P.S. This reply may be communicated to the States Department as soon as
possible and before it considers the question of fixing dates for any
proposed meeting.
C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYAR
1 Evidently a letter written by the Resident following receipt ol No. 2.
2 A reference to the meeting scheduled to be held on 25 July.
3 See Vol. VII, No. 262, para. 5.
4 Emphasis in original. 5 See Vol. XI, No. 7.
78
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Government of India , External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
Department to Secretary of State
Telegram , L/P &S/12/4197: f 34
new Delhi, 10 July ig47, 5.55 pm
Received: 10 July 1947 , 3.30 pm
No. 5350. Your telegram No. 8125 of June 24th.1 Lhasa Mission.
2. We agree that position of H.M.G. should be made clear to Tibetans and
suggest that it would be appropriate for (PRichardson), present head of British
Mission, to do so when he informs Tibetan Government of his impending
replacement by an Indian officer. Subject to your views we propose that he
should do this when new incumbent has been selected. He would at the same
time assure Tibetan Government that Government of India induced by their
friendly interest in Tibetans and in preservation of Tibetan autonomy, are
prepared (until such time as either party wishes to enter into fresh arrangements)
to assume obligations of H.M.G. under Simla Convention of 1914 and Asso¬
ciated Trade Regulations, and trust that Tibetan Government will also con¬
tinue to abide by them. He would add that Government of India propose
to maintain Trade Agents’ posts at Gyantse, Yatung, and Gartok, with sole
difference that incumbents will in future be described as Indian2 Trade Agents,
and that for the present we shall continue present informal arrangement where¬
by Trade Agent at Gyantse is head of Lhasa Mission. We should be glad to
know in what terms H.M.G. wish to make their own position clear to Tibetan
Government.
Repeated to Political Officer Sikkim No. 62 and British Mission Lhasa No.
23.
1 Vol. XI, No. 334. 2 Emphasis in original.
Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma ( via India Office)
Telegram, Rffij 1/163: f 4
IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 10 July I947, 10. 23 pm
secret Received: 11 July, 6.00 am
No. 8919. Before we first went to India Stafford Cripps recommended that
you should take Short as Sikh expert. I suggested it would be better to wait
JULY I947
79
until we saw whether he was necessary or not. Since then I have kept in touch
with Short who has great knowledge of and influence with Sikhs.
2. Baldev Singh and Sant Singh have now telegraphed him an invitation to
go to India, obviously in connection with Boundary Commission. My strong
hunch is that he might be of help in keeping Sikhs quiet and my idea is that
he should be attached to my staff as a temporary measure for 2 months. It
would not I think be right for him to be on Your Excellency’s staff. Cripps
entirely agrees with this and Prime Minister approves subject to your consent.
3. If you will telegraph1 approval I will arrange terms etc. here. Presume
Short could be put up in one of the Messes like Phillips was.
4. Baldev has also asked Short to engage a K.C. to represent Sikh case
before Boundary Commission and Cripps has recommended Holmes. This
is of course their private affair and has nothing to do with us but I thought that
you ought to know.
1 In tel. 1908-S of 12 July Lord Mountbatten agreed to this proposal but expressed doubts about the
wisdom of attaching Major Short to Lord Ismay’s staff. Instead Mountbatten suggested that Short
should come out as Baldev Singh’s guest as he had invited him. In tel. 9057 to Sir G. Abell, Ismay
accepted this arrangement. R/3/1/163: if 5 and 6.
6l
Minutes1 of Viceroy's Nineteenth Miscellaneous Meeting
L/POI6/12J: jf 416-25
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s House , New Delhi , on 1 1 July
1947 at 10.50 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, the Nawab
of Chhatari, Nawab Ali Yawar Jung, Sir W. Monckton, Mr Abdur Rahim, Mr
P. Ventakama Reddy, Mr Nazimuddin, Sir C. Corfield, Mr L. C. L. Griffin, Mr
E. B. Wakefield, Mr J. H. Thompson, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Mr Akhtar
Hussain; Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum ( Secretariat )
his excellency’s opening remarks
his excellency welcomed the presence of the Hyderabad representatives.
1 Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum evidently sent an advance copy of these minutes to Sir W. Monckton
who replied on 13 July suggesting that two sentences in the paragraphs dealing with Berar should be
deleted from the version of the minutes to be sent to Hyderabad, ie the last sentence of the second
paragraph and the sentence in the fifth paragraph beginning ‘his excellency said that he was
willing . . Monckton did not consider that these references were ‘suitable for Hyderabad consumption’.
This suggestion was agreed to. Monckton also commented on the sentence in the final paragraph on
Berar beginning ‘This denunciation . . .’. Originally this sentence continued ‘should not be unilateral’ and
Monckton commented that it could be, as the previous sentence showed, though it might be preceded
by meetings. Erskine Crum replied that he had substituted ‘precipitate’ for unilateral as he thought that
was what was meant, although Lord Mountbatten did actually say ‘unilateral’. A copy of the minutes as
printed here was sent to the India Office with an explanation of the changes made in the version supplied
to the representatives of Hyderabad. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Hyderabad,
Part 1(a).
8o
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
He explained why he had asked them to come to a separate meeting first,
apart from the leaders of the political parties.2 This method of negotiation with
one party at a time had proved most successful in the formulation of the Plan
of 3rd June. In fact, in that instance, the two parties had not come together at
the same meeting until 2nd June.
his excellency explained that, when first he had been appointed Viceroy,
he had come out with instructions from His Majesty’s Government not to
deviate from the Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum of 12th May, 194 6, 3 nor to
enter into fresh discussions on the subject of future relations with the States.
When he had first arrived, the Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum had not been
accepted by any political party. On behalf of the States, however, he had done
his best to persuade the parties which represented the two future Dominion
Governments to accept this Memorandum. These efforts had been successful,
as acceptance of the Memorandum was implicit in acceptance, by the parties,
of the 3rd June Plan as a whole.
the viceroy said that it was now his main object and ambition to try to
resolve the differences of opinion which had grown up between the States on
the one hand and the prospective Dominion Governments on the other. His
first step had been to get the States Department set up, so that, as Crown
Representative, he could deal with a properly constituted Department working
on behalf of both future Governments. Sardar Patel had been put in charge of
this new Department — a man whose greatest quality was that of realism.
Furthermore, it was gratifying to know that a member of his own staff, Rao
Bahadur Menon, had been appointed Secretary of the new Department.
the viceroy said that he felt that an atmosphere and conditions had now
been created in which it would be possible to hold discussions. He was proud
that the future Governments had entrusted him with the conduct of these
discussions in his capacity of Crown Representative. His main object was to
find a solution which would involve the minimum possible sacrifice and dis¬
location in the interior economy of the States, and particularly of Hyderabad.
It was his desire to bring as many States as possible into some system or scheme
which would produce stability. He was personally an ardent believer in con¬
stitutional monarchy considering that there was no better form of Government
provided that it was allied with democratic institutions. He knew that His
Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad was making strides in that direction.
He had no reason to think that there would be any change in Hyderabad,
except in the way of ordered progress. If the difficulties with Hyderabad,
which was the biggest State and had the most vexatious problems, could be
resolved, he felt that those connected with all the other States would thereafter
be much easier of solution.
his excellency said that, during his talks with Sir Walter Monckton, the
latter had pointed out the great difference between the Cabinet Mission Plan
JULY 1947
8l
ot 16th May, 1946, 4 and H.M.G’s Plan of 3rd June, 1947, 5 as they affected the
States. This difference lay in the fact that, in the former, a set of circumstances
was created in which States could adhere to the Central Government without
in any way surrendering their own rights over their internal economy. They
had been asked to join only on the three subjects which they could not fully
control themselves — namely, overall Defence, External Affairs and Communi¬
cations. On the other hand, as a result of the 3rd June Plan, the future Govern¬
ments both apparently envisaged a much tighter form of centre. However, it
had occurred to him, and the future Governments now recognised, that the
only way to induce the larger States to associate themselves with the future
Dominion of India would be on terms no stricter than those envisaged by the
original Cabinet Mission Plan. The present was not the time for argument. It
was necessary now to face up to realities. This in itself was a great advantage
to the States. He had asked the leading personalities of the political parties and
of the States, as well as the Editors of the most important newspapers, to avoid
making provocative statements for this next month. So it was to be hoped that
there would be a standstill agreement at least on verbiage !
the nawab of chhatari expressed his thanks to the Viceroy for
having convened the present meeting. He said that he and his associates were
fully conscious of the kindness which His Excellency had shown them in
offering personally to preside. He explained that the Nizam’s recent announce¬
ment6 on the future policy of Hyderabad had been made on the recom¬
mendation of the Hyderabad Government. In this announcement, it had been
made quite clear that there was no intention to obstruct the administration of
India as a whole, and that Hyderabad would be perfectly willing to enter into
agreements and treaties on matters of common interest, the nawab of
chhatari said that he considered it to have been a great personal triumph by
His Excellency to obtain acceptance of the Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum of
1 2th May, 1946, as also to persuade both parties to accept Dominion status. It
was quite clear from His Majesty’s Government’s Statements that the States
were free to take any action they liked when paramo untcy lapsed. But, he
repeated, it was not Hyderabad’s intention to place any obstruction in the way
of the general future administration of India.
his excellency said that he agreed that there was no shadow of doubt
that the legal position was that the States would be absolutely free after 15th
August.
SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENTS
The Meeting then passed to consideration in detail of the various points on
the Agenda. First there was the question of the Secunderabad Cantonments.
2 cf. No. 37, Item 2.
5 Vol. XI, No. 45.
3 Vol. VII, No. 262.
6 Ibid., No. 163.
4 Vol. VII, No. 303.
82
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
his excellency stressed the necessity that, when notices cancelling the
jurisdiction of the Crown Representative were issued, there should not be a
legacy of administrative vacuum. It was to be hoped that the Hyderabad
Government would accept the same general principle as had worked in con¬
nection with the retrocession of the civil lines, the nawab of chhatari
said that he considered that there would be no difficulty in this; there was a
precedent for it. But he would reserve the right to suggest such small amend¬
ments as might be necessary, his excellency said that he was confident that
agreement could be reached with the States Department.
On the question of the removal of troops from Secunderabad, the viceroy
explained that it was likely to prove impossible to move away all troops,
including especially the R.I.E.M.E. with their heavy equipment, before 15th
August ; but there was no intention on the part of the Government of India
to retain troops in Secunderabad against the wishes of Hyderabad. The com¬
batant troops, which were the most mobile, would be the first to move and the
technical personnel the last. The process was bound to take some time, in
just the same way as the withdrawal of British Forces from India as a whole
could not be completed at once, and was likely to extend until the end of 1947.
Alternative accommodation for the troops to be withdrawn would have to be
found.
the nawab of chhatari said that he would be willing to accept the
principle that it would not be possible to withdraw all the troops from
Secunderabad before 15th August. He asked for a detailed programme of
withdrawal, his excellency said that he would ask the Commander-in-
Chief to produce this and would let the Nawab of Chhatari have it.
RAILWAY LANDS
It was agreed that jurisdiction should be retroceded in terms which would
follow existing precedents. The proposed standstill agreement would cover
administrative arrangements and other details could be discussed at a lower
level.
BERAR
his excellency next raised the question of Berar. He explained that the
Indian Independence Bill clearly established the Nizam’s sovereignty over
Berar in law. The news that His Majesty’s Government had accepted this legal
position had been a most unacceptable piece of news to the Congress Party . The
degree to which the present position could be maintained by the States Depart¬
ment, which was under considerable pressure from the remainder of the
Congress Party, depended on the outcome of the present negotiations.
his excellency said that he wished to give his views on this subject in the
capacity of a private individual. The fact that Berar did belong to the Nizam
JULY 1947
83
of Hyderabad was legally incontestable. Nevertheless, Berar was now so firmly
a physical part of the Central Provinces that nothing short of war or voluntary
rendition could in fact return it to the Nizam. This was also a fact and had,
clearly, to be accepted as such. The question now arose as to how a solution,
which both sides would accept and which would have to be based on both the
actual and the legal position, could be found. It had to be realised that both
sides present at the meeting would have to “sell” this solution to their respective
parties.
his excellency said that he personally thought that the best way to deal
with this matter honourably would be to induce Congress to accept the fact
of the Nizam’s sovereignty continuing in its present form; and on the other
hand to induce His Exalted Highness to agree that the administration should
continue in its present form — in other words that the present situation should
continue for a period.
the nawab of chhatari stated that the question of Berar was a very
important one for Hyderabad. His Majesty’s Government and His Excellency
had both accepted the fact that the legal position was unassailable. There was
no need for him to stress this. He had brought a paper7 on this subject, which
he asked to be attached to the Minutes of the Meeting, the nawab of
chhatari stated that, if for practical and political reasons His Excellency
found difficulties in the situation, he would of course explain it fully to His
Exalted Highness — but this would mean that some concessions would have to
be provided. His Exalted Highness would doubtless ask for some quid pro quo.
the viceroy pointed out that a statement had been made on behalf of
His Majesty’s Government in 1936, to the effect that no change would be
considered in the present arrangements for Berar without taking the will of
the people into consideration.8 The present tendency of world opinion did not
permit wholesale transfers of territory without the people being consulted. He
had no doubt that, if this matter was pressed, Congress would take refuge
by calling upon him to order a referendum in Berar. He was very much
opposed to referenda as they invariably resulted in harsh and bitter tilings being
said. He had only given way so far in two instances — the N.W.F.P. and Sylhet.
He had made enquiries on the chances of a referendum in Berar, and had been
led to believe that the people would prefer the present system of administration
to continue. The only quid pro quo which the Nizam of Hyderabad could
surely expect would be that Congress should drop this demand for a referen¬
dum, at the same time continuing to recognise His Exalted Highness’s
sovereignty over Berar. his excellency said that he was willing also
privately to throw into the balance anything that he could. He had explained
this in more detail to Sir Walter Monckton personally. But he did not believe
7 See Enclosure.
8 For a brief history of the Berar case up to 1936, see Vol. I, No. 515, note 2.
84
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
that on the main issue it would be possible to push Congress any further. They
had already gone to their furthest point.
sir Walter monckton said that, whatever statement had been made on
behalf of His Majesty’s Government in 1936, His Exalted Highness would no
doubt remember a letter9 which he had received that year from the Crown
Representative to the effect that the administration of Berar could not be passed
into other hands without his (His Exalted Highness’s) consent.
his excellency pointed out that it was not physically possible for him to
turn over the administration of Berar to the Nizam on the 15th August. If
attempts to do this were made, it would mean a fight, a boycott and the per¬
haps fatal economic isolation of Hyderabad.
sir Walter monckton said that the Nizam would not expect that an
Army should be provided to give him back Berar by force. He felt that he
would agree to the continuation of the present system for a certain period,
subject to the understanding that the administration would finally return to
him.
his excellency said that a period of two or three years had been men¬
tioned. After the next two or three years, it would be easier to see the future of
India and to decide what then were reasonable politics. Circumstances might
come about in which the administration of Berar would be voluntarily handed
back to the Nizam. After such a period, it would be possible to make a final
agreement in an air of realism. Any attempt to rush an immediate change
through now in the present mood would result in disaster.
sir conrad c orfield asked whether a stand-still agreement on Berar
for a period of, say, three years would include acceptance by Congress of the
fact that at the end of that period the position would be identical to that which
would be reached on 15th August. In other words, would it still be legally
correct after that date, that the administration would return to the Nizam.
rao bahadur menon said that he had no doubt that if Congress once
entered into an agreement, they would not repudiate it. They were approach¬
ing the problem from a very realistic point of view. He pointed out that, if a
satisfactory solution on the wider issues was reached, the question of Berar must
necessarily fall into line. Congress were looking at the overall picture of how
unity could be established. Psychologically the problem now was, after separa¬
tion of Pakistan, whether the rest of India was going to be balkanised. There¬
fore, Congress were prepared to make some sacrifices to bring the States in on
the essential matters.
nawab ali yawar jung said that he did not believe that it was His
Exalted Highness’s intention that, after the retrocession, Berar should be
administered in the same way as the districts of Hyderabad State, but rather
as a provincial entity governed as were the Provinces of British India, his
excellency gave his view that this would surely have a serious effect on the
JULY 1947
85
people of Hyderabad itself. He suggested that the standstill agreement with
regard to Berar should be for an indefinite period, but liable to cancellation by
either party at twelve months notice. This denuciation should not be precipitate,
but should be preceded by meetings; and the period of twelve months after
indication of the intention to denounce, could be employed in negotiation.
There was general agreement that this suggestion should be put forward to the
Nizam and the States Department respectively.
STANDSTILL AGREEMENTS
his excellency said that the whole question of standstill agreements on
various other subjects would be covered by meetings between the representa¬
tives of the States and the States Department, beginning on 25th July. He
suggested that the Hyderabad delegation should come a few days early, and
this was agreed.
ADHERENCE ON THE THREE CENTRAL SUBJECTS
the viceroy then referred to the requests which had been made by the
Nizam of Hyderabad for Dominion status. He had received a telegram1 0 from
the Nizam before he had left London. However, before he had got this telegram,
His Majesty’s Government had decided that it could not agree to the grant of
Dominion status to individual States.11 This decision was based on reasons of
realism. Dominion status imphed that there were no military secrets between
countries in the Commonwealth. Although Hyderabad was a country of the
size of France, with a population bigger than any existing Dominion, it was
completely enclosed by the territories of British India. His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment did not feel that they could commit themselves to responsibihty to come
to the aid of a country which was thus surrounded. The case was to be compared
with that of Poland before the war. The question therefore arose as to how the
Hyderabad Government could be given full benefits without actually be¬
coming a member of the Commonwealth. In His Majesty’s Government’s
view, this could only be done through one or other of the two new Dominion
Governments. For this purpose, adherence on the three main central sub¬
jects would be necessary. It appeared to him that adherence for the purposes
of Defence represented an elementary requirement on the part of Hyderabad.
nawab ali yawar jung asked what would happen in this connection if
the Dominion, to which Hyderabad adhered, decided, after a period, to go
out of the Commonwealth, his excellency replied that he could not
prophesy what line H.M.G. would take in such circumstances. He did not
personally believe that either Dominion was likely to leave the Common¬
wealth at an early stage. In any case, if Hyderabad adhered on the three central
9 Not printed. 10 Vol. X, No. 548. 11 Ibid., Nos. 523, 533 and 553, Minute 4.
86
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
subjects, they would themselves have a big voice in the decision. What was the
alternative to adherence on the three central subjects? There was no other
means of coming into the Commonwealth. He had already mentioned
Defence. The second subject was External Affairs, and it was impossible, in his
opinion, to separate this from Defence. The third subject was Communications,
which was already covered by the standstill agreements which were to be made.
sir waiter monckton pointed out that Hyderabad had affinities with
both of the new Dominions. He asked how would it be possible to refrain from
adopting an un-neutral attitude if Pakistan and India engaged in political dis¬
agreement or worse.
the viceroy replied that this question had been one which had exercised
the minds of all parties and especially that of A4r. Gandhi. It would not be
possible to take it up before 15th August, but he hoped that, before the Joint
Defence Committee disintegrated, there would be meetings which would
clear this point up, at any rate on the military side. On the political side, an
idea which had occurred to him was that a Commonwealth Relations Con¬
ference might be held in Delhi, which would, after 15th August, be the geo¬
graphical centre of the Commonwealth, to discuss what would happen in the
case of strained relations between two members of the Commonwealth.
Before such a Conference took place, perhaps there would be talks on the
subject within India. There was no possibility of representatives of the States
joining the Joint Defence Council as such, because it consisted of only four
persons.
sir Walter monckton said that an idea which, in his opinion, would
attract His Exalted Highness would be a standing conference of the different
parts of India on this subject. He again emphasised that, although on many
subjects Hyderabad was irretrievably connected with the future Dominion
of India, there were also ties with the other future Dominion.
ADHERENCE TO THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF INDIA
rao bahadur menon pointed out that, if Hyderabad adhered to the
Legislative Assembly of the newT Dominion of India, not only would a greater
degree of stability throughout the sub-continent be introduced, but also the
voice of Hyderabad would be heard when subjects of Defence were discussed.
his excellency said that he held the same view. Hyderabad was entitled
to 17 seats in the existing Constituent Assembly, which would become the
new Legislative Assembly of the new India. There were 90 seats allowed to the
States altogether. Surely, the forum for discussion on these subjects would be
that Legislative Assembly. It, moreover, would probably have committees
dealing with various subjects, on some of which representatives of Hyderabad
would be. He undertook to inject the views expressed by the Hyderabad
Delegation into future discussions with the political leaders. He pointed out
JULY I947
87
that the States represented the section of India which, at present, had the
greatest experience of administration. The mere presence of carefully
selected representatives in the Legislative Assembly would have enormous
influence.
his excellency suggested that any reservations which Hyderabad might
wish to make in adhering to the future Dominion of India should, rather than
be pubhshed, be contained in a personal letter from the Nizam to himself. For
instance, he had in mind a reservation that Hyderabad would remain neutral
in the event of hostihties between Pakistan and India.
sir Walter monckton emphasised that His Exalted Highness would
have great difficulty in taking any course likely to compromise his independent
sovereignty. Rather than accession or adherence, could not an agreement be
made? Such language would be more acceptable to His Exalted Highness.
the viceroy gave his view that, if the Nizam of Hyderabad decided not
to send representatives to the Legislative Assembly, he would be doing himself
and bis State the greatest possible disservice. He would be abdicating the lead
which he should rightfully give to the States, and, indeed, the lead of one of the
greatest single parties in the Assembly itself. That was where States’ influence
would be able to exert itself. If this was thrown away, Hyderabad would be
depriving itself of a great opportunity.
sir Walter monckton said that the Nizam might in these circumstances
seriously consider the alternative of joining Pakistan, his excellency
replied that there was no doubt that he was legally entitled to do so. However,
the mechanical difficulty in the facts of geography was very real. Whereas the
two parts of Pakistan itself could communicate by sea, this was not possible for
Hyderabad. He gave his view that Congress would probably accept Hyderabad
sending representatives to the Pakistan Assembly — but, in some mysterious
way, it would be found that this did not work. Surely, Hyderabad could only
live by the active good will of the territory which surrounded it.
sir conrad corfield asked whether the Nizam of Hyderabad would be
likely to view the question of adherence differently if he were given the right
of secession, his excellency said that this was a point which the Nizam
might include in the reservations in the letter which he might write to him.
the nawab of chhatari said that, in his view, His Exalted Highness
would find it very difficult to adhere to the new Dominion of India.
his excellency once again emphasised the advantages of such a course.
He pointed out that Hyderabad was militarily defenceless. The present chance
was, moreover, probably the last one and, if not seized at once, would be lost
for ever. Without in any way threatening, he prophesied disastrous results in
five or ten years if his advice was not taken.
88
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Enclosure to No. 61
DRAFT STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OF HYDERABAD EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL ABOUT BERAR
i. The legal position is plain. Berar is admittedly under the sovereignty of
H.E.H. (See Section 47 of the Government of India Act, 1935) and not under
that of H.M. It is, therefore, impossible for H.M.G. to transfer the sovereignty
or the territory of Berar to the Indian Union and no attempt has been made to
do so in the India Independence Bill.
2. By reason of the Berar Agreement of 193612 and the letters which passed
between H.E.H. and the Crown Representative in that year, H.M.G. cannot
transfer the administration13 of Berar to the Indian Union without the consent
of H.E.H. nor have they attempted to make such a transfer of administration
in the India Independence Bill.
3. H.E.H. claims that the administration of this part of his Dominions should
be restored to him. He would undertake to allow the Beraris all the freedom
and responsible Government which they now have, under a Governor
appointed by him.
4. H.E.H.’s Government recognise that H.E.H. could not assume adminis¬
trative responsibility for Berar by a stroke of the pen. It would be necessary
first of all to arrange for an administrative split between Berar and the Central
Provinces and this must take time. Nevertheless, H.E.H. is undoubtedly
entitled to demand the reversion to him of the administration of Berar as
quickly as possible.
5. If the new Indian Government want a temporary arrangement to give
opportunities for a discussion of the Berar problem in all its aspects (an arrange¬
ment providing all the terms in H.E.H.’s favour which are included in the
present system) they must come forward with an offer. As explained above in
para. 1 and 2, the matter cannot be dealt with in the Bill now before Parliament
and, therefore, in order to continue for the time being on the present basis,
they need H.E.H.’s assent.
12 The agreement in question reaffirmed the Nizam’s sovereignty over Berar.
13 Emphasis in original.
JULY 1947
89
62
Mr Krishna Menon to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers . Demi-official Correspondence Files: Menon,
V. K. Krishna
11 July 1947
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
Thank you for your kind and warm note1 this morning. I don’t have to tell
how much I appreciate the confidence and affection you gave me and I am glad
that in some small way it has been of service. Lady Mountbatten also sent me
a very kind letter to which I will reply to from London.
I am sorry about Slim2 : very much so. I hope you will suggest and persuade
all concerned to have Nye. Someone else can go to Madras as Governor in 2
or 3 months. This appointment is so important that it might challenge much
of our hopes if the wrong choice is made. Perhaps you will think about it.
I am still hoping against hope that H.M.G. will put in some amendment to
improve the Bill in the matter of the States. It is not only necessary and just
but it is good sense and politics. I hope you will have no further difficulty on
reconstruction of Government and that the interim government will become
extinct for good next week. Please don’t allow any major modification of the
basic ideas we discussed yesterday.3 It may lead to fresh complications — and
the Viceroy’s Council as now for All-India must be ended for good.
Do keep in touch with Panditji, not least on States. He is your P.M. now and
obliged to give you advice on all matters.
Thank you for all your consideration and patience. I hope you will be able
to get a break off after you have packed Gandhiji off to Kashmir !
Yours affectionately,
KRISHNA
1 No. 55. 2 cf. No. 31, para. 4. 3 See No. 54.
63
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru 1
R/3/1I160: ff 112-4
PERSONAL 11 July I947
As you know, before Krishna left he helped us both to clear up the muddle I
had got myself into about the reconstitution of the Government.
2. You will remember that I promised you that I would give all the port¬
folios for India territories to the Congress as soon as I could legally do so.
1 A note on the file copy indicates that this letter was handed to Pandit Nehru personally by Lord
Mountbatten on n July.
90
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
3. You have always very honourably upheld the view that you did not wish
the Congress to interfere with the Pakistan territories. Krishna had always
meant to work out a scheme along these lines, but I am afraid I rather got off
the lines, and he tells me that he recently discussed the matter with you and
came to the conclusion that the best solution would be to give all the port¬
folios to Congress Ministers for the India territories, and the portfolios for the
future Pakistan territories to the League.2
4. Sardar Patel has written to me3 saying that he wished me to arrange
matters that all those Mushm officials who had opted to go to Pakistan could
be removed from their present offices in the Government of India, since their
continued presence was nothing but an embarrassment.
5. I discussed this point also with Krishna, and he suggested a solutions
which I gather you have accepted in principle. He gave me a draft Pres4
Communique5 which he told me you had agreed to. I thought it was rather
long and not quite as clear as I could have wished on all points, and I have
taken the hberty of re-wording it in my own language, and I am sending it to
you herewith.6 A few minutes ago I saw Sardar Patel about the Hyderabad
negotiations, and gave him a copy of this Press Communique. I do not
intend to ask Mr Jinnah’s concurrence or approval to this reconstitution. I
have decided that so long as you agree, I will go ahead and impose it since I
consider it to be in keeping with what you have always asked for, and abso¬
lutely just.
6. Furthermore, I do not propose to wait until 23 rd July, since this date is
based on the Bill not being through until the 21st.
7. It seems certain that the King’s assent will be given on the 17th, and I
therefore propose to reconstitute the Government along these lines on the
morning of the 18th.
8. If therefore you accept my wording, I shall immediately send for Mr
Jinnah and hand him the Communique.
9. As soon as this has been done, I would suggest that you should consider
who is to hold the five League portfohos in the Congress India Cabinet.
10. I would also suggest that when this is done, I should issue orders con¬
cerning the posting of India and Pakistan officials in sufficient time to enable the
detailed posting to be prepared to be implemented on the morning of the 18th.
11. If you can spare the time for a talk tomorrow Saturday, I would like
to give you a first hand account of how my meeting7 with the Hyderabad
delegates went off. I am hopeful that we may have a success, but cannot
answer for this until they have seen the Nizam.
JULY 1947
91
Enclosure to No. 63
DRAFT COMMUNIQUE ON THE RECONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT8
In order to facilitate the setting up of the new administration of Pakistan His
Excellency the Viceroy has decided with the concurrence of the party leaders
that the Interim Government should be reconstituted on the following lines.
The Government will consist of two groups representing the two successor
Governments. There will be nine members from India and nine from Pakistan.
The two groups will meet separately to consider matters concerning their
own territories, and jointly under the chairmanship of the Governor-General
to consider matters of common concern.
The personnel who have chosen to serve in Pakistan will be withdrawn from
existing departments, and will staff Pakistan departments which will be
organised at once in Delhi and will serve the Pakistan members of the Cabinet.
There will thus be what amounts to two provisional Governments, one for
India and one for Pakistan, each dealing with its own business and consulting
the other on matters of common concern.
2 cf. No. 54. 3 Not traced but cf. No. 53. 4 cf. No. 54, paras. 5(v) and 6(d).
5 No. 54. 6 See Enclosure. 7 No. 61.
In letters to Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel on 12 July Lord Mountbatten indicated that he had made
slight amendments to this draft. He omitted the second sentence of the second paragraph upon the
grounds that it was unnecessary to state an exact figure. He also inserted the following sentence at the
beginning of paragraph 4 : ‘The existing Departments will be in charge of the Members representing
India.’ The Viceroy explained that he intended to show the draft communique to Mr Jinnah on the
same day (ie 12 July). R/3/1/160: ff 116, 118, 119.
6 4
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru 1
tf/j/i/Sj:/ 73
no. 38/17 new Delhi, u July 1947
Dear Mr Nehru,
I am forwarding herewith a draft2 of the statement I propose to issue asking for
British personnel to stay on for the interim period during the reconstitution of
the Armed Forces.
I feel it is most important to get this out as soon as possible and I should be
grateful if you would let me have your comments as early as possible to-day
Friday.3 Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 Lord Mountbatten wrote in the same terms to Sardar Baldev Singh, Sardar Patel, Mr Jinnah, Mr
Liaquat Ali Khan and Dr Rajendra Prasad. R/3/1/83 : ff 72, 74-7.
2 Not printed; see the Enclosure to No. 80 for the statement as issued.
3 For the replies of Pandit Nehru and Sardar Baldev Singh, see Nos. 69 and 79. Mr Jinnah suggested the
addition of the words ‘as an independent Chairman’ to the reference to Lord Mountbatten’s acceptance
of the chairmanship of the Joint Defence Council in the second paragraph of No. 80. Sarder Patel, Mr
Liaquat All Khan and Dr Rajendra Prasad had no additional comments. R/3/1/83 : ff 79-81, 84.
92
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
65
Viceroy s Personal Report No. 12
LIPOI6/123: ff 168-77
TOP SECRET AND 11 July I947
PERSONAL
This has been another busy week, as, in addition to the usual Cabinet meeting,
there have been two meetings of the Partition Council as well as a meeting with
the Hyderabad delegation, and I have also been considerably occupied with
the question of the reconstitution of the Interim Government and the nomina¬
tions for Governors-General of the two new Dominions. I will refer to these
matters later on.
2. In regard to the country in general, the situation remains very much the
same in the Punjab, which is still most unsettled, but there has been an unex¬
pected outbreak of trouble in Calcutta. The trouble seems to have started in the
first instance on the 4th July, a Muslim Festival, when four Hindus in a jeep
passed through a crowded Muslim quarter firing a Sten gun at random
killing two and injuring seventeen. Not unnaturally incidents mutliplied after
this, but the principal trouble was on the 7th July.
3. On the night of the 6th July the Muslim Officer in charge of one of the
Calcutta Police Stations received multiple injuries from a Sten gun and died
the same evening. When his body was taken for burial on the 7th July a Muslim
mob succeeded in snatching it away from relatives and in defiance of the Police
Commissioner’s orders carried it in procession through certain streets where the
population is mixed. The procession swelled to considerable dimensions as
it progressed and was joined by hooligan elements. Unarmed pohce who in¬
tended to accompany the body of their colleague to the burial ground were
unable to control the situation and eventually the procession had to be dispersed
with tear gas. When breaking up, the processionists caused some disturbances in
a number of localities. There was another bad incident the next day when a
crowded bus in a Muslim quarter was deliberately fired into by a gunman
from a jeep using a Sten gun.
4. I have just sent Abell down to Calcutta to ascertain how the reconstituted
Cabinet there is working and to enquire about the progress of partition work.
It is rather early as yet to judge the success of the arrangement by which the
Congress have been put in office as a sort of ‘Shadow’ Cabinet. Nevertheless, the
start has been propitious and Burrows reports that at present there is plenty
of goodwill. The Congress are pressing to be allowed to see all papers that go
to their opposite numbers and it is not certain that the Muslim League will
consent to this since the basis of the request is that the existing Ministers cannot
JULY 1947
93
be trusted to show their new colleagues papers which do, in fact, concern
Western Bengal.
5 . If a difficulty arises in the Cabinet it is more likely to arise over law and
order policy in Calcutta than over anything else. The Governor has, however,
taken certain action in regard to the posting of Police Officers in the last few
days which has given satisfaction to the Congress and he thinks that, with good
luck, he will be able to jolly along his odd Ministry until the 15th August.
6. The partition work in Bengal is not going ahead very fast. The Congress
are at present being quite co-operative but the main burden falls on the Muslim
League, who have to set up a new capital at Dacca and to start a new adminis¬
tration. The resources of Dacca are small and the time available is very short.
The Muslim League High Command themselves take a good deal less in¬
terest in East Bengal than in Western Pakistan and I am afraid East Bengal is
at the bottom of the priority list. The attention of our Steering Committee
here in Delhi has been drawn to the importance of giving certain priorities to
Dacca and possibly things will improve. I am writing to Jinnah about all this.
7. Abell reported that Burrows, though looking forward to leaving on the
15th August, was in very good heart and taking a firm hold of the situation in
Calcutta, which is bound to continue an anxiety until power is transferred.
8. The Chairman of the two Boundary Commissions, Sir Cyril Radcliffe,
has arrived and after staying with me for 48 hours to get into the picture, he
left for a preliminary visit to Calcutta. Nehru, Jinnah and the Boundary Com¬
missions have all agreed that the work should be completed by the 15th
August and Sir Cyril Radcliffe has concurred. All are very pleased that the Bill
will make the findings of the Boundary Commissions an Award, since no
party could contemplate with equanimity the riots which would break out if
the boundaries remained indefinite on the day of the transfer of power.
9. In regard to the Punjab, the Sikhs are again becoming troublesome in their
meetings and public statements and even Sardar Baldev Singh was reported in
the press to have said at a meeting1 on 8th July: —
“It is the demand of the Sikhs that the Boundary Commission should give
its decision by August 15. 1 hope that the Boundary Commission will be fair
to us, but if its decision is against us, we will resist it, and will not consider
any sacrifice too great to vindicate the honour of the Panth. ’
I taxed him with this in the full Cabinet meeting2 on 9th July, but he
denied it indignantly and said that he had been misreported. He intends to
ask for a correction to be issued but, although he may not have been
absolutely correctly reported, I fear there is little doubt that he was talking
along these lines.
1 See No. 17.
2 Mountbatten Papers, Cabinet Minutes (India), Part II, Case No. 177/34/47.
94
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
10. I saw the Maharaja of Patiala yesterday,3 and impressed on him once
again that if the Sikhs showed any sign of fight they would have the Armed
Forces of India against them and would be crushed. He fully realised this and
undertook to do everything in his power to try and steady them. He had
brought ten retired Sikh officers as a delegation to see me about the Boundary
Commission; I refused to see them and turned them over to the Chief of the
General Staff (in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief) to explain to them
that the terms of reference of the Boundary Commission had been settled by
the leaders, that I had nothing more to do with the Boundary Commissions,
and that they must address themselves to the Sikh Judge on the Punjab
Boundary Commission. Patiala agreed that this was the right decision.
11. In paragraph 20 of my Personal Report No. n,4 I expressed fear that it
would be difficult to get through the Partition Council the terms of conditions
of service for the temporary employment of officers and other ranks with the
Indian Dominion after the 15th August. I had a paper prepared based on the
Report which was brought back recently from London by the Adjutant General,
India, and in point of fact all the proposals went through without any difficulty
at the meeting of the Partition Council on the 7th July ;5 indeed, I even obtained
a 50% increase in India Allowance for other ranks. It was agreed that a general
announcement should be issued embodying the terms of conditions of
service and it was further agreed that I should issue a personal appeal to British
officers to volunteer their services and Nehru and Jinnah have agreed that their
names should be linked with this appeal. I attach a copy of the draft appeal6 I
have sent to the Partition Council for their agreement.
12. At the same meeting a decision was also taken about the future of the
Federal Court. It was decided that the existing Federal Court should continue
as the Federal Court for the Dominion of India and that a separate Federal
Court should be set up for Pakistan. Assurances have been given to the present
judges and officers of the staff that they will be continued in service on existing
terms and conditions and an opportunity will be given to all officers and staff
to elect to serve in Pakistan on the same conditions of service.
13. I have had further discussions this week about the composition of the
Arbitral Tribunal. A suggestion was put forward that the Federal Court should
be used for this purpose, but the Chief Justice’s view was that this would be
most improper, particularly as it is to continue for one Dominion. He felt,
however, that there would be no objection to one or more Judges of the Federal
Court being appointed to the Tribunal. It has now been agreed that I should
write to Sir Patrick Spens,7 asking him to accept the appointment of Chairman
of the Arbitral Tribunal and to discuss the appointment of one nominee with
the leader of each of the main parties. The meeting was unanimous with
JULY 1947
95
Spells’ own view that he should not stay on in India after the work of the
Tribunal is finished in any office, or in fact in employment of any nature.
14. I had a further meeting of the Partition Council on the 10th July, on the
Agenda for which were a number of papers concerning the Reconstitution of
the Armed Forces, which had been put up by the various committees dealing
with each Service.8 Although these papers had been unanimously agreed by
the officer representatives of both future Dominions serving on the Committees
— in fact in the case of the Naval Committee the representatives of each future
Dominion had sat separately and reached almost identical conclusions — the
pohtical leaders, particularly of Congress, appeared loth to accept them without
further consideration. I wondered whether this was because of mistrust, but
eventually concluded that it arose from the complete lack of knowledge on the
part of the leaders of anything to do with the Armed Forces. They asked for
more time to study the papers and have them explained by experts.
15. I pulled Sardar Patel’s leg about this, because I had understood that it
was at his request that the Partition Council meeting had been called for that
day. He denied this, and it transpired that it was H. M. Patel, the Cabinet
Secretary, who had asked for the meeting. (It is not the first time there has been
a muddle about names — all the different Menons, too, are most confusing). So
it was eventually decided that the political leaders should have the various
papers explained to them by their representatives on the different Committees,
and that their approval would be assumed unless they commented within 24
hours.
16. The Cabinet Meeting on Wednesday the 9th July was a very tame
affair. There was a very short agenda as the routine business of the Government
of India has practically come to a standstill. Much of the time was taken up
by a discussion, in which there was a distinct note of acerbity, between the
Congress and Muslim League over the final destination of 22 million ounces of
silver, now lying in the Mint in Lahore.9 There had been an administrative
decision last March that this silver should be moved to Bombay, but for one
reason or another it has not yet got under way. It is required ultimately to
repay the loan of silver from the United States, and is not required for monetary
nickel. Although no Congress member actually said so, the fear was quite
3 No record of this meeting has been traced but cf. No. 52, Case No. P.C. 31/4/47.
4 Vol. XI, No. 506.
5 Lord Mountbatten evidently intended to refer to the meeting held on 5 July. Mountbatten Papers,
Partition Council Minutes, Case No. P.C. 18/3/47.
6 Not printed; see the Enclosure to No. 80 for the appeal as issued.
7 See Vol. XI, No. 516. Lord Mountbatten wrote to Sir P. Spens asking him to accept the position as
Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal on n July. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files:
Arbitral Tribunal.
8 Mountbatten Papers, Partition Council Minutes, Case Nos. P.C. 34/4/47, 36/4/47 and 37/4/47.
9 Mountbatten Papers, Cabinet Minutes (India), Part II, Case No. 173/34/47-
96
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
obvious that Pakistan would use this treasure to finance itself, and if 15th
August arrived before the silver was in Bombay, that would very likely be
the last of it which India would see. Finally the matter was shelved by calling
for a report of the full facts involved ; this is supposed to come up next week.
17. Under the standstill formula which we have adopted, by which no major
decision is being taken pending separation, B.O.A.C. have been stopped from
inaugurating their new line to Karachi, Bombay and Ceylon. I asked for the
agreement of the Cabinet to the B.O.A.C. application being considered on its
merits, and both sides accepted this. The matter is, therefore, now being
examined departmentally by the Communications and External Affairs
Departments; and if they agree B.O.A.C. will get permission to start their new
service.
18. In paragraph 10 to 14 of my Personal Report No. n10 I referred to the
reconstitution of the Interim Government. I had a further talk with Jinnah
during the week11 and had, I think, almost brought him up to the point when
he would have been prepared to discuss the arrangement I described with his
followers, in spite of the fact that he regarded it as a deliberate insult to the
League. The situation has, however, changed to a great extent during the last
three days as a result of the now quite fresh position created by my acceptance
of the Governorship [sic] of the Union of India. I pointed out to Nehru and to
Krishna Menon, who has once again been invaluable as a ‘‘go-between”, that
my position would be extremely difficult having accepted to stay on with the
Dominion of India if the League refused to send in their resignations and forced
me to dismiss them and give all portfolios for the whole of India to Members of
what will be my own future Government. I am, therefore, now investigating
the mechanism whereby these two future governments could hold separate
portfolios for their future areas for the three weeks before the actual transfer of
power.12 I believe I may be able to persuade Congress to accept such a scheme
and I feel that Jinnah would welcome it provided that the mechanics present
no insuperable problem. I attach a draft communique13 on the reconstitution
of the Government, which I am putting to the leaders in the course of the
next day or so. If both sides will accept this, we shall have got over by far the
most difficult hurdle we have had to jump so far.
19. I am most grateful for the very friendly reception which was accorded
by the King, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Committee, and the Opposition
to Ismay on his difficult Mission.
20. Now that advice has been so unanimous and strong14 that I should accept
the Governor-Generalship of India and the Chairmanship of the Joint Defence
Council, my mind is fully made up and I shall carry on and do my very best.
I must however record the feeling which I cannot altogether dismiss that it is a
JULY 1947
97
tragedy that I have had to take a position with one side when hitherto I have
managed to retain my complete impartiahty. I must also point out that this
will be an extremely difficult position for Congress leaders to put over on their
back-benchers; for Jinnah scores an undoubted victory over Congress from a
psychological point of view in having an Indian Governor-General for
Pakistan.
21. The one bull point in the favour of the Congress leaders is that by my
continuing as Governor-General the continuing entity of India as opposed to
Pakistan is more firmly established in the eyes of the world. The second is that
I have only accepted for the ‘‘transition” period — probably about eight months
— so that it cannot be looked upon as establishing permanent inequality between
the two Dominions.
22. On Thursday 10th July my wife and I gave a small “At Home” to
which the members of the Standing Committee of the All-India Newspaper
Editors’ Conference and the Central Press Advisory Committee totalling about
30 were invited. Members of the former committee represent the most power¬
ful managerial and editorial interests in the non-Muslim press (British and
Indian languages) throughout India. During the “At Home” I gave an informal
talk and listened to many of their reactions on the 3rd June and Cabinet
Mission plans.
23. The feeling at the beginning of the talk was tense. A very excited editor
from Calcutta decried the 3rd June plan and another from Lahore spoke of
discrimination in dealing with police officials who were responsible for com¬
munal tension. I parried their questions and answers explaining the facts to the
best of my ability and after a rather difficult ten minutes the atmosphere was
cleared and laughter prevailed. At the end of the party I informed them of the
nominations for Governors-General, reading out the extract from the Prime
Minister’s speech.
24. The President of the All-India Newspaper Editors’ Conference is Mr.
Devadas Gandhi, who is Managing Editor of “The Hindustan Times”.
10 Vol. XI, No. 506. 11 cf. No. 24. 12 See No. 54.
13 Not printed; see No. 63 and its Enclosure.
14 In his letter from London dated n July 1947 Mr A. Campbell-Johnson explained that he had inter¬
viewed a number of prominent persons connected with the press and commented : ‘I have briefed them
all fully on the situation which has arisen, but without putting forward any view of my own. They
were unanimous in urging the need for you to stay on and in stressing that the British Press reaction to
your doing so would be favourable and sympathetic.’ Campbell-Johnson also mentioned that he had
attended the debate on the Indian Independence Bill in the House of Commons on 10 July and com¬
mented: ‘It is a bad House of Commons and the attendance was nothing like as big as it should have
been. The first three speeches were of high quality however and tributes to your work were inspiring
to hear. I am sure that if you could come back for a few months and get the feel of the atmosphere
here you would realise that you have a body of support in this country which very few Englishmen
can hope to achieve for themselves, and which will I am sure stand by you and Lady Louis in the
coming months.’ Mountbatten Papers, Demi-Official Correspondence Files: Campbell-Johnson, Alan.
98
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Incidentally he is also the son of Mahatma Gandhi. In his vote of thanks he
said he was glad personally that I had been nominated for the post of Governor-
General of India. He said, however, that he felt there would be mixed feelings
in India at the appointment of a Britisher in this post, especially when Pakistan
had nominated an Indian. On obtaining their independence and in the face of
this mixed feeling he felt that the Indian leaders of Congress had been cour¬
ageous in making such a nomination.
25. With the concurrence of the Member for External Affairs (Nehru),
have arranged to give official dinner parties on all national occasions of the
countries who have ambassadors accredited to Delhi. On the 4th July I invited
the new American Ambassador, his Staff and the American colony in Delhi to a
dinner, thinking that perhaps 20 or 30 would turn up. Almost 100 names were
sent in which made it very difficult to provide enough hosts since we could only
seat 138 all told. Both Nehru and Jinnah came to this party and authorised me
to extend good wishes to America in my speech. The party appears to have
been a very great success. On the 14th July I am giving a similar party for the
French; and shall probably give one on the 10th October for the Chinese, and
on the 7th November for the Russians.
26. I have persuaded both Nehru and Patel to give me a fairly free hand in
negotiating with the States.15 I am on quite a good wicket, because on the
whole the States representatives are pleased that I managed to get the leaders to
accept the Cabinet Mission’s memorandum16 of the 12th May, which hitherto
no party had accepted. It will be remembered that this plan was specifically
quoted in the Statement of the 3rd June,17 which both parties publicly accepted.
27. I held a meeting this morning1 8 with the representatives of Hyderabad,
led by the Prime Minister, the Nawab of Chhatari, with three other representa¬
tives and also Sir Walter Monckton. I had V. P. Menon, the “India” Secretary
of the new States Department, Akbar [PAkhtar] Hussain, the “Pakistan”
Deputy Secretary of the new Department, Corfield and three members of the
Political Department, in attendance.
28. I was able to concede all Hyderabad requests on the retrocession of the
Secunderabad cantonment and the withdrawal of the Indian Army troops. I
was also able to meet all their points about retrocession of the railway lands ;
but Berar proved a very thorny problem. I put it to them that they should try
and persuade His Exalted Highness to accept an indefinite standstill agreement
about Berar by which the Dominion of India would recognise the Nizam’s
sovereignty and continue to pay the Rs. 25 lakhs a year in rent. Monckton
pointed out that the Nizam would not like an indefinite agreement, since he
would feel that he would thus lose sovereignty, and therefore suggested a clause
whereby this standstill agreement could be terminated at 12 months notice; and
V. P. Menon thought this would be acceptable to the States Department.
JULY 1947
99
29. Finally, I tackled the most difficult problem of all, the accession, or as I
put it the ‘adherence’, of Hyderabad to the Dominion of India. Up to now the
States have all felt that the Dominion of India Government would insist on
complete adherence for all the Central subjects, which would virtually mean
giving up internal autonomy. But both Nehru and Patel have made the most
realistic gesture in authorising me to negotiate on the basis of the three
original Central subjects in the Cabinet Mission plan — Defence, External
Affairs and Communications.
30. I was able to point out to the Hyderabad delegates what an immense
step forward this was over the previous position; and I noted that they were
visibly relieved. I pointed out that the standstill agreement which I proposed
to negotiate with all the States on the 25th July virtually covered comunica-
tions ; thus adherence on this point was almost certainly assured. I pointed out
further that they might as well equip their armies with bows and arrows as
retain their existing arms for all the good they would be when the new post-war
weapons and techniques were developed, and that anyhow they could hardly
expect to run their own overall defence. I also pointed out that they could
hardly expect to run External Affairs on an individual basis and that the two
questions were inseparably linked.
31. The Delegation feared that they might not be able to get the Nizam to
accept even this very loose adherence to the Centre; but I suggested that a
formula could be found which would salve the Nizam’s wounded pride and
which might yet be acceptable to the States Department.
32. The meeting broke up with a feeling that we had got much further
along the road to agreement than anybody could possibly have hoped, and I
have invited them to come back on the 24th July for further prehminary
discussions ; since if I can once get Hyderabad to stop their talk of complete
independence and to come realistically forward, this would set an example
which I do not believe any other State, not even Travancore, could resist.
33. I have also made arrangements for the Dewan of Travancore, Sir C. P.
Ramaswami Aiyer, to come to Delhi to see me, and I am not without hope that
I may be able to make Travancore see sense.
34. I must freely admit that I have not been able to grip this States problem
before. It will be remembered that I was instructed19 to adhere to the 12th
May Statement and I felt that until this was accepted by the leaders and an
atmosphere created in which reahsm would prevail, I could not make much
progress. There is also the small matter that there are only 24 hours in every
15 See No. 37, Item 2. 16 Vol. VII, No. 262.
18 No. 61. 19 See Vol. IX, No. 543-
17 Vol. XI, No. 45, para. 18.
100
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
day, which have been pretty fully occupied up to now with the problem of
British India and with partition and the transfer of power.
35. I thought it might amuse the members of His Majesty’s Government
to know that a manifesto was recently issued in Bihar announcing the formation
of a Muslim League Left Wing. In laying down the proposed rules of the new
party, the first principle was “The Left Wing will always uphold the cause of
the right”.
M. OF B.
66
Viceroy's Conference Paper. V.C.P. 125
Mountbatten Papers
SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 11 July 1947
ISSUE OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO STATES
1. At Annex ‘A’ is a copy of a letter dated 7th July from Sardar Baldev
Singh on this subject.
2. This was sent for advice to the Political Adviser, who replied in a letter
of which a copy is at Annex ‘B’.
3. At Annex ‘C’ is a note by P.S.V.
4. At Annex ‘D’1 is a copy of a letter sent to Sir Eric Mieville by the Deputy
C.-in-C.
5. This paper, and the line which His Excellency should now take, will be
discussed at the next Viceroy’s Staff Meeting.
V. F. ERSKINE CRUM
Conference Secretary
Annex ‘A’ to No. 66
Sardar Baldev Singh to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
SECRET DEFENCE DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 7 July lg^y
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
All kinds of rumours are afloat about States and other private parties collecting
arms. Most of these rumours are highly exaggerated and it is impossible to take
notice of all of them, but wherever we have an effective say in the matter, we
should put a stop to the supply of arms specially these days.
A number of States have put forward their demands for the supply of arms
and equipment as normal replacements. I have discussed this with the
Commander-in-Chief and have been informed that the orders for these supplies
to the States are issued by you in the capacity of Crown Representative and
JULY I947
IOI
that the Defence Department or the Defence Member have technically no
jurisdiction. I do not share this view, but without going into technicalities,
I may say that my real purpose in writing this letter is to emphasise that it is
absolutely essential that utmost care should be taken in the matter of issuing
arms and equipment during this transitional period. In fact, I am of the view
that no arms at all should be supplied for the State Forces or their Police until
the new Dominions come into existence. I shall therefore be glad if you will
kindly agree to the suspension for the present of supplies to the Indian States.
Yours sincerely,
BALDEV SINGH
Annex ‘ B ’ to No. 66
Sir C. Corf eld to Sir G. Abell
secret new Delhi, g July ig47
My dear Abell,
Please refer to your endorsement, No. 681/221 of the 8th July 1947, forwarding
a copy of a letter from the Hon. Member for Defence dated 7th July, about
supply of arms and equipment to States.
I think it would be quite improper to suspend supplies of the legitimate
requirements of arms and equipment to Indian States Forces and Police.
Such arms etc. are in the case of States Forces issued only to authorised units
in the establishment of which the Defence Department has concurred based on
the advice of the Military Adviser-in-Chief supported by the Political Depart¬
ment.
In the case of Police it has been agreed in the past that States Police Forces, if
certified by the Political Department to be adequately trained and disciplined,
should be armed and equipped on the same scale as Provincial Police Forces.
This is only fair since the responsibility for internal security rests upon each
State Government even more directly than upon Provincial Governments.
In this connection I enclose a copy of my letter2 of the 15 th April 1947 to the
Hon’ble the Defence Member and of his reply,3 as a result of which a dis¬
cussion was held with the Deputy Commander-in-Chief. A copy of the record
of the discussion on this point is enclosed.4
1 Not printed. In the letter referred to, the Deputy C.-in-C. stated that, with regard to the issue of guns
and ammunition to the States, the following rules were being observed: (i) no extra issue to any form
of States Forces or States Police; (2) normal maintenance to continue to Indian States Forces; (3) normal
issues to be made to States Police on demands duly received from Home or Political Department
through the Defence Department. It was emphasised that ‘normal’ issue referred only to rifles and
muskets and, in the case of officers, pistols. It did not include automatic guns, like the Bren or the
Tommy.
2,3 and 4. Not printed. A note attached to this letter stated that the discussion, which was attended also by
the Secretary of the Defence Department, agreed broadly that the ordinary legitimate requirements of
the States Forces and Police should be met as far as possible, and that requests for increases would be
considered by G.H.Q. on their merits if the Crown Representative considered that they were necessary
for the maintenance of internal security.
102
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
I would also draw attention to His Excellency’s letter No. 681/22 dated the
10th May to H.H. the Nawab of Bhopal, of which a copy is also enclosed.5
Yours sincerely,
C. CORFIELD
Annex ‘C’ to No. 66
Note by Sir G. Abell
10 July 1947
1. I think it would be best to talk to H.M. Defence about this because it is not
at all an easy matter.
2. It is natural enough that the Congress, with their views about the States,
should object very strongly to providing arms for, e.g., Hyderabad or Travan-
core or Bhopal.
3 . On the other hand, there is a clear obligation on the Crown Representative
to see that normal or justifiable supplies of arms and ammunition are not held
up at this time, which is so critical for the States.
4. I have ascertained from Political Department that there is, in fact, a
complete hold up at the moment and nothing is being sent.
5. I fear that in any case it would be very difficult to overcome obstructi on
so successfully as to get large supplies sent off before 15 August.
6. I think, however, that an attempt should be made and that Y.E. should
tell the Defence Member when you see him that you think that properly
authorised demands should be met at once, in accordance with the agreed
policy, and you hope that this will go ahead at once, subject to discussion with
Defence Member if in any particular case he feels that there is justification for
refusal to supply the arms, and equipment.
5 Not printed. A note attached to this letter indicates that the letter in question was sent by Lord Mount-
batten to the Nawab of Bhopal, saying that he was taking an interest in the supply of essential equipment
to States Forces.
JULY I947
103
67
Record of Interview between Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) and Jathedar Mohan Singh
and Sardar Harnam Singh
R/jI 1/176:/ 249
11 July 1947 , 3.00 pm
Jathedar Mohan Singh and Sardar Harnam Singh of the S.G.P.C. came to see
me at 3 p.m. today. They raised certain points concerning arrangements after
15th August, which I have passed on to Sardar Swaran Singh in a d.o. letter1
a copy of which is appended to this note.
2. Jathedar Mohan Singh then embarked upon a long statement of the Sikh
claim and said that I was solely responsible for seeing that the Sikhs got justice.
I pointed out that the Boundary Commission was appointed by the Governor-
General and would report to him. I could not give orders to the Commission ;
nor did I suppose for one moment that the President would ask me to advise
him. Jathedar Mohan Singh said that since there was no hope of a unanimous
report, the Governor-General would in the end have to decide what to do and
would then presumably ask my opinion, which might be decisive. I replied
that the Governor-General might or might not ask my opinion and might or
might not follow it if it were given.
3. Jathedar Mohan Singh talked a lot about the difficulties of the Sikhs and
took the same line as Giani Kartar Singh yesterday.2 He said that the only
solution was a very substantial exchange of population. If this did not occur,
the Sikhs would be driven to facilitate it by a massacre of Muslims in the
Eastern Punjab. The Muslims had already got rid of Sikhs in the Rawalpindi
Division and much land and property there could be made available to Muslims
from the East Punjab. Conversely the Sikhs could get rid of Muslims in the East
in the same way and invite Sikhs from the West to take their places. He did not
put his case quite as crudely as this, but his general ideas were clear. He said that
the Sikhs were being ridiculed as cowardly, but they were not going to act
upon the taunts of the Hindus ; their plan was to act in a big way immediately
after the transfer of power. Strong distrust of the Congress was apparent
throughout his statement of the Sikh case. When I suggested that in the East
the Sikhs might secure the Premiership or Governorship, he said that con¬
cessions of this kind were valueless and the Hindus would see to it that Sikh
influence was gradually eliminated.
4. This was a depressing conversation, but Jathedar Mohan Singh is quite
1 Not printed.
2 See Enclosure to No. 56.
104
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
a cheerful person and in talk at least comparatively sensible. He realises that
there will be little point in the kind of disturbances the Sikhs have in view,
though he regards them as more or less inevitable.
Sir A. Hydari (Assam) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
(Extract)
Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Assam,
Situation in
GOVERNMENT HOUSE, SHILLONG, 11 July I947
2. My visits to Kohima and Manipur were, I think, successful. At Kohima I
had prolonged discussions with representatives of ten of the Naga tribes and as
a result came to an understanding with them in respect of their future relation¬
ship with the Province and the Union Government. My Prime Minister and the
Constituent Assembly Advisory Committee on Tribal Areas, which has been
sitting in Shillong, agree generally with the substance of the proposed arrange¬
ments. It is now for the Constituent Assembly to consider the matter. I have
sent a copy of the Heads of the proposed understanding to Pandit Nehru.1
★ ★ ★
5. I again visited Sylhet on the 9th to obtain firsthand information from the
civil and military authorities as to how the referendum had gone. There were
also present at my conference the military officers whom you were good
enough to send. They all spoke from personal knowledge. They confirmed the
correctness of the first report that the referendum had been carried out peace¬
fully, and that the stray instances of disorder could not by any stretch of
imagination be magnified into a widespread breakdown of law and order which
had been alleged in some quarters.2 I got the two Surma Valley Ministers —
Basanta Kumar Das (Home Minister) and Baidyanath Mookerjee (Supply
Minister) to attend this Conference and the officers present, including those you
had sent, were able to prove to them how unfounded were the allegations to
which they had been inclined to give credence. On my return to Shillong the
same evening I had the Prime Minister to dinner and gave him a full account.
As he was leaving for Delhi the next morning I wanted to put him in the picture
so that he would be able to answer allegations which may be made to him
there.
6. It is only a guess, but it looks as if the referendum will go in favour of the
League; and the Prime Minister and I, as well as my officers, think that the
JULY I947
105
wildly irresponsible statements given to the Press by Basanta Kumar Das and
other Bengali workers were due to their realisation that they were losing the
battle and so provide an explanation in advance of their defeat.
7. On the whole, I think the officers, both civil and military, and the men
have done an extremely good job of work. In addition to the senior military
and civil officers the work of the Presiding and the Polling officers who are
small men — school masters, clerical assistants etc. — drawn from all over the
Province has been, with a few exceptions, entirely praiseworthy. The military
especially were feeling annoyed at the accusations hurled at them, the Assam
Rifles and the Police, and therefore at the Conference, and in the presence of the
two Ministers, I paid them a tribute for their good work which I repeated later
to the A.P.I. correspondent.
★ -k -k
1 It may also be noted that on 15 July 1947 a letter and telegram were sent to the Prime Minister by Lai
Biak Thanga, Chairman of the United Mizo Freedom Organisation, on behalf of the people of the
Lushai Hills. Copies were also sent to Lord Listowel, Sir Stafford Cripps, Mr A. V. Alexander and Mr
Churchill. The telegram and letter urged that the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Minorities of the Constituent Assembly should not be accepted as binding until the end of December.
This was to give the people of the Lushai Hills time for the Tull and free development’ of their ideas
and the expression of their ‘real wishes’. As with the earlier communications received from the Naga
National Comicil (see Vol. X, No. 134, note 7), the India Office sent no acknowledgement of this
representation either on behalf of the Prime Minister or of the Secretary of State for India.
L/P &J/7/10635 : ff 77-8 and 67.
2 cf. Nos. 94 and 95.
69
Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten ofB urma
Rl3M83:f82
SECRET EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI,
11 July ig47
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
Sardar Baldev Singh has just shown me your letter to him, dated the nth July1
and the draft of the statement you propose to issue asking the British per¬
sonnel to stay on for the interim period during the reconstitution of the armed
forces.
You know that we attach the greatest importance to the rapid nationalisa¬
tion of the defence services. It was our original plan that this should be
completed by June 1948. The partition activities have come in the way, but,
nevertheless, I trust that nationalisation will be pushed on as rapidly as pos¬
sible. It is incongruous for the army of a free country not to have its own
1 This letter was in similar terms to No. 64.
io 6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
officers in the highest ranks. As soon as India becomes a Dominion the control
of the army naturally fully rests with the Dominion Government. I take it that
this is clear; but some confusion has arisen owing to the process of division
going on. This process will not, I presume, lessen in any degree the control of
the army by the Dominion Government as well as the rapid Indianisation of
the Army.
I entirely agree with you that during the interim period the services of the
British officers and technical specialists will be required. We shall welcome
them. But I trust that when this interim period is over, and the date fixed for it
is the 3 1 st March 1948, the number required will be greatly reduced. A sentence
in your statement about large numbers of British personnel volunteering might
give rise to the impression that we are continuing a very large number of
British officers rather indefinitely. This would be unfortunate and will be
criticised.
I am anxious that senior Indian officers should be associated immediately
with work at the topmost level. I am rather surprised that no promotions have
been made among them during the last few months, although that was the
recommendation of the Nationalisation Committee. I do not suppose that
promotions would have come in the way of partition. It is not merely a question
of promotion but of association at high levels.
I should have liked the Armed Forces Reorganisation Committee also to have
senior Indian officers associated with it. This seems to me not only psycho¬
logically but also practically necessary. They will have to assume responsibility
soon and the sooner they begin to discharge it the better.
I am told that a number of senior officers and others employed in the Defence
Department have opted for service in Pakistan. Those who have done so should
not serve in any committee for partition, except as representatives of Pakistan.
Indeed, I would suggest that the time has come for all persons who have opted
for Pakistan to transfer their services forthwith to working for Pakistan. It is
incongruous and it will lead to difficulties if they continue to serve in our present
departments.
Yours sincerely,
JAWAHRLAL NEHRU2
2 Lord Mountbatten’s reply, dated 12 July, was in the same terms as No. 80 with the addition of a second
para, reading as follows: ‘You will notice that I have changed the wording from “a large number” to
“sufficient” which I think will meet the points you made in your letter of nth July.’ R/3/1/83: f 87.
JULY 1947
107
H.M. Minister at Kabul to Secretary oj State
Telegram , L/P &S/i2/i8i2: f 2g6
important Kabul, li July ig47, 6.00 pm
Received: 12 July , g.40 pm
No. 61. As reported in my despatch No. 63 of July 5th1 I called on Afghan
Foreign Minister and spoke as instructed in Forminka No. 57.2
2. On July 10th Foreign Minister handed me his Government’s reply in a
six-page letter which he read in Persian. Translation will follow but reply is
not helpful. It consists mainly of contradiction of statement in para 3 A of
Forminka 5 63 that area forms integral part of India. (? Afghan) thesis is
supported by reference to three Afghan wars and subsequent treaties and to
account in Volume 13 of Aitchison’s Treaties. Letter also argues that it was the
British and not Indian Government that seized these Afghan territories and that
their transfer to India therefore is arbitrary act out of keeping with British
sense of justice. It repeats old arguments and claims that referendum under
present limitations would lead to absorption of Afghans of North West
Frontier Province under alien rule which cannot be acceptable and that it
would inevitably leave legacy of disagreement between Afghan and whichever
Government is responsible for the area.
3 . In reply I informed Minister for Foreign Affairs of contents of Forminka
No. 60, 4 argued that further appeal to His Majesty’s Government to change its
course was stubborn and that present publicity campaign would only ensure
maximum resentment from His Majesty’s Government, India and Pakistan.
Afghan Government should look forward not backward and should now
seriously consider how problems of mutual interest especially assistance to
Frontier security could best be solved in friendly negotiation with new
1 Not printed.
2 This telegram informed H.M. Minister at Kabul that on the subject of the Afghan Government’s
claims regarding the N.W.F.P., he should reply to the Afghan Foreign Minister on lines already
established in recent telegraphic correspondence. Specifically, he was instructed to inform the Foreign
Minister that the arrangements contemplated in the 3 June statement had been expressed in general
terms only and that they would be elaborated in due course by further announcements made from time
to time by the Governor-General. He was also instructed to explain that the Government of India
could not accept one of the Afghan Government’s alternative suggestions that the N.W.F.P. should
become an independent state. Finally, he was told to point out that if the Afghan Government was
contemplating embarking on some diversionary adventure in the tribal areas, the Government of India
would probably respond by withdrawing provision for further economic assistance and military supplies
to Afghanistan. L/P &S/12/1811: ff 65, 73-75, 81 and 82.
3 Vol. XI, No. 453.
4 This telegram reiterated that H.M.G’s attitude was based upon the view that the Anglo-Afghan Treaty
of 1921 would remain valid when power was transferred to the new dominions. L/P &S/12/1811 : ff
63-4-
io8
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(probably Pakistan) Government whose friendship was of vital importance to
Afghanistan.
4. Press campaign continues on now familiar lines, I will examine Afghan
reply in detail but meanwhile no further reply seems called for.
Repeated to Government of India External Affairs and Commonwealth
Relations Department and N.W.F.P.
71
Mr Turnbull to Sir A. Carter
LjP &Jlioj8i: f 21
11 July 1947
Sir Archibald Carter,
Here is my attempt1 at a statement about the Arbitral Tribunal in reply to Mr.
R. A. Butler. I don’t like it at all because I think he has made a very good point.
If we say that we don’t put any in because the Indian leaders do not want it or
have not asked for it, we invite the question whether that does not show that
the Congress leaders are not very ardent for fair division of assets. It is also
rather near the wind because Jinnah has asked outright that H.M.G. should
ensure that there is a fair division of assets and should do their best to rectify
any departure from a fair division by allocating sterling balances to the injured
party. No-one could say that this is totally impracticable but the position
of H.M.G. is that they are not prepared to do anything to enforce a fair
partition and the only thing to do seems to be in effect to say so.
F.F.T.
1 No. 72.
72
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , L/P &J/ 10/81: ff 22-5
MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 11 July 1947 , 10. 4$ pm
secret Received: 12 July, 6.00 am
No. 8975. Opposition have informed us that they intend to urge strongly in
Committee on Monday that provision should be included in the Bill for an
arbitral tribunal. They will ask why if it has been agreed in principle between
Indian Leaders as stated by Prime Minister that an arbitral tribunal should be
set up “to which should be referred any question regarding division of assets
and liabilities of which the two Governments cannot reach agreement”,
provision for such a tribunal should not be included in the Bill as has been done
in the case of Boundary Commissions and the awards of this tribunal made
JULY I947
109
binding by the Bill on both new Dominions. They will also ask what are the
terms of reference of this tribunal.
2. I should be grateful to be informed not later than Sunday evening latest
position and especially whether any terms of reference have yet been settled.
3 . Following is a very tentative first draft of proposed answer on this rather
awkward point. I should be grateful for your observations and advice.
Reply begins. “I am asked why there is no provision in the Bill for an arbitral
tribunal for settlement of disputes in regard to partition of central assets
liabilities etc. The first answer is that the Bill gives effect to the plan agreed
to at conference of Indian Leaders held by the Viceroy to conclusions of which
expression was given in statement of H.M.G. of June 3rd. It was there agreed
that final boundaries should be demarcated by the Boundary Commissions but
there was no agreement about an arbitral tribunal. Secondly while Indian
parties have agreed in principle to the establishment of such a tribunal they
are still discussing personnel of tribunal and question of its terms of reference
is still outstanding. I suggest to the House that it would be of very little
use for us to put into this Bill a provision that there should be an arbitral
tribunal unless we were also to state precisely what basic functions were but
this would involve drafting elaborate terms of reference. In practice any
findings of the tribunal will have to be given executive effect by Orders of the
Governors-General jointly. It is one thing to refer absolutely to an arbitral
Commission the final demarcation of boundaries when broad principle on
which partition is to take place has been agreed upon and another for the Act
to give absolute and final authority to such Commission in regard to the whole
host of administrative and financial matters which arise out of a partition such
as is taking place in India. I suggest to the House that it would not be wise for us
to include a provision in the Bill of the kind which the Right Hon’ble Gentle¬
man has suggested. The first principle of this Bill is that in future Indians must
manage their own affairs on the basis that the two separate Dominions are
set up in India. It will not in our view add anything to [the] probability that
partition will be successfully and smoothly effected for Parliament to make
provision as to manner in which it should be carried out. We should not
therefore make any provision of the kind except on the express request of
both Congress and the League Leaders.” Reply ends.1
1 Sir A. Carter made certain amendments to Mr Turnbull’s original draft of this telegram. In particular,
he deleted the following three sentences which Turnbull had included after the word ‘Leaders’ : ‘I must
make it quite clear that His Majesty’s Government would not be prepared to undertake to enforce on
either of the new Dominions the findings of an Arbitral Tribunal. If Hon. Members opposite desire that
this country should assume that task they should make their position clear. If not I suggest that it is
unwise on their part to propose that legislation of Parliament should make provision as to how the
partition should be carried out.’ L/P &J/10/81. For the subsequent exchanges at the Committee stage of
the Bill, when the question of an Arbitral Tribunal was raised by Mr Macmillan on behalf of the
Opposition and the Attorney-General replied in terms which did not exactly follow what had been
suggested in the draft above, see Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 440, 14 July 1947, cols. 124-9.
no
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
73
The Earl oj Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram, L/P &J/ 10/81 : f 26
immediate India office, ii July ig47, n. 45 pm
secret Received: 12 July, 8.00 am
No. 8974. 1 have been considering further the position as regards Order making
power under Clause 9 as affected by decision that there shall be two Governors-
General from 15th August. It is clear that this decision may greatly limit the
use of that power and obstruct the processes of achieving a fair partition. No
doubt the Muslim League are themselves to blame for any such consequences
but we should wish to do what we can to obviate such a situation.
2. I should be grateful therefore if you would consider whether before the
15 th August you could make an Order setting up an Arbitral Tribunal and
announcing its terms of reference, and soon afterwards and also before 15th
August issue another Order defining a field of matters within which, failing
agreement between the two Dominion Governments, decisions of the Tribunal
would be final. The object would be to arrive before 15th August at a
position in which in a considerable field of matters decisions of Arbitral
Tribunal would be given effect by executive action only and would not
require to be implemented by Order made on advice in each Dominion
separately.
3. It would, of course, be necessary to get agreement of the parties both on
the personnel and terms of reference of the Arbitral Tribunal and on the field
of matters to which the Order would apply. If anything of this kind were
possible it would clear out of the way a large area of controversy in the period
after 15th August. I appreciate that this may not be obtainable but you may
like to consider the possibility, and if you pursue it I should be glad to know
what comes of it.
74
Pandit Nehru to Mr Attlee
R 1 30/1 1 12: ff 17-18
PERSONAL
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI,
11 July 1947
My dear Prime Minister,
V. K. Krishna Menon is returning to England and I am asking him to carry this
note with him1 and to convey my greetings to you. He has been in intimate
JULY I947
III
touch with us during the past few weeks here and I think he might prove
helpful in explaining the situation here.
In view of the impending changes the post of the High Commissioner for
India in London has an added significance. We attach considerable importance
to it as we do to the future relations of India with the U.K. We have therefore
given a great deal of thought to the choice of a suitable person for this post.
In consultation with the Viceroy and my colleagues we have decided to appoint
Krishna Menon to this post. I feel sure that with his knowledge of both India
and England and the intimate contacts he has in both countries, he will [be] of
great help to us in the new conditions that we shall have to face. I trust that he
will receive all possible help from your Government.
We do not propose to make any announcement about Krishna Menon’s
appointment till early in August. This is just for your personal information.
We are going to have plenty of difficulties in the future but I earnestly trust
that this future will see a growing friendship between India and England.
Yours very sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
1 Upon his arrival in London on 13 July, Mr Krishna Menon forwarded this letter, together with the one
from Lord Mountbatten (see No. 55, note 1) to Downing Street and wrote himself asking for an inter¬
view with the Prime Minister on the same day. R/30/1/12: f 16.
States Department to Residents
Telegram , Monckton Trustees, No. 39: f 12
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 11 July I947
No. i-S. Reference Polindia Express letter No. F.46-R(S)/47 dated 21st June
19471 and subsequent telegram No. 1810-P dated 8th July 1947.2 It is proposed
that meeting between States’ representatives and States Department should be
held in Delhi on 25th July and following days. His Excellency Viceroy will
preside at opening meeting. It is hoped that States themselves will hold pre¬
liminary meetings before 25th July for selection of small representative Com¬
mittee to conduct actual negotiations and arrive at agreement which could be
signed by accredited representatives of individual States.
2. Agenda for conference will be
(1) Accession of States to appropriate Dominion in respect of Defence,
External Affairs and Communications on basis of Part II Government of
India Act, 1935 as adapted.
Vol. XI, No. 287.
I
2 No. 2.
1 12
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(2) Standstill Agreement.
(3) Advisory Council for States Department.
(4) Arbitral procedure for settlement of disputes between States and
Provincial or Dominion Government.
(5) Extradition.
(6) Channel of correspondence and representation of Dominion Govern¬
ment in States.
3. Explanatory Memoranda will follow shortly.
4. Please inform all States immediately.
5. Political Department have seen.
6. Hyderabad Delegation now in Delhi will be given copy of this telegram.
76
Minutes of Viceroy s Fifty Seventh Staff Meeting, Items 1 and 5
Mountbatten Papers
SECRET
Those present during discussion of Items 1 and 5 of this Meeting held at the Viceroy's
House, New Delhi on 12 July 1947 at 10.30 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mountbatten of Burma, Sir G. Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Colonel Currie
(Item 1), Captain Brockman, Mr I. D. Scott, Commander Nicholls, Lieutenant-
Colonel Erskine Crum.
Item 1
THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
his excellency the viceroy said that he had shown the draft statement1
on the Reconstitution of the Interim Government to Pandit Nehru and Sardar
Patel the previous day. Pandit Nehru had raised no objections to this statement,
but Sardar Patel’s first reactions had not been so favourable.
Amendments to this statement were suggested, and approved by the
viceroy.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:
(i) directed Pers. Sec. to send a copy of this statement, as redrafted, to Pandit
Nehru;
(ii) directed the Reforms Commissioner to draft an Order-in-Council on the
Reconstitution of the Interim Government ;
(hi) directed P.S.V. to prepare a note on this subject for the next Cabinet
Meeting, together with letters to Pandit Nehru and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan.
JULY 1947
113
Item 5
THE POST-REFERENDUM PROBLEM IN THE N.W.F.P.
(v.C.P. 126)
A letter2 from the Governor of the N.W.F.P. was discussed. This letter con¬
tained an appreciation of the courses open in connection with the Government
of the N.W.F.P. after the result of the referendum was known, his
excellency said that it was clear to him that, if the N.W.F.P. opted for
Pakistan, he should in this matter act on the advice of the embryo Pakistan
Government which was to be set up. This was yet another reason for recon¬
stituting the Interim Government as quickly as possible.
mr scott suggested that a copy of the Governor’s appreciation should be
given to Mr Jinnah. the viceroy approved this suggestion, but asked Mr
Scott to ensure that there was nothing in the letter which was unsuitable for
this purpose.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY
(i) decided, in connection with the post-referendum problem in the
N.W.F.P., that he would act on the advice of the embryo Pakistan Govern¬
ment, which was to be set up ;
(ii) directed D.P.S.V. to ensure that there was nothing in V.C.P. 126 which
should not be shown to Mr Jinnah; and decided, if there was not, to give
a copy of this paper to Mr jinnah.
1 See Enclosure to No. 63.
2 V.C.P. 126 is the letter from the Governor of the N.W.F.P. at No. 45.
Government of India , Press Information Bureau to India Office
Telegram, LjP &J/ io\8i : f 15
I. AND B. DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 12 July I947
No. B.496. Final decisions have now been reached by the Partition Council
regarding the allotment of units of the Armed Forces between the future
Governments of India and Pakistan, says a communique. Reconstitution of the
Armed Forces will proceed in two stages. The decisions now arrived at refer to
the first stage, namely, “a rough and ready division on a communal basis”.
These decisions will by no means prejudice the second stage, namely, “the
combing out of units on a basis of the voluntary transfer of individuals”.
These decisions are based on the unanimous recommendations of the
Armed Forces Reconstitution Sub-Committee and the Armed Forces Recon¬
struction Committee. Recommendations regarding reconstitution of the Royal
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
114
Indian Air Force and some units of the Indian Army have not yet been made by
the Partition Council.
Following will eventually be the division of the ships of the Royal Indian
Navy:
India: All existing landing craft and 32 ships, of which there will
be 4 sloops, 2 frigates, 12 minesweepers, 1 corvette, 1 survey
vessel, 4 trawlers, 4 motor minesweepers and 4 harbour
defence motor launches.
Pakistan: 16 ships including 2 sloops, 2 frigates, 4 minesweepers,
2 trawlers, 2 motor minesweepers and 4 harbour defence
motor launches.
Indian Army: India is allotted 15 Infantry regiments, 12 Armoured Corps
units, i8| Artillery regiments and 61 Engineer units.
Pakistan: 8 Infantry regiments, 6 Armoured Corps units,
8| Artillery regiments and 34 Engineer units.
In allotting ships, infantry, armoured corps, artillery etc., the requirements
of each Dominion have been kept in view and care taken to see that the actual
allotment results in each Dominion getting its fair share.
78
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Gandhi
Rhl 1 194: f 29
12 July 1947
Dear Mr Gandhi,
Thank you for your letter of the nth,1 which by a coincidence arrived the
same day as the reply2 from the Maharaja of Kashmir which I enclose.
He reiterates the views he so strongly expressed to me when I was in Kashmir
and which I passed on to you: “A tiny spark, in spite of the best intentions in the
world, may set alight a conflagration which it would be impossible to control”.
As I told you, the Maharaja was strongly opposed to any Muslim League
leader coming to Kashmir, and I had asked Mr. jinnahnotto go or send anyone.
The Maharaja always told me he would make up his mind about joining one
side or the other as soon as he could see what the respective constitutions were
going to be like and could gauge the feelings of his people.
I am of course prepared to send any reply you would wish to the Maharaja,
either by letter at some length or if you would prefer it by telegram through
the Resident.
JULY T947
115
I understand that you contemplated a visit to Noakhali. Would you like me
to return to the charge and urge acceptance of your visit immediately after the
Noakhali visit, or do you feel it is urgent that you should go before?
I repeat I place myself at your service at this moment, but feel you may like
to discuss the actual wording of the reply with me. I will therefore arrange for
one of my Staff to ring up and find out whether you would like to have a
meeting today or tomorrow.
Yours very sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 This letter read: ‘I am still without any news from Kashmir. I wonder if you can remind the Maharaja.
II I was not bound by any promise made to you, of course I would not want any permission to go to
Kashmir. I would simply go as any private person.’ R/3/1/94: f 24.
2 Enclosure to No. 4.
Sardar Baldev Singh to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rl3li/83:f85
IMMEDIATE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 12 July 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I thank you for your letter of yesterday’s date1 enclosing a copy of the Statement
you propose to issue regarding the retention of British personnel of Armed
Forces. I showed it to Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru when I met him. I did so because
when we had discussed the matter in our meeting2 with Your Excellency, Mr
Jinnah had said that it should be shown to the leaders of both the Parties before
it was issued. I hope therefore that my showing it to Pt. Nehru was in order.
Pt. Nehru has sent me a copy of his letter3 to you in this connexion. I have
explained to him that the employment of British officers is not for an indefinite
period and that, as a fact, the terms clearly indicate that the employment will
be for a year subject to three months’ notice, except where the Dominion
concerned would offer employment for a longer period.
I have no particular objection to the issue of the proposed statement. In
order, however, to meet the views of Pt. Nehru, it would be better if the new
terms were also released simultaneously with the statement.4
1 See No. 64, note 1.
2 No record of this meeting has been traced. However, at a meeting ol the Partition Council on 5 July
it was agreed that Lord Mountbatten should, at his discretion, be empowered to appeal to British
officers to volunteer their services, and that the names of Pandit Nehru and Mr Jinnah might be linked
with this appeal. Mountbatten undertook to show the two leaders the text ot this appeal before he made
it. Mountbatten Papers, Partition Council Minutes, 5 July 1947, Case No. P.C. 18/3/47. See also No.
65, para. 11.
3 No. 69.
4 A note on the file dated 16 July by Sir C. Abell states that he had verified from G.H.Q. that it was the
intention to issue the appeal and the new terms simultaneously. R/3/1/83: t 99.
n6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
As regards our policy of nationalisation and in particular immediate pro¬
motion of some senior Indian officers, I have already written5 to you separately
and I am glad to note that you are taking it up with the C-in-C.
Yours sincerely,
BALDEV SINGH6
5 Not traced.
6 Lord Mountbatten replied on 16 July referring to the interview between Sir A. Smith and Pandit
Nehru (No. 88) and saying that he thought the points which Pandit Nehru had raised in No. 69 were
now clear. R/3/1/83: f 100.
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel , Dr Rajendra Prasad , Sardar Baldev Singh, Mr M. A. Jinnah
Rl3M83:f86
12 July 1947
With reference to my letter of nth July,1 I am forwarding herewith a copy of
the statement2 in the form in which it will be issued to the British officers and
men serving in India. It is not being issued to the press, but is being sent out by
air to all Commands in India for distribution as necessary.
★
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA3
* to Mr. Jinnah only: You will see that I have included in the second para¬
graph the small addition4 which you suggested.
Enclosure to No. 80
Rfa/i/fy:/ 88
THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 12 July 1947
TO ALL BRITISH SERVICE PERSONNEL IN INDIA
The Indian Army Forces have now to be reconstituted in accordance with the
policy agreed by the Indian leaders. All concerned are convinced that British
officers are needed for the period during which the Armed Forces are being
divided and reconstituted.
The Commander-in-Chief and Senior Officers of all three Services at
Defence Headquarters are staying on for this period. The Commander-in-
Chief, who is assuming the title Supreme Commander, will be responsible
under the general direction of the Joint Defence Council of the two Dominions
for reconstituting the Armed Forces. At the invitation of Pandit Nehru and
JULY I947
117
Mr. Jinnah, I have willingly accepted the Chairmanship of this Joint Defence
Council as an independent Chairman. The Supreme Commander will continue
to be advised by the existing Naval, Army and Air Staffs. When the task is done
the Supreme Commander and these other British officers will go, but others
will be required to see the Defence Forces of the two Dominions firmly
established.
The strain which will be thrown on Officers of the Indian Services in
carrying out this reconstitution, in addition to ordinary adminstration and
training, will be considerable and if a large number of highly trained and
experienced British Officers are suddenly removed the risk of a serious break¬
down will be very real.
Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah have expressed the desire and hope that the
requisite number of British Officers and Other Ranks, including technical
specialists, will stay on. I share their feeling and hope that available British
personnel will volunteer, although I want it to be clearly understood that no
one will be compelled to serve on if he does not wish to do so.
The terms and conditions of service under which British Officers and Other
Ranks will be asked to volunteer have been approved by the representatives
of both the new Dominions and by me, and His Majesty’s Government in the
United Kingdom have concurred. These terms will be published immediately.
I shall be proud to be associated with those who will stay on and help in this
great task.
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 No. 64, note 1. 2 See Enclosure.
3 A note on the file copy indicates that copies of this letter, together with the enclosed statement, were
sent out on 13 July.
4 See No. 64, note 3.
Note by Sir G. Abell 1
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab,
Situation in, Part II ( b )
THE PUNJAB
12 July lgqy
GENERAL
I had a long talk with the Governor of the Punjab last night and I attach at
Annexure i2 a copy of a very brief appreciation of the situation which he
prepared. There is no doubt that the Sikhs are in a dangerous mood and Giani
1 This note was circulated as V.C.P. 128 of 13 July.
2 See Enclosure.
1 1 8
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Kartar Singh, who saw the Governor on the ioth July, practically delivered an
ultimatum to the effect that the Sikhs would not accept the notional boundaries
and would go in for guerilla warfare after 15th August. I attach at Annexure II3
an interview note which shows how very frank the Giani was about the Sikhs
intentions.
THE POSSIBILITY OF A MINISTRY
I discussed this subject very fully with the Governor. I was surprised to find
to what an extent the representatives of the successor authorities are already
consulted and allowed to have their way about all matters other than law and
order. For instance, all proposals for transfer of assets of the Punjab Government
of any kind, all transfers of personnel, all important contracts, all expenditure
over Rs. 5,000, all leases of land and so on are referred to the Steering Com¬
mittee and they consult their principals (i.e. the League and the Congress)
wherever necessary. Thus the position is that the parties are fully in touch
except over law and order. The difficulty about law and order is that the pro¬
blem relates primarily to Lahore and Amritsar. These, and especially Lahore,
are disputed cities. If even regional ministries are secured, Lahore has to be
handed over to the care of the Muslim League group and since the Sikhs
absolutely refuse to accept the notional boundary the result would inevitably
be a major explosion. Similarly, there would probably be serious trouble in
Amritsar if the Congress and the Sikhs took over law and order in that city
before the Boundary Commission has reported.
I came away, therefore, convinced that in present circumstances and in the
absence of any effective demand for any form of Ministry it is necessary to
leave things for the time being as they are.4
PARTITION WORK
The Governor considers this is going ahead very slowly but it is more
advanced than in Bengal. Decisions are practically complete about the
splitting up of the Services and a settlement has been reached about joint
institutions. Now that an agreement has been reached at the Centre over the
High Court this also will present no difficulty. There is, however, no settlement
yet about the division of assets and this is the hard part of the work. Un¬
doubtedly there will be a great many loose ends on the 15 th August but, subject
to one point which I mention below, I think it will be possible for a new
Government to be set up.
REFERENCES TO ARBITRATION
There is a deadlock in the Partition Council and the Parties wish to refer the
dispute, on the lines of the following issues, to the Central Arbitral
Tribunal which has not yet been set up.
1. Should the partition proceedings continue on the basis of the notional
JULY 1947
119
boundary or should they be stayed pending report of the Boundary
Commission?
2. On the assumption that they should proceed on the basis of the notional
boundary should both Governments be located in Lahore until the
Boundary Commission passes its award?
3. On the same assumption, what arrangement should be made for the
interim administration of districts in dispute?
BOUNDARY COMMISSION
The reservation to which I referred above is about the unwillingness of the
Sikhs and the Hindus to set up a Government at all, except in Lahore, on 15th
August. They consider that to move from Lahore would prejudice their claim
to the city and they absolutely refuse to recognise the notional boundaries.
The Governor’s view is that there is something in the claims of the Sikhs to a
part of the fertile colony land of Montgomery District, since they were pioneers
in establishing the new canal colonies in the District and in Lyallpur. If this
could be arranged he thinks a settlement out of court with the Muslim League
might be possible. The Governor is convinced that the Boundary Commis¬
sion will not be able to produce an award which will solve the problem
except by negotiations out of court. He is also convinced that if there is no
compromise the Boundary Commission will not be able to finish their work
by 15th August.
RECOMMENDATIONS
H. E. the Governor agrees with the following recommendations :
I. There should for the present be no attempt to form a Ministry.
2. Y.E. or a member of your staff should tackle Mr Jinnah and ask him
whether the Muslim League would not be prepared to negotiate out of
Court with the Sikhs in order to prevent the confusion and bloodshed
which is probable otherwise. In particular he should be asked whether the
League would consider offering voluntarily some territory in Mont¬
gomery District so as to facilitate a transfer of population and property.
3. Y.E. should talk to Pandit Nehru or Sardar Patel and persuade them that
it is essential to get the Congress and the Sikhs to drop their claim to stay
in Lahore and to hold up all the partition proceedings until the Boundary
Commission reports, even if the report comes in after the 15th August.
Every attempt would be made to get an early award but meanwhile the
3 See No. 56, and its Enclosure.
4 In telegram No. 1971-S of 15 July, Sir G. Abell informed Sir E. Jenkins that Lord Mountbatten agreed
that there was no need to attempt at present to form a Ministry. Mountbatten Papers, Official Corres¬
pondence Files: Punjab, Situation in, Part 11(b).
120
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
partition work must go on and it is part of the plan which was accepted
by the Congress that until the award is made the notional boundaries
would be observed.
Enclosure to No. 81
governor’s appreciation
11 July 1947
(1) The communal feeling is now unbelievably bad. In the Ambala Division,
outside Gurgaon, the Muslims seem resigned to their fate, and the same is
probably true of the non-Muslims in the Rawalpindi Division and in Dera
Ghazi Khan, Muzaffargarh, Multan and Jhang. In the Lyallpur and Mont¬
gomery districts and the Lahore and Jullundur Divisions tension is extremely
high.
(2) The Sikhs are the most uneasy of the three communities. They believe
that they will be expropriated and possibly massacred in the Western Punjab
and smothered by the Congress and the Hindus generally in the Eastern Punjab.
They threaten a violent rising immediately after the transfer of power unless
by then there has been a satisfactory award by the Boundary Commission.
(3) The higher Services have virtually disintegrated. They were given the
final blow by the partition policy, which turned professional civil servants into
subordinate politicians. In the I.C.S. not one non-Muslim Indian is prepared to
serve in West Punjab, and only one Muslim is prepared to serve in East
Punjab. Hatred and suspicion are entirely undisguised.
(4) Partition goes very slowly indeed. Meetings of the Partition Committee
resemble a Peace Conference with a new war in sight. In the time available it
will be quite impossible to make a clean job of partition, and even if we can
check disorder up to 15th August, and the new Governments can maintain
themselves thereafter, there will be appalling confusion. In civil administration
certain things cannot be done properly in a matter of days or weeks, and
“standstill” orders (most of which will be accepted very grudgingly by the
Parties) do not really solve the administrative problem.
(5) From mid-July onwards many new officers will be posted to key appoint¬
ments, and the new Governments will face the critical time in August with
Secretariat and District teams even weaker than those which we have had
during the past year or two. There will be much wrangling about postings
since the non-Muslims are unwilling to commit themselves until the Boundary
Commission reports.
(6) The Chairman of the Boundary Commission does not arrive until 14th
July. His colleagues have given the Punjab Government an enormous question-
JULY 1947
121
naire, the replies to which cannot at the earliest be ready before about 20th
July. Thereafter, if all the information collected is to be studied and transferred
to special maps and if the parties are to be heard at any length (they have
engaged very eminent counsel), it is difficult to see how the Commission can
report by 15th August.
(7) If the Commission does report by 15 th August, there will in all probabi¬
lity be a row because the Muslims or the Sikhs are not satisfied with the report.
If the Commission does not report by 15 th August, there will be a row because
the Sikhs do not like the “notional ” boundary.
(8) The prospect is in short far from encouraging, but we can only go ahead
and see what happens.
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
and Mr Jinnah
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy’s Interview No. 162
12 July 1947, 6-7.50 pm
I discussed the Reconstitution of the Interim Government with him and gave
him a copy of the draft communique.1 He did not appear particularly grateful
and said in his usual manner “I will consider this with my people”. I pointed
out the only alternative was the scheme I had previously described to him, of
giving all portfolios to Congress and giving only a Shadow Cabinet to the
Muslim League. He told me that he had considered this with his Members of
the Executive Council and they had decided that they would in no circum¬
stances co-operate with or even accept such a scheme. I pointed out to him how
lucky he was that I had been able to find an alternative, as it was no longer in
his power to prevent me putting through any scheme I liked under Clause 9
of the Bill. I informed him of my interview with the Hyderabad Delegation,2
and told him of the lines I was working on. He informed me that if Congress
attempted to exert any pressure on Hyderabad, every Muslim throughout the
whole of India, yes, all the hundred million Muslims, would rise as one man
to defend the oldest Muslim dynasty in India.
I pointed out that the Nizam need not fear any armed intervention since
if he would not play at all with Congress, all they had to do was not to play
with him, which could only end in the quiet disruption of the dynasty from
1 See Enclosure to No. 63 and its note 8.
2 No. 61.
122
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
within, without any opportunity being given to the hundred million Muslims
to rise.
I discussed the policy to be adopted towards the States by the two Dominion
Governments, and asked his concurrence to call a meeting with the Khan of
Kalat on the 19th July, to put before him the proposition that he should adhere
to Pakistan on the basis of the three central subjects — Defence, External Affairs
and Communications.
He thanked me, said he would like to think this proposition over, and he
would be glad to meet the Khan of Kalat after my meeting. I told him I
intended to discuss the line Pakistan wished me to take up with the States with
Sardar Nishtar in the coming week.
Mr. Jinnah then informed me that he was considering making Nishtar
Governor of Baluchistan. I suggested that he should not take any such step
until he had discussed the matter with Sir Conrad Corfield, on the basis of
obtaining his advice as to whether a Pathan from the North-West Frontier
like Nishtar, would be acceptable to the tribes of Baluchistan, and alternatively
discussed which of the British political officers would be the most suitable to
put there. I gave him a copy of the Secretary of State’s telegram No. 8962,
announcing the acceptance by Sir George Cunningham of the governorship
of the N.W.F.P., subject to certain conditions.3 I asked him to let me know
as soon as possible that he accepted the conditions.
I informed him that the Foreign Office had now authorised negotiations to
begin with Lord Killearn, and that I had that day telegraphed4 him to Singapore
to come and stay with me at Delhi to discuss the governorship of East Bengal
and Sylhet with Mr. Jinnah.
I then handed Mr. Jinnah the original letter,5 d. 0.201 of the nth July, from
Vice-Admiral Miles, concerning candidates for the future Flag Officer, Royal
Pakistan Navy. I invited Mr. Jinnah to send for Admiral Miles and discuss
this letter with him, and if necessary, subsequently to arrange for the two
officers concerned to come and see him. I asked him whether he had made up
his mind about the Pakistan Dominion flag, and he told me that it was his
great personal regret that he had been unable to find one single supporter for
the idea of having a Union Jack in the upper canton of the Muslim League
flag. He explained that it would be repugnant to the religious feelings of the
Muslims to have a flag with a Christian cross alongside the crescent. I told him
that so far as the Navy was concerned, I considered that they would have to
fly the British Commonwealth white ensign at the ensign staff, but that they
could fly their Pakistan flag (whether it had a Jack in it or not) at the Jack staff.
I told him that this was the custom throughout the navies of the Common¬
wealth, and I hoped he would agree so that I could give Admiral Miles the
necessary instructions. He replied “Certainly”. He then raised with me the
question of his G.C.M.G.,6 and said that he had been surprised to fmd the
JULY 1947
123
strength of the opposition among his party to accepting this honour. He
pointed out that the Muslim League had only recently passed a resolution7
rejecting all British honours and that his followers considered that he would put
himself in an impossible position if he now accepted a British honour.
He wished me to know how much he personally regretted this, and how
much he hoped that the time would come in the not too distant future when
he would be able to bring about a change of heart among his followers, and
when not only he, but he hoped others in Pakistan who might have rendered
distinguished service, would be prepared to accept British honours and
decorations. I told him I would raise this with him again at a later date, wherever
I might be. He then went on to say that although there might be these apparent
rebuffs of the British, such as the Governor-General, the G.C.M.G., the flag,
etc., they would find that Pakistan intended to be a loyal and permanent
member of the Commonwealth whose friendly relations with the rest of the
British Dominions would improve year by year, until all feeling of bitter¬
ness had passed and they could regard themselves as truly a member of
the British family.
I asked him whether he would agree to fly the generally accepted flag of a
Governor-General, namely a dark blue flag with the letters “Pakistan” in
yellow and a yellow crown above, both for Government House and his car,
and hoist in a warship if he went afloat, He said he would be honoured to do
this and I undertook to supply him with his first flag.
(note : — The question of what flag the Governors in Pakistan are to fly, was
not discussed but will require urgent consideration.)
I talked to him from the brief8 prepared by P.S.V. consequent on his visit
to the Governor of the Punjab, and urged Mr. Jinnah to try for a settlement
of the boundary difficulties out of court, with the Sikhs. He was not very hope¬
ful, but said he was fully prepared to stick to his original promise to me to
meet Giani Kartar Singh, and I undertook to get in touch with the latter and
arrange for his meeting with Mr. Jinnah.
Finally, I discussed the position in the N.W.F.P.9 Mr. Jinnah was jubilant.
He pointed out that whereas in the last election only 62% of the electorate went
to the poll, and that Dr. Khan Sahib had said to newspaper correspondents that
anything over 31% would be regarded as a Muslim League victory, he now
believed that they might get as much as 75%. I asked him what he suggested I
should do on the 21st July, when the result of the referendum was announced.
Mr. Jinnah said he had not yet given the matter any thought, but favoured a
dismissal of the Ministry and Section 93 . 1 told him I was dead against Section 93 ,
3 See No. 31, para. 5 and its notes 6 and 7.
4 Lord Killearn eventually declined the governorship of East Bengal; see Vol. XI, No. 478, note 3.
5 Not traced. 6 See Vol. XI, No. 533, para. 3.
7 See Vol. VIII, No. 86, Resolution No. 2. 8 No. 81.
9 cf. No. 45.
124
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
which would merely get the British in [the] wrong during the last four weeks
of power. Mr. Jinnah asked me if I would be prepared to put a Muslim League
Ministry in power, and on my saying “Yes”, he commented “But how can we
stay in power if we have not got a majority in the Legislative Assembly?”
I pointed out that the Legislative Assembly had not been called and was not
due to be called in the near future and that after 15th August the matter could
be referred to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly which would then be the
legislature for the Dominion.
Finally, I said I was not prepared to dismiss Dr. Khan Sahib’s Ministry if they
refused to resign, or to form a Muslim League Ministry except on the advice
of my Cabinet or Executive Council for Pakistan. I pointed out how fortunate
it was for Mr. Jinnah that I intended to form such a body on the 18th July,
since otherwise he might well find Dr. Khan Sahib’s Ministry remaining in
power until the 15th August.
Finally, I discussed with him the question of the King’s signature. I told him
that I had felt that he had acted rather ungraciously at the Partition Council1 0
in opposing the suggestion which I had put up and which had already been
privately agreed to by the Congress Leaders. Namely, that the King should
continue to sign “George R.I.” after he had dropped the title “Emperor of
India”. Mr. Jinnah said that he was the last person to wish to dictate to His
Majesty how he should sign his name and if the King elected to continue
to sign his name “George R.I.” no-one in Pakistan would object. If, however,
it was a question of asking Pakistan to agree to invite the King to continue with
a legally incorrect signature, that was another matter and one on which he
hoped I would not press him. We therefore mutally agreed that I would recall
the Minutes of the Partition Council dealing with this matter and that I would
inform the Congress Leaders what had occurred and suggest that they also
take no further action and leave it to His Majesty to continue to sign in any
way he pleased.
10 See No. 52, Case No. P.C. 28/4/47.
JULY I947
125
83
Sir F. Bourne ( Central Provinces and Berar ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mountbatten of Burma (. Extract )
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Central Provinces
and Berar , Situation in
D.O. NO. N.16/G.C.P. governor’s CAMP, CENTRAL PROVINCES
AND BERAR, 12 July I947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
There is not much happening on the surface, as the Chief Secretary’s report1
shows. The casualties as a result of the quarrels mentioned in paragraph 2 of his
report were all Muslims, and though these quarrels were personal and not
communal in origin, the fact that there were no repercussions in a place like
Jubbulpore supports my view that any apprehensions of Muslims resorting to
direct action in this Province are entirely baseless. The danger, if any, is the
other way round, and I have recently seen reports of most offensive speeches
made by Hindu Socialist and Mahasabha speakers. The Ministry, however, are
perfectly confident of their power to restrain Hindu violence but regard every
Muslim as a Pakistani. This has led them to transfer all senior Muslim officers
in the Civil Service and Police from Berar (and even European officers except
the Commissioner), and they are now trying to transfer nearly all, if not all,
Muslim Inspectors and a large number of Muslim Sub-Inspectors of Police.
This manifestation of their distrust of Muslim officers is, I think, most un¬
fortunate and, actually, entirely unjustified by past history. It is true that the
Muslim element in the Police is very much higher than strict attention to
communal statistics in the Province warrants, but the Police force as a whole
has worked with the greatest loyalty to the present Government and I do
not remember to have heard of a single case where a Police officer can be
shown to have been diverted from his duty by communal considerations.
There is, however, a lot of talk particularly in Mahasabha circles of the need for
reduction in the Muslim element of all Services and as a result, I suppose, of
pressure of this nature the Premier has expressed the intention of dispensing
with the services of all Muslims recruited to the Special Armed Force or the
District Police on a temporary basis who are not residents of this Province.
★ ★ ★
1 L/P&J/5/196: ff 18-19.
12 6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
84
Sir F. Burrows [Bengal) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Bengal,
Situation in, Part I (b)
CONFIDENTIAL CALCUTTA, 12 July 1947 , 6. JO pm
Received: 13 July, 8.30 am
No. 202-C. It has for some time been apparent that the Calcutta Disturbances
Enquiry Commission,1 set up by Govt, of Bengal with assistance of your
predecessor and presided over by Chief Justice of India, would never complete
its work. Political parties at last took a realistic view and acquiesced in a proposal
to adjourn sine die when reassembled on July 8th. Chief Justice of India then
advised me to dissolve the Commission. To this both sides of my Cabinet have
agreed. Chief Justice has asked for a short time to clear up loose ends and my
intention is to dissolve the Commission as from August 1st, date suggested by
him in consultation with Bengal Govt. Dept, concerned. This will release
Chief Justice almost immediately for his other responsibilities.
1 Vol. VIII, No. 223, note 2.
85
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl ofListowel
Telegram, Rff/i {138: f 131
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 12 July 1Q47, 7.3O pm
confidential Received : 12 July, 8.30 pm
No. 1920-P. Your telegram1 No. 8807 of 9th July. General Conference between
States Department and representatives of States does not take place till 25th
July. First item on agenda2 for conference is Accession of States to appropriate
Dominion in respect of Defence, External Affairs and Communications on
basis of Part II Govt, of India Act 1935 as adapted.
2. If conference is successful problems relating to international position of
States after 15th August will be automatically resolved. Any attempt made in
Parliament to define position of States not acceding to Dominion in respect
of External Affairs would I suggest be premature and might indeed prejudice
successful outcome of discussions here.
3. I have already had preliminary discussions3 with Hyderabad Delegation
and prepared the ground for adherence on Defence and External Affairs.
JULY I947
127
4. States Dept, consider that it will greatly facilitate success of negotiations
if H.M.G. would make it clear that in the interests of States as well as of India
as a whole the States should come to arrangements with appropriate Dominion.
States Dept, suggest it should be made clear that States’ External Relations will
have to be conducted through one or other of the Dominions and no en¬
couragement should be given to any State to believe that if it stands out alone
it will receive recognition as a Dominion by H.M.G.
1 Lord Listowel evidently assumed that the conference would take place before the 25 July. In this
telegram he informed Lord Mountbatten that the question of the international position of the States
was likely to arise in the Lords during the following week and thus asked to be kept informed about
the ‘results’ of the conference. L/P &J/10/102: f 27.
2 See No. 75. 3 See No. 61.
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
L/P &JI 10 1 127: f 104
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 12 July 1947, 10. 45 pm
Received: 12 July, 9.10 pm
No. 1926-S. I must warn you that Jinnah has told draftsmen who are preparing
adaptation orders that he would prefer adaptation order for Pakistan to be
based on the Ninth Schedule rather than on Part II of 1935 Act.
2. The effect of this will be apparent to you. Adaptation based on the Ninth
Schedule would give Governor-General the following powers among others.
(1) To appoint members of Government
(2) to settle number of members
(3) to appoint a vice-president
(4) to overrule majority opinion of Government
(5) to frame rules of business.
3. The adaptation order would also have to be based on assumption that
Governor-General would ordinarily preside at Cabinet meetings.
4. Thus Governor-General would effectively be his own Prime Minister,
but with special powers. This would give Jinnah position of a dictator.
5. Two alternative adaptation orders have been prepared, one on basis of
Ninth Schedule (but omitting power to overrule a majority decision), and the
other based on Part 2 of the Act.
6. I should be grateful for advice what I should do in the event of Jinnah
128
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
insisting that the adaptation order should be based on the Ninth Schedule,
whether with or without the overruling power.
7. I am very doubtful about approving an Order in Council of this kind
before August 15th, but there must be some adaptation order, and it would be
embarrassing to adopt the alternative against the advice of Moslem League who
will certainly support Jinnah.
8. I take it this matter might cause embarrassment in Parliament, and that
you will want to consult Cabinet, but I should be grateful for a very early
reply as time is short.
87
Extract from India News
LIP&SI13I1845B: f 618
GOVT OF INDIA, NEW DELHI, 13 July I947
MR JINNAH ON KASHMIR SITUATION
Mr. Jinnah in a statement on the Kashmir situation says that the question en¬
gaging the Kashmir Muslims’ attention is whether Kashmir is going to join the
Constituent Assembly of Hindustan or Pakistan. Stating that he has made it
clear more than once that the Indian States are free to join either Assembly or
remain Independent, Mr. Jinnah says “I have no doubt that the Maharaja and
the Kashmir Government will give their closest attention and consideration to
this matter and realise the interests not only of the Ruler but also of his people”.
Those States who wish to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, Mr. Jinnah
adds, “will find us ready and willing to negotiate with them an agreement of
mutual advantage to both”.
Referring to the detention1 of Muslim Conference Leaders in Kashmir Mr.
Jinnah says that there is no justification for their continued detention. “I hope”,
he goes on, “the Maharaja and the Prime Minister of Kashmir will realise the
fast changing circumstances. Wisdom demands that feelings and sentiments of
the Muslims who form 80 per cent of the population should not be ignored,
much less hurt”.
1 See Vol. VII, No. 364.
JULY I947
129
Record of Interview between Pandit Nehru and Sir A. Smith with reference
to the letter dated 1 1 July 1 written by Pandit Nehru to the Viceroy
Rl3li/83:ff 90-91
secret 13 July ig47
1. Pandit Nehru did not seem to understand the sequence of events regarding
the progress of nationalisation. He had forgotten that the Indian Cabinet, some
weeks ago, agreed that rapid nationalisation to effect completion by June 48,
should be stopped, and that we should revert to the normal rate of nationalisa¬
tion.2 I explained to him that it was quite impossible both to reconstitute the
Armed Forces and to proceed with rapid nationalisation at the same time.
Pandit Nehru insisted that Indian officers should be promoted to the highest
ranks. I explained to him the need for centralised control regarding promo¬
tion and moves, and that this was a matter which he should discuss with the
Commander-in-Chief designate of (the Union of) India, and that it would be
necessary to balance up the national demands to have Indian Generals, with the
practical necessity of having senior British officers in the most responsible posts
during the early stages of reconstitution.
2. Out of this discussion emerged the fact that Pandit Nehru did not appear
fully to have grasped that operational control of the Army in (the Union of)
India would be the responsibility of the Dominion Government and not of the
Supreme Commander after August 15th. He referred to possible trouble in
Calcutta, and I explained to him the system of command that would obtain
there after the 15th August.
Following this, I outlined to him the practical difficulty that might arise
should disorder break out after 15 August on the frontier between Hindustan
and Pakistan, and told him that a proposal3 had been submitted to the Viceroy
whereby the Joint Defence Council, on behalf of the two Dominion Govern¬
ments, should ask the Supreme Commander to appoint a senior British
officer and adequate staff to take control of any “disturbed area.” In such
event operational control would have to be exercised by the Supreme
Commander on behalf of the Joint Defence Council. Pandit Nehru seemed
to think that such an arrangement would be temporarily necessary.
3. We discussed the retention of British officers and technical specialists, and
I emphasised that, from reports received, it seemed unlikely that British
personnel would be willing to volunteer. I explained the reasons for this, and
Pandit Nehru expressed the view that attacks on British Officers in the Press
1 No. 69. 2 Vol. XI, No. 354, Item iv. 3 See No. 102.
130
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
had lessened considerably of late. I told him it was not just a question of public
attacks in the Press, but of other pin pricks which British officers suffered,
(I had in mind the recent accusation by HMD4 of certain senior officers at
GHQ in connection with the issue of arms to States Forces and Police,5 but I
did not mention that HMD’s attitude was a case in point). I told Pandit Nehru
that, undoubtedly British officers would take a statement from Indian leaders
themselves of their indebtedness to the British officers and their hope that they
will continue to assist during the early period of reconstitution.
4. I referred to Pandit Nehru’s statement that he would have “liked the
Armed Forces Reorganisation Committee also to have senior Indian officers
associated with it”.6
I explained that, while the main AFR Committee had no Indian Officers on
it, there was a representative of both (the Union of) India and Pakistan: that this
had been agreed by the Partition Council, and if they had wanted Indian
Officers on this Committee, they should have said so earlier. I added, however,
that the detailed work concerning reconstitution lay with the Sub Committees,
and explained that, in the case of the Army Sub Committee, there were six
Indian officers as against four British. I also emphasised that, whereas the main
work of the present GHQ was to “break down” the Army, the main respon¬
sibility for “building up” the new armies would rest with the Commander s-in-
Chief of the two Dominions. It was, therefore, sound gradually to make the
diminishing GHQ consist mostly of British Officers so that more Indian
officers would be available for administrative and command posts in the armies
of (the Union of) India and Pakistan.
5. With reference to Pandit Nehru’s statement7 that a number of Senior
officers and others employed in the Defence Department have opted for service
in Pakistan, I pointed out this was not true as regards officers of the Armed
Forces as no replies had yet been received from Indian officers stating whether
they wished to serve (the Union of) India or Pakistan.
6. The interview started rather stickily, but as confidence was gained our
conversation became extremely easy. The interview lasted over an hour and
ended in the most friendly way, and, I hope, helped to reassure Pandit Nehru
that every action being taken in regard to reconstitution was being done on
sound lines and with complete integrity of purpose.
ARTHUR SMITH
4 Sardar Baldev Singh. 5 cf. Appendix ‘A’ to No. 66. 6 No. 69, para. 5.
7 Ibid., para. 6.
JULY I947
131
89
Sir E. Jenkins [Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma1
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Part II (b)
NO. 695 GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 1J July ig4J
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
As Chairman of the Punjab Partition Committee I submit for Your Excellency’s
consideration memoranda2 prepared by the representatives of West Punjab and
East Punjab upon certain matters in respect of which they are unable to agree.
I have endeavoured to set out the issues requiring decision in a covering note
of my own.3
2. The Punjab Partition Committee considered at an early meeting the dis¬
tribution between the two new Provinces of members of the various Civil
Services. For the fifth meeting on 7th July Mr Zahid Husain, a representative
of West Punjab, circulated a note in wdiich he suggested that, once officials
had been allotted, their posting within West Punjab or East Punjab should
be a matter not for the Committee, but for the representatives of West Punjab
or East Punjab, as the case might be, in consultation with the Governor. This
suggestion was accepted, but Sardar Swaran Singh, a representative of East
Punjab, observed that since the “notional” boundary was not final, special
arrangements would have to be made for the administration of districts likely
to be affected by the Boundary Commission’s award; and that it would be
necessary for both Governments and their offices to remain in Lahore until the
award was made.
These observations were discussed further at meetings on 9th and 10th July.
The following are extracts from the proceedings : —
“Before the Agenda was taken up, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Daultana
raised the questions referred to in item 6(a) and (b) of the record of decisions
of the 5th meeting of the Punjab Partition Committee held on the 7th of
July. As no agreement could be arrived at, it was decided that the matter
should be referred to the Party Representatives/Partition Council at the
Centre. The points at issue were as follows —
On the assumption that the Boundary Commission’s award is not
available by the 15th of August, and the present Independence Bill before
the Parliament is enacted into law,
(i) Should the Government of Eastern Punjab be permitted to remain
in Lahore and to administer Eastern Punjab from Lahore as headquarters or
should it move to a place in Eastern Punjab?
1 This letter was circulated as V.C.P. 129 of 14 July.
2 Not printed. 3 See Appendix ‘A’; cf. also No. 81.
132
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(ii) What arrangements will be made for the administration of disputed
areas and institutions situated therein? It was stated by the two Parties that
the districts affected would be Ferozepore, Hoshiarpur, Jullundur,
Ludhiana, Gurdaspur, Lahore, Sheikhupura, Gujranwala, Amritsar,
Montgomery, Lyallpur and Multan. It was agreed that both the Parties
will state their cases separately”.
“A draft covering note for Central Partition Council arising out of the
discussion held on 9th July 1947, which had been prepared by H.E. the
Governor and circulated to the members the previous evening, was
considered. In the list of districts likely to be affected by the orders passed
on the Report of the Boundary Commission, it was decided that Hissar,
Sialkot and Ludhiana should be added. Both sides will state their cases,
which will be forwarded with a covering note from H.E. the Governor to
the Governor-General for the decision of the Party Leaders at the Centre.
As the boundary between the two parts of the Punjab was to be the bound¬
ary between the two Dominions, it was felt that the matter was within the
competence of the Central Partition Council.”
Since no agreement was reached, it was decided that a reference should be
made to Your Excellency for decision by the Partition Council or the Party
Leaders. The representatives of West Punjab and East Punjab have made it clear
that they are prepared to abide by such a decision.
3 . The issues as stated in my covering note are based on the assumption that
the award of the Boundary Commission is not available by 15th August.
There are two other possible assumptions : —
(i) that the award is available by 15th August, but within so short a time
before that date that it is not possible to make the adjustments required
by the award by 15th August; and
(ii) that the award is available before 15th August and in time for the ad¬
justments to be made.
The time required for the adjustments would, of course, depend on the
extent to which the Boundary settled by the award differs from the “notional”
boundary.
The Punjab Partition Committee would, I am sure, be grateful for guidance
in respect of all these assumptions.
Yours sincerely,
E. JENKINS
JULY 1947
133
Appendix ‘A’ to No. 89
Covering Note 4 by Sir E. Jenkins
13 July 1947
The Punjab Partition Committee note that while the India Independence Bill
as introduced in Parliament provides that the Boundary between East and
West Punjab shall be the boundary as determined on the report of the
Boundary Commission, the Bill also provides that if the boundary has not
been so determined by 15th August, the two new Provinces shall be established
on the basis of what is commonly described as the “notional” boundary.
The representatives of West Punjab accept this position. They would like a
special Committee representing the major Indian parties and His Majesty’s
Government to be appointed to carry out any adjustments necessitated by the
Boundary Commission’s award; otherwise they see no difficulty.
The representatives of East Punjab think the position most unsatisfactory.
They contend that the award of the Boundary Commission must be available
by 7th August; and that if this is impossible the date of the transfer of power
must be postponed. If neither of these expedients is possible they urge that both
Governments be permitted to remain in Lahore until the award has been given
and implemented, and that “suitable arrangements” be made for the same
period for the administration of the districts likely to be affected by the award.
The following issues arise on which the representatives of West Punjab and
the representatives of East Punjab have been unable to agree: —
(1) On the assumption that Partition proceedings are to continue on the
basis of the “notional” boundary, should both Governments be located in
Lahore until orders have been passed on the Boundary Commission’s Report,
or should the Government of East Punjab be established elsewhere?
The representatives of West Punjab feel that it would be embarrassing for
both Governments to work in Lahore. They consider that the Government of
East Punjab should (unless Lahore is allotted to East Punjab by the Boundary
Commission before 15th August) move to one of the East Punjab districts.
They have no objection to offices subordinate to the Government of East
Punjab remaining temporarily in Lahore as a matter of administrative con¬
venience; but they do not think that Ministers, Secretaries to Government, and
the Heads of important Departments should remain in Lahore.
The representatives of East Punjab consider that if the Government of East
Punjab leaves Lahore, there will be great inconvenience, should Lahore later
be allotted to East Punjab by the Boundary Commission. They believe that it
will be for the convenience of both Governments for the Government of East
4 This note was considered at a meeting of the Partition Council on 17 July; see No. 148, Case No. P.C.
56/6/47.
134
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Punjab to remain in Lahore until orders have been passed on the Report of the
Boundary Commission.
J
(2) On the same assumption as in (1), what arrangements should be made for
the administration of districts likely to be affected by the orders passed on the
Report of the Boundary Commission? (These districts are in the Ambala
Division — Hissar; in the Jullundur Division — Hoshiarpur, Jullundur, Ludhiana
and Fcrozepore; in the Lahore Division — Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Lahore,
Sheikhupura, Sialkot and Gujranwala; and in the Multan Division — Multan,
Montgomery and Lyallpur).
The representatives of West Punjab take the view that no special arrange¬
ments be made in these districts, which should be staffed and administered by
the Governments responsible for them on the basis of: the “notional” boundary.
The representatives of East Punjab consider that in these districts staffs
should be appointed by the two Governments in consultation, so that friction
and disturbance may be avoided until orders have been passed on the report
of the Boundary Commission.
2. Detailed statements of the views of the representatives of West Punjab
and East Punjab are appended.5
3. The representatives of West Punjab and East Punjab are prepared to
accept the decision of the Party Leaders as such or as members of the Central
Partition Council.
5 Not printed.
90
Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma 1
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Part II (b)
NO. 696 GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 1J July 1947
SECRET
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I have just referred2 to Your Excellency a dispute in my Partition Committee
between the representatives of West Punjab and East Punjab. The party memo¬
randa are not very well done, and my own contribution as Chairman is neces¬
sarily colourless. As Governor, I can be rather more informative.
2. The position is as follows: —
(i) Partition involves, among many other things, large movements of
personnel, (a) to replace officers who are not serving on, (b) to fill new
JULY 1947
135
appointments (in the new Secretariat and new Departments), and (c) to
satisfy the hysterical urge of Muslims to serve in the West and of Hindus and
Sikhs to serve in the East.
(ii) Movements under (a) and ( b ) are essential, and must be completed
before 15 th August. Movements under (c) can be spread over a longer period
of time, and I hope that the parties will agree to a ‘'stand-still” arrangement
so that, whatever the boundary may be, service adjustments may be made in
an orderly way. Agreement ought to have been reached several days ago,
but the Easterners dug their toes in and up to yesterday no final decision had
been reached.
(iii) All partition planning has to be done on some assumption about the
boundary. So far we havd worked on the “notional” boundary, and I do
not see what else we could have done. The idea for staff is that once officers
have been allotted, the representatives of West or East should post them as
they please, the formal orders being issued by the Chief Secretary under my
instructions.
(iv) The Muslims seem quite happy about the “notional” boundary,
probably because it gives them Lahore and the Colony Districts, and they
do not seem to regard the Boundary Commission’s award as vital.
(v) The Hindus and Sikhs — particularly the latter — are most unhappy.
They believe that they are entitled to Lahore and large accretions of territory
in addition. They think it most improbable that the Boundary Commission
will report before 15th August. As planning proceeds, they see the Muslims
securing control, through district staffs of their own choosing, of all the
“disputed” districts on their side of the “notional” boundary. (Incidentally
the total number of districts now “disputed” by one side or the other is
14 out of 29). Once this has happened they do not think that any award
of the Boundary Commission modifying the “notional” boundary in
their favour will ever be enforced. They would therefore like to keep the
East Punjab Government in Lahore until the award has been announced and
enforced, and to employ joint staffs (or something of the kind) in the dis¬
puted districts. (A Hindu Judge of the High Court who for safety reasons
wants the East Punjab High Court to move out of Lahore on 15th August,
told me on 12th July that in his opinion if the Muslims once got Lahore into
into their hands they would destroy it sooner than give it up. I report this as
it illustrates the attitude of highly educated non-Muslims).
(vi) The question put formally to Your Excellency for decision by the
Partition Council or the Party Leaders are, (a) whether if the “notional”
boundary prevails on 15th August the East Punjab Government should leave
1 This letter was circulated as V.C.P. 130 of 14 July.
2 No. 89
136
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Lahore; and (6) whether, on the same assumption as in [a] there should be
any special arrangements for the “disputed” districts.
3. There appear to be three possible situations: —
First. The Boundary Commission does not report by 15th August. This is the
situation feared by the Hindus and Sikhs.
Second. The Boundary Commission reports by 15th August, but not in time
to enable adjustments to be made in our planning. In this situation we must
legally give effect to the award by 15th August — the India Independence Bill
gives us no alternative. But there might be great confusion especially if the new
boundary cuts across existing administrative units. There would be hurried
movements of staff, and some people might hardly know by 15th August in
which Province and Dominion they were living or serving. Disturbances, if
they occurred, would add to the confusion
Third. The Boundary Commission reports in time for adjustments to be
made. There would almost certainly be disturbances, probably before 15th
August; but theoretically we should be able to put the two new Governments in
a position to carry on.
None of the three situations is pleasant. Personally I think the First or Second
the most probable. I very much doubt if the Boundary Commission can report
by 15th August without outraging the feelings of the parties — the members are
party nominees and will be expected to see that all the material submitted is
thoroughly examined. Even if it proves possible to cut through the mass of
statistics and arguments with which the Commission will be confronted, it
seems highly improbable that the new boundary will be known in time for
adjustments to be made by 15th August. The Third situation is theoreti¬
cally the best, but it may easily merge into the Second , unless the changes in the
“notional” boundary are trifling.
4. Our main object must be to give the new Dominion and Provincial
Governments the best possible start. I do not think they will get a good start
on the basis of the “notional” boundary unless the Hindus and Sikhs are really
convinced that the Boundary Commission’s award will be enforced; nor on the
basis of an award unless there is time to make the adjustments in staff etc.
required by it, and even to demarcate the boundary if it cuts across Tahsils,
Police Station areas and so on. I believe the safest plan will be: —
(a) to make it quite clear that the Boundary Commission will not be rushed,
and is not expected to report until after the 15th August.
( h ) to locate the East Punjab Government out of Lahore (Simla is in my
opinion the obvious place for the time being. I would like to move both
Governments out of Lahore, but there is no suitable accommodation for West
Punjab elsewhere).
JULY I947
137
(c) to make it quite clear that the two Dominion Governments are pledged
to accept and enforce the Boundary Commission’s award, and to that end will
appoint a '‘Boundary Administration” responsible to the Premiers of both
Dominions to see that the final boundary is (if necessary) demarcated, and that
the award is enforced. This organisation (if the Party Leaders agreed to it) might
be in position early in August. It would probably have to consist of Army
Officers ; its head would be a very senior officer ; there would be senior liaison
officers with the two Provincial Governments; and junior liaison officers in
the “disputed” districts, the list of which should be reduced to reasonable
dimensions. Pending the award, the organisation would keep a very close
watch on law and order matters, and report, up to 15th August to Your
Excellency for the information of the Partition Council or the Party Leaders,
and thereafter to the two Premiers, any occurrences likely to cause concern
to the minorities on both sides of the notional line, and any preparations to
resist the award. On the award being announced the head of the organisation
would be responsible for its enforcement with the co-operation of the Provin¬
cial Governments, and of the troops at the disposal of the Dominions.
All this is, I fear, rather woolly; but I believe that if the representatives of the
future Dominion Governments could make it clear now that there is no
question of a chaotic change-over and that they mean business; and could put
up a fairly imposing organisation with appropriate publicity, they would
do much to steady the Punjab. After all, it is the Dominion boundary that is in
question, and not a Provincial boundary only.
Yours sincerely,
E. M. JENKINS
Mr Jayakar to Mr Attlee
Attlee Papers
GROSVENOR HOUSE, PARK LANE, LONDON, !J July 1947
Dear Mr Attlee,
I wonder if you remember me. We worked together in the days of the Indian
Round Table Conference, 1930-33, and I had then frequent occasions to discuss
Indian questions with you. You have since risen to a very high position, which
some of us expected even then. May I congratulate you on the great part which
you have played in setting India on its feet. You have enabled Macaulay’s hope
to be fulfilled and you will go down to posterity like Campbell Bannerman,
who gave freedom to South Africa.
138
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
I entirely join in your hope that India will remain in the British Common¬
wealth, and so far as my solitary voice may prevail with my countrymen I will
endeavour to give them right advice. I am one of those who have always
realised what the Prime Minister of New Zealand has so rightly said that
Dominion status is independence with something added.1
I am here at present on the invitation of the Lord Chancellor to assist in the
disposal of Indian appeals pending before the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council.
I wish you a long and useful life for the benefit of your country as also mine.
Yours sincerely,
M. R. JAYAKAR
1 See Vol. XI, No. 63.
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to the Earl oj Listowel
Rfel 1/158: f 82
CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, 13 July 1947, 1.00 pm
Received: 13 July, 12.10 pm
No. 193 2-S. Following telegram from Governor of Assam No 160 MSG
dated July 12th is repeated for information. Begins: Sylhet referendum result.
Valid voters for joining East Bengal 239,619. For remaining in Assam 184,041.
Majority 55,578. Percentage of valid votes to total electorate entitled to vote
77.33. Request your announcing result on July 14th morning. Bardoloi,
Prime Minister, who is now in Delhi, may himself be informed in advance of
your announcement. Ends.
93
Resident for the Madras States to the Secretary to the Crown Representative
Telegram, R^/ 1/144: f 42
CONFIDENTIAL TRIVANDRUM, 13 July I947, 3.3O pm
Received: 14 July, 12.30 pm
No. 58-P. Standstill agreements. If you see no objection please communicate
the following message to States Department with reference to their telegram
I.S. of nth July.1 Begins.
Travancore Government regard problems of Travancore as special and in-
JULY I947
139
dividual. They do not therefore intend to join preliminary meetings or to
participate in selection of Representative Committee to conduct negotiations.
They say there can be no question of any accession (repeat accession) to [? of]
Travancore State to either Dominion and that they do not therefore intend to
participate in the formation of any Advisory Council for States Department.
In these circumstances they feel there is no point in Travancore representative
attending the meeting on July 25th and following days. Travancore Govern¬
ment are however ready and anxious to initiate and conduct separate individual
negotiations with appropriate authorities or accredited representatives of
Dominions on all other matters namely standstill agreements, arbitral procedure
for extradition and channels of correspondence and on all other points arising
out of the future set up and they point out that in many important matters they
have already announced their willingness to accept continuance of present
arrangements. (See my Express letter No. P.2452/47 of June 24th).2 As to
representation of Dominion Governments in Travancore State, Travancore
Govt, say that this is a matter for personal negotiation. Ends.
Full text of Dewan’s letter3 by air mail.4
1<2 and 3 Not on the file.
4 In tel 513-GT of 14 July Lord Mountbatten asked the Maharaja of Travancore if he would allow his
Dewan to come to Delhi for talks before 25 July. The Maharaja replied by telegram on 15 July that
Sir C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar would come to Delhi. R/3/1/144: If 38 and 44.
Pandit Nehru to Sir A. Hydari (Assam)
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Assam, Situation in
secret 13 July 1947
PERSONAL
No. 5483. I have been receiving numerous complaints about Referendum in
Sylhet.1 Reports supported by many statements and other data indicate that in
many interior areas state of lawlessness prevailed and thousands of Muslim
National Guards from outside the district prevented voters from voting.
Large numbers of persons who had died in recent epidemics supposed to have
voted. No sufficient protection given at most polling booths in the interior
where intimidation rampant. These and other serious allegations apparently
supported by some Ministers of Assam Government.
If any truth in these complaints validity of Referendum might be success-
1 cf. No. 68, paras. 5-7.
140
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
fully challenged by Bardoloi here. Matter is being referred to Viceroy. Would
be grateful if you could send immediately your appreciation of situation
during Referendum and after, and what steps taken to give security to voters,
how far these were successful and what truth there is in complaints of intimida¬
tion and forcible prevention of voters from exercising their rights; whether
large numbers of armed Muslim National Guards came from Bengal? Reports
indicate that conditions in Sylhet District still very insecure and general intimi¬
dation continues. Trust that steps are being taken to meet this situation and
afford security.
95
Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
RI3I1I158: ff 35-6
SECRET 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 1 3 July I947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
Thank you for your letter of today’s date1 sending me the voting figures2 in
the Sylhet referendum.
2. During the last few days I have received a number of telegrams from
Sylhet complaining against a number of malpractices during the referendum.
Possibly some of these telegrams were received by you also. Today I had a
visit from a deputation from Sylhet consisting of Hindus and Moslems.
They pla ced before me a number of allegations supported by various statements
and data which together were formidable. I do not propose to send you now a
detailed list of these complaints and the facts which are meant to support them.
In brief, they referred to a state of lawlessness during the referendum in the
interior of Sylhet district. Most of the polling booths had no proper security
arrangements and intimidation was exercised by large numbers of armed
Mushm National Guards and others who had come from Bengal. Many
thousands of people who came to vote were forcibly prevented from doing so.
There were some incidents of killing voters and others. The district is partly
under water and people travelled by boats. Voters coming by boats were not
allowed to land.
3 . A large number of persons voted who according to definite evidence died
in the recent epidemics. Altogether the statements shown to me gave a
very extraordinary picture of what took place during the voting in the
referendum.
JULY 1947
141
4. On receipt of this information I sent a telegram3 to the Governor of
Assam requesting him to send me immediately his report and his appraisal of
the situation during the referendum and after. I did so especially as a Minister
of the Assam Government supported the charges made. I felt that when such
very serious charges are made there may be a necessity for a thorough enquiry.
This was not only because of the referendum but also because of the state of
terrorism that is alleged to prevail in the Sylhet district even now when armed
bands move about and threaten vengeance on those who might have voted
against joining East Bengal. Most of these people who move about are not
residents of Sylhet district but have come from East Bengal.
5. I feel I must draw your attention to these allegations as they are gravely
disturbing and if they are at all based on facts then the validity of the referendum
is doubtful. May I suggest that some kind of brief enquiry be made and a report
from the Governor be awaited before the figures for the Sylhet referendum
that you have sent me are published?
Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
1 R/3/1/158: f 81.
2 See No. 92; for a more detailed breakdown of the figures, see No. 107.
3 No. 94.
96
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Arbitral Tribunal
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 1J July IQ47, 7.4O pm
secret Received: 14 July, 00.30 am
No. 1937-S. Your telegram No. 8974 dated 12th July.1 Setting up of Arbitra¬
tion Tribunal. Like you, I am anxious that as far as possible area of controversy
remaining after August 15th should be reduced to minimum. General plan I am
following is to speed up Partition arrangements and to get agreement over as
wide a field as possible. That will indicate points on which reference to Arbitral
Tribunal will be necessary and make it easier to secure agreement between
parties on Terms of Reference. That stage will in all probability be reached by
first week of August which will leave sufficient time for taking action before
15th somewhat on lines suggested by you.
1 No. 73 ; die date should be n July.
142
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
97
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Arbitral Tribunal
MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 1J July 1947, 9.00 pm
secret Received: 13 July , 9.00 pm
No. 193 8-S. Your telegram No. 8975 of July nth.1
Position is that parties have agreed to nominate one Judge each for Arbitral
Tribunal, in consultation with Chairman. Chief Justice of India has been in¬
vited to be Chairman. He has not yet had time to reply. Terms of reference
have not yet been considered and general position is explained in my reply2
to your telegram 8974. 3
2. I agree to the draft reply4 proposed in paragraph 3 of your telegram.
3. In reply to any supplementary questions I feel it would not be unfair to
point out that as most of the assets are in the Dominion of India their agreement
to a common Governor-General was a generous gesture to Pakistan who have
voluntarily deprived themselves of the advantage this system would have con¬
ferred on the Dominion with the least assets in situ.
4. Congress are feeling very sore at being led up the garden path by Jinnah
over a matter in which they were sincerely trying to help him.
1 No. 72. 2 No. 96. 3 No. 73. 4 No. 72.
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru
Rl3lili58:f88
13 July 1947
Dear Mr Nehru,
Thank you for your letter1 about the Svlhet referendum, which was opened by
Abell at about 7.30 this evening and brought straight to me before I went to the
French party.
Mr Jinnah made detailed complaints to me yesterday about interference by
the Assam Ministry in the referendum and asked for an enquiry, which I
refused.2 I do not know how good a case he could make out, but I have no
JULY 1947
143
doubt that if an enquiry was held there would be a long and embarrassing
contest which at this stage would, in my opinion, do no good.
In any case I have already telegraphed3 the results to London and authorised
their release tomorrow, which means that they are probably already in the
offices of the newspapers, and to withdraw them would cause a sensation.
I imagine there are always complaints about the conduct of any election or
referendum and in this case the Governor, who is directly responsible under me,
has asked for an immediate announcement, which clearly means that he is
satisfied.
I am sure, therefore, that we must not stop the announcement of the results
tomorrow.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 No. 95.
2 The record of the interview on 12 July 1947 between Lord Mountbatten and Mr Jinnah in the Mount-
batten Papers (No. 82) makes no reference to a discussion of the Sylhet referendum. The complaints
in question, which Jinnah had received and then handed on to Mountbatten, are listed in the latter’s
tel. No. 1622-S of 28 June 1947 to Sir A. Hydari. R/3/1/1 5 8 : f 52. In his letter dated 4 July 1947 to
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Mountbatten stated that, in response to requests he had received from both
Liaquat and Jinnah to look into the conduct of the referendum, he had done so and was satisfied
that it was being conducted satisfactorily and in a fully impartial manner. Ibid., f 63.
3 No. 92.
Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty Eighth Staff Meeting , Item I
Mountbatten Papers
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at the Viceroy’s House , New Delhi , on 14 July
ig47 at 10.00 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , Sir G.
Abell , Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon , Captain Brockman , Mr I. D. Scott, Commander
Nicholls , Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
Item 1
THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
his excellency the viceroy said that he intended again to speak to
Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan on the question of the Reconstitution of
the Interim Government, after the Partition Council Meeting the following
day. He would point out that one of the main reasons for this reconstitution was
so that provisional Governments might be available to give him advice on the
Orders-in-Council which were to be issued dealing with each future Dominion.
144
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
He could not accept the Partition Council itself for this purpose, because Mr.
Jinnah was a member of that body and it would be improper to act on the
advice of a future constitutional Governor-General rather than on that of a
future Government; and because the Partition Council was a joint body, un¬
suitable for considering orders which would be different for either side.
rao bahadur menon gave his view that the main argument in favour of
the reconstitution was the practical consideration of the time required to prepare
the two new Governments to take over on 15th August.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY : —
(i) directed the Reforms Commissioner to complete the preparation of the
Order-in-Council dealing with the Reconstitution of the Interim
Government as soon as possible, and to show it to Sir B. N. Rau;
(ii) directed the Reforms Commissioner to prepare a statement for issue
to the Press in the event of the Muslim League members of the present
Interim Government refusing to co-operate in this reconstitution.
IOO
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Nawab of Bhopal
Mountbatten Papers. Demi-Official Correspondence Files: Bhopal
STRICTLY PERSONAL 14 July 1Q4?
My dear Hamidullah,
I find it difficult to thank you adequately for your letter of the yth July1 because
it shows such a fine spirit of friendship that I was very touched.
lam sure that from a personal point of view your advice is right. I tried to
take your advice, but find on all hands pressure for me to stay on until, at all
events, the partition is through which will be about April next.
It would have been so easy to have slipped away on the 15th August having
done a very quick job and to have left others to clear up the mess. But I feel
that the correct and unselfish action is to stay and see the job of partition
through.
I of course bitterly regret that the scheme for a common Governor-General
hasn’t come off, since I have an uneasy feeling that Pakistan is likely to suffer
and I will not, of course, be in a position to help them. However, Mr Jinnah
was so insistent that he would like me to stay on for the good of India as a
whole, and I may at least be able to help in the Defence Council.
I hope you will agree that we have made great progress as far as the future
Dominion of India Government is concerned, in their accepting the fact that
JULY I947
145
States need only adhere to the original three central subjects which you were
all prepared to accept under the Cabinet Mission plan, viz Defence, External
Affairs and Communications. Communications will in any case be dealt with
by the standstill agreement, and the other two subjects are so closely bound
together that they cannot be separated, nor can they be handled by any State
for itself alone.
This means, however, that in the case of every other subject, States will
retain complete internal autonomy, and I think all your objections should
therebv be met.
J
I do pray and trust therefore that you will be able to agree at least on these
three subjects, and leave yourself completely free in all other matters. You
were kind enough to give me personal advice, and you will therefore, I hope,
permit me to give you, Hamidullah, personal advice from Dickie Mo untbatten.
For your own good and the good of your State I beseech you to accept these
three subjects, and thus gain all the advantages of membership of one of the
Dominions, not the least of which is non-interference with affairs within your
own State.
In any case please don’t say ‘No’ finally without a further talk.
Yours ever,
DICKIE
1 Vol. XI, No. 561.
IOI
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Lieutenant-General
Sir R. Lockhart (. North-West Frontier Province)
Rfcl 1/165:/ 14
no. 1446/3 14 July 1947
My dear Lockhart,
Thank you for your letter No. GH-i 16 of the 9th July,1 with its full account of
the various possible developments which might take place after the announce¬
ment of the Referendum.
2. The whole context of this has now been altered by the fact thatjinnah will
be Governor-General of Pakistan, and secondly because I intend to reconstitute
the Central Government immediately the Bill is through Parliament. The
result of this will be that I shall have a Pakistan Cabinet to deal with Pakistan
affairs, and it will be up to them to advise what action is to be taken in the
N.W.F.P.
1 No. 45.
146
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
3 . I discussed the matter with Jinnah yesterday,2 whose first reaction was to
favour dismissal of the Ministry and Section 93. We discussed a possible minority
Muslim League ministry and finally I impressed on him that I would ask the
advice of my Pakistan Executive Council in due course, and was most averse
to going into Section 93 .
4. I am very glad that the Referendum is going so smoothly; please thank
Booth and his officers for their good work, and I am sure that you yourself
deserve a good deal of credit.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
2 No. 82.
102
Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten oj Burma1
Rl3l1l171: f 3
PERSONAL AND SECRET COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF INDIA,
NEW DELHI, — July 1947
Dear Lord Mounthatten,
I was asked by Your Excellency at a recent meeting2 of the Partition Council
to prepare a plan in case of possible clashes or disturbances in the neighbour¬
hood of the boundaries between the two Dominions after the 15th August.
I recommend that the Joint Defence Council3 should have the authority of
both the India4 and Pakistan Governments to declare any affected districts
to be ‘ ‘disturbed areas”.
When this has been done, the Supreme Commander, acting on the request
of the Joint Defence Council, will specially appoint a British Commander,
with an adequate HQ, who will have military control over the area and of
such troops and air forces as are considered by him to be necessary. These
troops etc should be allotted, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the two Domin¬
ions, at the request of the Joint Defence Council.
The British Commander, so appointed, will be responsible to the Joint
Defence Council, through the Supreme Commander, who, for this purpose,
will temporarily have operational control.
The above procedure would be similar to arrangements I would make for
JULY I947
147
disturbances on the boundary before 15 August, and will apply both in the
PUNJAB and BENGAL.
Yours sincerely,
C. J. AUCHINLECK
1 This letter was circulated by the Steering Committee on 14 July for consideration at a meeting of the
Partition Council to be held on 17 July; see No. 148, Case No. P.C. 47/6/47.
2 Mountbatten Papers, Partition Council Minutes, 30 June 1947, Case No. P.C. 9/2/47; see also No. 88,
para. 2.
3 For the decision to establish a Joint Defence Council, see Vol. XI, No. 416.
4 Emphasis throughout in original.
103
Sir E. Jenkins [Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma (. Extract
RI3M17S: ff 79-81
SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 14 July I947
NO. 697
4. The Partition Committee has been working regularly since ist July, but
progress has not been very good. We have decided on the distribution of the
members of the I.C.S. between the two Provinces, and I hope that the repre¬
sentatives of West and East Punjab will let me have their posting proposals
within a day or two. We have also agreed on a “stand-still” arrangement for
the joint use of various teaching institutions and services (such as the
Agricultural College at Lyallpur, the Medical Colleges at Lahore and Amritsar,
and the Police Training School and Finger Print Bureau at Phillaur). We have
still to deal with the distribution of the members of all the services other than
the I.C.S. , with financial and physical assets, and with the splitting of the
Budget. These are the main preliminaries to Partition — there are of course
many other matters which will have to be decided either before or after 15th
August.
5. The Boundary problem is uppermost in the minds of everybody. I have
reported separately on this question,1 and have kept Your Excellency in touch
with the views of the more militant Sikhs.2 There is no doubt that non-
Muslims are extremely nervous about residing or serving in West Punjab and
that Mushms are from happy about their position in East Punjab. In the Indian
Civil Service not a single Hindu or Sikh has agreed to serve in the West, and
only one Muslim (who has reason to think that the Muslim League would
victimize him) has agreed to serve in the East. I am told that the position is the
1 See No. 89 and its Appendix ‘A’.
2 See Enclosure to No. 56; cf. also No. 67.
148
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
same in the other Services. With feelings as they are now, it is not surprising
that the boundary is a very live issue — it may even be a casus belli between
the two Dominions. The Chairman of the Boundary Commission arrived in
Lahore today, and I understand that he believes it will be possible to give the
Commission’s award before 15 th August. If an award is given, it seems to me that
under section 4 of the Indian Independence Bill the award boundary prevails
over the “notional” boundary and must be adopted for the transfer of power
on 15th August. If this view is correct, there may be considerable confusion,
since we have necessarily planned on the basis of the “notional” boundary
and the adjustments necessitated by any important change in it might well
take some little time. I have submitted my views3 on this problem, which is
not an easy one. It is highly probable that the transfer of power will be attended
by disorders, but whether they will break out before or after 15th August and
how serious they will be it is impossible to say. The Sikhs certainly intend to
make a nuisance of themselves ; they are unhkely to approve any boundary,
and now seem to me almost as suspicious of the Congress as they are of the
Muslims.
3 No. 90.
104
Mr V. P. Menon to Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar
R/3/i l144- ff 53-4
NEW DELHI, 14 July ig4y
Dear Sir C.P.,
The Political Department has passed on to me for information your view on the
standstill agreements.1 I think I should let you know the present developments
so that you may be apprised of the situation more clearly.
I must first tell you about the States Department. The States Department has
been formed to deal with relations with Indian States in regard to economic
and other matters. They are not the successors of the Political Department; in
other words there is no question of exercising any Paramo untcy over the
States. The legal position is quite well known to you and it will be presumptuous
on my part to expatiate on it. The only intention is to have some Central
machinery to succeed the Political Department in dealing with matters of
common concern after the 15th August.
Immediately after the States Department was formed, in which H.E. had
already taken a hand, he wanted to clarify the policy of the Department. On
this point you will have seen Sardar Vallabhbhai’s statement2 of the 5th July
which embodies the considered opinion of the Congress. H.E., after prolonged
JULY 1947
149
discussion with his advisers, decided that the best policy to be adopted in order
to safeguard the interests of both British India as well as the States during the
transitional period pending the enforcement of the final Constitution was to
ask the States to accede on the three subjects, namely, External Affairs, Defence
and Communications. When he took this decision he thought it best that he
himself should conduct the negotiations with the States, and to this course both
Pandit Nehru and Patel readily agreed.3 The position then is that the accession
on these three subjects has been given the first place in the agenda4 and H.E.
himself will negotiate on this subject.
In our earlier talks you may remember telling me of the importance you
attached to a strong Centre as well as to India remaining a Dominion, at any
rate for the time being. I reported your opinion on these points to H.E., and
you will now see that both these have become accomplished facts under the
Indian Independence Bill.
The important consideration which H.E. had in mind in setting up the States
Department was this. When on the 15th of August the States get back their
sovereignty, the 500 and odd States will be literally released from the Centre
and will have no contact either with the Centre or among themselves. This is
O
too dangerous a position, and if the transitional period is not safeguarded the
result may be complete chaos. Transitions are always risky; and in India
especially at present there is great danger of unsocial elements rearing their
heads; unless they are checked at once, it may soon be too late to do so. This
danger at present concerns British India most, but the States will not be able
to escape the contagion. The aspect of the question which is causing particular
concern to H.E. is the Communist menace. The only remedy is to build up an
integrated economic and political system which will be able to withstand their
attack.
Now that independence has been attained, there is no longer any need for the
Congress to hurry up with their final Constitution; and the interim Constitu¬
tion can continue for some time till a well-thought-out scheme is devised to
take its place. Once the States accede to the Dominion for the transitional
period their representatives would get in to the Legislature and be in a position
to exercise their moderating influence which is good for both the parties con¬
cerned. On the other hand if a State stands out it will not be able to influence
British India’s evolution in any way, and once the major partner goes, the
States will be sure to follow.
You may ask me now about the implications of accession. As you know the
1935 Act contemplates accession on a Federal basis. Part II of that Act is being
adapted permitting the States to accede to the Dominion. The three matters
on which the States will accede do not carry any taxation powers. If you accede
to these items the Federal Government would have no right to levy taxation.
1 No. 58. 2 Vol. XI, No. 528. 3 cf. No. 37, Item 2. 4 See No. 75.
150
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
The States at present pay indirectly to the British Indian exchequer on account
of customs, etc. Secondly, what we ask for is only executive and legislative
authority in these matters. In other respects the sovereignty of the States (which
past conditions did not allow them ever to exercise in full) is completely
preserved. Further, your course of action as regards adhesion to the future
Constitution is in no way prejudiced by the present accession.
H.E. as you know is a well-wisher both of the States and of British India.
Though this letter has not been seen by him I am writing at his instance. He is
convinced that unless a minimum degree of solidarity is preserved at this junc¬
ture the consequences wfll be fatal both for British India and the States. Now
that H.E. has been able to bring about the transfer of power to India, his one
desire is to find a solution of the States’ problem satisfactory and fair to both
the parties. In his position as Crown Representative he could get the best of
terms for the States but only if the negotiations take place before the 15th
August. He is now completely concentrating on the solution of this problem.
Once this is cleared out of the way the States representatives and the States
Department could sit together and negotiate a satisfactory standstill agreement.
Of all the living pohticians I have the greatest regard for you both on account
of your realistic attitude to affairs and for the part you have played in moulding
the destinies of India which has led to freedom. It should not be said of you that
at India’s critical hour you did not make your contribution towards building
up a unified India when you had it in your power to do so. I therefore beg of
you not to take any precipitate decision. I shall discuss the matter further when
I meet you in Delhi, and whatever may be your grievances against the Congress
(and I know you have many) their utterances should not deflect you from what
you consider to be in the best interests not only of Travancore but of India as a
whole.
Yours sincerely,
v. P. MENON
105
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
and Sir B. L. Mitter and the Maharaja of Jodhpur (Extract)
Mountbatten Papers . Viceroy’s Interview No. 164
14 July 1947
I had a talk with these two together after lunch.
They vied with each other in expressing delight at the setting up of the
States Department, the choice of personnel of the Department and the new
policy adopted towards the States. They both agreed that in the course of a
JULY 1947
151
single month the entire outlook for the future peace of India between the
States and the Dominion of India had altered, and both were most optimistic
of the outcome of future discussions.
Sir B. L. Mitter said that so long as the Congress only demanded adherence
to the three Central subjects to qualify for membership of the Dominion he was
confident that most States would voluntarily come forward and give up a
number of other subjects to the Dominion Central Government.
★ ★ *
106
Cabinet
India and Burma Committee. Paper 1.8.(47)139
LIP&SI13I1842: ff 77-81
Travancore
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA
SECRET INDIA OFFICE, 14 July 1947
I circulate a copy of a telegram1 from the Dewan of Travancore (Sir C. P.
Ramaswami Aiyar) of which identical copies have been received by the Prime
Minister and by myself and which was published as a letter in the Daily
Telegraph on 9th July. I also circulate a copy of the reply2 which the Prime
Minister has sent.
2. His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore has declared that on 15th
August his State will become independent. The Maharaja’s statement left the
door open for the establishment of a treaty relationship with the Dominion of
India and it was announced by the Travancore Government on 21st June that
Pakistan had agreed to receive a Travancore representative and to establish a
relationship of mutual advantage with the State.3 There has been some inter¬
change of provocative speeches on the subject between the Dewan, Mr Nehru
and Mr Gandhi,4 but there is a Travancore Delegation now at Delhi partici¬
pating in discussions between representatives of the States and the interim
Government regarding the future relationship of the States with British India.
Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar is an expert in political negotiation5 and his present
1 Enclosure i. 2 Enclosure 2. 3 cf. Vol. XI, No. 295. 4 Ibid., cf. No. 226.
5 In his letter of 11 July 1947 to Lord Mountbatten, Sir A. Nye commented: ‘The present campaign,
which has gone on for the last few weeks, about the relations of the Indian States with the
new Dominions has had some effect locally. The public wrangle between Gandhi and the Dewan of
Travancore has excited great interest here and caused a good deal of annoyance. On the whole, Sir
C.P. Ramaswamy Ayyar, who has a very logical mind, seems to be winning !’ Mountbatten Papers,
Letters to and from Provincial Governors: Madras.
152
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
tactics may very well be to use the threat of independence as a means of obtain¬
ing an association with either India or Pakistan on favourable terms.
3. We have agreed (I.B. (47) 2 8th Meeting Minute 46 and 13.(47)3 6th
Meeting Minute 2) 7 that we should encourage the States to associate themselves
in a federal or treaty relationship with one or other of the new Indian Domin¬
ions and that we should withhold judgement at present as to what our attitude
would be towards any Indian State which decides to remain independent of
both the new Dominions and is able to make its independence effective. I do
not suggest any alteration of this policy at this stage. But the case of Travancore
is likely to offer special difficulties in its application because:
(a) The Government is clearly determined to establish for the State indepen¬
dence, or at least a very high degree of autonomy. On the other hand the
Congress Party, even if willing to abstain from interference in the internal
policy of the State, will be most reluctant to permit it to determine the desti¬
nation of its exportable surplus of rubber, tea, coir and mineral sands. They will
doubtless also wish to exclude the risk of Travancore becoming a pied a terre
in India for foreign influence. There is, therefore, little hope that the Con¬
ference now proceeding8 at Delhi will record any final agreement so far as
Travancore is concerned.
(b) Travancore’s economic and geographical position is such as to enable the
State to assert effective independence, at any rate for a time. A high proportion
of its trade is with overseas markets, and, having its own ports, it can insist on
conducting its own overseas trade independently of export controls maintained
by the Government of India. In this connection we are likely to be faced soon
by two awkward decisions:
(i) The Ministry of Food may have to choose between foregoing their 1947
requirements of Travancore tea or obtaining them by a procedure
inconsistent with their recent agreement with the Government of India
about tea. Fortunately the quantity involved is only 12-20 million
pounds out of the 260 million pounds we hope to get from India.
(ii) There are indications that Travancore, apprehensive lest the Government
of India may instruct the Reserve Bank to withhold exchange from
Travancore in order to bring pressure to bear on it, will try to build
up nest eggs of sterling and dollars from the proceeds of Travancore
exports, in order to finance its imports from overseas. If this happens
Travancore may well press us to accord exchange facilities in respect of
its sterling holdings, which would be inconsistent with our policy of
treating India as a unit from the foreign exchange point of view.
(c) The Ministry of Supply entered into a direct agreement with Travancore
State on 2nd April 1947 for the export of monazite to the United Kingdom.9
JULY I947
153
In making this agreement the Dewan stipulated that the fulfilment of the
contract is dependent on the continuance of normal conditions and that any
fundamental change of policy by His Majesty’s Government or the Govern¬
ment of India or any force majeure would be disabling factors. There are in¬
dications that the Dewan may use this stipulation to denounce the agreement.
It is also conceivable that he will argue that Clause 7(1 )(b) of the Indian Inde¬
pendence Bill10 voids the agreement in any case, together with other treaties
and agreements between the States and the Crown. He may then offer to
re-negotiate it only on condition that His Majesty’s Government recognise the
independence of the State or at any rate its economic autonomy on such points
as those referred to in (b) above.
4. I would accordingly propose that :
(1) For the time being at any rate, and until the prospects of Travancore
reaching a measure of agreement with the Dominion of India become clearer,
we should avoid any statement which would give this State leverage in asserting
its independence or economic autonomy;
(2) If at some later stage it becomes clear that Travancore or any other State
has effectively asserted independence, we may have to reconsider our policy;
(3) In the meantime we may be compelled to arrive at some understanding
with Travancore regarding the deliveries of monazite. If any communi¬
cation has to be made to the Travancore Government on this subject it will be
necessary for this to be done through the agency of the United Kingdom High
Commissioner.
L.
Enclosure 1 to No. 106
TELEGRAM FROM THE DEWAN OF TRAVANCORE TO THE
PRIME MINISTER DATED 6TH JULY
Statement by Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar in reply to Lord Listowel’s statement.
Adverting to Lord Listowel’s speech11 at the press conference in London with
6 Vol. X, No. 553. 7 Vol. XI, No. 360.
8 The conference did not in fact take place until 25 July.
9 See Vol. IX, No. 469, note 6.
10 Vol. XI, No. 428. See also No. 164 of this volume for the relevant clause in the Indian Independence
Act.
11 Sir C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar had evidently seen a Reuters report on Lord Listowel’s speech to the press
at the India Office on 4 July 1947. On the question of the States the report alleged that Listowel had
said: ‘Only two States have so far declared for complete independence — Hyderabad and Travancore.
We hope they will join up with one of the Constituent Assemblies. Quite a number have joined, others
will join shortly. These are only two States out of 600. We could not make up our minds regarding
these two States as we did not want to prejudice the choice of other States. We want to encourage them
to join up. We do not want to encourage them not to join with one of the two Dominions’. On a
file copy of this extract from Listowel’s speech Mr Chisholm noted on 9 July : ‘Spoke P/S. The S/S does
not agree that this represents what he told the press’, (emphasis in original). L/P &S/13/1842: f 108.
154
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
reference to Travancore I wish to emphasise on behalf of His Highness the
Maharaja of Travancore who has the overwhelming mass of public opinion
behind him in the most highly educated State in South Asia, that Travancore
cannot be forced to join a Dominion whose leaders have at this critical juncture
in world history established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Republic.
This step cannot but be followed by the establishment of Russian Embassies
and Consulates all over India with results that need not be detailed. Within
50 miles of Travancore are the main centres of Communist influence in South
India. The new diplomatic set up will afford immense facihties for infiltration
of Communist propaganda, money and violent activities which have already
been notorious in Cochin and British Malabar. The step taken by the Interim
Government is all the more strange in view to the past declarations of Congress
leaders.
2. Travancore [’s] economic and commercial position is special to itself. Its
imports will be from Burma, Pakistan, the Middle East, England and America
main and will be of the order of twenty million pounds per year. Its imports
from the Indian Dominion will be relatively very small. Its exports will be to the
Indian Dominion and the Pakistan Dominion and England and America and
will be of the order of twenty seven million pounds per year. The balance of
trade has been and will always be in favour of Travancore which can thus
command dollar and sterling credit without difficulty and independent fiscal
and commercial policy is essential for Travancore.
3. Although the State has offered to cooperate with the two Dominions and
to enter into the most friendly treaty and other relations with them in regard
not only to defence and communications but also such matters as public health,
education and research, the independence of Travancore is essential for its
existence and for the maintenance of those high standards of life, education and
public health which are more easily realisable in this State than elsewhere in
India. The recent statesmanlike utterances of Sardar Patel12 and the President
of the All-India States People Conference13 have partially realised these
aspects and are in refreshing contrast to previous bellicose statements.14
Enclosure 2 to No. 106
TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA TO
CROWN REPRESENTATIVE DATED 14.TH JULY 1947
Prime Minister and I have received telegram from Dewan of Travancore
referring to a rather inaccurate report which seems to have reached India of
what I said about States at press conference on 4th July and summarizing case
for independence of Travancore. The Dewan says that State is ready to enter
into friendly treaty and other relations with two Dominions regarding defence,
JULY I947
155
communications and such other matters as public health, education and research,
but stipulates that independent fiscal and commercial policy is essential.
2. If you see no objection please communicate following reply from Prime
Minister to Dewan: Begins. Secretary of State and I wish to thank you for your
telegrams of 6th July which we have discussed. He tells me that report sent to
India on what he said about States at press conference to which you refer was
not entirely accurate. As I explained15 in House of Commons on 10th July we
hope that all States will in due course find their appropriate place in one or
other of the new Dominions within British Commonwealth. We realise
States may need a little time to take their decisions and we hope that no
irrevocable decision to stay out will be taken prematurely. Ends.16
12 Volume XI, No. 528.
13 Presumably a reference to Dr B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, the Working President of the All India States’
People’s Conference. No reference to a statement or speech along these lines by Sitaramayya has been
traced in the India Office Records.
14 cf. Vol. X, No. 181, note 2 and No. 193.
15 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 439, cols. 2451-2.
16 This message was duly transmitted in tel. 1977-P of 15 July to the Resident for the Madras States for
communication to Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar. R/3/1/138: f 144.
IO7
Sir A. Hydari (Assam) to Pandit Nehru
Telegram , R/^/ 1/138: JJ 89-gi
MOST IMMEDIATE SHILLONG, 14 July 1947, 4.33 pm
personal Received: 14 July, 11.43 pm
No. 959/C. Your telegram No. 5483 of July 13th.1 Referendum in Sylhet just
received. Following figures which I have obtained from Referendum Com¬
missioner bears [? are] as follows. Percentage of valid votes to total electorate
77.33. Following figures for five Sub-Divisions in Sylhet read in following
order :
Name of Sub-
Division
Total Muslim
Electorate
Total General
Electorate
Votes cast
for East¬
ern Bengal
Votes for
remaining
in Assam
SADAR
92,268
48,863
68,381
38,871
KARIMGANJ
54,022
46,221
41,262
40,536
HABIBGANJ
75,274
60,252
54,543
36,952
SOUTH SYLHET
38,297
4T427
31,718
33,471
SUNAMAGANJ
1 No. 94.
51,846
39,045
43,7D
34,2ii
156
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Above figures show
(1) that a large proportion of electorate went to polls and
(2) that in each Sub-Division proportion of votes cast for Eastern Bengal and
for remaining in Assam in relation to Moslem and General electorates respec¬
tively was very high. Therefore taking district as a whole, including interior
areas, there could not have been intimidation on a large scale, or if will to
intimidate was there, military and police precautions were adequate to prevent
it. Mukherji one of the two Assam Ministers who had previously supported
allegations of widespread intimidation now agrees that in the light of these
figures they could not have been well founded.
I spent whole of July 9th in Sylhet investigating allegations in para No. 1 of
your telegram at a conference at which the following were present: Messrs.
Mukherji and Basanta Kumar Das the two ministers through whom most of
the complaints had been made, Col. Mahindar Singh Chopra commanding
troops in Sylhet, Deputy Commissioner, Reid Deputy Inspector General of
Police and four European Military Officers sent by Viceroy to help Stork in
supervising actual polling. All these officers travelled about various Sub-
Divisions during two days voting.
Great majority of specific complaints were found, on testimony of military
or police officers who were in localities from which these complaints came, to
be unfounded. In other cases, in respect of which reports from military or
police had not come, inquiries were promised and result of some of these which
have come in has proved complaints to be much exaggerated. There were large
numbers of Muslim National Guards who behaved arrogantly but none of them
was allowed to be armed even with lathis. Hindu voters in Muslim majority
areas were afraid for safety of their houses and their women folk, and in one
case a small party of them refused to go to the polls even when promised escort
by the military to the polls and back to their village. But while there must have
been threats to induce this frame of mind there were no acts of physical law¬
lessness except for two incidents. In one, as a result of the police firing, one
Muslim was killed and two injured, and in other a scuffle resulting in injuries
to about 8 persons took place when a crowd gathered round bus which had got
bogged [?down]. [?All] authorities attending conference mentioned above
testified to their being sufficient protection at the polling booths, and officers
sent by Viceroy were particularly emphatic about peaceful character of whole
operation of polling during two days. I understand from Referendum Com¬
missioner that complaint of false impersonation on any considerable scale is
unfounded.
On my return to Shillong on evening of 9th I recounted all these matters to
Bardoloi for his information, and also for yours as he was going to Delhi.
As regards security to voters after Referendum same precautions military
JULY 1947
157
and civil continue as were taken just before and during Referendum with this
added advantage that now there is no need to guard polling booths. Reports
are coming in of small scale evacuation of Hindu women and children from
some interior villages to towns for fear of what may happen. But efforts are
being made through military police and local authorities to allay this feeling
of panic. I am in telephonic touch with Colonel Chopra [and] Inspector
General of Police and will go down to Sylhet if lawlessness breaks out as a
result of present tension. Much depends whether League takes its success at
polls calmly or not. Have instructed Deputy Commissioner to stop influx if
any of volunteers from Bengal. Is there any further information you require?2
2 In his tel. 5530 of 15 July Pandit Nehru replied as follows: ‘In view of facts stated by you and large
percentage of voters and substantial majority in favour [of] joining East Bengal it appears clear that any
irregularities and intimidation that may have taken place could not have affected result of referendum’.
R/3/1/158: f 94.
108
Minutes of Viceroy's Fifty Ninth Staff Meeting , Items 1 and j
Mountbatten Papers
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at the Viceroy’s House , New Delhi, on 14 July
1947 at 6. jo pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Sir G. Abell,
Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Mr I. D. Scott, Commander Nicholls, Lieutenant-
Colonel Erskine Crum.
Item 1
THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
rao bahadur menon handed round a note1 on the Reconstitution of the
Interim Government, and a Draft Order2 for issue by the Governor-General.
He explained that the redistribution of portfolios would be the subject of an
Executive Order by the Governor-General.
his excellency the viceroy said that the great advantage of the plan
which Rao Bahadur Menon had produced was that it avoided the necessity
for the resignation of the Muslim League members of the Executive Council.
All that they could now do, if Mr Jinnah still decided to oppose this plan, was to
refuse to take over their reponsibilities. his excellency said that, in such
circumstances, he might hold all the Pakistan portfolios in his own hand, and
set up the necessary Departments consisting of officials.
1 Enclosure i.
2 Enclosure 2.
I5«
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY*.
(i) directed Con. Sec. to telegraph the Draft Order, prepared by the
Reforms Commissioner, to the Secretary of State, together with a covering
telegram ;
(ii) directed the Reforms Commissioner to amend the Draft Order, before
issue, to include provision that, as from the date of the reconstitution, all
officials would be posted to the Department of the Dominion for which they
had opted;
(iii) directed the Reforms Commissioner to prepare two statements for
issue to the Press concurrently with the Order, in the alternative events of
Mr Jinnah accepting or refusing this plan.
Item 3
THE PUNJAB
The Meeting considered two letters3 from the Governor of the Punjab
dealing with two matters which the Punjab Partition Committee desired to be
referred to the Central Partition Council.
his excellency pointed out that it was assumed, in these letters, that the
award of the Boundary Commission would not be available by 15th August.
The assumption more likely to prove correct was that the award would be
available by 15 th August, but within so short a time before that date that it
would not be possible to make the adjustments required before then, his
excellency said that he was in fact expecting to receive the awards of the
Boundary Commissions on the night of nth August.
his excellency said that he believed that it might be far easier effectively
to put down a general uprising of the Sikhs than it had been to deal with
isolated cases of arson and stabbing.
rao Bahadur menon pointed out that the damage that the Sikhs were
most likely to do would consist of the destruction of canal banks — and it
would be quite impossible to guard all the canals.
his excellency emphasised the necessity for the areas adjacent to the
final boundary being controlled by the two new Governments themselves.
This would be preferable to control by the Joint Defence Council.
mr scott advocated the desirability of broadcast speeches by the Party
Leaders (perhaps the future Prime Ministers of the new Dominions), stating
that disorder would be put down ruthlessly, immediately after the awards of
the Boundary Commissions were published.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:
directed P.S.V. to prepare a note to be circulated for consideration by the
Partition Council on the points put forward by the Punjab Partition Com-
JULY 1947
159
mittee, and containing his (The Viceroy’s) suggestions on how to deal with
these points.
Enclosure 1 to No. 108
RECONSTITUTION OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL’S EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL
This was discussed today at a meeting4 at which were present Sir George
Spence, Mr Cooke, Mr Sundaram and myself.
2. We think that psychologically it would be a bad move to ask the Muslim
League members of the Council to resign. The Muslim League would be
resentful if they were made to resign, and worse still, if they were dismissed.
For the purpose of reconstituting the Council on the plan we have in mind
there is however no need to adopt the procedure of resignation.
3. It is in H.E.’s power to withdraw all portfolios, re-allocate them and
create new portfolios. This is not a function of the Governor-General in
Council. What H.E. should do is to tell Mr Jinnah that he proposes to withdraw
all portfolios including those now held by the League members, and re¬
allocate them among the Congress members. The holders of these portfolios
will however be primarily concerned with the affairs of the future Dominion
of India. At the same time there will be created corresponding portfolios to be
allocated among the League members who will in their turn be primarily
concerned with the affairs of the Dominion of Pakistan in respect of those
portfolios. Matters of common concern to both Dominions will be dealt with
by the whole Council sitting together.
4. If this is accepted by Mr Jinnah — and I have no reason to believe that the
Congress will object to it — H.E. can then make an order under Clause 9 of the
Indian Independence Bill regularising the position. A tentative draft of the
order is attached.
Enclosure 2 to No. 108
DRAFT ORDER
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 40 of the
Government of India Act, as set out in the Ninth Schedule to the Government
of India Act, 1935, and by paragraph (e) of sub-section (1) of section 9 of the
Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Governor-General is pleased to make the
following order:
(1) Each Department existing immediately before the commencement of
this Order shall be renamed by adding the word “India” in brackets at the end
3 Nos. 89 and 90.
4 No record of this meeting has been traced.
i6o
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
of its former designation. Each such Department shall handle cases exclusively
or predominantly concerning the new Dominion of India.
(2) As from the commencement of this Order there shall be created a
Department corresponding with each of the Departments existing immediately
before the commencement of this Order. Each new Department so created shall
bear the same designation as the corresponding Department for India, but with
the substitution of “(Pakistan)” for “(India)” at the end of the designation.
Each new Department so created shall handle cases exclusively or predominantly
concerning the Dominion of Pakistan.
(3) Cases of common concern to the two new Dominions shall be handled in
consultation by the appropriate Indian Department and the appropriate
Pakistan Department.
(4) For the purpose of dealing with any case which exclusively or predomin¬
antly concerns the Dominion of India members of the Executive Council in
charge of Pakistan Departments shall not be entitled to attend the meetings of
the Council.
(5) For the purpose of dealing with any case which exclusively or pre¬
dominantly concerns the Dominion of Pakistan, members of the Executive
Council in charge of Indian Departments shall not be entitled to attend the
meetings of the Council.
(6) Any question as to whether a case exclusively or predominantly con¬
cerns the Dominion of India or Pakistan shall be determined for the purposes
of this Order by the Governor-General, whose determination shall be final.
(7) Any provision contained in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of
India Act, 1935, or any rules or orders made thereunder shall to the extent to
which it is inconsistent with the provisions of this Order, cease to have effect.
(8) This Order shall cease to have effect at midnight on the 14th day of
August 1947.
109
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Ear l of Listowel
Telegram, R/j/ 1/157: f 165
MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 14 July 1Q47, 7. JO ptil
secret Received: 14 July, 5.50 pm
No. 195 i-S. Your 9036 of 14th July.1
1. Baldev Singh was present at Viceroy’s 18th Miscellaneous Meeting2 on
13 th June (of which you have copies of minutes) at which composition of
JULY I947
l6l
Boundary Commissions was agreed. Baldev Singh was present at Partition
Council Meeting3 on 10th July at which amendments to clauses 3 and 4 were
agreed.
2. At a meeting of the Partition Committee on 27th June I asked Baldev
Singh whether he agreed with the terms of reference. He signified that though
not content he accepted them.4
1 In this telegram Lord Listowel asked Lord Mountbatten whether it could be stated at the Committee
Stage of the Bill that the Sikhs had agreed to the personnel and terms of reference of the Boundary
Commission and also whether they had agreed to the proposed amendments to Clauses 3 and 4 of the
Bill. R/3/1/157: f 164.
2 Vol. XI, No. 175, Item 2. 3 No. 52, Case No. P.C. 26/4/47.
4 cf. Vol. XI, No. 369, para. 10.
IIO
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , R/jI 1/160: f 121
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 14 July 1947, 11.00 pm
secret Received: 14 July, 11.10 pm
No. 1958-S. When I saw Jinnah on Saturday 12th July,1 he intimated that in
no circumstances would he be ready to accept the original plan for the recon¬
stitution of the Interim Government, vide my telegram to Ismay 1848-S of
8th July.2
2. I therefore explained the scheme referred to in Para. 2 of my telegram
1974-S of 9th July3 to Ismay. Jinnah was still unforthcoming and opposed to
any plan of reconstruction, particularly one which involved resignation from
present Government of Muslim League Members.
3. Spence and V. P. Menon have now helped me to produce an ingenious
means of avoiding the necessity for the League Members to resign. My next
telegram4 contains the text of a Draft Order.
4. I shall talk to Jinnah and Liaquat about this tomorrow, and will inform
you of their reactions. In any case I intend to go ahead with it.
5. When I issue the Order, I shall also put out a Press Note explaining the
necessity for it. This will point out particularly the necessity for the immediate
constitution of a provisional Government for each of the new Dominions, to
give me advice on matters affecting their respective territories. I have in mind
1 No. 82. 2 No. 25. 3 No. 51.
4 Not printed. The telegram referred to transmitted the text of the Draft Order in No. 108, Enclosure 2.
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
162
to consult these Provisional Governments on the adaptations to be made to the
Government of India Act, 1935; and in particular, so far as Pakistan is con¬
cerned, after the Referendum in the N.W.F.P., the future of the Ministry there
has to be decided in accordance with the wishes of the Provisional Government.
It would be improper now that Jinnah is officially Governor-General of
Pakistan to associate him rather than a Provisional Government with the giving
of advice on issues affecting Pakistan.5
5 In telegram No. 9088 of 15 July to Sir G. Abell, Mr Harris sought clarification on the question of the
allocation of portfolios in the Provisional Governments of India and Pakistan. He wanted to know
whether the intention was for existing members of the Interim Government to hold several portfolios
in the new governments or whether additional members would be appointed in order to provide one
member for each portfolio. If the latter were the intention, the King’s approval would be required befor
an Order could be made. Harris therefore asked that any new names should be notified to the India
Office as soon as possible. L/P &J/10/82: f 37.
Ill
Note 1 by Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab,
Part 11(b)
undated
I attach for consideration by the Partition Council a note2 prepared by the
Governor of the Punjab asking on behalf of the parties in the Punjab for the
decision of the Partition Council on two issues about the partitioning of the
Province.
2. I have asked Sir Cyril Radcliffe to see that the report of the Boundary
Commission is presented before the 15th August, and he intends to do this.3
There will however be no time to implement the decision before the 15th
August if there are major changes from the notional boundary.
3. It seems to me that planning must proceed on the basis of the notional
boundary, and that the East Punjab must therefore plan to set up its capital in
its own territory as now defined.
4. On the second issue about the interim administration of the disputed
districts, the Governor has proposed that the following action should be taken.
It should be made quite clear that the two Dominion Governments are pledged
to accept and enforce the Boundary Commission’s award. They should agree
to appoint “a Boundary Administration” responsible to the Premiers of both
Dominions to see that the final boundary is if necessary demarcated and that the
award is enforced. This organisation which should be in position early in
August, might have to consist of Army officers. It would have senior liaison
JULY 1947
163
officers with the Provincial Governments of the East and West Punjab, and
junior liaison officers in the disputed districts. Pending the award the organisa¬
tion would keep a close watch on law and order matters, and report up to 15th
August to me for the information of the Partition Council, and thereafter to the
two Premiers any occurrences likely to cause concern to the minorities on
either side of the notional line, and any preparations to resist the award. On the
award being announced, the head of the organisation would be responsible for
its enforcement with the co-operation of the Provincial Governments, and of
the troops at the disposal of the Dominions.
1 See No. 108, Item 3. Lord Mountbatten’s note was considered at a meeting of the Partition Council on
17 July; see No. 148, Case No. 56/6/47.
2 See Appendix ‘A’ to No. 89.
3 cf. Nos. 12, Item 1 and 65, para. 8.
1 12
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
and Mr Jinn ah and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan ( Extract )
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy s Interview No. 165
secret 15 July 1947
I kept them back after the meeting of the Partition Council, from 11.30 to 12
noon. I first handed them both a copy of the Order1 I proposed to make
reconstituting the Government on the 19th July.
Mr. Jinnah did his usual business of demurring and saying he would have to
give it due consideration. I told him that that was quite unnecessary since this
was not an Order in Council on advice but an Order from myself made legal
under clause 9 of the Bill, and that I proposed to circulate it to the Cabinet the
following morning as an act of courtesy prior to making the order.
I pointed out that resignations were not required under this Order, and that I,
on the contrary, required a Pakistan Council for two vital purposes : (< a ) to be
the Council to advise me on the Orders in Council for the amendment of the
1935 Act as required by the future Pakistan Government; and ( b ) to advise me
if the present Government in the N.W.F.P. refused to resign after having lost
the Referendum.
Finally I pointed out the immense advantage to Pakistan in being able to set
up their own departments with their own officials as well as Ministers well in
advance of the move to Karachi.
(As they were leaving I kept back Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan for a moment
1 See No. 116, Enclosure 3.
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
to make it quite clear that I could not make the Orders in Council for
Pakistan on the advice of Mr. Jinnah, since he was going to become the con¬
stitutional Governor-General2 of Pakistan and should therefore no longer
give me advice on this matter. I had not wished to rub this point in to Mr.
Jinnah, but I wished Mr. Liaquat Ah Khan to be under no illusions that I would
take no advice whatever from Mr. Jinnah on this matter from now on, which
would have to be submitted through the Pakistan Council. Mr. Liaquat Ali
Khan appeared to see the point, as he nodded and said “Thank you very
much”.)
item 2. I referred once more to the question of flags3 and expressed renewed
regret that Pakistan would not accept a small Union Jack on the Dominion
flag. This gave Mr. Jinnah the chance of saying that the last thing he wished to
do was to sever his connection with the Commonwealth in any way, and in
fact he was looking forward to building up an ever closer connection as time
went on. I told him that flags were an important outward and visible symbol
and I hoped that he would at least adopt the custom of hoisting the Union Jack
alongside the Dominion flag, either on the same pole or on two separate poles,
on all special occasions such as birthdays of the Royal Family, Dominion Days
of other Dominions (and presumably their own on the 15 th August each year),
and in general on as many occasions as possible. He replied: “Certainly, if you
will give me a list of the days on which the Union Jack should be hoisted
throughout Pakistan, I will see that it is done”.
item 3 . I urged him to make up his mind on the Army Commander-in-Chief
of Pakistan and told him he could not possibly do better than appoint General
Messervy; he was already in command at Rawalpindi with his H.Q. Staff and
to that extent Pakistan would have an advantage over India, who would have
to set up a new Headquarters for the new C-in-C India. I told him General
Messervy was coming here for our Silver Wedding and he would have an
opportunity of seeing him again in the next two or three days. Mr. Jinnah
said he would like to talk it over with General Messervy and would let me know
his decision immediately afterwards.
item 4. I asked them both whether they thought any useful purpose would
be served by keeping Lord Ismay on, on my staff (paid by HMG) with a view
to keeping liaison with Mr Jinnah and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan. Both of them
became excited and enthusiastic and said that they considered it absolutely
essential that Lord Ismay should stay, and indeed that this would be the perfect
solution to the problem of liaison between the two Governments in the early
days on high level policy questions, and would reduce the chance of friction to
a minimum. I told them that I could not guarantee that Lord Ismay would
accept, but that I knew that the opinions they had both expressed would weigh
greatly with him.
item 5. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was anxious to know whether I had had a
JULY 1947
reply from Sir Patrick Spens yet about the Arbitral Tribunal,4 as they had
selected their candidate and were anxious to discuss the matter with him. In
tact they wanted to ask their candidate to come up to Delhi to meet the Chief
Justice. I advised against this as it might make the Chief Justice feel that his
hand was being forced. I told them that Sir Patrick Spens was expected in
Delhi within the next day or two.
item 6. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan then asked what successor body I intended to
establish after the 15 th August to take the place of the Partition Council. I said
I had not yet given this matter much thought, but would now consider it and
let him know.
item 7. He asked me whether I thought I could use my well known
persuasive powers to get the Congress to agree to let the Pakistan High Com¬
missioner and his Staff be housed in the Red Fort. I said I would go into this.
★ ★ ★
2 Mr Jinnah did not in fact become a constitutional Governor-General; see Nos. 86, 117 and 122.
3 See No. 82.
4 See Vol. XI, No. 516 and No. 65, para. 13 of this volume.
113
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of
Burma and Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck [Extract)
Mountbatten Papers . Viceroy’s Interview No. 166
secret 15 July 1947
The Commander-in-Chief reported the result of the C.G.S’s conversation1
with Pandit Nehru, and thanked me for having arranged this interview which
he thought was most helpful to all concerned and better than if he himself had
gone to see Pandit Nehru. He said that he would arrange to have one or two
Indian Officers promoted to Major-General in each Division by the 15th
August.
2. I informed the C.-in-C. that I had warned the Defence Member that I
had heard rumours of his disgraceful behaviour in doubting the integrity of the
C.G.S. and other senior British officers2 and that if this came to my ears offi¬
cially I should take an extremely serious view of his dishonourable behaviour.
The C.-in-C. was delighted that I had spoken like this, for he said the Defence
Member’s behaviour had become quite intolerable recently and was dictated
by his insane desire to do down Pakistan at all costs during the partition of the
1 No. 88.
2 cf. Appendix ‘A’ to No. 66 and No. 88, para. 3.
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
1 66
Armed Forces; whereas the British officers were anxious to see ordinary fair
play.
3. The C.-in-C. suggested to me that the future British Embassy or High
Commissioner’s residence should unquestionably be the C.-in-C’s House,
since no future C.-in-C. of the Indian Dominion could either afford to live in
so big a house or would have the position in the Dominion which the C.-in-C.
in India had under British rule. I told him I thought this was an excellent idea
and would follow it up with Sir Terence Shone. He told me that Sir Terence
was equally enthusiastic but that H.M.G. had been unwilling to face the ex¬
pense. I told him I would take this up with the Prime Minister and H.M.G.
and would probably write up the idea in my next V.P.R.
4. The C.-in-C. raised the question of the position of British officers in
command of troops of the two Dominions becoming involved in a frontier
clash between troops of the two Dominions or, in the extreme case, in the
event of war between the two Dominions ; although he admitted that this was
unlikely. He also raised the question of British officers in charge of Indian
troops having to take the offensive against a State like Travancore.3 He said he
had mentioned this to the Defence Member, who had been most anxious that
the C.-in-C. should not raise it officially since he said it would worry the
leaders very much to think they could not count on British officers serving the
Dominions without reservations. I therefore undertook to telegraph to the
Secretary of State to find out what the view of H.M.G. on this point would be.
5. The C.-in-C. pointed out that he had not yet had an official ruling about
the Gurkhas, and this was worrying him since he could not begin to ask
the Gurkhas if they were prepared to stay on and serve with the British Army
until some announcement was made. He admitted that the responsibility for this
lay between the High Commissioner, H.M.G. and the Government of India;
but he regretted that nothing further appeared to have been done since the
visit of the C.I.G.S. I undertook to follow this matter up either with the High
Commissioner or the Secretary of State, or both.
6. The C.-in-C. informed me that the first contingent of British troops to
leave India would be 3,000 on board the Georgic, leaving Bombay on the
17th August. We agreed we would go down together to Bombay to see them
off, and that I would write to the Governor asking him to put us both up. The
C.-in-C. said he would go into the question of appropriate farewell cere¬
monies (M.S.V. should keep in touch with the C.-in-C’s Secretary about this).
★ ★ ★
8. I told the Commander-in-Chief that the Partition Council had authorised
me to draft a “Charter of Liberty”4 in which both sides would pledge them-
JULY 1947
selves to respect the Minorities, along the lines of Mr Jinnah’s press conference.5
I also hoped to put in something about a political amnesty and no victimisation
of previous political opponents (e.g. Khizar), and that finally it would contain
a warning to any unruly elements among the Sikhs or Khaksars that no form
of violence would be tolerated by either Government, and that on the boundary
joint action would be taken under a joint organisation. The C.-in-C. was most
enthusiastic about this and asked that in this “Charter of Liberty” a gracious
gesture should be made to the British officers, extending a welcome to those
who would stay on and serve and ensuring them of very fair and liberal
treatment. I told him I would include this in my draft.
3 See Vol. XI, No. 476.
4 The first reference in the Partition Council minutes in the Mountbatten Papers to a statement of this
nature is at No. 148, Case No. P.C. 47/6/47. No earlier reference has been traced.
5 In answering questions on the minorities problem at his press conference on 13 July Mr Jinnah stated:
‘The minorities, to whichever community they may belong, will be safeguarded. Their religion or
their faith or belief will be protected in every possible way. Their life and property will be secure.
There will be no interference of any kind with their freedom of worship. They will have their protection
with regard to their religion, faith, their life, their property and their culture. They will be in all respects
treated as citizens of Pakistan without any distinction of caste, colour, religion or creed.’ Times of India,
14 July 1947.
114
Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
R/3li/i58:f95
SECRET EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI,
no. f.7(7)-p.s./47 15 July lgqy
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I have received a telegraphic reply1 from the Governor of Assam in regard to
the Sylhet referendum. He has given full particulars. There was undoubtedly
intimidation, false impersonation and incursion of Muslim National Guards
from Bengal. But it seems clear both from the number of people who voted
and the result of the voting that any irregularities that took place could not
materiallv affect the result of the referendum.
j
There is one important matter to which our attention has been drawn by
Mr Gopinath Bardoloi, Prime Minister of Assam. From the June 3rd statement
it appeared that such parts of Sylhet district as might be determined by the
Boundary Commission would be transferred to East Bengal, this, of course,
after the referendum had taken place and the major issue decided. The Parlia¬
mentary Bill is not quite clear on this point and it might be said that in case the
boundary has not been demarcated by the Commission by the 15th August,
1 No. 107.
i68
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
the whole of Sylhet district will be transferred. Subsequently it might be
necessary and indeed it is highly probable that certain parts of Sylhet district
will have to go back to Assam after the report of the Boundary Commission.
Obviously this business of transfer and retransfer of territory will produce very
great confusion and difficulty and will completely upset the life of the district
and surrounding areas. The process of transfer must be a single one after final
determination of the area to be transferred. The easiest way to arrange this is
to get the report of the Boundary Commission before the 15th August.
This question of course arises in a more or less similar form in regard to the
notional division of Bengal and Punjab.
It is not quite clear as to whether the Bengal Boundary Commission will
also deal with Sylhet. Presumably, this will be so. The Assam Prime Minister
has pointed out that this procedure will not be a happy one, as people from
Bengal will not be fully acquainted with, or interested in, Assam. There is, as a
matter of fact, a longstanding difference of opinion between the Bengalees
and the Assamese, quite apart from any of them being Hindus or Muslims. The
Boundary Commission consists of eminent Calcutta High Court Judges who
naturally will be inclined to view the question more from the point of
view of Bengal than of Assam.
I do not know what can be done about this matter. Because of the shortness of
time available it might be desirable to have a third Boundary Commission for
the Sylhet Area, one person representing the Congress and the other the Muslim
League, with a Chairman. This Commission might work in collaboration with
the Bengal Commission.
Or else, it might be possible to attach two assessors, representing Assam,
to the present Boundary Commission for Bengal. They would only function
in so far as Sylhet area is concerned.
These are just ideas which occurred and I have not consulted any one about
them yet. If you wish, however, you could consult Mr Gopinath Bardoloi,
the Assam Prime Minister, in regard to this matter.
I am attaching a brief note2 by Sir B. N. Rau pointing out the slight dis¬
crepancy between the June 3rd statement and the draft Parliamentary Bill in
regard to Sylhet.
Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
2 Not printed.
JULY I947
Sir C. Trivedi ( Orissa ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
(Extract)
Rl3lili38:f 140
REPORT NO. 4 25 July 1947
5. When I was at Delhi I received your Excellency’s letter No. 592/89 of the
27th June1 on the subject of the relationship between Orissa and the Orissa
States, which was a final reply to my letter No. 559 G.O. ot the 28th May.2 I
had a general discussion3 with Corfield on the 30th June and at my request he
has sent to me and other Provincial Governors copies of letters regarding the
formation of the Indian States Department and the proposed standstill arrange¬
ments. The latter do not appear to cover jurisdiction over railway lands and
extradition. These are two very important matters and I do hope that they will
be tied up before the 15th August. As regards other matters not covered by the
standstill arrangement, which I hope will be accepted by the Orissa States
among others, we will have to deal directly with the Orissa States. I have had a
comprehensive memorandum prepared on the subject, but I do not wish to
trouble Your Excellency with it. I shall probably write to Menon in detail on
this matter.4 In this connection, I am very glad to note that the Rulers of
Orissa and Chhattisgarh States have decided to join the Constituent Assembly,
and also that there is agreement amongst the Rulers on the question of the
formation of a Federal Union of Eastern States. I am afraid there is a great
deal of trouble in store for the Rulers unless they reform their administrations
and agree to introduce a representative or responsible Government. The
Socialist Party in Orissa will, I am told, have a good crack in the States if they
find that the Rulers are not responsive, and there is a rumour afloat that Mrs
Malati Chaudhuri, wife of my Revenue Minister, proposes to resign from the
Constituent Assembly and devote herself to work in the States.
1 and 2 This exchange of letters dealt with the related questions of the retention of the Political Agent for
the Orissa States at Sambalpur and the need for administrative arrangements to cover matters of
common concern between the Orissa States and the Provincial Government. In an earlier telegram,
Sir C. Trivedi had informed Lord Mountbatten that although the Provincial Government had not
received official communication, he understood that it had been decided by the Political Department
to withdraw the Political Agent for the Orissa States from Sambalpur from i July 1947. R/3/1/1 3 6: ff
156 and 182-7. R/3/i/i37 : f 186.
3 Not traced.
4 In his letter D.O. No. 725 G.O. of 16 July 1947 to Mr Menon, Sir C. Trivedi discussed the subject of
the formula for Standstill Arrangements and questioned whether the following points had been
adequately covered in the circular letter of 14 June 1947 to Residents (Vol. XI, No. 198) : Jurisdiction
over railway lands; Extradition; Boundary Disputes; and Food. At the end of his letter Trivedi com¬
mented: ‘In this letter I have touched upon matters which appear to be the concern of the Central
Government. There arc several other matters of Provincial concern which have to be tied up between
the States and ourselves. This we hope to do in due course. I took up this matter shortly after I came
to Orissa, but the Political Department has up-to-date given me practically no assistance, and it looks
as if we shall have to fend for ourselves, though I am sure we can rely on the support of the new States
Department’. R/3/1/138: ff 156-9.
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
170
Il6
Government of India . Cabinet Secretariat
RI3I1/160: ff 141-6
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 1 3 July 1Q47
SECRET
NO. 145/C. N./47
With reference to this Secretariat memorandum of even number dated the
14th July, 1947, the undersigned is directed to circulate to Honourable Mem¬
bers the following additional item of agenda for the Cabinet meeting called for
10 a.m. tomorrow, the 16th July:
RECONSTITUTION OF THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
(Papers attached)
(h. m. patel)
CABINET SECRETARY
Enclosure 1 to No. 116
NOTE BY THE VICEROY
The Indian Independence Bill is likely to receive His Majesty’s assent on the
1 8th July, and I think that Hon’ble Members are aware that it is my intention
that the Government should be reconstituted shortly afterwards.
2. This is necessary on practical and administrative grounds. Indeed clause
(e) of sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Indian Independence Bill was speci¬
fically designed to enable this to be done.
3. There are many matters affecting the two new Dominions in respect of
which between now and the 15 th August I shall require the advice of all those
who will be responsible for the future administration of the two Dominions.
A case in point is the adaptation to be made of the Government of India Act
1935, which may be done differently for each of the two Dominions. The Act
as so adapted will of course become from the 15th August the constitution of
each of the two Dominions. The adaptation orders and other similar orders are
in the nature of Orders in Council and I consider that, in view of their impor¬
tance, I should make them on the advice of a Council solely concerned with
the territories in question. Also there may be decisions to be taken regarding
the N.W.F.P. in the light of the result of the Referendum.
4. For these and other reasons, it is necessary that provisional Governments
should be set up at once. These Governments will thus I hope be enabled to
take over power on the 15th August with the minimum of dislocation.
JULY I947
171
5. I attach a draft communique which I propose to issue after assent has been
given to the Indian Independence Bill, and an order which I propose to issue
at the same time.
6. If the leaders of either of the two major parties wish to suggest any addi¬
tions to the Government, I shall of course be glad to consider them.
7. I shall also be glad to discuss this paper, and the draft order and com¬
munique, in Cabinet tomorrow if any Honourable Member wishes to raise any
point.
8. I hope the leaders of the two Groups will let me have the names of any
additional members they may wish to recommend and their complete pro¬
posals for the allocation of portfolios by the 19th morning.
9. It will be seen from the communique that officers who have opted to serve
in Pakistan will be transferred to the corresponding new Pakistan Departments.
Subsequent transfers and postings will not require any reference to me.
Enclosure 2 to No. 116
DRAFT COMMUNIQUE ON THE RECONSTITUTION OF
GOVERNMENT
In order to facilitate the setting up of the new administration of Pakistan His
Excellency the Viceroy has decided with the concurrence of the party leaders
that the Interim Government should be reconstituted on the following lines:
The Government will consist of two groups representing the two successor
Governments of India and Pakistan.
The two groups will meet separately to consider matters concerning their
own territories, and jointly under the chairmanship of the Governor-General
to consider matters of common concern.
The existing Departments will be in charge of the Members representing
India. The personnel who have chosen to serve in Pakistan will be withdrawn
from the existing Departments, and will staff Pakistan departments which will
be organised at once in Delhi and will serve the Pakistan members of the
Cabinet.
There will thus be what amounts to two provisional Governments, one for
India and one for Pakistan, each dealing with its own business and consulting
the other on matters of common concern.
Enclosure 5 to No. 116
DRAFT ORDER
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 40 of the
Government of India Act, as set out in the Ninth Schedule to the Government
of India Act, 1935, and by paragraph (e) of sub-section (1) of section 9 of the
172
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Governor-General is pleased to make the
following Order, namely: —
1. (1) This Order may be called the Executive Council (Transitional Pro¬
visions) Order, 1947.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. (1) In this Order “existing Department” means any Department of the
Government of India in existence immediately before the commencement of
this Order.
(2) The Interpretation Act, 1889, shall apply to the interpretation of this
Order as it applies to the interpretation of an Act of Parliament.
3. Each existing Department shall be renamed by adding the word “India”
in brackets at the end of its former designation and, each such Department
shall, as from the commencement of this Order, handle cases exclusively or
predominantly concerning the future Dominion of India.
4. As from the commencement of this Order, there shall be created a
Department corresponding with each existing Department, and each new
Department so created —
(a) shall bear the same designation as the existing Department with the
addition of the word “Pakistan” in brackets; and
(b) shall handle cases exclusively or predominantly concerning the future
Dominion of Pakistan.
5. Cases of common concern to the two future Dominions shall be handled
in consultation by the appropriate Indian Department and the appropriate
Pakistan Department.
6. The Indian and Pakistan Departments shall respectively be in charge of
such members of the Executive Council as the Governor-General may
nominate in this behalf.
7. (1) For the purpose of dealing with any case exclusively or predominantly
concerning the future Dominion of India members of the Executive Council
in charge of Pakistan Departments shall not be entitled to attend the meetings
of the Council; and for the purpose of dealing with any case exclusively or
predominantly concerning the future Dominion of Pakistan, members of the
Executive Council in charge of Indian Departments shall not be entitled to
attend the meetings oi the Council.
(2) Any question as to whether a case exclusively or predominantly concerns
the future Dominion of India or Pakistan shall be determined for the purposes
of this Order by the Governor-General, whose determination shall be final.
JULY I947
173
8. Any provision contained in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of
India Act, 1935, or any rules or orders made thereunder shall, to the extent to
which it is inconsistent with the provisions of this Order, cease to have effect.
117
The Earl of Listowel to Mr Attlee
LIP&JI10I127: ff 97-9
SECRET INDIA OFFICE, 15 July I947
Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 125/47
Prime Minister,
I attach a telegram1 from the Viceroy in which he says that Jinnah wishes the
adaptation of the 1935 Act in respect of Pakistan to be based on the 9th
Schedule i.e. the provisions under which the Executive Council Government
at the Centre is set up. I attach a draft reply2 to this telegram for your con¬
sideration.
2. The Viceroy urged us during the drafting of the Bill to do it on the basis
that the existing Government of India Act would remain in force in each of the
two Dominions. It is as a result of this that Mr. Jinnah is able to do what he now
proposes to do. If an accusation is made that we are helping to set up a dictator¬
ship, the answer is that the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan is vested with
sovereign legislative powers and can rescind orders of the Governor-General
and also make a new Constitution. In practice, however, in view of the dicta¬
torial position which Mr. Jinnah holds in the Muslim League the Pakistan
Constituent Assembly is likely to be docile and it may be that Mr. Jinnah will
be able to establish himself as a virtual dictator instead of being constitutional
Governor-General of the kind customary in British Dominions. This will be
an embarrassing situation but it is one which can only come into being if the
Pakistan Constituent Assembly so desires and, if that is the position, it is likely
to arise in any event.
3. The only alternative to the line taken in the reply would be to amend the
Bill to require that adaptation of the Government of India Act should be based
on part II of the Act and not on the 9th Schedule. This would, however, be a
substantial modification of the Bill and we should have to explain why we were
doing it. It could only be done in the Lords and then at very short notice and
probably at the cost of re-arranging the Parliamentary programme. There is
1 No. 86.
2 See No. 122 for the reply as issued with an amendment suggested by the Prime Minister.
174
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
not time to take the matter to the India and Burma Committee as the Lords
are taking second reading and all other stages tomorrow afternoon.
LISTOWEL
Chiejs of Staff Committee. Joint Planning Staff. Paper J.PJ47) Sg (Final)
L/P &SI13I1831: ff 6g - 72
Hyderabad — Provision of Air Forces
REPORT BY THE JOINT PLANNING STAFF
TOP SECRET MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, July 1Q47
In anticipation of instructions we have examined a memorandum1 by Air
Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Courtney on the question of the provision of
British aircraft and personnel for a Hyderabad State Air Force.
2. Sir Christopher Courtney states that he was approached privately to
ascertain whether he would be prepared to advise the Hyderabad State on the
subject of raising an Air Force. This request led to an interview with the self-
styled Agent-General (who is in fact a Trade Commissioner) for Hyderabad
who told him that since Hyderabad had elected to remain an independent state,
they wished to increase their armed forces, and particularly to raise an Air
Force. They realised that it would be necessary to employ foreign personnel
for some years until Hyderabad personnel had been trained. The Agent-
General said that his Government would naturally wish their Air Force to be
organised on a British basis and that the aircraft and foreign personnel should
come from British sources. If the necessary advice and assistance could not be
obtained from us they would have to approach the Americans.2
3. Subsequently, the India Office told Sir Christopher Courtney that it
would be most embarrassing to them if he were to visit Hyderabad in the near
future. This was because of the delicate situation which had arisen over the
future sovereignty of Berar, which is claimed by both Hindustan and Hydera¬
bad.
4. Finally, Sir Christopher Courtney says that there may well be more than
one view on the whole question and that it may not be in the best interests of
H.M. Government that a chance of retaining a strong foothold in the largest
Indian State should be discarded.
Relations with Indian States
6. [5] The present position is that when we hand over power to India and
JULY I947
175
Pakistan the Indian States will cease to be part of the Empire. H.M.G. do
not, however, propose at this stage to recognise them as separate international
entities as we hope that they will enter into a federal treaty relationship with
either India or Pakistan.
7. [6] From the political point of view, therefore, it would be undesirable
to take any action which might lead to the “Balkanisation” of India or which
might encourage the Indian States to feel that they can stand on their own.
We understand that the United States Government is in agreement with this
general policy.
8. [7] From the military point of view our primary aim remains to get
satisfaction for our long term strategic requirements from India and Pakistan.
Military agreements with the Indian States are of little account in comparison
with this and if in attempting to negotiate them we made it harder to achieve
our primary aim it would clearly be better to avoid any entanglements with
the Indian States at the present stage.
We are advised that an attempt to establish military connections with the
Indian States would be resented by India and might be followed by revolutions
in the States, provoked by Congress, which would render any agreements we
made of no value.
To that extent, therefore, military policy should in our view go hand in
hand with the political policy outlined in the two paragraphs above.
9. [8] There remains the possibility, however, that we may fail to get our
long term strategic requirements out of either India or Pakistan. In those
circumstances there would be advantage in having military agreements with
the Indian States. They would provide valuable assets in the form of man¬
power, industry and raw materials. For example, the population of Mysore is
seven million; Travancore is the most important source of the supply of
thorium and the eastern States produce sixty per cent, of the iron ore of the
Indian continent. Given fly-over rights in other parts of India we should gain
some advantage by having air transit rights in the Indian States.
Moreover, it is in our interests that British training and equipment should be
standardised throughout the Indian Continent and that the Indian States should
1 Not printed.
2 In a letter dated 17 June 1947 to Lord Ismay, Sir D. Monteath explained in more detail the circumstances
surrounding Sir Christopher Courtney’s contacts with Nawab Mir Nawaz Jung, the Agent-General in
question. Courtney sought Monteath’s advice before giving his reply to the Nawab. Monteath urged
Courtney to be cautious upon the grounds that his acceptance of the offer to raise an Air Force in
Hyderabad would be construed by the Indian Press as evidence that H.M.G. had no intention of
relinquishing its hold on India. When consulted, Lord Listowel agreed with Monteath and Courtney
was finally advised to reply to the effect that he could not go out to Hyderabad immediately and that
he would therefore prefer to leave the matter over for three or four months. He was not, however,
advised to deliver a flat refusal for fear that it might provoke the Nizam to approach the Americans.
L/P &S/13/1851 : If 78-80.
176
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
therefore in no circumstances turn to a foreign power, not excluding the United
States of America, for military assistance.
10. [9] Against this there is the disadvantage that most of the Indian States
have no seaboard and any military agreement we made with them might be
difficult to implement if India opposed the passage of men and material.
Aid to Hyderabad
11. [10] In the light of the above general consideration of the question of
relations with the Indian States, it is clear that in the particular instance of
Hyderabad we should not in present circumstances become in any way openly
involved in military negotiations with her. It follows that it is undesirable for
an officer of the standing of Sir Christopher Courtney to assist the Nizam
since it would inevitably be assumed that H.M.G. were giving countenance
and support to the project. On the other hand, it would hardly be possible in
peacetime to prevent the Nizam from obtaining advice and assistance, e.g.
from less senior ex-R.A.F. Officers, or, if difficulties of transit through Indian
territory could be overcome, from purchasing aircraft and other war material.
12. [11] On the other hand, if we failed to get agreements with India and
Pakistan then there would be some advantages from an agreement with
Hyderabad. She could provide man-power, limited economic aid and, given
fly-over rights in India, air transit facilities. Moreover, other Indian States might
be encouraged to follow her lead in seeking our assistance.
Conclusions
13. [12] We conclude that
(a) It would be contrary to our long term strategic aims to attempt to
conclude military agreements with the Indian States so long as there is a
chance of obtaining our defence requirements from Pakistan and India.
(b) If we failed to get agreements with Pakistan and India there would be
some advantage in concluding military agreements with the Indian
States and it is therefore undesirable from the military point of view to
close the door on this possibility at the present stage.
(c) It wrould be contrary to the above policy for Sir Christopher Courtney
to enter into any negotiations with the Nizam of Hyderabad. On the
other hand, no positive obstacle should be put in the way of the Nizam
if he continued to seek unofficial advice and assistance from British
sources.
(d) It would be undesirable for the Indian States to turn to a foreign power,
JULY I947
177
not excluding U.S.A., for military assistance; and the U.S. Government,
should therefore be made aware of H.M.G’s. policy.
Recommendations
14. [13] We recommend that if this policy is approved: —
(a) The Chief of the Air Staff should be invited to inform Sir Christopher
Courtney of the conclusions in this paper.
(b) The Chiefs of Staff should inform the India and Burma Committee
through the Minister of Defence of the conclusions reached on the
general question of military assistance to the Indian States.3
J. F. STEVENS
J. II. N. POETT
J. H. EDWARDES-JONES
3 The Chiefs of Staff discussed this report with Lord Ismay at their meeting on 16 July and agreed with
the conclusions and recommendations in paras. 13 and 14 except that they considered no action was
necessary in regard to para. 13(d) and 14(b). C.O.S.(47) 88th Meeting, Minute 6. L/WS/1/1123.
1 19
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , LfF /7I2870: f 1 72
important India office, 1 5 July 1947, 5. oo pm
Received: 15 July , 11.45 pm
No. 9090. Following from Prime Minister. Your telegram of 7th July No.
1794-S.1
You may assure Nehru that we are approaching this important matter
sympathetically and with every intention of doing all that we can within the
limits set by our own increasingly grave difficulties to assist in meeting India’s
immediate necessities.
2. For your own information we do not at present believe that statistical
position is necessarily as gloomy as your message suggests, but examination
of figures in concert with Indian Delegation has only just begun.
1 In tel. 1794-S of 7 July Lord Mountbatten explained that he had been asked by Pandit Nehru to remind
H.M.G. of India’s difficult foreign exchange position. The estimated balance of payments deficit for the
half year July-December 1947 stood at 81 crores and the three means by which this deficit could be
financed — advances from the IMF, export of the Reserve Bank’s holdings of gold and a long-term loan
from the International Bank or from a foreign country — were considered unsuitable. It was therefore
important that H.M.G. should agree to a sterling balance release of -£40-45 million during the nego¬
tiations that were about to start in London (see Vol. XI, No. 39, note 10). Mountbatten concluded: ‘I
am sure you will do your utmost to see that those who negotiate on behalf of H.M. Government
appreciate the immense political importance of reaching a settlement which is fair to India at a critical
time, and which will increase the goodwill that we are all working so hard to build up’. Mountbatten
Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Finance (India).
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
120
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Telegram, L/S &Gly/ij8y: f 73
immediate India office, 13 July ig4y, 18.43 pm
No. 9107. We have decided that a separate High Commissioner for the United
Kingdom should be appointed to Pakistan as from the date of transfer of power.
This decision accords, as I am aware, with your own view. Sir Laurence
Grafftey-Smith, lately H.M. Minister at Jedda, has been selected as first in¬
cumbent.
2. In the circumstances we think that it would be desirable to ascertain in¬
formally from Jinnah that proposed appointment is acceptable to him. He
could at same time be told that it is proposed that Shone should remain as
High Commissioner in India (i.e. Hindustan) after partition.
3. We also think it desirable to tell Nehru that Shone will remain as High
Comissioner in India and that Grafftey-Smith is being appointed to Pakistan.
4. We should be glad if you could arrange for Indian Leaders to be
approached accordingly.1 (We feel that this approach should be made as from
yourself and not, repeat not, by Shone.) We regard it as important that very
early Press announcement should be made here and should be grateful if you
could let us know as soon as way is clear for this. Arrangements have been
made for Grafftey-Smith to leave by air on 22nd July for Delhi so that he
may have opportunity of picking up threads before assuming his post. Between
arrival and Aug. 15, he will be in position of High Commissioner designate in
Pakistan and not, repeat not, holding any appointment in Shone’s organisation.
5. Please give copy of this telegram to High Commissioner.
1 In tel. No. 2004-S of 16 July Lord Mountbatten replied that Mr Jinnah had agreed to the appointment
of Sir L. Grafftey-Smith as High Commissioner in Pakistan. He also explained that he had informed
Pandit Nehru that Sir T. Shone would remain as High Commissioner in India and that Grafftey-Smith
was being appointed in Pakistan. L/S &G/7/1387: f 64.
JULY 1947
179
121
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram, R/j/i 1 157: f 169
immediate new Delhi, 13 July 1947, u.oo pm
secret Received: 15 July, 11.30 pm
No. 1979-S. Jinnah and Liaquat came to see me this morning1 to protest
violently against a statement printed in today’s Statesman alleged to have been
made by Henderson in the debate,2 in which he explained the terms of reference
of the Boundary Commission. The particular statement they objected to was
his explanation of other factors, which read as follows: “These special factors
were being allowed to take account of the circumstances of the Sikh community
in the Punjab so that the location of their religious shrines could be taken into
account”.
They considered that such a statement by the Under-Secretary of State just
as the Boundary Commission is about to sit will give the Sikhs an opportunity
to introduce a specific meaning to other factors which the Partition Council
was careful to refrain from giving.
I told Jinnah that I would send a copy of this protest to Radcliffe so that he
may know that they do not accept Henderson’s views. I am therefore sending
a copy of this telegram to Radcliffe and also to Jinnah.
1 There is no reference to a discussion of this issue in the record of Lord Mountbatten’s interview with
Mr Jinnah and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan on 15 July (see No. 112).
2 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 440, 14 July 1947, col. 74. For the actual text of what Mr A. Henderson
said, see No. 144.
122
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram, LIP &Jj 10/127: j 93
immediate india office, 13 July 1947, 7.30 pm
secret Received: 16 July, 6.00 am
No. 9108. 1 Your telegram 1926-S.2 The Bill (Clause 8) says that until other
provision is made by Constituent Assembly each of the new Dominions shall be
governed as nearly as may be in accordance with Government of India Act.
Jinnah is therefore perfectly entitled to proceed under 9th Schedule and as he
can do what he pleases by Order on the 16th August, it would seem useless to
1 The number of this telegram has been taken from the recipient’s copy on Mountbatten Papers, Official
Correspondence Files: Interim Government of India, Part (2).
2 No. 86.
i8o
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
resist his wishes in regard to adaptation now. I consider, however, that it would
be right and proper to exclude in adaptation Governor-General’s power to
override his Council under 9th Schedule on ground that this was part of
machinery of British control.
2. As regards your paragraphs 6 and 7, therefore, we consider that you
should prepare Adaptation Order in form desired by Jinnah but excluding
over-riding power of Governor-General whatever his wishes on this point may
be. If it is necessary on administrative grounds that this Order be issued before
15th August we consider that it should be issued with a statement that it is in
the form desired by Muslim League. Otherwise we consider that it should be
prepared in readiness and left to be promulgated by Jinnah upon his appoint¬
ment.
3. It would be inadvisable to make this order until after the Bill has been
3
3 Mr Attlee had approved Lord Listowel’s original draft of this telegram (See No. 117 and its note 2)
subject to the insertion of the sentence in paragraph 3. It replaced the following sentence which had been
included in Listowel’s draft : ‘Disclosure of this situation might well cause embarrassment in Parliament
and every endeavour should be made to keep it secret until the Bill has passed.’ L/P &J/10/127: ff 96 and
102-3.
123
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Telegram , L/P &J 1 10/102: ff 6-7
IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 1$ July 1947, 8.20 pm
secret Received: 16 July , 6.00 am
No. 9109. Your telegram No. 1805-S of 8th July.1 You will see from Political
Adviser’s comments on your telegram No. 1850-S of 9th July,2 with which I
agree generally, that Rau’s fears are exaggerated.
2. We are doubtful whether amendment of existing proviso to Clause 7(1)
suggested by Rau carries out his purpose because ‘‘parties referred to therein”
are the Crown on one side and the States on the other, and the new Dominions
would not succeed to the rights of the Crown without the States’ consent even
if these were preserved. But apart from this the amendment would be directly
contrary to Cabinet Mission’s memorandum of 12th May 1946.3
3. Additional proviso which he suggests seems also undesirable. We under¬
stand there are good prospects that it will be through Confederation of States
in Kathiawar and Gujerat that petty States there will have their contacts with
British India. Nothing would more effectively prejudice this recently formed
Confederation than intrusion of British Indian jurisdiction into the small
JULY I947
l8l
attached States situated there. It seems preferable to leave attaching States to
deal with problem of jurisdiction in attached States after transfer of power in
their own way.
4. Krishna Menon called on Prime Minister on 14th July to urge these
amendments. Prime Minister explained position to him on above lines. Menon
also : —
(a) suggested that Clause 7 voids agreements setting up States of Mysore
and Benares and was told that these agreements conferred sovereignty on
Rulers of these States and Parliament could not deprive them of that sovereignty
by legislation;
(b) pressed proposal mentioned in your paragraph 4. He explained that its
significance is that there may be rights now exercised in States by British India
obtained otherwise than through paramountcy which would be saved by the
amendment. Prime Minister replied that we do not believe this to be correct
and that amendment was therefore pointless. He added that if it were correct
(i) amendment would be very difficult to justify to Parliament and (ii) con¬
sequence of amendment could be evaded by States terminating any relations
or arrangements invoked under it.
1 The date of this telegram should be 7 July; see Vol. XI, No. 559.
2 No. 30. 3 Vol. VII, No. 262.
124
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , R\j\i \82: f 59
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 15 July lp47, 11. JO pm
secret Received: lj July , 10.45 pm
No. 1983-S. I have discussed your 8841 of July 9th1 with Auchinleck.
2. I propose to inform Indian Leaders at Partition Council meeting in the
near future of your conception of role of British Forces after transfer of power.
3 . Auchinleck submits, and I agree, that a statement should be made publicly
to the effect that British Forces will not be used operationally and will not be
available to intervene in internal disorder after August 15th.2 He stresses the
point that British and European civilians should have this information, and that,
as the Press are already asking [about] their role, to withhold information is to
invite suspicion. May I therefore have your permission to make such a state¬
ment?
1 No. 50.
2 cf. ibid., note 3.
182
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
4. Auchinleck is definitely of the opinion that families should move with the
units concerned. Separation of families is never satisfactory, and there seems no
reason why troops should not be accompanied by them. To send families
ahead leads to many problems of accommodation at destination, and is an
unnecessary inconvenience. He has been planning on the assumption that
families will accompany units.
5. I will inform Indian Leaders at next Partition Council meeting of your
views on the retention of R.A.F. transport squadrons. Owing to shortage of
aircrews, which I understand cannot be made good, I suggest that one of the
three squadrons should be given up and that the deficiencies in the other two
should be made good thereby. It is unlikely that the Indian Leaders would
agree to having two Dakota transport squadrons in Pakistan and only one
Communication Squadron in India. I therefore suggest that one of these
squadrons should be transferred to India’s territory.
125
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl o/Listowel
Telegram , L/P &J 17/12596: f 20
important new Delhi, 16 July 1947, 00.23 am
confidential Received : 13 July , 10.00 pm
No. 1980-S. I discussed with Mr Jinnah whether he wished me to put his name
forward for customary honour for a Governor-General which I suggested
would be a G.C.M.G.1 He was immensely tickled with the idea and obviously
wanted to accept but said he would have to discuss it with his Working Com¬
mittee. He returned very crestfallen the next day to say that they would not
alkw him to accept in view of Moslem League resolution last year rejecting
British Honours,2 which was made in consequence apparently of a similar
rejection by Congress.
2. He expressed hope, however, that whole question of British Honours for
Pakistan might be reconsidered at an appropriate stage when atmosphere had
become more cordial, when he would gladly accept provided there were
sufficient other names from Pakistan in same hst. He asked me that this should
be kept extremely secret. I promised that this would be done.
3. It has been suggested that he might like to receive a Privy Councillorship
on August 15th, which does not really come in same category but which might
in view of his predilection for British judicial system, tickle his fancy and be-
JULY I947
183
come thin end of the wedge. Mieville informs me that it is quite customary
for Governors-General of Dominions to be made Privy Councillors?
May I offer him this?
*
1 cf. Vol. XI, No. 533, para. 3. 2 See No. 82.
126
Secretary of State to Government of India , External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations Department
Telegram , LJP &S/12I4197: f 31
important India office, 16 July 1947 , 00.30 am
No. 9106. Your telegram 53 50/10/7. 1 Lhasa Mission.
2. H.M.G. agree that appropriate time for defining their position will be as
you suggest. They would be grateful if Richardson could be instructed to
inform Tibetan Government at time agreed that, notwithstanding the con¬
stitution of the two Dominions of India and Pakistan on 15th August, H.M.G.
in the U.K. will continue to take a friendly interest in the future prosperity of
the Tibetan people and in the maintenance of Tibetan autonomy. They
accordingly hope that the Tibetan Government will agree to a resumption of
present friendly contacts, for which they would wish to provide by arranging
for visits to Lhasa to be paid from time to time by U.K. High Commissioner
in New Delhi or members of his staff.
3. Richardson might add, if the Government of India concur, that H.M.G.
trust that after 15th August the close and cordial relations which have existed
for so many years with themselves and the Government of India will continue
with the successor Indian Government(s) upon whom alone, as he will have
explained, the rights and obligations arising from the existing Treaty provisions
will thereafter devolve.
4. H.M.G. would be grateful if suitable expressions of goodwill and con¬
tinued interest could be conveyed on their behalf to Bhutan Government in
similar terms mutatis mutandis without reference to autonomy in whatever
1 No. 59.
184
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
manner Government of India think most appropriate in the circumstances.2
5. Please pass copy to U.K. High Commissioner.
2 The Government of India, E.A. &C.R. Dept, duly instructed the Political Officer in Sikkim to arrange
for messages in the above terms to be communicated to the Governments of Tibet and Bhutan. I11
addition, they directed that the Government ot Tibet should be informed that the Mission there would
from 15 August ‘become Indian Mission representing Dominion of India only’, and should be given the
message contained in G/I tel. 5350 of 10 July. The Government of Bhutan was to be informed that the
Government of India were prepared to assume the obligations of H.M.G. under existing engagements
with Bhutan and trusted that, until either party wished to make fresh arrangements, the Bhutan
Government would also continue to abide by them. On 11 August, in a letter to the Political Officer,
Sikkim, the Government of Bhutan agreed to abide by existing arrangements but gave notice that they
wished, ‘with all convenient speed after August 15th, to enter into negotiations with the Government
of India in regard to fresh arrangements in the future’. G/I. E.A. &C.R. Dept, to Political Officer
Sikkim, tels 73 and 74 of 23 July, L/P &S/12/4197: ff 29 and 30. Agent to the Government of Bhutan
to Political Officer, Sikkim, letter 131 of 11 August. L/P &S/12/2226: f 5.
127
Meeting of the Indian Cabinet . Case No. 180/35! 47
Rl3liji6o:ff 150-2
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held on 16 July 1947 at 10.00 am were: Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , Pandit Nehru , Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Patel,
Mr Chundrigar, Dr Rajendra Prasad, Mr Nishtar, Maulana A. K. Azad, Mr
Rajagopalachari, Dr Matthai, Sardar Baldev Singh, Mr Mandal; Sir G. Abell,
Mr H. M. Patel, Mr Osman Ali ( Secretariat )
Case No. 180/35/47. Reconstitution of Central Government.1
His Excellency said that he thought it would be proper that the two new
Dominions should each have their own Governments immediately after the
India Independence Bill became law on the 18 th of this month. It was important
that this should be done so that the two future Dominion Governments could
advise him regarding the manner in which they desired the existing Government
of India Act to be modified to suit their respective requirements. It would also
be advantageous for the Pakistan Government because they could commence
functioning with the officers who had elected to serve in Pakistan and thus be
in position to effect a smooth move to Karachi by the 15th of August. The
arrangement he proposed was perhaps a clumsy one but it was intended to
cover only the final transition period of a month, or rather two weeks, because
it would take the Pakistan Government at least two weeks to shift to Karachi.
And even in this short period, most of the business of the two governments
would in any case be concerned chiefly with partition work. He thought it
might be possible for each of the two parties to carry on with their existing
JULY 1947
185
members, redistributing the portfolios wherever necessary. If, however, the
leaders wished to suggest the names of any additional members,2 he hoped they
would let him have them well in advance of the 19th.
Continuing, His Excellency explained that decisions at joint meetings of the
two groups representing the successor governments would not be taken by a
majority vote. If the subject in question was likely to affect either of the future
Governments’ freedom of action, he would refer it to the Partition Council.
It was not his intention, however, to call such a joint meeting. The provision,
however, was necessary, for there might always crop up some emergent matters
which might necessitate such a joint meeting.
In the course of subsequent discussion, the following suggestions were
made- —
(a) the words ‘Indian departments’ should be replaced by the words ‘India
Departments’ wherever they occurred in the draft order.
(b) the date from which the order was to take effect should be inserted in the
order and the communique.
(c) any order of some importance on policy and such matters passed by
either group should be communicated to the other.
(d) paragraph 4 in the draft communique might be reworded as follows to
make for greater clarity: —
“The personnel who have chosen to serve in the Pakistan Government will
be withdrawn from the existing departments and will staff the Pakistan
departments which will be organised at once in Delhi and will be in charge of
Members of the Pakistan Cabinet. The remaining personnel will staff India
Departments which will be in charge of Members of the India Cabinet.’’
It was agreed that the suggestions at (a), (b) and (c) above should be adopted.
As regards (d) above, His Excellency said he would consider amending para¬
graph 4 of the draft communique if the Hon’ble the Finance Member would
give him a draft showing the lines on which he desired it to be reworded.3 The
Press Communique would be issued on the morning of the 19th on the assum-
1 See No. 11 6. 2 See No. iio, note 5.
3 In a minute dated 16 July 1947 and subsequently approved by Lord Mountbatten, Sir G. Abell explained
that, after discussion with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, paragraph 4 of the draft communique had been
amended as follows : ‘The personnel who have chosen to serve in Pakistan will be withdrawn from the
existing Departments and will staff Pakistan Departments which will be organised at once in Delhi and
will be in charge of the Pakistan Members of the Cabinet. The remaining personnel will staff the existing
Departments, which will be in charge of the India Members of the Government.’ (emphasis in original)
According to Liaquat, the change in the first sentence was necessary to avoid giving the impression that
portfolios were being taken away from the Muslim League and left with the Congress group. The last
sentence of the revised paragraph had been drafted by Abell and accepted by Liaquat as a compromise.
R/3/1/160: f 140.
i8 6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
tion that the Royal assent to the India Independence Bill was received on the
18th.4
His Excellency said that his intention was that officers who had opted to
serve in Pakistan would automatically be transferred to Pakistan Departments.
After that, however, both governments would have the liberty to make internal
transfers in their own departments. In the case of the India Government de¬
partments this would be subject to the decision already taken by the Cabinet in
circulation that no fresh appointments would be made for a period of 3 months
save in exceptional circumstances.
The 'standstill’ agreement would also come to an end as from that date, the
arrangement requiring Secretaries to send decisions to P.S.V. being replaced
by the undertaking that the respective India and Pakistan Secretaries would
show each other the more important of the decisions they take, and the decisions
which in some way concern both areas.5
His Excellency said that additional Members of either government, if any,
would be sworn in on the 19th. He would ask his legal adviser, Sir George
Spence, to examine the question whether the existing Members should also be
sworn in afresh on that date.6
4 In his secret letter No. 1446/36 of 16 July, Sir G. Abell informed Mr Menon of the amendments (includ¬
ing the amended version of paragraph 4) which had been made to the draft communique and stated that
Menon would presumably be publishing the Order in a Gazette Extraordinary. Ibid., f 153.
5 In his secret letter No. 1446/36 dated 16 July 1947, Sir G. Abell asked Mr Patel for confirmation that he
would take the necessary action in this respect after the communique and Order had been issued.
Patel replied on 17 July that he would take the necessary action. R/3/1/160: ff 154 and 164.
6 In his secret letter No. 1446/36 dated 16 July 1947, Sir G. Abell asked Sir G. Spence whether, if new
members of either government were appointed, they could take the same oath as already prescribed.
In his letter dated 17 July to Mr Patel, Abell stated that Spence had confirmed this point. R/3/1/160:
ff 155 and 171.
128
Sir G. Abell to Mr Harris
Telegram , R\3\i\i6o: f 149
immediate new Delhi, 16 July 1947 , 11. 45 am
secret Received: 16 July , 1.00 pm
No. 1985-S. Your 9088 of 15th July.1 Reconstitution of Government. Viceroy
understands that intention of Congress Group is not to introduce any new
members of Cabinet but simply to double up portfolios. Both groups are how¬
ever being asked if they wish to recommend appointment of further members
and if recommendations are received a telegram will of course be sent asking
for the King’s approval. Matter is being put up to Cabinet today.2
1 No. no, note 5.
2 See No. 127. This telegram was evidently drafted before the Cabinet meeting took place.
JULY 1947
IS?
129
Mr Gandhi to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Rl3lil94: f 30
BHANGI COLONY, NEW DELHI, l6 July I947
Dear Friend,
I had a long talk with Panditji about Kashmir.1 He is firmly of opinion that I
should go in any case, not minding if Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah or his deputy goes
after my visit. He thinks and I agree that if now my visit is postponed, it will
disappoint many persons in Kashmir. That I may not be allowed to see Sheikh
Abdulla Sahib should not affect the contemplated visit one way or the other.
In the circumstances, I suggest that you should telegraph to the Maharaja
Saheb that as my visit would not mean any speeches or public meetings, it
should not cause any embarrassment to the State and that I should go to
Kashmir at the earliest possible moment.
As I have said to you my suggestion is subject to your wish not to interfere
with Panditji’s wishes in the matter. If for any reason you wish otherwise, I
would not go.
If I go I would go as a private visitor. Hence I would not think of putting the
the Maharaja Saheb to any trouble on my account. Friends would make
arrangements for my stay.
Finally I should add that if for any reason, I do not go to Kashmir, most
probably Panditji would want to go for two or three days, though he would
prefer my going.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. GANDHI
1 See No. 78.
130
Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart ( North-West Frontier Province) to
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Rl3/ili65:ff 16-19
SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PESHAWAR, l6 July I94J
D.O. NO. GH-I27
Dear Lord Mounthatten,
Reference my signal CA-145 dated 15th July 1947.1
I attach my report2 on my talk with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr.
1 Giving advance notice of the proposal for Abdul Ghaftar Khan to go to Delhi to meet Mr Jinnah so
that, if Lord Mounthatten thought fit, Jinnah could be informed ‘with a view to delaying any decisions
on future set up of government [of] this province until Abdul Ghaffar’s proposals considered.’ R/3/1/165 :
f 15.
2 See Enclosure.
1 88
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Khan Sahib on 14th July. It is in telegraphic form because I drafted it as a
telegram. I then heard that an officer was going to Delhi by air and so decided
that a possible few hours delay would not matter and that it would be best to
send it by hand.
2. It may be that I have been led up the garden path, and all that the Con¬
gress Party want is to remain in power and are prepared to do anything to do so.
It may be that they are trying to postpone any decision to dismiss them after
the Referendum, or are seeking to find some excuse for not resigning then.
However, I believe that slight though the modifications in Abdul Ghaffar
Khan’s demands are they might not be totally unacceptable, and I am sure that
if the two parties can be brought to any sort of agreement it will be a great help
for the future. I believe too that the Congress Party may be seriously seeking a
compromise: there was a report which I saw last night that Abdul Ghaffar
Khan was trying to find a way to one through the Pir of Manki.
I have only a very shght hope that I may be right. I do not like the campaign
of vilification of the conduct of the Referendum which has been started. Dr.
Khan Sahib himself only yesterday made the most sweeping accusations against
the officials connected with it. They are a most illogical and prejudiced lot of
men, and I mistrust the motives at the back of this campaign. Nevertheless I
feel that any step which may lead to a peaceful solution is worth trying.
Yours sincerely,
R. M. M. LOCKHART
Enclosure to No. 130
SECRET AND PERSONAL PESHAWAR, l6 July 1947
NO. GH-I25
First Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib came to tea on 14th.
Afterwards I had discussion with them lasting about three-quarters hour.
Second I started by saying I had not invited Abdul Ghaffar Khan to talk
politics, but with object of meeting him. I felt however that all three of us had
welfare of Province as our first interest, and wished above all for peaceful
solution to its present troubles. I was most anxious to know what the position
would be on August 15th and line their (Congress) Party proposed to adopt.
I would therefore be very grateful if they would tell me what was in their
minds about future.
Third Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who throughout was amiable, spoke at some
length, very quietly and mostly in Urdu. He stressed his desire for peace and
his horror of present bad relations between Muslims of opposing parties in the
Province. He assured me that he would do nothing to encourage any violence
or ill-feeling, in fact he would do everything in his power to prevent them.
JULY 1947
Fourth He then referred without rancour to his failure to secure Jinnah’s
agreement to what he said were his three main points, namely:
(a) complete provincial autonomy;
(b) the right to admission to the N.W.F.P. of contiguous territories in¬
habited by Pathans (By this he meant areas such as Baluchistan, Tribal
Territory and parts of Western Punjab on banks of Indus);
( c ) to the Province’s right to secede from Pakistan if it so desired.
Fifth We all three then discussed these points. Discussion remained quiet and
amicable. It ended in my asking Abdul Ghaffar Khan if he would be willing to
meet Jinnah again. He said he would.
Sixth I then suggested that he should modify his demands on Jinnah. After
some discussion he agreed that he would be willing to negotiate with Mr.
Jinnah on the following terms and if Jinnah agreed to them his party would
accept Pakistan:
(a) Complete provincial autonomy for the Province in all matters except
(i) Defence,
(ii) External Affairs,
(iii) Communications.
(b) the right of any party to move for the secession of the Province from the
Dominion in the same way that a Dominion has the right to secede from
the Commonwealth should it so desire.
(r) That it is open to areas contiguous to the Province which are included in
the present boundaries of British India and are inhabited by Pathans to
ask to become part of the N.W.F.P., and if they do to be included in it.
Seventh If Jinnah is willing to negotiate on these terms Khan Abdul
Ghaffar Khan is willing to fly to Delhi at once. He would like to take with
him Qazi Ataullah Khan, Revenue Minister, and two attendants.
Eighth I then asked what they saw happening if Jinnah agreed to these terms.
The answer was that one solution would be that the present Ministry would
continue until a general election under the new Constitution had been held.
In reply to my query they agreed that it would be desirable to include at any
rate one Muslim League Minister in the Ministry. Abdul Ghaffar Khan said
that he had himself suggested this previously.
Ninth Although I am dubious of Jinnah’s reactions to eight above I see
possibility of peaceful settlement, at least for a time, if Jinnah and Abdul
Ghaffar could meet again and reach some agreement on lines of proposals now
made. I hope Your Excellency also will agree that meeting is worthwhile and
persuade Jinnah to agree to it.
190
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Tenth I would add that in informal talk with Ministers 14th morning
Qazi Ataullah, Revenue Minister, said that what their party resented was being
thrown to Pakistan. What they would like would be for the Province to
remain excluded from Pakistan and be governed under Government of India
Act 1935 until they had been able to consider the new Pakistan Constitution.
After such consideration they would be in a position to negotiate with Pakistan
the terms on which they would enter it. It was being compelled to join Pakistan
unconditionally that they disliked. The referendum was not fair as it was
impracticable to join Hindustan, and unjust to be forced into Pakistan when
they could not influence in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly (where they
would have only three representatives out of 42) the terms of their inclusion.
Eleventh I realise that Qazi’s views amount to non-acceptance of H.M.G.’s
plan, but I mention it to show way some Congress Party’s minds are working.
It indicates risk of civil disobedience campaign if Congress cannot be brought
to accept Pakistan on some basis of agreement.
Twelfth I would also add that Congress leaders may now be affected by
anxiety about their personal safety under Pakistan. Some Muslim League
leaders have made wild statements about anyone opposing Pakistan being
‘‘Kafirs” and also about hanging traitors.
Thirteenth I urge therefore that Jinnah should meet Abdul Ghaffar and Qazi
and negotiate on points in eight above, and also if agreement on these is reached
on possibility of forming a coalition Ministry to carry on until a general
election.
Fourteenth If you agree and Jinnah is willing could special aircraft be made
available urgently.
Fifteenth Dr. Khan Sahib has seen and agreed paras above.
Sixteenth There are indications that Congress Party are starting campaign
to show that referendum has not been properly conducted. Their criticisms are
that there have been many bogus votes and officials have not been impartial.
We shall no doubt be able to refute these accusations, but I regard campaign as
indication that Congress Ministry are out to justify refusal to resign on result
of referendum.
JULY 1947
191
131
Mr Abbott to Sir G. Abell
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab,
Part 11(b)
CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, l6 July I947
D.O NO. G.S.438
My dear Abell,
H.E. the Governor asks me to write to you in connection with his two letters
of the 13th July, Nos. 695 and 696, 1 which dealt with a dispute in the Partition
Committee here about certain adjustments pending the decision of the
Boundary Commission. In the latter (and Secret) letter H.E. dealt with the
various possibilities arising from the possible dates on which the Boundary
Commission’s award would be announced. H.E. has asked me to make a special
request for as much advance intimation not only of the date of the award but
also of its contents as can be given. Whatever the date and whatever Govern¬
ment will be in power when the award is announced, it will be necessary to
take precautions, especially in those districts which are likely to be affected,
particularly those in the Central Punjab.
Yours sincerely,
S. E. ABBOTT
1 Nos. 89 and 90.
132
H.M. Minister Kabul to Government of India, External AJJairs and
Commonwealth Relations Department
Telegram, LfP &S / 12/1812: j 278
immediate kabul, 16 July 1947, 3.40 pm
Received: 17 July, 10.45 pm
No. 64. My immediately preceding telegram1 and Katodon No. 62. 2 I had
long talk with Afghan Prime Minister yesterday and tried to convince him of
unwisdom of Afghan Press and Radio campaign especially the latter. Prime
Minister reiterated that their interest in Afghans of North West Frontier
Province was natural and not unfriendly to us but that they had been compelled
to allow young Afghan element certain latitude. He was however extremely
Not printed. 2 Not printed but see No. 142, note 1.
I
192
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
reasonable and promised to take my advice and order immediate discon¬
tinuance of radio and moderation of Press campaign.3 He was also worried
about the future of tribal areas especially in view of the clause in Indian
Independence Act annulling existing agreements.
2. Assuming that North West Frontier Province referendum goes in favour
of Pakistan I urged H.R.H. to see Mr Jinnah in Delhi and discuss with him
both possibility of issuing such announcement regarding autonomy of North
West Frontier Province within Pakistan orbit as would satisfy Afghan opinion
and also any steps which might be possible to ensure co-operation between
Afghanistan and Pakistan in settling future of tribal areas so that tribes should
not be tempted to play off one side against the other. It has been suggested that
North West Frontier Province should be renamed Pathanistan.
3. Perceptibly Mahmud had originally intended going to Karachi via
Lahore but readily agreed to change his plans. He further suggested that it
might be useful if his Government could later send a special emissary to Mr
Jinnah or could receive a Pakistan representative in Kabul to discuss all matters
of mutual interest. Afghan pride has rightly or wrongly been very hurt at
Government of India’s refusal to receive their proposed mission. I hope I have
not exceeded my authority in encouraging Prime Minister to visit Delhi but
provided always that he maintains his present reasonable attitude this seems to
me to offer greatest hope for satisfactory settlement. It inevitably involves
withdrawal by Afghanistan but enables this to be done without too much loss
of face. It might also be of help to new Pakistan if Mr Jinnah sees Afghan Prime
Minister personally. If H.E. the Viceroy could also see him and perhaps show
some hospitality I feel confident that it should be possible to bring Afghanistan
and Pakistan together in fruitful co-operation.
Repeated to Secretary of State and North West Frontier Province (copy by
post to Baluchistan).
3 In his tel. No. 68 of 20 July, Sir G. Squire reported that the Afghan Prime Minister had kept his promise
and stopped all radio propaganda since 15 July. Only one article had since appeared in the Afghan press
which explained the difference between Pathans and Indians and demanded a reference to the U.N.O.
L/P &S/12/1812: f 272.
Lord Ismay to Sir A. Carter
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Governors-
General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of-— Part (/)
INDIA OFFICE, 16 July 1947
Sir Archibald Carter,
I think that the Viceroy will be very disappointed that for the overriding reasons
JULY I947
193
set out in the attached telegram1 it was impossible to make the announcement
that he suggested in his 1944-S.2 Nevertheless I submit that it is most desirable
that there should be a very early announcement about Sir Archibald Nye and
Sir John Colville, even if all the other announcements must be delayed. To us
in India the Congress invitation to these two British Governors to remain in
charge of the two largest Provinces was one of the most significant developments
of the last three months, and I believe that it would be very welcome news
throughout this country.
2. I venture to put this in because I had a long talk with Lord Halifax
yesterday afternoon about his speech in the Lords today, and he volunteered
the suggestion that the sooner the announcement of British Governors
could be made the better.3
ISM AY
1 In this telegram, No. 9089 dated 15 July 1947, Lord Listowel explained that time did not permit an
announcement about the Governors to be made either on the third reading of the Bill in the Commons
or when it passed through all its stages in the Lords. He also pointed out that the India Office had yet to
receive acceptances for any of the new appointments. L/P &J/10/141 : f 126.
2 In this telegram dated 14 July 1947, Lord Mountbatten had suggested that an announcement about the
Governors, which would include a reference to the fact that the Dominion of India had asked Sir John
Colville and Sir Archibald Nye to continue in office, should be made on the third reading of the Bill
in the Commons. L/P &J/10/141 : f 127.
3 On 16 July, in a reply to Lord Ismay, Sir A. Carter minuted as follows: ‘I think we all realise the
importance of announcing as soon as possible some of the Governors’ appointments. Obviously we
need not wait till all are fixed. We are hoping to get some announcement out early next week’. Emphasis
in original. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Governors-General and Governors of
Provinces, Appointment of — Part (I).
134
Notes by Mr /. D. Scott and Sir G. Abell
Rl3liji7i:ff 7-8
16 July i$4y
The Agenda for tomorrow’s meeting of the Partition Council consists of three
main items. All of them are straightforward except the first, and H.E. may
accept the recommendation of the Steering Committee in each case.
The first item is the plan of action in the event of disturbances on the
boundaries of the two Dominions after August 15th. The Commander-in-
Chief has sent a letter to H.E.,1 which has been circulated as the agenda for this
item, suggesting that the Joint Defence Council should have the authority of
both Dominion Governments to declare any affected districts as ‘‘disturbed
areas”. When this had been done, the Supreme Commander would appoint
1 No. 102.
194
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
a British Commander to have military control over the area, and operational
control of such troops and air forces as were considered to be necessary.
This seems to me a thoroughly bad proposal. The Joint Defence Council has
been agreed to for the specific purpose of dividing up the defence Services, and
it has been agreed that it will have no operational responsibility whatever after
August 15th. Even if the Partition Council were to agree to the present sug¬
gestion, which is doubtful, it would in my opinion place H.E., the
Commander-in-Chief, the British local Commander, and other British
officers in an impossible position: whatever they did would be criticised, and
they would have no effective means ultimately of exercising their responsibility.
Since it is suggested that the two Governments should agree to place troops at
the disposal of the British Commander, it is obvious that at any time the
aggrieved Government could withdraw its troops. Moreover, it is possible that
trouble might continue for many months on the border, during which time
the Joint Defence Council will be coming to an end. Finally, very awkward
positionsmight arise, such as a mutiny by a Hindu Sikh battalion, which might
involve the use of British troops to suppress it or even to safeguard the lives of
the British officers handling the situation.
The proper solution of this matter of disturbances along the border is for the
two Home and Defence Ministers of the respective Dominions to keep in
close touch with each other and to arrange together, on behalf of their Govern¬
ments, whatever action they consider necessary to implement a solution to
which they have already agreed. There should be no British responsibility in
this matter.
I. D. SCOTT
Above note by DPSV. I agree with him that there are objections to the pro¬
posed arrangement, but I cannot think of a better one. In a matter like this
however if both the Dominions want the Joint Defence Council to control
matters on the frontier, the Joint Defence Council must clearly do so. In that
case, it is almost inevitable that the over-all Commander in the disturbed
area should be British, and whatever the objections, I think this will have to be
accepted, provided the two Dominions accept it. There is of course no question
whatever of using British troops, and it seems to me most important that the
British troops should be removed from Lahore at the earliest possible time, as
otherwise they may get involved, and secondly because they occupy accom¬
modation which may well be wanted for Indian reinforcements.
G. E. B. ABELL
JULY I947
195
135
Note by Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Partition Council Papers
SECRET
undated
WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES
i. H.M.G. have announced that the withdrawal of the British Army from
India will commence immediately after the transfer of power, will be carried
out as quickly as shipping permits and is expected to be completed by about the
end of 1947.
2. H.M.G. have also agreed with the conception that British Forces in India,
after 15th August, should have no operational function whatever, and that they
will therefore not be available to be called upon for such purposes as internal
security, use on the North West Frontier or, of course, use in the States. They
would be regarded as continuing their training here until transport arrives to
take them away.
3. H.M.G. have, however, represented that it may be of advantage to all
parties concerned to retain, for the time being, the R.A.F. transport squadrons
and their maintenance organisation at present in the Karachi-Mauripur area.
These squadrons might, it is suggested, be of great use to both Dominions in
maintaining internal military communications, and assisting in the training of
Pakistan and Indian Dakota squadrons. They could also be available in a non-
operational role in the event of serious internal unrest, bearing in mind that
both Dominions will themselves only be able to provide similar facilities to a
limited degree for some time to come. The presence of these R.A.F. units would
also assist both Governments in providing air transport facilities and mainten¬
ance of essential routes in and through India. One of these squadrons would be
moved from Karachi to Dominion of India territory.
4. The question of whether or not these transport squadrons should stay
on for a period will be considered at the next Partition Council meeting.1 If
they do remain, they would be under the general control of the Supreme
Commander through the Air Officer Commanding in Chief.
1 At a meeting of the Partition Council on 17 July representatives of both the future Dominions accepted
the proposal to retain the R.A.F. Transport Squadrons provisionally up to 31 March 1948. Mountbatten
Papers, Partition Council Minutes, Case No. P.C. 54/6/47. This decision was conveyed by Lord
Mountbatten in tel. 2034-S of 18 July. After some initial hesitation, the Air Ministry in London accepted
Mountbatten’s suggestion in para. 5 of No. 124 to the effect that the number of squadrons should be
reduced from three to two and that one of them should be located in India. L/WS/1/1092: ff 239, 221.
196
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mountbatten of Burma ( via India Office)
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Defence of India
and Pakistan, Part 1(b)
IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, l6 July I947 , 7. 00 pm
secret Received: 17 July, 9.34 am
PRIVATE
No. 90. It has occurred to me that you might use ridiculous claims of Afghan
Govt.1 to point out to Partition Council or perhaps to leaders individually how
essential it is for India and Pakistan to have a unified defence policy. Nothing
conduces to unity more than a common danger and a common fear.
2. I cannot for example see how Pakistan airforce unless supported by Indian
airforce could compete with anything but most trivial tribal incursion.
1 See Vol. XI, Nos. 140, 212, 272, 309, 377, 395, 431, 453, 463, para, v, 486, Minute 4, 517.
137
The Earl of Listowel to Sir T. Shone ( via Cabinet Office )
IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET
PERSONAL
UKRI 453. i. His Majesty’s Government consider that of the defence issues
that will have to be discussed with the New Dominions, the most urgent and
immediate problem is to obtain agreements allowing us to continue to maintain
facilities for the transit of military aircraft through India. The present military
routes carry mail, troops and Government passengers to destinations in the
Far East. It is essential that there should be no gap in the continuity of the
provision of these facilities and arrangements to this end should, therefore, be
concluded with the minimum of delay. Otherwise we stand to face withdrawal
of facilities, involving a complete cessation of service on some routes, and in
others a temporary stop until alternatives can be arranged.
2. The Viceroy has agreed that this is an issue that must be dealt with
immediately. His No. 1800-S of 7th July1 refers. He has suggested that you
should negotiate forthwith with the Party leaders, as representing future
successor authorities, with the object of obtaining their consent to continuation,
after August 15th, of present facilities, in form of a stand still agreement.
Telegram, L/WS/i I1046: jj 201-2
16 July 1947, 4.32 pm
JULY I947
197
3. Will you, therefore, initiate negotiations with the Indian leaders at an
early date to secure a stand still agreement for the continuation of the existing
military aircraft transit facilities after August 15th. Before opening negotiations
you should consult the A.O.C. in C. and ascertain his requirements: —
(a) For locating R.A.F. personnel and equipment
(b) For facilities from D.G.C.A. to permit the continued operation of existing
military aircraft transit facilities.
4. Negotiations for the continuance of air transit rights after the expiry of
the stand still agreement will form part of the general negotiations for the
securing of British strategic requirements, which, it is hoped will take place
later.2
1 Vol. XI, No. 556.
2 In IRKU 61 1 of 13 August Sir T. Shone reported that Mr Symon had called on Pandit Nehru on 21
July and Mr Jinnah on 22 July and left with each an aide-memoire which had been agreed with the
A.O.C.-in-C. A written reply from the Provisional Government of Pakistan had been received and was
‘satisfactory’. Despite frequent reminders a reply from the Government of India had yet to be received
but the High Commission had been assured informally that it would be satisfactory. In tel. 680 of 30
August Sir T. Shone confirmed that the Indian Government had now notified their agreement to the
continuance of existing military aircraft facilities ‘it being understood that negotiations for their future
continuance will form part of the later negotiations about defence matters between H.M.G. and India’.
L/WS/1/1046: fF 119 and 105.
138
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir F. Burrows (Bengal)
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Bengal,
Situation in, Part 1(b)
important new Delhi, 16 July 1947, has pm
SECRET
No. 1993-S. Pandit Nehru asked1 me whether I was satisfied that you have
been able to take adequate precautions against the outbreak of trouble in
Calcutta when the result of the Boundary Commission is announced. I should
be grateful for your appreciation of the situation which will then arise so that
I may reassure him.
2. It is clear to me that Congress fear that the League intend to carry out
their threats to wreck the city before they turn it over to the Dominion of
India.
1 No record of a conversation on this matter has been traced.
198
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
139
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Sir A. Hydari [Assam)
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Assam,
Situation in
CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, l6 July 1047, HAS pm
IMPORTANT
No. 2000— S. Pandit Nehru tells me1 he has asked you for a report on the
conduct of the referendum with reference to complaints by the Congress.2
2. I have also received complaints from the Muslim League,3 and before
Nehru mentioned the matter, I had told Jinnah4 I would not take any action.
I also refused Nehru’s request,5 and am glad to learn from your letter of the
nth July,6 which has just arrived, that you are fully satisfied about the conduct
of the referendum. I am sending him a copy of paras 5, 6 and 7. I realise that
complaints are almost inevitable in such circumstances, and so far as I can judge,
the referendum has been efficiently and impartially run.
1 See No. 95. 2 See No. 94. 3 and 4 See No. 98, note 2. 5 See No. 98.
6 No. 68.
140
Sir E. Mieville to Lord Ismay [via India Office )
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Governors-General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of —
Part [I)
private new Delhi, 16 July 1947, 11.30 pm
Received: 17 July, 3.35 am
No. 1996-S. Your telegram No. 88 of 15 th July.1 I saw Jinnah this evening, and
he is most anxious that Rowlands should come out as his Chief Adviser, but
does not feel that it would be fair to Rowlands or to Pakistan unless he were
able to stay for six months. He pointed out that Pakistan were starting from
scratch, and, as such, were at a great disadvantage with India and that they
would need all the help they could get. He asked me, therefore, to put it to you
as strongly as I could that he did hope that H.M.G. would see their way to
sparing, as he put it, one of their best men to help him for six months in his
initial difficulties.
The Viceroy entirely agrees with Jinnah in his proposal and is prepared to
JULY I947
199
appeal to the Prime Minister, if you think that would help. He further wishes
me to point out to you that it would be a great asset to have such a contact as
Rowlands in Karachi.
1 In this telegram Lord Ismay informed Lord Mountbatten that Sir A. Rowlands could not be spared for
more than two or three months at most. Although Ministers had yet to be consulted, Ismay felt that
Mountbatten should approach Mr Jinnah and ask whether he wished to have Rowlands’ services for
two to three months from 15 August. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Governors-
General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of — Part (I).
141
Mr V. P. Menon to Sir P. Patrick
Telegram: Rj^l 1/138: f 131
MOST IMMEDIATE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, STATES DEPARTMENT,
secret 16 July 1947, 11.33 pm
Received: 16 July , 11.40 pm
No. 5577. 1 have just seen Crown Representative’s reply1 to Secretary of State’s
telegram No. 9082 dated 15th July.2 H.E. had informal talks with representa¬
tives of Mysore, Baroda, Gwalior, Bikaner, Jaipur and Jodhpur on accession on
three subjects before 15th August.3 Their reactions are favourable. Subsequently
under H.E.’s instructions I met all these representatives and others. After dis¬
cussion with them some of them have definitely promised to accede to the
Dominion on these three subjects; others agreed in principle but subject to
discussion on details. I have now prepared without committing my Member
or H.E. a very tentative draft Instrument of Accession which I have handed
over to representatives of certain major States. We are discussing this either
tomorrow or the day after. While one cannot predict the ultimate outcome,
Secretary of State could say if this telegram reaches you in time that informal
discussions have been going on with major States and their reactions are
encouraging.
1 and 2 Tel. 9082 asked for information about the course of discussions which it was understood were in
progress with representatives of Hyderabad, Mysore and Travancore. In tel. 1986-S of 16 July the
Crown Representative had replied that discussions had so far been held only with representatives of
Hyderabad who were now reporting to the Nizam. L/P & S/13/ 1 848 : ft 160, 156.
3 For Lord Mountbatten’s talks with Sir B. L. Mitter and the Maharaja of Jodhpur, see No. 105. For his
talks with Sardar Panikkar and the Maharaja of Gwalior, see Mountbatten Papers, Viceroy’s Interviews
Nos. 155 and 161. No record of the talks with the representatives of Mysore and Jaipur has been traced.
200
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
142
Government of India , External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
Department to Secretary of State
Telegram, L\P &SI12/1812: f 291
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, l6 July I947, 11. $5 pm
Received: 16 July, 11.40 pm
No. 5574. Katodon 62. 1 Future of North West Frontier Province. In view of
our earlier refusal to accept anything in nature of an (? Afghan) Mission we see
no reason to request American Minister to suggest to Afghan Government that
they should send a suitable emissary to discuss whole matter with Viceroy
or any Indian political leaders. Any such suggestion can only create impression
on Afghans that their claim to voice in future status of frontier areas is still
open to discussion.2
Repeated to H.M.M. Kabul, No. 162, Government of the North West
Frontier Province, Peshawar, Indian Embassy Washington (copies by post to
U.K. Ffigh Commissioner and Baluchistan).
1 In his tel. 62 of 13 July Sir G. Squire reported that the American Minister in Kabul had informed him
that neither he nor the State Department were at present willing to give any advice to the Afghan
Government except to suggest that they should send a suitable emissary to discuss the whole matter
with the Viceroy. Squire added that Shah Mahmud (the Afghan Prime Minister) expected to leave for
America by air in the next fortnight and he (Squire) agreed that if he could stop en route in Delhi and
see the Viceroy and Mr Jinnah this might help. L/P &S/12/1812: f 292.
2 In tel. 68 of 17 July the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs commented that H.M.G. agreed that a
misleading impression might be created if the Government of India were to initiate a suggestion that
an Afghan emissary should specially visit Delhi. He pointed out, however, that this would not arise
since the Afghan Prime Minister planned to pass through Delhi in any case, and added that ‘H.M.G.
would see some advantage in personal contact with Shah Mahmud at this juncture’. L/P &S/12/1812:
f 281.
143
Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma (via India Office )
Rffififi6i: f 22
IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, l6 July I947, 8.45 pm
secret Received: 17 July , 9.30 pm
PRIVATE
No. 89. In continuation of my telegram 8840. 1 I have had a further long
meeting2 with Chiefs of Staff this morning on the subject of strategic require¬
ments. I have emphasised that detailed negotiations cannot be undertaken until
new governments have been set up, but Chiefs of Staff are anxious lest, if no
JULY I947
201
mention, even in general terms, of these negotiations is made in advance of
setting up of their governments, the Indian leaders may claim that we had not
been frank in not telling them about necessity for these negotiations before¬
hand.
2. I said that the most that you might be prepared to do would be to take an
early opportunity in pointing out to Indian leaders that there would of course
be a number of defence arrangements of mutual advantage both to Indian
Dominions and to remainder of Commonwealth that would have to be settled
when both governments were in a position to discuss these matters.3 A military
delegation would then be sent out to India for detailed talks. The main point
of these arrangements would be to provide necessary British assistance to
India and Pakistan for their own defence against external aggression and to give
both India and Pakistan as full and free members of British Commonwealth
opportunity of offering assistance to other members of Commonwealth if in
any contingency they so undertake.
3. I am bringing out with me for your personal information an India Office
statement of proposals and I have emphasised that when time comes Chiefs of
Staff must be prepared to send out a fairly high-ranking delegation to settle
details. The discussions will be of course under aegis of High Commissioner.
1 No. 49. 2 L/WS/1/1046: ff 197-200.
3 The minutes of Lord Ismay’s meeting with the Chiefs of Staff on 16 July read as follows in this respect:
‘He [Ismay] suggested that the approach to the Indian Dominion Governments should be made,
firstly, by demonstrating to them their military weakness arising from the political decision to partition
India. The defence tasks that would be likely to face them in the future would then be stated and it
could be emphasised that in meeting these problems they would be gravely handicapped unless they
could rely on the support not only of the United Kingdom but also of the remainder of the Common¬
wealth. The steps that could be taken to assist India could then be stated and arising from these our
strategic requirements could then be enumerated and elaborated. The emphasis must be laid on the
benefits accruing to India and Pakistan of remaining within the Commonwealth.’ In subsequent
discussion general agreement was expressed when Ismay suggested that he should be provided with the
views of the Chiefs of Staff on the manner in which the approach to the Dominion Governments on
defence matters should be made. Ibid.
144
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
Telegram , L/P &Jf iof 1 17: j 136
IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, 1 6 July 1947, 10. 35 pm
Received: 1 7 July , 9.30 am
No. 9156. Your telegram No. 1979-S of July 15th.1 I repeat below relevant
passage from Henderson’s speech, which differs in some important respects from
1 No. 121.
202
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
version given you by Jinnah and Liaquat: Begins. The provision that other
factors will be taken into account has been made primarily to enable the
Commission to have regard to the special circumstances of the Sikh com¬
munity in the Punjab, where considerations such as the location of their
religious shrines can reasonably be taken into account up to a point. I would,
however, emphasise to the Committee that it is for the Commission itself to
decide what are other factors and how much importance should be attached
to all or any of them. Ends.2
2 Lord Mountbatten sent Mr Jinnah a copy of this telegram on 18 July. R/3/1/1 57 : f 179.
145
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl oj Listowel
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Transfer of Power, Ceremonies for , Part I (j)
EXPRESS NEW DELHI, l6 fuly 1Q47, 11. Ip, pm
confidential Received : 17 fuly , 3.35 am
No. 1999-S. In order to arrange the ceremonies of August 15th, I should be
grateful for guidance on the following point: Do I cease to be Governor-
General as from one minute past midnight on the night of the I4th/i5th
August? In that case it will be necessary for me to be sworn in again before I
proceed in state to the Constituent Assembly on the morning of the 15th.
Will you please also send the form of Oath which I shall be required to take.
Presumably this will be the same for Jinnah, and I should like to give him a
copy as soon as possible so that he also can make arrangements for ceremonies in
Karachi.
146
Statement by Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar1
LIP&SI13I1842: ff 57-9
undated
Both the Houses of Parliament have now without division assented to pro¬
visions of Indian Independence Bill and on communication of assent of King
on Friday the Bill will become law. Thereafter Parliament will have no legis¬
lative or other authority over India. Two portions in parliamentary debate are
particularly notable, the first being Mr Attlee’s statement2 that there would be
no pressure either way, but even more significant is statement3 of Sir Hartley
JULY I947
203
Shawcross, Attorney General, who said we regard decision which States have
to take as being their decisions and we do not intend to bring any pressure of
any kind upon them. He further stated that he did not doubt that a State nego¬
tiating terms on which it might accede to a Dominion might make condition
that accession should be conditional on Dominion concerned remaimng within
Commonwealth.4 His Majesty the King who by virtue of treaties and agree¬
ments exercised paramountcy over Indian States has by his own voluntary act
given up his rights and obligations in respect of States and all treaties and
agreements entered into with him will be terminated from the 15th August
1947. In law as well as in fact Travancore will become an independent country
from that date, but will try its utmost to work in cooperation with rest of India
on such matters as regulation of electric power and transit arrangements, national
highways, railways, and sea and air communications, posts, telegraphs, tele¬
phones and wireless, passports, emigration, rights of movements, residence,
acquisition of property, validity of Indian currency, and several other matters.
Travancore has already expressed its assent to the continuance of existing
arrangements in regard to several topics pending final arrangements. With
disappearance of Treaties of 1795 and 1805 cash contribution that was agreed to
be paid under those Treaties will cease to be levied. In respect of defence
Travancore, having its own State Forces and its Armed Reserve Police, will
not ask for any help in matter of internal security. It is however prepared and
willing to place its armed forces at disposal of rest of India in order to resist
aggression. Such aggression will also be against declarations of U.N.O. and
defence in case of such aggression will be a world problem. No agreement as to
defence will however involve any subordination to or suzerainty of any other
part of India over Travancore. Travancore will not be a protectorate of any
other dominion or dominions. The State will be prepared to enter into arrange¬
ments regarding arms and equipments, with due regard to internal security
requirements and defence of India as a whole. As already stated such defence
will in circumstances of Travancore have to take into account Naval and Air
Forces requirements of future. The State will also expect and give free transit
to travellers, goods and merchandise and will be perfectly prepared to har¬
monise its import regulations with those of rest of India, import duties how¬
ever being levied and retained by Travancore as has been the custom. The
State had always had right to levy export duties and will maintain that right,
but will be ready to enter into a settlement with the rest of India on the rates
to be levied. Interportal convention has already been denounced by this Govt
and will cease to operate from the 15th of August as also provisions in regard
1 This statement was presumably made on 17 July, the day following the passing of the Indian Indepen¬
dence Bill in the House of Lords.
2 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 440, 14 July 1947, col. 112. See also No. 262 notes 3 and 4.
3 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 440, 14 July 1947, col. 101.
4 Ibid., cols. 116-7.
204
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
to customs and receipts under Cochin Harbour Agreements. Right already
existing in Travancore Govt to issue its own currency will be exercised and on
introduction of nickel coinage in what is now British India State is considering
question of issuing paper currency. The silver currency in State will be with¬
drawn on same day on which it is withdrawn in British India. The State will
recognise the currency and coinage of rest of India, subject to reciprocal
arrangements. Some confusion has been caused by remarks made during the
Parliamentary Debates as to international status of Indian States.5 They are
really beside the point, because international recognition of State has to be
earned by the State and Travancore will get such international recognition if
she is strong and united. There is no particular reason why she should be in a
worse position than Denmark, Switzerland and Siam. These considerations are
however material only if and when Travancore wishes or proposes to join the
United Nations Organisation. This is a matter to be decided in future and all
that Travancore is now concerned with is full freedom of trade and transit with
the rest of the world which is in the nature of things a matter of course.
5 cf. The exchanges between Lord Listowcl and Viscount Templewood during the debate on the
Independence Bill in the House of Lords on 16 July. Pari, Debs., 5th ser., H. of L., vol. 150, cols. 823-5.
147
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Telegram , L/P &J/ 10/82: fj 40-2
IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 1 7 July 1947, 2.00 am
Received: 17 July , 9.30 am
No. 9189. Your telegrams 1958-S1 and 1959-S.2 Interim Government. General
line taken in draft Order seems to me a satisfactory method of dealing with this
difficult situation. I have following suggestions to make on the terms of the
Order.
(1) I assume that Order will not now be issued until after the Indian Inde¬
pendence Bill has become law. I therefore suggest that reference to section 40
of ninth schedule to Govt of India Act be omitted. 9(i)(e) of the Bill gives full
authority for making of the Order and it would be wrong, I think, to imply
that the power is derived from Section 40(2) of the Schedule especially as what
you propose is inconsistent with 41(1) in that it excludes certain members of
Council from participation in its decisions on certain matters.
(2) As the new Dominions do not come into being until 15 th August I
suggest that word “future” be inserted before “Dominion of India” and
“Dominion of Pakistan” wherever they occur. Paragraph 6. I suggest that you
JULY I947
205
should insert after “Pakistan” the words “or is a case of common concern to the
two new Dominions”.
2. It is, of course, somewhat obscure how it is to be ensured that each of the
two Departments is aware what the other is doing and is able to protest against
any encroachment on its proper field. It can be argued that any matter of
common concern is predominantly the concern of the new Dominion of India
because the new Dominion of India is the largest part of the whole, but no
doubt imprecision on this point is a necessary part of the compromise. Is it also
intentional that there is no statement that matters of common concern will
be decided by the Council as a whole?
3. As regards your telegram 1958-S I agree that you must go ahead irres¬
pective of Muslim League reactions and that you should consult the two
Provisional Governments as regards adaptation of Government of India Act.
Is it, however, necessary to consult Pakistan Provisional Government about
North West Frontier Ministry? Legal position is that Governor appoints
Ministry in discretion under Section 50 subject to his instrument of instructions
and to your superintendence under Section 54 exercisable in discretion. When
the new Act comes into operation Governor will cease to have discretionary
power by Section 8(i)(c) and your control will, therefore, lapse. Constitu¬
tionally appointment of Ministries will then be a matter for Governor in
consultation with leaders of parties in local legislature, and it would seem
unfortunate to do anything which gives impression that we contemplate as
desirable control by Pakistan or India Government over appointment of
Ministries in Provinces which should be based on opinion in local legislature.
I do not, however, press this if you are satisfied that there are special circum¬
stances justifying consultation but suggest it would be preferable to consult
Jinnah and Liaquat as Muslim League leaders rather than proposed Provisional
Government.3
1 No. no.
2 Not printed. The telegram referred to transmitted the text of the Draft Order in No. 108, Enclosure 2.
3 A draft of this telegram, together with the two telegrams from the Viceroy, were forwarded by Lord
Listowel to Mr Attlee with the Secretary of State’s minute No. 126/47 of 16 July. Mr Attlee approved
the draft on the same day. L/P&J/10/82: flf 43 and 39.
20 6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
148
Meeting oj the Partition Council , Case Nos. P.C.47I61 47, 1 55/61 47, 56/6/47
and 57/6/47
Mountbatten Papers. Partition Council Minutes
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held on 17 July 1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , Mr Jinn ah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , S ardor Patel ,
Dr Rajendra Prasad, Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck, Sir P. Spens (No. P.C.
55/6/47), Sir E. Mieville, Sir G. Abell (No. P.C. 56/6/47), Mr H. M. Patel,
Mr Mohamad Ali, Brigadier Elliott, Mr Osman Ali, Lieutenant-Colonel Er shine
Crum.
Case No. P.C. 47/6/47 Plan of action in the event of possible clashes or
disturbances in the neighbourhood of the boundaries
between the two Dominions after 15th August.
his excellency said that he had not had an opportunity to discuss the note2
before the Council with the Commander-in-Chief. He felt that if the procedure
suggested by the C.-in-C. were agreed to, it would be essential that the two
Dominions should make it clear that they took full responsibility for the
association of British Officers who would be employed on this work and that
these officers were acting under instructions from the Dominion Governments.
He would have a draft statement prepared for the approval of both sides
covering this point, conveying their earnest and sincere assurances to the
minorities that their rights would be protected and that both Governments
would adopt ano reprisals policy, and warning all concerned that in the event
of trouble the full weight of the proposed machinery would be brought to bear
for its suppression.
the Commander-in-chief said that the disturbed areas in which this
machinery would be brought into operation would have to be defined, pre¬
ferably to correspond with civil districts, by the two Governments or the
Partition Council. The troops employed would be Indian, but there would be
a number of British Officers in command. His staff was working out details of
the possible areas which might be involved and the number of troops required
based on past experience. It was important to employ units of mixed class
composition as recent experience had shown that where a battalion composed
entirely of one class of soldiers was used, there were likely to be charges of
partiality. So far as the Punjab was concerned it was his intention to use the 4th
Indian Division commanded by Major General Rees which was already in
the area. He would attach to Major General Rees’s staff a senior Muslim officer
and a senior non-Muslim officer as advisers.
JULY 1947
207
Continuing, the commander-in-chief emphasised that for the sake of
avoiding confusion in the minds of officers and men who were conversant with
the existing law governing the use of troops in aid of civil power there should
be no change after the 15th August in that law for such period as these forces
were employed on this work.
In the course of subsequent discussion, the following points were made:
(a) It was not anticipated that there would be very serious trouble in Bengal
with the possible exception of the city of Calcutta. If, however, the necessity
arose, the same principles should apply in that province, his excellency
said that he had asked the Governor of Bengal to give him an appreciation of
his ability to maintain law and order in Calcutta and Bengal generally on the
date the decision of the Boundary Commission was announced.3
(b) The troops in the disturbed districts of the Punjab should be in position
by about the 7th or 8th of August.
(c) The Joint Defence Council should be constituted in sufficient time to meet
in a preliminary way by the first week of August. In the event of the Defence
Member Pakistan not being able to attend meetings summoned urgently to
take decisions on operational questions as opposed to policy questions, the
Pakistan High Commissioner in Delhi might be nominated as his representative.
(d) The High Commissioner would be at a disadvantage for this purpose as
he would be without expert advice. In cases of urgency it would be preferable
for the two Governors-General to discuss the matter over the secraphone, and
to agree upon a line of action.
(e) Generally speaking, 3 days’ notice of an intended meeting of the Joint
Defence Council should be given.
(J) The legal authority of the Joint Defence Council to declare martial law
in an area should be examined. The whole question of the composition, powers,
responsibility etc. of the Joint Defence Council would have to be considered
separately.
DECISION
The Council agreed:
(1) that action to deal with disturbances in the neighbourhood of the
boundaries between the two Dominions on or after the 15th August should be
on the lines indicated in the Commander-in-Chief’s note;
(2) that Major General Rees, Commander of the 4th Division should be
appointed as joint Commander on behalf of both Dominions to control all
1 This item has been taken from Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: India and Pakistan,
Plan of Action in event of clashes in neighbourhood of boundaries between the two Dominions.
2 See No. 102. 3 See No. 138.
208
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
troops operating in the defined areas in the Punjab, and that the chain of
control from the two Dominion Governments to Major General Rees should be
through the Joint Defence Council and the Supreme Commander. The
Council noted that the Commander-in-Chief would nominate a Muslim and a
Sikh officer of suitable seniority as advisers on Major General Rees’s staff;
(3) that the zones in which the troops would have to operate should be
defined by H.E.’s staff in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief and
submitted to the Partition Council for approval;
(4) that troops should be in position by the 7th or 8th of August at the
latest ;
(5) that there should be no change in the law governing the use of troops in
aid of the civil power after the 15 th August for such period as these forces were
employed on this work;
(6) that details of the organisation and the formal resolution of both Govern ¬
ments in the case of trouble should be incorporated in the statement which H.E.
was having prepared for issue over the signature of the members of the Parti¬
tion Council regarding protection of minorities’ rights, assurances of “no
reprisals” and the fact that such British Officers as would be engaged in this
work were acting under express instructions from and were directly responsible
to the two Dominion Governments;
(7) that a paper should be prepared defining the composition, powers and
responsibility of the Joint Defence Council for consideration by the Partition
Council.
Case No. P.C. 5 5/6/47 Arbitral Tribunal
The Council noted that Sir Patrick Spens had accepted the appointment of
Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal and recorded its appreciation of his accept¬
ance which it recognised was due to a high sense of duty on his part.
DECISION
The Council decided that:
(1) Sir Patrick Spens should be relieved of his office as Chief Justice of the
Federal Court from the day he took up his new appointment and that on the
conclusion of the work of the Tribunal he should accept no appointment,
official or non-official, in India (Sir Patrick Spens expressed his complete
agreement) ;
(2) the representatives of the India and Pakistan Governments should nomi¬
nate, in consultation with Sir Patrick Spens, one Judge each for appointment
on the Tribunal;
JULY I947
209
(3) in the event of either nominee not being able to attend any meeting of
the Tribunal, the party concerned should, in consultation with Sir Patrick,
nominate a substitute;
(4) the Tribunal should be set up as soon as the names of the two Judges
were agreed upon;
(5) the Tribunal should appoint its own stab after it is set up; it would pre¬
sumably be composed of Hindu, Muslim and British officials ;
(6) the terms of reference should be drawn up by Sir Patrick Spens, in
consultation with Mr Jinnah and Sardar Patel, and submitted to the Partition
Council for its approval;
(7) the Tribunal would be entitled to lay down its own procedure;
(8) parties on either side would be represented by counsel;
(9) the Tribunal would have the right to summon, if necessary, experts as
court witnesses ;
(10) the Tribunal should be located initially in Delhi which it was recog¬
nised would be the most convenient place, but that for good reasons it may
seek permission later to sit elsewhere;
(11) that the target date for completion of the work of the Tribunal should
be fixed at 31.3.48.
Case No. P.C. 56/6/47 Issues connected with the Partition work in the Punjab4
In answer to a query sir george abell said that the work of partition was
going ahead in the Punjab much on the same lines as were being followed at the
Centre and that the Partition Committee was being kept informed through
the Steering Committee on all matters of administration in the Province with
the exception of Law and Order which, since the withdrawal of the Muslim
League member from the Security Committee,5 was now solely the respon¬
sibility of the Government.
In the course of discussion the following points were made :
(a) It was desirable that both the Governments of the East and the West
Punjab should remain at Lahore with a view to facilitating the work of parti¬
tion. If Lahore goes to the West Punjab by the decision of the Boundary
Commission, the Government of the East Punjab would find no difficulty in
moving out at short notice to Simla which was the summer capital. Whichever
side lost Lahore would, of course, have to move out before the 15th August;
(fc) it was in all the circumstances best to proceed on the basis of the notional
boundary, and the Government of East Punjab should, therefore, prepare to
move to Simla without prejudice, of course, to the decision of the Boundary
Commission regarding Lahore;
4 See Nos. 81 and its Enclosure, 89 and its Appendix ‘A’, 90 and in.
5 See Vol. XI, No. 472.
210
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(c) the Boundary Commission might be asked to decide the question of
Lahore as a matter of priority. It was pointed out however, that such action
might prejudice acceptance by all parties of its subsequent decisions;
(d) the posting of officers should proceed on the basis of the notional bound¬
ary which was not likely to be greatly modified by the Boundary Commission.
The alternative proposal to set up joint administrations in all the 14 disputed
districts and then repost officers in accordance with the option, they had
exercised in the short period of two or three days between the announcement
of the Boundary Commission’s decision and the transfer of power would lead
to confusion and a breakdown of the administration ;
(e) trouble in any one part of the Province was likely to have repercussions
elsewhere. It was important, therefore, that as far as possible, the Governments
of the East and the West Punjab should each have its own administrative
machinery in position not later than 1st of August so that the problems of
law and order could be effectively tackled. It was pointed [out] that this should
be possible in all the Districts except possibly those regarding which there was
real dispute namely, Lahore, Amritsar and Gurdaspur;
( f) preparations for and actual posting of officers could be proceeded with on
the basis of the notional boundary. The officers would, however, have to be
warned that some changes might have to be made in the light of the Boundary
Commission’s decisions ;
(g) the uncertainty regarding the fate of the disputed districts was holding
up the work of division of assets and liabilities. It might, therefore, be necessary
for the Partition Committee in the Punjab to continue to sit after the 15th
August.
Summing up, his excellency said that he would visit Lahore, probably
on Monday next, meet the provincial Partition Committee and endeavour
to secure their agreement (a) to the Government of the East Punjab planning
its move to Simla before the 15th August without prejudice to the ultimate
award of the Boundary Commission regarding Lahore (b) to postings being
made on the basis of the notional boundary and ( c ) in the event of his failing to
secure agreement regarding the two or three seriously disputed districts, to
action being held up in respect of these districts until he had reported back to
the Partition Council. A telegram to this effect would be sent to His Excellency
the Governor of the Punjab.
Case No. P.C. 57/6/47 Replacement of present Partition Council after 15th
August
The Council recognised the need to bring into existence on the 15th August
a body, which might be suitably designated as the Partition Council, to com-
JULY I947
21 1
plete such work of the present Partition Council as remained unfinished on that
date.
After a brief discussion it was agreed :
(1) that on the 15 th August a new Partition Council be constituted to
complete the work of partition remaining unfinished on that date ;
(2) that two representatives of each of the new Dominions should serve on
this Council;
(3) that there should be in addition alternate members to serve on the
Council in the event of any of the representatives not being able to attend a
meeting ;
(4) that these representatives should be authorised to enter into agreements
on behalf of their respective Governments;
(5) that the Council should have a non-voting Chairman;
(6) that the leaders of the two parties should recommend the names of their
representatives ;
(7) that questions on which agreement could not be reached would be
referred to the Arbitral Tribunal.
149
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Mr Gandhi
Mountbatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: Visits and Tours
no. 2954 new Delhi, 17 July ig4y
Dear Mr Gandhi,
Thank you for your letter of the 16th.1
As I told you in our talk, I will entirely agree to anything you want, and
offer my services to facilitate your visit. I am accordingly telegraphing to the
Resident to pass on your proposal to visit Kashmir as a private person to the
Maharaja.
Since seeing you I have received news that the Maharaja is sending his Prime
Minister, Kak, to Delhi early next week to join in the discussions which I am
arranging with the States Department. I feel it would be both courteous and
wise if you and Pandit Nehru could have a talk with Pandit Kak before deciding
on the precise date and details of your visit, as I personally rather fear that a
visit of a man of such world-wide eminence as yourself can never be kept
sufficiently private not to have some effect on the rather delicate negotiations
which I hope to conduct during that week.
No. 129.
212
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
The last thing, however, I wish to do is to interfere in any way with your
liberty of movement; I only want to counsel a few more days patience.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA2
2 Mr Gandhi replied on 19 July that he had sent Lord Mountbatten’s letter to Pandit Nehru who had
replied that, in view of Mountbatten’s advice, Gandhi’s visit to Kashmir should be postponed till after
Pandit Kak’s arrival in New Delhi. R/3/1/94: f 38.
150
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sardar Nishtar
Mountbatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: States ,
Relations with , Part 11(b)
no. 1446/32 17 July 1947
Dear Mr Nishtar,
I have not replied to your letter of 6 July1 earlier because I wished to wait until
the reconstitution of the Government had been settled. As you know, that point
has now been settled and has a bearing on the difficulty you mentioned about
the States Department. Actually I had discussed the matter again with Pandit
Nehru and Sardar Patel and they had both agreed that you should be fully
associated in any matters relating to States within the periphery of the
Dominion of Pakistan.2 The problem is, however, now solved by the splitting
up of the Government and you will be able to create your own States
Department.
2. In your letter of 9th July3 you mention the Conference4 presided over by
me with representatives of Hyderabad. I presided over this Conference in my
capacity as Crown Representative in order to ascertain from Hyderabad
representatives the probable reactions of the Hyderabad Government to a
practical settlement of questions between them and the future Dominion of
India arising out of the prospective lapse of paramountcy. The Hon’ble
Member in charge of the States Department was not present but besides the
members of my own staff and of the Political Department, the Muslim Deputy
Secretary of the States Department was present.
3 . I am very glad to hear that you would like me to tackle the question of a
practical settlement of similar questions between Kalat and the future Dominion
of Pakistan. I am, of course, prepared to give all the help I can and, after
consulting Mr Jinnah,5 I asked H.H. the Khan of Kalat to come to Delhi for
this purpose with his advisers on 19 July. I should be glad to have a preliminary
JULY I947
213
discussion with you about the issues at stake and will arrange this before
meeting His Highness and his advisers.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 Not traced. 2 cf. No. 37, Item 2. 3 Not traced. 4 No. 61.
5 See No. 82, para. 3.
HI
Mr V. P. Menon to Mr C. P. Scott
R/jIi/i66: ff 11-12
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, STATES DEPARTMENT,
17 July 1947
My dear Peter,
As desired in your letter of today’s date,1 I attach a brief for H.E. in connection
with his talk with Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar.
Yours sincerely,
v. P. MENON
Enclosure to No. 151
The States with which the Dominion of Pakistan is concerned are Bahawalpur,
Khairpur, Kalat and the States in the N.W.F.P. All these States have
Muhammadan Rulers with a predominant Muslim population. The principle
which both India and Pakistan ought to follow is “Render unto Caesar that
which is Caesar’s and unto God that which is God’s”. If some sort of an under¬
standing is not reached on this matter between the two Dominions, there is
bound to be serious trouble ahead.
Kalat is a frontier State and ought really to go into Pakistan.
So far as Bahawalpur is concerned, it touches Bikaner and Jaisalmer in the
south and east and has a small common frontier with Ferozepore district. There
is however no question of its being absorbed by the Dominion of India, and its
rightful place is with Pakistan.
Kashmir presents some difficulty. It is claimed by both the Dominions, and
at the present moment my feeling is that the issue should not be forced by
either party. It is possible that a predominantly Muslim State like Kashmir
cannot be kept away from Pakistan for long and we may leave this matter to
find its natural solution. Unlike Hyderabad, it does not he in the bosom of
1 Asking for a brief for Lord Mountbatten’s talk with Mr Nishtar the following day. R/3/1/1 66: f 10 .
214
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Pakistan and it can claim an exit to India, especially if a portion of the Gurdaspur
district goes to East Punjab.
Khaipur is another State which should obviously form part of the Dominion
of Pakistan.
If N.W.F.P. goes into Pakistan, there is no question of the Dominion of
India having any interest in the States in that Province.
152
Mr Attlee to Pandit Nehru 1
RI30I lj 12: ff ig-21
personal 17 July ig47
My dear Nehru,
I was glad to see Krishna Menon and to know that you propose2 that he should
be High Commissioner here. He has, of course, many friends over here, and
knows the political position very well.
I discussed with him a suggested amendment to the clause in the Bill about
the States,3 but with the best of good will could not accept what was proposed,
as it would not in fact have effected what was desired, and might have created a
false impression. The Bill passed both Houses this week without any Division.
All speakers in the Commons, and all but two unimportant Peers gave it warm
support, and expressed most cordial good wishes for the success of the new
Governments.
I have admired the statesmanship and courage of yourself and Patel. Our
warm good wishes go with you in your heavy responsibilities, the weight of
which I am in a position to appreciate.
I was very grateful to you for your help over the matter of steel rails for
Russia. I am hopeful of getting something useful in the way of trade in that
quarter.
I am a little anxious over the position in Burma. I like Aung San and his
colleagues very much, but of course they have not the same resources of ex¬
perienced personnel as you have in India. I am a little afraid of their feeling
obliged to go ahead and take over before they have got an adequate machine
of government. They would, I think, be well advised to remain in the
Commonwealth at any rate for a period, as we could more easily help them to
deal with these problems of defence and finance which are not very easy. I
think, however, that they find it difficult to deal with their Left Wing, who
JULY I947
215
have very little knowledge of anything outside their own rather narrow range
of experience.
With all good wishes,
Yours sincerely,
C . R . A .
1 The draft of this letter was in Mr Attlee’s own hand.
2 See No. 74. 3 See No. 123, para. 4.
Mr Attlee to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Demi-Official Correspondence Files:
Attlee , C.R.
10 downing street, 17 July lg 47
My dear Dickie,
I have read your last report1 with very great interest. You are managing to
jump a lot of awkward hurdles.
Our debates on the Bill went very well — the opposition played up well and
helped us to get it through. The only real opposition came from Rankeillour
and Selbome in the Lords, but nobody took much notice.
I was glad that so many well deserved tributes were paid to you by every¬
body who spoke. I know too that it is well recognised that Edwina has played a
great part in creating the new atmosphere. It was a great help having Pug here
during this critical fortnight. I realise how heavy a time you will have during
the next four weeks especially.
We are all very grateful to you for carrying on for this next stage. I am very
conscious that I put you in to bat on a very sticky wicket to pull the game out
of the fire. Few people would have taken it on and few, if any, could have
pulled the game round as you have.
Philip’s engagement has been received with great enthusiasm by everyone.
I hope you will be able to get some rest as I am sure you must need it. I hope
to get away for most of August.
With all good wishes to you both.
Yours ever,
C. R. ATTLEE
No. 65.
1
2 16
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
154
Sir S. Cripps to Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar
L/P &SI 131 1842: f 63
17 July 1947
My Dear Sir C. P.,
Your friend Sir D. Sarnia came and spoke with me yesterday and rubbed in
( !) your arguments1 about Travancore.
You will have seen what I said about the States in my speech2 at the 3rd
Reading of the Indian Independence Bill — which is now passed and should
reach the Statute Book tomorrow.
I am so convinced that India must not be split up further as an international
personality — though of course all sorts of temporary expedients may be
required before you can all settle down together. That is why we are not
prepared to interfere though I know the Viceroy is using his good offices to
help in every way he can.
I am sure you will see the wisdom of our objective and that you will do all
you can to help without sacrificing the essential interests of your state. I am
certain accommodation is possible and wise and that time will solve the pro¬
blems provided a reasonable and sensible beginning is made. All my best
wishes to you in your difficult and perplexing times.
Yours sincerely,
R. STAFFORD CRIPPS
1 cf. No. 146.
2 Sir S. Cripps said the following about the States in his speech at the third reading of the Bill: ‘No one
who is conscious ot the geographical, economic and social considerations which must condition the
future of India and Pakistan can fail at this moment to express the hope that the peoples and Princes
of the States will throw in their lot with the people of India or Pakistan to the very great benefit of all.’
Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 440, 15 July 1947, col. 229.
155
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram, Rfjlifi6o : f 166
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 1J July ig4 7, 7. 00 pm
confidential Received: 17 July , 0.40 am
No. 2010-S. My immediately preceding telegram.1 Following is Communique
on the reconstitution of the Government.
Begins. In order to facilitate the setting up of the new administration of
Pakistan His Excellency the Viceroy has decided with the concurrence of
JULY I947
217
the party leaders that the Interim Government should be reconstituted on the
following lines :
2. The Government will consist of two groups representing the two
successor Governments of India and Pakistan.
3 . The two groups will meet separately to consider matters concerning their
own territories, and jointly under the chairmanship of the Governor-General
to consider matters of common concern.
4. The existing Departments will be manned by the staff who have elected
to remain in India, and will be in charge of the Members representing India.
The personnel who have chosen to serve in Pakistan will be withdrawn from
the existing Departments, and will staff Departments which will be organized
at once in Delhi, and will be in charge of the Pakistan Members of the Cabinet.
5. There will thus be what amounts to two provisional Governments, one
for India and one for Pakistan, each dealing with its own business and con¬
sulting the other on matters of common concern. Ends.
1 No. 2009-S of 17 July, explaining that Lord Mountbatten intended to issue the communique and
background press note (No. 156) upon receipt of information that the Bill had received the Royal
Assent. R/3/1/160: f 165.
156
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , R/jf if 160: f 167
important new Delhi, 17 July 1947, 8.20 pm
confidential Received: 17 July, 0.40 am
No. 201 i-S. My telegram 2009-S.1 Following is background press note.
Begins. The Indian Independence Bill has now received the Assent of His
Majesty and it is necessary on practical and administraative grounds to re¬
construct the Executive Council of the Governor-General. Indeed, clause (e)
of sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Indian Independence Bill was specifically
designed to enable this to be done.
2. There are many matters affecting the two new Dominions in respect of
which the Governor-General will, between now and the 15th August, require
the advice of those who will be responsible for the future administration of the
Dominions. A case in point is the adaptation to be made in the Government of
India Act, 1935, which as from that date will be the law of the Constitution in
the Dominions. The 1935 Act is likely to be adapted in a different way for each
1 See No. 155, note 1.
2l8
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
of the two Dominions. The adaptation orders and similar orders will be in the
nature of Orders in Council, and such orders should naturally be made on the
advice of a council solely concerned with the administration of the territories
in question. There are again decisions to be taken relating to the NWFP in the
light of the result of the referendum now being held there.
3. Up to this time in matters relating to the implementation of H.M.G’S
Statement of June 3rd the Viceroy has been acting in consultation with the
leaders of political parties. With important decisions requiring to be taken
affecting the setting up of the new Dominions this procedure has become
unsuitable. It is necessary now that Provisional Governments should be set up
at once so that they can take their due share in the organization of the new
set-up, and can take over power on the 15th August without inconvenience or
dislocation. Ends.
i57
Cabinet
India and Burma Committee. I. B. (4 7) 42nd Meeting
L/P&JI 10/82: ff 19-21
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.i, on 17 July 1947
at 3.00 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir S. Cripps, Viscount Addison, the
Earl of Listowel, Mr C. P. May hew, Mr Arthur Henderson
Also present were: Sir H. Wilson-Smith, Sir A. Carter, Mr J. I. C. Crombie,
Sir P. Patrick, Mr R. S. Brown, Mr S. E. V. Luke, Mr G. M. Wilson, Mr A F.
Morley ( Secretariat )
Minute 1
Continued Service of British Officers in the
Armed Forces in India
(Previous Reference: 13.(47)32 Meeting, Minute i)1
The Committee had before them a note by the Secretary (13.(47) 141)
covering a Second Report2 by the Official Committee on the continued service
of British Officers in the Armed Forces in India. The Report outlined the chief
divergencies between the proposals which had been approved by the Com¬
mittee on 19th June (I.B.(47) 32nd Meeting, Minute 1) and the modifications
to those proposals which had been made by the Partition Council in India.
the secretary of state for india said that the terms which had
been approved by the Committee had been put to the Partition Council by
JULY I947
219
the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief.3 The Partition Council, in revising
the terms, had made it clear that their new terms were the maximum which
they would be prepared to offer. These new terms might not attract British
officers, but there was no prospect of persuading the Partition Council to
reconsider them at this stage.
mr. crombie said that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not welcome
any proposal that His Majesty’s Government might supplement the terms pro¬
posed by the Partition Council, if it should be found that they were inadequate
to achieve their object.
The Committee
Concurred in the terms and conditions of service proposed for British
Officers continuing to serve in the Armed Forces in India as contained in
No. 2410 of 9th July4 from the Government of India, Defence Depart¬
ment.5
Minute 2
Position of Judges of the Indian Federal and
High Courts
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for
India (LB. (47) 140)6 on the question whether Judges of the Federal and High
Courts of India should be granted proportionate pension and compensation.
the secretary of state for India pointed out that Judges were
covered by Section 10 (h)(6) of the Indian Independence Bill, which guaranteed
to those who continued to serve the same conditions of service as they had
hitherto enjoyed. In the Viceroy’s opinion, it would be impossible to persuade
either of the new Dominion Governments to offer Judges proportionate
pension and compensation in view of this guarantee. Nor was there any case
for acceptance of this responsibility by His Majesty’s Government; the
Judiciary had always maintained their independence of the Executive, and
Judges were therefore in a different position from Civil Servants.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRET ATY OF STATE FOR INDIA
pointed out that, while Judges of the Federal and High Courts could at present
be removed only by the King on the advice of the Privy Council, there was no
guarantee that they would retain that, or similar, protection under the new
constitutions to be drawn up by the Constituent Assemblies. He therefore
thought that any Judge who wished to retire immediately should be allowed to
1 Vol. XI, No. 265. 2 L/WS/1/1115 : ff 74-5.
3 Mountbatten Papers, Partition Council Minutes, 5 July 1947, Case No. P.C. 18/3/47. See also No. 65,
para. 11.
4 L/WS/1/1115 : f 87.
s In his tel. No. 9227 of 17 July Lord Listowel informed Lord Mountbatten that his colleagues had
concurred in the amended proposals for the terms of service ‘on the basis that only the authorities in
India can judge whether or not they are likely to produce the desired result’. L/WS/1/1115: f 60.
6 P.R.O. CAB 134/346.
220
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
do so on proportionate pension, but that he should not be entitled to compen¬
sation.
the president of the board of trade suggested that Judges should
be eligible for proportionate pension only if their conditions of service
were radically altered as a result of the new constitutions. The Viceroy might
be asked to point out to the Indian Leaders that the position of the Judges
under the new constitutions was still uncertain and that it was conceivable that,
under one or both of them the Judiciary might, e.g., be subordinated to the
Executive, which would certainly be a radical alteration in their conditions
of service. The Indian Leaders should, therefore, be asked to undertake that, if
such circumstances were to arise, proportionate pension would be paid to any
Judge who wished to retire. If the Indian Leaders refused to agree, His Majesty’s
Government might guarantee the proportionate pension, in view of the com¬
paratively small number of officers involved. No public announcement need
be made, but the Chief Judge of the Federal Court should be informed.
The Committee —
Invited the Secretary of State for India to ascertain whether the Viceroy
would agree to consult the Indian Leaders on the lines suggested by the
President of the Board of Trade.
158
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Governors-General and Governors of Provinces , Appointment of — Part ( 1 )
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 1 7 July , 11.00 pm
secret Received: 18 July , 1.40 am
No. 201 8-S. I understand that Corfield has telegraphed to Patrick asking him
to find out whether Weightman would accept an appointment as Governor
of Baluchistan.1
2. In para. 2 of your telegram 9037 of July 14th2 you say that Baluchistan
cannot be made a Governor’s Province except by the Dominion legislature in
exercise of its cons titu tent powers.
3. Mr Jinnah is very anxious to make Baluchistan a Governor’s Province,
probably for prestige reasons, and I understand that if Section 290 of the 1935
Act is suitably adapted a Governor’s Province could be created by Order in
Council after repeat after August 15th. I am however obtaining further advice
on this and will telegraph again.
JULY I947
221
4. Meanwhile I am most anxious that Weightman should be persuaded to
accept. Jinnali originally wanted to put in Nishtar but I urged on him the
advantage of appointing a British Governor. I gather he has not finally made
up his mind on Weightman but if Weightman is willing there is a good
chance that he would recommend him. I suggest you should talk to Weight-
man and try to remove any doubts he may have.
1 In tel. 1976-P of 15 July 1947 Sir C. Corfield stated that Mr Jinnah had requested him to ascertain
whether Mr Weightman would accept an appointment as Governor of Baluchistan for one year and
asked Sir P. Patrick to contact Weightman and let him (Corfield) have a reply within the next few days.
Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files : Governors-General and Governors of Provinces,
Appointment of — Part (1).
2 L/P &J/10/141 : f 130.
159
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
and Sardar Nishtar and Mr Akhtar Hussain
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy’s Interview No. 167
18 July 1947
After some discussion of the general position of the States in North Western
India vis-a-vis the Muslim League, H.E. said that Mr Jinnah had given him an
assurance that the Western Punjab Government would not interfere with the
rights of irrigation from the rivers of the Punjab enjoyed by Indian States. He
said he would ask Mr Menon to secure a similar assurance from the Congress.
2. There followed a discussion about Kalat.1 Sardar Nishtar agreed that
Pakistan would not want the States to accede on more than three closely
defined subjects (Defence, External AEairs and Communications). Pakistan
would not have a policy of accepting all States that wished to accede. They
would consider requests on their merits. Pakistan had no wish to coerce any
State, but they would be embarrassed if States within their sphere of influence
wished to join the Indian Union, and would have to consider their attitude.
3. Sardar Nishtar added that the League had always opposed the 1935
scheme of federation, and might not agree to the Act being adapted so as to
use Part 2 for the Pakistan Constitution. Their position therefore about the
accession of States is still a little uncertain. In any case, they would be prepared
if necessary to enter into treaty relationships with the States if the States pre¬
ferred that.
4. Sardar Nishtar asked that for the forthcoming meeting with the States,
there should be separate representation of those States which were included in
1 See Nos. 82, para. 3, 150, para. 3 and Enclosure to 15 1.
222
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
groups of which the majority wished to join the Indian Union, but did not
wish to do so themselves. H.E. directed PSV to take this up with Political
Adviser.
5. H.E. said that he would like to know whether Pakistan would be re¬
presented by British Ambassadors, Ministers and Consuls in places where they
were not represented themselves. Sardar Nishtar promised to give a reply, but
said there would be no question of their using Indian representatives.
6. There was some discussion on the question of tariffs, and whether they
would have to be included under Foreign Affairs, and H.E. directed Mr
Akhtar Hussain to get the draft Instrument of Accession on which Mr Menon
was working, and arrange that H.E. should have a brief before the meeting,
indicating the League’s attitude about the points covered by the Instrument of
Accession.
7. In regard to Kalat, Sardar Nishtar explained that the Pakistan Government
would claim to succeed to the treaty obligations and rights of HMG. Otherwise
if Kalat claimed like the Indian States to be independent, it could also claim the
retrocession of leased areas over which in fact complete sovereignty had been
ceded to Great Britain by the terms of the leases.
8. It was agreed that the Kalat Delegation should be put off to 3/30 p.m. on
Saturday 19th, and that there should be a preliminary meeting at 3 p.m. to be
attended by Sardar Nishtar, Mr Akhtar Hussain, Sir Conrad Corfield and PSV.
G. E. B. ABELL
160
The Nawah of Bhopal to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
R/3l i/ 138: ff 167-8
QASR-I-SULTANI, BHOPAL, l8 July ig4 7
Your Excellency,
To save time, I sent to Sir Conrad Corfield an advance copy of the reply of my
Government to the invitation for the Conference in Delhi on the 25th instant.
Sir Conrad replied forthwith acknowledging the letter and informed me that
he had addressed it to the States Department.
As Your Excellency will be presiding at the opening meeting of the Con¬
ference, I feel I should also send to you a copy of my reply. I am therefore
enclosing it.
Yours sincerely,
HAMIDULLAH
JULY I947
223
Enclosure to No. 160
Air Qureshi to Lieutenant-Colonel Woods Ballard
EXPRESS MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
NO. 435-A GOVERNMENT OF BHOPAL, 15 July ig47
Formula for the Standstill arrangement on the
lapse of Paramountcy
Reference Your Express Letter No. 348-Q, dated the 13th July 1947. 1
2. The views of the Bhopal Government on the proposals contained in your
letter under reference are as follows :
(1) that those States which have already joined one or other Constituent
Assembly and those States which up to the present have not joined can
have no common basis for negotiations ;
(2) that while no doubt it may be possible for those States which have
already joined a Constituent Assembly to select a small representa¬
tive Committee2 to conduct actual negotiations it will not be possible
for the Bhopal State, which up to the present has not joined either
Constituent Assembly, to conduct negotiation by this means ;
(3) that the Government of Bhopal cannot accept the inclusion of item
(1) of paragraph 2 of your letter under reference in the agenda of any
meeting which they may be asked to attend.3
3. As regards items (iii) (iv) (v) & (vi) of paragraph 2 of your letter, the
Bhopal Government will be prepared to discuss these with item no. (ii) when¬
ever discussions on these matters can be arranged between the States’ Depart¬
ment and the representatives of the Bhopal State.4 This would not seem to
present any insuperable difficulty as there is reason to believe that separate
discussions have already been agreed to between the States’ Dept, and other
States of an equal status with Bhopal State.
4. The Bhopal Government are as anxious to negotiate, on the basis of
of equality and freedom, a Standstill Agreement on such matters as are envisaged
in clause 7 of the Indian Independence Bill and feel confident that their point
of view as explained in paragraph 2 above, will be appreciated. They, therefore,
trust that a suitable opportunity for discussions, on the lines already indicated
will be afforded them in due course.
1 Not traced. For the draft Standstill Formula, see Vol. XI, Enclosure to No. 198. See also ibid., No. 287.
2 See Vol. XI, No. 287, para. 4.
3 This item presumably dealt with accession by the States to the dominions on the three central subjects of
defence, foreign affairs and communications. See Nos. 2 and 75.
4 For items (ii)-(vi), see No. 75.
224
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
5. As time is very short the Bhopal Government will be grateful if you will
kindly forward a copy of their reply direct to the Political Department as well
as through the normal channels.
SHUAIB QURESHI
Sir F. Burrows [Bengal) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
'Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Bengal,
Situation in, Part 1(b)
important 18 July ig47, 7.45 pm
secret Received: 18 July, 10.00 pm
No. 210-S. Your telegram 1993-S of July 17th.1 Congress fears about security
of Calcutta. There is of course every possibility of trouble from Muslim
elements in Calcutta or [sic] as is fairly generally expected, if Boundary
Commission allocates Calcutta to West Bengal. There is also an unfortunate
proximity of dates about that time. So far as we can see Boundary Com¬
mission’s award on Bengal is not likely to be made till second week in August.
If, as I am told is possible and as would in other conditions be appropriate,
August 15th is declared public holiday and if provocative Hindu celebrations
are announced or take place, danger of trouble will be greatly enhanced.
August 1 6th is anniversary of last year’s “Direct Action’’ riots. August 18th is
ID festival.
2. I am watching developments closely and have already in agreement with
Dr P. C. Ghosh, Chief Minister for West Bengal, urged Army Commander to
let me have for critical period in August 3 additional Indian Army battalions of
full strength to replace equivalent of three British battalions at present assisting
civil power in Calcutta who will be withdrawn on August 14th. If, as I hope,
Army Commander can agree to this, these troops should be available, over
and above present armed forces in Calcutta, at time award is made, and I have
asked for them to be brought in some time before British troops are withdrawn.
If we get over day or two following announcement of Award I should be
hopeful that serious trouble would be avoided on 15th and 16th August.
As regards these extra troops for cover, I may have to invoke your good
offices with C.-in-C. but will telegraph again if this should becomeneces-
sary.2
3. Generally] speaking I find it difficult to believe that Muslim leaders
really intend to attempt destruction of the City if it is allocated to West Bengal,
JULY I947
225
but I am fully alive to possibility that some Muslim elements may get out of
hand especially as in all probability most of Muslim leaders will be leaving for
Dacca in second week of August and in view also of great probability that
Muslim Punjabi Police will be unreliable and partisan. I have had talks with
Area Commander and a concrete plan will be ready for execution by date of
Boundary Commission Award. I will also confer with Home Dept and Dr
P. C. Ghosh. You will appreciate that I cannot let Suhrawardy in on this aspect
of internal security.
4. You may assure Nehru that Calcutta shall not be destroyed.
1 No. 138. The date should be 16 July.
2 In his tel. 214-S of 20 July, Sir F. Burrows explained that an approach had been made by the Army
Commander to G.H.Q. New Delhi for the three extra battalions. Burrows had been hoping for
assistance from the resources of the Army Commander and now asked for Mountbatten’s support in
securing what he described as ‘this very necessary reinforcement’. He also urged that the battalions
should be in place by 5 August and asked that they should be as strong as possible as they were to
replace strong British units. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Bengal, Situation in,
Part 1(b). See also No. 289.
162
Viceroy s Personal Report No. 13
L/PO/ 6/123: ff 1 82-g
TOP SECRET 18 July ig<\7
PERSONAL
This has been another busy week. The Partition Council now meets three times
a week, on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays, and in addition there has been
much to do in connection with the reconstitution of the Government and the
partition of the Armed Forces.
2. There has been little change in the general state of affairs in the country.
The Punjab is still unsettled and incidents continue in Calcutta. But on the
other hand the referendum in Sylhet was in general clear from strife and the
referendum in the Frontier Province is also being carried out in almost peaceful
conditions.
3. I intend to go to the Punjab on Sunday to study the situation there and
meet the Partition Committee. Abell went down there about a week ago and
discussed matters with Jenkins after which Jenkins sent a note1 of certain points
on which his Partition Committee could not agree, but were prepared to
accept the decision of the High Commands in our Central Partition Council.
1 Appendix ‘A’ to No. 89.
226
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
The points were: —
(i a ) Whether the future Government of East Punjab should plan to move
from Lahore or should wait there until the Boundary Commission s
award was known. The East Punjab representatives were very anxious
not to take any action which could be construed as abandoning their
claim to Lahore.
(b) The second point was what arrangement should be made for the adminis¬
tration of the disputed districts (now totalling 14 out of the 29 districts
of the Punjab) during the period until the Boundary Commission’s
award could be implemented.
We discussed these points in the Partition Council here and decided that the
planning should go ahead on the basis of the notional boundaries and that the
transfer of officers should be arranged accordingly, but that I should go to
Lahore and try to urge an agreement on the administration of the three Districts
seriously in dispute, namely Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Lahore.2
4. Radcliffe came back with an optimistic report of the Bengal Boundary
Commission in Calcutta. He thought all four Judges were of a higher class
than he had expected and were fully determined to work as a team to a pro¬
gramme which would enable Radcliffe to give me his decision by the 12th
August. He has arranged that the senior Judge of each side shall take the chair
alternately in his absence.
5. Radcliffe then flew on to Lahore where he had satisfactory discussions
with the Punjab Boundary Commission. He says that they seemed very reason¬
able and were on good personal terms with one another. The four Judges had
agreed among themselves that Justice Din Mohammed should be their
Chairman and when Radcliffe said that he thought there ought to be a system
of alternating Chairman in view of the nature of the Commission, they all said
that they trusted Din Mohammed and would prefer to leave things as they
were. This atmosphere of common sense and tolerance sounds promising but
they have an exceedingly difficult problem to tackle, especially if they are to
report by August 12th.
6. The Sikhs have warned Jenkins through Giani Kartar Singh3 that they
will have to take violent action if they are not satisfied by the Boundary
Commission’s award. They said openly that they proposed to sabotage com¬
munications, canal systems, headworks, etc. In view of this we shall have to
make careful military arrangements and the Partition Council have agreed
that, under the control of the Joint Defence Council, there must be a unified
military Command in this area.4 The Commander will probably be Major
General Rees, who is at present in the area commanding the 4th Indian Division,
and he will have one Muslim and one non-Muslim officer attached to him for
JULY I947
227
liaison purposes with the forces of the two Dominions. We shall probably
have to get this organisation set up in advance of the announcement of the
award, and I shall discuss it with Jenkins and Messervy, the Army Commander,
at Lahore.
7. I have prevailed on the Partition Council to let me draft a joint statement
giving full assurances to minorities and former political opponents in both
Dominions and declaring as a corollary that they will not tolerate any violence
in either Dominion, and particularly in the areas affected by the Boundary
Commission’s awards.5 The organisation to deal with violence on the boundary
will be referred to. I think a statement of this kind will be very useful.
8. The referendum in Sylhet has resulted in a majority of 55,578 votes in
favour of the district joining East Bengal. The figures were 239,619 in favour
and 184,041 against, the percentage of valid votes to the total electorate being
over 77%. 6 As I had complaints from both Nehru7 and Jinnah8 about the
handling of the referendum, I came to the conclusion there could not have been
much wrong with it, and, in spite of Nehru’s request for an investigation, I
decided the result must stand, particularly as Hydari expressed himself as quite
satisfied.9 I wrote to inform both leaders accordingly.1 0
9. Before my letter reached Nehru the latter had sent a personal telegram11
to Hydari on the 13 th July, and told me about it when we dined together that
evening. I attach as Appendices 1 and 212 extracts from this telegram and from
Hydan’s reply, as the material in the latter’s telegram may be of value in case
echoes of Nehru’s assertions find their way into the press at home. It is a great
pity that responsible ministers out here should lend their ear to baseless stories
of this type.
10. The reconstitution of the Interim Cabinet has been my worst headache
to date, for it is an issue on which both sides have made their intentions of
resigning and taking no further part in the Government quite clear if they
considered that I was breaking faith with them. I would have been prepared to
have adhered to the Congress demand that they should be given the portfolios
for the whole of India, and Pakistan only shadow portfolios to hold a watching
brief for their areas, if I had been staying as the common Governor-General of
both; but one of the unfortunate results of my staying on with only one side
is that I cannot afford to give a decision which will be publicly denounced as
favouring my own future Government.
2 See No. 148, Case P.C. 56/6/47. 3 See Enclosure to No. 56.
4 See No. 148, Case P.C.47/6/47. 5 See ibid.
6 For a more detailed breakdown of the result, see No. 107.
7 See No. 95. 8 See No. 98, note 2. 9 See Nos. 68, paras. 5-7, and No. 107.
See No. 98 and its note 2. 11 See No. 94. 12 Not printed.
10
II
228
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
11. Last week I reported that Mr. Jinnah seemed disposed to accept.13 At
the next meeting I had with him, however, he made it clear that the League
Members would refuse to resign and if dismissed would publicly declare their
intention to take no further part in the Government of India.14 I need hardly
point out that this would have made my position quite impossible. I therefore
set about once more trying to find a new formula, the details of which are
given in the press communique which I shall issue to the press to-morrow, and
a copy of which is attached as Appendix 3.15 I also attach a copy of my Order as
Appendix 4.16
12. Krishna Menon and V. P. Menon managed to sell this idea to Nehru and
Patel respectively, though not without great difficulty; for basically both these
leaders would like to see Jinnah told where he gets off.17
13. Jinnah, whom I saw in the presence of Liaquat Ali Khan, instead of
being delighted with my new solution, said he would give it his careful
attention.18 I told him I was not asking for his views or advice since this was an
Order I was not making in Council, and it was entirely my own business.
14. As he and Liaquat Ali Khan were leaving I kept back Liaquat for a
moment to make it quite clear that I could not make orders in Council amend¬
ing the 1935 Act for the new Dominion of Pakistan on the advice of Jinnah,
since he was going to become the constitutional Governor-General of Pakistan
and therefore could no longer give me his advice on this matter. I said that I
did not wish to rub this point into Jinnah, but that I wished him to be under no
illusion that I would take no advice whatever from him on this matter from
now on, and would only act on the advice of my new Pakistan Executive
Council. I said that if the Council wished to consult Jinnah before giving me
advice that was their concern.19
15. I raised the matter at the full Cabinet meeting on the 1 6th July and it was
accepted by both parties without much trouble.20 I added that this was pro¬
bably the last time that the Interim Government would meet in its present form
and I thanked all members for the help and assistance which they had given me
both individually and as a team during the past vital four months.
16. In connection with the reconstitution of the Armed Forces one thing
that has clearly emerged and been accepted by the Partition Council is the need
for many British officers and other ranks, including technical personnel, to stay
on at least for the transition period of about eight months, and preferably
longer. They are, of course required in addition to the Supreme Commander
and senior officers of the Joint Defence Fleadquarters and were they all to
leave suddenly on the transfer of power there would be a very grave risk of
breakdown of the whole administrative machine and the training programme.
JULY I947
229
17. Auchinleck expressed the view strongly to me that in view of the
calumny and abuse, particularly in the press, from which British officers had
suffered in recent years, very few would remain on after the 15th August
unless they received a personal appeal from me.21 I secured the co-operation of
Nehru and Jinnah22 and attach as Appendix 5 23 a copy of the printed appeal
which was despatched by aircraft to all Commands over the week-end.
Auchinleck is not too hopeful about the result but I have a feeling that we shall
get sufficient volunteers now it is known that so many British officers in high
appointments are remaining on for the transition period.
18. We had a very remarkable Partition Council meeting on the 15th July24
in which seven items were disposed of in under 25 minutes, and we spent the
last half hour merely gossiping. If only all meetings out here could be disposed
of at this pace ! ! This reflects great credit on the Steering Committee, H.M.
Patel, and his Muslim colleague, Mahomed Ali, who are putting in an
enormous amount of preliminary work with great success, as is shown by this
result.
[Para. 19, on the question of shipping to England the exhibits for the Indian
Art Exhibition, omitted.]
20. I have written to Nehru25 in the last few days about the reduction in my
personal staff after the transfer of power. The four I.C.S. members of the
Private Secretary’s Office will, of course, leave at once. These are Sir George
Abell, the Private Secretary, Mr. W. H. J. Christie, the Joint Private Secretary,
Mr. I. D. Scott, the Deputy Private Secretary and Mr. C. P. Scott, the Assistant
Private Secretary. In regard to the special team brought out from the U.K.,
Nehru, Jinnah and all the leaders, even Gandhi, have warmly welcomed the
suggestion that Ismay and a few staff officers should remain on with me,
probably for the whole transition period.26 Not only are Ismay’s great ex¬
perience and sound advice appreciated but both sides visualise that he will be
of the greatest help in paying frequent visits to Karachi and acting as a high
level link with Jinnah. I do not feel it would be justified to retain Sir Eric
Mieville as well, and he will be returning at the end of August. I am also
giving up two of my British As.D.C., and there will be a corresponding
reduction in the clerical establishment.
13 See No. 65, para. 18. 14 See No. 82, para. 1. 15 Not printed; see No. 155.
16 Not printed; see No. 170. 17 cf. No. 53. 18 See No. 112, Item 1.
^ Ibid. 20 See No. 127.
21 cf. No. 1 13, paras. 1, 2 and 8; see also No. 88, para. 3.
22 See No. 65, para. 11.
23 Not printed; for the appeal as issued, see Enclosure to No. 80.
24 Mountbatten Papers, Partition Council Minutes.
25 For Lord Mountbatten’s letter, dated 14 July 1947, see Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence
Files: Viceroy’s Staff, Future of.
26 cf. No. 1 12 Item 4. See also Lord Mountbatten’s tel. 1961-S dated 14 July 1947. Mountbatten Papers,
Official Correspondence Files: Viceroy’s Staff, Future of.
230
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
21. My regular secretary, Captain (S) R. V. Brockman, RN, will remain on
as Secretary to the Governor-General (Personal) and I have suggested to
Nehru27 that it might be an excellent thing for him to appoint one of his own
officers as Secretary to the Governor-General (Official), who could have
offices both in the Secretariat and in Government House and who could be a
channel for all official papers and a link with Government Departments,
although he would, of course, work in close association with my Personal
Secretary.
22. I have also written to Nehru28 to let me know what he would wish me
to do about the Viceroy’s House and Viceregal Lodge, Simla, and I have
emphasised particularly that if it would help him, I shall be very glad to move
into a smaller house and cut my domestic staff right down.
23. I gave a large dinner party on the 14th July in honour of the French
community, in celebration of their national day, which was attended by
members of the Government and many other Indians; and speeches were
exchanged in French. This morning, Friday the 18th July, I held an investiture
in the Durbar Hall, and this evening we are giving a large dinner party attended
by Nehru with the whole Cabinet, Jinnah, and several of the Princes, to
celebrate our silver wedding. If I may be forgiven a personal reminiscence it
was in the old Viceregal Lodge here that I became engaged over 25 years ago.
Several of the Ruling Princes who are coming were on the Prince of Wales’s
Staff with me at that time.
24. Progress has been made on the plans for official ceremonies on the
transfer of power. I intend to go to Karachi on the 14th August and had pro¬
posed to come back the same day, but as Ramazan will still be on, Jinnah has
asked that I should stay to a State dinner, so I shall have to defer my departure.
The ceremonies in Delhi will take place on the 15th August, after which I shall
probably go down to Bombay to say farewell to the first contingent of British
troops due to leave on the 17th August.
25. In previous reports29 I have expressed the hope that I would be able to
persuade the new Dominions to have the Union Jack in the upper canton of
their flags as do other members of the Commonwealth. This design has not
been accepted by either party. Jinnah, in turning down the suggestion, ex¬
plained that it would be repugnant to the religious feelings of the Muslims to
have a flag with a Christian cross alongside the crescent. He also said that it
would be difficult to “sell” such an idea to his extremists at the present time.30
26. Nehru asked if I would mind if Congress rejected the design on the
grounds that, although Gandhi, Patel and others had originally expressed their
willingness to accept it, they had now come to the conclusion that the general
JULY 1947
231
feeling among Congress extremists was that the leaders were pandering far too
much to the British ; and that this had reached a point at which it was inadvisable
to press the design on them. Nehru has now sent in a design, prepared by a
Committee of the Constituent Assembly, of the future Indian Dominion flag.
Tnis is in the same colours as the existing Congress flag, but with the wheel
from the Sarnath Asokan capital replacing the spinning wheel in the centre of
the flag.
27. I have not pressed the leaders any further to accept the inclusion of the
Union Jack in the flags of the two new Dominions, but I have suggested as an
alternative that the Union Jack itself should be hoisted either on the same
flagstaff as the Dominion flag, or on a neighbouring flagstaff on the “recog¬
nised” days in the year. I am supplying the leaders with a list of such days and
both Nehru and Jinnah thought that this scheme would be acceptable if it
were not publicised.31
28. Both leaders have provisionally accepted the idea that the two Dominion
navies should follow the custom of other Dominion navies in flying the white
ensign of the Commonwealth at the ensign staff and the Dominion flag at the
jacks taff. Both leaders were anxious that this should not be publicised but
should simply happen as a matter of routine. In fact they are worried about
their extremists agitating against over-stressing the British connection, although
they are quite willing to retain it themselves.
29. Both Jinnah and Nehru have agreed that the two Governors-General
should fly the recognised Dominion Governors-General flag — i.e. a blue
flag with a gold crown and the name of the Dominion, and I am now working
out proposals for Governors’ flags, ADC’s armlets, etc.
30. Jinnah now issues his own Court Circular and it appears in “Dawn”
every day headed simply “Qaed-e-Azam”. This is the title by which he is
generally known among Muslims in India and it means, I understand, “The
great law-giver”.
M. OF B.
27 See Lord Mountbatten’s letter cited in note 25 above.
28 Ibid.
29 See eg Vol. XI, No. 369, para. 40. Paras. 25-29 of VPR No. 13 are based upon a note on Flags dated
17 July which was circulated as V.C.P. No. 132. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files:
Transfer of Power, Ceremonies for, Part I(i).
30 See No. 82, para. 7.
31 See No. 112, Item 2. See also Lord Mountbatten’s tel. 2035-S dated 19 July 1947. Mountbatten Papers,
Official Correspondence Files: Transfer of Power, Ceremonies for, Part I(i).
232
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
163
India and Burma Committee. Paper 1.8.(47)143
L/P &S/ 13/ 1842: f 61
Travancore
MEMORANDUM BY THE MINISTER OF SUPPLY
secret ministry of supply, 18 July ig47
In connection with the Secretary of State for India’s memorandum on
Travancore (I.B.(47)i39)1 the Committee should be aware of the following
considerations.
2. Thorium may become a source material for atomic energy work com¬
parable in importance with uranium. The richest known deposit of monazite
sand (the source material of thorium) is in Travancore.
3. After negotiations last winter, an Agreement2 was signed on 2nd April,
1947 securing to the U.K. substantial exports of monazite in return for our
help in setting up plant in Travancore for treating monazite, from which the
thorium content would still be secured to the U.K.
4. When the Agreement was made the Dewan stipulated that its fulfilment
was dependent on the continuance of normal conditions and that “any funda¬
mental change of policy on the part of the British Government or the Indian
Government or any force majeure will have to be recognised as disabling factors”.
The Dewan has recently offered some criticisms of detailed proposals which we
have made for the implementation of the contract, and the Secretary of State
for India fears that he may be anxious to denounce the Agreement.
5. I doubt whether this is so, but the Dewan will undoubtedly try to turn
the situation to his advantage in his campaign for independence by hinting that,
if he is forced into close association with the Indian Dominions, their policy
with regard to the conservation of India’s natural resources will almost certainly
bring about a situation which would threaten the fulfilment of the Agreement.
6. From my point of view, therefore, it would be an advantage if Travancore
retained political and economic independence, at least for the time being ; but I
realise that considerations of broad policy make it impossible for H.M.G.
actively to encourage this.
7. I do, however, suggest that while we should no doubt “avoid any state¬
ment which would give this State leverage in asserting its independence or
economic autonomy”, we should equally avoid any fresh action, over and
above the broad statements on policy already made, which would give the
Indian Dominions leverage in combating Travancore’s claim for independence,
JULY I947
233
and. so strengthen the Dewan’s bargaining position in discussions with us on the
monazite agreement.
8. Whatever may be the legal or constitutional position, our chances of
getting monazite from Travancore ultimately depend on the goodwill of the
Government of the State, and of the Dewan in particular. I would urge, there¬
fore, that, so far as general policy allows, nothing should be done to alienate that
goodwill.
j. w[ilmot]
1 No. 106. From noting on the file it appears that neither the above memorandum nor No. 106, though
circulated to the India and Burma Committee, were actually put on its Agenda. The Ministry of
Supply were content that the India Office should bear their Minister’s views in mind in the handling of
Travancore. L/P &S/13/1842: ff 46-7.
2 See Vol. IX, No. 469, note 6.
164
Indian Independence Act, 1947
10 & 11 Geo.6.Ch. 30
L/P &JI 10/ 124: ff 2-12
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
Section.
1. The new Dominions.
2. Territories of the new Dominions.
3. Bengal and Assam.
4. The Punjab.
5. The Governor-General of the new Dominions.
6. Legislation for the new Dominions.
7. Consequences of the setting up of the new Dominions.
8. Temporary provision as to government of each of the new Dominions.
9. Orders for bringing this Act into force.
10. Secretary of State’s services, etc.
11. Indian armed forces.
12. British forces in India.
13. Naval forces.
14. Provisions as to the Secretary of State and the Auditor of Indian Home Accounts.
15. Legal proceedings by and against the Secretary of State.
16. Aden.
234
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
The new
Dominions.
Territories of
the new
Dominions.
17. Divorce jurisdiction.
18. Provisions as to existing laws, etc.
19. Interpretation, etc.
20. Short title.
Schedules :
First Schedule — Bengal Districts provisionally included in the new Province
of East Bengal.
Second Schedule — Districts provisionally included in the new Province of
West Punjab.
Third Schedule1 — Modifications of Army Act and Air Force Act in relation
to British forces.
CHAPTER 30.
An Act to make provision for the setting up in India of two independent
Dominions, to substitute other provisions for certain provisions of the
Government of India Act, 1935, which apply outside those Dominions, and
to provide for other matters consequential on or connected with the setting
up of those Dominions.
(1 8th July 1947)
E it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice
and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this
present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows : —
1. — (1) As from the fifteenth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-
seven, two independent Dominions shall be set up in India, to be known
respectively as India and Pakistan.
(2) The said Dominions are hereafter in this Act referred to as “the new
Dominions”, and the said fifteenth day of August is hereafter in this Act referred
to as “the appointed day”.
2. — (1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (3) and (4) of this section,
the territories of India shall be the territories under the sovereignty of His
Majesty which, immediately before the appointed day, were included in
British India except the territories which, under subsection (2) of this section,
are to be the territories of Pakistan.
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsections (3) and (4) of this section, the
territories of Pakistan shall be —
(a) the territories which, on the appointed day, are included in the Provinces
of East Bengal and West Punjab, as constituted under the two following
sections ;
(b) the territories which, at the date of the passing of this Act, are included in
JULY 1947
235
the Province of Sind and the Chief Commissioner’s Province of British
Baluchistan; and
(c) if, whether before or after the passing of this Act but before the appointed
day, the Governor-General declares that the majority of the valid votes
cast in the referendum which, at the date of the passing of this Act, is
being or has recently been held in that behalf under his authority in the
North West Frontier Province are in favour of representatives of that
Province taking part in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, the terri¬
tories which, at the date of the passing of this Act, are included in that
Province.
(3) Nothing in this section shall prevent any area being at any time included
in or excluded from either of the new Dominions, so, however, that —
(a) no area not forming part of the territories specified in subsection (1) or,
as the case may be, subsection (2), of this section shall be included in
either Dominion without the consent of that Dominion; and
(b) no area which forms part of the territories specified in the said subsection
(1) or, as the case may be, the said subsection (2), or which has after the
appointed day been included in either Dominion, shall be excluded from
that Dominion without the consent of that Dominion.
(4) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (3)
of this section, nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing the
accession of Indian States to either of the new Dominions.
3. — (1) As from the appointed day —
(a) the Province of Bengal, as constituted under the Government of India
Act, 1935, shall cease to exist; and
(b) there shall be constituted in lieu thereof two new Provinces, to be known
respectively as East Bengal and West Bengal.
(2) If, whether before or after the passing of this Act, but before the appointed
day, the Governor-General declares that the majority of the valid votes cast in
the referendum which, at the date of the passing of this Act, is being or has
recently been held in that behalf under his authority in the District of Sylhet
are in favour of that District forming part of the new Province of East Bengal,
then, as from that day, a part of the Province of Assam shall, in accordance with
the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, form part of the new Province
of East Bengal.
(3) The boundaries of the new Provinces aforesaid and, in the event men¬
tioned in subsection (2) of this section, the boundaries after the appointed day
of the Province of Assam, shall be such as may be determined, whether before
1 Not printed.
Bengal and
Assam.
26 Geo. 5 &
1 Edw. 8. c. 2.
236
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
The Punjab.
The
Governor-
General of the
new
Dominions.
or after the appointed day, by the award of a boundary commission appointed
or to be appointed by the Governor-General in that behalf, but until the bound¬
aries are so determined —
(a) the Bengal Districts specified in the First Schedule to this Act, together
with in the event mentioned in subsection (2) of this section the Assam
District of Sylhet, shall be treated as the territories which are to be com¬
prised in the new Province of East Bengal;
(b) the remainder of the territories comprised at the date of the passing of this
Act in the Province of Bengal shall be treated as the territories which are
to be comprised in the new Province of West Bengal; and
(c) in the event mentioned in subsection (2) of this section, the District of
Sylhet shall be excluded from the Province of Assam.
(4) In this section, the expression “award” means, in relation to a boundary
commission, the decisions of the chairman of that commission contained in his
report to the Governor-General at the conclusion of the commission’s proceed¬
ings.
4. — (1) As from the appointed day —
[a) the Province of the Punjab, as constituted under the Government of
India Act, 1935, shall cease to exist; and
(b) there shall be constituted two new Provinces, to be known respectively
as West Punjab and East Punjab.
(2) The boundaries of the said new Provinces shall be such as may be deter¬
mined, whether before or after the appointed day, by the award of a boundary
commission appointed or to be appointed by the Governor-General in that
behalf, but until the boundaries are so determined —
(a) the Districts specified in the Second Schedule to this Act shall be treated
as the territories to be comprised in the new Province of West Punjab;
and
(b) the remainder of the territories comprised at the date of the passing of this
Act in the Province of the Punjab shall be treated as the territories which
are to be comprised in the new Province of East Punjab.
(3) In this section, the expression “award,” means, in relation to a boundary
commission, the decisions of the chairman of that commission contained in his
report to the Governor-General at the conclusion of the commission’s pro¬
ceedings.
5. For each of the new Dominions, there shall be a Governor-General who
shall be appointed by His Majesty and shall represent His Majesty for the
purposes of the government of the Dominion :
Provided that, unless and until provision to the contrary is made by a law
JULY I947
237
of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions, the same person may be
Governor-General of both the new Dominions.
6. — (1) The Legislature of each of the new Dominions shall have full power
to make laws for that Dominion, including laws having extra-territorial
operation.
(2) No law and no provision of any law made by the Legislature of either of
the new Dominions shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repug¬
nant to the law of England, or to the provisions of this or any existing or future
Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation
made under any such Act, and the powers of the Legislature of each Dominion
include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation
in so far as it is part of the law of the Dominion.
(3) The Governor-General of each of the new Dominions shall have full
power to assent in His Majesty’s name to any law of the Legislature of that
Dominion and so much of any Act as relates to the disallowance of laws by
His Majesty or the reservation of laws for the signification of His Majesty’s
pleasure thereon or the suspension of the operation of laws until the signi¬
fication of His Majesty’s pleasure thereon shall not apply to laws of the Legis¬
lature of either of the new Dominions.
(4) No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed on or after the
appointed day shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to either of the new
Dominions as part of the law of that Dominion unless it is extended thereto
by a law of the Legislature of the Dominion.
(5) No Order in Council made on or after the appointed day under any Act
passed before the appointed day, and no order, rule or other instrument made
on or after the appointed day under any such Act by any United Kingdom
Minister or other authority, shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to either of
the new Dominions as part of the law of that Dominion.
(6) The power referred to in subsection (1) of this section extends to the
making of laws limiting for the future the powers of the Legislature of the
Dominion.
7. — (1) As from the appointed day —
(a) His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have no responsibility
as respects the government of any of the territories which, immediately
before that day, were included in British India;
(b) the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it,
all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act
between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, all functions exer¬
cisable by His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all
obligations of His Majesty existing at that date towards Indian States
Legislation
for the new
Dominions.
Consequences
of the setting
up of the new
Dominions.
238
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
or the rulers thereof, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction
exercisable by His Majesty at that date in or in relation to Indian States
by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise; and
(c) there lapse also any treaties or agreements in force at the date of the
passing of this Act between His Majesty and any persons having authority
in the tribal areas, any obligations of His Majesty existing at that date
and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable at that date
by His Majesty in or in relation to the tribal areas by treaty, grant, usage,
sufferance or otherwise:
Provided that, notwithstanding anything in paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of
this subsection, effect shall, as nearly as may be, continue to be given to the
provisions of any such agreement as is therein referred to which relate to
customs, transit and communications, posts and telegraphs, or other like
matters, until the provisions in question are denounced by the Ruler of the
Indian State or person having authority in the tribal areas on the one hand, or
by the Dominion or Province or other part thereof concerned on the other hand
or are superseded by subsequent agreements.
(2) The assent of the Parliament of the United Kingdom is hereby given to
the omission from the Royal Style and Titles of the words “Indiae Imperator”
and the words “Emperor of India” and to the issue by His Majesty for that
purpose of His Royal Proclamation under the Great Seal of the Realm.
Temporary
provision as
to
government
of each of the
new
Dominions.
8. — (1) In the case of each of the new Dominions, the powers of the Legis¬
lature of the Dominion shall, for the purpose of making provisions as to the
constitution of the Dominion, be exercisable in the first instance by the
Constituent Assembly of that Dominion, and references in this Act to the
Legislature of the Dominion shall be construed accordingly.
(2) Except in so far as other provision is made by or in accordance with a law
made by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion under subsection (1)
of this section, each of the new Dominions and all Provinces and other parts
thereof shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the Govern¬
ment of India Act, 1935; and the provisions of that Act, and of the Orders in
Council, rules and other instruments made thereunder, shall, so far as applicable,
and subject to any express provisions of this Act, and with such omissions,
additions, adaptations and modifications as may be specified in orders of the
Governor-General under the next succeeding section, have effect accordingly:
Provided that —
(a) the said provisions shall apply separately in relation to each of the new
Dominions and nothing in this sub-section shall be construed as continu¬
ing on or after the appointed day any Central Government or Legislature
common to both the new Dominions;
JULY I947
239
(b) nothing in this subsection shall be construed as continuing in force on or
after the appointed day any form of control by His Majesty’s Government
in the United Kingdom over the affairs of the new Dominions or of any
Province or other part thereof;
(c) so much of the said provisions as requires the Governor-General or any
Governor to act in his discretion or exercise his individual judgment as
respects any matter shall cease to have effect as from the appointed day;
(d) as from the appointed day, no Provincial Bill shall be reserved under the
Government of India Act, 1935, f°r the signification of His Majesty’s
pleasure, and no Provincial Act shall be disallowed by His Majesty
thereunder; and
(e) the powers of the Federal Legislature or Indian Legislature under that
Act, as in force in relation to each Dominion, shall, in the first instance,
be exercisable by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion in addition
to the powers exercisable by that Assembly under subsection (1) of this
section.
(3) Any provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, which, as applied
to either of the new Dominions by subsection (2) of this section and the orders
therein referred to, operates to limit the power of the legislature of that
Dominion shall, unless and until other provision is made by or in accordance
with a law made by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion in accordance
with the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, have the like effect as a law
of the Legislature of the Dominion limiting for the future the powers of that
Legislature.
9. — (1) The Governor-General shall by order make such provision as appears
to him to be necessary or expedient —
(a) for bringing the provisions of this Act into effective operation ;
(b) for dividing between the new Dominions, and between the new Pro¬
vinces to be constituted under this Act, the powers, rights, property,
duties and liabilities of the Governor-General in Council or, as the case
may be, of the relevant Provinces which, under this Act, are to cease to
exist ;
(c) for making omissions from, additions to, and adaptations and modi¬
fications of, the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Orders in
Council, rules and other instruments made thereunder, in their applica¬
tion to the separate new Dominions ;
(d) for removing difficulties arising in connection with the transition to the
provisions of this Act;
(e) for authorising the carrying on of the business of the Governor-General
in Council between the passing of this Act and the appointed day other-
Orders for
bringing this
Act into
force.
240
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
wise than in accordance with the provisions in that behalf of the
Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935;
(/) for enabling agreements to be entered into, and other acts done, on
behalf of either of the new Dominions before the appointed day ;
(g) for authorising the continued carrying on for the time being on behalf of
the new Dominions, or on behalf of any two or more of the said new
Provinces, of services and activities previously carried on on behalf of
British India as a whole or on behalf of the former Provinces which those
new Provinces represent;
(h) for regulating the monetary system and any matters pertaining to the
Reserve Bank of India ; and
(i) so far as it appears necessary or expedient in connection with any of the
matters aforesaid, for varying the constitution, powers or jurisdiction of
any legislature, court or other authority in the new Dominions and
creating new legislatures, courts or other authorities therein.
(2) The powers conferred by this section on the Governor-General shall,
in relation to their respective Provinces, be exercisable also by the Governors
of the Provinces which, under this Act, are to cease to exist; and those powers
shall, for the purposes of the Government of India Act, 1935, be deemed to be
matters as respects which the Governors are, under that Act, to exercise their
individual judgment.
(3) This section shall be deemed to have had effect as from the third day of
June, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and any order of the Governor-
General or any Governor made on or after that date as to any matter shall
have effect accordingly, and any order made under this section may be made
so as to be retrospective to any date not earlier than the said third day of June:
Provided that no person shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence by reason
of so much of any such order as makes any provision thereof retrospective to
any date before the making thereof.
(4) Any orders made under this section, whether before or after the appointed
day, shall have effect —
(a) up to the appointed day, in British India ;
(b) on and after the appointed day, in the new Dominion or Dominions
concerned; and
(c) outside British India, or, as the case may be, outside the new Dominion
or Dominions concerned, to such extent, whether before, on or after the
appointed day, as a law of the Legislature of the Dominion or Dominions
concerned would have on or after the appointed day
but shall, in the case of each of the Dominions, be subject to the same powers
of repeal and amendment as laws of the Legislature of that Dominion.
JULY I947
241
(5) No order shall be made under this section, by the Governor of any
Province, after the appointed day, or, by the Governor-General, after the
thirty-first day of March, nineteen hundred and forty-eight, or such earlier
date as may be determined, in the case of either Dominion, by any law of the
Legislature of that Dominion.
(6) If it appears that a part of the Province of Assam is, on the appointed day,
to become part of the new Province of East Bengal, the preceding provisions
of this section shall have effect as if, under this Act, the Province of Assam was
to cease to exist on the appointed day and be reconstituted on that day as a new
Province.
10. — (1) The provisions of this Act keeping in force provisions of the Secretary °f
Government of India Act, 1935, shall not continue in force the provisions of services, etc.
that Act relating to appointments to the civil services of, and civil posts under,
the Crown in India by the Secretary of State, or the provisions of that Act
relating to the reservation of posts.
(2) Every person who —
(a) having been appointed by the Secretary of State, or Secretary of State
in Council, to a civil service of the Crown in India continues on and after
the appointed day to serve under the Government of either of the new
Dominions or of any Province or part thereof; or
(b) having been appointed by His Majesty before the appointed day to be a
judge of the Federal Court or of any court which is a High Court within
the meaning of the Government of India Act, 1935, continues on and
after the appointed day to serve as a judge in either of the new Dominions,
shall be entitled to receive from the Governments of the Dominions and
Provinces or parts which he is from time to time serving or, as the case may be,
which are served by the courts in which he is from time to time a judge, the
same conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension, and the
same rights as respects disciplinary matters or, as the case may be, as respects
the tenure of his office, or rights as similar thereto as changed circumstances
may permit, as that person was entitled to immediately before the appointed
day.
(3) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as enabling the rights and liabilities
of any person with respect to the family pension funds vested in Commissioners
under section two hundred and seventy-three of the Government of India Act,
1935, to be governed otherwise than by Orders in Council made (whether
before or after the passing of this Act or the appointed day) by His Majesty in
Council and rules made (whether before or after the passing of this Act or the
appointed day) by a Secretary of State or such other Minister of the Crown as
may be designated in that behalf by Order in Council under the Ministers of the Q & I0 Gco
Crown (Transfer of Functions) Act, 1946. c-31
242
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Indian
armed forces.
ii. — (i) The orders to be made by the Governor-General under the pre¬
ceding provisions of this Act shall make provision for the division of the
Indian armed forces of His Majesty between the new Dominions, and for the
command and governance of those forces until the division is completed.
(2) As from the appointed day, while any member of His Majesty’s forces,
other than His Majesty’s Indian forces, is attached to or serving with any of
His Majesty’s Indian forces —
(a) he shall, subject to any provision to the contrary made by a law of the
Legislature of the Dominion or Dominions concerned or by any order of
this Act, have, in relation to the Indian forces in question, the powers of
command and punishment appropriate to his rank and functions; but
(b) nothing in any enactment in force at the date of the passing of this Act
shall render him subject in any way to the law governing the Indian
forces in question.
British forces
in India.
12. — (1) Nothing in this Act affects the jurisdiction or authority of His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, or of the Admiralty, the Army
Council, or the Air Council or of any other United Kingdom authority, in
relation to any of His Majesty’s forces which may, on or after the appointed
day, be in either of the new Dominions or elsewhere in the territories which,
before the appointed day, were included in India, not being Indian forces.
(2) In its application in relation to His Majesty’s military forces, other than
Indian forces, the Army Act shall have effect on or after the appointed day —
(a) as if His Majesty’s Indian forces were not included in the expressions
“the forces”, “His Majesty’s forces” and “the regular forces”; and
(b) subject to the further modifications specified in Parts I and II of the
Third Schedule to this Act.
(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, and to any law
of the Legislature of the Dominion concerned, all civil authorities in the new
Dominions, and, subject as aforesaid and subject also to the provisions of the
last preceding section, all service authorities in the new Dominions, shall, in
those Dominions and in the other territories which were included in India
before the appointed day, perform in relation to His Majesty’s military forces,
not being Indian forces, the same functions as were, before the appointed day,
performed by them, or by the authorities corresponding to them, whether by
virtue of the Army Act or otherwise, and the matters for which provision is to
be made by orders of the Governor-General under the preceding provisions of
this Act shall include the facilitating of the withdrawal from the new
Dominions and other territories aforesaid of His Majesty’s military forces, not
being Indian forces.
JULY 1947
243
(4) The provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall apply in
relation to the air forces of His Majesty, not being Indian air forces, as they
apply in relation to His Majesty’s military forces, subject, however, to the
necessary adaptations, and, in particular, as if —
(a) for the references to the Army Act there were substituted references to
the Air Force Act; and
(b) for the reference to Part II of the Third Schedule to this Act there were
substituted a reference to Part III of that Schedule.
13. — (1) In the application of the Naval Discipline Act to His Majesty’s
naval forces, references to His Majesty’s navy and His Majesty’s ships shall not,
as from the appointed day, include references to His Majesty’s Indian navy or
the ships thereof
(2) In the application of the Naval Discipline Act by virtue of any law made
in India before the appointed day to Indian naval forces, references to His
Majesty’s navy and His Majesty’s ships shall, as from the appointed day, be
deemed to be, and to be only, references to His Majesty’s Indian navy and the
ships thereof.
(3) In section ninety B of the Naval Discipline Act (which, in certain cases,
subjects officers and men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines to the law and
customs of the ships and naval forces of other parts of His Majesty’s dominions)
the words “or of India” shall be repealed as from the appointed day, wherever
those words occur.
14. — (1) A Secretary of State, or such other Minister of the Crown as may
be designated in that behalf by Order in Council under the Ministers of the
Crown (Transfer of Functions) Act, 1946, is hereby authorised to continue for
the time being the performance, on behalf of whatever government or
governments may be concerned, of functions as to the making of payments
and other matters similar to the functions which, up to the appointed day, the
Secretary of State was performing on behalf of governments constituted or
continued under the Government of India Act, 1935.
(2) The functions referred to in subsection (1) of this section include functions
as respects the management of, and the making of payments in respect of,
government debt, and any enactments relating to such debt shall have effect
accordingly :
Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as continuing in
force so much of any enactment as empowers the Secretary of State to contract
sterling loans on behalf of any such Government as aforesaid or as applying to
the Government of either of the new Dominions the prohibition imposed on
the Governor-General in Council by section three hundred and fifteen of the
Government of India Act, 1935, as respects the contracting of sterling loans.
Naval forces.
Provisions
as to the
Secretary of
State and the
Auditor of
Indian Home
Accounts.
244
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Legal
proceedings
by and
against the
Secretary of
State.
(3) As from the appointed day, there shall not be any such advisers of the
Secretary of State as are provided for by section two hundred and seventy-
eight of the Government of India Act, 1935, and that section, and any provisions
of that Act which require the Secretary of State to obtain the concurrence of
his advisers, are hereby repealed as from that day.
(4) The Auditor of Indian Home Accounts is hereby authorised to continue
for the time being to exercise his functions as respects the accounts of the
Secretary of State or any such other Minister of the Crown as is mentioned in
subsection (1) of this section, both in respect of activities before, and in respect
of activities after, the appointed day, in the same manner, as nearly as may be
as he would have done if this Act had not passed.
15. — (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, and, in particular, not¬
withstanding any of the provisions of the last preceding section, any provision
of any enactment which, but for the passing of this Act, would authorise legal
proceedings to be taken, in India or elsewhere, by or against the Secretary of
State in respect of any right or liability of India or any part of India shall cease
to have effect on the appointed day, and any legal proceedings pending by
virtue of any such provision on the appointed day, shall, by virtue of this Act,
abate on the appointed day, so far as the Secretary of State is concerned.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this subsection, any legal proceedings which,
but for the passing of this Act, could have been brought by or against the
Secretary of State in respect of any right or liability of India, or any part of
India, shall instead be brought —
(a) in the case of proceedings in the United Kingdom, by or against the High
Commissioner;
(b) in the case of other proceedings, by or against such person as may be
designated by order of the Governor-General under the preceding pro¬
visions of this Act or otherwise by the law of the new Dominion con¬
cerned,
and any legal proceedings by or against the Secretary of State in respect of any
such right or liability as aforesaid which are pending immediately before the
appointed day shall be continued by or against the High Commissioner or, as
the case may be, the person designated as aforesaid :
Provided that, at any time after the appointed day, the right conferred by
this subsection to bring or continue proceedings may, whether the proceedings
are by, or are against, the High Commissioner or person designated as afore¬
said, be withdrawn by a law of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions
so far as that Dominion is concerned, and any such law may operate as respects
proceedings pending at the date of the passing of the law.
JULY I947
245
(3) In this section, the expression “the High Commissioner” means, in
relation to each of the new Dominions, any such officer as may for the time
being be authorised to perform in the United Kingdom, in relation to that
Dominion, functions similar to those performed before the appointed day, in
relation to the Governor-General in Council, by the High Commissioner
referred to in section three hundred and two of the Government of
India Act, 1935; and any legal proceedings which, immediately before the
appointed day, are the subject of an appeal to His Majesty in Council, or of a
petition for special leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, shall be treated
for the purposes of this section as legal proceedings pending in the United
Kingdom.
16. — (1) Subsections (2) to (4) of section two hundred and eighty-eight of the Aden.
Government of India Act, 1935 (which confer on His Majesty power to make
by Order in Council provision for the government of Aden) shall cease to have
effect and the British Settlements Acts, 1887 and 1945, (which authorise His
Majesty to make laws and establish institutions for British Settlements as
defined in those Acts) shall apply in relation to Aden as if it were a British
Settlement as so defined.
(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the said subsections (2) to (4), the Orders
in Council in force thereunder at the date of the passing of this Act shall con¬
tinue in force, but the said Orders in Council, any other Orders in Council
made under the Government of India Act, 1935, in so far as they apply to Aden,
and any enactments applied to Aden or amended in relation to Aden by any
such Orders in Council as aforesaid, may be repealed, revoked or amended
under the powers of the British Settlements Acts, 1887 and 1945.
(3) Unless and until provision to the contrary is made as respects Aden
under the powers of the British Settlements Acts, 1887 and 1945, or, as respects
the new Dominion in question, by a law of the Legislature of that Dominion
the provisions of the said Orders in Council and enactments relating to appeals
from any courts in Aden to any courts which will, after the appointed day, be in
either of the new Dominions, shall continue in force in their application both
to Aden and to the Dominion in question, and the last mentioned courts shall
exercise their jurisdiction accordingly.
17. — (1) No court in either of the new Dominions shall, by virtue of the Divorcc
Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Acts, 1926 and 1940, have jurisdiction Juusdlctlon*
in or in relation to any proceedings for a decree for the dissolution of a marriage
unless those proceedings were instituted before the appointed day, but, save
as aforesaid and subject to any provision to the contrary which may hereafter
be made by any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by any law
of the Legislature of the new Dominion concerned, all courts in the new
246
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
16 & 17
Geo. 5. c. 40.
1 Edw. 8 & 1
Geo. 6. c. 57.
Dominions shall have the same jurisdiction under the said Acts as they would
have had if this Act had not been passed.
(2) Any rules made on or after the appointed day under subsection (4) of
section one of the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1926, for a
court in either of the new Dominions shall, instead of being made by the
Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor, be made by
such authority as may be determined by the law of the Dominion concerned,
and so much of the said subsection and of any rules in force thereunder im¬
mediately before the appointed day as require the approval of the Lord
Chancellor to the nomination for any purpose of any judges of any such court
shall cease to have effect.
(3) The reference in subsection (1) of this section to proceedings for a decree
for the dissolution of a marriage include references to proceedings for such a
decree of presumption of death and dissolution of a marriage as is authorised
by section eight of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937.
(4) Nothing in this section affects any court outside the new Dominions,
and the powder conferred by section two of the Indian and Colonial Divorce
Jurisdiction Act, 1926, to apply certain provisions of that Act to other parts
of His Majesty’s dominions as they apply to India shall be deemed to be power
to apply those provisions as they would have applied to India if this Act had
not passed.
Provisions as
to existing
laws, etc.
18. — (1) In so far as any Act of Parliament, Order in Council, order, rule,
regulation or other instrument passed or made before the appointed day
operates otherwise than as part of the law of British India or the new Dominions
references therein to India or British India, however worded and whether by
name or not, shall, in so far as the context permits and except so far as Parlia¬
ment may hereafter otherwise provide, be construed as, or as including, re¬
ferences to the new Dominions, taken together, or taken separately, according
as the circumstances and subject matter may require:
Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as continuing in
operation any provision in so far as the continuance thereof as adapted by this
subsection is inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act other than this
section.
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and to any
other express provision of this Act, the Orders in Council made under sub¬
section (5) of section three hundred and eleven of the Government of India Act,
1935, for adapting and modifying Acts of Parliament shall, except so far as
Parliament may hereafter otherwise provide, continue in force in relation to
all Acts in so far as they operate otherwise than as part of the law of British
India or the new Dominions.
JULY I947
247
(3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the law of British India
and of the several parts thereof existing immediately before the appointed
day shall, so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations, continue
as the law of each of the new Dominions and the several parts thereof until
other provision is made by laws of the Legislature of the Dominion in
question or by any other Legislature or other authority having power in that
behalf
(4) It is hereby declared that the Instruments of Instructions issued before
the passing of this Act by His Majesty to the Governor-General and the
Governors of Provinces lapse as from the appointed day, and nothing in this
Act shall be construed as continuing in force any provision of the Government
of India Act, 1935, relating to such Instruments of Instructions.
(5) As from the appointed day, so much of any enactment as requires the
approval of His Majesty in Council to any rules of court shall not apply to any
court in either of the new Dominions.
19. — (1) References in this Act to the Governor-General shall, in relation to interpretation,
any order to be made or other act done on or after the appointed day, be cu'
construed —
(a) where the order or other act concerns one only of the new Dominions,
as references to the Governor-General of that Dominion;
(b) where the order or other act concerns both of the new Dominions and
the same person is the Governor-General of both those Dominions, as
references to that person; and
(c) in any other case, as references to the Governors-General of the new
Dominions, acting jointly.
(2) References in this Act to the Governor-General shall, in relation to any
order to be made or other act done before the appointed day, be construed
as references to the Governor-General of India within the meaning of die
Government of India Act, 1935, and so much of that or any other Act as
requires references to the Governor-General to be construed as references to the
Governor-General in Council shall not apply to references to the Governor-
General in this Act.
(3) References in this Act to the Constituent Assembly of a Dominion shall
be construed as references —
(a) in relation to India, to the Constituent Assembly, the first sitting whereof
was held on the ninth day of December, nineteen hundred and forty-six,
modified —
(i) by the exclusion of the members representing Bengal, the Punjab,
Sind and British Baluchistan; and
248
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(ii) should it appear that the NorthWest Frontier Province will form
part of Pakistan, by the exclusion of the members representing that
Province; and
(iii) by the inclusion of members representing West Bengal and
East Punjab ; and
(iv) should it appear that, on the appointed day, a part of the Province
of Assam is to form part of the new Province of East Bengal, by the
exclusion of the members theretofore representing the Province of
Assam and the inclusion of members chosen to represent the remainder
of that Province ;
(b) in relation to Pakistan, to the Assembly set up or about to be set up at the
date of the passing of this Act under the authority of the Governor-
General as the Constituent Assembly for Pakistan:
Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as affecting the
extent to which representatives of the Indian States take part in either of the
said Assemblies, or as preventing the filling of casual vacancies in the said
Assemblies, or as preventing the participation in either of the said Assemblies, in
accordance with such arrangements as may be made in that behalf, of repre¬
sentatives of the tribal areas on the borders of the Dominion for which that
Assembly sits, and the powers of the said Assemblies shall extend and be deemed
always to have extended to the making of provision for the matters specified
in this proviso.
9 & 10 Geo. 6.
c. 39-
(4) In this Act, except so far as the context otherwise requires —
references to the Government of India Act, 1935, include references to any
enactments amending or supplementing that Act, and, in particular,
references to the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act,
1946;
“India”, where the reference is to a state of affairs existing before the
appointed day or which would have existed but for the passing of this
Act, has the meaning assigned to it by section three hundred and
eleven of the Government of India Act, 1935;
“Indian forces” includes all His Majesty’s Indian forces existing before the
appointed day and also any forces of either of the new Dominions;
“pension” means, in relation to any person, a pension whether contri¬
butory or not, of any kind whatsoever payable to or in respect of that
person, and includes retired pay so payable, a gratuity so payable and
any sum or sums so payable by way of the return, with or without
interest thereon or other additions thereto, of subscriptions to a
provident fund;
“Province” means a Governor’s Province;
JULY I947
249
“remuneration” includes leave pay, allowances and the cost of any privi¬
leges or facilities provided in kind.
(5) Any power conferred by this Act to make any order includes power to
revoke or vary any order previously made in the exercise of that power.
20. This Act may be cited as the Indian Independence Act, 1947.
SCHEDULES
FIRST SCHEDULE
BENGAL DISTRICTS PROVISIONALLY INCLUDED IN THE NEW PROVINCE
OF EAST BENGAL
In the Chittagong Division, the districts of Chittagong, Noakhali and Tippera.
In the Dacca Division, the districts of Bakarganj, Dacca, Faridpur and Mymensingh.
In the Presidency Division, the districts of Jessore, Murshidabad and Nadia.
In the Rajshahi Division, the districts of Bogra, Dinajpur, Malda, Pabna, Rajshahi and
Rangpur.
SECOND SCHEDULE
DISTRICTS PROVISIONALLY INCLUDED IN THE NEW PROVINCE OF
WEST PUNJAB
In the Lahore Division, the districts of Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Lahore, Sheikhupura
and Sialkot.
In the Rawalpindi Division, the districts of Attock, Gujrat, Jhelum, Mianwali,
Rawalpindi and Shahpur.
In the Multan Division, the districts of Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Lyallpur, Mont¬
gomery, Multan and MuzafFargarh.
165
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Telegram , L/P &J/ 10/82: f 33
IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, l8 July 1947, I.30 pm
Received: 18 July , 7.40 pm
No. 9261. Your 2009-S.1
1. Royal Assent has been given today and Bill becomes law with effect from
00. 1 hrs [00.01 hrs] today July 18th.
2. Your para. 3. Please send fmal text by Air Mail.
3. Act will be available in about a week. How many copies do you require [5]
Short title.
Section 3.
Section 4.
1 See No. 155, note 1.
250
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
1 66
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to andjrom the Secretary of State
PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, l8 July lp47
Dear Mountbatten,
It is, I fear, a fortnight since I wrote to you and in the meanwhile I have received
two of your letters and personal reports. At the end of last week, when a letter
was due from me, we were all preoccupied with piloting the Bill through
Parliament and I felt it would be better to defer writing until that process was
completed.
2. In your letter of the 4th July1 you asked whether it would not be possible
to follow in the case of Burma a procedure similar to that adopted in regard to
India, namely, to rush through Parliament during the present Session legislation
on the basis of dominion status for Burma in the hope that it might still be
possible to convince the Burmese of the advantages of remaining in the
Commonwealth. I can assure you that the possibility of following this course
was fully weighed and that it was with the utmost reluctance that we finally
decided that it could not be for the reason that, whether out of honesty or on
other grounds, the Burmese leaders made it perfectly clear that there was no
possibility of their changing their minds about leaving the Commonwealth and
that if power were transferred forthwith on the basis of dominion status,
Burma would ask for complete independence at the earliest possible moment
thereafter and without making any show at giving dominion status a fair trial.
Apart from any question of the prostitution of dominion status, it was at least
doubtful whether the Opposition would co-operate to the extent of treating
any such legislation as non-controversial and legislation this Session was out of
the question on any other basis.
3. In the same letter you referred to Nehru’s interest in the appointment of
Indian agents in East Africa, the West Indies, Fiji and Mauritius. As a matter of
fact, I received a personal letter2 from Nehru on this matter and am glad to say
that the Colonial Office have now agreed in principle to the appointment of
such agents, the question of their exact function being left open for negotiation
between our High Commissioner in India and the Government of India. I have
replied to Nehru’s letter on these lines.3
4. In paragraph 2 of your Personal Report No. n4 you gave us the back¬
ground to the announcement of 1st July about the partition of the Armed
Forces. This announcement naturally took us rather by surprise as we had had
no preliminary warning of it but examination of its details revealed no apparent
JULY I947
251
defects. The part played by Trivedi in achieving this important success illus¬
trates well the vital importance of the personal factor in the handling of
Indian affairs at the present time.
5. I would like to say here how full of admiration I am for the public-
spirited and generous way in which you have faced the question of the
Governor-Generalships of the new Dominions. The whole affair must have
been most baffling and exacting to you personally, but, as you know, everyone
here without exception believes that the right course is the one you have so
unselfishly decided to follow.
6. I am very sorry that it was not possible, as you suggested,5 to announce
appointments to Governorships during the passage of the Bill through Parlia¬
ment but I hope that an announcement of at any rate some names will be
possible very soon. While it is excellent that Cunningham6 is willing to return
to Peshawar, it is perhaps rather surprising that Killearn7 feels at all attracted by
East Bengal but it would certainly help to raise the status of Eastern
Pakistan in the eyes both of Indians and of the outside world if he were finally
to accept.
7. I hope you will not have been too disappointed about Slim’s refusal to
accept the invitation to be Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the new
Dominion of India.8 Personally, I formed the impression that Slim’s con¬
viction that he was not in fact the right person for the job was sound and from
all that I can hear I think that Lockhart, if the appointment is offered to him,
would be a more suitable choice.
8. The future of the Interim Government must have been a perpetual anxiety
to you in recent weeks but it is to be hoped that your latest device9 for bridging
the time that remains before 15 th August will meet the case.
9. Krishna Menon came to see me on Tuesday. It has to be admitted that in
the past the impression he has created in home circles has been by no means
favourable but, in view of his selection as High Commissioner10 in the
United Kingdom for the new Dominion of India, it is encouraging to know
that his services have been of such assistance to you in the difficult negotiations
in Delhi in recent weeks. I am arranging for him to meet some of the Opposi¬
tion leaders to whom at the moment he is by no means persona grata . The
great need at India House at the moment is, of course, for someone at the top
with real organising and administrative capacity. I rather doubt whether
Krishna Menon will supply this need but perhaps he will be wise enough to
1 Vol. XI, No. 505. 2 Not traced.
3 Lord Listowel’s letter, dated 18 July 1947, is on L/P &J/8/180.
4 Vol. XI, No. 506. 5 See No. 133, note 2. 6 See No. 31, note 7.
^ See No. 29, note 1. 8 See No. 31. 9 See No. 155.
10 See Nos. 55 and 74.
252
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
realise that, if he wishes to concentrate on higher policy, he must find someone
as his deputy who will carry out the re-organising of the Office that will be
required.
10. In view of what you reported in paragraph 13 of your Personal Report
No. 11,11 it is indeed fortunate that the period to 15 th August is so compara¬
tively short. The strain upon you and your staff during this critical period must,
I am afraid, be almost unbearable but I trust that after 15 th August there will be
a relaxation of the tension.
11. I entirely agree with you as to the great political importance of our
providing the cruiser which the Congress members of your Cabinet have
agreed that they should have.12 At the moment we are rather held up by the
fact that the official telegram from the Defence Department, promised in
paragraph 18 of your Personal Report No. 1 1, has not yet been received and the
Admiralty (whose ways will be familiar to you !) stoutly refuse to make any
move except on the basis of an official request. The matter was raised in the
House of Commons during the Debates on the Bill and the Prime Minister
undertook to inform Commander Noble (M.P. for Chelsea) of the decision
finally reached in the matter.
12. In paragraph 4 of your letter of nth July13 you ask about the new set-up
in the Commonwealth Relations Office and to whom you should address your
private letters after 15th August. Ismay is fully informed on these matters and
will explain the position to you on his return.
13 . An intense effort will certainly be required of Radcliffe if the work of the
Boundary Commissions is to be completed by 15th August. I have always had
a feeling that the reactions of the Sikhs to the decisions of the Punjab Boundary
Commission would be one of the most critical danger spots in the process
of transferring power and I hope that the services of Major Short,14 over whose
appointment the Treasury have been most helpful, will be of some assistance
in this connection.
14. In my telegram No. 9035 of 14th July15 I sent you a message for trans¬
mission to Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer in reply to identical telegrams which the
Prime Minister and I had received from him. It is clear that Travancore is
going to require very careful handling indeed and that we must avoid any
statement which would give the State leverage in asserting its independence
or economic autonomy. The report in paragraphs 27-32 of your Personal
Report No. 1216 on the discussions with the representatives of Hyderabad is
very encouraging. I do indeed hope that you are right in believing that, if you
can get Hyderabad to abandon the idea of complete independence, this would
set an example which no other State, not even Travancore, could resist.
15. To-day the Indian Independence Bill has received the Royal Assent and
JULY 1947
253
we have fulfilled our intention with two days to spare. I was able to be present
for part of the Second Reading Debate in the House of Commons and was,
of course, present throughout the taking of all stages of the Bill in the House of
Lords on Wednesday but could not find the time to attend the Committee
Stage or Third Reading in the Commons. On the whole the Opposition in both
Houses have been most co-operative and constructive in their criticism. It
looked at the last moment as if the programme might be delayed in the House
of Lords by the tabling of some amendments by Lord Rankeillour but in view
of the course of the debate he did not even move them.
16. Ismay left this morning. His presence has, as usual, been most valuable
and he will be able to bring back to you first-hand impressions of the atmos¬
phere in both Houses of Parliament.
17. To turn to other matters, it is unfortimate that Nehru has not responded
to Smuts’s efforts to secure a detente between the Government of India and
the Union about the Indians in South Africa.17 He appears to be unwilling to
co-operate unless Smuts accepts the implications of the U.N.O. Resolution,
i.e. admits that U.N.O. has the right to intervene in matters of this kind, that
the arrangements entered into between the Union and India in the past have
the status of international obligations and that consequently the Asiatic Land
Tenure Act18 will have to be suspended or withdrawn. This, however, might
mean political suicide for Smuts. He has already lost an important by-election
mainly because of his alleged liberal attitude towards Indians, and if he goes
further his fall at the 1948 election in the Union seems certain. The result would
be the return to power of Malan and the Nationalists, whose extreme views
towards Indians are well known. This is surely not in Nehru’s interests.
18. It would be very desirable to avoid at the next meeting of the U.N.O.
Assembly a repetition of last year’s controversy. The State Department, who
like ourselves are uneasy about the position, have suggested to the Canadians
that they might try to find out what the position is and we have privately
advised the Canadians to make discreet enquiries both from the Union and from
the Government of India as to the line each proposes to take. Bottomley, the
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State in the new Commonwealth Relations
Office, will take any opportunity he has in the course of the visit he is now
paying to South Africa to talk the matter over with Smuts. I gather that Smuts
has had considerable success with the moderate Indian leaders in South Africa,
11 Vol. X, No. 506. 12 Ibid., para. 18.
13 Mountbatten Papers, Letters to and from the Secretary of State.
14 See No. 60. 15 No. 106, Enclosure 2. 16 No. 65.
17 Correspondence between Pandit Nehru and Field Marshal Smuts is on L/E/9/1405.
18 The Government of India broke off relations with South Africa in 1946 after the South African
Parliament had passed the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, which granted a
measure of representation in Parliament to Indians but which simultaneously restricted their freedom
to occupy and acquire property in certain parts of the country.
254
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
who are alarmed at the reaction in South Africa to the U.N.O. Resolution and
have formed a new organisation with the object of co-operating with the
Union Government.
19. All this is, of course, very confidential to yourself You will doubtless
use any opportunity you get to guide Nehru on the path of moderation.
20. You mentioned in your letter of 5th June19 that the Hon. Mr. Jagjivan
Ram, the Labour Member, would be visiting London after the end of the meet¬
ing of the International Labour Conference in Geneva. He actually arrived in
London the 8th July and we were able to arrange that his time in London was
used to the maximum advantage. In addition to interviews with the Prime
Minister, Bevin, Cripps and Alexander as well as with Henderson and myself,
Ram was taken to see various Ministry of Labour training centres etc., and also
attended a Garden Party at the Palace as well as being present in the Commons
for the Second Reading debate on the Indian Independence Bill. We also gave
him a small official lunch which was attended by Nanda, the other Indian
Delegate in Geneva, as well as Lall, the Secretary of the Labour Department
and the principal members of the Indian Sterling Balances Delegation. Ram
seemed to have enjoyed himself and I think that he will consider that his trip to
London has been well worth while. We were, of course, grieved to hear of
the air crash at Basra but are thankful for his miraculous escape.
[Paras. 21-23 on the Empire Forestry Conference and the Indian Art Exhi¬
bition, omitted.]
24. When I saw Amery the other day he threw out the suggestion that you
might find it helpful to have on your staff during the next few months someone
who was versed in Dominions procedure. The idea struck me as a good one
and Ismay, to whom I mentioned it this morning, thought that it might meet
your need if you were to have the advice of such a person even for a month or
six weeks ; it would probably be very difficult, if not impossible, to spare any¬
one for longer. I am making some quite tentative enquiries but if you feel that
the idea is worth pursuing, it would be helpful if you would let me know.
Yours sincerely,
LISTOWEL
p.s.
Since writing paragraph 9 above I have met Krishna Menon at lunch and he
would be very grateful if you would take an opportunity of mentioning to
Nehru that I am, at my own suggestion, arranging for him (Krishna Menon)
to meet Opposition leaders in view of the fact that, as High Commissioner, he
will be brought into official contact with them.
10 Vol. XI, No. 90.
JULY I947
255
167
Mr Krishna Menon to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma (Extract)
Mountbatten Papers. Demi-official Correspondence Files: Menon ,
V. K. Krishna
PERSONAL 47 STRAND, LONDON, W.C.2, l8 July lp47
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I hope you feel a slight sense of relief that the Bill has become law and that your
efforts have been successful. H.M.G. have been better than their word on
time-table. The Lords were particularly tame and co-operative. The under¬
current of opposition in the Conmions did not come to much, though ob¬
viously the Opposition had been briefed. Some of the “efforts” of those who
must have thought they were being helpful to us (and are our side) to
“organise” public opinion were not very helpful — particularly letters to the
Times and circularisation of back bench M.P.’s! However, it is all over, even
though there is little of enthusiasm anywhere. Partition and strife cast their
shadows dark and long.
Your letter1 and a personal note2 from Jawaharlal which I brought were sent
to Downing Street on Sunday last when I arrived here. It was at once sent on
to Chequers, where the P.M. was. His secretary telephoned me before six and the
P.M. saw me at io the next morning. You have educated them all in hustling !
The P.M. was glad to see me and to hear about you and about all the news. I
then tried to put our case about the States.3 He called in the Law Officers and
Henderson, and we had about seventy minutes over it. Mr Attlee was anxious
to help. We went over the amendments to Clause 7, and even tried some other
devices. The Law Officers, who appear most crusted, were stogy [? stodgy],
and the P.M. felt unable to do anything beyond saying something in speeches.
They were all of opinion that Mysore and Benares could not revert to pre¬
treaty positions as they had acquired sovereignty under British suzerainty. It
is all an odd kind of constitutional theory and will not hold good outside
Whitehall, but there it was. There was no lack of desire on the part of the P.M.
to be of assistance.
I found there and everywhere else that the“Fuhrer” had overplayed his hand.
Mr J’s last effort smells very badly, and even the man in the street has begun
to understand the business. I rather suspect it helped the speedy passage of the
legislation in the Commons and unnerved the Opposition.
I have also seen Listowel,4 Henderson and Cripps, all of whom promised to
do what they could in speeches to indicate that H.M.G. would not welcome
1 See No. 55, note 1. 2 See No. 74. 3 See Nos. 123 and 152.
4 See No. 166, para. 9.
256
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Balkanisation or Dominion Status for Princes. All of these were very co¬
operative. Altogether there is a new atmosphere in this country. One could not
help wishing that it were so in India also. But I am afraid that this won’t be the
case, and I have done my best to indicate fully to all concerned this aspect of
the situation and its reasons — which I thought desirable.
★ ★ ★
Affectionate regards,
KRISHNA
168
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , Rfe/if 160: f 178
immediate new Delhi, 18 July 1947, u.oo pm
secret Received: 18 July , 10.4s pm
No. 2036-S. Your telegram 9189 of July 17th.1
Order was deliberately expressed to derive from sub-section (2) of Section 40
in the Ninth Schedule as well as from para (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 9 of
Indian Independence Act and my advisers remain of opinion that reference to
former provision is entirely appropriate.
2. Word ‘future’ has already been inserted.
3. I would have no strong objection to your suggestion on para 6 but the
text of the draft order has already been seen by the whole Cabinet and I think
it is unnecessary to change it now.
4. Your para 2. Answer to question in last sentence is YES2 so far as the
draft order is concerned. Communique however makes it clear that the two
groups can meet jointly under the chairmanship of the Governor-General
to consider matters of common concern. Save to the extent to which the
order otherwise provides all matters brought before the Executive Council
will necessarily be brought before the full Council.
5. You para 3. 1 appreciate your point about the Frontier but if the Referen¬
dum goes in Jinnah’s favour the question is one which will affect Pakistan very
closely and I cannot leave it to be settled in Peshawar. Experience of the party
differences in Lahore and Calcutta shows that these matters have got to be dealt
with in consultation with the High Command. Thus practical considerations
outweigh the constitutional point you mention.
2 Emphasis in original.
1 No. 147.
JULY I947
25 7
I69
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma (Extract)
Telegram , L/WS/ 1)1092: j 240
IMMEDIATE
india office, 18 July 1947 , 11.30 pm
Received: 19 July , 1.00 pm
No. 9305. Your 1983-S dated 15th July.1
1. Paragraph 3. In order to avoid possibility of misconception arising as to role
of British Forces remaining in India after August 15 th, we now agree that you
make a public statement to the effect that, since responsibility for maintaining
law and order from that date will rest with the Governments of India and
Pakistan, British Forces will not be used operationally and will not be available
to intervene in internal disorder.
2. Paragraph 4. It is realized that unnecessary inconvenience may be caused
if families are moved to the U.K. ahead of the troops and we agree that, as far
as possible, families should move with the units concerned. In any case arrange¬
ments should tbe made that families are moved not2 later than the troops.
[Para. 3, on location of R.A.F. Transport Squadrons, omitted.]
1 No. 124. 2 Emphasis in original.
170
The Gazette of India Extraordinary
R/3I i) 160: f 189
NEW DELHI, 19 July I947
SECRETARIAT OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL (REFORMS)
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi , the 19th July , 1947
no. g.g.o. 1. — The following Order made by the Governor-General is
published for general information :
THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS)
ORDER, I947
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 40 of the
Government of India Act, as set out in the Ninth Schedule to the Government
of India Act, 1935, and by paragraph (e) of sub-section (1) of section 9 of the
Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Governor-General is pleased to make the
following Order, namely:
258
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
1. This Order may be cited as the Executive Council (Transitional Provi¬
sions) Order, 1947.
2. (1) In this Order “existing Department” means any Department of the
Government of India in existence immediately before the commencement of
this Order.
(2) The Interpretation Act, 1889, shall apply for the interpretation of this
Order as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of Parliament.
3. Each existing Department shall be renamed by adding the word “India”
in brackets at the end of its former designation and, each such Department shall,
as from the commencement of this Order, handle cases exclusively or pre¬
dominantly concerning the future Dominion of India.
4. As from the commencement of this Order, there shall be created a
Department corresponding with each existing Department, and each new
Department so created —
(a) shall bear the same designation as the existing Department with the
addition of the word “Pakistan” in brackets; and
(b) shall handle cases exclusively or predominantly concerning the future
Dominion of Pakistan.
5. Cases of common concern to the two future Dominions shall be handled
in consultation by the appropriate Indian Department and the appropriate
Pakistan Department.
6. The India and Pakistan Departments shall respectively be in charge of
such members of the Executive Council as the Governor-General may nomi¬
nate in that behalf.
7. (1) For the purpose of dealing with any case exclusively or predomi¬
nantly concerning the future Dominion of India members of the Executive
Council in charge of Pakistan Departments shall not be entitled to attend the
meetings of the Council; and for the purpose of dealing with any case ex¬
clusively or predominantly concerning the future Dominion of Pakistan,
members of the Executive Council in charge of India Departments shall not be
entitled to attend the meetings of the Council.
(2) Any question as to whether a case exclusively or predominantly con¬
cerns the future Dominion of India or Pakistan or is a case of common concern
to both those Dominions shall be determined for the purposes of this Order
by the Governor-General, whose determination shall be final.
8. Any provisions contained in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of
India Act, 1935, or any rules or orders made thereunder shall, to the extent to
JULY I947
259
which it is inconsistent with the provisions of this Order, cease to have effect.
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
Governor-General
K. V. K. SUNDARAM
Officer on Special Duty
171
Meeting of the Partition Council , Case No. P.C.6gf 7/ 47
Mountbatten Papers. Partition Council Minutes
SECRET
Those present during discussion of this item at this Meeting held on ig July ig4y
at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , Mr Jinn ah, Mr
Liaquat Ali Khan , Sardar Patel , Dr Rajendra Prasad , Sir E. Mieville , Mr H. M.
Patel , Mr Mohamad Ali, Mr Osman Ali, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
Case No. P.C. 69/7/47 Future economic relations between the two Dominions
his excellency said he had recently been meeting some industrial mag¬
nates1 who had raised the question of the future economic relations between
the two Dominions. They had brought to his notice the flight of capital from
Pakistan territory which was ascribed partly to the fear of Pakistan imposing
restrictive legislation on non-Muslims’ business activities; and expressed their
anxiety to check it, as it would, if allowed to continue, dislocate business in
both Dominions. The specific case of cotton had been mentioned in this
connection. For some years past the normal practice had been for the cotton
grown in the Punjab and Sind to be milled largely in Indian territory. There were
obvious and sound reasons for continuing this practice but the businessmen
concerned were afraid to go ahead with their purchases of cotton because of
their uncertainty regarding Pakistan’s policy in this matter. Continuing, H.E.
said he was convinced that the present tendency was unhealthy from the point
of view of both Dominions and he felt it was his duty to bring these facts to the
notice of both parties. He thought a possible remedy might be found if some of
these big businessmen were invited to discuss the matter with the Council or
with representatives of the two Dominions.
mr jinn ah said that he resented the allegations spread by mischievous
propaganda that non-Muslim industrialists in Pakistan would not get a fair
deal. He had also met some non-Muslim industrialists (who were not citizens of
Pakistan) in the past week who had expressed the desire to do business in
1 There is a brief account of Lord Mountbatten’s meetings with Mr Birla and Sir P. Thakurdas on 28 and
29 June respectively in a note by Mr I. D. Scott entitled, ‘The Flight of Capital from Pakistan’, which
was circulated as V.C.P. No. 122. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Pakistan.
26o
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Pakistan but who were afraid that they would be discriminated against as
foreigners. He had dispelled their fears on this score and assured them that
although they would be technically foreigners, no distinction or discrimina¬
tion would be drawn against them and they would be allowed full facilities to
carry on their normal business. There were now three courses open to us:
(i a ) to minimise, (b) to encourage or (c) to ignore the present developments.
Since both parties had accepted partition, he was in entire agreement with His
Excellency that they should make joint efforts to minimise this tendency.
sardar patel said that in his view it would be best to let things work
themselves out. We had agreed on partition, and we must face some of the
inevitable consequences of which this was one.
mr liaquat ali pointed out that one of the Expert Committees was at
present examining the question of economic relations between the two
Dominions, and would be reporting on the extent to which the present arrange¬
ments could be continued at least till March 1948. The Councifs decisions on
its recommendations should have the effect of dispelling uncertainties and vague
apprehensions.
his excellency said that in view of Mr Liaquat Ali’s statement the best
course would be for the letters he had received2 from businessmen to be placed
before the Expert Committee as evidence of the prevailing anxieties in the
business-world. He would inform the industrial magnates.
2 A letter from Mr Birla and a memorandum by Sir P. Thakurdas are mentioned in Mr Scott’s note but
they are not on the file.
172
Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten
of Burma
R/jI i\ 160: f 181
SECRET EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, ig July lg^y
Dear Lord Moun that ten,
In view of the reconstruction of the Government that has taken place, I have
consulted my colleagues and we are of opinion that at present only provisional
arrangements should be made. We shall undoubtedly have to add to the number
of members of the Government,1 but we do not wish to do so immediately.
We may be able to suggest names for additional members in the near future.
Meanwhile, all arrangements are strictly provisional and subject to change.
We propose that the following existing members of the Cabinet should
continue :
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel,
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad,
JULY 1947
26l
Dr Rajendra Prasad,
Dr John Matthai,
Sri Rajagopalachari,
Sardar Baldev Singh,
Mr Jagjivanram,
Mr C. H. Bhabha and
Jawaharlal Nehru.
These existing members will continue to hold their present portfolios and
will, in addition, take charge of the five portfolios and departments vacated
by the Muslim League nominees. This will be done in the following manner:
Finance: Mr C. Rajagopalchari,
Communications : Dr John Matthai,
Commerce : Mr Bhabha,
Health : Mr Jagjivanram,
Law : Jawaharlal Nehru.
As Mr Jagjivanram has not returned yet and it is not quite clear how soon he
will be able to take charge because of his injury, I am prepared to take tempor¬
ary charge of the Health Department, till Mr Jagjivanram can do so, or till
some other arrangement is made.
These arrangements, I would repeat, are provisional only and subject to
change in future.
Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
1 See No. 127.
Sir G. Abell to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
Rfcl it 160: ff 182 , 184
19 July 1947
My dear Mr Liaquat Ah Khan,
This morning you gave the distribution of portfolios in the provisional
Government of Pakistan to H.E., and he asks me to write to you as was ar¬
ranged at the meeting for your confirmation that the list enclosed is correct.
Could your reply please be telephoned.
Yours sincerely,
G. E. B. ABELL
262
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Name
The Hon’ble
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
The Hon’ble
Mr I. I. Chundrigar
The Hon’ble
Mr Abdur Rab Nishtar
The Hon’ble
Mr Ghazanfar Ali Khan
The Hon’ble
Mr Jogendra Nath Mandal
Enclosure to No. 173
DISTRIBUTION OF PORTFOLIOS1
Portfolios
Finance, External Affairs, Commonwealth
Relations and Defence.
Commerce, Industries and Supplies, Works,
Mines & Power.
Communications, Railways, Transport,
Information and Broadcasting, and States.
Health, Food and Agriculture and Home.
Law, Education and Art, and Labour.
1 Upon receipt of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan’s confirmation, the details of the Provisional Government of
Pakistan, together with those of the Indian Cabinet, were released in a communique which was issued
at 8 pm I.S.T. on 8 July. R/3/1/160: f 185.
174
Minutes of Viceroy's Twentieth Miscellaneous Meeting
R/jji/166: fifi 24-7
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s House, New Delhi , on ip July
1947 at 3.30 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma, Nawabzada
Mohammed Aslam Khan, Sir Sultan Ahmed, Sardar Nishtar, Mr Akhtar Hussain,
Sir C. Corfield, Mr E. B. Wakefield; Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum ( Secretariat )
his excellency’s opening remarks
his excellency welcomed the Kalat Delegation. He explained that it was his
desire, as Crown Representative, to settle all matters of potential dispute be¬
tween the States and the two new Dominions by 15th August.
UNDISPUTED AREAS OF KALAT
his excellency said that he understood that the districts of Kalat which
all concerned acknowledged to be directly administered by the Khan were
Makran, Jhalawan, Sarawan, Kachhi and Dombki and Kaheri.
DISPUTED AREAS
his excellency said that he understood that the status of Kharan and Las
Bela was disputed to the extent that the rulers thereof claimed not to be under
JULY 1947
263
the suzerainty of the Khan of Kalat. This, however, was a matter for future
discussion between the parties concerned and not for the present meeting.
THE LEGAL POSITION OF KALAT
his excellency asked whether it was considered that Kalat’s status in
relation to the Crown was that of an Indian State or different.
nawabzada mohammed aslam khan said that Kalat’s position was,
in his opinion, defined in the Treaty of 1876, according to which Kalat was an
independent sovereign State in treaty relations with the British Government,
and did not rank as an Indian State.
his excellency said that he was willing to accept that position for
purposes of negotiation. Mr. Nishtar said that he also would not contest it.
THE LEASED AREAS
his excellency said that he understood that the four leased areas of
Quetta, Nushki, Nasirabad and Bolan1 were to be the main subject of the
present discussion.
He explained that the claim that these areas should be returned to Kalat after
the transfer of power was resisted by the representatives of the future Pakistan
Government. Their opinion was based on the grounds that the successor auth¬
orities in India would, in relation to foreign States, inherit all Treaty obligations
incurred on behalf of India ; and that the Pakistan Government would be heir
to the obligations (both burdens and benefits) arising out of Treaties made with
Kalat — as they would be, for example, to the Anglo- Afghan Treaty of 1921.
nawabzada mohammed aslam khan said that Kalat submitted that
the leases clearly stated that, whereas on the one side His Highness, his heirs
and successors, were affected, the other party was the British Government
alone. There was no provision for transfer or inheritance of the leases from the
British Government, to which they were personal.
MR. nishtar said that he did not agree that these were “personal” agree¬
ments. Personal agreements were those which by their nature implied that only
a particular person was involved.
sir sultan ahmed said that, as he understood it, the word “personal”
had a wider legal meaning. He gave his opinion that the rights and obligations
arising out of the Treaty of 1876 could not be transferred to a successor Govern¬
ment. This Treaty had not been made by Kalat with the Government of India,
but with the British Government as such. The Kalat representatives could not
accept the legal position as understood by the representatives of Pakistan.
his excellency said that he himself had also been advised that, according
1 The terms upon which these areas were leased by the Khan of Kalat to the British Government are
explained in a note by Mr E. Wakefield entitled, ‘Kalat: Legal Position’, which was sent to Sir G. Abell
on 19 July. R/3/1/1 66: ff 29-30.
264
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
to international law, treaties such as this were not invalidated by a transfer of
power, but were inherited by the successor authorities. Treaties with States
over which the Crown had exercised paramountcy, on the other hand, lapsed.
Particular provision was made for this in the Indian Independence Bill.
his excellency suggested that if, after further discussion, there was no
agreement between the interested parties on the legal position, the case might
eventually be put before the Arbitral Tribunal, sir sultan ahmed sug¬
gested, and it was agreed, that the Khan of Kalat should first talk over the
matter with Mr. Jinnah.
nawabzada mohammed aslam khan said that, if the eventual
decision in this matter was in their favour, the Kalat representatives would still
be willing to enter into negotiations on the future of Quetta and do their
utmost to meet the Pakistan Government’s wishes in a reasonable manner but,
with regard to the other three leased areas, they saw no reason why these
should not return to Kalat without further discussion.
his excellency pointed out that Nasirabad would be of no value if the
irrigation supply was cut off. If Nasirabad was returned, some arrangements
would have to be made in advance for the continuation of this supply. This was
a question of mutual interest.
With regard to Nushki, nawabzada mohammed aslam khan said
that the railway facilities could continue to be used by Pakistan, whatever the
legal decision.
mr. nishtar said that he did not consider that it would be in the interest of
Kalat to have a common frontier with Afghanistan.
nawabzada mohammed aslam khan said that he believed that a
vote taken among representatives of the leased areas on the issue of their
joining Pakistan or going to Kalat would result in a decision in favour of the
latter. A number of petitions to this effect had been received. He pointed out
that previously the only issue had been as between Hindustan and Pakistan.
mr nishtar did not agree that such a vote was likely to have that result.
He said that he considered it better, at the present meeting, not to go into the
question of the petitions which had been made.
THE FUTURE OF KALAT AS A WHOLE
his excellency said that he also wished to discuss the future of Kalat as a
whole. He explained that he was going to see representatives of the States the
following week with a view to suggesting to them that they should adhere to
one or other of the Dominions. The Union of India had reduced their demands
in this respect to adherence only on the three main subjects of Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Communications. In the case of Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah was prepared,
as there were so few States concerned, to discuss with each, individually, the
question of the method and degree of adherence.
JULY I947
265
his excellency pointed out that the British Government had been very
anxious to establish the position that, on the transfer of power, paramountcy
would lapse and States would de jure become independent; but, de facto, very
few were likely to benefit from independence. Moreover, adherence to a
Dominion Government would be the only method, in the future, of main¬
taining some form of relationship between the Crown and the States. For
Kalat, although there was complete liberty of choice, he could personally
advise no course other than association on some terms with Pakistan.
nawabzada mohammed aslak khan said that the Khan of Kalat
had the deepest desire to remain on friendly terms with Pakistan. He was pre¬
pared to come to an amicable settlement to mutual benefit. He had, in parti¬
cular, the highest respect for Mr. Jinnah.
175
Mr Rumbold to Mr Davies
L/P&SI13I1S42 : f 65
pol. 1 112/47 India office, lg July ig47
BY HAND
Dear Davies,
Will you please refer to your letter No. 15392/47 of 1 8th July regarding trade
between Ceylon and Travancore.1
2. The United Kingdom are also receiving approaches from the Dewan of
Travancore, broadly of the same type as those which Ceylon is receiving. The
answer which we are giving is that we are anxious to continue to trade with
Travancore as at present and I think that the Ceylon Government ought to be
advised to make a similar reply. It might be explained to them that the implica¬
tion of it is that they should continue to trade with Travancore through the
same channels as are used at present.
3. The Dewan of Travancore appears to be trying to get trade discussions
going on a government to government basis and I think that we should resist
this so far as we can because, however informal governmental contacts with
Travancore might be, they would at this delicate juncture give Travancore
the encouragement which we do not want her to have to continue to try to
stand out for independence.
Yours sincerelv,
j 7
H. A. F. RUMBOLD
1 Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar had made suggestions to the Ceylon Government representative in India as
to ways in which trade between Ceylon and Travancore might be continued and increased. Mr Davies’s
letter of 19 July sought advice about the guidance that should be given by the Colonial Office to the
Ceylon Government regarding its response to these approaches. L/P &S/13/1842: f 66.
266
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
176
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Telegram , Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Hyderabad , Part 1(a)
SECRET INDIA OFFICE, ip fuly 1947, 12. 40 pm
Received: 19 fuly, 10.00 pm
No. 9298. 1 learn from Foreign Office that on July 4th French Embassy London
informed them that Hyderabad Trade Commissioner in London had proposed
to them establishment in Paris of Hyderabad Diplomatic Mission after August
15 th to cover the whole of Europe. Trade Commissioner was going to Paris on
July nth to discuss this with French Government. There are indications that
French Government are not entirelv sound on this issue.
j
2. Our policy in connection with Indian States was explained to French
Embassy on usual lines.
3. French Embassy also stated that Hyderabad Government have invited to
Hyderabad two French archaeologists from L’Ecole Fran^aise De L’Extreme
Orient and that this invitation has been settled.
177
Government of India , External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
Department to H. M. M. Kabul (Extract)
Telegram, L/P& S/ 12/ 181 2: f 276
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, ip July I947, 11.20 pm
Received in India Office: 20 July , 00.35 am
No. 166. 1 Katadon No. 642 and Forminka No. 68. 3 Future of North West
Frontier Province.
2. In view of Shah Mahmud’s more reasonable attitude and on the under¬
standing that he will not in any sense be regarded or treated as an official
emissary of Afghan Government, Government of India agree that there might
be advantage in establishing informal personal contacts with him at Delhi and
are prepared to facilitate these.
JULY I947
267
Repeated to Secretary of State for India, Washington and North West
Frontier Province (copy by post to Baluchistan and U.K. High Commissioner).
1 Repeated to Secretary of State for India as tel. 5702.
2 No. 132. 3 No. 142, note 2.
178
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma1
Telegram , L/P &Jjiol 141 : f 118
important India office, 19 July ig47, 11. jo pm
Received: 20 July, 10.10 am
No. 9329. Your telegram No. 201 8-S of 18th July.2 We are awaiting
Weightman’s reply.
2. I await further telegram promised in your para 3. Meanwhile proposition
seems doubtful on following grounds.
3. Section 290 of 1935 Act requires that Federal Legislature (which for this
purpose would be Pakistan Constituent Assembly) should be consulted before
Governor’s Province is created and I do not see how Section 290 could be
adapted consistently with Section 8(2) of Indian Independence Act in such a way
as to make such consultation unnecessary.
4. Moreover I do not see how purposes of Section 8(2) could be fulfilled
unless constitutional machinery of new Province were to be on same lines as
that in other Governor’s Provinces. This would involve creation of a Provincial
Legislature, of which the Ministers would ordinarily be members (Sections
51(2) and 60 of 1935 Act). Would Jinnah be willing or able to set up necessary
machinery (which would of course include making provision in regard to such
matters as constituencies and franchise) merely to cover period until Constituent
Assembly has drawn up a new constitution for Baluchistan?3
1 In a covering note submitting a draft of this telegram Mr Rumbold minuted: ‘I think there may be
virtue in bringing home to Mr Jinnah in the relatively unimportant context of whether British
Baluchistan should become a Governor’s Province, the important point that there are definite limita¬
tions on the order-making power contained in Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act and that the
Governor-General is not a complete dictator.’ L/P &J/10/141 : f 119.
2 No. 158.
3 In tel. 2071-S of 21 July Lord Mountbatten replied that Sir G. Spence agreed with the view that there
were legal difficulties in creating a Governor’s Province in Baluchistan at once. Mountbatten added:
‘There is also point that unless tribal areas are included in new Province it is absurdly small and there
has been a move from tribal areas to come in. Spence will discuss whole matter with Jinnah; meantime
it cannot be regarded as certain that appointment will be a Governor’s appointment’. Mountbatten
Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Governors-General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment
of — Part (1). In the event, Baluchistan did not immediately become a Governor’s Province. When Mr
Weightman declined the offer of the governorship (No. 233), an approach was made to Sir G. Prior to
stay on as AGG Baluchistan. Prior stayed on until 4 October 1947 when he was replaced by Sir A.
Dundas who served until 1948.
268
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
5. I am still awaiting reply to paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 903 74 before
approaching Bang about Mudie and Hidayatullah.
4 In para. 3 of this tel. Lord Listowel explained that before he could make recommendations to the King
in respect of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Sir Francis Mudie (see No. 29), he needed to know
whether they had accepted the offers of governorships and whether resignations had been received from
the retiring governors. In tel. 2071— S of 21 July Lord Mountbatten confirmed that the resignations had
been received and in tel. 2962-S of 26 July confirmed that Hidayatullah and Mudie had accepted and
that the King’s approval could therefore be obtained. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence
Files: Governors-General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of — Part (1).
179
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
States , Relations with , Part 11(b)
confidential new Delhi, 19 July ig47, 00.20 am
Received: 20 July , 00.3s om
No. 205 i-S. There are certain demands of the states outstanding for arms and
ammunition for their regular forces and police. The main items are some 9
thousand muskets, 8 thousand rifles, 16 hundred revolvers, 62 automatics and
4 million rounds of ammunition.
2. There are also demands outstanding for arms and ammunition for the
Indian States Forces. The exact amounts are not known by the Political Dept
or the Military Adviser-in-Chief, as indents are placed direct by local military
advisers on the Defence Dept.
3. The supply of arms and ammunition against all these indents has been
suspended by the Defence Member1 and although this is officially based on the
Cabinet Stand Still order which I issued I do not doubt the position is also a
political one related to the attempt to persuade the states to federate with the
Dominion of India or at all events not to arm those who refuse to join.
4. The discussions about federation are proceeding in a fairly promising way.
The States Dept have taken a sensible line, and ask only for federation on the
minimum three subjects which will be closely defined so as to remove the fear
that they will be gradually extended later.
5. Though it is out of the question for me to approve the holding up of arms
as a bargaining counter in these negotiations, I should be regarded as deliber¬
ately sabotaging the negotiations if I were to take up now the question of
amending my own General Stand Still order and thus overruling the Defence
JULY 1947
269
M ember’s orders or alternatively were to issue direct orders of my own to the
Defence Dept.
6. Whatever I do it is very doubtful if I can secure actual delivery of these
arms before the 15 th August even by amicable persuasion of the Congress group
in the Government.
7. I propose therefore to keep the matter pending for the moment and take
no immediate action.2
1 cf. Annex ‘A’ to No. 66.
2 Lord Listowel replied in tel. 9681 of 28 July: ‘I agree with your conclusions’, adding that ‘if Govern¬
ments of new Dominions maintain this embargo we shall find States seeking to place orders with
manufacturers in United Kingdom, U.S.A., etc.’ L/WS/1/1167.
180
Sir G. Abell to Sir A. Carter (Extract)
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files:
Governors-General and Governors of Provinces , Appointment
of— Part (I)
immediate new Delhi, 20 July ig47, 00.13 am
confidential Received: 20 July, 00.30 am
No. 2052-S. Your 9262 July 18th.1 Cunningham.2
2. Viceroy has had further talk with Jinnah. Jinnah is most anxious to have
Cunningham, but is genuinely embarrassed at any suggestion that one Gover¬
nor should be treated in a special way. He points out that concession would not
remain secret and three other British Governors are involved.
★ ★ ★
6. H.E. is most anxious that Cunningham should accept, and hopes Secre¬
tary of State will appeal to him to do so. He would also be grateful for a very
early decision so that Cunningham’s name may be submitted to the King.
1 and 2 See No. 31, note 7. Tel. 9262 of 18 July dealt with a problem which had arisen over Sir G.
Cunningham’s conditions of service. Cunningham originally stipulated that his salary as governor of
the N.W.F.P. should be tax-free as compensation for the expense of maintaining a home in the U.K.
and the loss of a Director’s fee. When Mr Jinnah indicated his unwillingness to make this concession, Sir
A. Carter suggested in tel. 9262 that Cunningham should receive a single lump sum payment of
between £2,000 and £2,500 in sterling as compensation for disturbance. Upon receipt of tel. 2052-S
from Sir G. Abell, Carter wrote to Cunningham on 21 July: ‘We do all feel here that Jinnah has behaved
very badly and has taken advantage of you’. Cunningham, however, accepted Jinnah’s terms. On 23
July, in a letter to Abell expressing disapproval of Jinnah’s attitude, Carter concluded: ‘. . . I am quite
sure that Jinnah won’t be able to get Europeans to help him from this country, as he seems to desire,
unless he shows a very much more generous spirit than he has in relation to Cunningham’s appoint-
m ent’ . L/P & J/7/ 1 23 62 .
270
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
7. The need to seize every vacancy for Governorships offered to the British
seems to all of us out here of paramount importance for future good relations.
The prospects of Pakistan remaining within Commonwealth may partly de¬
pend on this.
★ ★ ★
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru
RI3I1/15S: f 108
no. 1446/16 20 July ig47
Dear Mr Nehru,
I have your letter No. F.7(7)-PS/47 of 15th July1 regarding the Sylhet referen¬
dum. I am glad to note, and entirely agree with, your view that such irregulari¬
ties as there were could not have affected the result of the referendum.
2. I have no doubt that Sir B. N. Rau is right when he says that there is an
apparent contradiction between paragraph 13 of the Statement of June 3rd
and clause 3(3) of the Bill. So far as I can recollect, there was however no in¬
tention of treating the Sylhet district differently from the Muslim majority
districts of Bengal set out in the Schedule, and I think it was always understood
that in the event of the Sylhet referendum being in favour of amalgamation
with East Bengal, the provisional boundaries of that province would include
Sylhet district subject to the final decision of the Boundary Commission. I
fully appreciate the difficulty in transferring and retransferring territory from
Assam to East Bengal and vice versa. But as you point out, the problem arises
also in regard to the division of Bengal and the Punjab.
3. In my announcement of June 30th setting up the two boundary com¬
missions, the Bengal Commission has been asked to demarcate not only the
boundary between East Bengal and West Bengal, but also, if the result of the
Sylhet referendum requires it, the boundary between East Bengal and Assam.
Your suggestion that in order to expedite the work a third boundary commis¬
sion might be appointed is attractive, but since at the instance of the Partition
Council the plural form “awards of Boundary Commissions” used in the
original draft Bill has been amended in the House of Commons to read “the
award of a Boundary Commission”, it seems to preclude me from appointing
another. The appointment of two assessors representing Assam will, I am
JULY I947
27I
afraid, have the effect of delaying matters. In any case the Bengal Boundary
Commission are so arranging their work as to have the award out including
Sylhet before August 15th.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 No. 114.
182
Sir E. Mieville to Mr Jinnah
RI3I1/165: / 23
personal 20 July 1947
NO. 90/n
Dear Mr Jinnah,
H.E. the Viceroy, who is away today (Sunday) at Lahore, has asked me to let
you know that Lockhart has just telegraphed1 him to the effect that all present
information including private talks with Ministers indicated that the Frontier
ministry has no intention of resigning. He added, however, that Dr. Khan
Sahib had indicated yesterday (Saturday), in private conversation, that if he
could be assured that a general election would be held in the reasonably near
future he would resign.
H.E. the Viceroy asked me to let you have this for your personal information.
Yours sincerely,
ERIC MIEVILLE
1 No. CA/148 of 19 July. R/3/1/165: f 22.
183
Sir E. Mieville 1 to Mr Jinnah
Rl3lili6s:f24
20 July 1947
Dear Mr Jinnah,
The Governor of the Frontier Province has reported2 to me the result of a
lengthy conversation which he had with Dr. Khan Sahib and Khan Abdul
Ghaffar Khan on the 14th July. Abdul Ghaffar Khan said that he would like
to meet you and would be prepared to negotiate on the following terms which,
if you accepted them, would result in his Party accepting Pakistan: —
1 Lord Mountbatten instructed Sir E. Mieville to sign and send this letter in his absence.
2 See No. 130.
272
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(i) Complete provincial autonomy for the Province in all matters except
defence, external affairs and communications.
(ii) The right of any party to move for the secession of the Province from the
Dominion, in the same way that a Dominion has the right to secede
from a Commonwealth, should it so desire.
(iii) That it should be open to areas contiguous to the Province, which are
included in the present boundaries of British India and are inhabited by
Pathans, to ask to become part of the N.W.F.P. and, if they do, be
included in it.
2. Will you kindly let me know whether you would be willing to meet
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and discuss an agreement on this basis, so that I can
inform the Governor?
Yours sincerely,
ERIC C. MIEVILLE
184
Minutes of Viceroy's Twenty-First Miscellaneous Meeting
Mountbatten Papers
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at Government House , Lahore , on 20 July 1947
at 10.30 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Sir E. Jenkins,
Lieutenant-General Sir F. Messervy, Major-General T. W. Rees, Brigadier A. de L .
Cazenove ; Sir G. Abell, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
MILITARY MEASURES IN THE PUNJAB1
sir frank messervy and majgr-general rees recommended that the
districts2 in which special military measures should be taken should be: —
SIALKOT
GUJRANWALA
SHEIKHUPURA
LYALLPUR
MONTGOMERY
LAHORE
AMRITSAR
GURDASPUR
HOSHIARPUR
JULLUNDUR
FEROZEPORE
JULY 1947
273
For operations in these districts, Major-General Rees would be responsible to
both Dominion Governments, through the Supreme Commander and the
Joint Defence Council. It was stated that the troops under his Command
would include five brigades and an armoured regiment. The tanks of the latter
would be spread out over the whole area.
It was agreed to recommend that this system should come into effect on
1st August. It was stated that the advisers to be attached to Major-General Rees’
staff would be Brigadier Brar (a Muslim) from Pakistan and Brigadier Tiwana
(a Sikh) from India.3
sir frank messervy considered that it would be preferable to have
ordinances covering all eleven districts rather than to declare martial law in
some. There were insufficient officers to carry out martial law. The Punjab
Public Safety Act, the Punjab Disturbed Areas Act and the Governor-
General’s Ordinance on Special Powers for the Armed Forces were the measures
which would have to be continued in operation.
his excellency the viceroy said that he would take the necessary
action to this end; it might, however, still be necessary to declare martial law if
the situation got out of hand.
THE RETENTION OF BRITISH OFFICERS IN THE INDIAN
ARMED FORCES
the viceroy, at Sir Frank Messervy’s suggestion, undertook to fmd out
whether British officers who served with Dominion of India forces for one year,
and were thereafter no longer required, could then volunteer for Pakistan.
sir frank messervy said that the decision of a large number of officers
on whether or not to stay on would depend on the leave terms granted. The
initial reaction to these had not been favourable. He suggested particularly that
officers on leave on the date of the transfer of power should be allowed to
complete their leave and volunteer for a year from the date of their return to
duty, the viceroy undertook to discuss this point with the Commander-in-
Chief — and the wider possibility of improving the leave terms as a whole if the
general response of British officers was not good.
POSTING OF OFFICIALS IN THE PUNJAB
It was decided that the best solution was that postings should continue on the
basis of the notional partition except for the three districts of Gurdaspur,
1 See Nos. 102 and 148, Case No. P.C. 47/6/47.
2 A note by the Viceroy’s Staff listing these districts was circulated as V.C.P. No. 135. It was approved by
Lord Mountbatten at his Staff Meeting on 21 July and then circulated to members of the Partition
Council for the meeting the following day. Mountbatten Papers.
3 These details are the wrong way round. They should read: Brigadier Brar (a Sikh) from India and
Brigadier Tiwana (a Muslim) from Pakistan. The name of the adviser for Pakistan was later changed;
see No. 205, note 2.
274
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Amritsar and Lahore. In these, the Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents
of Police were British, and they would stay on until the decisions of the Bound¬
ary Commission were made known, when nominees of the party concerned
should replace them.
MUSLIM OFFICIALS
the viceroy asked Sir Evan Jenkins to let him have a note4 about certain
Muslim officials, with a view to this being shown to Mr. Jinnah; and also about
Mr. Henderson and Mr. Coates, who had, though ready to volunteer, been
turned down by the Muslims because of their impartiality — but who were
perhaps still willing to serve in the Central Pakistan Government.
4 By verbal arrangement with Sir E. Jenkins, it was decided that Sir G. Abell should write the note. See
Abell’s note, 21 July 1947. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Partll(b).
185
Mr. V. P. Menon to Sir G. Abell
Rl3l1l144: f 5°
SECRET GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, STATES DEPARTMENT,
20 July 1947
My dear George,
H.E. is seeing Sir C. P. tomorrow at 3 p.m. In this connection he should read —
(1) my letter to Sir C. P. dated 14. 7.47. 1
(2) Sir C. P.’s letter to the Resident of the Madras States, dated 10.7.47.2
(3) Draft Instrument of Accession which I have discussed with the States’
representatives.3
2. I had an hour’s talk with Sir C. P. this morning. I told him about H.E.’s
present plan and also mentioned to him that I had written a letter4 to him in
Travancore explaining the present development. He told me that he had not
received the letter, and I have today sent him a copy of it together with a copy
of the draft Instrument of Accession which I had prepared for discussion with
the States’ representatives. I mentioned to him that many of the States were
favourably inclined to adopt the course proposed, and asked him what would
be the attitude of the Travancore Government.
3. As you know, the Union Constitution Committee of the Constituent
Assembly has proposed to divert to the Union Centre the revenues from
customs, import and export duties etc. Travancore is a maritime State de¬
riving its revenue largely from these heads which account for half the revenue
of the State. This is really Sir C. P.’s objection to accession to the Union. Sir
C. P. mentioned to me that if he acceded on these conditions Travancore
JULY 1947
275
would be reduced to a fifth-rate State. I told him that H.E.’s plan had nothing
to do with the new Constitution. His plan is to ask the States to accede on the
three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communications as defined in
the 1935 Act and subject to the limitations contained in that Act. He said he was
not aware of this approach at all, and he promised to study the Instrument of
Accession, which I promised to send him, before he met H.E. tomorrow
afternoon.
4. I then went over the ground covered in my letter to him of the 14th July
which sums up the main arguments for the States acceding on the three subjects.
I stressed the advantage of an integrated India both for Travancore and for
British India, and mentioned to him about the communist menace now
threatening both British India and the States. The progress which the com¬
munists have made from 1939 uptodate is alarming. If this threat is to be dealt
with, the States should join hands with the Right Wing of the Congress.
Therein lies the safety for the future of this country. If the States came in, they
would be automatically represented in the Dominion Legislature which would
be the Constituent Assembly, and the States’ representatives would be able to
act as a brake on the headlong career of British India.
5. I suggest that in tomorrow’s discussion, H.E. should tie Sir C. P. down
on the question of accession only. If he raises the loss to Travancore as a result
of some of the existing agreements between British India and the State, he
should say that this could be negotiated on a standstill basis without much
difficulty once the main issue is out of the way.
6. H.E. should also play on the communist menace. Sir C. P. was rather
frightened about it. His State itself is not free from this plague.
7. Lastly, H.E. should say that here is a golden opportunity for the State to
play its part. Accession of Travancore to the Federation will be hailed through¬
out India as a great act of statesmanship ; and it will not entail any financial
loss to the State. On the other hand, in the shaping of the future destinies of
India, Travancore could play a very important part since its representatives
would be sitting in the Dominion Legislature.
8. The accession of the States on the three subjects as mentioned in my letter
to Sir C. P. involves the States surrendering legislative and executive authority
on these matters. Sir C. P. may demand that the executive authority in the
State could only be exercised by his officers. So far as major States are con¬
cerned, this is not unreasonable. But if it is raised, H.E. could say that this is a
matter which can be adjusted by negotiation and agreement.
1 No. 104. 2 No. 58.
3 For the final version of the Instrument of Accession, see Enclosure i to No. 313.
4 No. 104.
27 6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
9. Sir C. P. proposes to leave on the 23rd and I suggest that H.E. should have
one more talk with him if in his first talk no progress is made. The impression
left in my mind was that he was favourably disposed to the approach which
we are making now.
Yours sincerely,
v. P. MENON
186
Sardar Nishtar to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
RI3I1I138: f 173
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, 2 6 FEROZESHAH ROAD,
new delhi, 20 July 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I am leaving tomorrow for Karachi and will probably return on Wednesday.
I am sending you a suggestion in connection with the States Conference which
is to be held on the 25th instant. I understand that at the Conference you
propose to discuss with the representatives of various States inter alia the
question of their accession to one or the other Dominion and the Standstill
Agreement. As you know these are matters of vital importance and can be
successfully dealt with only if the representatives of the two future Dominions
are present at the Conference. Therefore I think it would be better if those
members of the Congress and Muslim League who normally attend the
Partition Council are invited to attend the Conference. In their absence I
believe the discussion may not prove very fruitful because occasions may arise
when an authoritative declaration on behalf of the Dominion concerned on
certain points arising out of discussion becomes necessary. So far I do not know
whether you propose to invite the two members who represent the State
Departments of the present Government of India, namely Sardar Patel and
myself. But even if we are present as Members in charge of State Departments,
we could speak only on behalf of our respective sections of the present Govern¬
ment of India and not on behalf of the future Dominions of India and Pakistan;
and I hope you will agree with me that it is the concern of the representatives
of the future Dominions to negotiate with regard to the important matters that
will be discussed at the Conference.
I had pointed out to you during our discussion on the 18th instant1 that at
present representations are arranged by Political Department on the basis of set
groups but in view of the fact that the States put together in certain groups
have adopted different attitudes on the question of joining the Indian Con¬
stituent Assembly it is essential that those States who have not joined the said
JULY 1947
277
Constituent Assembly are given separate representation because representatives
belonging to the States who have decided to join the Indian Constituent
Assembly cannot properly represent the views of the others. As a matter of
fact one of the main objects of the conference, if I have correctly understood it,
is to persuade those who are keeping away so far, therefore their representation
is more needed than that of others. You were pleased to direct your Private
Secretary to bring the matter to the notice of Sir Conrad Corfield. I hope
necessary steps have been taken in that direction.
Yours sincerely,
A. R. NISHTAR
1 No. 159.
187
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
North-West Frontier Province , Situation in, Part II
MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 20 fuly 1947, 1.15 pm
Received: 20 July, 1.15 pm
No. 543 -GT. 1. The result of the North West Frontier Province Referendum is
as follows :
(1 a ) Valid votes for Pakistan 289,244.
( b ) Valid votes for India 2874.
(c) Majority 286,370.
(d) Percentage of valid votes to total electorate entitled to vote 50.99 per cent.
(e) Valid votes cast in last general election 375,989-
2. Total electorate entitled to vote in referendum was 572,798 therefore
votes for Pakistan were 50.49 per cent.
3 . Leaders are being informed of result which will be released to the press
at 1730 I.S.T. on July 20th.
278
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
188
Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart (. North-West Frontier Province ) to
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten o/B urma
Telegram , / 25
most immediate 20 July 1947, 5-00 Pm
secret Received: 20 July, 9.30 pm
No. CA/149. Post Referendum problem. My GH 116 9th July1 last paragraph.
First. I assume Your Excellency will regard result2 of Referendum as decisive
vote for Pakistan and therefore of policy contrary to present Ministry’s.
Second. Following is present position.
(a) Present Ministry unlikely to resign.
(b) I see no hope of Coalition.
(c) Moslem League most averse to present Ministry remaining in office till
15th August. Deputation of local League leaders told me so today.
(d) Congress party would resent League Ministry.
(e) I believe each party would prefer section 93. I realise that under section
93 all opprobrium will fall on British.
(/) There is risk of trouble. Section 93 might be least likely to provoke it.
Third. Request therefore permission, if I cannot persuade Ministry to resign
and accept League Ministry, to dismiss Ministers and assume powers under
section 93 of Government of India Act. Propose my advisers be Mallam
Revenue Commissioner and Curtis Development Secretary. Neither Khan
Sahib nor Abdul Qayum seemed keen on non-official advisers.
1 No. 45. 2 No. 187.
189
Note by Sir G. Abell
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab,
" Part 11(b)
21 July 1947
H.E. the Governor asked FEE. in Lahore whether he agreed with the general
policy of letting the Sikhs blow off steam and not attempting to put their
leaders in jail owing to their inflammatory utterances. The Governor felt
it would only make matters worse if action was taken against the Sikhs and
H.E. agreed. Place on file.
G. E. B. ABELL
JULY I947
279
190
Sir G. Abell to Mr Beaumont
Rl3lili57:f 187
no. 1446/17 21 July 1947
My dear Christopher,
H.E. was in Lahore yesterday, and the Governor represented to him that it
would be of great practical advantage if he could be given advance information
of the general purport of the Award of the Boundary Commission when the
time comes. Even a few hours warning would be better than none, as the
nature of the Award would affect the distribution of police and troops. If it
is possible to give us an abstract here in advance we could telegraph it in secret
cipher to the Governor.
Yours,
GEORGE ABELL
191
Minutes of Viceroy s Sixty-First Staff Meeting, Items 2, 4 and 6
Mounthatten Papers
SECRET
Those present during discussions of Items 2, 4 and 6 of this Meeting held at The
Viceroy’s House , New Delhi , on 21 July 1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mounthatten of Burma , Sir E. Mieville , Sir G. Abell , Rao Bahadur V. P.
Menon , Captain Brockman , Mr I. D. Scott, Commander Nicholls, Lieutenant-
Colonel Erskine Crum .
Item 2
ISSUES CONNECTED WITH THE PARTITION WORK IN THE
PUNJAB (v.C.P. I36)1
This note had been prepared as a result of the Viceroy’s visit to Lahore the
previous day. In the morning he had held a meeting with the Punjab Partition
Committee. It was intended that this note should be put before the Central
Partition Council so that they might take note of it.
the viceroy said that he had made a tour of the riot areas in Lahore on the
afternoon of the previous day. It was of interest to note that only 5% of the
walled city, and 1% of the whole city had been destroyed. On the other
hand, 50% of the Hindu population were believed to have left the city.
1 Lord Mountbatten’s note is summarised in paras. 6-12 of No. 228.
28o
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:
approved V.C.P. 136 and directed Con. Sec. to arrange for this paper to
be circulated to members of the Partition Council for the meeting the
following day.
Item 4
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE
Reference was made to a telegram,2 received that morning from the Governor
of the North-West Frontier Province, concerning the post-referendum pro¬
blem in that Province. The Governor requested permission, if he could not
persuade the present Ministry to resign and to accept a Muslim League Ministry,
to dismiss the Ministers and assume power under Section 93 of the Government
of India Act.
his excellency recalled that he had already decided3 that he would seek
the advice of the Pakistan Executive Council on the form of Government for
the North-W est Frontier Province.
rao bahadur menon pointed out that constitutionally the decision on
this matter was the Viceroy’s own responsibility ; but he agreed that the Viceroy
was bound, in view of the statement on the reconstitution of the Interim
Government, to act on advice.
his excellency the viceroy:
(i) directed P.S.V. to ask Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to suggest a time for a
meeting of the Pakistan Executive Council to discuss the future Govern¬
ment of the North-West Frontier Province;
(ii) directed P.S.V. to arrange, if the Governor of the North-West Frontier
Province agreed, for Dr Khan Sahib to visit Delhi for discussion of this
subject.
Item 6
BALUCHISTAN
sir george abell stated that Sir George Spence agreed with the ruling4
given by the Secretary of State that Baluchistan could not be made a Governor’s
Province without the Legislature being consulted. It was further pointed out
that the present area of British Baluchistan was extremely small ; that there had
already been approaches from the tribal areas to join it; and that further action
towards declaring it a Governor’s Province might profitably await the result
of these approaches.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:
directed P.S.V. to arrange for Sir George Spence to discuss this matter with
Mr Jinnah.
2 No. 188. 3 See No. 76, Item 5. 4 See No. 178.
JULY I947
28l
192
Record of Interview between Mr Symon and Sir C. P. Ramaswarni Aiyar
( Extract )
L/P &SI13I1842: f 31
21 July 1947
At his request I called on Sir C. P. Ramaswarni Aiyar at Travancore House at
11.30 this morning.
2. He opened the conversation by a reference to what he termed the undue
haste shown by His Majesty’s Government in dealing with the constitutional
change and to the lack of consideration which, he said, had been given to the
States by His Majesty’s Government. He said that insufficient time had been
given to the States to deal with such important issues. Another six months
would have enabled him to have prepared for the new situation.
3. He then went on to say that Travancore had no wish to have anything to
do with the communal questions which had split the country. They had no
quarrel with either India of for] Pakistan but wished to be left alone. He was
convinced in his own mind that civil war was more or less inevitable — that it
would take place within a short time — and that there could be no settlement
in the north until Mr Jinnah decided in some way that East Punjab must be
returned to Pakistan. He said that even Mr Gandhi must inevitably come round
to the view.
4. The Dewan said that he had been invited to see the Viceroy this afternoon
and that he assumed that His Excellency would put forward proposals which
might lead to Travancore’s entry into the Indian Union. He was going to the
meeting determined to reject any such proposal outright. He was, however,
concerned about the threats of an economic boycott of Travancore by India.
It was for this reason that he had entered into agreement with Mr Jinnah for
the supply of foodstuffs from Pakistan. If the threats of an Indian boycott
extended to such things as steel, cement, etc, it would be essential for Travan¬
core to arrange imports from other sources. Hence his request to Colonel
Peacock of John Mowlem & Co., Ltd., to proceed to England to ascertain
whether he could rely on supplies from the United Kingdom.1 Colonel Peacock
had not yet returned but he understood that the result of Colonel Peacock’s
visit was satisfactory.
5. The Dewan then proceeded to say that it had already been agreed to
exchange representatives between Travancore and Pakistan. He would also
send representatives to other countries, for example Turkey. Whether His
1 See IRKU 440 of 2 July 1947. L/E/8/4875 : ff 268-9.
282
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Majesty’s Government recognised what he was doing at this stage did not
immediately concern him, though he hoped that ultimately His Majesty s
Government would accord recognition. At this stage he did not seek any formal
arrangements with his Majesty’s Government but it was essential that trading
arrangements between the two countries should continue as before and that
nothing should be done to prevent the flow of supplies from the United
Kingdom to Travancore. As an illustration of this he said that if India refused
to supply Travancore with textiles he must look to the United Kingdom to
meet the demands of the State.
a. c. B. SYMON
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Pandit Nehru
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Bengal,
Situation in, Part 1(b)
no. 746/3 21 July 1947
Dear Mr Nehru,
You spoke to me the other day about the situation in Calcutta, and your fear
that the Mushms might attempt to burn the city before leaving it; and you
asked me whether I was satisfied that the Governor had been able to take
adequate precautions against possible trouble.1
I asked the Governor for a report,2 and he has replied3 that there is of course
every possibility of trouble from Muslim elements in Calcutta, and that the
danger will be increased if the 15 th August is declared a public holiday and if
provocative Hindu celebrations take place. Perhaps you could use your in¬
fluence to prevent any provocation.
The Governor has asked for additional Indian Army battalions to replace
British troops who are being withdrawn on the 14th August, and is hopeful
that with their assistance serious trouble will be avoided on the 15th and 16th
August. A plan of action will be ready by the time the Boundary Commission’s
award is announced.
The Governor asks me to assure you that every possible step will be taken to
ensure that Calcutta will not be destroyed.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 cf. No. 138. 2 See ibid . 3 No. 161.
JULY 1947
283
194
Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten
of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Bengal ,
Partition oj , Part 11(a)
SECRET 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 21 July ig4y
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
You will remember that I mentioned to you in the course of a recent interview1
that Dr P. C. Ghosh, the prospective Prime Minister of West Bengal, had
written to me about Calcutta. From information received by him and his
colleagues in the Cabinet it appeared that there was grave danger of dis¬
turbances in Calcutta when the report of the Boundary Commission comes out.
Dr Ghosh has come up to Delhi for a day and I have had a long talk with
him.
2. He gave me some account of the difficulties he was facing both on the
Muslim and the Hindu side. There was considerable tension and excitement
between them and a general expectation of and preparation for conflict in
Calcutta. Meanwhile, while there is a kind of shadow Cabinet for West
Bengal, in effect the administrative machinery for the whole of Bengal is
continuing as previously under the charge of the old Muslim League Ministers.
Some changes and transfers have, however, been made.
3. In about three weeks’ time the full separation of Bengal will have to take
place. Presumably the Boundary Commission will have given its award by
then. We can hardly wait till then to begin the process of separation. It is clear
that the city of Calcutta will fall in West Bengal. It is desirable, therefore, that
the new arrangements at the Centre should be applied to Bengal also im¬
mediately. Some adjustments may be made later on after the Boundary Com¬
mission has reported. But in the main the division of administrative functions
should take place now. It was decided some time ago that the procedure
adopted in Bengal shall be similar to that adopted at the Centre. At the Centre
the process of separation of those who have opted for Pakistan has already
taken place or is taking place, and the Pakistan Departments are being run
separately preparatory to their departure for Karachi. In accordance with this,
a like procedure should be adopted in Bengal and those who have opted for
Pakistan or East Bengal should henceforward be in charge only of the East
Bengal area, and West Bengal, including Calcutta, should be in charge of the
Ministers for that area. It is obviously necessary that officers who have chosen
Pakistan for their future activities should have nothing further to do with
1 cf. No. 138.
284
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
West Bengal area. Their continued retention in West Bengal and Calcutta only
leads to friction and to charges and counter-charges being made against one
another. So also officers in East Bengal who have opted for West Bengal should
hand over charge and be sent to West Bengal. If no immediate appointment
can be made of these people, they might even be given two or three weeks’
leave. The point is that each set of officers should function entirely separately
and should not come into each other’s way.
4. In regard to Calcutta very early steps have to be taken to make these
transfers and to take all precautions to prevent any serious disturbances. At the
present moment Calcutta has, I believe, seven battalions, some British and some
Indian. Among these are Punjabi Musalmans and Gurkhas. The Punjabi
Musalmans are unfortunately bitterly anti-Hindu and the Gurkhas are anti-
Muslim. There have been serious complaints about the behaviour of the PMs.
In any event there is no reason to retain these PMs in Calcutta in future. They
can be transferred to East Bengal or some other place in Pakistan.
5. The position appears to be that unless full precautions are taken pre¬
viously, even an attempt to transfer these PMs might give rise to trouble.
Therefore it seems necessary that sufficient Indian troops should be sent to
Calcutta first and then the PMs should be transferred. I understand from Dr
Ghosh, and he tells me that the Governor agrees with him in this matter, that
seven battalions in all are necessary in Calcutta. That would probably mean
sending three or four additional Indian battalions to Calcutta as the British
troops are likely to be withdrawn and the PMs will be transferred. If this is to
be done, it has to be done immediately so that the additional troops might be
in Calcutta by the 3rd August. The PMs could be withdrawn and trans¬
ferred then. I understand from Dr Ghosh that the Governor agrees with
these proposals. Dr Ghosh suggests that an Indian Brigadier be placed in
command of the troops in Calcutta.
6. In the event of the situation deteriorating in Calcutta, there will be
immediate repercussions in other parts of Bengal, notably East Bengal. The
tragic events that happened in Noakhali2 last last year followed Calcutta
happenings. Calcutta thus becomes the key to the situation and has to be fully
protected from the possibility of any disturbance. There should also be no dual
authority in Calcutta or elsewhere in Bengal as this leads to continuous
difficulties and a lack of decision at a critical moment. Hence the necessity for
separating administratively and otherwise East and West Bengal, subject to
subsequent decisions of the Boundary Commission. Dr Ghosh was of the
opinion that by the 3rd August many of these processes should be completed
so that the new order has begun to function when the Boundary Commis¬
sion’s report comes out. Of course, whatever may be done will not be treated
JULY I947
285
as a precedent by the Boundary Commission whose final award will have to be
given effect to.3
Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
2 See Vol. IX, Enclosure to No. 51 and No. 102.
3 A manuscript note at the top of this letter indicates that Lord Mountbatten discussed the issues raised
during his interview with Pandit Nehru on 22 July. No record of this interview has been traced.
Mountbatten, however, covered some of Nehru’s points in his discussions during his visits to Bengal on
30 July; see Nos. 287, 290 and VPR of 1 August, No. 302, paras. 3-4, 9-1 1.
Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rl3l*l*57: f 196
SECRET NEW DELHI, 21 July ig4y
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
Thank you for your letter of the 20th July1 about Sylhet.
I am sorry this discrepancy has arisen between the statement of June 3rd
and clause 3(3) of the Bill, as this leads to argument and suspicions are raised.
I suppose the only thing to be done now is to expedite the decision of the
Boundary Commission, so that there is only one transfer involving Sylhet, after
the Boundary Commission has reported. As a matter of fact, a close analysis of
the voting figures in the referendum will be very helpful to the Boundary
Commission in determining which parts of Sylhet district should go to East
Bengal and which should remain with Assam.
If it is too late to appoint assessors at this stage, I hope that every facility will
be given by the Boundary Commissioners to the Assam Government to present
their viewpoint. The Assamese people are not at all satisfied with the representa¬
tion of their view point by Bengalees, whoever they might be. They feel that
Assamese interests might suffer for lack of proper representation.
For some time past I have been thinking of the national frontiers which
might emerge from the decisions of the Boundary Commissions. I think Sardar
Patel and I mentioned this to you on one occasion.2 At present this question of a
boundary is thought of far too much in terms of Sikh, Hindu or Muslim
interests. I suppose every party will produce arguments for the inclusion of a
little bit of territory here or there. The result might well be a very curious
frontier line with numerous curves and enclaves. Apart from the question of
defence, such a frontier would create many difficulties and a simpler frontier
1 No. 181.
2 See Vol. XI, No. 124, ‘Boundary Commission’.
286
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
based on some natural barrier would be far better. There is little chance, I hope,
ot defence coming into the picture in the normal sense of the word, but there
is certainly danger of private raiding parties and smugglers crossing the frontier
and doing mischief. This will have to be guarded against and the best way to
do so is to have some natural barrier like a river or some special kind of
terrain. The whole question is thus to be looked upon from the point of view
of a national boundary, much more than that of sectional interests.
I have suggested to Sardar Baldev Singh to depute some senior Indian officers
to present this point of view to the Boundary Commissions. In order to achieve
such a frontier, it may be desirable to shift the population of the border areas to
some extent. This need not involve any major transfers of population. We
must provide for a frontier line which, as far as possible, avoids continuous
friction and trouble.
Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
196
Secretaries to the Punjab Boundary Commission to Sir G. Abell
Telegram, Rj 5/ 1/ 157: J 191
IMMEDIATE LAHORE, 21 July 1947
Reference following extract from His Excellency Viceroy’s speech1 at Press
Conference on June 4th. Begins. I was not aware of all the details when this
suggestion was made but when I sent for the map and studied the distribution
of the Sikh Community under this proposal I must say that I was astounded to
find that the plan which they had produced divided their community into two
almost equal parts. Ends. Commission would be grateful if the plan submitted
to His Excellency on behalf of Sikhs and the map he studied could be sent to
them immediately.2
1 Vol. XI, No. 59, p. 112.
2 Sir G. Abell replied on 23 July 1947 attaching copies of the complete passage of Lord Mountbatten’s
address to the Press Conference; a question and answer from the Press Conference (R/3/1/157: f 21 1);
the Congress Resolution referred to in the complete passage (ibid., f 212); and a letter to Pandit Nehru
from Sikh and Hindu M.L.As and M.C.Ss, dated 2 April 1947 (Vol. X, No. 57). He did not attach the
map but suggested that any map if read with the population statistics in the 1941 census would suffice
for the purpose. Abell also mentioned Nehru’s letter to Lord Wavell of 9 March 1947 (Vol. IX, No.
514) in which he stated that he had been asked by the Sikhs to represent their point of view to Wavell
and that the Congress policy was supported by the Sikhs. Abell added: ‘The letter from Pandit Nehru
to Lord Wavell was personal but it can be seen in confidence by the Boundary Commission if necessary,
subject to the agreement of Pandit Nehru.’ R/3/1/157: f 209.
JULY I947
287
197
Chiefs of Staff Committee. C.0. 8.(4 7) 90th Meeting , Minute 1
LfWSf if 1070: ff 106-8
TOP SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street on 21 July 1947 at 10.30 am
were: Mr Attlee (; in the Chair), Mr Ernest Benin, Lord Tedder, Admiral Sir John
H. D. Cunningham, Lieutenant-General Sir Trank E. W. Simpson, Lieutenant-
General Sir Leslie C. Hollis; Group Captain D. C. Stapleton ( Secretary )
I. SERVICES STAFF COLLEGES I ADMISSION OF INDIAN STUDENTS
(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(47)88th Meeting, Minute 4)1
the conference discussed the issue as to whether or not, now that India and
Pakistan had been granted Commonwealth status, Indian students should be
permitted to attend courses at the Imperial Defence College, the Joint Services
Staff College and certain other Service courses dealing with TOP SECRET
subjects.
the prime minister said that once Commonwealth status had been
granted to India and Pakistan, it was politically impossible to prevent facilities
being placed at the disposal of these two Dominions when other Dominions
had access to them. To do so, would be straightforward discrimination and, at
a time when Indian acceptance of Commonwealth status had only been reached
after the most delicate and arduous negotiations, a decision to withhold these
facilities could only be interpreted by the Indians as meaning that their full
rights as members of the Commonwealth could not be expected in practical
dealings with the United Kingdom. The decision in principle, therefore, must
be that Indians should be allowed to attend the Service training courses, pro¬
viding they reached the requisite educational standard.
lord tedder, speaking on behalf of the Chiefs of Staff , said they were very
much aware of the grave political issues involved and the reaction on Indian
political opinion of a decision to refuse admittance of Indian students to Service
Colleges. The chief difficulty with which they were faced was the availability
of information from purely American sources. The British Services had an
agreement with the Americans not to disclose to Commonwealth or foreign
countries without specific American authority, classified information of
purely American origin. It was the strict observance of this clause that had
satisfied the Americans sufficiently to promote a most satisfactory and com¬
pletely free exchange of information between the Services of each country. Any
breach of this agreement, and there were signs that the Americans were appre¬
hensive of discussions in some of our Staff Colleges, would almost inevitably
entail the withdrawal by the Americans of nearly all the information and co-
1 L/ws/1/1070: f 112.
288
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
operation in defence matters which had so laboriously been built up during the
last seven years. If Indian students attended the Imperial Defence College and
the Joint Services Staff College, we should be forced to delete from the curri¬
cula any subject containing purely American information, also information of
our own strategic policy, since the new Indian Dominions could not be
regarded at present as completely secure. Bearing in mind the already agreed
statement that American support was essential to the British Commonwealth
in a major war, the issue appeared to be whether we were to risk forfeiture
of American co-operation or offending the new Indian Dominions.
If there were no political alternative to admitting Indian students, the Chiefs
of Staff would ask if a delay of a year or so before Indian students need attend
these Colleges were permissible, the reason being the administrative impossi¬
bility of taking further students when courses were already full, and in some
cases vacancies for them had been reduced.
the prime minster said a delay of this order should be acceptable. More¬
over, it was apposite to say that the attendance of Indian students now would
be premature, since the Indian authorities would not wish to fill vacancies until
the re-organisation of their own Armed Services had been completed and it
was possible to select candidates of the appropriate calibre.
the conference: — -
(a) Agreed in principle that vacancies at Service Staff' Colleges and training
courses must ultimately be offered to India and Pakistan.
(b) Agreed that invitations should be withheld from India and Pakistan to
attend Service Staff Colleges and training courses dealing with TOP
SECRET subjects or information of purely American origin for the next
year or so, for the reasons given by the Prime Minister and the Chief of
the Air Staff.
198
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , L/P &S/ 12/ 1812: f 273
IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, 21 July 1047, 7.3O pm
No. 9386. Please see Kabul telegram dated nth July No. 601 and paragraphs 1
and 2 of Squire’s No. 643 Tribal Agreements.
2. It is obvious that in view of Section 7(i)(c) of Indian Independence Act no
formal assurances could be given to the Afghans that existing agreements will
continue to be honoured. Now, however, that N.W.F.P. is to be included in
JULY 1947
289
Pakistan there would, be clear advantage in approach being made as soon as
possible on behalf of provisional Government to the tribes on lines correspond¬
ing to negotiations now being undertaken with the Indian States, with a view
to making provisional arrangements pending a formal settlement of future
relations.
3 . Anything that implies continuity of policy will have a stabilising effect
(c.f. paragraph 10 of Lockhart’s letter of 6th July)3 and would be all to the good.
4. I am very glad to see from E.A. and C.R.D. telegram No. 57024 that
your Govt have agreed to informal contacts with Shah Mahmud. I hope
Jinnah can give him some comforting reassurance as to future relations between
Pakistan and Afghanistan.5
Repeated by Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs, India Office to H.M.M.
Kabul.
1 In this telegram Sir G. Squire had enquired whether, in order to allay Afghan anxieties, it would be
possible to assure them that existing tribal agreements for the Khyber Pass would remain valid after 15
August until either denounced or revised. L/P &S/12/1812: f 305.
2 No. 132.
3 In para. 10 of his letter No. GH-109 of 6 July to Lord Mountbatten, Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart
stated that he did not have enough information about future policy as regards tribes and that the tribes
themselves and officials in the N.W.F.P. were anxious to know what the position of the former would
be when power passed to the new Dominions. Although they were holding back, Lockhart thought
that most of the tribes were pro-Muslim League. He added: ‘ All the tribes are however realistic. What
they want is to secure their economic life, i.e. they wish the present expenditure on Scouts, khassadars,
roads, building etc. and allowances to continue’. Mountbatten Papers, Letters to and from Provincial
Governors: North-West Frontier Province.
4 No. 177.
5 In tel. 293 5-S of 25 July Lord Mountbatten reported to Lord Listowel that the Afghan Prime Minister
had passed through Delhi the previous day without stopping, and did not see Mr Jinnah. The Pakistan
Cabinet were considering what action to take regarding the tribes. L/P &S/12/1812: f 255.
199
Sardar Baldev Singh to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
R/ 3/ 1/157: f 197
SECRET 17 TUGLAK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 22 July I947
IMMEDIATE
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I enclose herewith a copy of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s letter of yesterday’s
date1 and a press cutting of Dr. Ambedkar’s statement2 relating to the defence
aspect of the new boundaries both in East and West, on which the Boundary
Commission is now working. I have little to add to the views expressed by
1 R/3/1/1 57 : f 192. Pandit Nehru’s letter is on similar lines to No. 195.
2 Not on the file.
290
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Pandit Nehru and Dr. Ambedkar. This matter has already been referred to
by you in the Partition Council meeting3 and it is agreed that both the
Dominions could represent their respective cases before the Boundary Com¬
missions from the defence point of view.
There is no denying the fact that the new boundaries will be the boundaries
of two independent Dominions. It may be argued that in modern warfare
no particular significance attaches to national boundaries. This is true to some
extent particularly when conflict is already on. But, there is the peace-time
aspect of boundaries which is of far greater importance and that is that the
boundary line between two countries should be such as would eliminate day to
day complications. It is the multiplication of these complications which lead
to trouble and ultimately to disasters. Where there is no natural boundary line,
a demarcation will run through numerous interlocked villages, zig-zag the
countryside and lead to constant irritation to both dominions. To avoid this it
is necessary to have a natural boundary line as far as possible. The proposition
is of great importance and must be looked into with great care.
I agree with Pandit Nehru that the defence point of view should be put
before the Boundary Commission and that this should be done by competent
Indian Officers at once. The Boundary Commission has allotted four and a half
days to each party and started taking evidence yesterday. I hope there is no
objection to the proposal that Indian Officers, say one or two from each
dominion should represent the respective cases. As the time is short these
Officers should get their orders today in order to enable them to prepare the
cases.
Yours sincerely,
BALDEV SINGH
3 See No. 52, Case No. 30/4/47.
200
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir C. Radcliffe
Rf3l if 157: f 205
no. 1446/17 22 July ig4n/
My dear Radcliffe,
I went to Lahore on Sunday and had a discussion with the Punjab Partition
Committee.1 It was quite a satisfactory discussion, and it was stated, on behalf
of all parties, that they would accept your award. On the other hand, it was
emphasised that the risk of disorder would be greatly increased if the award had
to be announced at the very last moment before the 15th August.
JULY I947
291
2. I know that you fully appreciate this, but I promised that I would mention
it again to you, and say that we should all be grateful for every extra day earlier
that you could manage to get the award announced. I wonder if there is any
chance of getting it out by the 10th?
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 The minutes of the Viceroy’s Twenty-Second Miscellaneous Meeting with the Punjab Partition
Committee on 20 July 1947 on the subject of the Boundary Commission read as follows: ‘The Viceroy
explained that the leaders of all parties at the centre had been insistent that the award of the Boundary
Commission should if possible be published before 15th August. It was the present aim of the Punjab
Boundary Commission that their award should be published 011 12th August. The members of the
Punjab Partition Committee during the course of discussion, expressed their views that this date should,
if possible, be brought forward; and the Viceroy undertook to ask Sir Cyril Radcliffe if he could make a
decision by 10th August.’ Mountbatten Papers.
201
The Nawah of Bhopal to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rh! i\ 138: ff 190-201
PERSONAL & SECRET QASR-I-SULTANI, BHOPAL, 22 July IQ47
My dear Dickie,
I was very deeply touched by the contents of your letter of the 14th of July1
for it bears the seal of sincere friendship, and leads me to believe that you still
have confidence in me, a sentiment which I value very deeply. Despite the
fact that fate may be driving us, in our public capacities, into different political
camps you know that nothing will shake me in my sincere friendship for you
which has remained throughout the long years since those happy days when we
were together on the staff of the Prince of Wales in 1921-22. Since then we have
passed through numerous trials and tribulations and your achievements as a
Commander, a diplomat and a statesman have only raised you, if I may say so,
still further in my personal regard. In this matter of the accession of States to
the India Dominion, however, my dear Dickie, I would beseech you, even in
the position which you are shortly to find yourself, to try and appreciate my
point of view and that of my brother Rulers who have adopted the same atti¬
tude towards this problem.
You know that I have the greatest respect for your advice. Your horizons
may possibly be wider than mine, but the very breadth of the panorama which
is yours may possibly cause you to misapprehend the very great difficulties in
which we, the independent States, now find ourselves. I am ready to go with
you as far as I possibly can : indeed if it were only you, I might be willing to go
1 No. 100.
292
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
the whole length. Unfortunately, however, (and here I am confident that you
will not misunderstand me) you are shortly to become the head of the Dominion
dominated by a party whose policy and actions have throughout been inimical
to everything that I hold dear in life itself. I have a proud heritage with a record
of unbroken and loyal friendship with the Crown of England which is per¬
haps unparalleled in the history of British Connection with India. That record
is now being broken as a result of unilateral action by His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment. History will record its verdict on this unfriendly act to a friendly State.
I will not dilate on this point as I have no desire to complain at this stage. My
dynasty and my ancestors have never yet succumbed to any fear or bowed their
heads to unjustified superior force. To me has been handed down a sacred trust
and upon me are imposed obligations which I cannot evade. As a scion of the
British Royal House I know that you will understand and appreciate my diffi¬
culties. The history of this present century has witnessed the fall of many a
proud and historic dynasty: I do not intend to join that unhappy band if it is
at all possible for me to avoid it. Among men of honour — whether friend or foe
— this fact alone should inspire at least respect for the cause I seek to uphold.
Unfortunately, I have scant hopes that these sentiments will either be under¬
stood or appreciated by those with whom you now find yourself in association.
While I do agree that under your guidance the Dominions of India and
Pakistan have both had the good fortune to have made an auspicious start in
their career as independent nations, I am afraid I cannot agree with you that
there is much virtue in the proposal that States need only adhere to the original
three central subject which we Rulers were all prepared to accept under the
Cabinet Mission’s Plan viz. Defence, External Affairs and Comminications.2
I would remind you that the States’ acceptance of the Cabinet Mission’s Plan
was only accorded under the belief that there would be one United India
in which the States, the Muslim League and other minorities would be able to
combine, and by their combined voting power would be able to hold their
proper position in the future constitutional structure of India. The position
under the present plan is vastly different, for any State or group of States
acceding to the “India Dominion” would be relegated to the position of a
permanent powerless minority at the mercy of the Congress party whose
avowed intention it is to wipe out the Princely Order from the political map
of India. You may possibly feel that I am expressing matters too strongly; but
you have only to notice the recent scurrilous campaign, of threats, of violence
and civil war, of political coercion, of bribery and blandishment, which has
been conducted against the States, to see that the States who are unwilling to
join the Dominion of India are quite justified in their reluctant attitude.
I probably know Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and his colleagues even
better than you do, and it is with regret that I have to inform you that they have
done nothing so far to inspire confidence in their friendship. I judge them by
JULY 1947
293
their actions and their actions can only be interpreted as those of an enemy.
Don’t misunderstand me, I beg of you, when I express these somewhat
unpleasant opinions. I can realise how desperately keen you must be for your
plan to come to its ultimate and logical fruition. If you were not only the
architect of the plan but also its interpreter, and if I knew that you would be
permanently there with power to ensure fairplay, I would have no hesitation
in throwing in my lot with you; but unfortunately even Governor-Generals
pass on and the Congress remains permanently in the fore-front of the scene,
a Congress which makes no secret of its intention to destroy the Princes.
Despite all this we, the independent States, are still prepared to negotiate
with both Dominions on a basis of complete equality and reciprocity — despite
the shabby treatment which we have received we still retain confidence in the
person of His Majesty the King Emperor. Through three crises — the Indian
Mutiny, and the first and the second World Wars — we, the Rulers have done
our best to give all assistance to the British Crown, and, in the event of aggres¬
sion on the country as a whole we are still ready to help with all available
forces if we can be sure of help in the shape of arms, ammunition and equip¬
ment as was the case during our connection with the British power in India.
We need no protection: all we ask is that there should be no discrimination
against us and no interference with our internal affairs. We, as the weaker part¬
ners, will naturally commit no unfriendly acts and we trust that this attitude
will be appreciated and reciprocated. What is there immoral in the attitude
which we adopt ? If throughout two centuries in war torn Europe — the breeding
ground of world wars — Switzerland has been allowed to remain an island of
peace and an essential neutral to all the warring nations of Europe, why
cannot we, the Muslim and Hindu independent States, serve an equally use¬
ful purpose as neutral negotiators and friendly advocates in the delicate
negotiations which will inevitably be necessary in a communally divided
India ?
Then too I would ask you to cast your mind forward into the future. How
can we, the Rulers of independent States, throw in our lot with a political party
whose resolution that India should become a Republic is still on the statute
book. You cannot, my dear Dickie, mix oil with water. We value our con¬
nections with the British Crown above any hypothetical advantages that the
Dominion of India can ever offer. We wish to retain our relations with Great
Britain, a monarchy, rather than to merge ourselves with an unfriendly political
party which may tomorrow be ousted by Communist dominated elements
and which is almost certain to leave the British Commonwealth of Nations as
soon as this can conveniently be arranged. There is no guarantee of what the
future of the Dominion of India will be. Are we to write out a blank cheque
and leave it to the leaders of the Congress party to fill in the amount ?
2 See Vol. VII, No. 303, paras. 14 and 15.
294
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
His Majesty’s Government’s plan has clearly permitted the States the option
to join with one or other Dominion or to remain independent.3 We feel that
it would not only be to the advantage of the Dominion of India but to the
whole of the British Commonwealth of Nations if we are allowed to enter into
friendly relations, by means of treaties freely negotiated, with both the Domin¬
ions of India. We would also very naturally hope for the closest ties with His
Majesty’s Government. There is nothing inconsistent in this attitude, for when
the various Provinces of British India have agreed to ally themselves with the
British Commonwealth of Nations by becoming two separate Dominions why
should not a group of independent States be allowed jointly to have the same
relations? Can we not ally ourselves with His Majesty’s Government on the
subjects of Foreign Relations or Defence or is the fear that this would upset the
leaders of the Congress party preventing you from advocating this course?
I am conscious of the fact that you must already have heard these arguments,
advanced ad nauseam , but we too have also had enough of the Congress
propaganda. I, for one, am sick and tired of its petty-minded untruthfulness.
The hand of genuine friendship has never been extended to us by the Congress.
Frequently have they assured the astonished world that no coercion will be
brought to bear on any State to join the Constituent Assembly and yet
Jawaharlal Nehru4 in Gwalior and Shankar Rao Deo5 in Poona have gone
back on the word they gave to the States during discussions6 between the
two Negotiating Committees. Is this friendship? Is it even fair-play? Why
should it be necessary for the Congress, who had reassured the World that
no coercion was being resorted to against the States to have to declare that they
were now prepared to call off the propaganda campaign? Are we to believe
this change of heart overnight? No Dickie, I am afraid, that it has all along been
a case of coercion, bribery and intimidation reminiscent more of the tactics
of Pindaris early in the 19th century rather than responsible politicians and
statesmen. You know me well enough to know also that I will not give in nor
will I succumb to such manoeuvres. If agitation is to be the order of the day: if
dishonest and lying propaganda is to be the method employed, let the Congress
do the worst. You have had ships sunk under you in the last world war, but the
world knows that you never struck your flag and in my case too, landlubber,
that I am, I am prepared to go down fighting like a sailor with my flag still
flying. Let history judge between me and the Congress, your war time enemies.
If there is bitterness I ask you to consider who is to blame ? I ask you to tell me
straight if I have done anything to deserve the campaign of malicious pro¬
paganda which has been unloosed against me and my brother independent
Rulers. I would ask you to read the Congress speeches up to date. I would parti¬
cularly ask you to note the general developments of the last few days: the
secession of Sarat Chandra Bose7 and the growing impudence of Jai Prakash
Narain in his speeches at Bombay and the U.P. Government’s threat to raise
JULY I947
295
the I.N.A. flag over a historic Residency at Lucknow. All these latest develop¬
ments are not those to inspire confidence. There has been comparatively no
trouble so far in the States despite the worst endeavours of agitators and I for
one am not willing to launch my State into the muddy maelstrom of Indian
communal politics.
In any country in the world the two democratic barriers against the rising
tide of Communism are the vested interests which in India are the jagirdars and
Zamindars and the money owners which in India are the big industrialists. The
Congress are at present busily engaged in liquidating the Zamindars and Jagir¬
dars as these unfortunates have already fallen into their clutches. The future
intention of the Congress is to mete out similar treatment to the Princes. I tell
you straight that unless you and His Majesty’s Government support the States
and prevent them from disappearing from the Indian political map, you will
very shortly have an India dominated by Communists. You may laugh at this
prophecy and reply by saying that the Communist party in India is a small one,
but I would draw your attention to the fact that the dockers’ Unions, the
Railwaymen’s Federation and the Post and Telegraph sub-ordinates Unions are
all dominated by Communists. Despite, therefore, their smallness in numbers
the Communists are in a position, by their control over the transportation and
communication, to paralyse and starve India into a State of anarchy and chaos.
If the United Nations one day find themselves with 450 million extra people
under the heel of Communist domination they will be quite justified in blaming
Great Britain for this disaster, and I naturally would not like your name
associated with it.
I am afraid that I have been soliloquising and thinking aloud far too long and
you are probably very irritated and angry with me for what I have said.
You have the shaping of India’s destiny very largely in your hands, and I
realise what a heavy responsibility this must be. I know that these hands are
capable, sympathetic and humane.
You will by now have heard the Bhopal State is not prepared to attend the
meeting on the 25th8 and you are probably extremely disappointed at my
3 See Vol. XI, No. 45, para. 18 and Vol. VII, No. 262, para. 5.
4 See Vol. X, No. 181, note 2.
5 No reference to a statement or speech by Mr Shankar Rao Deo at Poona has been traced. However,
according to a report in The Statesman dated 17 July 1947 Shankar Rao Deo had, in presiding over a
special conference of the Ajmer-Marwar Political Conference on 14 July, warned the princes against
declaring themselves independent and doing anything against the wishes of their people. He added that
the statement by Sardar Patel (Vol. XI, No. 528) was not the last word but was only meant to meet the
present situation.
6 See Vol. IX, No. 389, para. 6.
7 Sarat Chandra Bose had resigned from the Congress Working Committee in January 1947. In the
following month he started a campaign against partition, particularly the division of Bengal, and in
May he produced a plan for the creation of a United Independent Bengal as an alternative to partition.
His final break with Congress came at the beginning of August 1947 when he announced the formation
of a new Republican Socialist Party.
8 Presumably the reply at No. 160 and its enclosure were intended to convey this information.
296
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
decision. If you can bear with me a little longer, allow me to explain my
reasons. There can be no common basis for negotiations between those States
which, by joining the Constituent Assembly, have thrown in their lot with the
Congressmen and those States which have up to the present preserved an
independent attitude. My information of developments in Delhi, as you
probably realise, is not altogether amateur. I have heard that the States’
Department is hatching up some drastic terms to be presented to the repre¬
sentatives of the States who have been invited like the Oysters to attend the tea
party with the Walrus and the Carpenter. If Patel, on behalf of the Congress,
means to extend a hand of friendship, why can’t he come out into the open
and announce the terms in advance? The States are being asked to accede to the
Dominion of India on the three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Com¬
munications. Now I ask you to give me a straight answer: what exactly are
the financial implications of this invitation ? Despite the denial in the Times of
India of the 18 th of July,9 my information is that the contribution which will
be demanded from the States for these three subjects alone will be crippling.
You might perhaps ask Vallabhbhai Patel to write to me and tell me clearly
what percentage of Bhopal State’s revenues will be required as a contribution if
I agree to adhere to the Dominion of India on these three subjects, and will
revenues such as from Sea Customs and Excises now collected from our
people by indirect means be treated as part of our contribution?
There is another question which you might perhaps be in a position to
answer. Is there going to be an agreement between Hindustan and Pakistan
for any sort of common defence in the event of foreign aggression, either from
the East or from the West. If there is to be no such agreement then how can,
for instance, India (Hindustan) without the Commonwealth remain friendly
to Pakistan which may continue to be a Dominion. If there is to be an agreement
then there can be no difficulty for a State like Bhopal or Hyderabad in coming
to some agreement on the question of Defence with both Dominions. Surely
these are not unfair questions and surely I am entitled to a plain, and straight
answer.
You know how much I have tried to help in promoting the prosperity,
freedom and unity of India. I am confident that Congress would acknowledge
this also. But now that India has been divided on communal lines, a State
(particularly a State with a Muslim Ruler) is placed in a very awkward posi¬
tion. In Bhopal we have both a Hindu and a Muslim population. We have
kept peace and tranquillity between the two communities. My State, thank
God, has not had a lathi charge or a shot fired in communal disturbance during
the last 40 years. We do not want to take any step now calculated to endanger
that record, of which any Government would be proud.
Our great problem, now that India is divided, is to decide which side to
take. Whatever we do, we shall be unpopular with one community or the
JULY 1947
297
other, and our decision may lead to serious trouble. In these circumstances we
do not see how it is possible to become an organic part of either Dominion.
We cannot risk the disturbances and bloodshed which would follow. But we
are anxious to have relations with both the Dominions. We have no intention
of being unfriendly either to India or to Pakistan nor of failing to cooperate
with both parties on matters of common concern for the mutual benefit of all.
I have now finished and I expect you are breathing a sigh of relief. This has
been a difficult letter for me to write. Despite all that has happened and is
happening, I still regard you, Dickie, as one of my oldest and most valuable
friends. Don’t let these political differences come between us. You have your
furrow to plough and I have mine. I know that you are in an extremely
difficult and delicate position; but I also know you to be a man of his word who
will not let old friends down. There are means whereby we independent States
can still become closely identified with both Dominions. The avenues of co¬
ercion and intimidation have been explored; are there no others? Please think
this over and give me your reply whenever you have the time, and remember
that if you wish me to come up and discuss matters at any time I shall be only
too glad to do so. But for God’s sake let us stop all this backhanded Balkan
diplomacy and get the negotiations on the level — fair and above board.
I have perhaps been too sentimental but I hope you will forgive and under¬
stand this shortcoming.
As promised I have so far remained absolutely mum in spite of killing pro¬
vocation: how long one can bear up with it is for those to decide who habi¬
tually provoke in utter disregard of the principles of diplomacy and states¬
manship.10
With my very best wishes,
Yours ever
HAMIDULLAH
9 No reference to this subect has been found in the Times of India, 18 July 1947.
10 On 23 July Sir G. Abell minuted: ‘This is an interesting letter from H.H. of Bhopal, and one cannot
help having much sympathy with him’. He suggested that Mr Menon might be consulted about a reply
to the questions concerning the final implications of accession and a defence agreement. The same day
Captain Brockman noted that ‘H.E. has not read but would like V.P’s advice first’. R/3/1/138: f 211.
In submitting a draft reply on 28 July Mr Menon also included a reply in the form of a postscript to a
further letter dated 26 July from the Nawab of Bhopal (No. 239) which Lord Mountbatten had handed
to Mr Menon. R/3/1/139: f 10. For Mountbatten’s reply to both letters, see No. 297.
298
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
202
Sir C. Corfield to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
Rhl4l 144: f 61
10 QUEENSWAY, NEW DELHI, 22 July 1947
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I had a talk with Sir C. P. this morning but I fear that I was unable to shake his
firm determination. He seemed in no way attracted to possible future Dominion
Status at the price of immediate accession. He has very decided views of his
own, which I have seldom been able to influence.
I was unable to meet Sir R. Mudaliar owing to his other engagements.
With kind regards an d good wishes to you both in your future work.
Yours sincerely
CONRAD L. CORFIELD1
1 Sir C. Corfield was due to leave India on 23 July on leave preparatory to retirement (see Vol. XI, No.
196, note 3).
203
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Maharaja of Travancore 1
R/3l 1 1 144: ff 57-9
22 July 1947
My dear Maharaja,
I am giving this letter to Your Highness’s Dewan, Sir C. P. Ramaswami
Aiyer, whom you were kind enough to send2 to have discussions with me in
my capacity as Crown Representative and Viceroy, concerning the future of
your State.
May I first of all express my great regard for the way in which Sir C. P. has
conducted the negotiations on behalf of Travancore. I think I thoroughly
understand both the position of Your Highness’s state and the particular
problems which face you, and I have been giving the greatest possible personal
attention to trying to find a solution which would be acceptable to Your
Highness.
2. Ever since His Majesty’s Government made their statement of the 3rd
June I have been trying to think how we could secure the minimum measure
of integration of the States and British India in such a way as to prevent
irreparable damage to the country as a whole.
3. I assumed that a State of the importance and development of Travancore
JULY I947
299
would wish to continue with complete freedom as regards internal autonomy
and trade relations.
4. I also realised that defence and external affairs (which two subjects I am
sure Your Highness will agree are completely interlocked) were subjects which,
since the advent of the British, Travancore had not been called upon to deal
with. In passing may I, as a sailor, pay tribute to the fact that Travancore is the
only Indian country to have inflicted a naval defeat on a European navy (I am
glad to say not the British). There was therefore clearly no disadvantage to
Your Highness in finding a solution for these two problems within the adjacent
and newly created Dominion of India.
5. The third subject, communications, is one which in any case it was Your
Highness’s intention to have dealt with under the standstill agreement.
6. Thus, accession on these three subjects — Defence, External Affairs and
Communications — would not detract from the independence of Travancore,
whilst bringing you completely into the British Commonwealth of Nations
with all the attendant advantages which would result therefrom, and on
which I need not here enlarge.
7. Furthermore, I feel I would owe it to Your Highness to endeavour to
arrange with the future Dominion government of India that there should be
no interference with internal jurisdiction, and I feel that it should be possible
now to find a solution to this particular aspect which would be acceptable to
both parties. 1 also note that Your Highness does not wish to send representa¬
tives to the Constituent Assembly or Central Legislature, even though you
accede on these three subjects before the 15th August.
Thus, I believe I shall be able to negotiate successfully on Your Highness’s
behalf with the Government of the Dominion of India if I am in a position to
inform this Government that Your Highness is prepared to accede on the three
subjects mentioned above.
Once I have Your Highness’s accession I will be in a position to negotiate
that there should be no interference with customs, tariffs, or internal financial
arrangements or taxes.
Your very sincere friend
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 Lord Mountbatten sent this letter via Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer. R/3/1/144: f 60.
2 See No. 93, note 4. For an account of Lord Mountbatten’s discussions with Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer,
see No. 228, paras. 16-19.
300
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
204
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
L/P &JI 10/ 142: f 56
22 July 1947
Under Section 18(4) of the Indian Independence Act the existing Instruments
of Instructions, and all the provisions of the 1935 Act relating to them, will
lapse on August 15th. I have been considering whether it is desirable to ask
The King to issue any formal Instructions to replace these documents.
There are arguments both for and against this course. On the one hand, it is
the normal practice for His Majesty to issue Instructions to the Governors
General of the Dominions; there exist Royal Instructions to the Governors
General of all the Dominions except Eire. Such Instructions are also issued to the
Governors of the Australian States, though not to the Lieutenant Governors
of the Canadian Provinces. On the other hand, I am not sure that in present
circumstances these documents have any great practical importance. In the case
of India, moreover, it would be necessary to reduce the content of any Instruc¬
tions to the barest minimum ; and even so they might, instead of serving any
useful purpose, only act as an irritant to Indian opinion. I am inclined to think,
therefore, that we can dispense with any fresh Instructions; but I should be
glad if you would consider the question urgently and let me have your views
by telegram.
In order to show what might be the content of Royal Instructions to the
Governors General and Governors, should it be decided that any are required,
I enclose the following drafts1 which have been prepared in the India Office
viz: —
(a) Instructions to the Governors General of India and Pakistan.
(b) Instructions to the Governors of all the existing Provinces except Bengal
and the Punjab.
(c) Instructions to the Governors of East and West Bengal and East and
West Punjab.
Broadly speaking, these drafts consist of the very few provisions of the existing
Instruments of Instructions which are not inconsistent with the new regime
which will come into being on August 15th.
In view of Section 18(4) of the Independence Act there would, of course, be
no question of submitting any fresh Instructions for the approval of Parliament.
His Majesty’s approval would be all that would be required to bring them into
operation.
I am taking the necessary steps for the issue of Letters Patent creating the
Offices of the Governors of the four new Provinces which will come into
JULY I947
301
being under the Act; and also revoking the Letters Patent which created the
Office of Crown Representative. I do not think that Letters Patent erecting
[ ? creating] the Offices of Govemors-General of India and Pakistan are necess¬
ary as these offices are already created by Section 5 of the Indian Independence
Act.
LISTOWEL
1 Not printed; see L/P &J/10/142: ff 58-69.
205
Meeting of the Partition Council , Case Nos. P.C. 74/8/47 , 80/8/ 47,
81/8/47, 82/8/47
Mountbatten Papers. Partition Council Minutes
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held on 22 July at 5 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mountbatten of Burma, Mr Jinnah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Patel, Dr Rajendra
Prasad, Sardar Baldev Singh (No. P.C. 74/8/47), Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck
(No. P.C. 74/8/47), Lord Ismay, Mr Christie, Mr H. M. Patel, Mr Mohamad Ali,
Brigadier Elliott (No. PC. 74/8/47), Mr Osman Ali, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
Case No. P.C. 74/8/47 Plan of action in the event of possible clashes or dis¬
turbances in the neighbourhood of the boundaries be¬
tween the two Dominions after 15th August.
his excellency said that the list1 of districts had been drawn up during his
recent visit to Lahore by common agreement between the Governor of the
Punjab, the G.O.C.-in-C., Northern Command and the Punjab Partition
Committee. The area was of convenient size and included those districts in
which trouble might occur.
The suggestion was made that Ludhiana civil district should also be in¬
cluded as, although it was to the south of the boundary areas, it contained a
considerable Muslim and Sikh population and was contiguous to other areas
where there were large numbers of Muslims. Trouble might, therefore, be
expected in this district also.
the commander-in-chief said that from the military point of view
it was desirable to concentrate the force available in a homogeneous command.
Any extension would involve more troops and complicate the plans already
worked out for command and administration.
The Council approved the list of districts subject to the addition of Ludhiana
if this was agreed to by the Punjab Partition Committee. His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief was requested to send a telegram to the Army Com-
1 See No. 184.
302
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
mander to take steps to consult the Partition Committee through His Excellency
the Governor of the Punjab.2
Case No. P.C. 80/8/47 Issues connected with the partition work in the Punjab
his excellency said he had had a very successful meeting with the
Punjab Partition Committee. The conclusions reached at that meeting were
set out in the note3 before the Partition Council. He was glad to say that the
Punjab Partition Committee was tackling the problems facing it in a realistic
and business-like way.
In the course of discussion, it was explained that the Partition Committee
was making postings district-wise purely for administrative convenience and
not on the assumption that the Boundary Commission would give its decisions
district by district according to their present boundaries.
Case No. 81/8/47 Draft Statement by Partition Council.
his excellency said the Punjab Partition Committee had expressed their
willingness to issue a statement4 of their own on the same lines as the one which
the Partition Council intended to put out. He was particularly happy to be able
to report that Sardar Swaran Singh had agreed to be a signatory to that state¬
ment. his excellency said that he had made the suggestion that other party
leaders in the Punjab should also endorse the statement. As regards the state¬
ment to be issued from the Centre, he proposed to mention the names of those
who were present at the meeting of the Partition Council when the statement
was adopted.
The Council approved the issue of the draft statement5 subject to the follow¬
ing modifications :
(a) the omission of the word 'God’ occurring in the 10th line of paragraph 2 ;6
(b) the insertion in paragraph 5 of the full names of the two brigadiers to be
attached to the Military Commander as advisers ;
(c) the addition of Ludhiana in para. 5 if this was considered necessary by the
Partition Committee of the Punjab.
Case No. P.C. 82/8/47 Temporary performance of duties of Joint Defence
Council by Partition Council.7
his excellency said it was necessary to define the authority to whom
the Commander-in-Chief would owe allegiance up to the 15 th August in
dealing with the disposition of troops and allied questions in those zones in the
neighbourhood of the boundaries between the two dominions where he would
have operational control. It had already been agreed8 that the composition of
the Joint Defence Council should be: the two Governors-General (with G. G.
(India) in the chair), the two Defence Members, and the Commander-in-Chief
(who would be designated Supreme Commander from the 15th August).
All these persons now attended those meetings of the Partition Council when
JULY 1947
303
questions concerning the Armed Forces were under consideration. He sug¬
gested, therefore, that up to the 15 th August the Partition Council should
treat itself as the Joint Defence Council (of which the Indian Defence Member
and the C.-in-C. would be regarded as members) when such subjects came up
for discussion, and that a separate record should be kept of the Council’s
deliberations on those matters. It would also be necessary to take steps forth¬
with to constitute the civil secretariat of the Joint Defence Council. The two
joint Secretaries of this secretariat would not, however, attend meetings. In
other words, his proposal was that the Partition Council should function
temporarily as the Joint Defence Council for the consideration of such items of
business until the 15th August when the latter would come into full being.
The Council approved H.E’s proposal.
2 Lord Mountbatten informed the Partition Council at its meeting held on 24 July (Case No. P.C. 87/9/47)
that all parties concerned had agreed to the addition of Ludhiana to the list of Districts. He added that
the Muslim Officer who would be attached to the Joint Commander in an advisory capacity would be
Colonel Ayub Khan and not Brigadier Tiwana. Mountbatten Papers, Partition Council Minutes.
3 Not printed. Lord Mountbatten’s account of his meeting with the Punjab Partition Committee in his
V.P.R. at No. 228, paras. 6-12, follows closely the note before the Partition Council at its meeting on
22 July.
4 See No. 228, paras. 10-11.
5 For the statement as issued, see No. 224.
6 See the last sentence of paragraph 2 of the statement as issued. The draft included the word ‘God’
between the words ‘worship’ and ‘in’.
7 See No. 148, Case No. P.C. 47/6/47, point (c).
8 See Vol. XI, No. 416.
206
Secretaries to the Punjab Boundary Commission to Sir G. Abell
Telegram , R/j/i/i57: f 202
IMMEDIATE LAHORE, 22 July 1Q47
EN CLAIR
Reference Mr. Henderson’s explanation of terms of reference of Boundary
Commission in speech1 on clauses Indian Independence Bill in House of Com¬
mons on 14th July. Punjab Boundary Commission would be grateful if com¬
munications exchanged2 between His Excellency the Viceroy and Secretary
or Under Secretary of State for India or other authority in Whitehall on Mr.
Henderson’s interpretation of terms of reference could be made available to
them immediately.
1 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 440, 14 July 1947, col. 74.
2 See Nos. 121 and 144.
304
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
207
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sardar Baldev Singh
Rhl il 157: f 198
231 July 1947
Thank you for your letter of yesterday2 about the Boundary Commission.
The point you mention was raised in substance in the Partition Council on
10th July and for ready reference I enclose a copy of the minutes.3
I do not think the Partition Council would be in favour of reconsidering
their decision and I am sure it would be embarrassing either for the Government
of India as a whole officially to put a point of view to the Boundary Com¬
mission or for the two provisional Governments to put opposite views through
representatives who are still members of a single Army.
Sir Cyril Radcliffe, who had made the enquiry mentioned in the minutes of
10th July has been sent a copy of those minutes by way of an answer.
1 The file copy of this letter is dated 22 July but 23 July is correct. Sir G. Abell was instructed to draft
this reply to Sardar Baldev Singh during discussion of the Boundary Commission at the Viceroy’s
Sixty-Second Staff Meeting (Item 3) on 23 July. Mountbatten Papers.
2 No. 199.
3 See the first three paras, of Case No. P.C. 30/4/47 of No. 52.
208
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Pandit Nehru
Rhl 1/157: f 219
23 July 1947
Dear Pt Nehru,
Thank you for your letter of 21st July.1 I have had a talk with Mr. Bardoloi
about Sylhet. I have explained to him that the interpretation of terms of refer¬
ence will have to be undertaken by the Boundary Commission itself and that
it is now too late to consider altering the position of the Commission or
appointing assessors to assist it. I think he appreciates the position.
We discussed in the Partition Council on the ioth July the question of
putting before the Boundary Commissions the defence point of view about the
boundaries. I have written to Sardar Baldev Singh about this and attach a copy
of my letter.2
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 No. 195.
2 No. 207.
JULY I947
305
209
Sir C. Radclifje to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 2J July 1947
Dear Viceroy,
Thank you for your letter of 22 July.1 I am very glad to know that your dis¬
cussion with the Punjab Partition Committee was on such satisfactory lines.
I will certainly bear in mind the importance of the earliest possible date for
the Award. The time schedule, as you know, has to be a fme one owing to the
necessity of giving adequate time first for public hearings and then for full
discussions of their differences with the judges of the two simultaneous Com¬
missions. Unless the Punjab judges agree with each other more than I have
reason to expect, I do not think2 that I could manage the 10th: but I think
that I can promise the 12th, and I will do the earlier date if I possibly can.
Yours sincerely,
CYRIL RADCLIFFE
1 No. 200. 2 ‘think’ underlined in original.
210
Mr. C. P. Scott to Lieutenant Jawand Singh
Rl3l 1/157: f 215
23 July 1947
Dear Sir,
H.E. the Viceroy asks me to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of the 18 th
July1 in which you asked for an interview on behalf of the military grantees of
Montgomery District to enable them to make a submission about the boundary
to be determined between India and Pakistan.
H.E. asks me to say that as the Boundary Commission has already been
appointed, and the Chairman has arrived in India, it would be most improper
for him to receive any representations affecting their work. The question of the
Punjab boundary is entirely a matter for the Commission, and His Excellency
therefore regrets his inability to receive your deputation.
Yours faithfully,
c. P. SCOTT
1 R/3/1/157: f 180.
30 6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
21 1
Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart ( North-West Frontier Province) to
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma (Extract)
Rhl 1/165: jf 28-9
23 July 1947
POST-REFERENDUM PROBLEM
5. It is the future which is now exercising everybody’s minds. I have had
talks with numerous people (officials as well as leaders of the political parties
and my Ministers).
The Muslim League are, I think, genuinely anxious about the intentions of
the Congress Party. They believe that the Congress intend to stage a civil
disobedience movement.
A deputation of 5 local League leaders came to see me on Sunday (July 20th).
They made the usual accusations against the Congress Party and the Zalmai
Pakhtun, and urged me to dismiss the Ministry, to resort to Section 93, to take
immediate action to disarm the Zalmai Pakhtun, generally to render the Con¬
gress Party incapable of sabotaging the administration of the Province before
15 th August, and so ensure that Pakistan would have a fair start on that date.
I told them that decisions as to what action would be taken as a result of the
Referendum would have to come from you.
6. There are I think good grounds to suppose that the Congress Party do
intend to stage a movement, and that this movement may be violent. Many
reliable people are sure of it. Most significant of all is that Dr. Khan Sahib,
who came to see me on 21st July, practically admitted that a movement which
might result in violence was likely.
Dr. Khan Sahib was not at all excited and spoke quietly. He said that the
people would resent the dismissal of his Ministry, dislike intensely a minority
League Ministry, and like little more government under Section 93 . He repeated
that he would only resign if assured that a General Election would be held in
the reasonably near future. He agreed that such an election could only be held
under the new Pakistan Constitution and after new electoral rolls had been
prepared. He expressed his and his party’s apprehension that the Pakistan
Government would not hold elections soon, but govern the Province for some
time to come by Ordinances or something similar.
7. Both parties are indulging in much propaganda; the League’s is to the
effect that the Congress are going to turn violent ; the Congress and Red Shirts
are being provocative and threatening, and preaching Pathanistan and the need
to fight for it. There is great tension and feelings are being worked up. Congress
have perhaps some reason to fear victimisation.
JULY I947
J07
It is possible that all this is bluff and part of a war of nerves. But the risk is
there. When a movement would be launched I can’t yet say. It might be soon ;
they may wait till 15th August or even until after the Roza.
We have warned Deputy Commissioners and the Area Commander here
that they must be vigilant and ready to reimpose precautions at once. The
Ordinances remain in force and in Peshawar, which is I think the danger spot
(the rest of the Province will behave if we can keep Peshawar quiet), certain
prohibitory orders under Section 144 have been imposed. The coming reduc¬
tion in troops is disturbing in the present circumstances.
8. As regards the formation of a League Minority Ministry, the local leaders
don’t seem at all keen on the idea; they say because they do not command a
majority in the Legislative Assembly. I am however not at all sure that it
isn’t because there are so many dissensions amongst them that they cannot agree
who should be Ministers !
9. No more has been said about a compromise between the two parties. I
gather that Jinnah would not be willing to consider it. Abdul Ghaffar Khan is
however, Dr. Khan Sahib says, still willing to go to Delhi to discuss the pos¬
sibility with Mr. Jinnah.
10. The Faqir of Ipi has been attracting even more local attention than usual
lately, and I think it likely that he may come into the open after the Id.
For some months Ipi has been collecting the thumb impressions of tribesmen for
an unspecified purpose, and latterly there have been many reports that he
contemplates declaring himself Amir of Waziristan — there have even been
reports of a sort of rehearsal ceremony. Ipi, of course, has always been a good
friend of Congress, who have given him liberal financial support, and he did
his best to dissuade his followers in the Bannu District from voting in the
Referendum. He will naturally seek to enhance his political power when
British control is withdrawn, and, provided his old allies continue to be
generous, he would probably be quite ready to make things difficult for
Pakistan by creating as much disturbance as possible. Ipi and his lieutenants have
lately been very active politically, and he could certainly raise a large following
in North Waziristan. The Mahsuds on the whole have hitherto been unrespon¬
sive to his blandishments, but were he to “start a party” which offered good
prospects of, say, looting Bannu, the Mahsuds would be in quick enough. The
Muslim League leaders in the Province were definitely worried about this
possibility, and they spoke of it when I saw them on Sunday. I repeat that I
do not expect any large scale disturbance during the Ramzan, but the period
immediately following the Id is always a ticklish time in Waziristan, and “after
the Id” combined with the demission of British control is, I think, more than
likely to produce fireworks.
308
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
212
Mr Rowan to Mr Harris
L/P &JI71 12596: f 11
IMMEDIATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 10 DOWNING STREET, 23 July 1947
My dear Harris,
The Prime Minister has considered the draft reply to the Viceroy s telegram
No. 1980-S.,1 enclosed in your letter to Graham-Harrison of 18th July.2
The matters to which this telegram refers are of some importance and
delicacy. The Prime Minister, therefore, feels that the answer should set out
the position fully and plainly and has approved the attached revised draft3 which
has been seen and concurred in by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations.
Yours very sincerely,
LESLIE ROWAN
1 No. 125.
2 Mr Harris had, on Lord Listowel’s instructions, sent a draft reply to tel. 1980-S for the Prime Minister’s
approval. This draft is not printed. L/P &J/7/12596: If 15, 17-18.
3 See No. 225 for the reply as sent.
213
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel 1
Telegram , R/j/ 1\ 138: f 203
CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, 23 July 1947, 5-45 pm
Received: 24 July , 6.50 am
No. 2900-P. In connection with transfer of power representations have been
received from Gwalior, Indore2 and Sangli claiming from H.M.G. either
return of territories ceded in return for specific military guarantees or alter¬
natively cash compensation ( vide Chapter IV Davidson Committee Report).3
No claim has yet been received from Baroda. Regarding Hyderabad please see
para. 13 of Memorandum presented by Hyderabad Delegation to Cabinet
Mission in May 1946.4
2. In view of Section 2 of Indian Independence Act return of ceded territory
is clearly out of the question. Alternative of cash compensation remains. Poli¬
tical Dept suggested that Dominion might be prepared to entertain these
claims on principle that Succession Govt inheriting physical assets of its
predecessor inherits also corresponding liabilities. But States Dept point out
that under Section 7(i)(b) of Indian Independence Act all obligations of His
JULY I947
309
Majesty existing on August 15th towards Indian States are extinguished
absolutely as from that date. This is undoubtedly correct legal position and
Dominion Govt will after August 15th be legally justified in refusing to
recognise obligations which have been extinguished by Act of Parliament.
Dominion Govt will it is understood resist States claims on these unassailable
legal grounds. Thus H.M.G. who are presumably not prepared themselves to
satisfy these claims may be exposed to charge of breach of faith. It does not
seem practicable however for anything to be done before August 15th. Do
you agree?
1 Mr Wakefield had sent Sir G. Abell drafts of this telegram and the one mentioned in note 2 on 22 July
remarking that, as they had been ‘drafted in consultation with Menon, you may perhaps think it
unnecessary to trouble H.E. personally’. R/3/1/138: f 202.
2 In tel. 290 i-P of 23 July the Crown Representative explained that Indore had also claimed repayment of
a capitalised contribution made in 1865. Upon the basis of the 1865 Agreement, Promissory Notes had
been issued in the name of the Maharaja Holkar. Inquiries, however, had revealed that the capital sum
had subsequently been absorbed in the general revenues of the Central Government. If this amount were
to be repaid it would have to be repaid before 15 August but the provisional Dominion Government
were certain to oppose repayment before 15 August of a substantial sum which would lapse to them
after that date. The Crown Representative therefore sought approval for the view that it did not seem
practicable to do anything about this matter. R/3/1/138: f 204.
3 Cmd. 4103. Report of the Indian States [Financial] Enquiry Committee, 1932. Sir John Davidson
chaired the Committee.
4 A copy of this Memorandum is on L/P &J/5/337: ff 311-16.
214
Note by Sir E. Jenkins
RI3I1I176: f 254
SECRET 23 July 1947
A large Sikh Diwan has been advertised to be held at Nankana Sahib, Sheik-
hupura district, on Sunday, 27th July 1947. The names of 22 members of the
Legislative Assembly appear at the foot of the poster, including those of Master
Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh; but it is not certain who the actual organi¬
sers are.
2. Public meetings are prohibited throughout the Sheikhupura district,
and this meeting will not come within the religious exemption, as it is frankly
a political conference called to impress the Boundary Commission and che
public generally with the enthusiasm of the Sikhs for their boundary claims.
3 . It is said that the poster has been widely circulated in the local villages and
that the intention is for those attending the meeting to come in Jathas. The
leaders hope to be arrested; if no arrests are made, they will announce a further
programme of meetings.
3io
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
4. Meetings about the Boundary Commission and the determination of the
boundary are extremely dangerous, and Sikh meetings in the Western zone,
apart from the direct disorders they may occasion, will inevitably cause the
Muslims in the Eastern zone to hold counter meetings. It is therefore clear that
this meeting at Nankana Sahib must be prevented.
5. Commander, Lahore Area, is sending to the Sheikhupura district a force
consisting of Headquarters and one Squadron 18th Cavalry and 3rd Baluch
Regiments. This force will be under command of 23rd Brigade and will be in
addition to the Gurkha Company now stationed at Nankana Sahib/Sheik-
hupura. It will be in position by morning of 25th July.
6. I.G. Police is arranging Police precautions, which will consist of —
(a) stoppage of bookings by rail to Nankana Sahib and adjacent stations;
(b) control posts on main roads giving access to Nankana Sahib;
(r) control posts at convenient places on railways; and
(d) patrols in villages to discourage attendance.
Lahore Area Commander has intimated to me personally that troops will
assist in these arrangements as required, e.g. there are troops available at
Ly allpur.
7. It is impossible to give detailed instructions about the handling of the
situation 011 27th July; but the following should be the general policy —
(i) As far as possible, persons attending the meeting should be turned back
some way from Nankana Sahib.
(ii) Interference by Police or troops inside the Gurdwara precincts should be
avoided.
(iii) In amplification of (ii), if a meeting is in fact held inside the Gurdwara
precincts and there is no immediate danger of a breach of the peace, it should
not be interfered with, and any arrests that may be necessary should be made
afterwards, at times and places chosen by the authorities and not by the
organisers.
8. If the special Force makes its presence evident from 25th morning and
if the Police arrangements to discourage attendance at the meeting are thorough,
the attendance will probably not be very large. We must enforce the law, and
I have already made it clear to Sardar Swaran Singh that we intend to do so ;
at the same time we must avoid provoking a large-scale physical clash with
the Sikhs, especially in a Gurdwara.1
E. m. j.
1 In tel. 189-G of 23 July Sir E. Jenkins informed Lord Mountbatten that this meeting had been advertised
and outlined the measures he proposed to take to prevent it. He added that ‘actual organiser is almost
certainly Giani Kartar Singh’ and explained that Sardar Swaran Singh had been informed that the
meeting was illegal and that it would be ‘dealt with unless stopped’. Mountbatten Papers, Official
Correspondence Files: Punjab, Situation in, Part II (b).
JULY 1947
311
215
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
Telegram , L/P &J/ 10/ 142: ff 120-21
CONFIDENTIAL INDIA OFFICE, 2J July 1Q47, 4.JO pm
Received: 24 July , g.oo am
No. 9507. Your telegram No. 1999-S of 16th July.1 Oaths of office. You will
cease to be Governor-General immediately after midnight of 14th August.
2. I agree that it will be necessary for you and for Jinnah to be sworn and
to take the oath of allegiance on 15 th August before proceeding in state to the
Constituent Assembly. Following is form of oath of allegiance and oath of
office taken by Govemors-General of Dominions. Oath of allegiance. Begins.
I ... do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty
King George, his heirs and successors, according to law. So help me God. Ends.
Oath of office. Begins. I ... do swear that I will well and truly serve His
Majesty King George in the office of .... So help me God. Ends.
1 No. 145.
216
Sir G. Abell to the Secretaries to the Punjab Boundary Commission
Telegram , R/j/ 1\ 137: j 208
en clair 23 July 1947 , 10.30 pm
No. 563-GT. Reference your telegram dated 22nd July.1 Mr. Henderson’s
reference to Boundary Commission’s terms in the House of Commons on the
14 th July.
2. Mr. Henderson’s remarks were wrongly reported in the Indian Press.
The relevant passage from his speech is as follows : — Begins. The provision
that other factors will be taken into account has been made by Prime Minister
to enable the Commission to have regard to special circumstances of Sikh
community in Punjab where considerations such as location of their religious
shrines can reasonably be taken into account up to a point. I would however
emphasise to Committee that it is for Commission itself to decide what are
other factors and how much importance should be attached to all or any of
them. Ends.
1 No. 206.
312
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
3. Regret must claim privilege for correspondence2 between Viceroy and
Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State but this has been made available
to Sir Cyril Radcliffe who will show it in confidence to his colleagues.
2 See Nos. 12 1 and 144.
217
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sardar Nishtar
Rhl i/ 138: ff 216-7
no. 592/89 22 July 1947
Dear Mr Nishtar,
Thank you for your letter of the 20th July1 about the States Conference.
It is my intention to meet the representatives of the States separately in my
capacity as Crown Representative. I am sure this is the right course. Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel will not be present at the Conference.
If I cannot obtain from the representatives of the States those terms which the
two States Departments want, I may fmd it necessary to put them in direct
touch with you, and with Sardar Patel, and if necessary with the Partition
Council.
In regard to the point raised in the second paragraph of your letter —
individual representation of States included in Groups — there appears to be
some misunderstanding. For purposes of States’ representation in the Consti¬
tuent Assembly set up under the Cabinet Mission Plan, it was necessary to
distribute among States on a population basis the 93 seats available to them.
The method of distributing these seats was one of the main questions which the
States’ Negotiating Committee appointed by the Standing Committee of the
Chamber of Princes had to decide in consultation with the corresponding
Committee set up by the Constituent Assembly. Agreement was reached in
regard to the allocation of these seats, and most of the individual States or
groups of States which have decided to participate in the proceedings of the
Constituent Assembly have already sent their representatives to that body. This
grouping of States was however solely for the purposes of representation in the
Constituent Assembly, and it does not bind States in any way in regard to the
Conference on July 25. 1 enclose a copy of an express letter sent by the Political
Department to all Residents on June 21, 1947, 2 (before the States Department
had been formed). This will show that, for the purposes of the Conference,
every3 State is asked to send an accredited representative to the meeting. As
many States as possible are asked to combine to send a joint representative, but
JULY 1947
313
there is absolutely no suggestion that the grouping adopted for purposes of the
Constituent Assembly should be followed for purposes of the Conference.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 No. 186. 2 Vol. XI, No. 287. 3 Emphasis in original.
218
Mr Subbarayan to Mr Attlee
Attlee Papers
GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS, FORT ST GEORGE, 24 July I947
My dear Prime Minister,
Please accept my congratulations on the passage of the Indian Independence
Act. I little imagined when we used to have discussions in my house during
your visit as a Member of the Simon Commission that it will be given to you
to finally solve the problem of India as has been done now by the passing of this
measure. I realised then how deep and abiding was your interest in India. Your
work at the Round Table Conference and subsequently at the Joint Select
Committee showed that you had even then wished for a different solution than
what was eventually done. The visit of Sir Stafford Cripps in 1942 in the middle
of the war afforded another opportunity for the solution of this problem, but
because of misunderstandings the problem remained unsolved, and led to
bitterness on both sides as I wrote to you at the time. The Cabinet Mission
under the leadership of Lord Pethick-Lawrence tried to solve the problem
which depended so much on agreement between communities. This unfor¬
tunately was not found possible. As I remarked to you in Madras and sub¬
sequently in my letters, the introduction of separate electorates in 1909 by
Lord Minto really sowed the seeds for the bitterness that has ensued between
the communities. Responsible Government on the Parliamentary model with
segregated electorates can never work. I am only mentioning this not to
escape from the responsibility that we owe to our own people, but to point
out that one step taken on the wrong road often complicates a situation which
was already difficult enough because of communal feelings. But all that is past
and both Britain and India will be grateful to you for what you have done to
bring about friendly relations between the two great peoples. As you mentioned
in the House of Commons, the division of India has been accepted as inevitable
because of the present situation. I do hope and trust, as you have said, that it
will be possible for the two parts of India to coalesce at some future date as I
feel in the interests of world peace this will be necessary. But for the present I
314
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
am hoping both the parts of India will, when the division eventually
takes place, live as friendly neighbours and work for the greatness of this
ancient land. There is of course the further complication of the States and
I am glad in spite of the pressure from the Conservative benches, you avoided
encouraging fissiparous tendencies which we see in Indian political life today.
Lord Mountbatten is, I know, doing his best to solve this problem and to get
the States into one or the other of the two Unions of India and Pakistan
consistent with the contiguity of the territory concerned. I am hoping he will
be successful. Travancore through its Dewan has already announced that as
from August 15th they will be independent,1 and Hyderabad through a
firman2 of H.E.H. the Nizam has already put out its claim for independence.
This, I know, is going to cause a great deal of bitterness. As Gandhiji has often
said, we believe in the bona fides of the British Government, but people of the
States who have been agitating for responsible Government are still very
suspicious. I know that after the passage of the Independence Act, it will mostly
be our duty to solve this problem in the best way we can, but I am sure the
British Government also will help in any manner they can without actually
coercing the States.
I am sorry to have raised a controversy over what has been done in such good
faith, but let me conclude by congratulating you on your great achievement
and I am sure your name will go down to history along with Sir Henry
Campbell Bannerman as the two persons who found a solution for most
difficult problems that confronted them when they happened to be the First
Adviser of the Crown in England. My wife joins me in these congratulations.
I trust your family are all well.
With kindest regards,
Yours very sincerely,
P. SUBBARAYAN3
1 See No. 146. 2 Vol. XI, No. 163.
3 A note on the file indicates that Mr Attlee replied personally to this letter.
219
The Earl oj Listowel to Mr Attlee
L/WS/ 1/1046: ff 153-4, 156-63
India office, 24 July 1947
Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 131/47
Prime Minister,
You will remember that at an informal meeting1 at No. 10 Downing St. on the
evening of the 9th July it was decided that a long draft telegram from Lord
JULY 1947
315
Ismay to the Viceroy setting out the defence requirements which the Chiefs of
Staff thought we should endeavour to secure by negotiation with the two new
Dominions should not be sent but that Lord Ismay should take out with him,
on his return to India, such information as he felt he would be able to make use
of.
2. In fact, it did not prove possible for all the information required to be put
into suitable form before the date of Lord Ismay’s departure but the Chiefs of
Staff have had the attached “Brief for Negotiations” prepared in accordance
with what they understand to be Lord Ismay’s wishes.2 This document is
intended as background material for use in the way which seems to Lord Ismay
to be best and is not intended to be handed to Indian leaders, at any rate at this
stage. The Chiefs of Staff wish to make it clear moreover that, although this
document has been prepared under their aegis, the matters dealt with in it are
primarily political and the views expressed must not be taken as being the
views of the Chiefs of Staff. The Annex to the brief is, on the other hand, an
objective statement of British defence requirements in India, which has the
Chiefs of Staff’s specific approval.
3. Although it is contemplated that the attached document should be sent
to Lord Ismay by my Principal Staff Officer (General Sir Geoffry Scoones) I
think you would wish to see the document before it is despatched and I should
be glad to know that the proposal that it should be sent to Lord Ismay has your
approval.3
LISTO WEL
Enclosure 1 to No. 219
TOP SECRET
INDIA — DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS
BRIEF FOR NEGOTIATIONS
The fulfilment of the main object of the United Nations, the maintenance of
world peace, depends on the ability and readiness of the great powers to keep
the peace. Because of the veto, the United Nations Organisation provides no
security against war between the Great Powers.
2. In this situation, the only effective deterrent to a potential aggressor is
tangible evidence of the intention and ability of the Commonwealth to with¬
stand attack and to hit back immediately. The Commonwealth must, therefore,
remain strong enough to demonstrate its ability to withstand, and its intention
to counter aggression at any time. Whether, therefore, we are acting in
pursuit of national policy or in support of the United Nations, it is necessary
1 See No. 49, note 3. 2 cf. No. 143.
3 Mr Attlee minuted: ‘Yes, as a guide to Ismay I approve the statement. C.R.A. 24.7.47.’ L/WS/1/1046:
3i6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
to maintain forces in peacetime to deter aggression which might lead to a major
war, and to defend our own interests should war be forced upon us.
3 . The association of Commonwealth nations is held together by common
ideals and principles. It follows that, whereas the rights and policies of each
nation are independently determined on a national basis, any threat to the
security or principles of freedom of one of these nations is a threat to the future
of the Commonwealth as a whole. Through the association of common ideals,
the nations of the Commonwealth tend to act together. There is little point in
such common action unless the will of the Commonwealth is supported by the
united strength of its members. Provided this strength is maintained, the status
and power of any one nation is, therefore, based not only on its national
position, but on the strength of the whole Commonwealth association.
This factor alone is an effective deterrent to any potential aggressive action
against a member or members of the Commonwealth.
4. The partition of British India into two separate Dominions has affected
the position of the Indian Continent in respect to war and to all questions of
defence.
5. In the first place, like all other British Dominions, both India and Pakistan
are absolutely free to decide in any threat affecting the security of any part of
the British Commonwealth whether they would participate with other mem¬
bers of the British Commonwealth in war or not.
6. In the second place, the partition of India and, following naturally upon
the assumption by India and Pakistan of Dominion status, the withdrawal of
British troops, will seriously weaken the security of the Indian Continent and
disorganise the navies and air forces of both Dominions. At such a period a
greater burden is thrown upon the two Dominion armies in respect of both
external and internal security. As the division of the Indian Army is now in
progress, the possibility of protecting India from outside aggression has been
seriously jeopardised for the time being to the dangerous point where sur¬
rounding nations may be encouraged to impose on her security. This weakness
is exemplified by the recent Afghan demand for Indian territory adjoining the
North West Frontier.
7. The Indian Continent has long claimed the moral leadership of the South
East Asia countries. Through its dominant geographical position, the Continent
also is in a position to affect the security of all nations dependent on the sea
communications through the Indian Ocean. The stability and strength of the
Indian Continent is thus the direct concern of other nations, since it affects their
security. These nations, including those Colonies and Dominions within the
Commonwealth association, cannot, therefore, forego a direct interest and
JULY I947
317
anxiety that the authorities in India are not only conscious and alive to this
responsibility to other nations, but display the necessary strength to ensure the
peaceful use of the sea communications on which these nations are dependent.
The discharge of this responsibility needs strength both to preserve internal
order and prevent external domination or aggression.
8. It is the intention of H.M.G. to help — insofar as this is required — to
ensure to the best of its ability that the Indian Dominions shall not suffer any
loss of security either now or at any time in the near future as a result of their
achievement of political independence. The long experience of the United
Kingdom of such matters as the central organisation for defence, and of
training, and the resources of this country in scientific research and development
and industrial production, will also be available to the Indian Dominions.
H.M.G. is willing to provide advice and technical assistance in the reorganisa¬
tion of the land, sea and air forces of both Dominions. It would be prepared to
come to their aid if a major threat developed to their security with the addi¬
tional forces required to repel and defeat that threat.
9. I11 planning the broad strategy of the British Commonwealth as a whole,
the Chiefs of Staff in the United Kingdom must take account of the fact that
in the event of a major war the Dominions, though they have no obligation to
participate, may in fact decide to do so. In the two world wars which have
taken place in this century, the members of the British Commonwealth have
acted together in the face of a declared enemy.
10. The advent of mass destruction weapons and other new means of offence,
including the dangerous potentialities of chemical and biological warfare, has
greatly increased the vulnerability of nations with dense and concentrated
population and industries. The main implications of these new weapons are: —
(a) The possibility of achieving rapid and decisive results by the use of mass
destruction weapons against industry and the civil population.
(b) There are greater possibilities than before of surprise attack and little
likelihood of inactivity similar to the beginning of the last war which
would allow us time to build up our strength before serious action is
11. The efficient organisation and readiness of the forces of the Common¬
wealth to act together in an emergency is, therefore, the primary military
Commonwealth task in peace. To this end, at a Conference between Common¬
wealth Prime Ministers in May, 1946, there was a general measure of agreement
on the following principles : —
(a) A centralised system of Commonwealth defence is unlikely to be gener¬
ally acceptable and might restrict freedom of action of the individual
3 1 8
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
members of the Commonwealth in making bilateral arrangements for
co-operation with allies.
(, b ) W e must, therefore, set up some looser system for co-ordination which,
we suggest, should be based upon the national defence organisations to be
maintained in the United Kingdom and in each Dominion.
(c) The essence of this system is that the United Kingdom should maintain
liaison in each Dominion, while the Dominions should maintain similar
missions in London and in other Dominions as required.
(d) It may not be possible to bring this system fully into operation immedi¬
ately, but provided the essentials are agreed, the necessary framework
upon which the full organisation could grow will be available.
12. Any system which we devise must fulfil the following conditions. It
must —
(a) Ensure that final co-ordination of, and executive decisions on, all matters
of high defence policy within the Commonwealth are achieved by
agreement between the Governments concerned.
(b) Provide the maximum degree of co-ordination on defence matters which
the sovereign status of the members of the Commonwealth allows.
(c) Provide for discussion of Dominion views on world security problems.
(d) Be sufficiently flexible to cope with the varying outlooks and resources
of the different countries of the Commonwealth.
(e) Be framed so as to allow the central direction of effort in war to be
carried out from an alternative location to the United Kingdom.
13. The foregoing is an example of how military co-ordination is built up
between members of the Commonwealth. Consultation on matters of the
defence of the whole British Commonwealth now takes place between its
members and it is now the practice to exchange liaison staffs with the United
Kingdom. In this way consultation on questions of Commonwealth defence
can proceed regularly and conveniently, but without involving any obligation
or commitment whatever on the Dominion Governments to enter a war if they
decided it was not in their interests to do so.
14. To sum up these factors —
(i) Providing facilities and co-operation are forthcoming to utilise the
combined strength of members, the weight and position of each member
of the Commonwealth is based on the strength of the whole associa¬
tion and not only on its national position.
(ii) Tangible evidence and the knowledge of the unity of members of the
JULY I947
319
Commonwealth are effective deterrents against aggression. The degree
of unity determines the ability to deter aggression.
(iii) The destructive capacity of modern weapons means that the readiness
and strength of the armed forces of the Commonwealth must be
preserved in peace.
(iv) The achievement of independence by India and Pakistan has brought
heavy internal and external military responsibilities.
(v) For the time being, owing to the re-organisation of Indian Armed
Forces, these responsibilities cannot be discharged to the degree required.
This is a situation fraught with danger, not only to India but to
countries who cannot disregard the effect on their own security.
(vi) The United Kingdom is prepared to aid India and Pakistan to enable
these countries to play their part in the maintenance of their own tran¬
quility and stability and the strength of the Commonwealth, on which
in the last resort their continued peace and independence must depend.
(vii) To enable the United Kingdom to provide this aid, certain facilities
must be placed at the disposal of the United Kingdom, India and
Pakistan.
15. With these considerations in mind, the Chiefs of Staff have formulated
their views on the strategic importance of the Indian Continent to the British
Commonwealth as a whole, the role which the Indian Dominions might play
and the consequential arrangements which ought now to be made. The views
of the Chiefs of Staff are attached.
Fmclosure 2 to No. 219
BRITISH DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS IN INDIA
Strategic importance of the Indian Continent to Commonwealth defence
From the point of view of the defence of the British Commonwealth as a
whole, the Chiefs of Staff would like to be able to retain the assistance and co¬
operation of both India and Pakistan, in order that
(a) The Continent of India could continue to be a main support area in war,
i.e. that we should continue to have the active co-operation of the Armed
Forces of both Dominions and the use of the reserves of man-power and
of the industrial potential which they can provide.
(b) We might have the use of strategic airfields in the event of a major war.
( c ) We might have the use of the naval and air bases which are important to
the security of the Indian Ocean and to the maintenance of our world¬
wide sea and air communications.
320
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Role of the Indian Dominions in mar
2. On the assumption that the Indian Dominions decided to enter a war in
which the Commonwealth became involved, the least that would make a
substantial contribution to Commonwealth defence is that both States
should : —
(, a ) Undertake primary responsibility for their defence on land and of their
ports and coastal communications by naval forces.
(b) Accept the obligation to participate actively in the defence of India in the
event of a threat developing in any of the neighbouring territories,
including the possibility that this might entail employment of some of
their forces outside their own territory.
Detailed Requirements
3 . In order to enable the Indian Dominions to play their part in Common¬
wealth defence, and the United Kingdom to give them what assistance they
required, arrangements would have to be made which would ensure the
following : —
(a) The maintenance by India and Pakistan of land forces on a scale adequate
to ensure the defence of the Indian Continent.
(h) The maintenance of the efficiency and modernisation of their Armed
Forces, which must be capable of expansion in war, and the acceptance of
British advice and assistance therein.
(c) The acceptance by India and Pakistan of the assistance of additional naval,
land and air forces from Commonwealth resources together with the
technical and other assistance necessary to ensure the defence of the
Continent of India and that of the Indian Ocean in the event of war, and
the admission on threat of war of R.A.F. units and of any other assistance
which may be necessary.
(d) The maintenance of the necessary bases and communications for offence
and defence at the required standard of efficiency and degree of readiness,
the acceptance of the assistance of British supervisory personnel and the
making available of these bases in war or on the threat of war. The
retention of certain armament stores in the new Dominions is also most
desirable by mutual arrangement.
(e) Air transit rights and facilities both in peace and war, irrespective of
whether the new Dominions themselves are involved in the war. Air
staging facilities for military aircraft will be required at the following
airfields in peace : —
Mauripur
Palma
JULY I947
321
Dum Dum
Jodhpur
Allahabad
Ranchi
Ahmadabad
Poona
Hakempet
Bangalore
Car Nicobar
(/) Agreement to take what defensive measures we consider necessary and to
establish such facilities as we require in the Andaman, Nicobar and
Laccadive Islands.
(j?) Availability of Gurkhas for the Imperial Army and transit rights for
Gurkha personnel through India and possibly Pakistan. This is of course
already in hand.
(h) The exchange of liaison staffs with the United Kingdom to represent the
views of their respective Chiefs of Staff on matters of common concern.
220
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir A. Hydari (Assam)
Telegram , P/j/i /157: / 224
important 24 July 1947, 4.00 pm
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 2918-S. Your 164 of 23 July.1
It is for Boundary Commission to interpret their terms of reference. I have
been asked more than once to define them but have had to refuse.
1 In tel. 164 of 23 July Sir A. Hydari asked whether he was correct in his interpretation that the scope of
the Boundary Commission did not extend to Goalpara or any other district of Assam which was not
contiguous to Sylhet district. R/3/1/157: f2i4.
322
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
221
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Attlee ( via India Office)
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Finance (India)
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 24 July 1Q47 , 1.20 pm
secret Received: 24 July, 4.00 pm
No. 2912-S. Sterling balances. I was glad to receive your telegram No. 9090
dated July 15th1 on this subject.
2. A point I might have made is that any repudiation of the debts and any
suggestion that India is not entitled to the money would have the worst possible
effect here. I think there is some realisation here of Great Britain’s difficulties
and of the fact that only limited payments can be made. Probably the present
negotiations will not cover the long term question of total balances at all, but
if this question does come up I am sure we should take the line that we admit
obligations even though we cannot make large payments at present.
1 No. 119.
222
Record of Interview between Lord Ismay and Mr Jinnah
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy’s Interview No. 1 68
24 July 1947, 5.15 pm
I started off by saying that I wanted to have a most serious and completely
frank talk. It was no exaggeration to say that, as a result of a series of recent
incidents, the Viceroy was almost in despair about the possibility of friendly
co-operation with Mr. Jinnah. However much he (the Viceroy) tried to meet
him and to help him, Mr. Jinnah always seemed to be in opposition. Over and
over again it was the same story.
First there was the eleventh hour announcement by Mr. Jinnah that he in¬
tended himself to assume the appointment of Governor-General, Pakistan.1
This had put the Viceroy in an extremely awkward position and, incidentally,
had lost Mr. Jinnah a lot of ground in England amongst all shades of political
opinion.
Secondly, the Viceroy had particularly asked Mr. Jinnah to restrain his Press
from chortling over the fact that Congress were to have a European Governor-
General, while Pakistan was to have one of its own nationals. Mr. Jinnah had
undertaken to do this,2 but the undertaking had not been fulfilled. Dawn had
done precisely what Lord Mountbatten had wished them not to do.
JULY 1947
323
Thirdly, there was the question of the flag.3 Mr. Jinnah was understood to
have given his provisional agreement to a Pakistan flag with the Union Jack in
the comer, but had subsequently said that he could not accept this.
Finally, Mr. Jinnah had now said that he could not fly the normal flag for a
Dominion Governor-General over his official Residence and that he could not
allow the Pakistan Navy to fly the White Ensign. These two refusals4 were the
unkindest cut of all, and the Viceroy (for reasons which I elaborated at some
length) felt them so deeply that he had drafted a telegram to the Prime Minister
saying that it seemed hopeless to try to co-operate with Mr. Jinnah and asking
for instructions. Lord Mountbatten had, however, decided on further reflection
not to send the telegram for the moment.
Mr. Jinnah listened patiently to all I had to say and then proceeded to deal
with each of my charges in turn.
As regards the first point, he protested that he had from the start dissented
from the idea of a joint Governor-General. He had always been sure — and he
was still sure — that it would not have worked. I intervened to remark that our
grievance was not so much the substance of Mr. Jinnah’s decision, but the fact
that he had waited until the eleventh hour to announce it. I reminded him that
Sir Eric Mieville and I had asked Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan in the very early days
of June to persuade Mr. Jinnah to nominate the Governor-General of Pakistan
as soon as possible, and that if he had only said frankly and finally at that time
that he proposed to be Governor-General himself, a great deal of misunder¬
standing and trouble would have been saved. Mr. Jinnah kept on reiterating
that he had never given the Viceroy the slightest grounds for believing that he
would agree to a common Governor-General and there seemed to be no object
in pursuing the argument.
Mr. Jinnah then turned to the question of the Muslim League Press. He said
that he had kept his undertaking and that the Muslim Press had done no chort¬
ling until the Congress Press had attacked Mr. Jinnah for having, in the first place,
agreed to a common Governor-General and of subsequently having broken his
word. This was an intolerable and untrue accusation which had to be countered.
I observed that I had been away in London and had not seen the articles in ques¬
tion. I was not, therefore, in a position to continue the argument.
We then got on to the question of the Viceroy’s original design for the
Pakistan flag with the Union Jack in the corner. Mr. Jinnah admitted that, when
this was first shown to him, he was inclined to see no objection to it, but added
that when he discussed it with his colleagues they had at once pointed out that it
would be impossible to have the cross and crescent on the same flag. All the
1 See Vol. XI, No. 506, paras. 21-34.
2 No reference to Lord Mountbatten’s request or Mr Jinnah’s undertaking on this matter has been traced.
3 For the issue of the Pakistan national flag, together with the flags mentioned in the immediately
succeeding paragraph, see Nos. 82, 112, item 2 and 162, paras. 25-29.
4 cf. No. 228, para. 28.
324
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
old hatreds and rivalries would be revived. I said that the Viceroy appreciated
this difficulty, but that he could not understand Mr. Jinnah’s objection to
flying the Dominion flag over his Residence. At this point Mr. Jinnah seemed to
be less sure of himself. He started off by dragging in the irrelevant observation
that it was a mistake for the King to continue to sign himself “George R.I.”
after the 15 th August. His Majesty would no longer be Emperor of India and if
he were to continue to subscribe himself as such it would be resented. His next
line of argument was that surely he was entitled to fly any flag he liked over his
own personal Residence? I said that the residence was, in a sense, not a personal
one. It was the residence of the King’s representative and it seemed only right
that the King’s emblem should be flown.
Mr. Jinnah then went off into a long yarn about the constitutional position
of Eire. He said that India and Pakistan would have the same constitution as
Eire, i.e. unlike the other Dominions they would be able to secede without an
act of the British Parliament. He was therefore in favour of the Eire model.
I said that I was not aware that the secession of Canada or Australia would
have to be done by act of the British Parliament. But in any case I was not
concerned with constitutions but with the practical applications thereof. Did
Mr. Jinnah really wish the relations between Pakistan and the U.K. to be the
same as those which now obtained between Eire and the U.K.? We did not
help Eire with officers, or supply them with the latest equipment; nor did we
admit them to our Staff Colleges. In fact, they enjoyed none of the benefits of a
Dominion. Mr. Jinnah, on the other hand, appeared to be anxious to have a
very large number of British officers and officials to help him and was insistent
that he wished Pakistan to be at once and always a member of the British
Commonwealth.
Mr. Jinnah then switched to another line. He said that he had acquired the
reputation of having complete authority over his people merely because he
always studied their views and wishes and faithfully expressed them. He was
obviously gratified when I intervened to say that this was all that Mr. Churchill
had claimed to do for the British people in 1940. He went on to say that
although he personally would not object to flying the Dominion flag he had a
feeling that his people might resent it. It would be a thousand pities if it were to
be flown in the first instance, and subsequently had to be changed as the result
of agitation in the Pakistan Parliament.
I said that I entirely disagreed. If Mr. Jinnah were to start off by flying his own
flag instead of the Dominion flag, public opinion at home would attribute this
lack of the customary friendly courtesies to Mr. Jinnah himself. Whereas, if he
were to start off by flying the Dominion flag, and it was subsequently changed
owing to pressure from his Parliament, public opinion in England would not
take it nearly so badly.
JULY 1947
325
Mr. Jinnah said that he would have another talk with his colleagues on this
point and would let me know the result.
Finally, we got on to the question of the White Ensign. To my great surprise,
Mr. Jinnah said that he thought there must have been some misunderstanding.
He was quite determined that the Pakistan Navy should fly the White Ensign,
which was an emblem of comradeship between all the Dominion Navies. I
said “Thank God”: and we left it at that.
Considering the somewhat embarrassing character of our talk, the at¬
mosphere throughout our meeting was most cordial.
As Mr. Jinnah was leaving the house, he stopped, put his hand on my
shoulder and said with great sincerity; “I beg you to assure the Viceroy that I
am his friend and yours for now and always. I beg that he should judge me by
deeds and not by words.”
ISMAY
25.vii. 47
223
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to the Earl oj Listowel
Telegram , Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Pakistan and India , Plan of Action in event oj clashes in
neighbourhood of boundaries between the two Dominions
most immediate new Delhi, 24 July 1947, 3-45 pm
confidential Received: 24 July , 2.03 pm
No. 291 5-S. I am happy to inform you that I have secured the agreement of the
Partition Council to publication of statement in my immediately succeeding
telegram1 which will be released at 19.00 hours, 1ST tonight. Please inform
Prime Minister.
1 No. 224.
326
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
224
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl oj Listowel
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Pakistan and India, Plan of Action in event of clashes in
neighbourhood of boundaries between the two Dominions
MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 24 July 1Q47, 4. 00 pm
en clair Received: 24 July, 3.30 pm
No. 2916-S. Press Note: At their meeting1 at 5 P.M. on Tuesday July 22nd,
1947, the members of the Partition Council (which included Sardar Baldev
Singh for this item) decided to issue the attached statement. Those present were :
In the Chair — His Excellency the Viceroy; for the future Government of
India — the Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and the Hon’ble Dr Rajendra
Prasad; for the future Government of Pakistan — Mr Jinnah and the Hon’ble
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan; and on behalf of the Sikhs — the Hon’ble Sardar Baldev
Singh.
2. Statement by the Partition Council. Begins: Now that the decision to set
up two independent Dominions from the 15th August has been finally taken,
the Members of the Partition Council, on behalf of the future Governments,
declare that they are determined to establish peaceful conditions in which the
processes of partition may be completed and the many urgent tasks of admini¬
stration and economic reconstruction taken in hand.
Both the Congress and the Muslim League have given assurances of fair and
equitable treatment to the minorities after the transfer of power. The two future
Governments re-affirm these assurances. It is their intention to safeguard the
legitimate interests of all citizens irrespective of religion, caste or sex. In the
exercise of their normal civic rights all citizens will be regarded as equal and
both the Governments will assure to all people within their territories the
exercise of liberties such as freedom of speech, the right to form associations,
the right to worship in their own way and the protection of their language and
culture.
Both the Governments further undertake that there shall be no discrimi¬
nation against those who, before August 15th, may have been political oppo¬
nents.
The guarantee of protection which both Governments give to the citizens
of their respective countries implies that in no circumstances will violence be
tolerated in any form in either territory. The two Governments wish to em¬
phasise that they are united in this determination.
To safeguard the peace in the Punjab during the period of change-over to the
new conditions, both Governments have together agreed on the setting up of a
JULY 1947
327
special military Command from the 1st August covering the civil districts of
Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Lahore, Amritsar,
Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Jullundur, Ferozepore and Ludhiana. With their
concurrence Major-General T. W. Rees has been nominated as Military
Commander for this purpose and Brigadier Digamber Singh Brar (India) and
Colonel Ayub Khan (Pakistan) have been attached to him in an advisory
capacity. After August 15th, Major-General Rees will control operationally the
forces of both new States in this area and will be responsible through the
Supreme Commander and the Joint Defence Council to the two Govern¬
ments.
The two Governments will not hesitate to set up a similar organisation in
Bengal should they consider it necessary.
Both Governments have pledged themselves to accept the awards of the
Boundary Commissions, whatever these may be. The Boundary Commissions
are already in session; if they are to discharge their duties satisfactorily, it is
essential that they should not be hampered by public speeches or writings
threatening boycott or direct action, or otherwise interfering with their work.
Both Governments will take appropriate steps to secure this end; and, as soon as
the awards are announced, both Governments will enforce them impartially
and at once. Ends.2
1 No. 205, Case No. P.C. 81/8/47.
2 In tel. 292 i-S of 24 July to Mr Joyce, Mr Campbell Johnson explained that the full text of this statement
was not approved until the morning of the same day and thus it had not been possible to give more
advance notice of release. Campbell Johnson added: ‘I am playing it very hard here both as a “charter
of liberty” and as evidence of the two Governments’ firm intention to ensure peaceful outcome of
the boundary commission’s decision. All support your end will be gratefully appreciated.’ Joyce
replied in tel. 9591 of 24 July as follows: ‘We have issued Partition Council’s statement fully to press
but it was received a little late to mobilise editorial comment for tomorrow. We will do our best
however to follow it up.’ Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Pakistan and India,
Plan of Action in event of clashes in neighbourhood of boundaries between the two Dominions.
225
The Earl ofListowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram, LjP &JI7/12596: jf 12-14
IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 24 July 1Q47, 6.00 pm
PRIVATE
No. 92. Your telegram No. 1980-S of July 16. 1
This question of honours for Governors-General is not at all simple. You will
realise better than anyone else how important it is to safeguard the position of
the King. It is an accepted practice that before any approach is made, however
1 No. 125.
328
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
informal, to a candidate for an honour, the King’s formal authority is sought
beforehand. The reason for this is clear. If an approach has been made without
the King’s prior authority and the King, when the matter is put to him, sees
some objection, then the King’s position is one of great difficulty. Either he
must give way or else it is obvious to the candidate where the objection has
arisen. The King’s position is thus exposed which should never happen.
2. I realise that the position in India at the moment is almost without pre¬
cedent, but this makes it all the more important that matters connected with
honours should be dealt with, if possible, on established lines. Certainly the
position of the Prime Minister of Pakistan may not be quite similar in the
immediate future to that of the Prime Minister of a Dominion, but in all
straight forward cases it is the practice to ascertain before any approach is made
to a Governor-General that no objection is raised by the Prime Minister of the
Dominion concerned.
3. I have set these matters out in some detail because Jinnah’s conduct over
the question of the Governor-Generalship during the interim period has
hardly been such as to call for favourable recognition from the King. If he
establishes in Pakistan a regime of autocratic rule by the Governor-General
dissimilar to that in other parts of the British Commonwealth, as he apparently
shows some signs of doing, it might be undesirable to have made him a Privy
Counsellor. As I think you know, the King regards a Privy Counsellorship as
one of the highest honours he can bestow; at the moment it so happens that of
the Commonwealth Governors-General only the Governor-General of South
Africa is a Privy Counsellor. I am glad, therefore, that you have not mentioned
this possibility to Jinnah and you should not do so. Furthermore, if Jinnah is
given such a distinction, embarrassment might arise over the award of a similar
distinction to the Governor-General of India who succeeds you.
4. I think it best to let all these honours matters rest for the time being. They
can be reconsidered subsequently if in fact there is any development on the
lines of paragraph 2 of your telegram and if in the meantime all has gone
reasonably well in Pakistan.
5. This telegram has been seen and approved by the Prime Minister person¬
ally. It is the Prime Minister of course who submits any recommendations for
appointment to the Privy Council of the United Kingdom.
JULY I947
329
226
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram, L/P&J/ 10/117: jf 142-4
immediate india office, 24 July 1^47, 7. oo pm
Received: 24 July , 8.30 pm
No. 9551. My telegram No. 9156 of July 16th.1
The following questions have been put down for answer on Monday, 28th
July: —
1. To ask the Under Secretary of State for India, whether it is intended that
the freedom given to the Boundary Commission to take into account other
factors than contiguous majority areas shall enable the commission to have
regard only to the special circumstances of the Sikh community in the
Punjab ; or whether the location of the religious shrines of other communities
will also be a factor to be taken into account by the commission.
2. To ask the Under Secretary of State for India, whether it is intended that
the freedom of the Boundary Commission to take into account other factors
than contiguous majority areas is to provide for minor local variations only, or
whether substantial inroads into majority areas are contemplated, in order to
unite minority shrines with their own majority populations.
It is proposed that Henderson should reply to them together in these terms : —
‘“The terms of reference of the Boundary Commission instruct it to
demarcate the boundaries in question on the basis of ascertaining contiguous
majority areas of Moslems and non-Moslems, but state that in doing so the
Commission will also take into account other factors. As I emphasised in my
speech2 in Committee on Clause 3 of the Indian Independence Act, it is
entirely for the Commission itself to decide what these other factors are and
how much importance should be attached to all or any of them.”
If further asked how the above reply accords with his statement on July 14th
about Sikh shrines in the Punjab, Henderson would reply:
“My reference to Sikh shrines was by way of illustration only, and was not
intended to give a specific meaning to the words ‘other factors’, as I went on
to state that the decision as to what the other factors were was entirely a
matter for the Commission.”
If pressed as to why Sikh shrines were singled out for mention, he would reply
that the location of shrines of other communities might equally receive con¬
sideration if the Boundary Commission so decided.
Your concurrence in or suggestions on the above is requested by Sunday
night.
1 No. 144.
2 Pari. Debs. 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 440, 14 July 1947, col. 74.
330
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
227
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl ofListowel
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary of State
PRIVATE AND TOP SECRET 2$ July 1947
Dear Listowel,
Thank you so much for your long letter of the 1 8th July,1 which I read with
much interest.
2. I am sorry to hear that the Burmese leaders during their recent visit to
the U.K. made it perfectly clear that there was no possibility of their changing
their minds about leaving the Commonwealth. In the circumstances I fully
appreciate that there is no possibility of rushing legislation through in the same
way as has been done in the Indian Independence Bill, as it is obvious that there
would be no chance of the Opposition co-operating on such terms.
3. But I am still worried whether at some future date we shall not find the
Union of India wishing also to leave the Commonwealth — after all their
vowed intent is still a sovereign independent republic — and I hope this matter
is receiving consideration at home. In an earlier letter2 I suggested the pos¬
sibility, to which Ranee had also referred, of some looser form of association
within the British Commonwealth, and I am putting the staff out here on to
thinking about this and trying to find out the way in which more prominent
Indians are thinking. I have been wondering whether some form of common
citizenship, as was proposed for France and England in the summer of 1940,
might be a possible solution and I shall be grateful for any thought on this
matter from you at home.
4. In speaking of Burma I need hardly say how distressed and shocked I was
to hear of Aung-San’s death.3 In my opinion, he was far and away the out¬
standing man of that group and I had hoped that he would occupy an out¬
standing position in Burma for many years to come. I do not think any of the
others are up to his standard, and, although no one is irreplaceable, I fear that
affairs in Burma will be much more unsettled now that he is dead. I suppose
there is no chance of persuading the new Government to give Dominion
status a trial.
5. I am sorry the announcement4 about the partition of the Armed Forces
took you by surprise. Had there been time I would certainly have kept you
informed, but it was a delicate matter securing agreement on so complicated a
subject. Not only the political parties but also the Commander-in-Chief had
to be carefully handled. With the valuable help of Ismay and Trivedi I managed
to secure an agreement, and it was essential that once the negotiations were
JULY I947
331
completed the formal decision of the Partition Council should be recorded and
the announcement made. This was one of the biggest hurdles we have jumped
since I came out here, and had I known I should have to jump it so soon I
would have let you know, though clearly it was for the Partition Council to
make the decision.
6. Jinnah has offered East Bengal to Killearn,1 * * 4 5 who with Lady Killearn has
been staying with us. They are now on a visit to Dacca to see if they can find
adequate accommodation, and I think the final answer will probably depend
on that, for they have a family of small children and there are practically no
modern sized houses in that one-horse town.
7. I was very sorry that Slim decided not to accept the appointment of
Commander-in-Chief, India; I have had a very nice letter6 from him and I
fully see his point of view. I understand that he felt he had been away from
India too long, that he did not know the new Government or the new set-up
and that he felt he would not fit in. I know him so well that I am sure there is
nothing anti-Indian about him but that this is a perfectly straightforward
honest opinion. Fortunately in Lockhart we have a most capable substitute.
8. I fully appreciate all that you say about Krishna Menon. I was aware that
he is “persona non grata” in many circles at home, and I would not say that he
was popular or entirely trusted here. But he has been the very greatest help to
me in the past difficult four months. Fortunately I made his acquaintance some
years ago in England when he was very much an outcast because of his left-wing
views and activities. He has never forgotten this and I have found him a valuable
contact between Nehru (whose complete confidence he has) and myself, and
through him I have been able to be particularly well informed about the trend
of Congress thought and opinion. I need not stress how useful this has been to
me since I came out. In fact with V. P. Menon and his close contact with
Vallabhbhai Patel I have been able to know all that has been going on in both
“camps” in the Congress Party.
9. With reference to the postcripts in your letter I am passing on to Nehru
Menon’s message about his meeting with the Opposition.
10. The official telegram about the cruiser must have crossed your letter, as
it was despatched by Defence Department on the 14th July, telegram No. 2457.7
I am afraid as regards personnel it will not give the Admiralty all the details they
1 No. 166. 2 Vol. XI, No. 368, para. 6.
3 Aung-San and six other members of the Burma Executive Council were assassinated on 19 July.
The Times, 21 July 1947.
4 See Vol. XI, No. 506, para. 2.
5 See No. 29, note 1.
6 Not traced. 7 L/WS/1/1006: f 16.
332
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
require. But at least it will let them know officially that India once again wishes
to acquire the Achilles.
11. Thank you so much for the confidential information you gave me about
Smuts and the Indian position in South Africa. This is not a matter which I have
so far discussed personally with Nehru, though it has often come up in Cabinet.
I will try and draw him out at some convenient opportunity, as I do not think
this unsatisfactory state of affairs should be allowed to continue within the
Commonwealth.
12. I am so glad to hear of Jagjivan Ram’s programme at home and I am
most grateful for all that was done to him on his initial visit to England. I am
so glad that he survived the crash in the desert as he is a cheerful little man and
I should have been sorry if he had been killed. I have not yet had full
details of the crash, but I gather that through dust storms they were unable
to land either at Basra or Shaiba and had to do a belly-landing in the desert.
I think they were exceedingly lucky that they were not all killed.
13. I am certainly attracted to the idea of having someone on my staff, even
for a short period, who is conversed in Dominion procedure and I shall be most
grateful if you will go ahead with this. I think the earlier he can come out here
the better and I think he will be a help not only to me but to the members of the
Government.
[Paras. 14-16, on food situation and Indian Medical Service officers, omitted.]
17. I have been reading Hansard both for the Commons and the Lords
during the past week and I am filled with admiration at the way the Bill went
through both Houses. If it is not out of place I should like to congratulate you
and the members of the Government concerned heartily on this achievement.
It is obvious that a very great deal of work must have been put in behind the
scenes to smooth the passage of the Bill and to prevent the Opposition from
raising controversial points, and I can assure you that I am most grateful to you
for all that has been done. I need not say how high the British Government’s
stock stands out here at present for their honesty and good faith, and the smooth
and swift passage of the Bill has been the greatest help to me personally in my
relations with the Indian leaders. If you see fit I should be very glad if you
would pass my warmest thanks to all concerned.8
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
8 Lord Listowel circulated this paragraph to the India and Burma Committee under reference I.B. (47)151
of 1 August. L/P &J/10/124: f 16.
JULY I947
333
228
Viceroy s Personal Report No. 14
L/POI6li2j: ff 196-203
TOP SECRET 23 July 1947
PERSONAL
Work still continues here at high pressure. In addition to the usual thrice-
weekly meetings of the Partition Council, I visited Lahore on Sunday the
20th July. I have also been carrying out some intensive preliminary work in
connection with the meeting with States representatives.
2. The referendum in the Frontier Province resulted in an overwhelming
vote for joining Pakistan,1 which was inevitable in view of the boycott carried
out by the Congress Party. The actual figures were: —
Valid votes for Pakistan
Vahd votes for Hindustan
Majority
Percentage of valid votes to
electorate entitled to vote was
50.99%.
Valid votes cast in last election
were
Total electorate entitled to
vote in referendum was
572,798; therefore votes for
Pakistan were 50.49%.
— 289,244
— 2,874
—286,370
—375,989
3 . It is particularly satisfactory that over 50% of the total electorate voted for
joining Pakistan (and the total votes cast were only 15% less than last time
without a boycott), as that disposes of any possible argument on the Congress
side that, in spite of the boycott, the Province was not really in favour of
joining Pakistan.
4. Before I visited the N.W.F.P. at the end of April2 1 was assured by Nehru3
and by other Congress leaders that any form of election or even referendum
would be a gross injustice, since the last election had proved conclusively that
the Frontier was solidly against Pakistan. My argument was that the vote
against Pakistan was really a vote for a united India, and that once India was to
be partitioned they had to be given a fresh chance of deciding which of the
two new States they would join.
See No. 187.
1
2 See Vol. X, No. 27 6, paras. 7-19.
3 Ibid., No. 167.
334
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
5. My visit to the N.W.F.P. confirmed me in the view that they would join
Pakistan. I am therefore particularly glad that I insisted on the referendum in
spite of the strongest possible opposition up to the morning of the 3rd June from
Congress. They also prophesied that there would be the most frightful rioting
and bloodshed if I insisted on the referendum. It is therefore all the more satis¬
factory to record the absence of any really serious disturbance during the ten
days which the referendum occupied.
6. I visited Lahore on Sunday 20th July and had a meeting4 with the
Punjab Partition Committee when I discussed the points I referred to in para¬
graph 3 of my Personal Report No. 13. 5 It was agreed that the Government of
East Punjab should, in any case, move all unessential personnel to Simla on
10th August, though it now appears there may not be adequate room for them
all in Simla.
7. It was further agreed that, if the decision of the Boundary Commission
places Lahore in the West Punjab, the remnants of the East Punjab Government
should leave Lahore by midnight I4th/i5th August; and that, if Lahore was
placed in East Punjab, the Government of West Punjab should leave Lahore
by midnight I4th/i5th August — and that detailed plans should be made for
this contingency beforehand.
8. It was agreed that the posting of officers should continue on the basis of
the notional partition except in the case of Deputy Commissioners and Super¬
intendents of Police in the districts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Lahore.
9. In these three districts, which are the most disputed areas, there happen
now to be British Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police. It was
agreed that these should remain in control until the 15th August, but that
each side should be entitled to nominate personnel ready to take over from
them, and that there would be no objection to these personnel being attached
to the districts in advance of the 15th August, though without any executive
authority. On the 15th August the British officials, and on or before that date
the personnel of the Government not 6 entitled by the award to assume control,
will be withdrawn.
10. I am glad to be able to report that all the members of the Punjab Parti¬
tion Committee, and particularly the Sikh member, Sardar Swaran Singh,
declared that their parties would accept and abide by the decision of the
Boundary Commission, in spite of threats in the press by both Muslims and
Sikhs that they would fight rather than accept an “unfair” award.
11. I told them that the Central Partition Council had decided to issue a
statement reassuring minorities and warning against disturbances. I am glad
to be able to report that the members of the Punjab Partition Committee
JULY I947
335
agreed to issue a similar statement, signed both by themselves and by as many
of the influential leaders in the Province as possible.
12. I also discussed with the Punjab Partition Committee the question of
military measures which might have to be taken in the Punjab along the
boundary line before the Boundary Commission’s award was announced. In
conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief, the Army Commander and the
Punjab Partition Committee, it was decided that special military measures
should be taken in twelve of the fourteen disputed districts.
13. All these points which I discussed at Lahore were put to the Partition
Council in Delhi on Tuesday, 22nd July,7 and they approved unanimously
the proposals which had been made, and were delighted at the solution of the
Punjab deadlock.
14. I referred in paragraph 7 of my Personal Report No. 13 to the joint
statement giving full assurances to minorities and former political opponents in
both Dominions; I am glad to say that I had this agreed to8 by both parties and
Baldev Singh and it was issued to the press on the 24th July. I attach a copy for
reference as Appendix I.9
15. On the 19th July I received a delegation from the Kalat State to discuss
the return of the leased areas together with the Member and Secretary of the
Pakistan States Department.10 The Kalat State’s representatives claimed that
they were an independent sovereign State in treaty relations with the British
Government. The Pakistan States Department readily agreed to this view since,
in their opinion, the successor authorities in India would inherit any treaty
obligations with foreign States on behalf of India, whereas of course the Indian
Independence Bill renounces all treaties entered into with Indian States. The
matter has now been referred for legal opinion, and it looks as though if the
Khan of Kalat insists on his independent status it will cost him the leased
territories including Quetta — a high price to pay for vanity. Finally I instructed
the Kalat representatives to request the Khan to come and see me and Jinnah
in person so as to settle all outstanding details together, and he arrives to¬
morrow.
16. I have had a preliminary meeting11 this week with Sir C. P. Ramaswami
Aiyer who has been bombarding me with telegrams and issuing statements12
4 cf. No. 191, Item 2 and its note 1.
5 No. 162. 6 Emphasis in original.
7 See No. 205, Case Nos. P.C. 74/8/47 and 80/8/47.
8 See ibid, Case No. P.C. 81/8/47.
9 Not printed; for the statement as issued, see No. 224.
ro See No. 174.
11 No record of this meeting has been traced but cf. No. 185.
12 See eg No. 146.
336
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
to the press during the last month about the independence of Travancore after
the 15th August. At my meeting with him on the 22nd July he started off by
presenting his own case through the medium of a series of files. The first of
these contained a number of rather amusing cartoons, to which he took the
greatest exception, and in particular one published that morning showing him
being spanked by me at this very meeting ! The next contained a number of
rude cuttings about himself. I advised him to follow the example of Lord
Balfour and not to read the newspapers if he is going to let himself get upset
in this way. The next file contained cuttings to prove that Gandhi was a danger¬
ous sex maniac who could not keep his hands off young girls. He considered
him to be the most dangerous influence in India, and said that if he insisted on
backing the unstable Nehru against the realistic Patel he would break up the
Congress Party within two years. Sir C. P. said that he was not prepared to
ally himself with such an unreliable Dominion.
17. By the end of an hour, Sir C. P. had worked off his emotional upset. He
claimed that the statements which he himself had made were devised for the
consumption of the people of Travancore itself, who were the highest educated
in India. He declared that Travancore would never accede to the Dominion of
India: he had indeed already made preliminary terms with Mr. Jinnah, in¬
cluding a trade agreement.13 I pointed out to Sir C. P. that there could be no
objection on the part of the Dominion of India to a trade agreement between
Travancore and Pakistan. I went on to say that the States had never con¬
trolled their own foreign affairs and defence ; and to emphasise the advantages of
accession on these two subjects and on communications.
18. Finally, after I had worked on him for more than two hours he came
round as far as to say that he might consider a treaty with India. I felt that we
had made some progress and let him go and sent V. P. Menon to work on
him. Then next day he came back and I informed him. that Patel would not be
prepared to accept a treaty; Travancore could either accede to the Dominion
or stay right out. I said that Dalmia had that morning paid 5 lakhs of rupees
into the Travancore Congress Party funds in anticipation of starting internal
trouble after the 15th August, and that I was confident that there was more to
follow. I pointed out that his only escape from internal trouble lay in accession
before the 15th August. He then said this was indeed a serious matter and asked
me to write a letter14 to his Maharajah putting my proposals before him, so
that he could take His Highness’ pleasure. As I gather the Maharajah is com¬
pletely under Sir C. P.’s thumb I cannot but feel that this advice has at least left
the door open for Sir C. P. to come in at the last possible moment, provided
he finds that I have been able to get every other State into line.
19. Before leaving, he asked me what the position of Travancore would be
if India decided to leave the Commonwealth. He asked me if the Maharajah
JULY 1947
337
would have the right then to secede from India and whether His Majesty’s
Government would then allow him to remain within the Commonwealth.
I told him I was unable to give him any official opinion, but I thought that it
would not be difficult to disentangle himself from India if he had only joined
on the basis of the three central subjects; and that whereas His Majesty’s
Government would never have agreed to allowing the Maharajah to enter
separately on a Dominion basis as they did not wish to Balkanise India, I
thought he would have a somewhat different case in demanding not to be
thrown out once he was in. I re-emphasised, however, that I could give him
no assurance beyond pointing out that if he did not accede he would never get
into the Commonwealth, whereas if he was once in there might be some pros¬
pect that he would be allowed to stay in; and that if all the other States shared
his view there would be a good chance that India would not wish to leave the
Commonwealth in any case.
20. The Hyderabad delegation is back,15 and although Sir Walter Monckton
had done noble work in bringing the Nizam up to the point of saying that he
would accept a treaty with India on the three central subjects, I told them that
this would not be good enough, and that the Nizam must accede. Mean¬
while the Nizam had written to Jinnah behind Monckton’s back saying that he
would not take any step without Jinnah’s concurrence. The delegation went to
see Jinnah who fortunately behaved in his most megalomaniac manner, which
put everybody’s back up. He said that he could not agree to the Nizam joining
India even if he inserted a clause that his forces must never be used to fight
Pakistan, for, he said, “I require Hyderabad as an active ally and not as a
neutral in any such war”.
21. Monckton and I have now agreed together on a co-ordinated plan of
campaign to bring the Nizam in, and I have offered to fly down if Monckton
feels that he requires my help to pull it off.16 As a last resort I shall offer to
make his second son “His Highness”,17 which I believe would carry a great
deal of weight with him; and now that paramountcy is about to be relin¬
quished, this would not create any awkward precedents for us.
22. If we can get Hyderabad and Travancore in I think that nearly all other
States will accede. If they refuse there are quite a number of other States (such as
13 cf. No. 192, para. 4. 14 No. 203.
15 No record of a meeting between Lord Mountbattcn and the Hyderabad delegation during the week
covered in this report has been traced but cf. No. 240.
16 The question of Hyderabad was discussed at the Viceroy’s Sixty Second Staff Meeting (Item 2) on
23 July when Lord Ismay reported that he had been informed by Sir Walter Monckton that the
Nizam had declared that he would not accede to the Indian Dominion until he knew more about the
future prospects, eg whether there was a likelihood of trouble between Pakistan and India and whether
it was probable that India would remain within the Commonwealth. Lord Mountbatten seated that
he would interview Monckton after the Staff Meeting. No record of this interview has been traced.
17 See No. 1 1 .
338
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Mysore, Bhopal and Dholpur) who may stand out. I am working hard on the
representatives of these three States and believe we shall either get them all in
together or have a considerable number standing out.
23. I should like to say here in parenthesis that in my talks with the Rulers I
have been surprised by the great store they set not only by retaining their
existing honorary military ranks and British decorations and being allowed
to remain honorary As.D.C. to the King, but even greater anxiety that they
should not be cut off from future consideration as A.D.C. to the King or from
receiving British decorations for themselves or their subjects who distinguish
themselves. To my equally great surprise Sardar Patel the Member in charge
of the States Department, when I raised this aspect with him, said that so far
as the future Government of India were concerned they were only too delighted
that those States who acceded to the Dominion should remain in courtesy
relations with the Crown and be allowed to accept British decorations, ranks
and honours. I am sure that this news of the attitude of the future Govern¬
ment of India will be very welcome to His Majesty and to the Cabinet, and it
gives me an added lever to bring the States into line before the 15th August.
24. When one thinks that a month ago Congress were insisting that States
should join the Constituent Assembly and wished them to join a Constitution
which would give them large financial control within the States, I must say
that the offer which is now being made is a tremendous advance for the States.
It boils down to this — “accession before the 15th August to the Dominion of
India for Defence, External Affairs and Communications without any inter¬
ference in internal autonomy or jurisdiction or any financial implications”.
25. I have not yet got Patel to agree to all these terms and even if I get his
agreement, he has yet to fight them through the Congress Working Com¬
mittee. But I am positive that if I can bring in a basket-full of States before the
15th August, Congress will pay whatever price I insist on for the basket. As
Monckton put it — “You are selling something you haven’t got, but I shall
certainly recommend My Exalted Highness to buy it”. I need hardly say that
unless we can pull this off, India will be in a bit of a mess after the 15 th August.
26. As far as Pakistan is concerned Jinnah says he will offer States Treaties
of accession along the same lines, but insists on dealing with each State
separately.18 As he only has the States of Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, Chitral,
Dir, Swat and Khaipur who wish to join him and possibly Kashmir, this is
reasonable. But as India would have to deal with some 550 other States we
cannot possibly start separate negotiations, and I attach as Appendix II19 a
copy of the instrument of accession, which V. P. Menon has drafted, which I
am putting before the full meeting of Rulers and States’ representatives at the
inaugural meeting in the Chamber of Princes this afternoon.
JULY I947
339
27. Liaquat Ali Khan tells me that the situation between the Pakistan and
India officials has become so tense that he does not know how much longer
they can continue working together. Since the reconstitution of the Govern¬
ment, the Secretaries of Pakistan Departments have been turned out of their
offices and told to work among the clerks, so that in some cases they have had
to move tables and chairs out and are working under the shade of trees.
Liaquat was kind enough to admit — “I was one of the strongest opponents of
rushing partition through by the 15th August, as I did not think it could be
done, but I now wish to God you could get partition through by the 1st
August”.
28. I got both Jinnah and Nehru to agree that their Navies would fly the
white ensign at the ensign stafl and the Dominion Flag at the jackstaff, and that
the Governors-General would fly the regular Dominion Governor Generafs
Flag, with the King’s crest and the name of the Dominion. When I showed
Jinnah the design of his new flag he announced that he had changed his mind
and he intended to design his own flag with his own monogram on it, and he
regretted that he could not allow his ships to fly the white ensign. Fie was
only saved from being struck by the arrival of the other members of the
Partition Council at this moment. Plowever, I sent Ismay round to beat him up
as soon as possible, and Jinnah claimed that I must have misunderstood him as
of course he was keen that the Pakistan Navy should fly the white ensign, and
talked glibly about the “brotherhood of the seas”.20 He also said that he would
reconsider whether he would have the King’s crest or Inis own monogram !
29. My wife came with me to Lahore, and while I was in conference in the
morning she visited hospitals and the Punjab Public Health School. Some
severe riot casualties were brought into the hospital whilst she was there. In
the afternoon she accompanied me round the riot areas. On the following day
my wife flew to Sialkot to visit the Northern Red Cross Home for Disabled
ex-Servicemen, where she was satisfied to see the care that is being provided
for these men.
30. From press accounts one might imagine a quarter or even half Lahore
was burnt. Although the damage is bad enough the actual figures are 5% of
walled city destroyed and I believe about 1% of the whole of Lahore.21
M. OF B.
18 cf. No. 139.
19 Not printed. For the final version of the Instrument of Accession, see Enclosure i to No. 313.
20 cf. No. 222.
21 In his letter of 29 July to Sir G. Abell, forwarding a copy of a report he had written on the Lahore
disturbances in 1947, Mr J. C. W. Eustace, the Deputy Commissioner at Lahore, explained that
Lord Mountbatten had, during his recent visit to that city, asked for certain information to meet
criticism about the failure of the British administration in Lahore. Eustace also commented that lie
was ‘a bit shaken to find how surprised Lord Louis was to see so much of Lahore standing’. For tiie
letter and report, which bears the same date and contains detailed statistics on the scale of the dis¬
turbances, see R/3/1/91: fi 77-83.
340
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
229
Mr Jitinah to Sir E. Mievilie
Rl3lilt65:f30
10 AURANGZEB ROAD, NEW DELHI, July I947
Dear Sir Eric Mievilie,
I am in receipt of your letter of 20th July, 19471 and I thank you for it.
I have carefully considered the matter and I regret to say that it is not possible
for me to meet Abdul Ghaffar Khan and discuss an agreement on the basis
reported to you by the Governor of the N.W.F.P. I am sure you will see that
all these matters can only be dealt with by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan
who will frame the constitution for the Pakistan Federation. It is obvious that I
cannot negotiate with any section or party over the head of the Constituent
Assembly. Besides, I have no power to commit the Constituent Assembly in
advance or anticipate their final decisons.2
Yours sincerely,
M. A. JINNAH
1 No. 183.
2 Lord Mountbatten conveyed the gist of this reply to Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart in tel. 293 8
of 25 July. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: North-West Frontier Province,
Situation in, Part II.
230
Master Tara Singh to Mr Attlee1
LIP&JI7I12465: f 75
NO. E/lOI SHIROMANI AKALI DAL, HEAD OFFICE, AMRITSAR,
25 July 1947
Dear Sir,
The Shiromani Akali Dal, the only Sikh political organisation is sending a Sikh
Deputation with Principal Ganga Singh as its leader to London to place before
you the urgent case of our community. We fear that the notional division of the
Punjab will cut our community into two and thus threaten our existence and
may lead to very grave consequences. We want to avoid it if possible; with this
idea this deputation is coming to your country. I sincerely hope that you will
JULY I947
341
give them some time to explain our case to you and help them in every possible
way.
Thanking you in anticipation.
I beg to remain,
Yours sincerely,
TARA SINGH
1 Master Tara Singh wrote a similar letter to Lord Listowel. On 6 August the Sikh Deputation forwarded
these letters of introduction to Mr Attlee and Lord Listowel and also wrote separately to each of them
asking them ‘to find some time before the Boundary Commission gives its award to hear the rep¬
resentatives of six million of Sikhs who flocked around Britain’s banner as one man in the last great
wars’. The deputation had, in fact, already seen Sir Paul Patrick, an Assistant Under-Secretary of
State at the India Office, on 1 August. Patrick’s note of this interview, together with a copy of ‘The
Sikh Memorandum to the Punjab Boundary Commission’ and a copy of a brief Statement of the Sikh
case which the deputation left with him, may be found on L/P &J/7/12465 : ff 81, 86. Attlee sub¬
sequently declined to receive the delegation. Listowel offered to meet members of the delegation in
order to make their acquaintance but made it clear in so doing that he would not be able to say
anything about the Boundary Commission. See ibid, f 46 and No. 397.
231
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary of State
PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, 2 5 fuly 1947
Dear Mountbatten,
Thank you for your personal report No. 13 1 which, as usual, I have read with
the greatest possible interest.
2. We were delighted last night to get your telegrams 2195-S and 2196-S2
and you are indeed to be congratulated on securing the agreement of the
Partition Council to this important statement. It is to be hoped that it will have a
calming effect throughout all the areas affected by partition and will help to
discourage any large-scale migration of Muslims to Pakistan and Hindus to the
territories of the future dominion of India ; it has been disturbing to learn from
Indians I have met in this country recently that such migration will be the
natural tendency. It is also encouraging to learn from your latest personal
report that Radcliffe has formed a favourable impression of the members of
the Bengal and Punjab Boundary Commissions.
3. I sincerely hope that the absence of any information to the contrary can
be taken as meaning that your solution of the problem of the Interim Govern¬
ment during the period that remains to August 15th is working out satisfactorily
in practice.
[Para. 4, on the Indian Art Exhibition, omitted.]
1 No. 162. 2 Nos. 223 and 224.
342
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
5. I was also very glad to hear that all the leaders have so warmly welcomed
the suggestion that Ismay and some of your staff officers should remain on with
you during the transition period. As you say, Ismay may prove of the greatest
help as a link between you and Jinnah.
6. I think we can regard the arrangements you have come to with the leaders
about flags as satisfactory. It is clearly desirable to avoid pushing them so far in
the direction of accepting the “externals” of dominion status that they will
forfeit the confidence and support of their followers.
7. Since I last wrote there have been the tragic events in Rangoon.3 Aung
San is, of course, a tremendous loss both to Burma and to us since we had put
our confidence entirely in the will and ability of A.F.P.F.L. to take over power
from us and exercise it worthily. At the same time it is indeed fortunate that
Thakin Nu who, though not perhaps of quite the same calibre as Aung San,
is undoubtedly a man of fine character and a potential leader, should have been
spared and should so recently have visited this country and made the acquain¬
tance of Ministers. It is, of course, disquieting that any degree of suspicion
should attach to British officers over the theft of arms and ammunition from
the Base Ordinance Depots and regrettable, though not altogether surprising,
that this suspicion should have helped to engender some degree of anti-British
feeling. I have considerable confidence, however, that Ranee and Thakin Nu
between them will succeed in keeping the ship level and on its course.
8. A member of my staff has been shown confidentially by a member of the
American Embassy the instructions issued by the State Department to the U.S.
Ambassador at Delhi about the attitude that he and American officials should
observe towards the Indian States. The State Department have indicated that
they do not wish any formal dealings to occur between American representa¬
tives and the governments of Indian States while the negotiations for the
inclusion of the States in one or other of the two Dominions are continuing.
They recognise that at some later time it may be necessary for the U.S. Govern¬
ment to determine its attitude towards any States which remain outside the two
Dominions but they attach importance to their remaining uncommitted so
long as there is any prospect of the States who have asserted claims to in¬
dependence entering into political arrangements with one or other Dominion.
This is very satisfactory. There are indications, however, that the attitude of the
French Government, particularly in regard to Hyderabad,4 may not be quite
so sound but the Foreign Office are taking such steps as they can to prevent the
French going off the rails.
[Para. 9, on the B.B.C’s plans for their programme dealing with the transfer
of power in India, omitted.]
JULY 1947
343
10. I telegraphed to the Finance Department of the Government of India on
the 19th July, No. 9306, 5 asking that the Central and Provincial Governments
should be invited to reconsider their attitude on the question of applying the
Pensions (Increase) Act, 1947 to Indian pensioners in the U.K. I hope you will
take any opportunity that offers itself for influencing the Indian leaders to
change their minds on this matter. The question has already aroused consider¬
able interest in this country, both inside and outside Parliament, and I fear that
the refusal of the Indian leaders to extend the benefits of the 1947 Act to their
pensioners in this country may afford an opportunity to throw doubts on the
sincerity of the undertaking of the new Governments to maintain existing
conditions of service.
[Para, n, on the Empire Forestry Conference, omitted.]
12. In my last letter6 I also mentioned (paragraph 11) that the promised
official telegram7 from the Defence Department about the cruiser for India
(Hindustan) had not yet been received. I am afraid I owe you an apology for
this as the telegram had, in fact, been received on the 15th July but I had not
seen a copy. This matter will, of course, now be pressed forward.
13. In conclusion, I might mention that on Friday last, after acting as a
Royal Commissioner for the purpose of the King’s Assent to the Indian Inde¬
pendence Bill, I attended a very successful inaugural luncheon of the newly
formed association of Indian Journalists in London. It was altogether a very
successful affair and the Association, which should be of the greatest assistance
to us in the future, could not have had a more auspicious inauguration. This
was largely due to your message, which I read to the gathering.
14. I have now arranged a luncheon for Krishna Menon on 5th August, to
which prominent figures in all three Parties in the Lords and Commons have
been invited. Menon would be reassured to know that you have mentioned this
to Nehru, and that it has his approval.
Yours sincerely,
LISTOWEL
3 See No. 227, note 3. 4 See No. 176. 5 Not printed. 6 No. 166.
7 L/WS/1/1006: f 16.
344
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
232
Cabinet
India and Burma Committee. Paper 1.8.(47)146
L/P&Sli3li843:ff 106-8
Hyderabad
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA
SECRET INDIA OFFICE, 25 July 1Q47
I circulate, for the information of the Committee, a letter dated 9th July1 from
the Nizam to the Viceroy, in which the Nizam: —
(a) protests against our unilateral repudiation without consultation of our
Treaties with Hyderabad in Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act;
(b) expresses the hope that a link between Hyderabad and the British Crown
is still possible;
(c) declares his intention to negotiate with the new Dominions practical
arrangements covering Hyderabad’s relations with them for a transition
period ;
(d) asks that his letter be placed before His Majesty’s Government and
reserves his right to publish it.
2. On nth July the Viceroy, with the assistance of officials, met a Delegation
from Hyderabad led by the Prime Minister of the State, the Nawab of Chhatari,
and including Sir W. Monckton.2 At this meeting: —
(i) The Viceroy explained that, although Hyderabad is a country the size
of France with a population bigger than that of any existing Dominion,
it was surrounded by British Indian territory and His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment could not undertake the defence commitment which acceptance
of Hyderabad as a separate Dominion might involve. Hyderabad could
remain part of the Commonwealth only by adherence to one of the new
Dominions. The Hyderabad Delegation replied that Hyderabad had
affinities with Pakistan as well as with the Union of India and would
have difficulty in compromising its independent sovereignty. If it had
to join one of the new Dominions it might prefer Pakistan. The State
would be in a difficult position in the event of disputes between Pakistan
and India and would favour arrangements for the peaceful settlement of
such disputes and for joint defence.
(ii) The Viceroy explained that the Union of India are ready to accept the
adherence of States even if this is confined to defence, external affairs
and communications, and that, if Hyderabad accepted this offer, her
JULY I947
345
representatives in the Dominion Legislature would give her a voice in
the future of that Dominion. The Viceroy suggested that it might help
Hyderabad if the Nizam sent him a letter,3 not for publication, making
any necessary reservations to his adherence to the Union of India, such
as that Hyderabad would remain neutral in the event of hostilities
between Pakistan and India, and that she would have the right of
secession.
(iii) On Berar (which cannot legally continue to be administered as part of
British India after 15th August without a new agreement between
Hyderabad and the Union of India), the Hyderabad Delegation said that
the Nizam would agree to a temporary stand-still arrangement, pro¬
vided that this was regarded as a transition to the transfer of Berar
to Hyderabad administration. The Nizam would agree to give Berar a
free and responsible Government with a Governor appointed by him.
The Viceroy replied that Congress would ask for a referendum if the
proposal for the transfer of administration was pressed. He suggested a
standstill arrangement of indefinite duration, liable to denunciation by
either side at 12 months’ notice.
(iv) On Secunderabad, agreement was reached on the retrocession of the
Cantonment Area, and on the principle that Indian troops would be
withdrawn as soon as possible, but that withdrawal could not be com¬
pleted by 15th August.
3 . The Hyderabad Delegation have returned to Hyderabad for consultation
with the Nizam and are due back at Delhi for further discussions with the
Viceroy on 24th July,4 preliminary to the Conference between Sardar Patel5
and representatives of all States on 25th July.
4. The Viceroy considers that he was able to bring the Hyderabad Delegation
much further along the road to agreement than anybody could possibly
have hoped, and that if he can once get Hyderabad to stop talking of complete
independence, this would set an example which no other State, not even
Travancore, could resist.6
5. I have also received a proposal from the Viceroy, to which The King has
been pleased to agree, that, in the event of Hyderabad adhering to the Union
1 No. 33. 1 2 See No. 61.
3 The correspondence on file in the Mountbatten Papers indicates that the Nizam of Hyderabad did not
write to Lord Mountbatten again until 8 August. See No. 376.
* See Nos. 228, paras. 20-21 and 240.
5 It had in fact been decided that Lord Mountbatten would meet representatives of the States separately
and that Sardar Patel would not be present at the conference: see Nos. 37, Item 2, and 217, para. 2.
6 See No. 65, para. 32.
346
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
of India, the title of “His Highness” should be given to the second son of the
Nizam. Lord Mountbatten understands that this may have a real influence on
the Nizam’s decision.7
L.
7 See No. n and its note 4.
233
Mr Weightman to the Earl of Listowel ( Extract )
L/P &JI7I1 2 5° 5 '■ ff 6-9
ALTNAHARRA HOTEL, LAIRG, SUTHERLAND, 25 July 1947
Dear Lord Listowel,
Thank you very much for your letter of the 21st July1 and for your kindness in
explaining the issues involved in this matter of the offer of Baluchistan.
I know Jinnah fairly well and I know Baluchistan and its people intimately.
I know too that these people have little regard for Jinnah and the League and
that they would look on me as an old friend whom they would expect to
“protect” them from Jinnah and his henchmen. I dare say it would be easy
enough to steer a middle course but it would be vastly unpleasant and the
possibility of a really bad misunderstanding would be always present.
That however is not the main difficulty. If I had to serve in India I would
frankly prefer to serve Nehru rather than Jinnah. And I have no belief in the
working possibility of two Indias. Nehru knows this for I have talked and
written to him often on the subject, and he knows too that I have other plans
in mind. I offered to go back this month to help him — so far as I could — for a
few months on the understanding that I should be free to take up a new career
in the early winter. His reply was that as things were turning out with the
projected partition, he did not feel justified in asking me to delay my embarking
on a new course, and he has written me three very friendly letters in this vein
recently. I feel that he would regard my acceptance of a post in Pakistan as a
crude piece of chicanery and, unimportant as that may be in the larger
issues which H.E. the Viceroy visualises, it would quite certainly offset any
advantage that there might be in my accepting Jinnah’s offer.
I am much disturbed at the suggestion that my refusal of Jinnah’s offer, which
of course coincides with my personal interests, may not be in the general in¬
terest. But I have given this question a good deal of thought for some months
JULY I947
347
past — since for various reasons I had half-anticipated the offer — and I genuinely
believe I should do more harm than good by accepting.
★ ★ ★
Yours sincerely,
HUGH WEIGHTMAN
1 In his letter of 21 July Lord Listowel asked whether, in the light of Lord Mountbatten’s representations
(cf. No. 158), Mr Weightman would be prepared to reconsider his earlier decision to decline
Mr Jinnah’s offer of the post of Governor of Baluchistan. Listowel explained that he understood from
Mountbatten that Jinnah might be dissuaded from his original decision to appoint a member of the
Muslim League if Weightman were to accept. He added that Mountbatten was impressed by the
importance of taking advantage of every vacancy for Governorships offered to the British and that he
(Mountbatten) considered that the prospects of the two new Dominions remaining in the Common¬
wealth may partly depend on this. L/P &J/7/12505 : f 11.
234
Press Communique of an Address by Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of
Burma to a Conference of the Rulers and representatives of Indian States 1
Rfal1 lJ39: ff 4~7
25 July 1947
A Conference of the Rulers and representatives of Indian States was held at
3.30 p.m. in the Chamber of Princes on Friday, the 25th July, 1947, His
Excellency the Viceroy presiding.
Addressing the Conference, H.E. the Viceroy said: —
Your Highnesses and Gentlemen,
It is a great pleasure and a great privilege for me to address so many Rulers,
Dewans and representatives of the States of India in this historic Chamber of
Princes. It is my first and my last occasion that I have the privilege of addressing
you as Crown representative.
I would like to begin with by giving you a very brief history of the negoti¬
ations I have conducted since I have been out here and the line that I have
taken up about the States.
There were two distinct problems that faced me. The first was how to trans¬
fer power to British India and the second, how to fit the Indian States into the
picture in a manner which would be fair and just to all concerned.
I dealt first with the problem of British India, because you will realise that
until that problem was solved it was quite useless to try to start on a solution
of the problem of the States. So I addressed my mind to that.
Here I digress. There was a universal acceptance among the States of the
1 On 23 July Mr V. P. Menon forwarded to Sir G. Abell a draft of a speech, which had been seen by
Mr Griffin of the Political Department, for Lord Mountbatten’s use at the conference. Mountbatten
Papers, Papers of Special Interest.
348
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum of May 122 and when the parties accepted
my Statement of June 3rd3 they fully reahsed that withdrawal of Paramountcy
would enable the States to regain complete sovereignty. That gave me a start¬
ing point from which to try and deal fairly with the States.
But before I got down to dealing with the States there was one other thing
that I clearly had to do. I had to address myself to the problem of the mechanics
of partition — a plan against my personal desires. As you all know, it took three
years to separate Burma from India, in spite of the fact (as I can testify, as also
His Highness of Bundi and others) that there are no roads running between
India and Burma. Nevertheless, it took three years to arrange that partition. It
took two years to separate the Province of Sind from Bombay. It took
two years to separate the Province of Orissa from Bihar. Gentlemen, we
decided that in less than 2^ months we shall have to go through the partitioning
of one of the biggest countries in the world with 400 million inhabitants.
There was a reason for the speed. I was quite cerrtain that while the British
overlordship remained no satisfactory conclusions could be reached psycho¬
logically between the parties. So once we got the two Governments set up
and separated, they would be able to try and finish off the details in an
atmosphere of goodwill.
Now, the Indian Independence Act releases the States from all their obliga¬
tions to the Crown.4 The States have complete freedon — technically and
legally they are independent. Presently I will discuss the degree of independence
which we ourselves feel is best in the interests of your own States. But there
has grown up during the period of British administration, owing to the fact
that the Crown Representative and the Viceroy are one and the same person, a
system of co-ordinated administration on all matters of common concern
which meant that the sub-continent of India acted as an economic entity. That
link is now to be broken. If nothing can be put in its place, only chaos can result,
and that chaos, I submit, will hurt the States first — the bigger the State the
less the hurt and the longer it will take to feel it — but even the biggest of the
States will feel herself hurt just the same as any small State. The first step was to
set up some machinery by which it was possible to put the two future Govern¬
ments of India — the Dominion of India and Pakistan — into direct touch with
the States. So we conceived the scheme of setting up two States Departments5
within the future Governments. Please note that these States Departments are
not the successors of the Political Department. They have been set up simul¬
taneously and side by side. While the Political Department exercised functions
relating to paramountcy on behalf of the Crown Representative, the States
Departments are to take over those subjects gradually which have nothing to
do with paramountcy but which will be concerned with relations with neigh¬
bouring States and also provide the machinery to negotiate in such matters.
In India the States Department is under the admirable guidance of Sardar
JULY I947
349
Vallabhbbai Patel with my own Reforms Commissioner, Mr. V. P. Menon as
Secretary. In Pakistan the Department is under Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar
with Mr. Ikramullah as the Secretary. It was necessary to set up two States
Departments, one in each Government because the States are theoretically
free to link their future with whichever Dominion they may care. But when I
say that they are at liberty to link up with either of the Dominions, may I
point out that there are certain geographical compulsions which cannot be
evaded. Out of something like 565 States, the vast majority are irretrievably
linked geographically with the Dominion of India. The problem therefore is
of far greater magnitude with the Dominion of India than it is with Pakistan.
In the case of Pakistan the States, although important are not so numerous,
and Mr. Jinnah the future Governor-General of Pakistan is prepared to nego¬
tiate the case of each State separately and individually.6 But in the case of India
where the overwhelming majority of the States are involved, clearly separate
negotiations with each State is out of the question.
The first step that I took was to suggest that in the Bill before Parliament —
the Indian Independence Act — a clause7 should be put in which would enable
certain essential agreements to continue until renounced by either side. That
was only done to ensure that there should be some continuity and to see if in
the short time available it was not possible to get the agreement through with
every State representative. It does not replace the need for Standstill agree¬
ments ; it gives a very slight breathing space.
Now, I think it is no exaggeration to say that most Rulers and Dewans were
apprehensive as to what their future would be when paramountcy lapsed. At
one time it appeared that unless they joined the Constituent Assembly and
accepted the Constitution when it was framed, they would be outside the
organisation and left in a position which, I submit, if you think it over carefully,
no State could view with equanimity — to be left out having no satisfactory
relations or contacts with either Dominion Government. You can imagine
how relieved I was, and I am sure you will yourselves have been equally
relieved, when Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel on taking over the States Department
made, if I may say so, a most statesmanlike statement8 of what he considered
were the essentials towards agreement between the States and the Dominion of
India.
Let us turn for one moment to the Cabinet Mission Plan of 16th May 1946.
In this Plan the proposal was that the States should surrender to the Central
Government three subjects — Defence, External Affairs and Communications.9
2 Vol. VII, No. 262. 3 Vol. XI, No. 45. 4 No. 164, Section 7(1) (b).
s See Vol. XI, Nos. 175 (pp 324-5), 338 (Case No. 152/32/47), 528 and Enclosure to No. 173 of this
volume.
6 cf. No. 159.
7 No. 164, Section 7(1). The clause in question begins ‘Provided that’ and ends ‘subsequent agreements’.
8 Vol. XI, No. 528. 9 See Vol. VII, No. 303, paras. 14 and 15.
350
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
That was a Plan which, to the best of my belief, every Ruler and every State
accepted as reasonable, fair and just. I talked with so many Rulers and everyone
felt that Defence was a matter that a State could not conduct for itself. I am
not talking of internal security but of defence against external aggression. I
submit, therefore, that if you do not link up with one or the other of the
Dominions, you will be cut off from any source of supplies of up-to-date arms
or weapons.
External affairs is inextricably linked up with Defence. External affairs is
something again which is outside the boundaries of India in which not even the
greatest State can operate effectively. You can hardly want to go to the
expense of having ambassadors or ministers or consuls in all these foreign
countries; surely you want to be able to use those of India and Pakistan. Once
more I suggest that External affairs is something that you have not dealt with
since the formation of the East India Company. It would be difficult to operate
and will also be a source of embarrassment for you to have to take it up and it
can only be managed by those who manage the Defence of the country. I
submit that if you take it up it will be a liability and not an asset.
The third subject is communications. Communications is really a means of
maintaining the life-blood of the whole sub-continent. I imagine everybody
agrees that the country has got to go on. The continuity of communications is
already provided for to a certain extent in the Indian Independence Act ; and most
of the representatives here have come to discuss it as item 2 on the agenda.10
Therefore I am sure you will agree that these three subjects have got to be
handled for you for your convenience and advantage by a larger organisation.
This seems so obvious that I was at a loss to understand why some Rulers were
reluctant to accept the position. One explanation probably was that some of you
were apprehensive that the Central Government would attempt to impose a
financial liability on the States or encroach in other ways on their sovereignty.
If I am right in thL assumption, at any rate so far as some Princes are concerned,
I think I must dispel their apprehensions and misgivings. The draft Instrument
of Accession11 which I have caused to be circulated as a basis for discussion and
not for publication to the representatives of the States provides that the States
accede to the appropriate Dominion on three subjects only without any
financial liability. Further, that Instrument contains an explicit provision that
in no other matters has the Central Government any authority to encroach on
the internal autonomy or the sovereignty of the States. This would, in my view,
be a tremendous achievement for the States. But I must make it clear that I have
still to persuade the Government of India to accept it. If all of you would
co-operate with me and are ready to accede, I am confident that I can succeed in
my efforts. Remember that the day of the transfer of power is very close at
hand and, if you are prepared to come, you must come before the 15 th August.
I have no doubt that this is in the best interests of the States, and every wise
Lord Mountbatten as Crown Representative addressing a Conference of Rulers and Representatives oj Indian States, 23 fuly ig4y. Document 234.
Mr Jinnah and Lord Mountbatten leaving the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, Karachi, 14 August, 1947. Document 489, para. 57.
JULY I947
351
Ruler and wise Government would desire to link up with the great Dominion
of India on a basis which leaves you great internal autonomy and which at the
same time gets rid of your worries and cares over External Affairs, Defence
and Communications.
The whole country is passing through a critical period. I am not asking any
States to make any intolerable sacrifice of either its internal autonomy or
independence. My scheme leaves you with all the practical independence that
you can possibly use and makes you free of all those subjects which you cannot
possibly manage on your own. You cannot run away from the Dominion
Government which is your neighbour any more than you can run away from
the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible. Whatever may be your
decision, I hope you feel that I have at least done my duty by the States.
His Excellency then proposed the following Committee for a detailed con¬
sideration of the items on the agenda : —
His Highness the Chancellor the Maharaja of Patiala
His Highness the Maharaja of Baroda
His Highness the Maharaja of Gwalior
His Highness the Nawab of Bhopal
His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner
His Highness the Maharaja of Nawanagar
His Highness the Maharawal of Dungarpur
His Highn ess the Maharaja of Panna
His Highness the Maharaja of Sirmoor
The Raja of Korea
The Nawab of Chhatari of Hyderabad
Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer of Travancore
Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar of Mysore
Sir V. T. Krishnamachari of Jaipur
Sir B. L. Mitter of Baroda
Mr. M. A. Srinivasan of Gwalior
Sardar K. M. Panikkar of Bikaner
Mr. C. S. Venkatachar of Jodhpur
Sardar D. K. Sen
Dewan Bahadur C. P. Karunakara Menon of Cochin
Rai Bahadur D. A. Surve of Kolhapur
Mr. B. H. Zaidi of Rampur.
His Excellency stated that the idea was to have a compact body to save time.
10 For the agenda which was used at the conference, see No. 75. A programme for the conference which
had been prepared by Mr V. P. Menon envisaged that Lord Mountbatten would deliver his opening
address and then say: ‘Now if any of you have any questions to ask about the first item on the Agenda,
I shall be glad to answer. The other items are somewhat technical, but I have made the question of
accession my own peculiar concern.’ Mountbatten Papers, Papers of Special Interest.
Not printed. For the final version of the Instrument of Accession, see Enclosure 1 to No. 313.
1 r
352
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
They could split into two sub-committees, one to discuss the draft instrument
of Accession and the other to discuss the Standstill agreements and other matters.
He sincerely trusted that the other State representatives would not leave Delhi
and that they would maintain daily contact with the members of the Com¬
mittee to make sure that the Committee are conversant with the majority
feelings in the States.
235
The Earl ofListoivel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , L/P &J/ 10/82: j 9
IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 23 July 1947, 12,30 ptll
confidential Received: 26 July, 9.00 am
No. 9616. Following personal from Prime Minister. Your telegrams Nos.
291 5-S and 2916-S.1 Congratulations. This is very good.
1 Nos. 223 and 224.
236
The Earl of Listoivel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , L/P &JI10/117: f 140
IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 25 July 1947, 1.00 pm
secret Received: 23 July, 8.33 pm
No. 9607. Since my telegram No. 9551 of 24 July1 issued, Henderson has seen
the M.P. concerned, whose questions are the result of an approach by Muslims
living in his constituency. The Member is agreeable to making his questions
non-oral on condition that some reference is made in reply to shrines of other
communities which puts them on the same footing as Sikh shrines. Please tele¬
graph your views on following proposed reply. Begins . The terms of reference
of the Punjab Boundary Commission instruct it to demarcate the boundaries
in question on the basis of ascertaining contiguous majority areas of Moslems
and non-Moslems; but state that in doing so, the Commission will also take
into account other factors.
I welcome this opportunity of expressing the full confidence entertained by
H.M.G. in the Chairman and Members of the Commission in the interpreting
of their terms of reference. As I emphasised in my speech in Committee on
Cl. 3 of the Indian Independence Bill it is entirely for the Commission itself to
JULY I947
353
decide what are the other factors to be taken into account and how much
importance should be attached to all or any of them. It would be improper to
fetter the discretion of the Commission which is now in session by expressing
views here as regards the interpretation of the terms, but it is obvious that the
location of the shrines of any religious community will be among the factors
before them. Fnds.2
1 No. 226.
2 Lord Mountbatten replied in tel. 2955-S of 26 July as follows: ‘Questions about Boundary Commission.
I consider oral question and answers given in your telegram No. 9551 would be best’. R/3/1/157: f 234.
In the event, however, these questions received a written reply along the lines suggested in No. 226
(ie ‘The terms of reference ... to all or any of them’) with a concluding sentence which read: ‘The
location of the shrines of any community is therefore one of the factors which may receive consideration
if the Boundary Commission so decides.’ Pari. Debs. 5th ser., H. of C. vol. 441, 30 July 1947, col. 60.
237
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Mr Attlee
Mountbatten Papers. Demi-Official Correspondence
Files: Attlee , C. R.
25 July 1947
My dear Prime Minister,
Thank you so much for your very charming and encouraging letter1 which
Pug brought out.
I cannot get over the masterly way in which you managed to get the Bill
through in such record time and two days better than your promise. It saved
a complete breakdown over the reconstruction of my Government.
The fact that you and the Cabinet and the King were so unanimous in your
advice2 to me to stay on made this difficult decision easy.
I am now in the midst of trying to get 560 odd States to accede to the
Dominion before the 15th August. My meeting3 in the Chamber of Princes'
went well and my spies tell me we had unexpectedly good results.
Thank you for your kind remarks about Philip’s engagement. I am sure she
couldn’t have picked a better man.
Yours ever,
DICKIE
1 No. 153.
2 See Nos. 27 and 31.
3 See No, 234.
354
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
238
Record of an Interview between Sir E. Jenkins [Punjab) and Sardar Swaran Singh
Rfrl 1/176:/ 255
25 July 1947
I sent for Sardar Swaran Singh this evening and asked what was happening
about the Nankana Sahib Diwan on 27th July.1 'He was distinctly evasive, and
said that it was not an officially sanctioned meeting. He did not believe that
there would be a very large attendance, and he personally saw no harm in a
meeting of this kind in a Gurdwara.
I replied that a large gathering of Sikhs from villages would in the present
state of communal feeling be dangerous. There might easily be clashes between
the Sikhs going to or returning from the meeting and the Muslims through
whose villages they passed. The danger would be greater if the Sikhs marched
about in Jathas, as I understood they intended to do. I said that we had taken
elaborate precautions and that S. Swaran Singh had better tell the leaders of his
party to discourage the meeting. I pointed out that the Sikhs could not go back
on Sardar Baldev Singh’s statement as a member of the Partition Council that
the Boundary Commission’s award would be accepted, whatever it might be,
and would be enforced.
We had further desultory discussion on the boundary issue. Sardar Swaran
Singh is still most anxious to get the whole err a part of the Montgomery
district and Nankana Sahib, and says that the main hope of the Sikhs is an
exchange of land and population. I said that I had never thought that there
could be much deviation from the “notional” boundary. If the Sikhs had made
no extravagant claims and had simply stated their case for the transfer to the
East of some colony land, they might possibly have secured some sympathy
from the Boundary Commission ; as it was, I thought they must dismiss from
their minds any idea of large territorial gains. I made it clear that the Boundary
Commission had nothing whatever to do with me, and that it was not my
business to advise the members or to make any recommendations whatever.
2. We discussed two other matters on which I have made separate notes.2
E.M.J.
1 Sec No. 214.
2 No record of these notes has been traced.
JULY I947
355
239
The Nawab of Bhopal to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
R/3i 1 1 139: ff 8-9
SECRET QASR-I-SULTANI, BHOPAL, 26 July 1947
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I have just read in the newspapers that a Committee has been formed to discuss
terms of Accession and Standstill arrangements, and my name has been included
as one of the Committee.1
I have already explained to Your Excellency my point of view in regard to
these matters.2 My State is one of those, like Hyderabad, who is not prepared
to accept federation of any sort at this juncture. We are prepared to come
to an agreement which Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar discussed with you at his
last meeting with Your Excellency.3 1 am also one of those who will be prepared
to come to some workable and equitable standstill arrangement on the basis of
equality of status and reciprocity in regard to certain matters of common
concern such as Communications, supply of arms and equipment etc. on the
basis of existing arrangement, and in accordance with the provision of the
Independence Act4 and the Declaration of June the 3rd, 1947, 5 and May the
1 2th 1 946. 6
It is impossible for me to serve on a Committee with those States who have
already joined the Constituent Assembly. I have already given you my reasons
for this.7
I am, therefore, writing at once to request Your Excellency to arrange
separate negotiations for my State or, if this is found too inconvenient, to form
a separate Committee consisting of those States alone (such as Hyderabad,
Indore & Travancore) who have not yet joined the Constituent Assembly.
I hope Your Excellency will not find this request unreasonable and will help
us in this matter.
The recent cowardly attempt on Sir C. P.’s life8 makes the situation ex¬
tremely delicate and most difficult. Apart from the fact that we have been
deprived of the services of our chief adviser, for a temporary period at any
rate, I don’t think such acts of violence help in bringing about an under¬
standing between the Congress and the States.
I have written in great haste and without reference to any records. You will,
1 See No. 234. 2 See No. 201. 3 See No. 228, paras. 16-19.
4 See No. 164, Section 7(1). 5 Vol. XI, No. 45, para. 18. 6 Vol. VII, No. 262.
7 See No. 201.
8 Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar sustained facial injuries when an attempt was made on his life at
Trivandrum, the capital of Travancore, on 25 July, The Statesman, 26 and 28 July 1947.
356
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
therefore, I hope, overlook mistakes as far as references to any documents are
concerned.
Yours very sincerely,
HAMIDULLAH
240
Note by Ali Yawar Jung
Monckton Trustees No. 29: ff 384-88
camp, new Delhi, 26 July 1Q47
H.E. the Viceroy had, as has already been recorded in the proceedings of the
meeting at Viceroy’s House on nth July, promised a separate day for negotia¬
tions with Hyderabad.1 We naturally took it to mean that while we would on
that day give a reply to H.E. the Viceroy on the subject of accession, we would
also negotiate Stand-Still Agreements the same day. We got the impression,
however, on the 23rd that nothing had been fixed for the 24th because we had
made it clear in the meantime both to H.E. the Viceroy and to Mr. V. P.
Menon that accession was out of the question. They appear, therefore, to have
decided for reasons ostensibly of convenience, since the discussions could only
be on Stand-Still Agreements, to have them with Hyderabad along with the
other States. Since no intimation was received on the 24th morning, the Prime
Minister sent a letter to His Excellency the Viceroy, copy of which is attached.2
The immediate reaction was a telephone message from Sir George Abell to say
that the Prime Minister was being invited to the Conference of the 25 th and
that he would shortly get the relevant papers. The Prime Minister said over the
telephone that a separate discussion would be necessary and had been promised.
Sir George Abell said that he would convey this to H.E. the Viceroy. That same
afternoon while we were discussing what line to take, and had in fact decided
to press for separate discussion, Nawab Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, Prime
minister of Bahawalpur, visited Asoka House. He said that Congress pro¬
paganda both in the press and by word of mouth was aimed at the States which
had decided to stand out and that all kinds of things were being said about
Hyderabad in order to create the impression that Hyderabad would ultimately
accede and thus demoralize the other States (I had myself the previous night and
the same morning reported this to H.E.P.M. after certain contacts I made in
Delhi soon after I came). He said that if we did not go to the Conference and
did not raise awkward questions there, there would be a landslide in favour of
the States Department’s view. He also said that isolation in the matter of nego¬
tiations would endanger the position of Hyderabad and also result in letting
down the other States which were looking to Hyderabad for leadership.
JULY I947
357
The Delegation then decided, after full consideration, to send Mr Reddi,
Mr Rahim and myself as Representatives of Hyderabad to the Conference. It
was also decided to make Hyderabad’s attitude clear by a statement in the
Conference and to ask for negotiations separately from the States which had
decided to enter the Constituent Assembly.
Mr Reddi, Mr Rahim and I, therefore, went to the Conference and so did the
Prime Minister of Bahawalpur, as well as the Constitutional Adviser from
Junagadh who was going to follow the same line. I learnt soon after arrival
that no speeches would be allowed after the Viceroy’s speech but only questions
which the Viceroy himself would answer. I, therefore, suggested to Nawab
Mushtaq Ahmad that we might frame questions in such a way as to make our
attitude clear and also create doubt in the minds of States which had so far
been found to be in the pocket of the States Department. Here are the four
questions I put at different times after the Viceroy had finished his speech1 2 3 : —
(1) a Draft Stand-Still Formula had been sent to us and we had said that we
accepted it as a basis of discussion. Now, a second Draft, called a Revised
Draft (actually sponsored by Congress) had been circulated at the last moment.
Which one of them was now sponsored by the States Department for negotia¬
tions? The Viceroy’s reply was that the formula which we liked and had
accepted was the one sponsored by himself as the Crown Representative
(implying thereby that the States Department was sponsoring the revised
formula). The object of the question was to state that we preferred the first
formula and to elicit a reply which would show that the less favourable
formula emanated from the States Department. (2) The Negotiating Com¬
mittee appointed by the Viceroy consisted both of States which had joined the
Constituent Assembly and of States which had not joined it. We considered
that the approach of States which had joined would naturally be different
from the approach of States which had not joined it. Therefore, the two
should be allowed to negotiate separately, and not in one bunch. Would this
be possible as it appeared to be necessary? I said that Hyderabad had made its
line clear that it would not join the Constituent Assembly and it would,
therefore, negotiate only with those States which had similarly not joined the
Assembly. The reply given by the Viceroy was that there would be no diffi¬
culty about it and that it was a matter which could easily be adjusted by His
Highness the Chancellor. (The object of the question was to state our view¬
point as well as to stress the fact that we had made our attitude clear on the
subject of the Constituent Assembly; the question was also designed to state
our view that we would not negotiate along with those States which are re¬
presented in the Constituent Assembly.) (3) I said that even whilst negotiating
1 See No. 61, para, entitled ‘Standstill Agreements’.
2 Not printed. The Nawab of Chhatari’s letter is on R/3/1/138: 1 214.
3 No. 234.
358
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
only along with those States which had not joined the Constituent Assembly, I
could not conceive of negotiations with Hyderabad or any particular State not
ending up with separate, individual negotiations discussions [sic] of problems
peculiar to that State either on account of its size, population and resources or
any other reason. Was it contemplated that such separate, individual negotia¬
tions on individual problems would take place? The Viceroy replied that there
was nothing against it and if the need arose there would certainly be such
individual discussions. (The object of this question was to state that we ex¬
pected a separate discussion with Hyderabad individually on problems relating
to Hyderabad alone, like Postage, Currency and the like). (4) I said that the
Negotiating Committee proposed by the Viceroy consisted of States like
Bhopal and Travancore which had decided not to accede. I said that His
Excellency knew Hyderabad’s attitude on the subject of accession and it was
clear that we were not interested in discussing accession and were interested
only or mainly in discussing the Stand-Still Agreements. That being so why
have States like Hyderabad been represented on a Negotiating Committee
which had accession as the first subject on its agenda to discuss? The Viceroy
said that no one could compel any Member of the Negotiating Committee to
discuss a matter which he did not wish to discuss and the choice would be that
of the Member concerned. (This question was raised in order to remove all
doubts as to how we stood on the question of accession. It came as a surprise
to many as propaganda had gone round no doubt inspired to the effect that
Hyderabad had decided to join. The Maharaja of Dungarpur came afterwards
and asked me whether I was speaking authoritatively or not and I said I was. He
said he felt encouraged and wished Hyderabad good luck). Subsequently I
went with Mr Reddi and Mr Rahim to Bikanir House where a meeting was
taking place ot Princes and Representatives of States. This was by permission
of the Prime Minister and was necessary as I had to convey to the Chancellor
our decision that we would not discuss accession and also that we could not
negotiate along with those States which had decided to join the Constituent
Assembly. I duly conveyed this information to the Chancellor at the meeting
after which the three of us returned.
I may add that the Prime Minister did not attend either the Conference or
the meeting at Bikanir House as it was thought best that he should not identify
himself fully with either and that representatives of the State at both meetings
should be on the level of Ministers rather than of the Prime Minister himself.
ALI YAWAR JUNG
Constitutional Affairs Member
JULY 1947
359
241
The Nawab of Chhatari to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
R-tel1 1139: ff 11-12
CONFIDENTIAL PRIME MINISTER, HYDERABAD, CAMP:
NEW DELHI, 26 July 1947
Your Excellency,
I am writing to thank Your Excellency for my nomination, as Representative
of Hyderabad, on the Negotiating Committee1 proposed by Your Excellency
and announced at the Conference yesterday. On nth July Your Excellency
had kindly agreed to a separate discussion for Hyderabad2 but, if that causes any
inconvenience, Hyderabad would, as an alternative, like to negotiate its Stand-
Still Agreements along with those States which have not joined the Constituent
Assembly and separately from those which have joined it. This is because
ot our view that the approach of the latter States will be different from the
approach of States, like Hyderabad, which have not joined the Constituent
Assembly.3
In view of the above and also as the above Negotiating Committee has to
discuss the problem of accession — a matter in which Hyderabad is not interested
— I hope Your Excellency will not mind my not participating in the Com¬
mittee.
I need hardly assure Your Excellency that Hyderabad desires fully to assist
in the working out ot satisfactory Stand Still Agreements and, in general, to
cooperate with the rest of India in avoiding a breakdown of the administrative
machinery after August 15.4
Yours sincerely,
AHMAD SAID
1 See No. 234.
2 See No. 61, para, entitled ‘Standstill Agreements’.
3 cf. No. 240.
4 O11 28 July Sir G. Abell minuted on this letter: ‘I am afraid this means that there is now little chance
of getting in Hyderabad’, to which Lord Mountbattern rejoined: ‘Still a chance’. Mountbatten replied
to the Nawab of Chhatari on 29 July as follows: ‘I am very sorry to hear that at present you feel unable
to serve on the Negotiating Committee proposed by me at the Conference with the Rulers and
Representatives of the States on 25 July. I still hope you may be persuaded to change your mind.’
R/3/1/139: if 21, 23.
360
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
242
Mr V. P. Menon to Sir G. Abell
RI3I1I139: / 13
NO. D2586 STATES DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 26 July I947
My dear George,
Please refer to your demi-official letter No. 592/89 dated the 22nd July 19471
forwarding copy of a letter dated July 20, 1947, from His Highness the
Maharaja Rana of Dholpur.
2. The essence of the representation from His Highness is that with the lapse
of paramountcy he may enter into a treaty in respect of common matters with
the two Dominions but that he is not in favour of executing an Instrument
of Accession by which he would become an integral part of the Indian Union ;
and secondly, that a separate Negotiating Committee should be appointed of
Rulers holding this view.
3. There appears to be some confusion in the mind of His Highness. The
Conference that was convened on the 25th July2 was with a view to impressing
upon the Rulers the desirability and indeed the necessity of joining the
Dominion in the common interest of both, by means of an Instrument of
Accession, and secondly, to continue the existing administrative arrangements
by means of Standstill Agreements until they could be replaced by freshly
negotiated agreements. Immediate accession to the Dominion on the three
subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communications will not prejudice
the position of the States either in regard to their participation in the Con¬
stituent Assembly or their freedom to join or not to join the Union Constitu¬
tion that may eventually be adopted by that Assembly. Our plan merely pro¬
vides a basis on which common policies can be evolved in regard to these three
subjects for the interim period while the new Constitution is being framed by
the Constituent Assembly. That being so, there could be no question of setting
up two Committees based on the participation or non-participation of States
in the Constituent Assembly. In fact, the meeting of Rulers held on the 25th,
which was attended by H.H. of Dholpur, agreed to the setting up of a single
Negotiating Committee which will take into account the different circum¬
stances of the various States. It has been made clear that negotiation with the
Indian Dominion will be on the basis of accession in respect of the three subjects
inasmuch as the Dominion of India does not contemplate entering into separate
treaty relations with individual States.
4. We all regret that it has not been possible to give Rulers sufficient time to
consider these important issues. But it must be realised that the whole timetable
JULY I947
36l
is governed by the date fixed for the transfer of power. Still, most of the other
States have found sufficient time to consider the draft Instrumen t of Accession
and come to a decision on this important issue and it should not be difficult for
Dholpur to do so.
5. Griffin concurs in our above remarks.
Yours sincerely,
v. P. MENON
1 Asking Mr Menon to advise (in consultation with Mr Griffin) on the letter from the Maharaja of
Dholpur. R/ 3/1/138: ff 174-84, 185. Sir G. Abell had originally minuted to Lord Mountbatten:
‘Pol. Dept, will advise as to a reply’. Mountbatten had responded: ‘V.P.’ also to advise and perhaps
see him [the Maharaja]. URGENT. M.’ Ibid., f 174.
2 No. 234.
243
Cabinet
India and Burma Committee. Paper 13.(47)147
L/P &J 1 10/136 : ff 228-32
Ceremonies in India on 15TH August and Flags
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA
secret India office, 26 July 1^47
I attach an outline, in Appendix ‘A’, of the official ceremonies which it is
proposed to hold in Delhi on 15th August. It is expected that Mr. Jinnah will
hold similar ceremonies in Karachi, the capital of Pakistan.
2. The Viceroy has suggested1 that in these ceremonies there should be in¬
cluded a Message from the King, and a draft of such a Message is attached as
Appendix ‘B’.2
3. Foreign representatives in India are being invited to attend the Delhi
ceremonies and I have asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Rela¬
tions to suggest to the other Dominions that they may care to consider sending
representatives to the ceremonies and appropriate messages to the Viceroy.
Those Dominions already represented by a High Commissioner, i.e. Canada
and Australia, will probably regard his attendance as sufficient and it is unlikely
that South Africa will want to make any special gesture.
4. In Appendix ‘C’ are details of what is proposed regarding flags for the
new Dominions. Neither Mr. Nehru nor Mr. Jinnah will agree to a proposal
1 See tel. 1546-S of 24 June. L/P &J/10/138: f 222.
2 Not printed; see No. 261, note 4.
362
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
put to them by the Viceroy for the inclusion of a small Union Jack in the new
Dominions’ flags. Both, however, have agreed that the Union Jack should
be hoisted either on the same flagstaff as the Dominion flag or on a neighbouring
one on certain days in the year.3
5. It is intended that ceremonies in the Provinces will be on much the same
lines as those at Delhi and Karachi, Provincial Governors reading the King’s
Message. Similar ceremonies will, however, not take place at Residencies in
the Indian States where they exist.
6. The Union Jack over the old Lucknow Residency, which has never been
lowered by day or night, will be hauled down quite unostentatiously at sun¬
down on 14th August and sent home.
7. I recommend the above arrangements for the approval of the Committee,
particularly : —
(a) the draft Royal Message
(b) the proposals about Flags.
L.
Appendix ‘A’ to No. 243
OUTLINE OF OFFICIAL CEREMONIES TO BE HELD IN
DELHI ON I5TH AUGUST
A Proclamation will be made by the Governor-General, who will be accom¬
panied by Lady Mountbatten, to the assembled Constituent Assembly of the
Union of India. This will include a Message from His Majesty The King and
the proceedings will be broadcast.
There will be some form of ceremonial parade at which representatives of
the three Services will take part.
The Ceremony of substituting the new Dominion flag for the Union Jack
will be performed.
*N.B. The Office of Viceroy and Governor-General (old style) will terminate
at midnight on 14th August. It will be as Governor-General (new style)
that Lord Mountbatten will make the Proclamation.
Appendix ‘C’ to No. 243
FLAGS
Governors-General
The two Governors-General will, it is proposed, take into use the special
Governor-General’s flag which was approved by His Majesty for this purpose
some years ago and which is in general use by Governors-General throughout
the Commonwealth.
JULY 1947
363
2. This is a blue flag, with a crown and lion and the name of the Dominion
in gold. Instead, however, of the name of the Dominion being in blue on a
gold scroll, the names ‘ ‘India” and “Pakistan” will be in gold.
Dominions
(1 a ) India
3 . The Dominion of India flag will be the existing Congress flag but with
the wheel from the Samath pillar, in blue, symbolising unity, replacing the
spinning wheel in the centre of the flag. It is a tricolour, in horizontal lines, of
saffron, white and green.
(b) Pakistan
4. The Dominion of Pakistan flag will be the present Moslem League flag
which is dark green with, in white, a crescent and a five-pointed star.
Provincial Governors
5. The Viceroy has agreed with Mr. Nehru and Mr. Jinnah that they should
fly flags similar to those of the Governors-General but with the name of the
Province inserted instead of the Dominion.4 It has, however, had to be put to
the Viceroy that the Govemor-Generafs flag signifies the Governor-General’s
position as His Majesty’s personal representative in a sense that the Governor is
not and that its use by Governors would be an innovation.5
Dominion Navies
6. The custom of other Dominion navies will be followed of flying the
White Ensign of the Commonwealth at the ensign staff and the Dominion
flag at the jack staff.
3 See No. 162, paras. 25-9.
4 See tel. 203 5-S of 19 July. L/P &J/10/138 : f 204.
5 See tel. 9697 of 26 July. Ibid., f 188.
244
Mr V. P. Menon to Mr Symon
LIP&SI13I1837: f 27
STATES DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 26 July ig47
Dear Symon,
I understand that you are taking some Political Officers in your organisation.
I do very much hope that in this matter the sentiments of the Government of
of India will be respected. We will feel considerably embarassed if they are
either to use their influence or establish direct relations with any Indian State.
Yours sincerely,
v. p. MENON
364
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
245
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl o/Listowel
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Compensation
for Members of the Services , Part 11(b)
CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, 26 July 1947, — 1
Received: 26 July , 5.20 pm
No. 2957-S. Your telegram No. 9451 of 22nd July.2 Future of Judges.3 Parti¬
tion Council agreed this morning4 that maintenance of principle of indepen¬
dence of Judiciary was of paramount importance, and that right of propor¬
tionate pension should be granted in certain circumstances. I have therefore
sent the following telegram to all Governors :
Begins. Future of Judges. Hitherto the constitutional position has been that
judiciary is independent of the executive and this independence has rested
mainly on the fact that High Court Judges cannot be removed from office
save by His Majesty on report from the Privy Council in accordance with the
provisions of Section 220 (2) of Government of India Act 1935.
2. Terms and conditions of service have been guaranteed by both new
Governments.
3. Government of India and H.M .G. agree that so long as the constitutional
position remains as at present there is no case for the grant of proportionate
pension or compensation.
4. But since it is open to either Dominion Government to repeal Part 9 of
the Act or any portion of it and indeed to make the judiciary subject to the
executive if they think fit, the representatives of both future Dominion
Governments have agreed that existing permanent Judges in either Dominion,
whether of the Federal Court or of the Provincial Courts would be entitled
to rank for grant of proportionate pension if their constitutional position were
so altered as radically to affect the independence of the Judges.
5. Please ask your Chief Justice to inform all Judges urgently. Ends.
1 Time of despatch is not indicated on sender’s copy. Date and time of receipt have been taken from the
India Office register of inwards telegrams.
2 In tel. 9451 of 22 July Lord Listowel explained that ^o long as the judiciary remained independent of
the executive in accordance with the provisions of Section 220(2) of the Government of India Act,
1935, there was no case for the grant of proportionate pensions or compensation to High Court Judges.
He did, however, admit that under the new constitution it was open to either Dominion Government
to make the judiciary subject to the executive by repealing Part IX of the Act or any portion of it.
In these circumstances Listowel maintained that Judges would be eligible for the grant of proportionate
pensions. He therefore asked Lord Mountbatten to invite the Indian leaders to agree that, if such
a change were introduced, they would grant proportionate pensions at the expense of their revenues
to any Judge who wished to retire. L/S &G/7/920: f 2.
3 See No. 157, Minute 2.
4 Partition Council Minutes, 26 July 1947, Case No. P.C. 93/10/47. Mountbatten Papers.
JULY 1947
365
246
Mr Rumbold to Mr Williams
Telegram , L/P &J 1 10/92: f 8
important India office, 26 July 1947, 11. so pm
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 9701. Your telegram to Clauson No. i84i~G of July 9th.1 All matters
specified in memorandum enclosed with Secretary of State’s letter of May
19th2 have been or are being covered so far as question of making arrangements
before repeat before transfer of power is concerned, either by provisions of
Indian Independence Act or in separate correspondence, with either Viceroy
or U.K. High Commissioner.
1 No. 20. 2 See Ibid., note 2.
247
Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten
of Burma
Rteli/ifaff 14-17
SECRET AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI,
immediate 26 July 1Q47
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I have been following from a distance some of the proceedings of the Partition
Council. I have, in particular, seen some of the papers relating to the partition
of the Army and the future reorganisation of the Defence Forces. The approach
made by the Commander-in-Chief in regard to certain matters seems to me
very different from our approach.
On reading yesterday some correspondence1 which has passed between Mr
Rajagopalachari and the Commander-in-Chief regarding the Financial Adviser,
War and Supply, I was surprised to find that the Commander-in-Chief should
not have realised that there had been a reconstitution of the Government and
a splitting up of the Secretariat Departments. The Financial Adviser, War and
Supply, is ex officio an Additional Secretary of the Finance Department and the
post had therefore necessarily under this order to be divided into two. That
was the reason why we immediately recommended on the 19th the appoint¬
ment of a Financial Adviser (India). There was just the possibility, however, that
the Commander-in-Chief was unaware of the promulgation of the Executive
(Transitional Provisions) Order, but when I was shown the relevant minutes of
1 R/3/1/169: ff 7-12.
366
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee meeting held on Thursday the
24th July,2 I found that the Commander-in-Chief had ignored this order ap¬
parently because (a) he and his Financial Adviser, Mr Mohamad Ah’, had not
been consulted, and (b) he considers the whole arrangement to be unworkable !
I must express my surprise at what appears to me to be the rather extraordinary
conduct of Mr Mohamad Ali at this meeting. He could not have been unaware
of the correct position and yet by his silence he appears to have conveyed that
the Commander-in-Chief’s understanding of the position was correct. Judging
from these minutes, the Commander-in-Chief seems to be gravely perturbed
at the suggestion that anyone but Mr Mohamad Ali should be his Financial
Adviser.
May I say that we are gravely perturbed that the opinion and attitude of the
Commander-in-Chief in these matters are completely contrary to what we have
been given to understand. I think it should be made perfectly clear what the
present position is and what the future positionmay be. So far as the question of
a Financial Adviser for Military Finance is concerned, this inevitably must
follow the rule laid down about the division between India and Pakistan.
It would be absurd, in the circumstances, for any person who has opted for
Pakistan, and much more so for one who is the special advocate for Pakistan
in the partition proceedings, to be the Chief Adviser of the Commander-in-
Chief in regard to our forces. We cannot possibly admit this. A corollary of
the position which the Commander-in-Chief would like to have is that we
should agree to a joint Military Finance and Accounting Organisation under
Mr Mohamad Ali, if we accept him, or under a British officer. I need not go
further into the merits of this particular matter, since the Steering Committee,
I understand, is preparing a paper for consideration by the Partition Council on
this subject and the two points of view will be clearly brought out in that paper.
The only reason for my mentioning it here is to draw your attention to the
attitude the Commander-in-Chief is said to have displayed towards the
India point of view.
Apart from this particular matter, the general attitude of the Commander-
in-Chief and presumably his senior advisers does not seem to me to be in
keeping with the position as it has developed and as it is going to develop. If
that is so, we have to consider afresh how this should be clarified so as to avoid
future conflict of opinion on vital matters. The Dominion Government of India
will necessarily have definite opinions and a clear policy in regard to its armed
forces, and the officers serving in the army, the navy and the air force will have
to carry out that policy. The mere fact that the Supreme Commander will be
in administrative control for a limited period does not mean that he will during
that period be free to carry out administration in accordance with his own
ideas. What we have in mind is that he would endeavour so to run the adminis¬
tration during the joint period that the transition from the joint administration
JULY I947
367
to our own administration would be smooth and as nearly in accord as possible
with our own ideas regarding the future administration of the Forces. If this
is not clearly understood there is bound to be a conflict which should be
avoided in the interest of all concerned.
The whole set-up of the future Joint Defence Council will have to be re¬
considered, if necessary, if there is any doubt in regard to the position of the
India Government and its defence forces. In a way, the Supreme Commander
will have the casting vote and if his general outlook is completely different
from our own then clearly the Council will not function at all. This is a
matter of great importance.3
Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
2 Not traced.
3 In a further letter of 27 July Pandit Nehru drew Lord Mountbatten’s attention to the minutes of the
Commander-in-Chief’s Committee of 25 July (not traced) in which Mr Dundas was said to be
functioning as Secretary of the Defence Department (including Pakistan) and Mr Bhalja was described
as an Additional Secretary. Nehru insisted that with the splitting up of the Secretariat Departments
(see No. 170), Mr Bhalja was the Secretary of the Defence Department (India) and Mr Dundas had no
business to function as such. He concluded : ‘This is not merely a matter of designation but of outlook,
and I fear that if the outlook is as represented in these minutes, then the interests of India will suffer.’
R/3/1/169: ff 17-18.
248
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers , Official Correspondence Files:
Governors-General and Governors of Provinces , Appointment of—
Part (1)
IMPORTANT new Delhi, 26 July 1947 , 10. 50 pm
confidential Received: 27 fuly, 7.35pm
No. 2963-S. Please pass following to Cunningham.1 Begins. Jinnah has asked
me to let you know how glad he is that you have agreed to serve as Governor
of the Frontier Province and to send you a personal message of welcome. He
is delighted to have secured for the Governorship of this most important
Province such a distinguished person as you who, he is sure, will serve Pakistan
will all your heart and loyalty to the State. Ends.2
1 See Nos. 31, notes 6 and 7, and 180, notes 1 and 2.
2 Sir G. Cunningham replied on 2 August as follows: ‘Thank you very much for your kind message. I
feel greatly honoured by being asked to serve Pakistan and the North West Frontier Province.’ On
5 August Mr Jinnah sent a further telegram as follows: ‘I shall be very pleased indeed if Sir George and
Lady Cunningham will stay the night [11/12 August] with me at Karachi.’ Mountbatten Papers,
Official Correspondence Files : Governors-General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of —
Part (3).
368
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
249
Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Rfal1 194: f 41
17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 2J July I947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
You will remember that soon after your arrival in India as Viceroy I discussed
Kashmir with you.1 It was my intention then to visit Kashmir. But on your
telling me that you would go there yourself, I decided to postpone my visit.
Your visit to Kashmir2 was from my particular point of view not a success and
things continued as before. Indeed there was considerable disppointment at the
lack of results of your visit.
2. My desire to visit Kashmir remained and indeed I felt it my particular
duty to go there.3 But in view of various other happenings following one
another I continued to postpone my visit. I feel now that I must go there very
soon if I have to go at all. I know very well that the work in Delhi is important
and urgent and it is not easy for me to leave it. But Kashmir has become a
first priority for me.
3 . I have decided, therefore, to go to Kashmir about the 4th of August and
to stay there four or five days. I shall fix up my programme more definitely
in a day or two. I shall go, of course, as a private individual and not as a member
of Government. My chief object in going there will be to meet my many
friends and colleagues and more specially the common folk who have suffered
so much owing to the disastrous policy followed by the State authorities for
over a year. If it is possible for me, I shall meet Sheikh Mohamad Abdullah
who is in prison. I shall endeavour to come back by the 10th of August.
Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
1 No record of such a discussion has been traced but cf. Vol. XI, Nos. 69, para. 3, 70, Item 2 and 369,
para. 29.
2 See ibid., Nos. 294, 319, para. 5 and 369, para. 30.
3 See correspondence ending with Nos. 129 and 149.
JULY 1947
369
250
Viceroy s Conference Paper V.C.P. 140
Mountbatten Papers
SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 2J July ig47
THE POSSIBILITY OF DISTURBANCES IN THE PUNJAB
Attached is a note containing a paraphrased version of a report rendered by the
Director of Intelligence. Copies of this note (less this cover sheet) will be handed
round at the Partition Council Meeting on Tuesday 29th July, if approved at
the Viceroy’s Meeting at 10 a.m. on Monday 28th July, 1947.
V. F. ERSKINE CRUM
Conference Secretary
THE POSSIBILITY OF DISTURBANCES IN THE PUNJAB
NOTE BY THE VICEROY’S STAFF
1. Information has been received from a reliable source to the effect that,
if Nankana Sahib (which is about 12 miles north of Lahore) is not included,
by the award of the Boundary Commission, in East Punjab, the Sikhs intend
to start trouble on a big scale.
2. It is reported that the Sikhs intend to act on or about 7th August; and
that during the ten days before this date large meetings will be held to work
up agitation. As is already known, the Sikhs have collected large quantities of
arms.
3. It is also reported that the Muslims are fully aware of the preparations
which the Sikhs are making; and are, in fact, making counter-preparations
themselves.
4. Both sides are attempting to subvert troops in the areas concerned. These
attempts are said not to have been wholly unsuccessful; promises of assistance
from some troops have been received.
370
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
251
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Transfer of Power , Ceremonies For , Part 1(2)
express new Delhi, 27 July 1947 , 2.00 pm
confidential Received : 27 July , 4.30 pm
No. 2970-S. My immediately succeeding telegram. Following is text of Oath
of Office.
Begins. I ... do swear that in the office of ... I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the Constitution of India /Pakistan as by law established; that I
will be faithful to His Majesty, his heirs and successors according to law; and
that I will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of India/
Pakistan without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. So help me God. Ends.
252
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Transfer of Power, Ceremonies For, Part I (2)
CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, 27 July 1947, 2.00 pm
Received: 27 July, 4.30 pm
No. 2971--S. Your letter of July 22nd.1 Instrument of Instructions and forms of
oath.
2. The Governor-General’s oath2 is not likely to be any trouble (though I
shall have to check this with Jimiah) but there may be difficulty over oaths for
Ministers.
3. My immediately succeeding [Ppreceding] telegram3 gives a draft oath
of office which would combine the existing oath of office with existing oath of
allegiance and would put allegiance to Constitution of India or Pakistan before
allegiance to the King.
4. I am advised that there is a precedent in Irish case4 for an oath of this sort
and it might cause difficulty if I tried to secure agreement to old forms of oath.
5. I am sure the draft I suggest is fully adequate and I hope His Majesty will
approve and allow me to discuss it with leaders. I will then discuss the question
JULY 1947
371
of issue of an abbreviated Instrument of Instructions to each of the Governors-
General.5
6. In addition to oaths of office Ministers will take the oath of secrecy in
existing form.
1 No. 204. 2 No. 215. 3 No. 251.
4 The oath to be taken by Members of the Parliament of the Irish Free State in clause 4 of the Irish Free
State (Agreement) Act, 1922 reads as follows:
‘I ... do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by
law established and that I will be faithful to H.M. King George V, his heirs and successors by law in
virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership
of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.’
5 In tel. 9974 of 2 August Lord Listowel explained that it had been found that those paragraphs of the
existing Instructions which were appropriate in the new constitutional circumstances, could be
incorporated in revised forms of Commissions of Appointment of Governors-General and Governors.
In seeking Lord Mountbatten’s approval for the adoption of this procedure, Listowel emphasised the
desirability of reducing formal documents of this kind to an essential minimum. Mountbatten conveyed
his approval in tel. 3152-S of 4 August. L/P &J/10/142: ff 41-2, 35. For the subsequent Commissions
of Appointment, see Ibid., ff 24-6, 28-9. At Mountbatten’s request, the concluding paragraph of the
old form of Commission (which read: ‘And we do hereby command all and singular Our officers
and loving subjects in India/Pakistan and all others whom it may concern to take due notice hereof and
to give their ready obedience accordingly.’) was omitted.
253
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Armed Forces, Reconstruction of, Volume I, Part I
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 2J July 1947, 1.00 pm
secret Received: 27 July, 4.30 pm
No. 2973 -S. Appointment of Commanders of the armed forces of the two new
Dominions. I have now received nominations from Nehru and Jinnah and
propose to issue the following announcement for simultaneous release in India
and the U.K. at 18.00 hours 1ST on Tuesday 29 July. Please obtain approval
of Departments concerned and wire concurrence immediately. Begins.
The following officers have been selected by the provisional governments of
India and Pakistan respectively to command their Armed Forces with effect
from 15th August 1947.
Naval Forces
(1) Captain J. T. S. Hall, CIE, RIN to command the Naval Forces of India,
in the rank of Rear Admiral.
(2) Commodore J. W. Jefford, OBE, RIN to command the Naval Forces of
Pakistan, in the rank of Rear Admiral.
372
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Land Forces
(1) Lt. Gen. Sir Rob Lockhart, KCB, CIE, MC to command the Land
Forces of India, in the rank of General.
(2) Lt. Gen. Sir Frank Messervy, KCSI, KBE, CB, DSO to command the
Land Forces of Pakistan, in the rank of General.
Air Forces
(1) Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst, KBE, CB, AFC to command the Air
Forces of India, and to continue in the rank of Air Marshal.
(2) Air Vice Marshal A. L. A. Perry-Keene, CB, OBE to command the Air
Forces of Pakistan, and to continue in the rank of Air Vice Marshal. Ends.1
1 Lord Listowel replied in tel. 9765 of 28 July as follows: ‘After obtaining concurrence of departments
concerned I have submitted proposals to the King who has approved.’ Mountbatten Papers, Official
Correspondence Files: Armed Forces, Reconstruction of, Volume I, Part I.
254
Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
(Extract)
IMMEDIATE
NO. I95-G.
Telegram , L/P &JI 8/663: f 47
Lahore, 27 July 1947, 10.40 pm
Received in India Office: 28 July , 7 am
★ ★ ★
5. General situation worsening owing to refusal of Sikhs to await Boundary
Commission award and their apparent unwillingness to accept it.
Repeated to Secretary of State and Governors of United Provinces, Sind and
N.W.F.P.
JULY I947
373
255
Mr Gandhi to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
&l3l94:j 42
NEW DELHI, 28 July 1947
Dear Friend,
It is my silence day. Hence this infliction in the shape of my hand writing.1
Pandit Nehru told me last night that as there were hitches about my going
to Kashmir he had decided to go even if only for two or three days.2 Thus I am
now free to go to Bihar and thence to Noakhali. Before doing so, I might go
for two days to the Punjab. I should like to leave Delhi tomorrow. You wanted
me to see you before leaving. If the need is still felt, I am at your disposal to¬
morrow, you will then name the hour.
May I say I deeply appreciated your wish to go to an unpretentious house
as the chosen Governor General of the millions of the half famished villagers
of the Union. I hope it will be possible to carry out the wish.
Yours sincerely,
M. K. GANDHI
1 The holograph original is on file R/3/1/94: ff 43-4.
2 cf. No. 249.
256
Minutes of Viceroy's Sixty-Fifth Staff Meeting , Items 2-4 , 6-8
Mounthatten Papers
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s House , New Delhi , on
28 July 1947 at 10.00 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma,
Lord Ismay, Sir G. Abell , Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Captain Brockman,
Mr Campbell-Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine-Crum
Item 2
THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
the viceroy said that it appeared that there had been serious confusion in the
mind of the Commander-in-Chief concerning the new arrangements which
had come into force as the result of the Reconstitution of the Interim Govern-
374
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
ment. For example, in a letter1 which he had written to Mr. Rajagopalachari
the following paragraph occurred:—
‘'You state in your letter that Mr. Chanda is being appointed Financial
Adviser in place of Mr. Mohd. Ah. This statement would appear to me to
have been made under a misapprehension. Mr. Mohd. Ali is Financial
Adviser, Military Finance, in the Government of India and competent,
therefore, to advise me as Commander-in-Chief and the Defence
Secretary of the Government of India, on all matters affecting the Armed
Forces of India as a whole. As I see it, Mr. Chanda, being representative of
the new Dominion Government of India only, will in no way be competent
to discharge these responsibilities”.2
the viceroy said that he had also received a letter3 from Pandit Nehru on
this same subject.
lord i s m a y said that the C. in C. appeared to have misunderstood the new
arrangements. The situation had now been fully explained to him, and he was
going to take the necessary action to correct the previous statements which
had been made.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —
decided to explain the situation verbally to Pandit Nehru at his next
meeting.
Item 3
PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN EMPLOYMENT AFTER I5TH AUGUST, IN CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES, OF BRITISH OFFICERS SERVING WITH THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE NEW DOMINIONS (v.C.P. I33)
This paper contained a draft telegram4 from the Viceroy to the Secretary of
State, which asked that the position of British officers serving after 15 th August
with the Armed Forces of the two new Dominions, should be defined in the
event of the following situations arising : —
(a) A Dominion deciding to use its Armed Forces (other than police) to
coerce a recalcitrant Indian State within its frontiers ;
(b) Clashes between Armed Forces of the Dominions on the common
boundary which might develop into serious conflict.
lord ismay suggested that it was impossible to legislate against every
eventuality. It was obvious that minor frontier clashes were quite possible. In
such cases British officers would presumably do their utmost to stop the clashes.
If anything of more serious proportions arose, both Governments would surely
realise that it was impossible to ask British officers to fight against each other.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —
(i) did not approve the draft telegram contained in V.C.P. 133;
JULY 1947
375
(ii) decided to mention this question at a future meeting of the Partition
Council.5
Item 4
THE STATES
his excellency the viceroy said that he was still confident that Hyderabad
and Travancore would accede to the Dominion on the three Central subjects.
rao bahadur menon said that, so far as Hyderabad was concerned, he
was more pessimistic. However, it was probable that sufficient States would
join for the purpose in view. So far as Indore was concerned, he advised that
the Viceroy should take no steps towards summoning the Maharaja in order
to induce him to join. He considered it extremely probable that the Maharaja
himself would approach the Viceroy on the subject before the end of July.
However, a useful link in this connection might be the Maharaja of Kolhapur.
Item 6
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FUTURE DOMINION OF INDIA
rao bahadur menon said that he was concerned about the way things were
going in connection with the selection of Ministers for the Government of the
future Dominion of India. He had hoped that this would be a Ministry of
talents ; possibly including a number of young men. However, it appeared that
Pandit Nehru was having a great difficulty in forgetting his loyalties : and names
such as those of Rajkumari Amrit Kaur had been mentioned, rao bahadur
menon gave his opinion that Rajkumari Amrit Kaur did not possess the
necessary capacity. He said that he understood that it was also intended to
retain Mr. Rajagopalachari, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Sardar Baldev
Singh.
the viceroy gave his opinion that the four outstanding members of the
present Government of India were Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel, Dr. Matthai
and Mr. Bhabha. It would be a great tragedy if the two latter were dropped.
1 D.O. No. 80/M-5/R/47 of 24 July. R/3/1/169: ff 8-9.
2 The two immediately succeeding sentences of Field Marshal Auchinleck’s letter to Mr Rajagopalachari
read as follows : ‘For so long as the process of reconstitution of the Armed Forces continues under the
direction of the Joint Defence Council, the Joint Armed Forces Headquarters under my control as
Supreme Commander, will be dealing almost exclusively with matters concerning both Dominions.
They cannot, therefore, be advised by an officer representative of one Dominion only.’ Ibid.
3 No. 247.
4 See No. 113, para. 4. The draft (dated 16 July) had been prepared by Field Marshal Auchinleck upon
instructions from Lord Mountbatten. The concluding paragraphs of the draft read as follows: ‘I am
in no doubt myself and Auchinleck agrees entirely that in the circumstances envisaged, British officers
or other ranks can not repeat not be allowed to take any active part in operations and must be with¬
drawn under the orders of the Supreme Commander whatever inconvenience this may cause to the
Dominion Governments. This is most urgent and I shall be grateful for an early decision.’
Mountbatten Papers, V.C.P. 133. Auchinleck’s draft was before the Viceroy’s Sixtieth Staff Meeting
(Item 5) on 18 July but further consideration of it was deferred until Lord Ismay’s return from London.
5 The question was in fact raised at the second meeting of the Provisional Joint Defence Council on
29 July. See No. 276, Case No. J.D.C. 9/2/47 and the last para, of Case No. J.D.C. n/2/47.
376
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
However, Mr. Bhabha himself had said that he might not be prepared to stay
on because of the inefficiency of his colleagues, the viceroy said that, if
Congress made a mistake in this matter, it was probable that they would not
survive.
With this rao bahadur menon agreed. He said that he had pointed out
to Sardar Patel that, in such circumstances, many of the present Government
servants would feel that they might be of more assistance outside the
Government than in it.
his excellency said that he intended to discuss this matter with Pandit
Nehru at his next interview. He would point out that, although he would be
a constitutional Governor-General and bound to accept whatever advice he
was given in this matter, he trusted that he would first have an opportunity of
discussing the proposed list. It was customary for a Governor-General to have
this opportunity.
rao bahadur menon emphasised the undesirability of it becoming
generally know that His Excellency was taking a hand in this matter. He also
advised against His Excellency discussing it with Sardar Patel.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —
decided to discuss with Pandit Nehru at his next interview the question
of the membership of the future Government of the Dominion of India.
Item 7
THE RETENTION OF INDIA WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH
Reference was made to Paragraph 3 of the letter6 which the Viceroy had sent
that week to the Secretary of State. In this the Viceroy had touched on the
question whether, at some future date, the Union of India might decide to
leave the Commonwealth.
the viceroy said that he wished all members of his staff to give this matter
their consideration ; in particular, he would like a paper on the whole subject
prepared by Mr. Morris Jones. Two points should especially be taken into
consideration — first, the abolition of the term “Dominion”; and secondly,
the nomination by the King of an elected Head of the State, whose title should
preferably not be President, or translatable into English as such.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —
directed P.S.V. to arrange for Mr. Morris Jones to write a paper, for
consideration at a future meeting, on the possibility of a somewhat looser
form of association with the British Commonwealth, with particular
regard to the two new Dominions.
Item 8
THE POSSIBILITY OF DISTURBANCES IN THE PUNJAB (v.C.P. I40)7
This paper contained a note, for circulation at the Partition Council Meeting
JULY I947
377
the following day, containing a paraphrased version of a report rendered by
the Director of Intelligence to the eifect that the Sikhs intended to start trouble
on a big scale if Nankana Sahib was not included, by the award of the Boundary
Commission, in East Punjab.
the viceroy drew attention to the reports which had appeared in that
morning’s papers to the effect that it has been necessary to open fire on a
meeting of Sikhs at Nankana Sahib the previous day.8 He said that he considered
it doubtful whether it had been correct on the part of the Governor of the
Punjab to declare this meeting illegal.9 sir george abell pointed out that
a considerable number of people had been prevented from attending it as a
result of this step.
rao bahadur menon said that he had suggested to Sir Cyril RadclifFe the
possibility that Nankana Sahib might be made a sort of Vatican. This could
not be done by the Boundary Commission, but Sir Cyril RadclifFe might put
forward this suggestion to the Muslim League.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY: —
approved V.C.P. 140, and directed Con. Sec. to hand round copies of
this paper at the Partition Council meeting the following day.
6 No. 227. Lord Mountbatten’s letter had been circulated as V.C.P. 139.
7 No. 250.
8 The report in The Statesman of 28 July indicates that troops opened fire twice to disperse crowds and
that five persons were injured. Sir E. Jenkins’s account of the demonstration (see No. 292, para. 3)
makes no reference to troops opening fire or to any injuries.
9 See No. 214.
257
Sir W. Monckton to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Hyderabad, Part 1(a)
SECRET AND PERSONAL LAKE VIEW GUEST HOUSE,
HYDERABAD, DECCAN, 28 July 1947
My Dear Dickie,
I have had long and intimate talks with H.E.H. on the question which you
discussed with me,1 namely, what chance there was of Hyderabad acceding to
the Dominion of India before the 15th August. The whole subject has been
discussed from every point of view and I am quite satisfied that H.E.H. has
definitely made up his mind not to accede. I am sure that nothing — not even
a visit by you — has the smallest hope of modifying this attitude. The truth is
that the Moslems in the State would undoubtedly revolt if he acceded now.
On the other hand, I do think that, in spite of great opposition from influential
1 cf. No. 228, para. 21 and its note 16.
378
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
quarters within the State and outside it, he is quite likely to be willing to offer
by treaty substantially all that could reasonably be asked of him. I cannot, of
course, commit him to this by a casual letter but I am faithfully recording
my own appreciation of the position. The local Ittehad, supported by our
mutual friend2 from Delhi, are attacking me hard. But so far H.E.H. is not
moved by it.
I shall probably be returning to Delhi about Wednesday and will ask for an
interview. But I honestly cannot advise you to come here. I think the association
of Hyderabad with the Indian Dominion is inevitable in the interests of both,
but I believe it can’t be rushed. The difficulties, as I am discovering to my cost,
are real and intractable.
Yours ever,
WALTER
2 Presumably a reference to Mr Jinnah.
258
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
and the Khan of Kalat
Mountbatten Papers , Viceroy's Interview No. 1 71
28 July 1947, 12.35 pm
H.H. reminded me that he had been one of my first visitors in March this
year,1 and was extremely complimentary about what had been achieved in so
short a time, and he assured me that everyone in Kalat thought that the solution
was the very best possible; they were delighted that Mr. Jinnah had got his
Pakistan and grateful for my help in the negotiations with Mr. Jinnah.2
After this preliminary politeness we got down to business. He thanked me
for obtaining recognition of the Pakistan Government that his position was
that of an independent sovereign state in treaty relations with the British
Government.3 He told me that he had had a long meeting with Mr. Jinnah at
which both had said that they wished to be friends with each other, and it
looked as though a suitable treaty or agreement could be drawn up between
them. But the main bone of contention was the leased territories.4
I explained to H.H. that this was a legal question which could be settled
by getting an agreed legal opinion; but that it appeared to me as though the
Pakistan Government would inherit the leases in the same way as they
would inherit the Anglo- Afghan Treaty of 1921.
I also pointed out that the British and Indian governments had sunk a lot of
money in Quetta and Wazirabad, and that even if the legal opinion was that
JULY I947
379
the leased territories reverted to Kalat there still was the problem of how the
immensely valuable fixtures were to be paid for.
H.H. admitted that all this would have to be worked out with Mr. Jinnah,
but said that Jinnah was most anxious that he should see me and report progress ;
and he asked if he and Mr. Jinnah might come together to see me on their
proposed draft treaty and agreement. I replied “'With pleasure”.
Finally he told me that he was extremely anxious that Mr. Jinnah should
not import a Pathan A.G.G. into Baluchistan. Everybody, he said, liked
Sir Geoffrey Prior5 and everybody hoped that he would stay and that in any
case, if he left, he should be replaced by a Britisher if Mr. Jinnah wanted peace.
He told me that all the Baluchis loved and trusted the British in a way they
had never trusted anybody else.
I invited him to give Mr. Jinnah this advice.
M. OF B.
1 See Vol. X, No. 59, p. 91. 2 See Nos. 82, 150, 159 and 174.
3 See No. 174. 4 See Ibid., note 1.
5 See No. 178, note 3.
259
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Gandhi
R-bl 1l94'- f 45
28 July 1947
Dear Mr Gandhi,
Thank you for your letter of the 28th July.1
Pandit Kak told me he had given you2 his reasons why the Kashmir
Government were so very anxious not to have the visit from a political leader,
which might result in the spread of violence from the Punjab border.
He told me after seeing you that although he feared even a visit from you
might provoke violence, the fact that you were known to preach non-violence
would reduce the risk in your case to less than half the risk if Pandit Nehru came.
The last thing he asked me to tell you was that if you felt it was essential
that either you or Pandit Nehru should go, then he would greatly prefer a
visit from you, particularly as the papers had already announced your visit
and the public were mentally prepared for it.
May I therefore urge that you should suggest to Pandit Nehru that your
visit at this moment would be better than a visit from him; for I really do not
1 No. 255.
2 Lord Mountbatten had arranged a meeting between Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Kak on 24 July when the
latter was in Delhi for the meeting with the representatives of the States on 25 July. See Nos. 149 and
302, para. 26.
380
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
know how the future Prime Minister can be spared from Delhi with only
1 8 days left for him to take over power.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
260
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Resident at Kashmir
Telegram , i^/5/i/p^; j 46
most immediate new Delhi, 28 July 1947, 3.00 pm
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 2989-S. Inform Maharaja immediately that I arranged for Kak to negotiate
with Gandhi about visit of himself or Nehru.1 I warned him that if he dis¬
couraged Gandhi I was certain Nehru would go. Kak has now succeeded in
dissuading Gandhi from going with the inevitable result that Nehru intends to
visit State, as he always said he would if Gandhi was prevented from going.2
He will arrive on 4th August and stay four or five days. He is undertaking to
go as private individual and not as Member of Government. Object: meet
friends and colleagues and if permission granted to see Sheikh Abdulla.
2. I am sending for Gandhi and Nehru and will make one more endeavour
to stop Nehru though possibly at the expense of Gandhi going.
3 . Finally, I must point out that I warned Kak after he had seen Gandhi that
if he had indeed succeeded in preventing Gandhi from going then there would
almost certainly be a visit from Nehru. I therefore must hold him solely
responsible for this visit.
4. Please point out that declaration of adherence to one or other of the two
Dominion Governments as soon as possible before the arrival of Nehru is now
in the vital interests of His Highness.
5. I need hardly ask His Highness to ensure that Nehru is decently treated
and nothing is done to embitter relations between Kashmir and the new
Government of India.
1 See No. 259, note 2.
2 See correspondence ending with No. 249.
JULY 1947
381
26l
Cabinet
India and Burma Committee . LB. (47) 43rd Meeting
RI30M12: ff 23-5
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.JV.i, on 28 July 1947
at 3.00 pm were: Mr Attlee ( in the Chair), Sir S. Cripps , Viscount Addison ,
the Earl oj Listowel , Mr C. P. Mayhew, Mr Arthur Henderson , Lord Chorley.
Also present during discussion of this item were: Sir P. Patrick , Mr H. A. F.
Rumbold
Minute 2
CEREMONIES IN INDIA ON I5TH AUGUST AND FLAGS FOR NEW
DOMINIONS
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for
India (I.B.(47) 147)1 regarding the ceremonies to be held in India on 15th August,
1947, and the flags proposed for the new Dominions after the transfer of
power.
the secretary of state for India said that the Viceroy had suggested
that The King might be prepared to send a message to the new Dominions on
15th August, since this would be very greatly appreciated. A difficulty had
arisen over the question of the flag to be used in future by the Provincial
Governors. The Viceroy had agreed with Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah that
Provincial Governors should fly flags similar to those of the Governors-General
(which was a blue flag with on it a crown and lion in gold and the name of the
Dominion) but with the name of the Province inserted instead of the Dominion,
and without the lion. It had been pointed out to the Viceroy2 that the flag of
the Governors-General signified the latter’s position as His Majesty’s personal
representative in a special sense, and that its use by Governors would be an
innovation. He had expressed the hope that it might be possible for Provincial
Governors to fly the Union Jack or the Union Jack with the badge of their
Province as was the custom of Governors of Australian States and Lieutenant
Governors of Canadian Provinces respectively. Lord Mountbatten had,
however, replied3 that there was no possibility of securing agreement at this
stage to this suggestion.
The Committee felt that it was undesirable that the flags used by Provincial
Governors should be too closely similar to that flown by the Governors-
1 No. 243.
2 Tel. 9697 of 26 July. L/P &J/10/138 : f 188.
3 Tel. 2979-S of 27 July. Ibid.,: f 174.
382
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
General. They thought that the Provincial Governors’ flags might differ in the
colour of their background from those used by the Governors-General, i.e.
those for Pakistan might have a dark green background and those for India
a saffron one. In view of the short time available flags of both types might be
made and sent out in anticipation of the Viceroy’s agreement.
The Committee: —
(1) Invited the Secretary of State for India to ask the Viceroy for his
suggestions regarding the form which the Royal Message to the new
Indian Dominions on 15 th August might appropriately take.4
(2) Invited the Secretary of State for India to consult further with the
Viceroy in the light of their discussion regarding the flags to be used
by Provincial Governors in the new Indian Dominions after the
transfer of power.5
4 In tel. 9672 of 26 July, Lord Listowel had forwarded to Lord Mountbatten the draft of a Royal
Message which had been placed before the Cabinet India and Burma Committee the same day (see
No. 243, para .2). I11 tel. 9767 of 28 July, Listowel explained that, upon further consideration, the draft
seemed capable of improvement and that it should perhaps be framed in more personal terms. He
added : ‘I am sure that you are in best position to prepare something which while more inspired would
not irritate Indians . . .’ In his reply, Mountbatten suggested that separate messages for India and
Pakistan would be more appropriate and forwarded drafts of such messages in tels. 3203-S and 3204-S
of 6 August. Listowel submitted these drafts to the Prime Minister in his minute, Serial No. 146/47,
of 1 1 August and sought permission to submit them to the King. Mr Attlee gave his permission on
12 August and the King approved the drafts the same day. L/P &J/10/136. Mountbatten delivered these
messages in his addresses to the Constituent Assemblies of India and Pakistan on 15 and 14 August
respectively. See Appendices I and II to No. 489.
5 It was subsequently agreed that the flags to be used by Provincial Governors would be similar to those
used by Governors-General except that they would carry the Crown without the Lion with the name
of the Province in white. The background, instead of blue, would be saffron in the case of India and
deep green in the case of Pakistan. L/P &J/10/138.
262
Minutes by Mr Rumbold , Sir P. Patrick and Mr Henderson
L/P &SI13I1848: ff 137-9
There are two points in the Viceroy’s speech to the Representatives of the
States on 25th July1 which seem to be inconsistent with what was said on this
subject in Parliament and I suggest that it is desirable that we should draw the
Viceroy’s attention to these inconsistencies so that in his further discussions
with the Representatives of the States he may avoid further emphasis of these
two points.
In these discussions with the States the Viceroy is acting as a mediator in his
personal capacity. He is not acting on the advice of his Ministers either in form
or in fact. That being so we are answerable here for what he may do and it
JULY 1947
383
would seem well to give him warning that he may be creating grave embarrass¬
ment for us, particularly having regard to the importance which the Opposition
attaches to no pressure being put upon the Princes by us.1 2
H.A.F. RUMBOLD
28.7.47
The Viceroy’s speech to States representatives is very difficult to reconcile
with the passage in the Prime Minister’s second reading speech3 regarding the
Princes or with his assurance in his concluding speech4 that H.M.G. would
exercise no pressure on the States to federate.
It would be legitimate, I think, to endeavour to persuade the States to accept
in addition to the standstill arrangement provided for in the Indian Indepen¬
dence Act, s.7(i) Proviso,5 a modus vivendi in regard to external affairs, defence
and comm unications with the adjacent Dominion whereby while terms of
accession are being negotiated they will enjoy external protection from that
Dominion and grant it the security of communications within their territories
necessary to ensure that such protection would be effective. But it is surely
unreasonable to expect any State before 15th August to commit itself to
accession to a Federal Constitution yet to be agreed upon and promulgated,
even on the basis that accession is only for three items, external affairs, defence
and communications.
It can, however, be seen from a glance at the existing Federal List in Schedule
VII to the Government of India Act, 1935, that the great majority of the
entries in that list are relatable to External Affairs, defence and communications
and the finance necessary to these subjects. Sardar Patel’s offer of federation
1 No. 234. 2 Emphasis in original.
3 In his second reading speech regarding the princes Mr Attlee remarked: ‘It is the hope of His Majesty’s
Government that all States will, in due course, fmd their appropriate place within one or other of the
new Dominions within the British Commonwealth, but until the constitutions of the Dominions have
been framed in such a way as to include the States as willing partners, there must necessarily be a less
organic form of relationship between them, and there must be a period before a comprehensive system
can be worked out.’ Attlee also referred to the proviso in clause 7(1) of the Independence Bill (see No.
164) which had been inserted to secure the continuation of financial and economic agreements on matters
of common concern to the States and British India and suggested that the consummation of more detailed
and binding arrangements would ‘take time to work out, and the transition of the States from the lapse
of paramountcy into a free association with the new Dominions is a process which will require proper
discussion and deliberation’. Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 439, 10 July 1947, col. 2452. See also
No. 39 and its Enclosure.
4 Mr Attlee concluded his remarks about the princes in his second reading speech in the following
manner: ‘If I were asked what would be the attitude of His Majesty’s Government to any State which
has decided to cut adrift from its neighbours and assert its independence, I would say to the ruler of
that State, “Take your time and think again. I hope that no irrevocable decision to stay out will be
taken prematurely.” ’ Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 439, 10 July 1947, col. 2452. In response to
questions at the committee stage Attlee remarked, with reference to the States: ‘I do not think it would
be wise for me to add anything to what I said on second reading, which was to the effect that we did
not want to bring pressure either way.’ Ibid., vol. 440, 14 July 1947, col. 112.
5 See No. 164.
384
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
was very loosely phrased.6 It is clear, however, that it must mean something
more than bare accession for these Items, e.g., their financial and administrative
implications. Moreover, it is inconceivable that Congress, having decided on
a strong centre, at the expense of the Provinces, have abandoned all their
intentions of infiltrating into the States.
The draft Instrument of Accession proposed by the Viceroy, which he
admitted had not yet been accepted by the Government of India, has not been
referred to this Office. I gather from Sir Conrad Corfield that he also had had
no part in framing it. It remains to be seen whether the terms offered by
Sardar Patel when reduced to documentary form will in fact prove acceptable
to the States. Meantime they are left with the impression that the Viceroy
condones pressure on them to accept, as for example by withholding the
normal supplies of arms and ammunition,7 and that the assurances given in
Parliament were meaningless.
It does not seem profitable merely to take the Viceroy to task after his speech
has been made. But we have to be ready to deal with any questions in Parliament
which his speech may evoke. In the versions in the Press here the more minatory
phrases which appear in the full text do not seem to have been reproduced. But
as there has been a good deal of press reference8 to the speech it seems quite
probable that questions will be asked.
In any reply H.M.G. will naturally be disposed to take its stand on the state¬
ment of policy contained in the Cabinet Mission's Memorandum of 12th May
1 946, 9 and to say that they do not interpret the Viceroy’s remarks as intended
to imply any departure therefrom. It could be added that H.M.G. share the
Viceroy’s desire that there shall be no avoidable delay on the part of the States
in filling the void when Paramountcy lapses in one or other of the ways indi¬
cated in the Memorandum, namely by entering into a federal relationship with
the appropriate Dominion or, failing this, entering into particular political
arrangements therewith.
It may be thought desirable to obtain the Prime Minister’s approval to a
telegram in the above sense.
[p.j.p.]
28.7.47
Secretary of State,
Reference attached draft telegram.10 I think paragraph 4 goes too far.11 I see
no reason why the States should not make up their minds in principle before
August 15th;12 nor does it seem necessary that they should have the con¬
stitutions of the Dominions before them prior to them taking their decision.
The suggestion is that they should only be associated with either Dominion
in respect of three subjects; defence, foreign affairs and communications.
I think what the Viceroy had in mind, therefore, was not to suggest that they
JULY I947
385
should necessarily accede prior to August 15th, but to indicate their willingness
so to do.13
A. H.
29.7
6 See Vol. XI, No. 528. 7 See Nos. 66 and 179,
8 See eg The Times, 26 and 28 July 1947. 9 Vol. VII, No. 262.
10 Not printed. The draft telegram attached to this minuting was the same as the telegram (No. 307)
as issued.
11 Lord Listowel commented: ‘If the Viceroy said that the States must accede before Aug. 15, I do not
think this statement is consistent with the P.M’s speech. Provided that he did say this I think para. 4
should stand.’
12 Lord Listowel commented: ‘I interpret his words in this sense.’
13 Lord Listowel minuted: ‘Draft telegram should go to P.M. with covering minute on lines of
Rumbold’s comment.’ The draft and minute were put up to Mr Attlee on 29 July. Attlee approved the
telegram on 31 July. L/P &S/13/1848 : ff 132-6.
263
Minutes by the India Office 1
LIP&SI13I1846: ff 30-2
I understand that the past papers about Kalat are in the External Department,
but my understanding, which Mr. Donaldson will doubtless be able to confirm,
is that we have always stoutly resisted any claims by Kalat to regard itself as
anything other than an Indian State. Consequently the Viceroy and the
Pakistan representatives seem to me to be quite wrong in their facts in accepting
the claim of the State to be regarded as a separate international entity.
Apart from this, it is quite contrary to the policy which we have been
following, with the strong support of the Viceroy, of declining to recognise
any Indian States as separate international entities at this stage. To do so in the
case of Kalat will encourage other States to stand out from federation with one
or other of the Dominions, and this risk seems to outweigh the transitory
advantage which such an admission in the case of Kalat might give Pakistan
in negotiations with Kalat in respect of the leased areas. There are particular
dangers in making this admission in respect of a frontier State, because it is so
much easier for such a State to maintain its independence.2
I think that we ought to explain these dangers to the Viceroy. Until 15th
August we cannot avoid responsibility for his actions.
H.A.F. RUMBOLD
28.7.47
1 These minutes refer to the record of the Viceroy’s Twentieth Miscellaneous Meeting of 19 July at
No. 174.
2 Mr Donaldson commented on the last sentence of this paragraph as follows: ‘You can’t press this very
far with Kalat, can you?’
386
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Sir P. Patrick suggested to me that the VR’s action in respect of Kalat is
inconsistent with the G/I’s attitude towards Chinese overtures to Bhutan. But
1 am not certain that this really helps us, because the VR would doubtless point
out that, even if Kalat is not an Indian State, we control its foreign policy
under Article 3 of the 1854 Treaty in the same way as we control Bhutan’s
foreign relations.
h.a.f. r[umbold]
I quite agree: though the pass seems to have been sold and Pakistan is com¬
mitted to the contrary view. Bhutan is not3 and never has been, an Indian State
though by the Treaty of 1910 (Aitchison XIV No. IX)4 the Bhutan Govt, is
“guided by the advice of the Br Govt.” in its external relations. There is a
distinct difference between the two. Unless it would pile on the agony I wd.
add a sentence about the Treaties to para 1 of the telegram.5
e.p. d[onaldson]
28.7
Sir W. Croft
Sir A. Carter
I think the Viceroy made a mistake here — perhaps in trying to be too clever
over the inference that Pakistan inherits the Crown’s rights in Quetta and so
avoiding the impasse over Berar. But Sir C. Corfield tells me H.E. did this,
against his advice, quite deliberately, and as Mr. Donaldson says the pass has
been sold. Kalat has always maintained an unwarranted claim to independence.
But this really collapsed when it joined the Chamber of Princes and got into
the 1st Schedule to the Government of India Act with a Seat in the Federal
Legislature.
I should not be disposed to telegraph but merely to mention the point
mildly in Secretary of State’s letter.6
p. j. p[atrick]
28.7
Secretary of State
I think there is no doubt that the Viceroy went astray. But I am not too sure
what there is to be gained by pointing it out.
w. d. c[roft]
29.7
3 Emphasis in original.
4 C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring
Countries, Vol. XIV, Revised and continued up to the end of 1929, Calcutta, Government of India
Central Publication Branch, 1929.
5 A telegram to Lord Mountbatten had been drafted but it was not sent. Instead, as recommended by
Sir P. Patrick and Sir A. Carter (see Patrick’s minute and note 6 below), the point about Kalat was
mentioned in Lord Listo wel’s letter of 2 August (see No. 317, para. 6).
6 Sir A. Carter commented against this recommendation: ‘I agree. RHAC. 29.7.47.’
JULY 1947
387
264
The Resident at Hyderabad to Mr Griffin
L\P &S/ 13/ 1843: ff 145-6
TOP SECRET THE RESIDENCY HYDERABAD, BOLARUM,
D.O. No. 84 -R 28 July ig4y
My dear Griffin,
HYDERABAD AFFAIRS
I am writing this letter with the object of describing the situation in the State
with reference to the present constitutional changes since an appreciation of
the existing position may be of interest. I propose also to attempt to forecast
how events may develop after the 15 th August in the various differing circum¬
stances which may then exist.
2. The dominant factor in the situation is the communal feeling between
Hindus and Muslims. This has recently increased considerably and is now very
intense, particularly in the towns. In the countryside it is not so much in
evidence partly because the large majority of the villagers are Hindus and,
partly perhaps at the present time, because most of the country population is
too much engaged in work in the fields to have much time to attend to other
matters. Were serious communal rioting to occur at any point however it
might well spread throughout the State. Even now all political questions are
considered almost wholly on a communal basis. A constant recollection of this
fact is essential to a correct appreciation of the present state of affairs and to
any accurate forecast of the course which events may take in future.
3 . In these circumstances the division of British India into communal units
greatly increased the difficulties of the Nizam and his Govt, in solving the
problem of the State’s future political relationship with the rest of India. So
long as the whole country remained a single unit in some parts of which
Muslims predominated and in others Hindus, there could be no reasonable
objection to the State joining the rest of India under some such arrangement as
that described in the Cabinet Mission’s plan.1 The problem in the State was
merely an extension of the All-India problem. The position was wholly
changed by the division of British India on a communal basis. Thereafter the
Hindus in the State clamoured for the inclusion of the State in the Union of
India, while the Muslims agitated for it to remain independent or to join
Pakistan. In those circumstances had the Nizam announced his intention of
acceding to the Union of India he would have outraged the feelings of his
Muslim subjects: had he elected to join Pakistan he would have alienated his
1 Vol. VII, No. 303, paras 14-15.
388
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Hindu subjects — in addition to leaving many of the State’s administrative
problems unsolved. Thus the reasons by which in his recent firman,2 he
justified his decision to remain independent of both the new British Indian
units were not merely sophistical arguments but a statement of cold hard fact.
4. The problem of the State’s future relationship with the Union of India
by the territories of which it is completely surrounded, however, remained
unsolved. The Nizam, in his firman, had indicated his desire to negotiate on
this subject and as a basis for such negotiations Monckton suggested3 that the
State should agree to enter into a treaty with the Union of India by which, in
return for certain concessions, the Govt, of the latter would be allowed to
conduct the State’s foreign relations and defence against external aggression
and to be responsible for its through communications. This plan, while, for
practical purposes, it fulfilled the recommendations of the Cabinet Mission
that the three subjects in question should be administered by the Federation,
did so by a method which had a reasonable chance of being accepted by both
communities. On the one hand, it avoided the accession of the State to the
Union of India — which, as I have pointed out, would almost certainly have
been resisted by the Muslims : on the other, it afforded a means of solving the
problem of the State’s future relations with the Union of India in a manner
which might be acceptable to Hindu opinion. It was probably the only method
of achieving a practical solution of the difficulty by peaceful means. The plan
at first seemed to have a good chance of being adopted by Nizam’s Govt, as
a basis for negotiation: subsequently, however, objection was taken to it by
the non-official Muslim member4 of the Council on the ground that it merely
conceded indirectly the position which accession to the Indian Union would
have yielded directly. This view was first put forward by the Muslim Member
in question in Delhi during the recent visit5 of the State’s delegation of which
he is a member to that place. The other members of the delegation appear to
have adopted a non-committal attitude being, no doubt, characteristically
unwilling to commit themselves until they knew the Nizam’s reaction to the
proposal. Meanwhile objection to the plan is increasing among members of
the Ittihad-ul-Muslimin who apparently consider that the State’s best policy
would be to agree to negotiate a treaty with the Govt, of the Indian Union
and to enquire what subjects that Govt, desired to have included in it. Since,
assuming the Indian Union to be prepared to negotiate a treaty at all, the
principal matters with which it would deal are already well known, this
suggestion is particularly fatuous and could only result in the State being left
on the 15 th August with its future relationship to the Indian Union wholly
undefined. Up to the present the Nizam has adhered to his original opinion
in favour of Monckton’s plan, but it is uncertain whether he will continue to
do so should Muslim agitation against it increase. If he changes his opinion
JULY 1947
389
and decides in favour of die policy suggested by the Ittihad-ul-Muslimin,
Monckton, upon whom some veiled attacks have been made in the local
Muslim press, will I understand refuse to continue as his Constitutional Adviser.
5. The present position therefore is one of considerable difficulty and
uncertainty. As regards the future should Monckton’s plan prevail and be
accepted by the Govt, of the Union of India as a basis for negotiation there is
a reasonable chance of disturbance, at any rate on any considerable scale, being
avoided. Should however no effective action to reach an agreement with the
Union of India be taken in the near future there is a strong probability that an
active agitation will be started by the State Congress and widespread rioting
may result. It is unfortunate that both the State Congress and the Ittihad-ul-
Muslimin which represent the majority of vocal Hindu and Muslin opinion
in the State are at present under the control of their more extreme members.
Meanwhile many of those who can afford to do so are sending their families
and valuables to places of safety outside the State in anticipation of the trouble
which may come.
6. I will keep you informed of any further developments.
Yours sincerely,
C. G. HERBERT
Annexure to No. 264
Commonwealth Relations Office , (. Division B) Minutes 6
HYDERABAD RESIDENT’S FINAL APPRECIATION.
the nizam’s firman7
The attached final Appreciation by the Resident of affairs in Hyderabad at the
end of July, together with the Firman issued by H.E.H. the Nizam are submitted
for information. The former is now rather out of date but is probably worth
The dominant factor in Hyderabad politics is believed to be the communal
feeling between Hindus and Muslims which is now intense. Questions therefore
fall to be considered almost entirely in this light. The problem is really an
extension in miniature of the general all-India problem.
The Resident believes that the Nizam’s bid for independence has been forced
on him, quite apart from any personal ambitions, by cold hard fact. Sir Walter
2 Dated 12 June 1947. Vol. XI, No. 163. 3 cf. Nos. 228, para. 20 and 257.
4 Presumably a reference to Syed Abdur Rahim.
5 The Hyderabad delegation visited Delhi twice in July 1947. See Nos 61, 228, paras. 20-21 and 240.
6 These minutes are on L/P &S/13/1843 : f 144. The India Office was absorbed into the C.R.O. on 15
August 1947, but retained for sometime thereafter a distinct identity as C.R.O. Division B.
J. Garner, The Commonwealth Office 1925-68, London, 1978, pp. 287-9.
7 This refers to a Firman warning against propaganda and not to the Firman of 12 June 1947 in Vol. XI,
No. 163. A copy of the Firman in question had been forwarded by Mr Herbert to Mr Griffin on
1 August. L/P&S/13/1843: f 147.
390
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Monckton’s suggestion of a Treaty between India and the State is discussed and
is considered to be probably the only method of achieving a practical solution
without trouble. He himself may not continue much longer as Constitutional
Adviser to the Ruler.
Failing acceptance of this plan, the Resident considers that widespread
rioting may ensue. Many people in ancitipation of this are already taking steps
to remove their families and valuable [s] from the danger areas.
The Firman issued by the Nizam is admonitory in tone.
R. G. CHISHOLM
18.8
This report is hardly worth circulating to I and B Committee. Mr Herbert’s
letter was written before the most recent reports8 from Lord Mountbatten.
These did not indicate that the negotiation of a treaty between the Nizam and
the G/I was being seriously considered in the States Department; on the other
hand Lord Mountbatten had consented to continue to negotiate on behalf of
the G/I with the Nizam after the transfer of power.
Sir W. Monckton, if he cannot speak for the Nizam’s Govt, has ceased to
serve a useful purpose as negotiator. It looks to me as if contact between
Hyderabad and Delhi could more profitably be maintained on a lower level
with a view to preparing the ground for a successful demarche by Lord
Mountbatten.
The proposal at A9 was I feel sure the right one; that at B10 was a mere waste
of time and no doubt wrecked the prospects of the former.
p. j. p[atrick]
19.8
This is a very interesting appreciation of Hyderabad’s position. It strengthens
the doubts which we had here about the wisdom of the Viceroy’s efforts to
get Hyderabad to accede instead of urging on the G/I acceptance of a treaty
with the State.
h. a. f. r[umbold]
18.8
The logic of economics and geography is inexorable; in the long run
Hyderabad, to enjoy a tolerable existence, will have in some way to “come in”.
If the “plan” were tried, and worked smoothly, the way might be open for
a closer merger at a later time.
G. h. b[axter]
19.8
8 See Nos. 228, paras. 20-21, 302, para. 47 and 385, paras. 15-18.
9 The letter A had been inserted by the India Office in the margin of para. 4 of Mr Herbert’s letter
against that section which begins ‘Monckton suggested’ and ends ‘for its through communications’.
10 The letter B had been inserted by the India Office in the margin of para. 4 of Mr Herbert’s letter against
that section which begins ‘the State’s best policy’ and ends ‘desired to have included in it’.
JULY I947
391
265
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Maharaj-Rana
of Dholpur
Rl3l1l139: ff 2 4~ 7
no. 592/89 29 July 1947
My dear Maharaj-Rana Sahib,
When we met yesterday at the party at the Viceroy’s House I told you I had
dictated my reply to your letter1 and would send it round by the hand of
a Staff Officer who has been with me for 5 years, Mr. Campbell Johnson,
whom I introduced to you. He will bring this round and will gladly answer
any further questions or take back any further message from Your Highness.
Although I thanked Your Highness verbally for your letter of the 20th July,
I must apologise that sheer pressure of events has prevented me from acknow¬
ledging it in writing.
Most of the points that you raise have been answered either verbally or by
the actual events; since you will observe that I myself took the chair at the
meeting2 of the Chamber of Princes which Your Highness attended; and that
at this meeting a committee was set up, to which, so far as I can find out,
everyone present agreed.
Out of some 565 States there are indications that somewhere round about
560 would accede to their appropriate Dominion, using the Instrument of
Accession3 for India which I submitted at the meeting which Your Highness
attended, and adopting somewhat similar lines for Pakistan.
I understand that the Rulers who are contemplating not acceding have
already been organised by our mutual friend the Nawab of Bhopal with whom
I have been in constant touch.4
Consequent on our two or three recent talks I think I may also claim to
know Your Highness’s views and I trust you know mine.
I have already met the Hyderabad delegation5 and am in touch with His
Exalted Highness the Nizam6 and also Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer.7 I hope to
meet the Maharaja of Indore soon. Thus, I think it may fairly be said that I am
endeavouring to keep touch with the representatives of all points of view.
I appreciate Your Highness’s regard for the Royal House of Windsor and
your concern that I should not be directly or indirectly associated with an
1 cf. No. 242. 2 See No. 234.
3 For the final version of the Instrument of Accession, see Enclosure i to No. 313.
4 See correspondence ending with No. 239.
s See Nos. 61 and 228, para. 20; see also No. 240.
6 See No. 33 ; see also Nos. 228, para. 21 and 257.
7 See No. 228, paras. 16-19.
392
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
attempt to hustle the Indian Princes into any hurried decisions within 3 days.
I am glad to assure Your Highness that this is far from my wish, and I would
be glad to extend the time to any Prince who wishes an extension until the
14th August, which you will appreciate is the last possible date on which I can
be of any further direct service to the States, since my functions as Crown
Representative end at midnight on that day. This will give Your Highness
one month from the time you first received the proposals ; and I trust that you
agree that this will meet your objections.
In your letter you ask whether you may enter into a treaty in respect of
common matters with the two dominions to avoid becoming an integral part
of either dominion. As I explained to Your Highness, I have now wrung from
the future Government of India the maximum concessions to which they will
agree, and they will definitely not enter into any treaty with any State since
they consider that the terms of the Instrument of Accession, which I myself
drafted,8 are fair and generous.
I would point out that immediate accession to a Dominion on the three
subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communications will not prejudice
the position of the States either in regard to their participation in the Con¬
stituent Assembly or their ultimate freedom to join or not to join the Union
constitution that may eventually be adopted by that Assembly. My plan merely
provides a basis on which common policies can be evolved in regard to these
three subjects for the interim period, while the new constitution is being framed
in the Constituent Assembly. That being so I have never been able to under¬
stand Your Highness’s point of view that you are afraid that if you sign the
Instrument of Accession you will fmd yourself linked against your will to an
independent Government without a monarchical head. If you accede now you
will be joining a Dominion with the King as Head. If they change the con¬
stitution to a republic and leave the British Empire, the Instrument of
Accession does not bind you in any way to remain with the republic. It would
appear to me that that would be the moment for Your Highness to decide if
you wish to remain with India or reclaim full sovereign independence.
I know that His Majesty would personally be grieved if you elected to sever
your connection with him whilst he was still King of India now that it has
been made clear that this would not involve you in accepting to remain
within a republic if this was inacceptable to you when the time came.
I too will be grieved if I fmd that Your Highness refuses to accede before
the 14th August, since I shall bitterly feel the fatal isolation of an old friend;
and it would be sad that you or your illustrious family would travel without
any diplomatic privileges unless Your Highness were able to set up legations
or consulates in various parts of the world to look after the interests of your
subjects.
You asked me what I thought India would do to Dholpur if you did not
JULY I947
393
accede. To the best of my knowledge and belief they will do nothing; that is
precisely the trouble — nothing whatever will be done and your State will
remain in complete isolation in the centre of an indifferent India.
Although Your Highness, being a man of such great wealth, may be able
to abdicate and leave your State, I know that your loyalty to your subjects and
your belief in the position and obligations of a Ruler will not let you desert
your subjects; and I shall grieve indeed as I read reports of the plight of
Dholpur month by month during 1948.
I need hardly assure Your Highness that this letter is written in the most
sincere spirit of friendship, and if I can help in any further way by personal
meetings, I hope you will regard me as at your disposal to help you with
discussion and advice.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
8 The terms of the Instrument of Accession had in fact been drafted by Mr V. P. Menon; see ibid.,
para. 26.
266
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Maharaja of Indore
Rf3l if 139: f 31
29 ply 1947
Your Highness has doubtless seen in the Press the report of my speech1 to the
Rulers and their representatives on the 25th July. It has been a great disappoint¬
ment to me that I have not had the benefit of your counsel in the deliberations
here regarding the accession of States to the Indian Dominion and other
important matters of common concern to British India and Indian States. I am
glad, however, that there is still time to make up for this and to that end I am
sending this invitation to you through Their Highnesses the Maharajas of
Baroda, Gwalior and Kolhapur to come to Delhi for a frank and free talk on
these matters.
2. Time is pressing and the problems demand urgent solution. I hope,
therefore, that Your Highness will avail yourself of the earliest opportunity of
visiting Delhi, preferably before the end of this week as I may be away from
August 3rd for two or three days.
1 No. 234.
394
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
267
Directive from Sir A. Smith
Mountbatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: Secret Orders to
British Forces in India
top secret and personal 29 July 1947
No. AFS/34
USE OF BRITISH TROOPS AFTER 14 AUGUST I94?1
i. The contents of this Document are NOT2 to be divulged to Indians, and
may ONLY be known to British Officers as follows : — 3
(a) C-in-C India
and his three senior British stab officers.
(b) C-in-C Pakistan
and his three senior British staff officers.
(c) G.O. C.-in-C., Southern Command
and his two senior British staff officers.
(d) G.O. C.-in-C., Eastern Command
and his two senior British staff officers.
(e) Area and Sub Area British Commanders
at discretion of C-in-C India* and Pakistan and their senior British
staff officer.
*G.O. C.-in-C. Eastern Command and G.O. C.-in-C. Southern Command will act for C.-in-C. India
in deciding.
(f) G.O.C., British Troops in India and Pakistan and his two senior staff
officers.
(g) Commanders British Brigades and their Brigade Majors.
(h) C.Os of British Battalions and their seconds in command.
2. No copies of this document will be made.
No issues will be made below: —
(a) those area and sub area commanders authorised to receive copies under
para i(e) above.
(b) British Brigade Commanders.
JULY I947
395
All copies will be destroyed when British Troops leave India.
ACKNOWLEDGE.
ARTHUR SMITH
Lieut General
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
Enclosure to No. 267
USE OF BRITISH TROOPS AFTER 14 AUGUST 1947
i. The charter for G.O.C. British Troops in India and Pakistan lays down that
the Supreme Commander may order the employment of British Troops in
“unforeseen contingencies”.
2. In certain cases the protection of British lives would come under the
term “unforeseen contingencies”, and the employment of British Troops in
such an emergency after 14 August 1947 will be governed by the following : —
(a) Although British Troops can NOT be employed in communal dis¬
turbances to protect Indian subjects, they may be so employed to protect
British lives.
If, in the opinion of the local commander, Britisli lives can only be
saved by the use of British troops to suppress a communal riot; per¬
mission for their use in this manner may be given by the Supreme
Commander.
(b) The chain of responsibility in this matter will be as follows:
(i) When a local civilian authority requests the assistance of troops,
the local sub area commander decides what troops and how many
shall be used. If he considers British lives are endangered, and if
he considers the employment of British Troops as essential, he
will (after consulting the local Commander of British Troops)
apply to the next senior commander for authority to use them, at
the same time sending “for information” a telegram to the Chief
of Staff (Army) Supreme Commanders EIQ, who will consult
G.O.C. British Troops in India and Pakistan. In the meantime,
the local commander in British Troops will have referred the
1 Lord Ismay put up a copy of these orders to Lord Mountbatten on 3 1 July, minuting : 'I think that you
should glance through these very secret orders when you have time. It is very hard to cater for all
possible eventualities, but these orders look as good as they can be. Ismay.’ Mountbatten Papers, Official
Correspondence Files: Secret Orders to British Forces in India.
2 Emphasis throughout in original.
3 In IRKU 474 of 9 July 1947 to General Sir G. Scoones, Field Marshal Auckinleck referrred to para. 2
of Lord Mountbatten’s tel. 1744-S of 4 July (Vol. XI, No. 511), which dealt with the question of the
use of British troops in an emergency to save British or European lives, and remarked as follows:
‘I agree no mention of this should be made in official Charter to G.O.C. British troops in India but it is
not wise to rely on ad hoc arrangements should emergency arise and Viceroy agrees that instructions
should be issued to limited British Commanders on Top Secret and personal basis.’ Mountbatten
Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Withdrawal ot British Forces, Part (2).
396
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
matter direct to G.O.C. British Troops in India and Pakistan,
and the C-in-C of the Dominion concerned will have reported to
the COS (Army) Supreme Commanders HQ, and given his
recommendations .
(ii) Before British Troops are used operationally the decision of the
Supreme Commander will be obtained. In exceptional circum¬
stances, however, where the time factor does not allow references
to higher authority, the local British area/sub area commander —
after consultation with the senior British officer (not below
Brigade Commander) — may call on British Troops to intervene
if he is satisfied this is essential to protect British lives. In this case,
he will at once report his action.
On approval by the Supreme Commander, orders will be issued
by the COS(Army) to the G.O.C. British Troops in India and
Pakistan with copies to Army HQ of the Dominion concerned,
to the G.O.C.-in-C concerned and to the local Area Commander.
G.O.C. British Troops in India and Pakistan will place the
necessary British troops “in support” of the local area/sub area
etc commander, IF this officer is a British officer. Constitutionally
British Troops cannot serve under an Indian officer, and if
the local area/sub area commander etc is an Indian officer, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Dominion concerned will make other
arrangements for local command.
(iii) At all times when British troops are employed operationally the
local British Commander has the right of direct access to G.O.C.
British Troops in India and Pakistan to whom he will send regular
reports. It will be his responsibility to ensure that British Troops
are not wrongly used, and to recommend their withdrawal when
the task is completed should such withdrawal not have been
already ordered by the British Commander under whom the
British Troops are acting ‘in support’.
(iv) In addition, the local commander of British Troops (not below
the rank of Brigade Commander) must be prepared to take
action to protect British lives without order, from the local
area/sub area commander should he consider it necessary. In such
event he will immediately report to G.O.C. British Troops in
India and Pakistan, and to the local area/sub area commander
the action he has taken.
ARTHUR SMITH
Lieut General
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
JULY 1947
397
268
Sir G. Abell to Mr Morris-Jones
R/3l 1/152:/ 8
secret 29 July 1947
No. 1996/5
My dear Morris-Jones,
H.E. asks me1 to say that he will be grateful if you will examine the question
how there can be a looser association within the Commonwealth which would
allow India to remain a member, even if it became a Republic. H.E. thinks
that two points might be taken into consideration. First the abolition of the
term “Dominion”, and, secondly, the nomination by The King of an elected
head of the State, whose title should preferably not be “President” or any
Indian term which would immediately be translated as “President”.
When your paper is ready we could perhaps consider it with H.E. at a Staff
Meeting.
Yours sincerely,
G. E. B. ABELL
1 See No. 256, item 7.
269
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
and Mr Gandhi , Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy’s Interview No. l 70(A)
29 July 1947, 10.30 am- 11.43 am
I explained that I had called this meeting to consider Pandit Nehru’s projected
visit to Kashmir.1 I recalled the history2 of this affair from the time I arrived,
and said that Pandit Nehru had from the very beginning repeatedly expressed
to me his strong desire to visit Kashmir which I understood was based on the
incidents3 that occurred there during the visit of the Cabinet Mission last year.
I expressed sincere sympathy with Pandit Nehru’s mental distress at having
been unable to keep his promise to visit his friends in Kashmir and endeavour
to effect the release of Sheikh Abdulla.
I reminded the meeting that it had been agreed that Mr, Gandhi should visit
Kashmir in place of Pandit Nehru if this was generally thought to be a better
1 See No. 249.
2 See correspondence ending with No. 260.
3 See Vol. VII, Nos. 364 and 594; see also No. 4, note 3 of this volume.
398
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
solution; and I took the full blame for having delayed this visit by offering to
go myself to Kashmir. I repeated my regret at having been unable to discuss
the release of Sheikh Abdulla with the Maharaja on the last day of my visit
owing to His Highness’s indisposition. I admitted having asked Mr. Gandhi
to wait until the arrival of the Prime Minister of Kashmir, Pandit Kak. But
I said I was at a loss to understand how, consequent on Pandit Kak’s visit to
both Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Nehru to ask neither of them to go, the result
should have been that Pandit Nehru wished to go instead of Mr. Gandhi.
Whatever Pandit Nehiu’s personal emotions might be, I felt I should be
failing in my duty if I did not point out that this was hardly the time for the
Vice-President of the Interim Government and the Prime Minister of the
Dominion Government which was to take over power in 17 days, to leave the
capital on what really amounted to almost private business; at all events on
a visit which it would be extremely difficult to explain away to world opinion.
I also pointed out that a visit by any Congress leaders could not fail to be
badly received in the world press just at the time it was known that Kashmir
had the choice of Pakistan or India before its Ruler ; but that this effect would
be somewhat mitigated if Mr. Gandhi went on account of the religious aura
that surrounded him, whereas if Pandit Nehru went it would be regarded as
a piece of straightforward political lobbying.
Mr. Gandhi agreed with what I had said, and stated that although at Mr. Kak’s
request he had agreed not to go, if I seriously regarded Pandit Nehru’s pro¬
posed visit as objectionable, he would himself be prepared once more to take
his place.
Sardar Patel gave it as his view that neither of them should go, but that in
view of Pandit Nehru’s great mental distress if his mission in Kashmir were to
remain unfulfilled, he agreed that one of them must go. He very bluntly
remarked: “It is a choice between two evils and I consider that Gandhiji’s visit
would be the lesser evil”.
Pandit Nehru held forth at some length about his mental distress and defended
his visit on the grounds that (a) nothing would be more natural than that
Congress should send a high-level emissary to lay before the Government of
Kashmir the advantages of joining the Dominion of India, and (b) that it was
well known that he was over-worked ; that he would like to go away for three
or four days’ rest somewhere in any case, and that Kashmir would be a delight¬
ful place in which to have a brief holiday. The fact that he might be engaged on
local work would be a sufficient change of occupation to give him the necessary
rest.
The rest of us each argued in turn with Pandit Nehru and finally Mr. Gandhi
specifically renewed his offer to go provided Pandit Nehru would accept that
offer, which he urged him to do since Sardar Patel and I, who were the two
JULY I947
399
“outside” members of the party, were so strongly in favour of Gandhi’s
going.
Finally it was agreed that Mr. Gandhi should leave on the following night
train via Rawalpindi and that I would send telegrams4 to the Resident in
Kashmir and the Governor of the Punjab.
M. OF B.
29.7.47
4 For the telegram to the Resident at Kashmir, see No. 277. F01 the telegram to the Governor of the
Punjab (No. 3021-S of 29 July), see R/3/1/94: f 47.
270
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
and Pandit Nehru ( Extract )
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy’s Interview No. 1 70 (. B )
29 July 1Q47, 11.45 am-i pm
★ ★ ★
7. I next referred to the unfortunate confusion over the Commander-in-Chief,
and the reconstitution of the Government.1 I assured him of my complete
faith in Field Marshal Auchinleck’s integrity. If proof were needed of his
impartiality, it was to be found in the fact that the League, Congress and the
Services Clubs in London, were all equally convinced that he was not
adequately looking after the interests of Muslims, Flindus and the British
element. I assured him that the Field Marshal had not read my order splitting
the Government, and that the remarks recorded in the minutes were made in
perfectly good faith, and in complete ignorance of what the new Government
policy was. I told him the C-in-C was asking Sir Chandulal Trivedi to come
up and visit him at the beginning of August, and I was sure that Trivedi would
be able to convince him of the genuineness of the misunderstanding, and help
to clear up the confusion.
/
/
★ ★ ★
1 Sec Nos. 247 and 256, Item 2.
400
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
271
Mr Griffin to Sir G. Abell
R/3l1l149: f 2
D.O. NO. f63-r(s)/46 political DEPARTMENT,
NEW DELHI, 29 July I947
My dear Abell,
Please refer to your demi-official letter No. 1299/2 dated July 24, 1947.1
2. Disposal of the Political Department’s records was discussed at His
Excellency’s meeting with the Party Leaders on June 13, 1947, 2 it was agreed —
(a) that the Political Adviser should apply to the Member for Education for
the services of experts to assist in the weeding and sorting of the Crown
Representative’s Records; but that there should be no more destruction
of these records until after the transfer of power; and
(b) that records which
(i) contained information regarding the private lives of Rulers and
the internal affairs of States, or
(ii) had not been weeded to see whether they contained such
information
should be handed over, on the transfer of power, to the United Kingdom
High Commissioner.
3. In view of this decision it is not now possible for the Political Department
to transfer any of their records to States. Residents have, however, been
instructed to hand over to individual States such of the Residency records as
they are likely to find of administrative value, and I understand that the
Resident, Punjab States, is, in fact, transferring a number of such records to the
Patiala Government.
4. The Maharaja was of course wrong when he spoke of records being
“returned” to States. No one has taken away any records from them; indeed
they must, in the normal course, have their counterparts of the correspondence
portion of Political Department records with which they are concerned ; and
they have no more right to our records than we have to theirs.
Yours sincerely
C. L. GRIFFIN
1 Requesting advice as to a reply which could be given in response to a request made by the Maharaja
of Patiala that records in the Political Department of great interest to the States should be returned to
them. R/3/1/149: f 91.
2 Vol. XI, No. 175, pp. 325-6.
JULY I947
401
272
Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , R/31 1/157 * / 239
immediate 29 Jw/y 1947, 3. oo pm
confidential Received: 29 July , 7.00 pm
No. 197-G. Partition Committee has not yet made promised statement 1 At
today’s meeting Daultana said he had prepared a draft which he would discuss
today with Swaran Singh. Latter saw me after meeting and said that in view
of Giyani Kartar Singh’s statement2 that Sikhs would not accept Boundary
Commission’s award unless they considered it just, he did not know what to
to do. He could not oppose Giyani Kartar Singh who is President S. A. Dal.
I replied that Sikhs were making themselves ridiculous and that having agreed
to Commission and Baldev Singh having further agreed on their behalf to
accept award3 they could not now decently change their ground. Swaran
Singh agreed but said that Giyani had gone to Delhi and he could not contact
him. I advised Swaran Singh to get into touch with Baldev Singh immediately.
In the meantime I suggest you ask Baldev Singh to put all possible pressure on
Giyani to make statement accepting award. Nankana Sahib demonstration4
seems to have fizzled out but Giyani intends to organise Sikh hartal on
5th August.5
1 See No. 228, para. 11.
2 No such statement by Giyani Kartar Singh has been traced but cf. Enclosure to No. 56 and Enclosure
to No. 292.
3 See No. 224. 4 See Nos. 214, 238 and 292, para. 3.
5 In tel. 224-C of 30 July from Bengal to New Delhi, Mr Christie informed Sir G. Abell that the
‘Viceroy would like Lord Ismay to contact Major Short and Baldev Singh immediately in order to
bring pressure on Giyani to make the statement’. R/3/1/157: f 240.
273
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Transfer of Power , Ceremonies Jor, Part ( 2 )
important new Delhi, 29 July 1947, 12. 30 pm
confidential Received: 29 July, 1.30 pm
No. 301 i-S. My 2971-S.1 Oaths of Office. Nehru and Patel have now been
consulted. They have no objection to the Oaths of Allegiance and Office being
taken by me in the manner suggested by you.2
1 No. 252.
2 See No. 215.
402
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
2. As regards Governors neither Colville nor Nye will be required to take
fresh Oaths.3 For the rest Formula A in my immediately succeeding telegram4
is proposed.
3. For Ministers Formula B in my immediately succeeding telegram is
proposed.
4. Form of Oath of Secrecy can be as at present except that the following
words at the end will be omitted “or as may be specially permitted by the
Governor-General’ ’ .
5. I agree that in the Oath for Ministers we need not specifically mention
being faithful to His Majesty, etc. This is implied by faith and allegiance to the
Constitution of India which includes His Majesty and this could be made clear
in Press guidance. I am sure we should not force this issue which is not repeat
not in my view a vital one.
6. I shall still have to agree the forms with Jinnah but I hope this will not
present difficulty.
3 Lord Mountbatten telegraphed as follows in tel. 664-GT of 14 August: ‘Government of India have
now requested that Governors of Bombay, Assam and Madras should take an oath of allegiance and
office tomorrow Friday 15th August and instructions to this effect have been issued to them.’
L/P&J/10/142: f 7.
4 No. 274.
274
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Transfer of Power, Ceremonies For , Part (2)
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 2p July I947, 12.J0 pm
CONFIDENTIAL Received : 29 July, 4.20 pm
No. 3012. My immediately preceding telegram.1
Formula A. ‘I . do swear that in the office of . I will be
faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty King George VI, his heirs and
.successors and to the Constitution of India as by law established and that I will
do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of India without fear
or favour, affection or ill will. So help me God.’
Formula B. ‘I . do swear that in the office of . I will bear true
faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established and that
I will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of India without
fear or favour, affection or ill will. So help me God.’
1 No. 273.
JULY I947
403
275
The Earl of Listoivel to Mr Attlee
L/P &S/ 13/1848: ff 133-4
India office, 29 July 1947
Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 134/47
Prime Minister,
You will have seen the report of the Viceroy’s Speech to the Conference of
Rulers and Representatives of Indian States on 25 th July1 which has already
been circulated as I.B.(N) (47) 222 (copy attached for convenience of reference).
The speech contained two points which appear to me to be not altogether
consistent with what was said on the subject of the States in Parliament,3 and
it seems to me desirable to draw the Viceroy’s attention to these inconsistencies
so that in any further discussions he may have with States’ representatives he
may avoid emphasising these points further.
It has to be remembered that in his discussions with States’ representatives
the Viceroy is acting as a mediator in bis personal capacity and not on the
advice of his Ministers either in form or fact. We are therefore answerable in
a special way for what he may do and it would seem advisable to warn him of
the dangers, particularly in view of the importance which the Opposition
attaches to no pressure being put upon the Princes by us .4
If you agree, I would propose to send the Viceroy the telegram of which
a draft5 is attached.
LISTOWEL
1 No. 234. 2 Not printed. 3 See No. 262. 4 Emphasis in original.
5 Not printed. The draft telegram attached to this minute was the same as the telegram (No. 307) as
issued. On 31 July Mr Attlee minuted: ‘I approve your telegram’. L/P &S/13/1848 : f 132.
276
Meeting of the Provisional Joint Defence, Case Nos.J.D.C. 9/2/47 , 11/2/47
Mountbatten Papers. Provisional Joint Defence Council Ministers
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting on 29 July 1947 at 5 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mountbatten of Burma, Mr Jinnah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Patel,
Dr Rajendra Prasad, Sardar Baldev Singh, Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck,
Mr Christie, Mr FI. M. Patel, Mr Mohamad Ali, Brigadier Elliott, Mr Osman Ali,
Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
404
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Case No. J. D.C. 9/2/47 Position of British Troops after 15 th August.1
His Excellency said that it had been agreed that British troops remaining in
India after 14th August would have no operational responsibility, and he had
been considering the best method to let that fact be known. It was agreed that
His Excellency should suggest to H.M.G. that a question be asked in Parliament
and a suitable reply given; failing that a statement would be issued in this
country.
Case No. J. D.C. 1 1/2/47 Situation on the Punjab Frontier
His Excellency circulated a note2 showing information he had received as to
the possibility of trouble in the boundary areas of the Punjab as a consequence
of partition. He explained that the information had been supplied before the
ban was placed by the Governor of the Punjab on Sikhs attending the meeting
at Nankana Sahib.3
The Commander-in-Chief explained that General Rees’ force would be in
position by 1st August. He said that attempts were always being made to subvert
troops, but that he had no recent information that these had been any more
successful than in the past.
It was suggested that the imposition of the ban by the Governor of the
Punjab had accentuated the trouble, and that while it was wise to take pre¬
cautionary measures, undue repression very often aggravated the trouble it
was designed to suppress.
His Excellency pointed out that in imposing the ban the Governor of the
Punjab had had to take into consideration the very large number of Sikhs who
proposed to attend the meeting. He had felt that the presence of very large
crowds might cause trouble to break out spontaneously and that the imposition
of the ban had in fact reduced the trouble that would otherwise have had to be
faced.
His Excellency emphasized that there were British officers present with
practically every unit of General Rees’ force, and he considered that they were
the best safeguard not only against attempts to subvert the troops, but also in
restraining the troops of the two Dominions from fighting against each other
since under no circumstances could British officers be ranged on opposite
sides.
1 See No. 256, item 3.
2 No. 250.
3 See Nos. 214, 238 and 292, para. 3.
JULY 1947
405
277
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Resident at Kashmir
Telegram , R/3/1/94: / 48
most immediate 29 July 1947, 6.45 pm
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 3020-S. Please inform H.H. that with the greatest difficulty I have suc¬
ceeded in persuading Nehru to stand down in favour of Gandhi, but nothing
would induce them to forgo a visit by one or the other of them to Kashmir in
the immediate future.1 Gandhi leaves Delhi night train Wednesday 30th, via
Rawalpindi 31st, due Srinagar by car afternoon Friday 1st.
2. Nehru is arranging for Gandhi to stay with friends privately.
3. Gandhi wishes to give Maharaja assurance that he adheres to original
undertaking to hold no public meetings, not even prayer meetings, and to make
no political speeches.
4. Properly handled the visit of Gandhi should not give rise to any serious
trouble.
5. I should like you to send me brief daily reports during visit.
1 See No. 269.
278
Minutes of the Viceroy’s Twenty Third Miscellaneous Meeting
Mountbatten Papers
S E C R F T
Those present at this Meeting held at the Viceroy’s House, New Delhi , on 29 July
1947 at 6. jo pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma, Mr Jinnah,
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart, Lieutenant-Colonel
Frskine Crum
sir rob lockhart stated that, when first he had arrived to assume the
Governorship of the NorthWest Frontier Province, he had asked the members
of the existing Ministry whether they could, in any circumstances, see their
way to agreeing to vote for Pakistan, as they admitted that it was out of the
question foi the North West Frontier Province to join Hindustan — and also,
surely, in their heart of hearts, admitted that an independent Pathanistan was
40 6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
impossible. The Ministers had made both these admissions; but had stated that
they would never accept joining Pakistan as such. He had then seen Dr. Khan
Sahib separately, and asked him what he would do if the referendum went
against him. Dr. Khan Sahib had said that he would resign if there was 30%
vote for Pakistan. Later, however, complaints against the conduct of the
referendum had begun; Dr. Khan Sahib had claimed that it was being run in
an improper manner, had changed his position, and had declared that he would
not resign, sir rob lockhart said that he had then tackled Dr. Khan Sahib
privately, but the latter had held his position and claimed that the referendum
result would not be a fundamental issue. Dr. Khan Sahib had stated that he saw
no reason why he should resign, because he had a majority in the Legislative
Assembly and was convinced that he still enjoyed the support of the majority
of the electorate. He (Sir Robert Lockhart) had pointed out that the referendum
was surely no more improperly run than the election which had put the
Congress party in power ; and with this Dr. Khan had agreed !
sir Robert lockhart said that he had then considered what recommen¬
dation for the future Government of the Province to make to the Viceroy.1
He had first thought of some form of Coalition Ministry for the interim period.
But neither the present Ministry nor the local Muslim League leaders considered
that this was practicable, although Dr. Khan Sahib personally thought that it
could be done although he himself would take no part. Another course might
be for the present Ministry to continue until 15th August. But this did not
seem fair to the future Government of Pakistan. Another possibility was to
dissolve the Legislative Assembly. A still further one was to dismiss the present
Ministry and to form a Ministry of the Muslim League minority — but, if the
Legislative Assembly met, such a Ministry would be in a minority in the
House. Furthermore, the local leaders were not particularly keen on this course.
The last course open was Government in Section 93 . The only point in favour
of this course was that it would be the least offensive to either party at the
present time. But the great disadvantage was that there would be no one to
carry on the Government when 15th August came.
his excellency said that he personally was violently opposed2 to Govern¬
ment by Section 93 as it would be interpreted by the public as the last act of the
British to introduce direct rule.
sir rob lockhart said that he had later seen Dr. Khan Sahib again and
the latter had still adhered to his decision not to resign.3 He (Sir Rob Lockhart)
had asked Dr. Khan Sahib on what terms he might consider resigning. Dr. Khan
Sahib had suggested that the Legislative Assembly should be dissolved and
fresh elections ordered. But he had agreed that this was impossible before
15th August, and that new elections would have to be held under the new
Constitution and the new Electoral role. Dr. Khan Sahib had thought that this
could be done within three to four months, sir rob lockhart said that
JULY I947
407
finally he had pointed out to Dr. Khan Sahib that it was in his own interests
to resign; and thus the position had been left when he had come away. He
had asked Dr. Khan Sahib what the Congress party would do if the present
Ministry was dismissed. Dr. Khan Sahib had left no doubt in his mind that it
was intended to stage a movement of some sort.4 He had personally given an
assurance that he would himself do his best to ensure that this was non-violent.
sir rob lockhart added that he understood that, if the Assembly was
dissolved, the existing Ministry would have to carry on.
the viceroy asked whether it was considered that there was any possibility
of those members of the Legislative Assembly who had up to now supported
the present Ministry, changing sides.
sir rob lockhart said that it was very difficult to get definite information
on this point; but so far as he could gather, few members of the Legislative
Assembly had declared this intention.
MR. liaquat ali khan said that he considered it quite possible that non-
Muslim members, now that they knew that Pakistan had been established,
would feel that they must look to the Muslim League, and might cease to
support Congress.
mr jinnah said that he agreed with this, but he considered that it was
necessary to plan on the assumption that Dr. Khan Sahib would continue to
enjoy the support of the majority of the Legislative Assembly. He pointed out
that there had been precedents, for example in Bombay and the Punjab, for
calling on minority parties to form Ministries. He agreed that the Legislative
Assembly should not be summoned. He further agreed that Section 93
Government should be avoided. He gave his opinion that the North West
Frontier Province had given a “thumping” verdict of ‘No confidence’ in the
present Ministry.5 mr. jinnah went on to say that he considered Dr. Khan
Sahib was acting in a mamier which made it clear that he was unfit to be
a Prime Minister. No decent man would, in such circumstances, refuse to resign.
mr. jinnah said that in his view the only practicable course now was again
to ask Dr. Khan Sahib to resign; and, if he refused, to dismiss him and to form
an Interim Ministry of the next largest party (the Muslim League), mr. jinn ah
suggested that a Ministry of three should be formed to begin with. Possibly
later the fourth place might be offered to the Hindus. He gave his opinion that
the Hindus would be the first to support such a new Ministry.
mr. jinnah said that he did not consider that it would be desirable to
dissolve the Legislative Assembly. It was not necessary that this Assembly
should be called together until the Budget Session in March 1948. He did not
consider it necessary that it should be called in order to choose a successor to
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who had resigned from membership of the
1 See Nos. 45 and 188. 2 See Nos. 82 and 101. 3 See No. 211.
s Presumably a reference to the result of the referendum; see No. 187.
4 See ibid.
4-08
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Constituent Assembly.6 He went on to say that, in the rules which would be
framed on ioth August for the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, there would be
provision to the effect that if a member did not attend two consecutive meetings
he would, ipso facto , be expelled unless he had special reasons to be excused.
the viceroy said that, in his opinion, it would be psychologically ideal to
give warning to both sides of this intention now, but not to take the step
until 15th August. He enquired whether, if such a course was chosen, the
present Government could do much harm to the future of the Province in
Pakistan.
sir rob lockhart replied that he did not consider that they could do a
great deal of harm. Financially, the North West Frontier Province was in
a poor way, and there was no more to spend. There might, however, be inter¬
ference in the posting of officials, the viceroy suggested that a Standstill
Order might be enforced on this aspect.
sir rob lockhart went on to say that he considered that, if warning of
the intention to dismiss the Ministry was given, the Congress party would
have more time to plan and prepare a movement. Therefore, he considered it
desirable that, if a change were to be made, it should be made as soon as
mr. li aqu at ali khan said that he also considered that a new Ministry
should be formed as soon as possible. It would then have time to get hold of
the machinery properly, particularly in view of the danger of trouble in the
tribal areas, where the machinery of Government could be used for propaganda
purposes, mr. jinn ah said that he considered that every day that passed made
the situation more dangerous. He could provide no definite proof of the
intentions of the tribes ; but was receiving daily reports of agents stirring up
trouble in the tribal areas and even of terrorization in the Province itself. For
example, 6,000 arms licences had been issued during the last few weeks.
the viceroy said that it was his desire to legalise the position as much as
possible. He suggested that there should be a meeting of the Members of the
Pakistan Executive Council, and that, at this meeting, instructions for him to
send the Governor should be drawn up. These should preferably be in the
form of an Order-in-Council.
the viceroy said that the situation with regard to choosing a successor for
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad might also be considered at his meeting with the
Pakistan Executive Council.
the viceroy also emphasised the necessity for making a clear statement on
the decision which would be reached at the Pakistan Executive Council Meeting.
It was decided : —
That there should be a Meeting of the Pakistan Executive Council at
10 a.m. on Friday, 1st August; and that Mr. Liaquat Ah Khan should arrange
JULY 1947
409
for papers to be prepared for this meeting, in co-operation with Mr. Mohd.
Ah and Sir George Spence on —
(a) the form of instructions which the Viceroy should issue to the Governor
of the North West Frontier Province on the future Government of that
Province,
(b) the problem arising from the resignation of Maul ana Abul Kalam Azad
as a member of the Constituent Assembly.7
6 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad resigned his membership of the India Constituent Assembly on 21 July.
7 On the related issue of the summoning of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly Mr Sundarain, in his
letter of 1 August to Sir G. Abell, explained that a formal summoning by Lord Mountbatten was not
required from a purely legal or constitutional point of view. The Assembly had been duly constituted
by virtue of Mountbatten’s announcement (published on 26 July) giving the names of the members.
R/3/1/168: f 26.
279
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
and Mr Jinnah and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan (Extract)1
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy s Interview No. 172
29 July 1947 , 7.00 pm
★ ★ ★
4. BIHAR
the viceroy asked Mr. Jinnah whether he would agree to request the local
Muslim League Leaders in Bihar to withdraw their demand for an enquiry
into the riots2 which had taken place there.3 mr. jinnah said that it would be
very difficult for him to make such a request at this stage. However, he con¬
sidered that the situation would be radically changed by the setting-up of two
new Dominions on 15th August, and assumed that the issue would probably
lapse.
After further discussion it was agreed that the Viceroy would take no action
towards answering the letter4 5 which he had received from the Governor of
Bihar on this subject, and that the whole question would be left in the air.
5. ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
mr. jinn ah stated that he was in close touch with Sir Patrick Spens concerning
the rendition of the name of a Muslim representative for the Arbitral Tribunal.
He had already decided on a nominee and would send the name in to Sir Patrick
Spens shortly.
1 Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum was also present at this interview and dictated the record.
2 See Vol. IX, No. 77. 3 See No. 34. 4 cf. ibid., note 2.
4io
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
6. AMNESTY TO BE DECLARED ON I5TH AUGUST
the viceroy suggested that he should go into the question of the declaration
of an amnesty on 15th August, on behalf of both future Dominions. He
emphasised the desirability of both Dominions acting ‘in step’ on this matter.
He said that it was proposed to release the ex-I.N.A. prisoners as part of this
amnesty. He emphasised the undesirability of publicity in this connection.
mr. jinnah signified thorough agreement; and the viceroy undertook
to send Mr. Jinnah particulars when he had further considered the matter.
7. FLAGS
mr. liaquat ali khan produced, out of his brief case, a revised design for
the flag of the Pakistan Dominion. This was similar to the Muslim League flag
except that the quarter nearest the flagpole was white instead of dark green.
There was unanimous approbation of this design, the viceroy said that it
had been suggested that the flags of Governors in Pakistan should be on a deep
green background.5 mr. jinnah agreed with this suggestion.
mr. jinnah also agreed that the armlets for members of the Personal Staff
of Governors in Pakistan, should be deep green.
mr. jinnah said that he had decided to agree to the design for the Governor-
General’s flag,6 which had been put forward. He made it clear that his reason
for not having made this decision previously had arisen from fear that the
Dominion of India would change the design at the earliest possible moment.
the viceroy undertook to inform M. Jinnah privately, in advance, if there
was any evidence that the Dominion of India had any such intention.
5 See No. 261 and its note 5. 6 See Appendix ‘C’ to No. 243.
280
The Resident at Kashmir to Sir G. Abell
Telegram , Rf 3/ 1/94: f 49
MOST IMMEDIATE 2 p July 1Q47, 10.00 pm
confidential Received : 30 July , 1.43 am
No. 73. Viceroy’s telegram No. 2989-S of July 28th.1 Have conveyed His
Excellency’s message. His Highness says visit of either Gandhi or Nehru not
only most inadvisable at this stage but most dangerous in potentialities from
point of view even of India as a whole. There is no ban on entry into the state
but it must be remembered that all public gatherings, processions etc. are
JULY 1947
411
banned in the interest of public peace. Kashmir Government will do their best
to prevent untoward incidents during visit if it cannot be avoided but are not
prepared to give any guarantee in this behalf 2 As for declaration regarding
adherence to a Dominion His Highness says no decision has been arrived as yet.
1 No. 260.
2 Following the decision that Mr Gandhi should visit Kashmir instead of Pandit Nehru (see Nos. 269,
and 277) Sir G. Abell, in tel. 3050-S of 30 July, asked Lieutenant-Colonel Webb to ‘emphasise to
Kashmir Government that Viceroy hopes every possible precaution will be taken to ensure that there
are no untoward incidents’ which the Viceroy thought it should be possible to prevent. Webb telegraphed
on 31 July that ‘Prime Minister assures me that every possible repeat possible precaution is being
taken’. In subsequent telegrams he reported that Gandhi had seen Pandit Kak on 2 and 3 August and
the Maharaja on 3 August, and that he was to see the Begum Abdulla during the evening of 3 August.
In tel. 83 of 4 August, Webb reported that Gandhi had reached Jammu safely and was to leave for
Sialkot early the next day. R/3/1/94: ff 53-7. Gandhi sent Nehru a report of his visit to Kashmir in
which he referred to his talks with Pandit Kak and the Maharaja. Extracts from the report are quoted
in Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: the Last Phase , Volume II, Amhedabad, 1958, pp. 357-8.
281
Mr Symon to Mr V. P. Menon
LIP&SI13I1837: jf 28-9
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE
UNITED KINGDOM, 6 ALBUQUERQUE ROAD,
new Delhi, jo July ig47
Thank you for your letter of the 26th July1 about the employment of ex-
Political Department officers under the High Commission.
2. I have discussed this with the High Commissioner who has asked me to
say that he feels sure you will appreciate that we have had great difficulty in
filling the posts required for the two High Commissions in India and Pakistan,
and that it would not have been possible to do this without having recourse to
the Political Service as well as the Indian Civil Service. Nor would it have been
fair on the men from the Political Service who have now opted for and accepted
employment under His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, to
have left them out of the running.
3 . At the same time, in choosing officers from the Indian Services of what¬
ever kind, Sir Terence Shone has always been mindful of the undertaking
which he gave both to Mr. Nehru and Sardar Patel when he first told them of
the intention to recruit men from those Services, that he would do his
utmost to ensure that none were taken or employed on work in a manner
likely to raise difficulties with the Indian authorities. All men selected for
1 No. 244.
412
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
employment under the High Commission have been chosen with great care,
having regard to their records and after personal interviews. They will also be
posted with the same care which, after all, is just as essential from the point of
view of the High Commission, in the interests of the friendly relations which
it is our particular desire to maintain with the Indian authorities.
4. As regards the High Commission for the United Kingdom in India, we
have already made arrangements to employ three officers from the Political
Service, namely, Messrs. Shattock, Ramsay, and Crawley. It is understood that
the latter has only had a very short period of service with the Political
Department.
5 . It is our present intention to employ Mr. Shattock in Delhi, Mr. Ramsay
in Calcutta and Mr. Crawley in Madras.
6. The High Commissioner has authorised me to convey to you an assurance
that there is no intention to use these officers to influence the Indian States or
to maintain direct relations with them. You may rest assured that in this, as in
other matters, the High Commissioner and his staff will continue to respect
the sentiments of the Government of India to which you refer in your letter ;
and Sir Terence Shone, who is anxious to ensure that there are no grounds for
any complaint on the part of the Government of India in respect of the employ¬
ment of ex-officers of the Indian Services in the High Commission under his
direction, is confident that the employment of these officers will not give rise
to any such complaints.
c. B. SYMON
282
Mr. V. P. Menon to Mr Symon
L/P&SI13I1837: f 30
STATES DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 30 July I947
My dear Symon,
Many thanks for your letter of the 30th July1 which I have shown to my
Hon’ble Member. He is quite satisfied with the assurance you have given in
para. 6 of your letter.
Yours sincerely,
v. P. MENON
1 No. 281.
JULY I947
413
283
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl oj Listowel
Telegram, R/ 3/ 1/82: f log
immediate new Delhi, 30 July 1947, 1.30 am
confidential Received: 30 July , 00.03 am
No. 3039-S. In continuation of my telegram 2977-S dated 27th July.1 Role of
British forces. We discussed this in provisional Joint Defence Council this
evening.2 The Council agreed that a statement should be made, and preferred
that it should be made by means of a question and answer in Parliament. This
would have the advantage of appearing more spontaneous and therefore would
be less likely to cause alarm than a deliberate announcement by the Government.
2. Suggested question and answer might be as follows: —
Begins. Question. To ask the Secretary of State what will be the role of British
forces who remain in India after 15th August during the next few months
before they are finally withdrawn. Answer. The Hon’ble Member presumably
has in mind the possibility that British troops may be used for maintaining
law and order. The position is that British troops will not be available to inter¬
vene in internal disorder and will have in fact no operational responsibility
whatever. Ends.
3 . If you see any difficulty about the question and answer method I will have
a short announcement made here.
4. Partition Council has accepted that there will not be any RAF Squadrons
available for operational use.
1 This telegram referred to No. 169 and continued: ‘Question has now been raised whether Royal Air
Force would be used if necessary to deal with tribal raids on frontier. Until this is settled no public
statement about use of British forces can be made.’ L/WS/1/1092: f 213.
2 See No. 276, Case No. J. D.C. 9/2/47.
414
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
284
The Maharaja of Travancore to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten oj Burma1
Rtel 1 1 144: ff 69-70
PALACE, TRIVANDRUM, 30 July 1947
Your Excellency,
Your Excellency’s letter of the 22nd July2 has been handed over to me by
Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar. He has also told me of the discussions he has had
with Your Excellency.3 I have perused the letter with the full realisation that
Your Excellency has paid as much regard as possible to the history and traditions
of this State, to the complete maintenance of its internal autonomy and to the
need for trade, fiscal and commercial relations with the whole world which are
the basic needs of this maritime State and are essential for its survival as an
effective economic unit.
Having regard to the assurances conveyed by Your Excellency, I have
decided, though not without hesitation, to take this step of accession to the
Dominion of India subject to the conditions adverted to in your letter.
Your Excellency, of course, realises that the States have been given the
option of reconsideration of the position when the final Constitution of the
Dominion is formulated.
I am,
Your Excellency’s sincerely,
RAMA VARMA
1 The Maharaja had also sent Lord Mounthatten a telegram, dated 30 July, as follows: ‘I have posted by
air mail reply to Your Excellency’s letter of twenty second in general confirmation of terms discussed
with my Dewan’, to which Lord Mounthatten replied in tel. 3070-S of 1 August: ‘Many thanks for
Your Highness’s telegram. I am delighted that you are coming in.’ R/3/1/144: ff 67, 71.
2 No. 203. 3 See No. 228, paras. 16-19.
285
Sir G. Abell to the Maharaja of Patiala
Rl3lil49:ff 93
No. 1299/2 30 July 1 947
My dear Maharaja Sahib,
Your Highness will remember diat at a recent interview1 with H.E. the
Viceroy you mentioned the question of Political Department records.2 You
suggested that there must be records with the Political Department or in the
Residencies which would be of value to the States concerned.
JULY 1947
415
H.E. asks me to let you know that the Residents have been instructed to
hand over to individual States such of the Residency records as they are likely
to find of administrative value and I understand that the Resident, Punjab
States, is in fact transferring a number of such records to the Patiala
Government.
Yours sincerely,
G. E. B. ABELL
1 Not traced. 2 See No. 271 and its note 1.
286
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab )
Telegram , R/j/ 1/171: f 44
confidential jo July 1947, 2.00 pm
BY HAND OF PILOT
No. 3041-S. Partition Council have been discussing precautionary action to
prevent disturbances in the neighbourhood of the boundaries between the two
Dominions before and after 15 th August.1 After some discussion about the
powers of the Central Government in this respect, it was decided that I should
ask you to cover the period up to 15th August by declaring under your
Punjab Legislation the districts likely to be affected on either side of the
boundary, to be “disturbed areas”, as from 1st August.
2. To meet the situation which might arise after 15 th August, it was decided
that, instead of getting the Governments of East Punjab and West Punjab to
make similar declarations on that date, an order should be kept ready for
publication in the Central Gazettes of India and Pakistan, directing Govern¬
ments of East Punjab and West Punjab respectively to refrain from rescinding
your declaration referred to above, save with the concurrence of the Central
Government of India or of Pakistan.
3. I should be glad if you would now take the action indicated in para¬
graph 1 above.
1 This issue had in fact been discussed by the Provisional Joint Defence Council at its meeting (Case No.
J. D.C. 18/2/47) on 29 July. The decisions reached corresponded with those referred to in the above
telegram. Mountbatten Papers, Provisional Joint Defence Council Minutes.
4i 6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
287
Minutes of Viceroy s Twenty Fourth Miscellaneous Meeting 1
Mounthatten Papers
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at Government House , Bengal , on 30 July 1947
at 3 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma , Sir F. Burrows ,
Mr PL S. Suhrawardy , Mr Nazimuddin , Mr D. N. Mukherjee , Mr IV. jR. Sarker ,
Mr N. M. Khan, Mr S. N. Ray .
H/so present were: Mr Tyson , Mr Christie , Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
THE viceroy’s OPENING REMARKS
his excellency the viceroy explained that the object of the meeting was
that he should give any help in his power towards the solution of problems
which had arisen in the Council. He might be able to give advice based on
decisions which had been reached elsewhere; or take back to Delhi for con¬
sideration by the Central Partition Council any points of particular difficulty.
He said that he understood from the Governor that the Bengal Separation
Council was a most friendly and competent body.
sir Frederick burrows confirmed this. He stated that the three major
issues on which no agreement had yet been reached were those of which the
Viceroy had been informed by telegram. Apart from these, there might be
other points which individual members wished to raise.
THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
the viceroy stated that the Arbitral Tribunal, of which Sir Patrick Spens
would be chairman, was on the point of being set up. This body, which would
have as members one Hindu and one Muslim judge, would be available to
settle problems for the whole of India. The aim and object of the Central
Partition Council, however, was to avoid referring matters to the Arbitral
Tribunal whenever possible, and whenever a common-sense solution could
be found.
THE CONTINUATION OF THE PARTITION COUNCIL AFTER
I5TH AUGUST
the viceroy explained that, in view of the fact that the processes of setting
up the two new Dominions were being rushed through by 15 th August, and
it was obviously impossible to get all details of partition settled by then, it had
been decided that there should be a definite period, until 31st March, 1948, for
the completion of partition. By this date it was hoped to complete the
reconstitution of the Armed Forces; and on it the special powers of the
Governor-General, under Section 9 of the Indian Independence Bill, would
JULY I947
417
disappear. It was intended, at the Centre, to retain a Partition Council for this
period — although the membership of this body would be different from that
of the present Council, as neither Governor-General would participate, the
viceroy suggested that it would be of great advantage if a similar arrangement
were made for the continuation of the Separation Council in Bengal.
INTERNAL SECURITY
the viceroy outlined the system of joint command which both future
Dominion Governments had decided to set up in the Punjab.2 He expressed
a hope that it would not be necessary to introduce a similar system in Bengal.
mr. suhrawardy stated that there was considerable apprehension among
the people of Calcutta.3
mr. nazimuddin pointed out that the whole work of separation would
be jeopardized if there were serious disturbances — particularly the move of the
East Bengal Government from Calcutta to Dacca, which was due to take place
in the last seven days before 15th August.
sir Frederick burrows suggested, and it was agreed, that questions of
internal security should, nevertheless, more properly be discussed in detail in
Cabinet than at the present meeting.
THE INCLUSION OF ROADS, ETC., AMONG ASSETS TO BE DIVIDED
It was stated that the first major issue on which there was a serious difference
of opinion in the Council was whether roads and road bridges, certain forests,
and rivers should be included among “assets”.
mr. ray said that he understood that roads were not so included by the
Central Partition Council.
mr. suhrawardy put forward the point that the revenues of the whole
Province had been used on improving roads ; money was moreover continually
being spent on upkeep. His suggestion was that natural assets, such as minerals,
should not be divided; but that assets on which the Government had spent
money should. Rivers, however, had had a negligible amount spent on them,
and should be excluded from this arrangement.
It was stated byMR. sarker that there were 1,200 miles of roads in Western
Bengal, and 600 miles in Eastern Bengal.
1 At a meeting of the Partition Council on 24 July Lord Mountbatten announced his intention to visit
Bengal on 29 July to meet the Provincial Separation Committee and explained that he would have a
telegram sent to the Governor of Bengal (No. 2924-S of 24 July) asking whether there were any specific
points which he or the Separation Committee wished to raise during the visit. In tels. 220-C and
222-C of 25 and 26 July respectively, Mr Tyson indicated that it was not possible to ascertain the views
of the Separation Committee as some of its members were in Delhi but furnished a list of points on
which there were serious differences of opinion. Mountbatten raised these points at a meeting of the
Partition Council on 29 July prior to his departure for Bengal and directed Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine
Crum to ascertain from the Steering Committee such information as they had on them. Mountbatten
Papers, Official Correspondence. Files: Bengal, Partition of, Part II (b).
2 See minuting ending with No. 205, Case No. P.C. 74/8/47.
3 cf. Nos. 138, 161, 193 and 194.
41 8
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
the viceroy explained that the principle on which the Central Partition
Council was working was that only moveable assets were being divided. In
the case of railways, for example, the stock was to be divided, on the principle
of train mileage in each Dominion. One problem which had not yet been
decided was the division of manufacturing plant — for example, there was only
one factory which produced gun carriages. His suggestion was that, for the
partition period at any rate, this should be made common to both Dominions.
The same principle might apply to certain institutions, particularly those
connected with research work.
the viceroy stated that he understood that, in the Punjab, roads and canals
were more or less equally situated in each half of the Province. Therefore, it
was to be realised that this particular problem was peculiar to Bengal. In his
view, it should be left until all the other issues connected with partition were
decided.
ELECTRICAL FITTINGS, TYPEWRITERS, ETC.
It was explained that the second major issue on which agreement had not
been reached was whether, in the case of divisible assets, the party in whose
region the assets would fall on partition had the right to retain a sufficient share
to satisfy its own requirements before making over all or part of the surplus
only to the other party, with or without further financial adjustment; or
whether divisible assets should be shared equally or in some proportion to be
decided upon so that both new administrations might have something to start
off with, even if both were thereby a little short until new purchases could be
made. This matter had come up in connection with certain electrical fittings,
but had also produced a deadlock in connection with typewriters and was
likely to prove a source of fundamental difference of approach.
the viceroy said that he understood that the Central Partition Council
had decided that typewriters, for example, should be divided pro rata, based on
the genuine requirements of the two new Governments.
mr. ray and mr. khan stated that the particular problem of typewriters,
and that of furniture, had been settled.
sir Frederick burrows explained that it was the general principle on
which a decision was required. The Government of West Bengal desired to
retain whatever was considered necessary to avoid impairing their efficiency.
mr. suhrawardy said that the allocation of printing presses presented the
greatest problem. There was no Government press in East Bengal. In West
Bengal, besides a Government of India press and small presses at Government
House and in Darjeeling, there were two Provincial Government presses, one
in a jail. He considered that the linotypes of these two should be divided.
the viceroy stated that this same problem had arisen at the Centre, and
had taken a long time to resolve. The disadvantages of splitting printing presses,
JULY I947
419
which would reduce their efficiency more than in proportion, which would
take a considerable time in which the parts to be moved were out of action,
and which would probably result in damage to these parts, had been realised.
He had eventually proposed, and it had been agreed, that the existing presses
should be retained by the Government of India but should be made available
to work for Pakistan on a pro rata basis. An order had been placed in the
United Kingdom for the provision of new presses for Pakistan on a high
priority. There would be a fair division of the payment for these. In the
meanwhile, the existing presses would engage extra operators and would work
double shifts. Perhaps a similar arrangement might be applied to Bengal.
mr. suhrawardy pointed out that, if the Pakistan Government was to
have top priority for the new presses being produced, there might be con¬
siderable delay before any arrived for East Bengal.
the viceroy offered to telegraph to the Secretary of State asking for
priority to be accorded to the provision of a press for East Bengal also. It was
agreed that the Governor of Bengal should inform the Viceroy of details of
what was required, sir Frederick burrows offered also to take the matter
up with the Trades Union leaders concerned, on his return to England.
mr. suhrawardy expressed himself satisfied with this arrangement. He
stated that 400 employees of the Government press had opted for Eastern
Pakistan; but the viceroy pointed out that there could be no objection to
these men continuing to work in Calcutta until the new press arrived.
the viceroy emphasized the necessity for a written agreement on these
arrangements to be made. They would work well if both sides would play fair.
mr. suhrawardy then raised the question of motor repairing workshops.
Of three in Western Bengal, one belonged to the Government of India, and
the other two to the Government of Bengal. All worked on Government
vehicles. There was also any number of other vehicle workshops in Western
Bengal, but none at all in Eastern Bengal.
the viceroy gave his opinion that, when Government vehicles were split,
the means of maintaining them should be split also. All these transactions should
be live, and not only paper ones.
mr. suhrawardy said that there was an ice-plant in Calcutta, for which
eight Diesel engines had been supplied, but which could run equally well on
the central electricity supply. There was no such supply in Eastern Bengal,
which was therefore claiming the Diesel engines.
the viceroy expressed the hope that there would be a “give and take”
attitude on both sides in matters such as this. But it seemed to him that the
Separation Council was doing the work of its sub-Committees. Problems of
this nature should very rarely come up to the Council.
sir Frederick burrows gave his opinion that the sub-Committees had
in fact done their work well.
420
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
mr. ray and mr. khan indicated agreement with the lines on which the
Viceroy had spoken, mr. ray stated that Mr. Suhrawardy had claimed that
there should be “equality of sacrifice”. The West Bengal opinion was that it
would be better to have one party capable of “carrying the other on its back”
rather than “two lame legs”.
the viceroy said that he considered that everyone should rather work on
the long-term aspect. He did not subscribe to such catch-words as “equality
of sacrifice”; but rather to “equality of common good”.
METHOD OF ASSESSING PRESENT VALUE OF GOVERNMENT
BUILDINGS AND LANDS
sir Frederick burrows explained that the problem here was whether
Government buildings and lands were to be assessed at book value, market
value or municipal value. Opposite views were held on this by either party.
mr. ray stated that this matter had not yet been fully considered on a lower
level and had not officially come up before the Separation Council.
the viceroy said that, if the problem could not be settled locally, it might
well have eventually to go before the Arbitral Tribunal.
MONEY FOR EAST BENGAL
mr. suhrawardy stated that the future Government of East Bengal wanted
25 lakhs to purchase building materials for Dacca and for pay and travelling
allowances for employees who were going to move there. This sum had
originally been allotted. But the allocation had now been withdrawn and only
5 lakhs had been made available.
mr. ray explained that the reason for this was a genuine shortage of cash.
He added that the matter had never come up before the Separation Council.
the viceroy said that it seemed to him that it would be essential for money
to be provided somehow to enable the East Bengal Government to move. All
were agreed that the money must be found, and it was only a question of ways
and means of how to produce it.
sir Frederick burrows said that this matter was to be considered at the
next Cabinet meeting, and it was hoped that it would be resolved there.
BUILDING MATERIALS
mr. suhrawardy said that much difficulty was being experienced in
obtaining cement and other building materials for Dacca.
the viceroy said that this appeared to be a question of the over-all
allocation to the Province. He offered to take the matter up in Delhi.
FOOD
mr. suhrawardy said that the food problem in East Bengal was critical.
All imports passed through Calcutta, and he understood that the Government
of West Bengal intended to make allocations in accordance with the offtake
JULY I947
421
which had hitherto obtained. If this was done, rather than an allocation
according to requirements, East Bengal would starve. The requirements of
West Bengal were static. Those of East Bengal were growing, owing to the
time of the year. The prices in East Bengal were almost three times as much as
those in West Bengal, and higher than anywhere else in India.
sir Frederick burrows said that this matter was due to come up before
the Cabinet that week.
the viceroy emphasized the extreme gravity of the food situation not only
in India but throughout the world. He suggested that Mr. Suhrawardy should
contact the Food Member of the Pakistan Government. Western Pakistan was
one of the only surplus areas in the Far East. But the question must be looked
at fairly in Bengal itself.
THE POSTING OF OFFICIALS
It was explained that Government servants in Bengal were only being given
one opportunity to decide in which of the two new Provinces they wished to
serve.
the viceroy explained that, at the Centre, a scheme had been devised
whereby each person was given a preliminary choice now, and would be asked
to make a firm decision after six months. At present feelings were running so
high that everyone, if the choice he made had to be final, would opt for the
Dominion in which his community had a majority. It was agreed that a similar
scheme might with advantage be introduced in Bengal ; and that the Steering
Committee should examine this in detail.
288
Resident for the Madras States to Sir G. Abell
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Madras , Situation in
immediate 3° Juty *947, 4'°<> pm
confidential Received: 30 July 6.00 pm
No. 73~P. Following personal and immediate message is for His Excellency
the Viceroy from Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar. Begins. Direct action and civil
disobedience including burning of buildings and toddy shops threatened by
State Congress on and from first August. This threat has to be met by police
and military action. In view of Your Excellency’s conversation with me1 and
1 See No. 228, paras. 16-19.
422
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
of the accession to the Dominion now accepted by His Highness at Your
Excellency’s instance,2 I would suggest the discountenancing of such violent
agitation by political parties. Such assistance is asked for only to avoid needless
trouble and possible loss of life. Our resources are adequate to meet the
threatened action but firing by police and possibly military would be inevitable.
Ends.
2 See Nos. 203 and 284.
289
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma and
Lieutenant-General Tuker (G.O.C. in C., Eastern Command) and Major-General
Ranking (G.O.C., Bengal and Assam District)1
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy's Interview No. 1 73
30 July 1947, 3.30 pm
the viceroy explained the plan for a joint command organisation in the
Punjab.2 He asked whether it was considered that a similar organisation was
required in Bengal. He also asked whether there was confidence that the
military authorities could deal with any disturbances which were likely to take
place in Calcutta.
lieutenant-general tuker said that he did not consider that a system
of joint command was necessary. With this sir Frederick burrows and
MAJOR-GENERAL RANKING agreed. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL TUKER gave his
opinion that there was a possibility of larger disturbances in and around Calcutta
than ever before. However, the Army was ready for this. There were more
troops available than ever before. Even after the withdrawal of the British
brigade on 14th August, there would be a Command reserve of two Indian
brigades.3 major-general ranking explained in detail the plan to deal with
major trouble in Calcutta. This was based particularly on defence of the centre
of the city, and of the “heart” (the area around Government House) which he
felt that he could guarantee.
sir Frederick burrows said that large-scale disturbances were not
anticipated in East Bengal, lieutenant-general tuker confirmed this,
JULY I947
423
and diat there were sufficient troops there to deal with anything likely to
happen. He asked, however, that steps should be taken to expedite the provision
of a Headquarters for East Bengal. He had written to G.H.Q., about this, the
viceroy said that he would take this matter up on his return to Delhi.
1 Sir F. Burrows and Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum, who dictated the record, were also present at this
interview.
2 See minuting ending with No. 205, Case No. P.C. 74/8/47, 3 cf. No. 161.
290
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
and Dr Ghosh and Mr Suhrawardy 1
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy s Interview No. 1 74
30 July 1947 , 6.30 pm
the viceroy said that he understood that Mr. Suhrawardy and Dr. Ghosh
were going to issue a joint statement similar to the one put out by the Central
Partition Council.2 This was confirmed by mr. suhrawardy and dr.ghosh.
the viceroy said that he was very pleased to hear of it.
the viceroy said that he had discussed3 with Lieutenant General Tuker and
Major General Ranking the possibility of setting up in Bengal a joint command
organisation similar to that established in the Punjab. They and the Governor
were unanimous that this was unnecessary.
MR. suhrawardy said that it was no use minimizing matters, and went on
to give details of certain incidents which had taken place. He later handed two
papers to the Viceroy, one concerning the disturbances at Kharagpur and the
other those at Howdah.
dr. ghosh said that Mr. Suhrawardy was exaggerating. The latest report
was that the situation at Kharagpur was under control.
sir Frederick burrows confirmed that the situation had been under
control since 24th July. He said that an approximately equal number of
casualties had been suffered by Muslims and non-Muslims.
the viceroy said that he was sure that, after 15th August, the Government
of West Bengal’s first request to the military authorities would be to maintain
law and order without fear or favour. This dr. ghosh confirmed.
With reference to the discussion at the Separation Council that morning,4
the viceroy said that the Governor had informed him that 7 lakhs had already
1 Sir F. Burrows and Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum, who dictated the record, were also present at
this interview.
2 See No. 224. 3 See No. 289.
4 See No. 287.
424
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
been made available for the East Bengal Government. So no question surely
arose of the move to Dacca of that Government being delayed.
mr. suhrawardy said that this amount would be “swallowed up” by the
purchase of steel and concrete.
sir Frederick burrows said that the progress of building at Dacca was,
in his opinion, so far very good.
On the question of the disposal of the Punjabi Mussulmans in the Calcutta
armed police,5 sir Frederick burrows stated that it had been arranged that
these men should start leaving on 5 th August. After they had gone, there would
be only 63 Muslims left in the armed police, the viceroy asked Dr. Ghosh
whether he would consider retaining some of the Punjabi Mussulmans.
dr. ghosh appeared to remain adamant on this point; but he declared that it
was his intention to increase the Muslim percentage in the police as a whole
until they were of a number proportionate to the total population.
In connection with the discussion which had taken place at the Separation
Council, dr. ghosh said that he agreed that Government servants should be
given first a preliminary and later a final choice as to which part of the Province
they would opt to serve in.
With reference to the future of denominational institutions, tpie viceroy
suggested that the question of the communal proportions to be admitted to
each after the transfer of power should be examined in detail by the Education
sub-Committee of the Separation Council.
5 cf. Nos. 161 and 194.
291
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
and Mr Suhrawardy 1
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy s Interview No. 1 75
30 July 1947, 7.00 pm
mr. suhrawardy suggested that representatives should be exchanged between
1 Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum was also present at this interview and dictated the record.
JULY 1947
425
East and West Bengal, after the transfer of power, in the same way as rep¬
resentatives in the form of High Commissioners were to be exchanged between
India and Pakistan, the viceroy welcomed this suggestion, and undertook
to put it forward to the Partition Council, mr. suhrawardy added that he
and Dr. Ghosh had anyhow arranged to visit each other at weekly intervals.
MR. suhrawardy asked what was happening about Sir Archibald
Rowlands.2 His view was that it would be very much worth Sir Archibald
coming out as Financial Adviser to Pakistan, even if for only three months. He
said that he would express this view in writing to Mr. Liaquat Ah Khan. When
the viceroy divulged that Mr. Jinnah had asked for Sir Archibald Rowlands
to come out as Governor of East Bengal,3 mr. suhrawardy displayed
extreme enthusiasm.
2 See No. 140.
3 In tel. 3078-S of 1 August Lord Mountbatten explained that he had been asked by Mr. Liaquat Ali
Khan, acting on behalf of Mr. Jinnah, to approach Mr Attlee to allow Sir A. Rowlands, then Permanent
Secretary at the Ministry of Supply, to accept the Governorship of East Bengal. Liaquat emphasised
that as East Pakistan would be separated from West Pakistan by a thousand miles, the position was
practically a sub-Governor-Generalship and thus one of quite unusual importance. He also pointed out
that East Bengal had a monopoly of the world’s raw jute and that properly handled it could become
a great economic asset within the Commonwealth. In tel. 10309 of 9 August Attlee explained that
economic difficulties, and particularly the heavy burden of work which would fall on the Ministry of
Supply, made it impossible to spare Rowlands for the appointment in question. He did, however,
renew the offer made in Lord Ismay’s telegram of 15 July (see No. 140 and its note 1) to make
Rowlands’ services available for two or three months as an adviser. Mr. Jinnah accepted this and
Rowlands served as his Economic and Financial Adviser between August and December 1947.
Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files : Governors-General and Governors of Provinces,
Appointment of — Part (3).
292
Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma.
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to arid from Provincial Governors
SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, JO July 1947
No. 698
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
Since my last fortnightly letter was written on 14th July,1 there has been no
improvement in the communal situation at Lahore and little improvement at
1 No. 103.
426
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Amritsar. The incident of iotli July at the North-W estern Railway Workshops
at Lahore led to further trouble, as such incidents always do. There have been
daily fires, stabbings and bomb explosions. Between 19th and 22nd July there
were no less than six serious bomb explosions in Lahore and its suburbs. In
one of these outrages the bomb was thrown at a truck load of workmen, but
fortunately there were no casualties. There was a similar outrage with a good
many casualties at an entirely different place later on the same day. Another
bomb was thrown on 20th July at a group of Muslims buying fruit near
Baghbanpura; on 21st July a fourth bomb was thrown among the audience
at a cinema; and on 22nd July the fifth and sixth outrages occurred at Lahore
Railway Station and Moghalpura Railway Station respectively. In all the four
outrages on 20th, 21st and 22nd casualties were heavy. The offenders were
Hindus or Sikhs, and luckily we were able to arrest five or six of them. Probably
in revenge for the Moghalpura outrage on 22nd a workmen’s train was held
up by Muslims near Harbanspura on 23 rd July, and several non-Muslims were
murdered. Feeling in Lahore is perhaps worse than it has ever been; the only
favourable feature in the situation is that the fires seem somewhat less effective
than they have been in the recent past.
I11 Amritsar there have been a number of bomb outrages — the worst occurred
on 28th July when 48 persons were injured in an explosion outside the Sessions
Court. Murder cases arising from the disturbances were being heard, and the
bomb was probably intended to kill some of the accused and any Muslims who
happened to be about. It actually injured 46 Muslims, one Hindu and one Sikh,
and two of the Muslims have since died.
2. Outside Lahore and Amritsar, the situation in the Amritsar and Gurdaspur
villages, along the Jullundur-Hoshiarpur border, and along the Ferozepore-
Lahore border gives cause for considerable anxiety. In Amritsar there has been
a string of rural outrages, some of them serious. Muslims have been murdered
in various ways. There have been several bomb explosions, and a train has been
fired on. In Gurdaspur attempts have been made to raid Muslim villages, and
a train has been held up. There have been two or three village raids in
Hoshiarpur, and the neighbouring Jullundur villages are involved. Casualties
have been fairly heavy. A regular communal riot has occurred at Garhshankar,
a small town in the Hoshiarpur district, with a certain amount of burning.
Various villages in the Lahore district are disturbed, and it is possible that
trouble may spread via Kasur into the Ferozepore district, where too various
outrages have been reported. The aggressors in all these rural areas seem to be
the Sikhs. I have the impression that they have made certain preparations, some
of which are now being disclosed prematurely. Bombs are widely owned and
are being widely used, and many people are in possession of firearms. A few
days ago there was a big explosion in one of the buildings attached to the
JULY I947
427
the Tam Taran Gurdwara. A stock of bombs must have gone up — the
estimates of their number vary from 6 or 7 to 150 — and during a subsequent
search gelignite, some parts of bomb cases, and two revolvers were recovered.
In various other parts of the Punjab tension is high and there have been
incidents. Gurgaon remains generally quiet owing to the presence of troops.
3. The Sikhs decided during the fortnight to hold a big meeting at Nankana
Sahib2 in the Sheikhupura district on 27th July to air theii views about the
boundary between West and East Punjab. As this was frankly a political
gathering, I decided that the general prohibition on meetings (other than
religious meetings) in the Sheikhupura district must be enforced. A consider¬
able body of Police and troops was employed; all ordinary approaches to
Nankana Sahib were guarded by an inner and an outer cordon; wide publicity
was given to the fact that the meeting was illegal ; bus services were suspended ;
and the sale of railway tickets to a number of stations, including Nankana
Sahib, was suspended. Nankana Sahib is a country town with a fairly large
Sikh population, and a good many Sikhs had collected in the Gurdwara some
days before 27th July. There was therefore a fairly large gathering on that date
— as always, estimates of its size vary, but the best opinion seems to be that
from 1500 to 2000 outsiders attended. Speeches are alleged to have been made
inside the Gurdwara, and for some time on 27th it seemed that we were in for
a civil disobedience movement. The Sikhs in Amritsar had already begun to
defy the ban on processions as a protest against the banning of the Nankana
Sahib meeting, and the leaders present at Nankana Sahib were obviously
upset. Late in the evening they informed the authorities that they would
disperse quietly, and the Deputy Commissioner said that in that case he would
not interfere with access to the Gurdwara from 28th morning. During the
night of 27/28th July Giani Kartar Singh turned up at Nankana Sahib,
apparently in disguise, and repudiated the local understanding. On hearing of
this I sent the Commissioner and the Deputy Inspector General of Police to
Nankana Sahib on 28th morning in expectation of serious trouble. Fortunately
the Sikhs present at the Gurdwara dispersed peacefully during the day, and it
was possible yesterday to withdraw both cordons of Police and troops. On the
whole I think we achieved our objective, which was to prevent a gigantic
rural gathering and to make it clear to the Sikhs that mass demonstrations about
the boundary are not considered a good thing. The Sikhs intend to organise
an all-Punjab hartal for 5th August. They are very puzzled and unhappy, and
do not quite know what to do.
4. Partition work is going very slowly indeed, and I am now clear that
a considerable muddle on 15th August cannot be avoided. Generally there is
no enthusiasm for partition — the Muslims are naturally pleased at the establish-
2 Sec Nos. 214 and 238.
428
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
ment of Pakistan, but as Punjabis they wanted the whole of the Punjab ; the
Hindus and Sikhs on the other hand are apprehensive and most reluctant to
leave Lahore. It would be difficult enough to partition within six weeks a
county of 30 million people which has been governed as a unit for 93 years,
even if all concerned were friendly and anxious to make progress. The members
of the Partition Committee are friendly enough to me, and as a rule outwardly
civil to one another; but there is a background of fear and suspicion and much
time is wasted on trivialities. We have so far been unable to reach agreement
on the principles on which assets should be divided. The reconstitution of the
Expert Committees3 was a very great mistake — instead of objective reports,
such as one is entitled to expect from civil servants, we are receiving poor
political essays, recording the fact that the experts are unable to agree. The rush
of Muslims to the West and of non-Muslims to the East continues. West
Punjab with a minority of 27% non-Muslims will when all transfers have been
made have hardly a Hindu or Sikh official, and East Punjab with a minority of
33% Muslims will have hardly a Muslim official. The shortage of petrol owing
to the strike at Karachi will complicate the move of the East Punjab Govern¬
ment, and it has been very difficult to secure adequate accommodation at such
short notice. Simla will take the Governor and the Ministers, the Secretariat
proper, and the Heads of important Departments with skeleton staffs. The
High Court and a large part of the departmental staffs will have to go elsewhere.
I have done my best to keep the Partition Committee on the rails, but the
members are very slow, and the East Punjab representatives are insinuating
that the Muslims only want to get them out, after which nothing will ever be
settled at all. I hope that the two new Governments will by 15th August have
the key staffs they need, some cash and the elements of a Budget each ; almost
everything else will have to be setded later.
5. We are still very short of rain, and in some districts the Kharif harvest
will be definitely bad. In the end I was unable to get the Partition Committee
to agree to the immediate loan of 30,000 tons of wheat to the Centre. The
Muslim representatives said that they must make enquiries in New Delhi, and
I have not yet heard the result. Statistically and otherwise a strong case can be
made out against the loan. With a bad Rabi harvest, poor prospects for Kharif,
and the chance of severe and widespread disturbances the two Governments
will hardly know for some weeks there they stand.
6. I shall probably write Your Excellency one more letter in this series
about 13 th August. I expect to relinquish charge on 14th afternoon and leave
for Karachi on 15th.
7. Since the paragraphs above were dictated, I have had a long talk with
Giani Kartar Singh, and enclose a copy of the note I made when it ended.
Yours sincerely,
E. M. JENKINS
JULY 1947
429
Enclosure to No. 2g2
Giani Kartar Singh saw me at his request at 3.30 p.m. today. He said he
understood from Sardar Baldev Singh that I had felt that at our last meeting3 4
his attitude had been threatening. He had certainly not intended any threats
and apologized for any wrong impression he might have caused. I would no
doubt realise that the Sikhs felt strongly on the boundary question and were
sometimes carried away by their feelings. He handed me a copy of the Sikh
Memorandum to the Boundary Commission,5 a copy of another document
entitled “The Hindu-Sikh case for Nankana Sahib Tract”,6 and a map.7 He
then went over all the old ground again — the importance of the integrity of
the Sikh community ; the demand for an exchange of population so as to bring
85 per cent of the Sikhs into East Punjab; the Sikh claims on Nankana Sahib
and other historical Gurdwaras; and so on.
2. I said that the Giani Sahib had himself to thank for all that had happened.
1 had told him from the beginning that the Sikhs could only suffer by the
partition, and it was perfectly obvious that with their scattered population this
must be so. But the Giani Sahib and other leaders had pressed for partition and
had accepted the announcement of 3rd June.8 Now they suddenly turned
round and said they did not want partition and would not accept the Boundary
Commission’s award.
3. The Giani Sahib broke in here and said that what the Sikhs had originally
agreed to was a report by a Boundary Commission, which would be considered
by the Governor-General. The report had suddenly been turned into an award,
which would be final. This was quite contrary to what the Sikhs had accepted.
4. I replied that I did not understand the Sikhs at all. On the one hand
Sarder Baldev Singh, in association with Mr. Jinnah, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,
Sardar Patel and Dr. Rajendra Prasad, had said that the award would be
accepted, whatever it might be; on the other hand Giani Kartar Singh and
others were saying in the Punjab that they would not accept the award unless
they liked it.9
5. The Giani Sahib rejoined that Sardar Baldev Singh had no authority to
make any statement and that he had not consulted the Party before doing so.
The Viceroy had simply sent for him “to get his thumb impression,” and
Sardar Baldev Singh would soon find out that he had made a mistake. The
Sikhs were certainly not going to accept an award which they thought unjust.
3 See Vol. XI, Nos. 144 and its Enclosure, 145, 162, paras. 27-8, 169 and 180.
4 See Enclosure to No. 56.
5 A copy of this memorandum may be found on L/P &J/7/12465.
6 and 7 Not traced. 8 Vol. XI, No. 45.
9 cf. No. 272.
430
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
6. I observed that the Sikhs would have to accept the award, and that there
was no point whatever in their pretending that they would not do so. If the
two Dominions were united in accepting the award and determined to enforce
it, the Sikhs would have to come into line. Personally I had always held that
there could be little change in the '‘notional” boundary. It seemed to me that
nowadays population was the most important factor, and I very much doubted
if other factors would count very greatly. This was of course only my own
opinion. I had nothing whatever to do with the Boundary Commission, and
I might prove wrong. (My object at this point was to make it clear that the
Sikhs must abandon extravagant claims and hopes.)
7. The Giani Sahib remarked that if no substantial modification in the
“notional” boundary was intended, there was no need for a Commission at all.
His Majesty’s Government might have fixed the boundary and left it at that,
and the Sikhs would have known where they stood.
8. I said I thought the Sikhs were making an unreasonable fuss. The creation
of the two new Provinces would not affect titles in property, and Mr. Jinnah
had guaranteed freedom of worship as well as other personal freedoms to the
minorities. There was no reason why Nankana Sahib should not function in
West Punjab exactly as it functioned now — there need be no difference at
all in the religious and financial future of the Sikh community.
9. The Giani Sahib rejoined that he had seen a good deal of Mr. Jinnah and
had no confidence in him. Even if I was right, Mr. Jinnah was not immoital,
and the Sikhs were in great danger.
10. I said that what I wanted was a joint statement by the Muslim, Sikh and
Hindu leaders in the Punjab on the lines of the recent statement10 by the
Partition Council. Nobody wanted trouble when the Boundary Commission’s
award was announced.
11. The Giani Sahib replied that he could not agree to any such statement.
The future of the Sikhs had been placed in the hands of the Chairman of the
Commission, who knew nothing whatever about them or about the Punjab,
and this was a position the Sikhs could not accept.
12. I said that the Sikhs would have to accept the position in the end. They
were doing themselves no good by their futile demonstrations and outrages.
I mentioned the Nankana Sahib meeting, various outrages committed by
Sikhs in Ferozepore, Gurdaspur and Amritsar, and particularly the shooting
up of a train at Gangra Railway Station between Amritsar and Beas. I also
mentioned the proposed hartal on 5 th August.
13. The Giani Sahib agreed that the Sikh demonstrations were futile, but
he did not agree to take the Commission’s award lying down. He began a
further statement of the Sikh claims and talked at some length on the usual lines.
JULY I947
431
14. I said he would be wise to get extravagant ideas out of his head. The
partition was bad for the Sikhs, as I had already said, but by no means as bad
as they thought. They would have a big share in the administration of East
Punjab, and there was no reason why their position in West Punjab should be
seriously impaired.
15. The Giani Sahib gave me some interesting information on the future of
East Punjab. He said that the Sikhs favoured the amalgamation of the non-
Punjab speaking districts with the U.P. or with another new Province. They
would then try to organise what remained of East Punjab as a Sikh majority
Province. The Sikh States would come in with them on this — they had not of
course given the Hindus any idea of their intentions yet, as they wanted Hindu
help over the boundary question.
16. Finally, the Giani Sahib burst into tears, as at our last interview, and said
that it was my duty to protect his small and oppressed community. I replied
that the question of the boundary was not in my hands and that I had no power
to interfere. He then said that I must apprise the Viceroy of the position I
replied that the Viceroy was very fully informed of the Sikh point of view,
and that advice from Sardar Baldev Singh was always available to him.
17. I got the impression that Giana Kartar Singh was still unhappy and
extremely puzzled. He and Master Tara Singh have certainly made a great
mess of the whole Sikh question. The real solution was to get rid of the non-
Punjabi speaking districts and to keep the rest of the Punjab in Pakistan.
I think the Sikhs appreciate this now ; but it is too late to do anything about it.
E. M. JENKINS
GOVERNOR, PUNJAB
30.747
10 No. 224.
293
The Earl ofListowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , L/P &JI 10/ 101 : f 17
immediate India office, jo July 1947, 7-45 P"1
secret Received: 31 July , 8.00 am
No. 9857. Your telegram No. 3010-S of 29th July.1 Is it proposed that
Mr Mangal Das Pakwasa should be appointed Governor of Central Provinces
and Berar repeat Berar? Under Article 40 of Berar Agreement of 1936
1 Transmitting Pandit Nehru’s recommendations for Governors and requesting that the King’s approval
be obtained and communicated as soon as possible. L/P &J/10/141 : f 99.
432
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Governor is appointed by King after consultation with Nizam. Agreement
will lapse on 15th August and with it legal basis for administration of
Berar together with Central Provinces as part of British India, unless in
the meantime new agreement maintaining existing arrangements is reached
between Government of India and Nizam. This was made clear by Mr.
Henderson in House of Commons on 14th July.2 If Standstill Agreement
about Berar is reached it would presumably require Nizam to be consulted
about new Governor. If it is not reached new appointment would have to
be confined to Central Provinces.
2. I suggest that Nizam be consulted urgently on this nomination. Pending
your reply I am not repeat not submitting Pakwasa’s name to The King.3
2 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., Vol. 440, cols. 59-60.
3 In tel. 3068-S of 1 August Lord Mountbatten indicated that Sir W. Monckton would consult the
Nizam verbally and requested submission of Pakwasa’s name to the King on the understanding that
there would be no announcement without further consultation unless the Nizam agreed. He added
that time was short and that it would cause comment if the appointment for the Central Provinces
were not announced with the others. In a further tel., No. 3077-S of 1 August, Mountbatten emphasised
that it was ‘most important that announcement should not repeat not be made until Berar point has
been cleared and I telegraph further. We should prefer to make simultaneous release in India and I
will suggest time as soon as possible.’ Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files:
Governors-General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of — Part (3).
294
Notes by Air Mohammad Ali and Sir G. Spence 1
Rl3lili6y.ff 38-40
30 July 1947
THE EFFECT OF THE REFERENDUM IN THE N.W.F.P. ON THE
POSITION OF THE MINISTRY IN THAT PROVINCE
A note by Sir George Spence on the above subject is enclosed.
2. The referendum in the N.W.F.P. has no analogy with the precedents
referred to by Sir George Spence where a Ministry ascertains the national will
on a particular issue in order to regulate its course of action accordingly. The
referendum in the N.W.F.P. was of an entirely different character. Its purpose
was to determine the authority — the Muslim League or the Congress — to
whom power should be transferred. Since this referendum has clearly demon¬
strated that the majority of the electorate in the N.W.F.P. is in favour of the
Muslim League,2 it is clearly established that Congress Ministry should not
remain in power. If an immediate general election could be held without
danger to the security and tranquillity of the Province there could be no doubt
that the present Ministry would be defeated. The situation on the Frontier is,
JULY I947
433
however, fraught with danger and the occasion of a general election would be
seized by the Red Shirts and the Zalame Pakhtoon to cause serious disturbances
in the Province. The tribes are in a restive mood and any internal disorder in
the NorthWest Frontier Province might be a signal for a general uprising in the
Tribal areas. The holding of a general election in the near future should there-
fore be ruled out on practical grounds.
3. Since as stated above, the referendum in the N.W.F.P. is a clear indication
of the will of the electorate, the Governor General in his discretion may, if he
agrees, issue a direction to the Governor under sub-section (1) of Section 54
of the Govt, of India Act, 1935, to ask for the resignation of the Ministry and,
if they refuse, to dismiss them under the power given to him by sub-section (5)
of Section 51 of the Govt, of India Act, 1935. In such an event the Muslim
League would be asked to form a Ministry.
MOHAMMAD ALI
Enclosure to No. 294
In those Dominions in which the referendum is a regular feature of the
constitution it appears to be established that the defeat on a referendum of
proposals submitted by the ministry itself to a referendum as their own
proposals does not render it constitutionally obligatory on the ministry to
resign. Indeed, the normal course appears to be for a ministry whose proposals
have been rejected on a referendum to remain in office until a dissolution next
occurs in the ordinary course (Keith’s Responsible Government in the Dominions ,
Vol. I, p. 137 and Vol. II, p. 693). 3
2. It follows, I suggest, a fortiori that the result of the referendum held in
the North-West Frontier otherwise than at the instance of the Ministry, and
on an issue to the formulation of which the Ministry was not a party, cannot
in itself have produced a position in which it is constitutionally obligatory on
the Ministry to resign.
3. I understand that the Ministry is still in a position to command a majority
in the Provincial Assembly. If this is so, a new Ministry formed on the resig¬
nation or dismissal of the present Ministry would not be in a position to
maintain itself in power and would be constrained at an early stage of its
existence to ask the Governor to dissolve the Assembly with a view to the
holding of a general election.
4. In the circumstances it appears to me that on a purely abstract view of the
question the appropriate course for the Governor would be to offer the present
1 These notes had been prepared for a meeting of the Pakistan Cabinet on i August in accordance with
Lord Mountbatten’s instructions recorded at the end of No. 278.
2 See No. 187 for the result of the referendum.
3 Arthur Berriedale Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, 3 vols., Oxford, 1912.
434
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Premier the choice between resignation and dissolution. If the Governor called
for the resignation of the Ministry without offering the alternative of a
dissolution and thereafter granted a dissolution to the new Ministry, he would
expose himself to the charge of having been actuated merely by the desire
that the new Ministry and not the present Ministry should enjoy the advantage
of being in office during the conduct of the general election, which any new
Ministry would be unable to avoid for any length of time.
5. I understand, however, that security reasons would constitute an insuper¬
able obstacle to the holding of a general election in the immediate future and
in these circumstances I have no doubt that the Governor (assuming him to be
satisfied that if an immediate general election were a practicable proposition
it would result in the defeat of the present Ministry) would be justified in
calling for the resignation of the present Ministers and in dismissing them if
they declined to resign.
6. Under sub-section (5) of section 51 of the Government of India Act,
1935, the functions of the Governor with respect to dismissal of Ministers are
exercisable by him in his discretion with the result that under sub-section (1)
of section 54 it is open to the Governor General in his discretion to issue such
directions to the Governor in the matter as he thinks fit. This position will, of
course, cease to prevail as from the appointed day but I assume that any action
taken in the matter is designed to be taken before the appointed day.
G. H. SPENCE
30.7.47.
295
The Maharaja oj Indore to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
R/3l 1/139: ff 49-31
SECRET INDORE, 31 July 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I thank Your Excellency for your invitation1 to Delhi for a frank and free talk
with you. I regret very much indeed that my absence from Delhi during recent
discussions on questions of common concern to Indian States and British India
etc. has been a source of disappointment to you. I did not attend the meeting2
because I felt that the States had a free hand in determining their future, I was
one of those who had all along felt that my connections with the British should
continue on the basis of separate Dominion status for such States as may
decide not to form an integral or organic part of the two recently created
Dominions of India.
JULY I947
435
In view, however, of Your Excellency’s pressing invitation I shall be prepared
to go to Delhi as soon as possible, provided Your Excellency sees no objection
to my bringing with me His Highness the Nawab of Bhopal, and would agree
to meeting us both together. I make this proposal because, as you no doubt
know, my relations with my brother the Nawab of Bhopal are very close and
intimate, and we have pledged ourselves to unity of action in regard to all
matters relating to the future constitutional developments in India. I have
reason to hope, as a matter of fact feel confident, that His Highness of Bhopal
will, if requested by me, consent to accompany me to Delhi for the purpose
of these discussions between us. I understand that Your Excellency had already
asked His Highness of Bhopal to see you before he took any final decision and
he had consented to do so.3
I am making arrangements for reaching Delhi as early as possible, and will
try to arrive there not later than the 2nd of August.
I shall intimate to Your Excellency the exact date and time of my arrival
after I have met His Highness of Bhopal. I propose to go to Bhopal this evening
and will be able to write to you from there tomorrow (the 1st of August).
Yours sincerely,
Y. R. HOLKARR4
1 On 30 July the Gaekwar of Baroda and the Maharajas of Gwalior and Kolhapur (accompanied by three
other princes, see No. 302, para. 49) arrived at Indore with Lord Mountbatten’s letter of 29 July
(No. 266). On the same day Baroda wrote to the Nawab of Bhopal asking him to absolve the
Maharaja of Indore of his promise not to visit Delhi before he had seen him (ie Bhopal). Baroda
indicated that he wanted to take Indore to Delhi by plane to arrive at noon the following day and
promised to see that Indore did not commit himself to anything during his stay. Kolhapur added a
postscript to Baroda’s letter supporting this request. R/3/1/139: f 35.
2 See No. 234. 3 See Nos. 100 and 201.
4 The Maharaja of Indore signed himself thus in the original letter.
296
The Nawab of Chhatari to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
R/31 1/139: f 52-3
PRIME MINISTER, HYDERABAD, CAMP NEW DELHI, 31 July lgqj
Your Excellency,
I thank Your Excellency for your letter No. 592/89 of the 29th July 1947.1
The Hyderabad Delegation has given full consideration to the matter and
feel that no useful purpose would be served by my presence in the Negotiating
Committee appointed by Your Excellency. For the reasons I have indicated in
my previous letter,2 Hyderabad wishes to negotiate its Stand-Still Agreements
along with those States only which, like Hyderabad, have kept out of the
2 No. 241.
1 See No. 241, note 3.
436
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Constituent Assembly. Also, the State does not wish to discuss the problem of
accession, having chosen the alternative of political relations permitted by the
Memorandum of May 12, 3 and accepted by the political parties under Your
Excellency’s Plan of 3rd June.4 I suggest for Your Excellency’s consideration
appointment of a second Negotiating Committee consisting of such States
only as have decided to remain out of the Constituent Assembly.
It is assumed that the negotiations will be, as has throughout been understood,
with the representatives of both Successor Governments and that the Agree¬
ments will be of a tripartite nature.
Yours sincerely,
AHMAD SAID
3 Vol. VII, No. 262. 4 Vol. XI, No. 45, para. 18.
297
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Nawab of Bhopal
Rl3l il 139: ff 54-$
PERSONAL AND SECRET 31 July 1947
My dear Hamidullah,
I have read and reread your letter of the 22nd July1 and given my most careful
and anxious consideration to it and what I say now is entirely as a friend (whose
sincerity you have so generously acknowledged and which I hope none of my
actions will ever belie in future) and not as Viceroy, still less as the future
Governor-General of India, interested somehow or other in bringing about an
association of States like yours with the Indian Dominion.
I concede at once, in fact I have never doubted, that you have had your
difficulties arising from both Congress propaganda and loose statements by
some of the leading members of Government and that you have had ample
justification for feeling bitter and disappointed. With all that I want you to
bear in mind a few matters which I shall mention presently as a real and
genuine friend of the States whose services to the British cause since the time
of the Indian Mutiny and even before that, no one appreciates more than
myself. We have come to a stage, however, where it is necessary to forget the
past and think dispassionately of the future in the common interest of all
sections of the country. Although there have been provocative and unfair
statements,2 to put it mildly, made by certain leaders of the Congress, the
position now is that the statement3 made by Sardar Patel on his assuming
charge of the States Department is the one that should be taken by the Princes
as the official policy of the new Dominion of India towards States. So far as
JULY 1947
437
I know, no member of Government has made any statement conflicting with
or detracting from, the statement of Sardar Patel, which I have no doubt you
must have found to be a distinct departure from previous utterances and which
should be taken as a point where negotiations with Princes could be undertaken
on a basis of equality and without any trace of domination, threat, finesse, or
communalism.
Secondly, the very danger of communist influence to which you refer and
rightly attach so much importance is more likely to be stayed and averted if all
important stake holders in the country make common cause and lend their full
support to the Dominion. I have seen now for quite a few months the leaders
of the Congress who are likely to be the leaders of the new Dominion Govern¬
ment and I hope you will believe me when I say that on the whole their
influence will be exercised in future towards stability and they are as frightened
of communism as you yourself are. If only they had support from all other
stable influences such as that of the Princely Order, it might be possible for
them to ward off the communist danger during the next few years which will
be the crucial period for this country. We must remember that if the Indian
Dominion territory is overrun by communists as feared by you, this will
affect all territories situated geographically within the Indian Dominion and
that it will not be possible for individual States existing as independent units to
escape the tentacles of this revolutionary octopus. In so far as the communists
are concerned, the interests of States, especially of States like Bhopal, which is
entirely surrounded by the territory of the Indian Dominion, are identical
with those of the Indian Dominion, and either both survive or both sink to¬
gether. Make no mistake about it. There is a far greater chance of averting this
danger if the States and the Dominion stand together rather than in isolation;
for it is this very isolation which the communists now want.
You have some understandable doubts as to the implication of accession.
You will now have seen my speech1 2 3 4 to the Princes and their representatives on
the 25th in which I have tried to make the position clear. You are being invited
to accede on the three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communi¬
cations for executive and legislative purposes only. I enclose a copy of the
draft Instrument of Accession5 which has been amended and now agreed to by
the Sub-Committee of the Conference, from which you will see that there is
absolutely no financial commitment of any kind on the part of the States.
Further, you are in no way fettered (and this is explicitly made clear in the draft
Instrument of Accession) as regards your attitude to accession to the new con¬
stituent Assembly. So you get a second choice at this time, and then, my dear
1 No. 201.
2 cf. Vol. X, Nos. 1 8 1, note 2 and 193. See also No. 201, note 5 of this volume.
3 Vol. XI, No. 528. 4 No. 234.
5 Not printed. For the final version of the Instrument of Accession, see Enclosure 1 to No. 313.
438
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Hamidullah, will come the chance of a leader like you among the Princes to
hold them together to take a firm line if the new constitution turns out after
all to be inaccep table to the States. What a tragedy if at this time they were
deprived of their most outstanding leader by your own actions.
The draft Instrument recognises and reaffirms the sovereignty of the acceding
States except to the extent of their accession and secures complete freedom
from interference in their internal affairs. When you have read the Instrument
of Accession, you will, I am sure, be satisfied that there is absolutely nothing
sinister or machiavellian about it; otherwise the representatives of the States
would not have accepted it, and I should certainly not have had anything to
do with it. This is a most reasonable, even a generous offer and in my judgment
the interests of a State will be best served by accession on these terms.
You have raised another question as to what is going to be the relationship
between the Dominion of India and Pakistan with special reference to Defence.
On my suggestion, the parties have agreed to have a Joint Defence Council
under my chairmanship to be constituted on the 15 th August.6 This will function
till the separation of the Defence Forces takes place, but I have every hope that
something similar will be put in its place as a permanent arrangement, and
there are indications already that the leaders may accept this.
I have now dealt with the important points raised in your letter. I am sure
you will agree with my statement in the speech that no Ruler can run away
either from the Dominion or from his subjects for whose welfare he is
responsible.
I do hope that what I have said above has not the least savour of intimidation
or special pleading. If it did that I would not have written this letter to you as
a sincere and genuine friend which, regardless of whatever may be your
decision on this issue, I hope I shall always have the privilege of remaining.
Yours sincerely,
DICKIE
p.s.
Since first dictating the above, I have received your letter of the 26th July.7
1 discussed the whole position with Sir C.P. and was able to answer his very
able and searching questions to his satisfaction.8 He was kind enough to
express astonishment that I should have wrung terms so favourable to the
States from Congress. While he did not commit himself or his state, he took
a letter9 from me to his Maharaja and promised me that he would return on
the 27th for further talks with me. I am terribly sorry that the dastardly
crime10 which has been perpetrated on him prevented his return in person but
the Maharaja of Travancore telegraphed11 his acceptance of the Instrument of
Accession as soon as he got my letter.
Well, my dear Hamidullah, this letter has grown nearly as long as yours, but
JULY 1947
439
my distress at your not appreciating the fundamental change which has been
brought about, impelled me to write at length.
I gladly accept your offer to come and talk things over with me, the sooner
the better.
6 See Vol. XI, No. 416 and No. 205, Case No. P.C. 82/8/47 of this volume.
7 No. 239. 8 See No. 228, paras. 16-19. 9 No. 203.
10 See No. 239, note 8. 11 See No. 284, note 1.
Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of B
urma
Rl3lif57 : f 241
31 July 1947
H.E.
Both P.S.V.1 and Major Short consider that it would be not only useless but
impolitic to press Baldev Singh to try to persuade Giyani to make the statement
in question.2 The Nankana Sahib demonstration3 seems to have fizzled out, and
on the 28th July Master Tara Singh definitely said that the Sikhs must await the
decision of the Boundary Commission and not complicate an already
immensely complicated situation.4 Thus things on the Sikh front are going as
well as one could have hoped, and, moreover, we have nothing to offer them as
an inducement to make them subscribe to the Lahore statement.
2. Major Short goes so far as to say that if he were to undertake this mission,
it would be with the conviction that it would do more harm than good.
3. I am sure that Y.E. will be most disappointed if the Lahore statement is
not issued at all, as it cannot be without Sikh participation; but, at the end of it,
neither the Moslem nor the Hindu signatories are personalities who count
for much.
4. If you agree, a reply will be sent to the Governor accordingly.5
ISMAY
1 Sir G. Abell. 2 See No. 272.
3 See Nos. 214, 238, 272 and 292, para. 3.
4 In his statement to the press on the meeting at Nankana Sahib, Master Tara Singh declared: ‘Our
object of holding the conference has been achieved. The Boundary Commission is yet to give its
decision and we must await the decision and not complicate the situation. Therefore, my advice is
that the conference should not be prolonged merely because the Government interfered.’ The
Statesman, 28 July 1947.
5 Lord Mountbatten minuted in reply: ‘I agree, but if statement is made by Partition Committee as
a whole without specifically quoting membership this might be acceptable to Swaran Singh. M.’
R/3/1/157: f 241 •
440
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
299
Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram, JR/3/ 1/171: f 46
CONFIDENTIAL LAHORE, 31 July 1<)47
BY SAFE HAND OF PILOT
No. 203-G. Your telegram of 30th July No. 3041-S.1 The whole of the Punjab
was declared to be a disturbed area under the Punjab Disturbed Areas Act 1947
on May 3 1st; a copy of the gazette notification is attached.2 As a result of this,
the special powers conferred upon the armed forces by section 2 of the Punjab
Disturbed Areas (Special Powers of Armed Forces) Ordinance 1947 are already
available throughout the Punjab.
2. I presume that the notification, as well as the Punjab Disturbed Areas Act,
continues in force automatically after August 15 th in virtue of section 18 of the
Indian Independence Act,3 and I welcome the proposed order that it will not
be rescinded save with the concurrence of the Central Government of India or
of Pakistan.
Issue of the above has been authorised.
S. E. ABBOTT
Secretary to the Governor, Punjab
31.747
1 No. 286.
2 Not printed. A copy of the notification is on R/3/1/171 : f 47.
3 No. 164.
300
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , L/PO/i^ : f 82
immediate 3 1 July i947, 5. 1 0 pm
PRIVATE AND SECRET
No. 95. Following Personal from Prime Minister. It is my intention on the
occasion of the end of your short but great Viceroyalty and the transfer of
power in India to submit your name to The King for Dignity of an Earldom
of the United Kingdom. If the King approves, the announcement would be
made in this country on the morning of August 15 th. I shall be glad to know
as soon as possible whether this proposal is agreeable to you.1 All good wishes.
1 Lord Mountbatten accepted, the king approved and the announcement was duly made on 15 August.
L/PO/152: ff 81, 80.
AUGUST 1947
441
301
Meeting of the Pakistan Cabinet . Case No. if if 47
Rl3il 1/165: ff 4^-5
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held on 1 August ig47 at 10 am were : Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart , Mr Liaquat
Ali Khan , Mr I. I. Chundrigar , Mr Abdur Rab Nishtar , Mr Ghazanfar Ali Khan,
Mr Jogendra Nath Mandal; Mr Mohammad Ali, Mr Osman Ali
Case No. 1/1/47 The effect of the referendum in the N.W.F.P. on the posi¬
tion of the Ministry in that Province.1
His Excellency said that the present position of the Ministry of West Bengal
was proving extremely inconvenient to Dr. Ghosh and his colleagues, but he
had resisted the demand for the reconstitution of the Suhrawardy Ministry on
a regional basis because he had been advised by Mr. Jinnah that it would be an
unconstitutional step to take. He mentioned this because Sir George Spence’s
note,2 and particularly paragraph 1 thereof, indicated that it would be
unconstitutional for him to remove the N.W.F.P. Ministry and he felt that he
should be guided by the same constitutional considerations in dealing both with
the Frontier Province and with Bengal. He accepted the position, however,
that it was his duty to prevent the present Ministry in the Frontier Province
from doing anything prejudicial to the interests of the Muslim League. He
offered, therefore, to instruct the Governor of the N.W.F.P. to issue a complete
standstill order under which business would only be transacted with the
Governor’s sanction, which he would give only on the advice of the Muslim
League. On the 15th of August, of course, it would be open to the Muslim
League to put in its own Ministry in that Province.
In the course of subsequent discussion the following points were made : —
(1) Paragraph 1 of Sir George Spence’s note was irrelevant. The reference
there was to constitutions such as the Swiss model which specifically
provided for referenda on particular matters. This was not so in the case of
the N.W.F.P. Here the question was as to who should be the successor
authority to whom power should be transferred. The referendum had
clearly shown this to be the Muslim League.3 The Province should, therefore,
be handed over now to the League and the Congress should not be allowed
to remain in power even for a day. To leave the present Ministry in power
until the 15 th August would mean in effect that a part of Pakistan territory
1 See Nos. 278 and 294. 2 Enclosure to No. 294.
3 See No. 187 for the result of the referendum.
442
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
would pass to the Congress on that date. Sir George Spence had not taken
this point into consideration. Paragraph 5 of his note, however, showed
that even he considered that it would be constitutional to remove the present
Ministry given certain specified circumstances.
(2) The position would have been different had disagreement between the
Muslim League and the present Ministry in the Frontier Province been
based merely on party programmes. It went much further than that because
the Ministry was opposed to Pakistan itself. There were precedents for
removing a Minister or a Ministry who acted in a way detrimental to the
interests of the State as a whole. This could be said to be the case in the
N.W.F.P. Constitutionally also it was open to the Governor of a Province
to dismiss the Ministry without assigning reasons if he thought fit.
(3) A ‘standstill’ arrangement would not meet the requirements of the
case — because (a) it was likely to be flouted by the Ministry and (b) it could
be applied only in the case of those subjects which were the Governor’s
special responsibility.
(4) The present Ministry was acting in an unconstitutional manner if not
resigning when defeated on a fundamental issue.
(5) To effect a smooth tiansfer of power it was necessary that the Province
should be handed over immediately so that the Muslim League Ministry
would be able to function successfully from the 15th August. To that end
many preliminary steps had to be taken, such as disarming all the illegally
armed elements in the Province. Otherwise on the 15 th August the Pakistan
Government would be faced with a very dangerous situation.
(6) According to Sir George Spence action to remove the Ministry had
to be taken before the appointed day and it would not be open to the
Pakistan Government to dismiss the Ministry on or after the 15th August.
This point would have to be examined when considering the Adaptation
Orders.
(7) A possible solution was to put the Province under Section 93 rule a day
or two before the 15th August so as to avoid any criticism that Britain was
trying to run the Province at this stage. Since, however, the imposition of
Section 93 rule with immediate effect would be done on the advice of the
Pakistan Government, such criticism would not be justified.
(8) It would be unprecedented and impracticable to dismiss the Ministry
without also dissolving the Legislature because the Ministry still commanded
a majority there. It was pointed out, however, that the referendum had
clearly shown that the Ministry did not possess the confidence of the majority
of the people. It was not, therefore, necessary to dissolve the House.
(9) The referendum had not shown that the Province was behind the
AUGUST 1947
443
Muslim League except on the one specific issue as to whether it should join
Pakistan or India. The objection of the N.W.F.P. Ministry to the referendum
had been that they were not free to put to the people the third choice of
their electing foi Pathanistan.
(10) The position of West Bengal was different from that of the Frontier
Province because it was not yet clear which parts of the existing Pr ovince of
Bengal would go to Pakistan.
(11) It could be argued that the Frontier Ministry, in not accepting the
policy of partition as laid down in H.M.G’s statement of the 3rd June, 19474
was not doing its duty of assisting the Governor in running the Province and
it could, therefore, be dismissed. It would then be open to the Governor to
call on the leader of the opposition to form a Ministry.
Summing up, His Excellency reiterated the assurance he had given that he
regarded it as his duty to see that the present Ministry did nothing to injure
the Pakistan State. Two courses had been suggested in the following order of
preference :
(a) that His Excellency the Governor should ask the present Ministry to
resign and if they refused should dismiss them and call on the leader of
the opposition i.e. the Muslim League, to form a new Ministry;
(b) that the Province should be placed under Section 93 rule with a Muslim
League Council of Advisers and the League Ministry installed by about
the 14th August.
It was his opinion that because the latter course would place the responsibility
for running the Province almost entirely on British shoulders at this particular
juncture H.M.G. were likely to be averse to it, unless it was adopted a day or
two before the 15th August. Whichevei course, he ultimately adopted, it
would be only on the advice of his colleagues and after consultation with his
legal advisers and H.M.G. to ensure that his action was constitutional.
4 Vol. XI, No. 45.
302
Viceroy s Personal Report No. 15
L/PO/61 123: ff 208-22
TOP SECRET 1 August I947
PERSONAL
Pressure of work has, if possible, increased as our D-Day draws near. Friction
is more intense and much time has to be devoted to oiling the bearings and
444
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
pulling spanners out of the works. I am more than ever convinced that if the
date of transfer had been ist October there would have been a serious risk of
a complete breakdown before that date. The Provisional Joint Defence Council
was formed this week and now has thrice-weekly meetings immediately before
the meetings of the Partition Council; in fact it consists of the membeis of the
Partition Council plus the Defence Members of India and Pakistan and the
Commander-in-Chief.
2. The country as a whole is quiet, with the exception of the Punjab, where
there have been continued disturbances in which the Sikhs have been very
prominent; even Giani Kartar Singh, who should have known better, managed
to get himself arrested in the demonstrations which took place around Nankana
Sahib1 but was released the same day. There are continued rumours that the
Sikhs will make trouble after the Boundary Commission award has been
announced,2 but there is evidence that both the new Dominions intend to be
very firm in dealing with disturbances in the future, and the Joint Command
referred to in Appendix I3 of my last report will be a great help.
3. I visited Calcutta for 20 hours to deal with partition matters, on the
30th/3ist July. My wife remained on for another 30 hours which she spent in
an intensive programme visiting hospitals, schools, institutions, Red Cross
centres and the like.
4. The main object of my visit was to meet the Bengal Separation Council
who, I gathered from Burrows, had got into some difficulties, and to see if
I could not help them, by comparing notes, from my experience of our Central
Partition Council and the Punjab Partition Committee. I feel that part of their
trouble is that Suhrawardy is rather a gas bag, who likes to score debating
points. Another weakness is that in Bengal, unlike Delhi, the Separation
Council start arguing on general principles and, in some cases, about the nuts
and bolts of a problem, before there has been any chance of an agreed recom¬
mendation coming up from a lower level. The Steering Committee, Ray and
Khan, seem to be a reasonable pair, who have just returned from a profitable
discussion with our own Steering Committee in Delhi.
5. Our informal meeting,4 which Burrows attended, lasted two hours, and
I am sure was useful. The Council had got bogged down over three main
points : —
(a) The question whether the value of roads, rivers, etc., should be included
among the assets to be divided (West Bengal is, of course, rich in roads
and East Bengal in rivers).
(b) The division of certain mechanical equipment, such as printing presses,
typewriters and M.T. repair workshops, nearly all of which are now
located in West Bengal.
AUGUST 1947
445
(c) Whether Government buildings and lands should be assessed at book
value or their present market value.
6. As regards 5(a), I said that this was a matter which might easily fall into
place later on, if they deferred consideration of it until all other issues connected
with partition had been decided. They agreed to accept my suggestion. If they
go on discussing it now they will only irritate each other, as the whole question
of the roads was obviously put up by Suhrawardy to increase the value of the
assets to be counted against West Bengal.
7. As regards 5(b), it was printing presses which, as usual, were causing a
complete deadlock. I think I persuaded them to follow our lead in the Centre
not to try splitting up and moving old presses, but to reach some working
agreement for joint use of them until new presses could be obtained for East
Bengal. On this I undertook to try and obtain early delivery of requirements,
and when I pointed out that His Majesty’s Government had no means of
imposing priority, Burrows said that he would see what he could do by
a personal approach to Trade Union leaders.
8. As regards 5(c), this is one on which the Separation Council are not likely
to reach agreement, and I advised that they should let it come before the
Arbitral Tribunal, which is now being set up at the Centre.
9. After the meeting with the Separation Council, I had a meeting with the
Army and Area Commanders and the Governor;5 at which they informed me
that they did not consider the setting up of a joint Command organisation in
Bengal would be necessary, since they did not anticipate the same difficulties as
in the Punjab. I went carefully through the military plans for the defence of
Calcutta against last minute arson and sabotage by the Muslims and feel
confident that the military will be able to prevent the City from being burnt
or sacked if any such attempt should be made.
10. I then had a meeting with Dr. Ghosh,6 the Chief Minister of the West
Bengal Shadow Ministry, and subsequently with him and Mr Suhrawardy, the
present Muslim Chief Minister of Bengal and the probable future Chief
Minister of East Bengal.7 They both agreed that a joint military command was
unnecessary. I am glad to report that the two Chief Ministers have agreed to
issue a joint statement on lines similar to the Statement8 recently issued by our
Partition Council. I am sorry to have to report, however, that the Sikhs have
1 See Nos. 214, 238 and 292, para. 3.
2 See Nos. 250, 254, 256, Item 8, 272 and 292, para 2.
3 See No. 228, para. 14; see also para. 5 of the Partition Council statement at No. 224.
4 See No. 287. 5 See No. 289.
6 There is no record of a meeting between Lord Mountbatten and Dr Ghosh during the former’s visit
to Bengal in the Mountbatten Papers. Mountbatten did, however, have a separate meeting with
Mr Suhrawardy; see No. 291.
7 See No. 290. 8 No. 224.
446
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
“ratted” on the undertaking they gave me to issue a similar statement in the
Punjab Partition Committee.9
n. Burrows visited Dacca, the capital selected for East Bengal, this week
and reported that the rate at which temporary buildings were going up and
old buildings were being repaired was truly remarkable, and he felt that there
would be enough accommodation ready for the East Bengal Government by
15th August, provided they were not held up for material. East Bengal leaders
were, however, worried about getting sufficient supplies, and I have undertaken
to do what I can to help over their immediate requirements. It would be a pity
if any excuse were given to the Muslim League not to move out of Calcutta
well before 15th August. The dates immediately after that are rather tricky,
1 6th August being the anniversay of last year’s holocaust, and 17th August the
Muslim Id, which ends the month of Ramzan. A month of fasting in the
middle of the summer does not improve tempers, though I was told that the
last few days have been quieter than usual. Unfortunately, there were several
incidents yesterday, including another sten gun shooting, this time apparently
perpetrated by Muslims.
12. Four hours after landing at Palam on 31st July I was in the midst of the
most difficult Joint Defence Council and Partition Council meeting that we
have had so far. Of the 6 items on the agenda, the Steering Committee had
been unable for the first time to find an agreed recommendation on four. Of
these four items the most important concerned the division of the Royal Indian
Air Force squadrons between the two Dominions.
13. I should explain that we have been working on the basis of communal
proportions in dividing the fighting services, the smaller partner by far being,
of course, Pakistan. In the case of the Army this was the obvious method of
dividing the actual soldiers since there was no shortage of equipment, and it
worked out at a rough proportion of 70:30. In the case of the Navy it worked
out at about 60 : 40, but as India have a far bigger coastline with more harbours
and a far greater proportion of the trade to guard, the actual ships were divided
in the proportion 70:30. When it came to the Air the communal proportions
worked out at 80:20. As there were ten squadrons to divide (2 transports and
8 fighters) the India representatives claimed 8. The Armed Forces Recon¬
stitution Committee recommended that on the anaology of the naval partition
the proportion should be 70:30, since Pakistan had the North-West Frontier
to guard.
14. This caused the most frightful feeling, for the India representatives had
at a previous meeting categorically turned down my suggestion that they should
send air squadrons to help Pakistan if there were trouble with the tribes,
though they undertook to reconsider the matter if Afghanistan or any foreign
AUGUST 1947
447
power started to invade. They now took the line that even to give Pakistan
one of the squadrons to which they were entitled would be equivalent to giving
them India’s facilities to use them against the tribes.
15. Patel infuriated Jinnah and Liaquat by referring to the tribes as “our
people”, since the Muslims of course claim them as their own. Matters not
only became heated, but I am sorry to say that Patel took violent exception to
the fact that the British officers of Auchinleck’s Armed Forces Reconstitution
Committee had dared to suggest that communal proportion should be de¬
parted from in favour of Pakistan ; and in fact I know privately that they are
beginning to take the view that Auchinleck and his senior commanders are
becoming pro-Pakistan,10 whereas in fact they are, of course, merely trying
to be fair. (The arrival of the invaluable Trivedi on a brief visit should help to
straighten this trouble out before it becomes really serious).
16. The situation had become so tense and bitter that agreement even in the
future appeared out of the question. I therefore suggested that from the
immediate reserve of aircraft available throughout India, the equivalent of
a ninth fighter squadron should be raised and placed at the disposal of Pakistan,
and manned as soon as they could get sufficient personnel. There was a sigh
of relief all round and this solution was accepted in principle “if proved to
be practicable”. I have given instructions to the Air Officer Commanding
in Chief that it is to be proved practicable before the next meeting.
17. The other three issues on which there was disagreement were less
important ; one was not urgent and so I got it put back for reconsideration in
September and on the other two I again managed to suggest acceptable com¬
promises. So far we have not had to reserve any question for the Arbitral
Tribunal.
18. Major General Cawthom, Auchinleck’s representative with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in Melbourne, has been here and conveyed a request from
Australia that the Indian contingent in Japan should not be withdrawn until
the peace treaty is signed. The representatives of both Governments in the
Joint Defence Council took the view that India’s prestige would be enhanced if
they could keep their force out there. Auchinleck pointed out that it would be
impossible to reconstitute the units out there on a communal basis and that, if
after the rest of the army had been partitioned, there were trouble with the
unpartitioned Indian force in Japan, the prestige of India would suffer rather
than benefit. The matter is therefore being reconsidered, and it now looks as
though the leaders will reconsider their first views.
9 See Nos. 228, para. 11, 272, Enclosure to 292 and 298.
cf. Nos. 247, 256, Item 2 and 270.
10
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
19. I have run into some difficulty over the question of the Ministry in the
North West Frontier Province. The present Ministry is, of course, a Congress
Ministry, and has refused to resign in spite of the adverse result of the referen¬
dum. Dr. Khan Sahib, the Premier, originally indicated11 that he would be
prepared to resign if the Referendum went decisively against him, but possibly
on instructions from the High Command, he has withdrawn this decision, and
now says12 he sees no reason why his Ministry should resign until there is a
General Election or he is defeated in the Legislature, in which, the Congress
with the weightage of the minorities, have a considerable majority.
20. It is within my legal powers to direct the Governor to dismiss the
Ministry and that decision cannot be called to question. On the other hand
such action would be contrary to normal constitutional practice since the
Ministry undoubtedly have a majority in the Legislature, and would almost
certainly be taken amiss by Congress, who wish their Ministry kept as long as
possible as a matter of prestige.
21. I informed Lockhart that I would take the advice of the Provisional
Government of Pakistan on this issue and make them take the major respon¬
sibility for the decision. The advice they gave me at this morning’s Pakistan
Cabinet meeting13 was that I should direct the Governor to ask the Ministry
to resign and, if they refused, to dismiss them. I said that I did not want, in my
last fortnight as Viceroy to do something which could be alleged to be
unconstitutional and although I recognised the difficulties I thought it would
be better to get the Governor to issue a sort of standstill order so that League
interests should not be damaged during the next fortnight by any action taken
by the Congress Ministry.
22. This did not go down well and ultimately the advice given me was that
if I could not direct that the Ministry be dismissed I should order the Governor
to go into Section 93 and take on the Muslim League team as his advisers. I was
urged to admit that unless a change was made soon the Muslim League would
inherit chaos in the N.W.F.P. on the 15th August.
23. Ultimately I promised to accept the advice of my colleagues provided
I was assured by the experts that it was constitutionally correct. I also said that
I must refer the matter to London before taking a final decision. Jinnah has
always stalled on matters he does not wish to give me a decision on. He can
hardly complain if I follow suit.
24. I think it is clear that the present Ministry must either resign or be
dismissed before 15th August, but it may be advisable to make the change as
late as possible, and possibly to adopt the expedient of going into Section 93
for a couple of days rather than appointing a Muslim League Ministry before
15th August.
AUGUST 1947
449
25. Ever since I arrived out Nehru has been hankering after a visit to
Kashmir. He is obviously still suffering from an emotional upset consequent
upon being recalled by Congress after being arrested in Kashmir during the
time of the Cabinet Mission’s meetings last year.14 In the first instance I offered
to go myself and discuss the future of Kashmir with the Maharajah, but Nehru
was dissatisfied with the result of my visit and asked me to let him go himself.
Gandhi came to the rescue and offered to go in Nehru’s place.15 I telegraphed
to Kashmir but the Maharajah begged that no leaders should be allowed to
come, at all events before the 15th August, since they had so far avoided having
bloodshed in Kashmir and Jammu, although they could see people killing each
other across the borders in the Punjab.16 I managed to delay Gandhi’s visit
until the Prime Minister, Kak, had come to Delhi for my meeting with the
States representatives.
26. I had arranged a meeting between Kak and Gandhi on the 24th July17
and warned Kak against dissuading Gandhi from coming to Kashmir, unless
they were prepared for Nehru to take his place. Kak failed to take my advice,18
and succeeded in stopping Gandhi, with the result that the moment Kak had
returned to Kashmir, Nehru wrote and said that he must now go to Kashmir
himself.19
27. Kak and the Maharajah hate Nehru with a bitter hatred and I had visions
of the Maharajah declaring adheience to Pakistan just before Nehru arrived
and Kak provoking an incident which would end up by Nehru being arrested
just about the time he should be taking over power from me in Delhi! I
realised Nehru was in a most emotional state so called a meeting of Nehru,
Patel and Gandhi on the 29th July.20 I said that whatever Nehru’s personal
emotions might be, I felt I should be failing in my duty if I did not point out
that this was hardly the time for the Vice President of the Interim Government
and the Prime Minister of the Dominion Government which was to take over
power in 17 days, to leave the capital on what really amounted to almost
private business ; at all events on a visit which it would be extremely difficult
to explain away to world opinion.
28. I also pointed out that a visit by any Congress leaders could not fail to
be badly received in the world press just at the time it was known that Kashmir
had the choice of Pakistan or India before it; but that this effect would be some¬
what mitigated if Gandhi went, on account of the religious aura that surrounds
11 See No. 45, para. 3(i)(b) .
13 No. 301.
14 See Vol. VII, No. 594 and Vol. VIII, No. 16, p. 29.
15 See Vol. XI, Nos. 319, 369, paras. 29-31 and 386.
16 See No. 4. 17 See No. 259, note 2.
19 See No. 249. 20 See No. 269.
12 See Nos. 21 1, para. 6 and 278.
20
18 See No. 260.
450
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
him; whereas if Nehru went it would be regarded as a piece of straightforward
political lobbying.
29. Gandhi agreed with what I had said, and stated that although at Kak’s
request he had agreed not to go, if I seriously regarded Nehru’s proposed visit
as objectionable, he would himself be prepared once more to take his place,
if this would be an adequate solace to Nehru.
30. Patel gave it as his view that neither of them should go, but that in view
of Nehru’s great mental distress if the mission in Kashmir were to remain
unfulfilled, he agreed that one of them must go. He very bluntly remarked:
“It is a choice between two evils and I consider that Gandhiji’s visit would be
the lesser evil”.
31. Nehru held forth at some length about his mental distress and defended
his visit on the grounds that (a) nothing would be more natural than that
Congress should send a high-level emissary to lay before the Government of
Kashmir the advantages of joining the Dominion of India, and (b) that it was
well known that he was over-worked; that he would like to go away for three
or four days’ rest somewhere in any case, and that Kashmir would be a
delightful place in which to have a brief holiday. The fact that he might be
engaged on local work would be a sufficient change of occupation to give him
the necessary rest.
32. The rest of us each argued in turn with him and finally Gandhi speci¬
fically renewed his offer to go provided Nehru would accept that offer, which
he urged him to do since Patel and I, who were the two “outside” members
of the party, were so strongly in favour of Gandhi’s going. Finally it was
agreed that Gandhi should leave on the following night train via Rawalpindi :
I can now only hope that the visit will be uneventful.21
33. I have reason to believe that when Patel had tried to reason with Nehru
the night before our meeting, Nehru had broken down and wept, explaining
that Kashmir meant more to him at the moment than anything else. Patel
found it impossible to deal with him and told a friend after our meeting that
I had probably saved Nehru’s political career, and thus the chance of Congress
making good on the transfer of power.
34. I had a separate meeting22 with Nehru on 29th July and referred to the
desire of the British Government to discuss overall Commonwealth defence
arrangements with both India and Pakistan as soon as the two Governments
were set up. I said I thought the Chiefs of Staff would either come themselves
or send high powered representatives to hold discussions with the Joint
Defence Council in Delhi. Nehru welcomed this wholeheartedly as he thought
it was a most necessary move, particularly as it would facilitate discussion of
AUGUST 1947
451
questions of mutual assistance between Pakistan and India. I have also mentioned
this to Jinnah who was equally pleased.
35. I told Nehru I sent a weekly personal report to the King, the Prime
Minister and the India Cabinet Committee. I presumed that after the
15th August, he would wish me as a constitutional Governor-General, to
cease this practice. He told me he thought that I was quite right in offering to
stop it. I then asked whether he had any objection to my writing a regular
letter to the King in view of the fact that he was still the King in India, and I
was his representative. Nehru said he saw no objection to this. I asked if I
might make those letters personal, and not show them to Nehru. He said he
trusted me implicitly in this matter and that I could do as I wished.
36. Rumours in the press and private sources of information had indicated
to me that Nehru was about to submit to me an unimaginative Cabinet of
old-time Congressites.23 I was convinced that such a Cabinet would be
disastrous. I therefore made a great point of discussing the composition of the
new Cabinet with him. I began by admitting that as Constitutional Governor-
General I would have to accept any names he put to me, but I hoped that as
a friend he would allow me to give him some advice. He said that he would
always look to me for advice in these matters.
37. I then said I had no idea who the new Members would be, but I was
convinced that unless he got a really sound Cabinet in which young, talented
and keen members predominated, he would lose a great opportunity of
gripping the imagination of the country. I told him I thought his greatest
weakness was his personal loyalty towards old friends and colleagues, and
that unless he got rid of a lot of top-weight like Rajagopalachari and Maulana
Azad, he would find himself greatly hampered. I told him I thought that
Bhabha and Matthai should both be kept since they were extremely able and
fearless. I told him that Baldev Singh appeared to me to be unsatisfactory as
Defence Member though I realised he was the only available Sikh, that
Rajendra Prasad was a dear old man, and ought to become the Speaker in the
House, and that in general, it was essential that he should get a crowd of really
good young men. With such a Cabinet the Congress could remain in power
for the next few years ; without it, it was done.
38. Nehru agreed in principle, but said that there was a remarkable dearth
of good young men, between the ages of 30 and 45, but that it was his intention
to pick fairly unknown young men and put them in as Deputy Ministers or
Parliamentary Secretaries to get experience. I told him I thought that this was
21 cf. Nos. 277 and 280, note 2.
22 Mountbatten Papers, Viceroy’s Interview No. 170(B).
23 cf. No. 256, Item 6.
452
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
a serious matter for India, and I sincerely trusted that he would give it his
closest personal attention.
39. Although Nehru listened attentively he gave no indication of what his
reactions were and I felt that I had probably failed to convince him. I now hear
that he went straight back and summoned a meeting of his Congress colleagues,
at which he tore up the list of the Cabinet that they were proposing to submit
to me and said that it was vital for the future of India that they should produce
a more imaginative Cabinet and that they should start thinking again.
Sensation! ! ! Patel came down heavily on “my” side and they are now
sitting night and day trying to produce a better Cabinet. I sincerely trust that
they will succeed for otherwise I fear Congress really will be finished within
a year.
40. Jai Prakash Narain’s price for bringing the Socialist party in was the
Finance, Home and States Departments portfolios and 25 seats in the new
Legislative Assembly. Much as they need the Socialists in, Congress cannot
afford to pay such a price. They are now trying to get the Hindu Mahasabha in.
41. When Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst was interviewed by Nehru
with a view to being offered the command of the Air Forces of the Dominion
of India, Nehru began to ask him searching questions about the range and
performance of all the aircraft which were going to be turned over to the
Dominion. It finally became clear to Elmhirst that Nehru was seriously
considering trying to get an Indian air striking force to join the Indonesians as
soon after the 15 th August as possible. Elmhirst was able to ride him off this
by pointing out all the technical difficulties which Nehru had not appreciated.
But it does show the lengths to which Nehru is prepared to go to support the
Indonesian cause.
42. Dr. Shariar has been staying here with Nehru and came to the Viceroy’s
House for a discussion with Killearn. I also told Nehru that he could bring him
to the party we gave for the Princes and States’ representatives on the 25th July ;
but I have not had a personal interview with Shariar, since it does not seem my
place to do so at the moment.
42. On the 26th July24 I addressed the Chamber of Princes, which was
crowded to capacity with Rulers, Dewans and representatives. I spoke without
notes, hoping to gain in sincerity what I might lack in lucidity. A shorthand
transcript of what I said has been sent to the India Office. The address lasted
half an hour after which I answered questions for an hour.
44. It was clear to me from the beginning that the Rulers and Dewans of
practically all the big States followed every word that I was saying with
sympathy and understanding. The representatives of the smaller States, how-
AUGUST 1947
453
ever, showed a lack of comprehension which was almost incredible. Again and
again I was asked the same sort of questions in different words, and again and
again I drew attention to the fact that I had already answered this question
and was now going to answer it once more. Many of them seemed inclined
to doubt that I should be offering them terms so much better than anything
they had been led to believe Congress would agree to. In particular they
seemed to find difficulty in grasping the fact that accession would not25 involve
giving any financial control to the Central Government, nor would it tie them
to accepting the new constitution if they did not like it.
45. The only States that have been seriously holding out are Travancore,
Hyderabad, Dholpur, Indore and Bhopal.
46. I reported my conversations with the Dewan of Travancore in para¬
graphs 16 to 19 of my last report.26 Shortly after his return he was assaulted
with a billhook and very nearly killed.27 The States Peoples organisation
turned the heat full on and Travancore immediately gave in. The Maharajah
telegraphed his acceptance of the Instrument of Accession to me personally,28
and C.P’s friends have been trying to get Patel to call off the States Peoples
organisation movement.29 He is trying to do this but is having very consider¬
able difficulty since C.P. had really driven them beyond endurance. The
adherence of Travancore after all C.P’s declarations of independence30 has
had a profound effect on all the other States and is sure to shake the Nizam.
47. Walter Monckton is having the greatest difficulty in Hyderabad.31 His
life has been threatened by the local Muslim organisation, the Ittihad-ul-
Muslimin. The Ittihad representative on the Hyderabad delegation issued to
the Delhi press an account of their most secret negotiations so as to discredit
Monckton; whereupon he promptly resigned from the delegation. This, I
think, will enormously strengthen his hand and although everybody else in
India appears to have given up hope of Hyderabad coming in, I still think he
has a sporting chance of managing it at the last moment. If he fails, Hyderabad
is undoubtedly finished.
48. The Maharaja of Dholpur is an old friend, having been on the Prince
of Wales’s staff with me. He suffers from a belief in the divine right of Kings
and is so besotted on this subject that it is just possible that I may not be able to
make him see sense. But I have been having frequent interviews and exchanging
letters with him and am getting as many of his brother rulers as I can to work
24 The date should be 25 July; see No. 234.
25 Emphasis in original.
26 No. 228. 27 See No. 239, note 8.
28 See No. 284 and its note 1.
29 cf. No. 288. 30 See eg No. 146.
31 cf. No. 257.
454
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
oil him. To illustrate his state of mind, he told me that the terms of the
Instrument of Accession are better than anything he could have hoped for,
and he would accept them at once if they were a treaty, but considers it infra
dig that he should sign an Instrument of Accession.32 I shall probably write him
a farewell letter33 expressing my deep regret at the demise of Dholpur, in the
hope that on the 14th August he may yet come round and save the life of his
State.
49. As is well known, Indore has a most unsatisfactory Ruler. He has
refused to come to Delhi or to allow a representative to come even to hold
discussions. As Crown Representative I do not feel I can leave any stone
unturned to help any State. I therefore got hold of the Gaekwar of Baroda
and the Maharaja of Kolhapur and told them to collect the other Mahratta
Rulers and fly down and bring Indore back. I sent a letter containing an
invitation to come and discuss matters with me in Delhi by the Gaekwar.34
They took with them the Maharajas of Gwalior, Dhar, Dewas Junior and the
Raja of Sandur (Indore’s oldest friend and companion). The six princes flew
down on the 30th and reached Indore airfield at 10.30 a.m. only to find that
the Maharaja had gone on a visit to the Nawab of Bhopal. So they sent the
Prime Minister of Kolhapur in their aeroplane to fetch Indore. Bhopal refused
to allow the Prime Minister to see Indore, negotiations having to be carried
on by messages. It took more than four hours to persuade Indore to return with
the Prime Minister. He anived at six o’clock, went to his Palace, and
unceremoniously kicked out five of the Rulers literally into the passage,
keeping only the Gaekwar.
50. It appears that Indore has an extremely unpleasant ex-Police Officer
called Horton, as his Prime Minister. Horton had the nerve, on reading my
letter, to say to his Maharaja that this was a threat, which the Gaekwar
vigorously denied. Indore said he could not go to Delhi as he had given his
word of honour to Bhopal not to go without his permission. They spent most
of the night trying to make contact with Bhopal by telephone to get the
Nawab to release Indore from his promise, but failed. They returned on the
3 1st July without Indore. I saw four of the Committee who are all horrified
at their treatment. The Gaekwar wished me to depose him at once, but I
pointed out that I had no grounds for doing this before the 15th August.
51. It may not be a bad thing to have a thoroughly unsatisfactory State like
Indore remaining outside the Dominion, as an example of what happens to
States that try and stand on their own. If he does not change his mind and
come in I prophesy that the people of Indore will kick their Ruler off the
Gaddi before the end of September.
52. This leaves only Bhopal, whose Ruler is my second best friend in India.
AUGUST 1947
455
We are still in frequent correspondence and he has offered to come up and
have a final talk with me.35 He is of course a Muslim ruler widi a majority of
Hindus in his State and his position is admittedly difficult. But he is making it
far more difficult for himself by his extraordinary attitude, and I do not know
whether I can pull him round either by reason or through personal friendship.
53. Rulers are notoriously dilatory in taking any action. I therefore gave
a luncheon party today to which I invited all the Rulers who are still in Delhi.
I asked all those who were prepared to let me announce their accession in the
papers to let me know privately before they left and I undertook not to coerce
those who had not yet made up their minds. It was really a great success, for
all of them joined except two of the Punjab Hill States who have had Sardar
Patel’s agreement to their deferring their decision until their negotiations with
Kashmir are completed, and it is known which Dominion Kashmir will join.
54. As might have been expected Nehru has returned to the charge about
the I.N.A. prisoners. He pointed out that unless they are released by 15th August
pressure from the extreme elements of Congress will be such that Government
will be forced to yield. On the other hand Auchinleck is adamant that if it is
known that I am responsible for their release whilst Viceroy it will upset the
British officers who are remaining on. There are only n still in jail, with
sentences ranging from 2 to 7 years rigorous imprisonment, all awarded for
brutality and not for political reasons. The Federal Court have just finished
reviewing the sentences and have recommended a reduction in most of them.
In view of the fact that there was a general amnesty for certain classes of
prisoners when the Duke of Connaught opened the Legislative Assembly in
1921 and on the occasion of the King’s coronation in 1937 the right answer
would appear to be to make use of a similar general jail release throughout both
Dominions on the 15th August. Auchinleck is prepared to reduce the sentences
of the I.N.A. prisoners to the level needed for bringing them into the amnesty
clause, and both Nehru and Jinnah are prepared to accept this solution. The
main thing will be to arrange that there should be no special publicity about
this so that the I.N.A. men may find themselves out in a large crowd without
becoming heroes.
55. Having heard of appalling conditions in Indonesia, particularly through
lack of supplies, my wife consulted Nehru, the Indonesia representatives and
the Indian Red Cross, as well as Lord and Lady Killearn and has been instrumental
in arranging for medical supplies to be made available to Indonesia by
Indian Red Cross. Arrangements are also being made through the Indian
32 cf. No. 242. 33 cf. No. 265.
3* See Nos. 266 and 295, note 1.
35 See correspondence ending with No. 297.
456
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Medical Association for two doctors to proceed to Indonesia as soon as
necessary; safe passage and arrangements have been fixed.
46. The following is an extract from The Statesman of 31st July : —
"One of the few institutions which will not be partitioned immediately is
the Punjab Mental Hospital. It will continue to be shared for some years.
Some Hindu imnates of the asylum have protested against being left in
Pakistan. They have been assured that their fears are imaginary.”
M. OF B.
p. s. Since writing the above news has come that the Maharaja of Indore and the
Nawab of Bhopal are coming to Delhi together to see me.36
36 The Maharaja of Indore conveyed this information in his telegram to Lord Mountbatten dated
1 August. R/3/1/139: ff 47-8.
303
The Khan of Kalat to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
R/31 1/ 166: f 36
GOVERNMENT OF KALAT CAMP HOTEL IMPERIAL,
NEW DELHI, 1 August I947
My dear Friend,
After I had the honour of seeing Your Excellency on Monday, 28th July,1
I have met Mr. Jinnah three times, while my Wazir-i-Azam has had two or
three meetings with the Hon’ble Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar and one with the
Hon’ble Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and the aforesaid Sardar Sahib together. I regret
to say that in spite of these meetings we are where we were before I arrived
here.2
Your Excellency will, I hope, agree that for negotiations to succeed or make
any headway at all on an important issue like this there should be present some
spirit of ‘give and take’ on both sides. On my part while I maintain that all the
areas in question (Quetta, including the rights of collection of tolls in the
Bolan, Nushki and Nasirabad) belong to Kalat State and must revert to Kalat
State on the termination of my Treaty with British Government, I am prepared
none-the-less to come to a reasonable settlement with Pakistan in respect of
such problems as defence and the safety of the Railway Line passing through
the Bolan and Nushki Territories. But I have noticed with regret that the
Pakistan Authorities are in no mood to admit my right to the retrocession of
these territories or to give up possession of any of them to me.
In these circumstances there seems to be no point in my staying here any
longer, and I would, therefore, request Your Excellency to give me the
AUGUST 1947
457
honour of a further interview with you as soon as may suit your convenience,
in order that I may be able to submit my case finally to Your Excellency and
to take leave of Your Excellency to return home.
I assure Your Excellency of my loyal services at all times, and subscribe
myself
Your Excellency’s sincere friend,
AHMAD YAR KHAN
1 No. 258.
3 Sir G. Abell noted on the file that Mr Jinnah’s Secretary had told him that ‘Mr Jinnah asked the Khan
to accede to Pakistan and discuss the matter of the leased areas afterwards. The Khan did not agree.’
R/3/1/166: f 37-
304
Note by Steering Committee
Mountbatten Papers. Provisional Joint Dejence Council Papers
1 August 1947
POSITION OF SUPREME COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF
DURING RECONSTITUTION1
(1) The A.F.R.C. had under consideration the following draft submitted by
the chairman: —
“It is necessary to make clear the position of the Supreme Commander and
his staff during the next few months.
2. The Supreme Commander has been charged by the Joint Defence
Council to reconstitute the Armed Forces. This is a formidable task, and
for its successful execution it is essential that there shall be the minimum
dislocation in the existing machinery. If this delicate and complicated
machine, namely Armed Forces Headquarters, is thrown out of gear,
chaos will result and this will be to the severe detriment of the Armed
Forces of the two Dominions.
3. For at least four weeks after 14 August and probably longer the volume
of work at Supreme Commander’s Headquarters will be little less than
today. In many cases the volume of work has recently increased.
4. It follows that there carmot be any appreciable reduction at present in
1 This note was circulated by the Steering Committee on i August for consideration at the meeting of
the Provisional Joint Defence Council to be held on 2 August. At the meeting, the C. in C. gave an
assurance, with reference to para. 4, that the new headquarters of India and Pakistan would be
adequately staffed, and the note was accepted in principle. Mountbatten Papers, Provisional Joint
Defence Council Minutes, 2 August 1947, Case No. J.D.C. 23/4/47.
458
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
the size of the staff of existing Armed Forces Headquarters; therefore
any proposals such as a considerable move of clerks or the move of
offices is quite impracticable at present.
5. It is the duty of the Supreme Commander to pass as soon as possible more
and more responsibility to the Armed Forces Headquarters of the two
Dominions. This will be done and as responsibility passes the staff of the
Supreme Commander will be progressively reduced.”
(2) The Committee unanimously accepted the draft and refer it to the Joint
Defence Council for their concurrence.
Recommendation of the Steering Committee
The Steering Committee recommend that the Joint Defence Council accept in
principle this general statement on the position of the Supreme Commander
and his staff during the Reconstitution.
305
Sir G. Abell to Mr Abbott
Telegram , R/j/ if 157: f 242
CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, 1 August I947
BY TELEPHONE
No. 3094-S. Governor’s telegram 197-G of July 29th.1
After taking soundings here2 Viceroy is convinced that it will be best not to
press Kartar Singh. Indications are that this would have no effect especially as
there is no inducement to offer.
Tara Singh’s statement3 reported on July 28th that the Sikhs should wait for
the award of the Boundary Commission suggests that there may be no serious
trouble for the moment.
Does Governor think that a statement by the Partition Committee as
a whole without specifically quoting membership would be suitable ? Swaran
Singh has returned to Lahore.
1 No. 272.
2 See No. 298.
3 See ibid., note 4.
AUGUST 1947
459
306
Telephone message from Mr Abbott
Rhl 1/157:/ 244
1 August 1947
Your telephone message of 1st August.1 Statements by Punjab Partition
Committee. Governor has since submitted record of conversations with
Kartar Singh of 30th July,2 and says that Viceroy is clearly right in decision
not to press Kartar Singh.
2. There is going to be trouble with the Sikhs. When, and how bad, the
Governor cannot yet say. Raids on Muslim villages have begun in Amritsar
and Lahore district and along the Jullundur Hoshiarpur border, and there have
been four attacks on, or attempts to interfere with, trains in the past two or three
days. Muslim casualities in Amritsar Rural area alone since night of
30th/ 3 1st July are 23 killed, including 3 women and 2 children, and 30 wounded.
3. Statement by Punjab Partition Committee, as a whole, would have no
effect, and Swaran Singh would probably not dare to agree to it. Governor
proposes to consult Committee again, and see how members feel. He will not
press them if they are not in agreement.3
1 No. 305.
2 See Enclosure to No. 292.
3 Lord Mountbatten minuted, on the file copy of this message in the Mountbatten Papers, as follows:
‘I must make Statement in Partition Council not later than Wed [6 Augustj on this. M.’ Mountbatten
Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Security Arrangements for Partition. The subsequent
minutes of the Partition Council meeting on 6 August, Case No. P.C. 147/16/47, read as follows in
this respect: ‘His Excellency said that he regretted that the Punjab Partition Committee had been
unable to fulfil the promise made to him that they should issue a statement on the lines of the one
issued by the Central Partition Council, assuring minorities of fair treatment etc. The reason was that
Sardar Swaran Singh had been unable to persuade any of the Sikh leaders to sign the statement ; it was
embarrassing for him to sign it without their support, and in such case it would have little practical
value.’ Mountbatten Papers.
307
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscoutit Mountbatten oj Burma
Telegram, L/P&S/ 13/ 1848: ff i2g-ji
important india office, i August ig47, 6.1 5 pm
secret Received: 1 August, 10.00 pm
No. 9947. I have read with interest and admiration your speech to Rep-
\6o
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
resentatives of States on 25th July.1 I am sure that you are right in urging on
States that it is in their best interests to seize Patel’s offer2 to accept federation
for three subjects only.
2. We must, however, keep balance even and not ourselves add to the
pressure which facts of situation place in any case on States. H.M.G. were
closely questioned on this point in Parliament during debate on Indian
Independence Act and we gave categorical assurances that we would exercise
no pressure.
3. In this connection I am doubtful about your statement that if States do
not link up with one or other Dominion, they will be cut off from any repeat
any source of supplies of up to date arms or weapons. If Dominions of India
and Pakistan decline to supply military equipment to States which refuse to
federate, these States will seek to place orders overseas. It is true that Dominions
would be physically able to prevent delivery of such orders to States lacking
access to sea but some States have access to sea and we do not wish it implied
at this stage that H.M.G. have reached any conclusion as to what our attitude
would be towards such orders placed in United Kingdom.
4. Your statement that if States are prepared to come in they must do so
before 15th August also seems inconsistent with what was said in Parliament.
I am not clear why States should be given this time limit. They seem to me
entitled to say that before deciding finally to adhere to one or other Dominion
they wish to see constitutions of Dominions as they emerge from Constituent
Assemblies and form judgment as to what sort of structure they are joining.
In any case they camiot accede until Government of India Act as modified by
Indian Independence Act is amended in respect of both Dominions in order to
permit accession of States to be accepted. With these considerations in mind
government spokesmen in Parliament made it clear that States might need some
time in which to make up their minds. Indeed, this fact is surely the justification
for the Standstill Agreement.
5. It is possible that we may be asked in Parliament whether your speech
implies any departure from policy regarding States, particularly as stated in
the Prime Minister’s speeches3 in debate on Indian Independence Act. We
propose in that case to reply to the effect that policy of H.M.G. remains as
indicated in Cabinet Mission’s memorandum of 12th May 19644 and that we
do not interpret your remarks as intended to imply any departure therefrom;
H.M.G. share your desire that there shall be no avoidable delay on the part of
the States in filling the void when Paramountcy lapses in one or other of the
ways indicated in the Memorandum, namely by entering into a federal relation-
AUGUST 1947
ship with the appropriate Dominion or, failing this, entering into particular
political arrangements therewith.
6. Have you any comments?5
1 No. 234. 2 See Vol. XI, No. 528.
3 See No. 262, notes 3 and 4. 4 Vol. VII, No. 262.
5 On 2 August Sir G. Abell put up this telegram to Lord Mountbatten together with a draft reply for
approval, remarking: ‘I have not consulted V.P. on this but will do so if you wish.’ Mountbatten
replied: ‘Yes please. I would like this redrafted to knock these arguments on the head.’ R/3/1/139: f 66.
Abell’s draft is not on the file; for the reply as issued, see No. 340.
308
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
LIP&JI10I141: ff 63-3
MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 1 August I947, 3.3O pm
secret Received: 1 August, 11.00 pm
No. 9962. Your telegrams 3077-S1 and 3068-S2 of 1st August. Governors
appointments.
2. Important preliminary point needs to be settled. Press this morning
contains message3 from Delhi dated 31st July saying that Indian Constituent
Assembly will re-assemble at midnight on 14th August and either by resolution
or otherwise will authorise Nehru to ask you to accept the Governor-General¬
ship, also communicating to you the names of the new Cabinet. Is this correct ?
If so it is exceedingly embarrassing. It does not accord with the procedure
announced with great elaboration by the Prime Minister in Parliament on
10th July vide official report columns 2461 and 24.62* Further, King has now
approved formal submission by the Prime Minister appointing you and
Jinnah to be Govemors-General from 15th August. Any attempt to undo what
has been done and substitute at this stage a fresh procedure would be most
difficult. Incidentally if above report is true what procedure was proposed for
Governor-Generalship of Pakistan? If despite the immense difficulties you wish
to advise a revision of procedure please telegraph your views most immediate
for consideration of Prime Minister. If formal announcement of the appoint¬
ments of the Governors-General were to be deferred to the 15th August it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that it would be necessary to defer to the same
date the announcement of the appointments of all the new Governors which
would be another most unfortunate development.
1 and 2 See No. 293, note 3.
A copy of this message is on L/P &J/10/136: f 206.
4 The column references cited here are incorrect. The full reference for Mr Attlee’s remarks on the
procedure for the appointment of Govemors-General is as follows: Pari. Debs., 5th ser.,H. ofC.,
vol. 439, 10 July 1947, cols. 2448-50.
462
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
3. Assuming that procedure for Go vemors-General is to stand I am strongly
averse from holding up release of announcement of appointments of Governors.
Among other things there is the always grave risk of leakage of names. In
order to give you time to comment I am holding up announcement contained
in my 9925 of 31st July5 until 18.00 D.B.S.T. Sunday with embargo on broad¬
casting till 00.30 Monday with a view to publication in Monday morning’s
papers. I do not think it ought to be deferred later. It would no doubt have
been preferable to have complete list but it does not seem particularly
embarrassing, whatever speculation there may be as to the cause, if, as will be
the case, there are two Governors left over for further announcement, namely
Central Provinces and East Bengal. I cannot make a submission to the King
about the former until it is decided as to whether the appointment is to be that
of the Governor of Central Provinces and Berar or Governor of Central
Provinces. Accordingly, the announcement of this appointment must it seems
to me be deferred until after the Nizam’s views have been obtained.6 I shall
be most reluctant to defer publication of the whole list beyond Monday
morning.7
4. Reverting to paragraph 2 above it occurs to me that if it is essential to
bring in the Constituent Assembly in some fashion it might be possible that
this should take the form of a resolution to the effect that the Assembly
welcomes and endorses the action of Nehru in having recommended that you
should be appointed Governor-General of India from 15th August. I cannot,
of course, judge from here what is practicable vis-a-vis the Constituent
Assembly but some solution of that kind if indeed anything at all is needed
would save great embarrassment.
5 L/P &J/10/141 : f 72. 6 See No. 293. 7 ie 4 August.
309
The Earl oj Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , L/P &S/ 12/ 1821 : f 14
IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE 1 August 1Q47, 8.0 5 pm
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 9980. Your telegram dated 25th July No. 2935-S.1 I am sorry that the
Prime Minister of Afghanistan was unable to see Jinnah but am glad to know
that Pakistan Government are considering their attitude towards tribes.
2. While Ismay was here Croft discussed with him briefly possibility of
promoting exchanges of views between Pakistan and India (and ourselves if
invited) on problem of North West Frontier defence and relations with the
AUGUST 1947
463
tribes of Afghanistan. I am sending you a memorandum2 suggesting stages in
which this problem might be approached. This has been shown in draft to the
Foreign Office and Cunningham and embodies their comments.
3 . As we see it, Pakistan must first settle its policy and announce to the tribes
decisions regarding allowances and methods of control and defence. Action on
this is important before 15th August owing to lapse of tribal agreements and
need for some arrangement for carrying on pending final settlement as in
analogous case of Indian States. Thereafter, if Pakistan wishes foi consultation
and help from India and H.M.G., the consultations should proceed in Joint
Defence Council with a view to common policy being put jointly to Afghan
Government in Kabul on behalf of all three Commonwealth Governments.
4. Our readiness if so desired to take part in consultations with a view to
a joint policy should not, of course, be taken as implying any financial
commitment.
1 See No. 198, note 5. 2 Enclosure to No. 310.
310
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
L/P&SI 12/1821: 12-13
1 August 1Q47
I mentioned in my telegram of ist August1 that I was sending you a memo¬
randum which we had put together here2 about the problem of the North
West Frontier Tribal Area and Afghanistan. I now enclose this paper which has
been seen in the Foreign Office and generally agreed ; we have also had the
benefit of Cunningham’s advice. He emphasises3 that the possibility of
collaboration by H.M.G. in these arrangements would have to be advanced
very cautiously and we are, of course, fully alive to the danger of seeming to
intervene in these matters without being asked. We are very conscious that
the initiative in this matter must come from Pakistan in the first instance, as
the Government primarily concerned with relations with their next door
neighbours.
We should hope, however, that they would appreciate the wider aspects
(paragraph 3 of the memorandum) in which the whole Commonwealth
cannot fail to be interested and will realise that India and H.M.G. may each
1 No. 309.
2 ie the External Department of the India Office.
3 Sir G. Cunningham’s letter of 21 July to Mr Donaldson (head of the India Office External Department)
is on L/P &S/12/3282: ff 43-4.
464
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
have a part to play in a joint policy. We should readily consider any approach
leading towards a joint policy.
I feel confident that if concrete proposals are made to us my colleagues will
be very willing to examine them with the utmost sympathy.
LISTOWEL
Enclosure to No. 310
NORTH WEST FRONTIER TRIBAL AREA AND AFGHANISTAN
Speaking in the Debate on the Committee State of the India Bill in the House
of Commons on 14th July, the Prime Minister said that the important matter
of the North West Frontier and its defence was “very much in the minds of
both successor Governments and there is a joint Defence Council to consider
it”.4 We gather that this question will not strictly be within the purview of the
Joint Defence Council when constituted, but that the Viceroy would be likely
to agree, if the Indian leaders consented to this course, to include this question
within the scope of the discussions of the Council. The Prime Minister has
indicated the willingness of H.M.G. to enter into the discussions if desired.
2. The basic factors, which need no elaboration here, are: —
(a) the potential danger to the peace of the common border of the war-like
inhabitants of the tribal areas, and
(b) the economic weakness of the tribes on both sides of the border.
3 . From the wider view-point account must also be taken of —
(c) the need for a strong and independent buffer State between the Common¬
wealth and Soviet Union, and
(d) the provisions of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 the rights and obli¬
gations arising from which will hereafter devolve, primarily upon
Pakistan, but to a lesser degree upon the new India. (It has to be borne
in mind that, whereas the International Treaty subsists after the transfer
of power, the Tribal Agreements, like the Indian States Treaties, lapse,
and in default of some interim arrangement there would be a vacuum
pending negotiations for new Agreements with the Tribes).
4. The following in broad outline, might be the successive stages in which
the problem could be approached by the several interested parties : —
(a) The Pakistan Government should consider and settle the policy it intends
to adopt in regard to
(i) the continuation of allowances- - the key to the situation,
(ii) the maintenance of political control in the agency areas, and
(iii) the organisation of forces (scout and militia formations backed by
AUGUST 1947
465
regular ground troops with air support) to provide for watch and
ward and frontier defence;
(b) The Pakistan Government would approach the tribal jirgas with an
offer of some form of association with the new Dominion corresponding
to the approach which is being made by the successor authorities to the
Indian States, “standstill” agreements being concluded to cover the
interim period ;
(c) If the Pakistan Government reach the conclusion that, because of the
all-India character of the problem of frontier defence, the Government
of India should be brought in there should be joint consultation and if
there was a further desire to extend the consultation so as to include
H.M.G. a proposal to this effect would be sympathetically considered;
(d) In any event it would be desirable to promote discussions between the two
Dominion Governments on the extent to which each will respectively
undertake in future the obligations devolving upon them under the
Anglo-Afghan Treaty and the fulfilment of what may be regarded as
Commonwealth policy designed to secure the independence and stability
of Afghanistan as a buffer State between the Commonwealth and the
U.S.S.R.
5 . Items which it would seem most urgent to cover in any discussions under
(d) above are
(a) transit facilities and customs exemptions for Afghan goods passing
through Pakistan and Indian territory;
(b) the supply of military equipment (including aircraft) at concessional
rates and the provision of instructors and training facilities for the
Afghan forces ; and
(c) financial, economic and cultural assistance to the Afghans.
6. The final stage would be that when a common policy has been worked
out on the Commonwealth side a joint approach would be made in Kabul to
the Afghan Government.
4 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H of C., vol. 440, col. 113.
466
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
311
Commonwealth Relations Office to British High Commissioners in Canada ,
Australia , New Zealand and South Africa
Telegram , L/P &J/ 10/ 133: f 33
TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL 1 August 1 947, 8.33 pm
No. 65. Please refer to Prime Minister’s message of 14th June1 regarding
proposed alteration of the King’s title by the omission of the term “Emperor
of India”.
Legislation has now been passed in the United Kingdom and in Canada
authorizing the necessary action for the issue of a Royal Proclamation amending
the title, but such action has not yet been found possible in Australia, New
Zealand and South Africa. In the circumstances we have reached conclusion
that proper course is to defer issue of formal Proclamation until the other
Commonwealth countries concerned have taken necessary Parliamentary
action. At the same time it seems desirable, more particularly in relation to
documents concerning the two new Indian Dominions, that the style
“Emperor of India” should be discontinued after the 15th August. We under¬
stand that the omission of this style in formal documents in anticipation of the
issue of the Proclamation is not likely to give rise to legal difficulty.
In the circumstances the King has approved a proposal that for all official
documents issued here after the 15th August the words “Emperor of India”
should be omitted, and that the King’s signature should be “G.R.” and not
“G.R.I.”.
Please inform Dominion authorities accordingly, and, so far as Australia,
New Zealand and South Africa are concerned, please ask them to keep us
informed of progress of their Parliamentary action.
Repeated Dublin for information.
1 Vol. XI, No. 203.
312
Sardar Patel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Mounthatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: Joint Defence Council,
Part (a)
NEW DELHI, 2 August I947
My dear Lord Mounthatten,
The composition of the Joint Defence Council, in our opinion, requires some
AUGUST 1947
467
reconsideration. Originally, when it was decided that it should consist of a
Governor-General or Governors-General, two Defence Members and the
Supreme Commander, the general impression was that there would be only
one Governor-General and, therefore, there was no question of unequal
representation of India and Pakistan. Now, if the composition is adhered to,
you would be its independent Chairman while Pakistan would be represented
both by its Governor-General and its Defence Member. As against this, India
would be represented only by the Defence Member. This difference is further
accentuated by the attitude recently displayed by the Commander-in-Chief
about which Jawaharlal has already written to you.1
We feel, therefore, that the representation of India on the Joint Defence
Council should be further strengthened by the addition of another Minister.
We fully realise that it would be possible for the Defence Minister to bring
with him another colleague to assist him in the deliberations of the Joint
Defence Council. You will doubtless concede that this is not the same thing as
having another Minister with full membership rights. On the other hand, the
addition of one representative will restore the balance between the two
Dominions and should not matter to Pakistan Government since there is no
question of majority decisions.
We should be grateful if you would give this matter early consideration so
that it could be put before the Partition Council either today or at its next
meeting.2
Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL3
1 See No. 247.
2 This letter was considered at the Viceioy's 66th Staff Meeting (Item 10) held at 12.15 pm on 2 August.
Mr Menon then suggested that he should discuss the letter with Sir C. Trivedi to which Lord Mount-
batten agreed. Mountbatten Papers.
3 At a meeting of the Provisional Joint Defence Council on 5 August Mr Jinnah agreed to the name of
the Governor-General of Pakistan being deleted from the list of members of the Joint Defence Council
provided that the relevant paragraph in the Draft Joint Defence Council Order was amended to read:
‘The Governor-General of India shall be independent Chairman of the Joint Defence Council.’
(Emphasis in original). Mountbatten Papers, Provisional Joint Defence Council Minutes, Case No.
J.D.C. 40/6/47.
3D
Mr V. P. Menon to Sir P. Patrick
LjP &SI13/ 1 848: ff 101-4
AIRMAIL GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, STATES DEPARTMENT,
NEW DELHI, 2 August 1947
My dear Patrick,
I have been wishing to write to you about our negotiations with the States but
468
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
have been really in a frightful rush all these days. You would now have known
that quite a number of Indian States have expressed their desire to accede to
the Dominion of India on the subjects of Defence, External Affairs and
Communications. I enclose a copy of the Instrument of Accession as it has been
finalised after discussions with the States Negotiating Committee; also a copy
of the communique which we put out this morning. I also send herewith a copy
of the Standstill Agreement which has been agreed upon with the States.
2. I am sure you will agree that our first bag of States who have declared
their accession outright is most encouraging and that the fact that Travancore
was practically the first State to intimate its decision1 is a great triumph for
H.E. I have now no doubt whatever that with the possible exception of
Hyderabad, Bhopal and Indore and one or two waverers, all the States will
accede.
3. Hyderabad has not yet intimated its decision about accession: H.E. feels
that Hyderabad would come in. I also think that Indore who is now in the
Bhopal Group will eventually accede. Both Bhopal and Indore are here and
we will know the result in a day or two.
Yours sincerely,
v. P. MEN ON
Enclosure 1 to No. 313
INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION OF2 .
Whereas the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that as from the
fifteenth day of August, 1947, there shall be set up an independent Dominion
known as INDIA, and that the Government of India Act, 1935, shall, with such
omissions, additions, adaptations and modification as the Governor-General
may by order specify be applicable to the Dominion of India ;
And whereas the Government of India Act, 1935, as so adapted by the
Governor-General provides that an Indian State may accede to the Dominion
of India by an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof :
NOW THEREFORE
I .
Ruler of .
in the exercise of my sovereignty in and over my said State Do hereby execute
this my Instrument of Accession and
1. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the intent
that the Governor-General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal
Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the
Dominion shall, by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession, but subject
always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion,
exercise in relation to the State of .
AUGUST 1947
469
(hereinafter referred to as ‘‘this State”) such functions as may be vested in
them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the
Dominion of India on the 15th day of August 1947 (which Act as so in force
is hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).
2. I hereby assume the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given to the
provisions of the Act within this State so far as they are applicable therein by
virtue of this my Instrument of Accession.
3. I accept the matters specified in the Schedule hereto as the matters with
respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for this State.
4. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India on the assurance
that if an agreement is made between the Governor-General and the Ruler of
this State whereby any functions in relation to the administration in this State
of any law of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the Ruler of this
State, then any such agreement shall be deemed to form part of this Instrument
and shall be construed and have effect accordingly.
5. The terms of this my Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by any
amendment of the Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 unless such
amendment is accepted by me by an Instrument supplementary to this
Instrument.
6. Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature
to make any law for this State authorising the compulsory acquisition of land
for any purpose, but I hereby undertake that should the Dominion for the
purposes of a Dominion law which applies in this State deem it necessary to
acquire any land, I will at their request acquire the land at their expense or if
the land belongs to me transfer it to them on such terms as may be agreed, or,
in default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the
Chief Justice of India.
7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to
acceptance of any future constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter
into arrangements with the Government of India under any such future
constitution.
1 See No. 284.
2 In the event, the States Department of the Government of India invited only the 140 full-powered
States to accede to the Dominion of India upon the terms laid down in the Instrument of Accession.
The 327 non-jurisdictional estates and talukas situated in Kathiawar and Gujarat expressed a desire to
be freed from the larger States to which they had been adjoined as a result of the Attachment Scheme
of 1943 and to be administered by the Dominion Government as in the pre-attachment period. A
revised form of Instrument of Accession suitable for their status and requirements was prepared for
them. The rulers of some 70 intermediate States, located in Kathiawar, Central India and the Simla
Hills, who exercised limited powers were asked and subsequently agreed to accede upon the basis of
such powers as they exercised at the time of the lapse of paramountcy. R/3/1/140: ff 74-8.
470
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty in
and over this State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the
exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me as Ruler of
this State or the validity of any law at present in force in this State.
9. I hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and
that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of the State is to be
construed as including a reference to my heirs and successors.
Given under my hand this . day of August,
Nineteen hundred and forty-seven.
I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession.
Dated this . day of August, Nineteen hundred and
forty-seven.
(Governor-General of India)
SCHEDULE
THE MATTERS WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THE DOMINION
LEGISLATURE MAY MAKE LAWS FOR THIS STATE
A. Defence
1. The naval, military and air forces of the Dominion and any other armed
force raised or maintained by the Dominion; any armed forces, including
forces raised or maintained by an Acceding State, which are attached to, or
operating with, any of the armed forces of the Dominion.
2. Naval, military and air force works, administration of cantonment areas.
3. Arms; fire-arms; ammunition.
4. Explosives.
B. External Affairs
1. External affairs; the implementing of treaties and agreements with other
countries ; extradition, including the surrender of criminals and accused persons
to parts of His Majesty’s dominions outside India.
2. Admission into, and emigration and expulsion from, India, including in
relation thereto the regulation of the movements in India of persons who are
not British subjects domiciled in India or subjects of any acceding State;
pilgrimages to places beyond India.
AUGUST 1947
471
3. Naturalisation.
c. Communications
1. Posts and telegraphs, including telephones, wireless, broadcasting, and other
like forms of communication.
2. Federal railways; the regulation of all railways other than minor railways
in respect of safety, maximum and minimum rates and fares, station and service
terminal charges, interchange of traffic and the responsibility of railway
administrations as carriers of goods and passengers ; the regulation of minor
railways in respect of safety and the responsibility of the administrations of such
railways as carriers of goods and passengers.
3 . Maritime shipping and navigation, including shipping and navigation on
tidal waters; Admiralty jurisdiction.
4. Port quarantine.
5. Major ports, that is to say, the declaration and delimitation of such ports,
and the constitution and powers of Port Authorities therein.
6. Aircraft and air navigation; the provision of aerodromes; regulation and
organisation of air traffic and of aerodromes.
7. Lighthouses, including lightships, beacons and other provisions for the
safety of shipping and aircraft.
8. Carriage of passengers and goods by sea or by air.
9. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of the police force
belonging to any unit to railway area outside that unit.
d. Ancillary
1. Elections to the Dominion Legislature, subject to the provisions of the Act
and of any Order made thereunder.
2. Offences against laws with respect to any of the aforesaid matters.
3. Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the aforesaid matters.
4. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts with respect to any of the aforesaid
matters but, except with the consent of the Ruler of the Acceding State, not
so as to confer any jurisdiction or powers upon any courts other than courts
ordinarily exercising jurisdiction in or in relation to that State.
Enclosure 2 to No. 313
[2 August 1947]
A special communique3 from Viceroy’s House begins :
3 The text of this communique is to be found on L/P &S/13/1848: f 124.
472
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
“Following a conference of Rulers and States’ representatives held on
25th July,4 which was presided over by the Viceroy, the States Department
has been engaged in discussions with the Rulers and their representatives on
the terms of the Instrument of Accession and the Standstill Agreement. These
documents are now finalised and accepted by the representatives of the States.
“The States Department are sending copies to the States for signature. It
will be recalled that the Viceroy had discussions with Sir C. P. Ramaswaini
Iyer, Dewan of Travancore, when the latter was in Delhi.5 As a result of these
discussions, the Maharaja of Travancore has now agreed to accede to the
Dominion.6 Before he left Delhi, the Gaekwar of Baroda also informed the
Viceroy that Baroda would accede. Their Highnesses, the Maharajas of Cochin
and Rajpipla likewise expressed their desire to accede to the Indian Dominion.
“The Viceroy had informal consultations today with Rulers of the Indian
States who are at present in Delhi. The Rulers of the following States have
expressed their readiness to accede to the Dominion: Gwalior, Patiala, Kotah,
Bikaner, Jodhpur, Dungarpur, Dhar, Nawanagar, Jhalawar, Panna, Tehri-
Garhwal, Faridkot, Sangli, Sitamau, Palitana Phaltan, Khairagarh and Sandur.
“Most of the other States are understood to be willing to accede, but in the
discussions at Delhi, they were represented by their Ministers, who cannot
formally commit them to accession. These Ministers are now returning to their
States at once, in order to place the instruments before their Rulers. It is
expected that barring a few who have not finally made up their minds, all the
States will have signed the Instrument of Accession by August 10th.”
Enclosure 3 to No. 313
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATE OF .
AND THE DOMINION OF INDIA
whereas it is to the benefit and advantage of the Dominion of India as
well as of the Indian States that existing agreements and administrative arrange¬
ments in the matters of common concern, should continue for the time being
between the Dominion of India or any part thereof and the Indian States :
Now therefore it is agreed between the State and the
Dominion of India that: —
1. (1) Until new agreements in this behalf are made, all agreements and
administrative arrangements as to matters of common concern now
existing between the Crown and any Indian State shall, in so far as
may be appropriate, continue as between the Dominion of India or,
as the case may be, the part thereof, and the State.
(2) In particular, and without derogation from the generality of subclause
(1) of this clause the matters referred to above shall include the matters
specified in the Schedule to this Agreement.
AUGUST 1947
473
2. Any dispute arising out of this Agreement, or out of the agreements or
arrangements hereby continued, shall, unless any provision is made therein for
arbitration by an authority other than the Governor-General or Governor, be
settled by arbitration according, as far as may be, to the procedure of the
Indian Arbitration Act, 1899.
3. Nothing in this Agreement includes the exercise of any paramountcy
functions.
. State.
Secretary to the Government of India
SCHEDULE
1. Air Communications.
2. Arms and equipment.
3. Control of commodities.
4. Currency and coinage.
5. Customs.
6. Indian States Forces.
7. External Affairs.
8. Extradition.
9. Import and Export Control.
10. Irrigation and Electric Power.
11. Motor vehicles.
12. National Highways.
13. Opium.
14. Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones.
15. Railways (including police and other arrangements in Railway lands).
15. Salt.
17. Central Excises, relief from double income-tax and other arrangements
relating to taxation.
18. Wireless.
4 See No. 234.
5 See No. 228, paras. 16-19.
6 See No. 284.
474
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
314
Sir G. Abell to Mr Harris
L/P &J! 10) loj 122: jj 9-12
NO. 1446/5
THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI,
2 August 1947
My dear Ronald,
I enclose copy of a letter from Sir B. N. Rau giving an opinion about the
matter of secession. This may possibly be of interest to you in the India Office.
Yours sincerely,
GEORGE ABELL
Enclosure to No. 3141
My dear Abell,
As desired by you, I have examined the vexed question of secession, par¬
ticularly the point whether there is any difference as to the right of secession
between one Dominion and another.
I should like to mention at the outset that the subject is one on which there
is still room for controversy.
Professor Keith’s views as to the right of a Dominion under the Statute of
Westminster to secede from the Commonwealth will be clear from the follow¬
ing extracts from his book “The Dominions as Sovereign States”, 1938. The
date of this book is important, because it was written not only after the enact¬
ment of the Statute of Westminster, but also after the enactment of the Irish
Constitution of 1937 in which Ireland is described as a sovereign, independent,
democratic State: —
“The United Kingdom and the Dominions recognise the same sovereign,
and the fact is solemnly recorded in the preamble to the Statute of
Westminster in accordance with the decision of the Imperial Conference of
1930: ‘It is meet and proper to set out by way of preamble to this Act that,
inasmuch as the Crown is the symbol of the free association of the members
of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and as they are united by a com¬
mon allegiance to the Crown, it would be in accord with the established
constitutional position of all the members of the Commonwealth in relation
to one another that any alteration in the law touching the succession to the
throne or the royal style and tides shall hereafter require the assent as well of
the Parliaments of all the Dominions as of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom’. The declaration thus solemnly asserts that any change in the
succession must be made by common action, and it is inevitable that the
AUGUST 1947
475
conclusion should thence be derived that the union of the parts of the
Commonwealth is one which cannot be dissolved by unilateral action.
★ ★ ★
“What is obvious and is never denied is that, if any Dominion should
really decide to sever itself from the Empire, it would not be held proper
by the other parts of the Empire to seek to prevent it from doing so by the
application of armed force. This is a doctrine which was recognised as early
as 1920 by Mr. Bonar Law, and has often been admitted since. Most recently
it was made clear in the discussions of the attitude of the Irish Free State in
the matter of the oath and the withholding of the land annuities and other
payments due to the British Government that, if the Free State should deter¬
mine to declare itself a republic, the British Government would not make
war to prevent such a result. But that view, of course, has nothing to do with
the legal aspect of the case.
“From the legal point of view the matter is prima facie simple enough. The
Dominions were created as organised Governments under the British Crown,
and there is no provision in their constitutions which contemplates that they
have the right to eliminate the Crown, or to sever their connection with it.
The language of the British North America Act, 1867, is emphatic; the Act
was passed to unite the provinces in a federal union under the Crown of the
United Kingdom. The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900,
is based, as the preamble states, on the agreement of the people of the
colonies of Australia to unite in one indissoluble federal Commonwealth
under the Crown of the United Kingdom. The South Africa Act, 1909, was
passed in order to unite the colonies in a legislative union under the Crown
of the United Kingdom. The Irish Free State was created by an agreement
which assigns to it the same place in the Empire as is enjoyed by Canada.
★ ★
“It is not surprising that in face of these facts General Smuts has con¬
sistently maintained in the past, and even now perhaps holds, that even the
King himself could not with due regard to his duty assent to a measure of
a Dominion Parliament purporting to destroy the connection with the
Crown, and that still less could the Governor-General exercise the power.
It is indeed now seriously open to argue that to effect separation there would
in law be necessary an Imperial as well as a Dominion measure, and that
1 The original of this letter, dated i August 1947, is on R/3/1/152: ff 9-1 1.
476
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
under the principle enunciated by the Statute of Westminster the con¬
currence of the other Dominions would also be requisite. ”2
It is clear from these extracts that according to Keith neither Canada nor
Australia nor South Africa nor Ireland nor any of the other Dominions under
the Statute of Westminster can legally secede from the Commonwealth by
unilateral action and that in order to effect a valid separation there would be
required in addition to a Dominion Act, an Act of Parliament of the United
Kingdom passed with the concurrence of the other Dominions.
On the other side, we have another authority, K.C. Wheare who in his book,
“The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status” (also published in 1938),
after discussing the judgment of the Privy Council in Moore v. Attorney-General
for the Irish Free State [1935] A. C. p. 484, goes on to say: “It would follow, too,
that any enactment of the Oireachtas [the Irish Parliament] to abolish the
monarchy, or to provide for secession from the Commonwealth, or to declare
neutrality, would in strict law be valid.”3
The question was considered by the King’s Bench Division in Murray v.
Parker in 1942. The Chief Justice Lord Caldecote’s view (in which the other
judges concurred in effect) was : —
“The removal by the Statute of Westminster in 1931 of any restriction
upon the power of the Legislature of the Irish Free State to pass legislation,
whether repugnant or not to an Imperial Act, did not either expressly or by
implication provide for any separation, described sometimes as the right to
secede, from the British Commonwealth of Nations. Nor at any time, so
far as I am aware after listening to the agreement [ ’argument] of the appellant,
has it ever been declared in terms by the Government of Eire, that the so-
called right to secede has in fact been exercised. ... If I am wrong in the
opinion I have thus expressed, it would still be a matter for consideration
whether secession by Eire could be effective unless and until the other
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations had given recognition
to Eire as a foreign state.”
6. The balance of authority at present would thus seem to be in favour of
Keith’s view. On that view, there is no right of secession under the Statute of
Westminster either for Canada, or Australia or South Africa or Ireland by any
unilateral act.
The terms of the Indian Independence Act are wider than those of the Statute
of Westminster. In the first place, there is no restrictive preamble to the Act;
secondly, section 6( 2)4 of the Act expressly permits repeal of the Act itself (so
far as it is part of the law of the Dominion) by Dominion legislation; finally
the name5 of the Act is significant. For these reasons, the position of India in
AUGUST 1947
477
respect of the right of secession may be different from that of the Dominions
under the Statute of Westminster.
Yours sincerely,
B. N. RAU
2 Arthur Berriedale Keith, The Dominions as Sovereign States : Their Constitutions and Governments, London,
1938, pp. 100-103.
3 K. C. Wheare, The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status, Oxford, 1938, p. 270.
4 No. 164. 5 i.e. Indian Independence Act, 1947.
3D
Mr Christie to Mr Tyson
R/3I1I149: / 96
no. 1299/2 2 August ig 47
My dear Tyson,
Two of the points you asked me on Wednesday to look into were, (a)
Governor’s letters and (b) destruction of records.
As regards Governor’s letters, these are not printed up now. The practice
ended with Lord Linlithgow’s Viceroyalty. Copies of letters are sent by
Governors to the India Office who keep them for some time. It has been
decided here that no further record is necessary, and, having sent Lord Wavell
a set for his private use, we propose to destroy what is left with us of his
correspondence. I have no doubt that the present Viceroy will also keep one
full set for his own use.
I gathered that the point on which you wished to be assured was that one
complete set of letters from Governors of Bengal was available somewhere.
I am writing to Ronald Harris, India Office, to confirm that they have a
complete set, and to find out how far back the set goes.1
As regards destruction of records, I have looked up George Abell’s letter
No. 1299/2 of the 23 rd March,2 and have verified from him that there is nothing
to add to the instructions in paragraphs two to four of that letter.
We have ourselves destroyed almost all our records up to 1943, and have
reduced the remainder to approximately two days’ destruction.3
I will write to you separately about cyphers.
Yours sincerely,
w. H. J. CHRISTIE
1 It was duly confirmed that there was ‘on record in the India Office a complete set of all fortnightly
letters since they were started in 1937’ and that it was proposed ‘to retain them permanently’. Rumbold
to Christie, 11 August 1947. R/3/1/149: f98.
2 Vol. X, No. 7. Certain records of the Bengal Governor’s Secretariat were transferred to London;
see ibid., note 2.
3 It should also be noted that in 1948 a number of policy files from the P.S.V’s Office, dating mainly
from the period 1945-47, were sent to London. These are now available for consultation in the India
Office Records as R/3/1/80-178. Also transferred were a number of files dealing with ‘Honours’
questions. In 1946 a number of printed volumes of Viceregal papers, mainly consisting of Lord
Linlithgow’s correspondence with Provincial Governors, had been sent to the India Office.
478
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
316
The Earl of Listowel to Mr Attlee
L/E/gl 1514: jf 196-8
INDIA OFFICE, 2 August 1 947
Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 138/47
Prime Minister,
I have been considering, in consultation with the Foreign Secretary, the
question of the succession to the present Indian membership of the United
Nations Organisation. You will recall that the India and Burma Committee
agreed1 that we should regard India as continuing the international personality
of the former “India” and as succeeding, where appropriate, to its international
rights and obligations, including membership of the United Nations. This view
has been communicated to the Indian leaders, but it has not yet been made
public. We know that our interpretation is accepted by Congress,2 but it has
not so far been accepted by the Moslem League.3
2. If our view regarding India’s position is accepted internationally it will
be necessary for Pakistan to seek membership of the United Nations Organ¬
isation. Under the normal rules of procedure applicants for membership who
wish to be considered for election during the present year’s Assembly com¬
mencing in September must apply in time for a recommendation to be formu¬
lated by the Committee on Membership before 10th August. There is no
indication that the Pakistan authorities have submitted any application to the
United Nations, nor is there any evidence that they are alive to the danger that
unless application is made during the next few days they may be unable to
secure membership before the end of 1948. Since it is important that we should
do whatever is possible to ensure that Pakistan does not find herself in any
worse position than India internationally, I propose to telegraph to the
Viceroy in the terms of the attached draft,4 asking him to ensure that
Mr. Jinnah is acquainted with the position.
3. I should mention that a draft reply was recently prepared to a question
(which was subsequently withdrawn) by Reid, in which a statement of views
in regard to the international position of India and Pakistan as endorsed by the
India and Burma Committee was set out. This proposed reply, which stressed
that H.M.G. would do all in their power to secure that Pakistan should be
“accepted as a new member of the family of nations”, was telegraphed5 to the
Viceroy who indicated6 that he was in agreement with its terms. Whilst it was
1 See Vol.'XI, No. 244, Minute 2. 2 Ibid., No. 479, para. i(d).
3 Ibid., No. 463, point (v). 4 Not printed. For the telegram as issued, see No. 328.
s Tel. 9763 of 28 July. L/E/9/1514: f 234. 6 Tel. 3037-S of 30 July. Ibid., f 226.
AUGUST 1947
479
eventually found unnecessary to make the statement we have this evidence
that Lord Mountbatten does not see any reason arising out of the past attitude
of the Moslem leaders for modifying the view previously formulated.
The Foreign Office concur in the proposed telegram.7
LISTOWEL
7 A note by Mr Addis on the Prime Minister’s file reads as follows: ‘The P.M. discussed this by telephone
yesterday morning with Sir A. Carter. As the result of this, the draft telegram was approved and has
been despatched. J.M.A. 4/8.’ P.R.O. Prem 8/569.
317
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary of State
PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, 2 August 1Q47
Dear Mountbatten,
Thank you for your letter of 25th July1 enclosing Personal Report No. 14.2
2. I very much hope that within the next two or three days it will be possible
to issue the announcement about the formal appointments of yourself and
Jinnah as Govemors-General and about the appointments of Governors.
To-day’s reference in “The Times” to the intention of the Constituent
Assembly to meet at midnight on 14th/ 15th August and, as their first act,
invite you to be Governor-General of the Dominion of India, about which
I have telegraphed to you,3 is rather disconcerting but I hope it can be got
round. On the whole, I think that the two new Dominions will get a good
start so far as Governors are concerned. I must confess that the new Indian
names for Governorships in India do not, with one notable exception, mean
very much to me but the experience of Nye, Colville, Trivedi and Hydari
should prove of inestimable value. The exception among the new Indian
Governors to which I refer above is, of course, Rajagopalachari whose qualities
should have ample scope in Calcutta. As for Pakistan, Cunningham will, of
course, be a tower of strength. It was hardly surprising that Killearn eventually
was obliged to decline Eastern Bengal4 and I fear that Jinnah may find it very
hard to get anyone of the necessary calibre to take the job on. As regards
Baluchistan, about which I telegraphed,5 Weightman was quite ready to
travel from the North to discuss the matter with me although he was fully
convinced that he ought not to take the job on.6
1 No. 227. 2 No. 228. 3 See No. 308.
4 See Vol. XI, No. 478, note 3. 5 See No. 178.
6 See correspondence ending with No. 233.
480
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
3. I am having some enquiries made about providing you with a
’‘Dominions” expert,7 but I would be misleading you if I were to hold out
any concrete hopes at this stage of being able to meet your need.
[Para. 4, on the terms being offered to I.M.S. officers on appointment to the
Colonial Medical Service, omitted.]
5. I much appreciated what you said in paragraph 17 of your letter about
the passing of the Indian Independence Act and I feel sure that all the officials
and ministers concerned, to whom I have passed on your message, will appreci¬
ate it equally.
6. I must confess to having some doubts about the line which you took at
your meeting8 with the delegation from Kalat on 19th July. The treaties of
1854 and 1876 do not lead to the inference that Kalat is an independent and
sovereign state and it has, in fact, always been regarded as an Indian State. It
figures as such in Part II of the First Schedule of the Government of India
Act, 1935, and I have no doubt that, as a matter of law, Section 7(1) (b) of the
Indian Independence Act9 applies to our treaties with it. Consequently, the
leased areas lapse to Kalat and the future is a matter for negotiation between the
State and Pakistan. We have been at pains in Parliament to discourage claims
by States to be regarded as separate international entities and to accept such
a claim by Kalat will surely encourage other States to press similar claims.
There is, moreover, particular danger in admitting such claims by frontier
States since it is easier for them to make their independence effective. Apart
from the risk to the integrity of India and Pakistan, the emergence of new weak
international entities is undesirable. It seems to me, therefore, that any possible
simplification of the problem of the areas leased by Kalat is outweighed by the
general considerations set out above.
7. I was greatly interested in your account of your talk with the Dewan of
Travancore and of your further talk with the Hyderabad Delegation on its
return from seeing the Nizam. C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, is by all accounts,
a past master in verbal diplomacy, and I congratulate you on having brought
him to admit openly the danger to Travancore of pursuing a policy of
independence. The Nizam is, no doubt, a very different proposition, since he
is an incalculable creature and may not be wholly susceptible to reasoned
arguments in this matter. If, however, what appears in a press message10 from
Hyderabad in today’s Times is well-founded, your efforts with both these
States have been crowned with success and they have agreed to treat for
accession to the Union of India.
8. I have telegraphed11 to you some comments on the speech you made on
25th July12 to the representatives of the States. It is still not altogether clear to
me how the States can, in fact, be expected to complete by the 15th August the
AUGUST 1947
process of adherence to the constitution of India, even if this is limited to three
subjects. The draft Instrument of Accession, of which you sent a copy,13
would seem to open up various questions, such as the method of admin¬
istration of the federal subjects in the States, which would require their careful
examination. No doubt also there may be hesitation among the British-Indian
negotiators about accepting a reservation, such as you discussed with the
Dewan of Travancore,14 of the right to secede in the event of the Union of
India leaving the Commonwealth. I had myself rather expected that the most
that could be achieved before the 15 th August would be an agreement on the
part of the Union of India authorities to extend external protection to the
States which were in process of negotiating terms of accession. The conclusion
of the Instrument of Accession must surely be dependent on the constitution
having been so amended as formally to provide for the admission of Indian
States, and a completed constitution might contain other elements which
would affect the States, notwithstanding their accession being limited in
terms to external affairs, defence, and communications. If, therefore, in the
long run it is found impossible to secure the final accession of the key States
you mention before 15 th August, I think we shall feel well satisfied if these and
the rest agree to be represented internationally for the time being by the
appropriate Dominions while the negotiations are in process of completion,
and I should hope that Patel would prove reasonable on such an accom¬
modation, which would not be at variance with paragraph 5 of the Cabinet
Mission’s Statement of 12th May 1946.15 Such an arrangement, together with
the standstill arrangement16 in economic and financial matters provided tor in
Section VII of the Indian Independence Act,1 7 would relieve us of responsibility
for the States while acquitting us of any charge of having exercised undue
7 See Nos. 1 66, para. 24 and 227, para. 13.
8 See No. 174; also No. 263. 7 8 9 * 11 No. 164.
10 A report from Hyderabad dated 31 July, which appeared in The Times on 1 August, declared:
‘According to informed political quarters here, Hyderabad is to accede to the Dominion of India, and
representatives of the State have gone to Delhi to discuss the matter with Indian Government
officials.’ The report referred to the Nizam’s announcement on 12 June (see Vol. XI, No. 163) to the
effect that he would in law be entitled to resume his status as an independent sovereign upon the lapse
of paramountcy and attributed the ‘reversal of this decision’ to the draft Instrument of Accession
submitted by Lord Mountbatten at the conference with representatives of the States on 25 July
(No. 234). The report continued: ‘If Hyderabad accedes to India it will be the second State to change
its mind since the conference between the Viceroy and the princes. Travancore, which announced its
intention to declare its independence on the same day as Hyderabad, decided yesterday to join the
Dominion.’ A further report from Delhi dated 1 August, which appeared in The Times on 2 August,
referred to the ‘blitz tactics’, used to produce such decisive results in British India, which were now
being applied to the Indian States. The report alluded to Travancore’s ‘change of front’ but declared
with reference to Hyderabad: ‘Negotiations regarding its future relations, both with India and
Pakistan, are continuously in progress and, although the Nizam is apparently opposed to the use of an
instrument of accession such as other States have used, alternative forms of association may be devised.’
11 No. 307; see also No. 262. 12 No. 234.
13 See Enclosure 1 to No. 313. 14 See No. 228, para. 19.
15 Vol. VII, No. 262. 16 See Enclosure 3 to No. 313.
17 No. 164.
482
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
pressure on them to enter the new Dominions on terms against their better
interests.18
9. Pakistan clearly has a much simpler problem in dealing with the small
number of States adjacent to its territory, and individual negotiations with
each of these is clearly possible. No doubt Kashmir will claim as a price of
accession acceptance by Pakistan of the existing customs arrangement whereby
it imports goods from abroad free of duty. I shall be most interested to hear
how the negotiations with the States progress, and we shall be asking Shone
and Graft tey- Smith to keep us informed after the 15th August, more especially
since Parliamentary interest in this matter is still keen.
10. I am sorry I troubled you unnecessarily with a reminder (telegram
No. 971 1)19 about the Resolution on the Services. The wording of the
Resolution finally agreed upon is as follows :
“That this House, on the occasion of the transfer to Indian hands of the
responsibility for the affairs of India, wishes to place upon record its profound
appreciation of the ability and devotion, with which, during the long period
of British rule, the Civil and Military Services of the Crown in India have
served India and its peoples.”
I understand that the Prime Minister is now exploring the possibility of
associating the Opposition parties with the Resolution, which will be moved
and voted in both Houses before Parliament rises at the end of next week.
11. I was, of course, interested in the report20 of the Union Constitution
Committee of the Constituent Assembly presented by Nehru on 21st July.
At this end the emphasis in the report on the objective of a sovereign indepen¬
dent republic strikes a somewhat incongruous note at this moment and it
seemed possible that it might give rise to some awkward questions in Parliament
seeing that the Indian Independence Act had been passed at unprecedented
speed on the basis of dominion status. However, the report has had no awkward
repercussions here so far.
12. I was interested in the reference in Dow’s fortnightly letter21
(D.O. No. 156-GB) to the possibility of a reunion of Bihar with Western
Bengal. No doubt this is the right long-term solution. The coalfields and other
material assets in Bihar, for example, the very important Asansol Railway
junction, would greatly help stimulate the prosperity of Calcutta and Patna
would be able to revert to its former and natural obscurity but the amalgamation
would put a lot of local politicians in Bihar out of business and is hardly likely
to appeal to the Congress High Command as an immediate measure.
13. It is clear that between now and August 15th Ministers here will be
deluged with requests of one kind or another for “messages” for publication
on 15th August. I think the best solution will be for a single message to be
AUGUST 1947
483
sent from His Majesty’s Government to the Governments of the two new
Dominions and that all other requests for messages should be declined. In this
connection I have seen a telegram22 from Canada saying that the Canadian
High Commissioner at Delhi has arranged with the Government of India that,
since the posts of Prime Minister “are still in the air”, messages for the two new
Dominions should be sent, not from Prime Minister to Prime Minister, but
from Minister of External Affairs to the two Ministers of External Affairs
and Commonwealth Relations at Delhi and Karachi. I should be very grateful
if you would confirm by telegram23 that this is, in fact, the position and that
H.M.G’s message should, therefore, go from the Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations to his opposite numbers in the two new Dominions.
[Para. 14, on Zoffany portraits lent to Viceroy’s House, omitted.]
15. I am very glad you have been able to pay a visit to Bengal as I feel sure
that your presence in Calcutta at this time will have had a heartening effect in
political and administrative circles and a reassuring effect on the population.
Yours sincerely,
LISTOWEL
18 On 7 August Sir G. Abell informed Mr Menon that Lord Mountbatten wanted the latter to draft a
full reply to this paragraph and also a more considered statement for inclusion in his next Personal
Report for circulation to the Cabinet because he (Mountbatten) was ‘anxious that the U.K. Cabinet
should not misunderstand the position about the States’. R/3/1/139: f 170.
10 Not printed.
20 For the text of the report, which was dated 4 July 1947, see B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India's
Constitution: Select Documents, vol. 11, New Delhi, 1967, pp. 574-91.
21 Dated 11 July 1947. L/P&J/5/182: f 27.
22 Not traced.
23 Lord Mountbatten’s response to this request has not been traced. The subsequent decision of the India
and Burma Committee, however, was that H.M.G’s message on 15 August should be sent to the
Prime Ministers of the new Dominions. See No. 339, Minute 4. A telegram to this effect, No. 674 of
8 August, was sent to the British High Commissioner in Canada. L/P &J/10/136: f 200.
318
Message from Sir C. Radcliffe to Sir G. Abell
Rhh! ‘57-' f 245~6
2 August 1947
There is a difference of opinion among the members of the Bengal Boundary
Commission as to the scope of their duty in respect of Sylhet. The wording
of their Terms of Reference1 is as follows: — “The Boundary Commission is
instructed . . . contiguous Muslim majority areas of the adjoining districts of
Assam”.
2. Two members of the Commission take the view that the adjoining
districts include all parts of Assam that join Bengal, even if they do not adjoin
1 See Vol. XI, No. 415.
484
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Sylhet and that the Commission is, therefore, intended to ascertain contiguous
Muslim areas of such districts (Goalpara) and transfer them to East Bengal. Two
other members take the view, on the other hand, that the only districts of
Assam that the Commission should consider are those that in fact adjoin
Sylhet and that it is only the contiguous Muslim majority areas of those
districts that should go with the Muslim areas of Sylhet to East Bengal.
3 . If I have to decide between these two views I should, with some hesitation,
adopt the latter. I think that it accords better with the natural meaning of the
words used in our Terms of Reference, and with paragraph 13 of the statement2
of the 3rd June, 1947. I think also that it would be to some extent anomalous
that a referendum in Sylhet in favour of amalgamation with East Bengal
should occassion the transfer to East Bengal of parts of other districts that have
had no hand in the Sylhet decision, and are not even its neighbours
geographically.
4. The question is, however, an open one, and as the Commission only wish
to carry out whatever duty was intended to be entrusted to it, I think I ought
to ask whether any further instructions can be given to me on this point so as
to put the matter beyond dispute. It does not seem to me that there would be
anything to object to in the Terms of Reference being supplemented in this
way, but I would be grateful if any instructions that are to be given should be
given at the earliest possible date, as the Sylhet sittings of the Commission
begin on Monday, 4th August, and I shall have to give them a decision one
way or the other by Monday, the 4th August.
Enclosures to No. 318
Message for P.S.V.
Sir Cyril Radcliffe would be very grateful if P.S.V.3 or D. P.S.V.4 could give
a reply to the point raised by 7.30 this evening and hopes that P.S.V. or
D.P.S.V. can meet him at 4, Willingdon Crescent.
2 August 1947
H.E. considered this matter in a Staff Meeting5 today. He authorised me to
tell Sir Cyril Radcliffe that he agreed with his view about the meaning of the
terms of reference but thought that he must leave it to Sir Cyril Radcliffe to
decide the matter for himself since there would be many complications if
H.E. gave a ruling.6
G. E. B. ABELL
2.8.47.
2 Ibid., No. 45. 3 Sir G. Abell. ♦ Mr I. D. Scott.
5 No. 66 (Item 7), held at 12.15 pm on 2 August 1947. Mountbatten Papers.
6 Sir C. Radcliffe’s decision was conveyed via P.S.V’s tel. 3130-S of 3 August to the Governor’s Secretary,
Bengal, which read as follows: ‘Please pass following from Sir Cyril Radcliffe to members of Bengal
Sylhet Boundary Commission. Begins. Reference our conversation of August 1st. I think that Com¬
mission must proceed on the basis that adjoining districts are adjoining districts of Assam that adjoin
Sylhet, not any districts of Assam that adjoin Bengal. Ends .’ R/3/1/157: f 248.
AUGUST 1947
485
319
Minutes of Viceroy’s Sixty Sixth Staff Meeting , Item 13
Mountbatten Papers
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s House , New Delhi, on 2 August
1947 at 12.13 Pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Lord Ismay,
Sir G. Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Colonel Currie, Mr Christie, Mr. A.
Campbell-Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
Item 13
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE
the viceroy said diat he had discussed1 the question of dismissing the
Ministry of the North-West Frontier Province with Sardar Patel, who had
expressed the hope that nothing unconstitutional would be done, and that in
any case any step of this nature should be postponed until the 15th August.
Mr. Jinnah, on the other hand, was extremely keen that immediate action should
be taken,2 preferably before the arrival of Sir George Cunningham. He had
said that the present Ministry was deliberately attempting to sabotage the
position of the North-West Frontier Province in relation to Pakistan.
rao bahadur menon gave his view that, if the present Ministry was
dismissed in consequence of the result of the Referendum, this step should be
immediately followed by a general election. He considered that the dismissal
of the Ministry should not take place before the 15th August.
the viceroy said that the main difficulty confronting him was how he
could, behaving constitutionally, reject the advice3 which had been given to
him by the Pakistan Executive Council. It might be desirable to delay the final
decision for a few days. He enquired why the Congress Party objected so
strongly to the proposed dismissal of the Ministry. Perhaps this was mainly
a question of prestige.
lord ismay gave his view that the sooner this matter was settled, the better
it would be. He advised against undue delay.
sir george abell suggested that the dismissal might take place four or
five days before the 15 th August.
rao bahadur menon said that if this was done he would suggest govern¬
ment under Section 93 for the intervening period. He said that he still believed
that a Coalition Ministry after 15th August was a possibility.
It was also suggested that Sir George Cunningham, who was due to arrive
in Karachi on the evening of nth August, should come direct to Delhi to
discuss this matter with the Viceroy.
1 No record of this interview has been traced.
2 cf. No. 278. 3 See No. 301.
486
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —
directed P.S.V. further to discuss the future of the Government of
the North-West Frontier Province with Sir George Spence and Rao
Bahadur Menon.
320
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
and Pandit Nehru
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy s Interview No. 1 76
TOP SECRET 2 August 1947, 3.3O-5 pm
I told him about the Secretary of State giving a party for representatives of
the three parties from the Lords and Commons to meet Krishna Menon, and
that Krishna Menon wanted Pandit Nehru to know about this. I said that I
would mention this in my next letter to Krishna Menon.
2. 1 told him the question of jail releases had been discussed1 with the
Partition Council that morning and that it had been agreeed that Sardar Patel
and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan should prepare a joint scheme for India and Pakistan
and recommend to all Provincial Governments as to the level up to which
jail releases should be counted.
3. I told him how gratified I was that everybody had accepted my proposal2
that the I.N.A. prisoners should have their sentences reduced by the
Commander in Chief to the level which would get them out on the general
releases, and that the parties had agreed that there should be absolutely no
publicity given to the I.N.A. prisoners. Pandit Nehru said that he was in full
agreement.
4. I told him that I had reconsidered the matter of Governors’ fortnightly
letters3 and had come to the conclusion that it might be thought uncon¬
stitutional if I accepted Pandit Nehru’s offer to continue them. But I asked him
if I could see the fortnightly confidential reports from Provincial Governors,
to which he replied “Of course”.
5. He told me that he was proposing to tell Governors and Prime Ministers
to write personal letters to him. I told him that I proposed to invite the
Governors up to stay with me during the cold weather for a conference, and
that I hoped he would be able to address them. He said that he thought this
would be a good idea.
6. I informed him that I proposed to recommend to the Secretary of State
AUGUST 1947
487
that Sir Fazl Ali’s appointment as a permanent Judge of the Federal Court
should be made before the 15th August. Pandit Nehru agreed.
7. I told him that I had spoken4 to Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan
that morning and had suggested to them that they should appoint the Pakistan
High Commissioner for India before the 15 th August, so as to represent
Pakistan at the celebrations in Delhi on that date.
8. I urged Pandit Nehru to appoint his Pligh Commissioner for Pakistan by
the 13 th August, so that he might be in Karachi in time to represent India at
the celebrations there. Pandit Nehru said that he thought the High Com¬
missioner would probably be Mr. Shri Prakash, but that he would let me know.
9. We also discussed the question of the Gurkhas, a note of which was taken
by the Conference Secretary for action.
Enclosure to No. 320
I was summoned to H.E’s interview with Pandit Nehru at which they were
discussing the Gurkhas, and I was directed to take the necessary action. The
situation was said to be as follows : —
The Indian Cabinet at its meeting5 on Wednesday, 30th July, 1947,
approved a note6 which Nehru had put up. The Commander-in-Chief is
said to be under the impression that the moment this note was approved he
could allot battalions as between the British and Indian Armies, and ask
officers to which they wished to volunteer. Pandit Nehru, however, points
out that there is a third party to these negotiations, namely the Government
of Nepal. It is still essential for a British and Indian representative to go to
Nepal (which has agreed to the principle of allocation, but laid down
certain conditions which include prior discussions).
The Viceroy said that the Commander-in-Chief should be warned that
he had been misled in this matter and should not take formal executive
action until Nehru had been consulted. Also the High Commissioner was
to be instructed to get in touch with Sir G. S. Bajpai as to the composition
of the delegation to go to Nepal. The British representative on this should
1 Mountbatten Papers, Partition Council Minutes, 2 August 1947, Case No. P.C. m/13/47.
2 See No. 302, para. 54.
3 When consulted by Lord Mountbatten on this matter during an interview on 29 July, Pandit Nehru
had expressed the view that Mountbatten should continue to receive fortnighly letters from Governors,
subject to the condition that drafts of such letters were shown to Prime Ministers before despatch, and
that Mountbatten should continue to reply to them. Nehru had further stipulated that Prime Ministers
should not have the right to alter a letter but should have the power to state their own explanations of
particular events in the same letter. Mountbatten Papers, Viceroy’s Interview No. 170(B).
4 No record of this interview has been traced.
5 and 6 Not traced but see R/3/1/147 for correspondence on this subject. See also Vol. XI, Nos. 337 and
388.
488
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
either be a member of the High Commissioner’s staff or one of the War
Office representatives.
V. F. ERSKINE CRUM7
CON. SEC.
2 August 1947
7 This signature has been taken from the file copy of this note on R/3/1/147: 1 156.
321
H.M. Minister at Kabul to Government oj India ,
External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Department
Telegram , L/P &S/ 12/ 1812: f 238
IMPORTANT KABUL, 2 August 1947, 4. 30 pm
Received: 3 August, 3.43 pm
No. 75. After brief lull Afghan Press has resumed daily articles on frontier
problems of which few have been broadcast.
2. Writers continue to criticise so-called forced referendum and urged
Pakistan Government not to allow among Muslims extension of disunity
unfortunately continuing between Muslims and Hindus. Tone is generally
mild.
3. Ghulam Faruq, Minister of the Interior, has returned from Eastern
Province along with Ras-Al-Khaimah and religious leaders whom acting Prime
Minister has been interviewing. Arrival of Mr. Puri, Deputy Speaker of North
West Frontier Province Legislative Assembly, and staunch supporter of Abdul
Ghaffar Khan, lends further support to view that there is collusion between
Afghan Government and Congress Party for a renewed campaign for an
Independent Pathanistan.
Repeated to U.K. Commissioner, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and
Government of North West Frontier Province, (copy to Baluchistan by post.)
AUGUST 1947
489
322
Rear Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Compensation for Members of the Services, Part II (b)
EXPRESS NEW DELHI, 2 August 1Q47, 2.20 pm
confidential Recei ved: 2 August, 7.40 pm
No. 3100-S. 1 have sent you three telegrams today, Nos. 3097-S,1 3098-S2 and
3099-S,3 about Service matters. In each case I have suggested that liability
should be accepted by H.M.G. without my making any further attempt to
negotiate with the Home Member.
2. The issues involved are comparatively small though they make a great
deal of difference to certain individuals. Sardar Patel is tired of these discussions
about protection of the Services. Recently he refused absolutely to agree to
proportionate pension for members of the non-covenanted Services and said
that even where a Provincial Government was prepared to grant a right of
proportionate pension he would advise them to revise their decision except
in the case of men of whom they wished to get rid.4 Williams, my Secretary
(Public) is having a very difficult time with the Home Department as the
officials naturally take their cue from Sardar Patel, and in addition are heavily
overworked. The result is that decisions are not reached quickly and there is
a good deal of obstruction.
3. I am most loth to prejudice my personal relations with Sardar Patel by
perpetual discussions over these matters, which to him are so annoying. On the
other hand I cannot agree to the Services being treated unfairly.
1 Tel. 3097-S explained that the pensions of officers about to retire could not be verified until after the
transfer of power when there would be no Secretary of State to whom a final appeal could be made
against reductions. Lord Mountbatten suggested that individual cases should be dealt with as they
arose, H.M.G. instructing the High Commissioners to make representations to the Dominion Govern¬
ment concerned. If these proved unsuccessful, Mountbatten suggested that H.M.G. should, if they
decided that a pension had been improperly reduced, make good the reduction from British revenues.
Lord Listowel accepted this procedure in tel. 10427 of n August. L/S&G/7/903: ff 46 and 43.
2 Tel. 3098-S recommended that non-Indian Civil Service officers of the Secretary of State’s Services
should receive pensionary benefit from their service in administrative rank irrespective of completion
of the 28 years qualifying service. Lord Listowel approved this recommendation in tel 10484 of
12 August. L/S&G/7/928: ff 13 and 8.
3 Tel. 3099-S dealt with four claims for compensation and raised in the case of two officers who were of
mixed descent, the question of whether they should be treated exceptionally as Europeans for the
purpose of compensation. For Lord Listowel’s reply, tel. 10466 of 12 August, and subsequent cor¬
respondence on this subject, see L/S &G/7/931.
4 In tel. 323 i-G of 7 August to all Governors (except Bombay), Mr Williams explained that both Congress
and Muslim League were opposed to the grant of proportionate pensions for European and non-
Secretary of State’s officers and that Lord Mountbatten, having ‘fought this question over considerable
period both in Cabinet and by personal approach but without success’, had decided that no useful
purpose would be served by pursuing the matter with the successor Dominion Governments.
Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: British Services in India (Civil).
490
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
4. The only solution, therefore, is to ask you to get these questions decided
by H.M.G. I hope it will be recognised that the financial implications are
nothing compaied with the importance of avoiding unnecessary friction with
Sardar Patel.
323
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl oj Listowel
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Governors-General and Governors of Provinces ,
Appointment of — Part (3)
MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 2 August 1947, 8.00 pm
secret Received: 2 August, 7.35 pm
No. 3108-S. Your 9962 dated 1st August.1 Governors Appointments. There is
no question of altering the procedure. The President of the Constituent
Assembly and Nehru have agreed that their resolution should be so framed as
not to cause embarrassment.
2. I expect to get Monckton’s reply today Saturday about Berar.2 That
should allow time to get announcement out on Sunday evening. But please
do not issue until you get clearance from me about CP and Berar.
3. For your private information significance of midnight meeting on
I4th/i5th August is that according to astrologers this is considered an auspicious
time.
1 No. 308. 2 See Nos. 293 and 308, para. 3.
324
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Sir F. Wylie
( United Provinces )
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers , Official Correspondence Files:
Governors-General and Governors of Provinces
Appointment of— -Part (3)
MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 2 August 1947, IO.3O p\H
PERSONAL
No. 3118-S. Muslim League are anxious to know whether if they decide to
ask you to accept the Governorship of East Bengal you would be prepared to
accept. This should not be considered a firm offer at present but please inform
AUGUST 1947
491
me if you would consider it. I very much hope that if a firm invitation is
extended to you you may be able to accept and I am quite sure that you would
be able to do very valuable work there. A man of real experience and standing
is required both because it is a new Province and because it is so far from
Karachi. It contains more than half the population of Pakistan.
2. Pay proposed is Rs. 72,000 per year and there will be suitable allowances
and an arrangement by which part of the salary is income tax free.
3 . Grateful for a very early reply.1
1 Upon receipt of a second telegram from Lord Mountbatten, Sir F. Wylie, in tel. G-122 of 5 August,
declined this informal offer explaining that his luggage had already gone and that he himself was
leaving for the U.K. in hardly more than one week’s time. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspon¬
dence Files: Governors-General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of — Part (3).
325
The Nawah of Bhopal to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rfclilwff 103-4
PERSONAL AND SECRET TRAVANCORE HOUSE, NEW DELHI,
3 August 1947
My dear Dickie,
You have touched my heart deeply by your gracious letter of the 31st July1
which reached me only a few minutes ago in Delhi.
Your generous references to me and my relations with you have moved me
very much indeed. You will always find me true to my word and always
ready to serve my friends like yourself to the maximum limits of my capacity
and opportunity.
You have extended to me your hand of friendship and I am prepared to hold
it firmly. I hope that if I extend my hand of friendship to Sardar Patel he will
also respond genuinely. If he does then I will never play false to him.
I have genuine difficulties and doubts in my way, but with goodwill and
understanding they can be removed, provided you help. I will talk to you in
full detail when I get an opportunity of doing so and when you can spare me
some moments at your leisure.
I shall probably be meeting you tomorrow with Maharaja Holkar who has
kidnapped me here by force, but it would be his day and I will be a listener most
of the time. After that I should like with your permission and subject to your
convenience to meet you alone perhaps the day after and explain my position
and point of view. I am prepared to come forward if you help and clear a few
obstacles in the way.
1 No. 297.
492
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
With my genuine and earnest thanks for your kind letter and with all good
wishes.
Yours ever,
HAMIDULLAH
326
Major Short to Sir S Cripps (Extract)
P.R.O. Cah 127/130
★
17 TUGHLAK ROAD, NEW DELHI,
3 August 1947
★ ★
Things here go on apace. By God’s grace they will prosper.
But J has, I think, made his first major blunder — looking for the G. Gship.
This has certainly complicated the Sikh situation. Now he, and he alone, can
draw them in: and then only by offering extravagantly generous terms. Of
course that miracle may yet happen. That failing, the nature of the award will
determine events. If it meets the least the Sikhs think fair, peace will reign —
and prosper. If it does not, in ratio to the extent that it offends Sikh sentiment,
peace will be a calm before a growing guerilla situation. For, unless it flagrantly
affronts Sikh feeling, I doubt an immediate really dangerous reaction. Except
in one quarter. The armed forces massed to keep peace on the border. There,
and not in the Sikh country, is, I feel, the powder magazine. I amv. much
alone in this view. But I seen no reason yet to depart from it. But come
what may, the most delicate factor is the obstinate popular belief that
Radcliffe will award as H.E. dictates. And this is a truly popular belief. What¬
ever any Indian may say to H.E., I living here, with Indians, am all too
aware that nothing will shake their conviction that this is so. Which means
— well, you will draw all the conclusions.
However, this is a temporary assessment. And necessarily based on instinct
more than anything. I must not [?now] move about to test my antennae. So
maybe my next letter may say something different.1
★ ★ ★
1 No subsequent letter 011 this subject to Sir S. Cripps from Major Short has been traced. However, in
a minute to Lord Ismay dated 12 August, Short made the following points:
T. Sikh situation report: written, because I’m avoiding you till B.C. award is out.
2. I’ve reason to believe what follows.
3. H.E. has succeeded in convincing Sikh leadership at least that he is not touching B.C. award.
This is source of Baldev’s and prevailing Sikh mood of deep gloom.
4. The same goes for you, both on H.E’s behalf and on your own as his Chief Adviser.’
Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Security Arrangements for Partition.
AUGUST 1947
493
327
Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart ( North-West Frontier Province )
to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , fl/j/j/jtfj: jf 48-9
IMMEDIATE 1 August I947 , 1.00 pm
secret Received: 3 August, 1.00 pm
No. CA-158. I saw Khan Sahib informally 2nd August and discussed situation
generally without reference to meetings1 in Delhi. Abdul Ghaffar Khan ex¬
pected to return 3rd August and subject to anything he may dictate I am certain
Khan Sahib will not voluntarily resign and he is in position to make serious
trouble if dismissed.
2. I also consider it likely that League will make trouble if Ministry remains
in office after 15th August or at any rate after Id. Probably only Ramazan and
hopes of favourable decision in Delhi have prevented trouble hitherto.
3. Fundamental position is that both parties, with their Pathan factional
characters, want power, but Congress though in majority2 in province as a
whole are well organised and disciplined whereas League are somewhat dis¬
united and mutually suspicious.
4. Present Ministry has already done much to prejudice moral conflict in
their favour, and immediate dismissal would stimulate rather than hamper
their undermining of Pakistan Dominion e.g. by fomenting tribal unrest.
5. Khan Sahib says he has already stopped issuing of arms during referendum
(and) agrees to standstill on any administrative matter as I may order. He says
he personally would recommend his party to accept the position on the
understanding that they might continue to work constitutionally for Pathan-
istan.
He still thinks coalition impracticable and I see little hope of one.
6. I have consulted experienced individuals on all aspects and expediency.
My Advocate General is of opinion that dismissal without dissolution would
be unconstitutional and I now consider it would be inexpedient because
(a) it will precipitate disorder which could not be subdued before 15th so that
both transfer of power and arrival of new Governor would take place in a state
of turmoil ( b ) the Ramazan is a bad time for widespread operations by troops
and police (c) such action must involve Governors Special powers the authority
for which will be obscure from 15th until orders are issued under Sec. 9 of
Independence Act.
1 See Nos. 278 and 301.
2 This word should evidently read ‘minority’. Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart corrected the error
in tel. CA-164 of 8 August. R/3/1/165: f 61.
494
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
7. I would however make retention of present Ministry conditional upon
their maintaining constitution and reasonable attitude towards Pakistan
Dominion and new Governor-General and not creating circumstances which
would hamper administration of successor government.
8. Given these conditions I now feel the less3 for dismissal and/or dissolution
is one which 1 should not repeat not take.
If this is agreed to I request authority to put conditions above to Khan Sahib.
3 On the file copy of this telegram on R/3/1/165 the words ‘the less’ have been deleted and replaced
by ‘choice?’.
328
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mountbatten of Burma 1
Telegram, LIEI9I1314: ff 192-4
MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, J August 1947* 3*55 pm
secret Received: 3 August, 6.00 pm
No. 10078. Your telegram No. 3037-S of 30th July.2 International position of
new Dominions. No public statement on lines of my 9763s has yet been made
by H.M.G., and we should prefer to avoid, if possible, publicly initiating
proposition which may appear to Pakistan to be discriminatory against her.
2. We have not received any intimation that Moslem League are now
prepared to acquiesce in our view regarding succession of new India to in¬
ternational rights and obligations of old India, including membership of
U.N.O. Nor do we know what steps, if any, they have in mind to establish
their position. We presume, however, that Pakistan will desire to take her
place without loss of time among United Nations, and as you know this will,
in our view, be found to necessitate application by Pakistan for election to
membership. Procedure forelection to membership of United Nations is con¬
tained in Rules 58/60 of Provisional Rules of Procedure of Security Council
which are set out in my immediately succeeding telegram.4 Under these rules
States desirous of election during 1947 Assembly commencing on 16th Sep¬
tember are normally required to submit application for membership in
time for Membership Committee to report on apphcation by 10th August.
If Pakistan desires to secure election this year, therefore, immediate applica¬
tion is advisable.
3 . Subject to your views we suggest that Moslem leaders should be acquainted
with this position and advised, if they wish to obtain early election, to put
AUGUST 1947
495
forward provisional application at once (which we assume they can do in
capacity of Provisional Government) to be confirmed after 15th August when
Dominion of Pakistan formally comes into existence. We appreciate that
Moslem leaders may be reluctant to accept publicly and without qualification
a liability to submit themselves for election. To meet this point they may think
it advisable that their approach to United Nations should be on basis of a
request (a) that they should be treated as automatically entitled to membership
as a constituent part of the former Indian entity which enjoyed membership
of the United Nations and,(&) that if this is not possible their communications
should be treated as a normal application for membership.
4. For your own information we would prefer that Pakistan should go
forward with an application on these lines to the United Nations Secretariat,
because if Moslem theory of two co-equal States is pressed too far a position
might arise in which both India and Pakistan were required to apply for mem¬
bership, which could do no-one any good. We hope, therefore, that Moslem
leaders will be prepared to apply on basis indicated above, which we think
should enable them to register their view in regard to their international
personality and which, by its suggestion of continuity, may facilitate their
election. (You will have read reports of recent Soviet vetoing of candidates
supported by us who have not5 previously enjoyed membership.)
Please give copy of this telegram to High Commissioner.
1 This telegram was sent in accordance with Lord Listowel’s minute at No. 316.
2 and 3 See ibid., para. 3 and notes 5 and 6.
4 Not printed. 5 Emphasis in original.
329
Notes 1 of a Meeting between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma ,
the Nawab of Chhatari , Sir W. Monckton , and for part of the time , Mr V. P. Menon
Monckton Trustees , No. 30: Jf 17-20
SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, [NEW DELHI ,] J August 1 947,
7-8.45 pm
1. H.E.P.2 first raised the question of the Indian Army Troops in Secunderabad
and said that this was a matter upon which H.E.H. had sent him two telegrams
in the last 24 hours. H.E. said that these troops were going and he had insisted
on their not being replaced. Some of them had already been removed.
The difficulty was one of finding accommodation. It had arisen because owing
1 These notes are not signed or initialled but it seems reasonable to infer that, with the possible exception
of the bracketed paragraph, below para. 4, they were written by Sir W. Monckton.
2 The Nawab of Chhatari.
496
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
to partition demobilisation had been stopped before it reached half-way, but
lie assured us that the troops were being genuinely removed.
2. Thereafter, the discussion was rambling and at times heated. I raised 3
points but the Viceroy dealt with them in reverse order and they merged into
one another.
3. The first point was that, in my opinion, an arrangement of a standstill
nature about Berar was not only desirable but necessary if an unconstitutional
position was to be avoided. I thought there would have to be a Firman, an
Order amending the Independence Act or at least an Order under it and an
Agreement. V. P. Menon did not seem to worry whether the position after
the 15 th August was constitutionally correct or even tolerable. I said, if the new
Dominion wanted to start by flouting Constitutional Law in the eyes of the
world, they were welcome to do so but I would have no hand in it.
4. My second point was about the Standstill Agreement generally. From a
perusal of the draft Instrument of Accession and draft Standstill Agreement3
and from what I could learn of the attitude of the States’ Department, it seemed
that there was no disposition to make a Standstill Agreement except with
States which had decided to accede. V. P. Menon said that they were only
going to make Standstill Agreements with acceding States. I said that this was
quite contrary to the British pledges and statements, namely, that the States
were to have a free and unhurried choice and were not to be coerced or sub¬
jected to pressure of any kind.4 H.E. agreed but V. P. Menon said that Congress
did not regard themselves as bound by these pledges or statements. This
observation came after statements (thrown in at intervals throughout our dis¬
cussions) that H.E.H, had not a hope of survival unless he acceded. I said if
these were the lines they were going on, there was no more I could or would
do in the negotiations except to report to the Nizam and I should refuse to
take any further part in such a disgraceful perfomance. H.E. said that no doubt
Congress would lay themselves open to such criticism but one had to face the
facts and criticisms from the world would not deter them, but he tried to pour
oil on the waters.*
(*The Nawab of Chhatari added that any such action on the part of the
Congress Government amounts to dishonour of the pledges given on behalf of
HMG in various Houses. Sir Walter supported this and His Excellency also
agreed with it but the general impression was that if Congress was to do any¬
thing wrong HMG could not stop it.)5
5. Finally, I urged that H.E.H. ought not to be hurried in his decision which
ought not to be demanded by the 15th August. He was in a very difficult posi¬
tion and would be likely to get trouble whatever he decided. H.E. said he would
be whiffing to try and get an extension of time for decision from Congress, if
AUGUST 1947
497
H.E.H. wrote asking for it and saying in effect that he was in a specially
difficult position and wanted further time to make his decision. H.E. said a
definite limit would have to be given, say, a month and H.E.H. would have to
show that he was genuinely considering the matter. I said it was not H.E.H.
who was asking for time: it was I who wanted it. I was quite sure H.E.H.
would refuse to accede, but with further time he might decide to make a
satisfactory offer by treaty. H.E. throughout the discussion avoided the dis¬
tinction between accession and a treaty, but V. P. Menon was emphatic that
any treaty would be unacceptable in any case. Nevertheless, H.E.V. pressed us
to continue our talk and said repeatedly and emphatically that if H.E.H. did not
join the Dominion, his State would be ruined and he would lose his throne. He
said it was not a question of odds. H.E.H. had not a chance. He would be off
the throne in a few months. I said he would go down (if at all) fighting and the
Mussalmans would help him all over India. It would not take a few months but
probably 3 years of bloodshed and I was not betting that Congress would last
that long. H.E. said we all wanted to avoid bloodshed and we must try to find
a solution. It is to be noted that before V. P. Menon came in, H.E. had said to
the President that an offer of treaty by H.E.H. might put Congress in the
wrong. [This has always been my point].6
6. H.E. asked us to continue discussions with V. P. Menon and himself; if
necessary staying longer in Delhi. We left this in doubt but I said I would get
in touch with V. P. Menon about Berar.
7. H.E. left just before 8.30 p.m. and returned to us about a quarter of an
hour later repeating his determination that a way out should be found. He
would, if it became necessary, himself in his speech to the Assembly urge that
further time for decision should be given to Hyderabad to come in on the
terms now offered.
8. During the Viceroy’s absence, V. P. Menon elaborated what H.E. had
said about the prospects, if we did not come in. There wouldn’t be any overt
act but there would be refusal of grain levy and of taxes and other payments.
Disorders would arise and if they became serious, as they would, India would
not stand by and see that state of affairs to continue. Their propaganda was not
only for accession but for responsible government. If responsible government
were conceded, he had no doubt that Hyderabad would join the Dominion.
H.E.P. pointed out that the agitation for responsible government was likely
to take place, whether or not Hyderabad joined the Dominion.
Note
My own conclusion from these discussions is that, though it is possible that H.E.
3 See Enclosures i and 3 to No. 313. 4 cf. No. 262, notes 3 and 4.
5 The paragraph in brackets was evidently added to these notes. In the original, it appears on a separate
slip of paper which is attached at the end of para. 4.
6 Brackets in original.
498
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
would try, and conceivably might succeed in persuading Congress to accept
a treaty from Hyderabad which gave to the Dominion everything they would
get by accession, there is not the remotest chance of a treaty on terms less
favourable to the Dominion being considered for a moment. On the whole,
I think that a treaty on terms equivalent to accession would be rejected. I
cannot see any reason why Hyderabad should not now take the step of offering
a treaty on the lines of my draft letter7 and if Mr. Jinnah advises against this
course and his advice is taken, there is no more I can usefully do in or for
Hyderabad.
7 Not printed. For the letter as sent, see No. 376.
330
Minutes of Viceroy s Twenty Fifth Miscellaneous Meeting
Rl3ji/i66:ff 44-7
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting 1 held at the Viceroy's House , New Delhi, on 4 August
1947 at 9. jo am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , H.H. The
Khan of Kalat, Nawabzada Mohammed Aslam Khan, Sir Sultan Ahmed
Also present were: Lord Istnay, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum .
the viceroy said that since his last meeting2 with the Khan of Kalat, he had
spoken3 to Mr. Jinnah, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and Mr. Nishtar. Mr. Jinnah had
explained that he was under such pressure of work at the present time that he
had been unable to give his full consideration to the problems arising between
Pakistan and Kalat; he was, however, willing and anxious to find an amicable
solution. Mr. Jinnah had told the Viceroy that he could rely on him to find, after
15th August, a solution which would suit both Kalat and Pakistan. It was his
desire to live in peace and friendship with this large Muslim State.
the viceroy said that he had proposed, and he understood that Sir Sultan
Ahmed agreed (incidentally Sir Walter Monckton agreed also) that before
the next series of meetings between the Khan of Kalat and Mr. Jinnah took place
a decision should be reached on the legal position as to whether or not treaties
made between the British Government and Kalat would be inherited by the
Pakistan Government. Mr. Jinnah had admitted Kalat’s claim to be an inde¬
pendent sovereign State of a status different from that of Indian States, and was
prepared to negotiate on those terms.
sir sultan ahmed said that he also understood that Mr. Jinnah wanted
more time to study the problems between Pakistan and Kalat; and the Kalat
representatives felt that this time should be given. Mr. Jinnah had appeared
AUGUST 1947
499
very anxious that the correct decision should be reached and that he should not
be rushed. It was certain that Mr. Jinnah did not as yet realise the full com¬
plexity of the problem, sir sultan ahmed suggested that if no agreement
was reached on the legal question this would have to go before a higher
tribunal for decision.
the viceroy said that every effort should first be made to establish the
legal position by agreement between the representatives of the two parties
concerned. He suggested that Mr. Jinnah himself should not be brought into
these particular discussions. Only in the event of failure to reach agreement
between these representatives would the matter have to be referred to a
tribunal.
his excellency said that he considered it essential that an immediate
Standstill Agreement should be made between Pakistan and Kalat. The
Kalat representatives agreed that this was necessary.
nawabzada mohammed aslam khan asked that a statement should be
made declaring the recognition by the Crown Representative, as well as by
the Government of Pakistan, of Kalat’s independent status, the viceroy
replied that the advice4 which he had received on this point from the Political
Adviser precluded this ; in any case a declaration by the Crown Representative
would be of little value at the present time compared to one by the Pakistan
Government.
the khan of kalat said that Mr. Jinnah had asked him whether Kalat
would be willing to send representatives to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.
He had replied that this was not possible because of the State’s independent
status, but he had agreed that [?with] Mr. Jinnah that it was essential that a
reasonable understanding should be reached between Pakistan and Kalat on
Defence, External Affairs and Communications, the viceroy gave his
opinion that agreement on these subjects was essential.
the viceroy pointed out that, if legal opinion decided that the treaties
made between the British Government and Kalat would not be inherited by
the Pakistan Government, a further decision would be necessary on the finan¬
cial arrangements to be made in view of the fact that much capital had been
sunk into construction at Quetta on the basis of a lease in perpetuity. It would
presumably be necessary to obtain a further legal opinion on this point also.
With this sir sultan ahmed agreed.
1 This meeting had been arranged in response to the Khan of Kalat’s letter at No. 303.
2 No. 258. 1 2 3 Not traced.
4 On the eve of Lord Mountbatten’s meeting with the Kalat delegation, Sir G. Abell minuted as follows:
‘States Dept. (Pakistan) are advising on the legal issue but I discussed it last night with the British Joint
Secretary concerned and he said he was clear that Pakistan would inherit the treaty obligations and
rights of HMG vis a vis Kalat unless Kalat repudiated the treaty. The question really is, what can HMG
do for Kalat if they do want to repudiate the treaty and take back the leased areas, and the answer,
I, fear, is ‘very little’. They cannot avoid the necessity of negotiating with Pakistan.’ R/3/1/166: f 42.
500
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
It was then decided that a communique should be issued outlining the
negotiations between Pakistan and Kalat. A first draft5 was made and agreed in
principle at the meeting. This was also agreed to in principle by Mr. Jinnah
and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, who entered at the end. the viceroy asked
Lord Ismay to clear it in detail with representatives of both parties.6
Appendix A’ to No. 330
DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
As a result of a meeting held between a delegation from Kalat and officials
of the Pakistan States Department, presided over by the Crown Representative,
and of a series of meetings between the Crown Representative, His Highness
the Khan of Kalat, and Mr. Jinnah, the following is the situation : —
1 . The Government of Pakistan recognises Kalat’ s status as an independent
sovereign State; this status is different from that of Indian States.
2. Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not treaties made between
the British Government and Kalat will be inherited by the Pakistan Govern¬
ment.
3. When this opinion has been received, further meetings will take place
between representatives of Pakistan and the Khan of Kalat.
4. Meanwhile a Standstill Agreement has been made between Pakistan and
Kalat.
5. Discussions will take place between Pakistan and Kalat at an early date
with a view to reaching decisions on Defence, External Affairs and Communi¬
cations.7
5 Attached as Appendix ‘A’ to these minutes.
6 When Sir P. Patrick saw the minutes of this meeting on n August he commented as follows: ‘It looks
as if Lord Mountbatten had received advice that the decision to treat Kalat as an independent State was
wrong and had devoted himself to preparing the parties for a volte face. This will now be for Jinnah.’
L/P &S/13/1846: f 43. See also No. 263.
7 On 5 August Lord Ismay wrote to Mr Jinnah explaining that the Khan of Kalat agreed with the
communique, with the exception of one word in clause 2. He suggested that the words ‘agreements
for leases’ should be substituted for the word ‘treaties’, as there were no treaties with respect to leased
areas. Ismay asked if Jinnah agreed with this amendment and also whether he had any other comments.
R/3/1/166: f 56.
AUGUST 1947
501
331
Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten
of Burma
17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 4 August 1 947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I had a visit from some members of the East Punjab Ministry yesterday. They
informed me that the situation in Lahore continues to be very tense and the
advent of August 15th was looked upon with apprehension by many who
expect a possibihty of trouble then. All this is, of course, well-known to you.
2. I was told that when you went to Lahore recently1 it was suggested to you
that military pickets might be kept in the city of Lahore in addition to the
police who are already there. Apparently you approved of this suggestion. But
it has not yet been given effect to. The East Punjab Ministers were afraid that
unless these pickets are sent there soon, there might be a considerable exodus
from the city of Lahore. This might be avoided by the presence of the pickets
during this critical phase.
3. I imagine there is no difficulty about this as the troops are already in
Lahore and only some minor arrangements have to be made. This would
certainly reassure the people in Lahore city and scotch the rumours of trouble.
I hope it will be possible for this to be arranged soon.2
Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
1 See No. 228, paras. 6-12.
2 In tel. 3162-S of 4 August Lord Mountbatten informed Sir E. Jenkins of this suggestion and asked for
advice as to a reply. R/3/1/91: f 88.
332
Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence
Files: Interim Government of India, Part (2)
SECRET 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 4 August I947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I give below the names of my colleagues in the new Cabinet:1
1. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.
1 cf. Nos. 172, 256, Item 6 and 302, paras. 36-40.
502
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
2. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.
3. Dr. Rajendra Prasad.
4. Dr. John Matthai.
5. Shri Jagjivan Ram.
6. Sardar Baldev Singh.
7. Shri C. H. Bhabha.
8. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur.
9. Shri Rafi Ahmad Kidwai.
10. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar.
11. Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukerji.
12. Sir Shanmukhan Chetty.
13. Shri Narhar Vishnu Gadgil.
You will notice that all the existing members, with the exception of Shri C.
Rajagopalachari, have been included in this list. Six new names have been
added. I have obtained the consent of all of them.
2. We shall decide finally about the portfolios when we have our first
meeting. We do not intend making any changes in the present distribution of
portfolios among the eight existing members except that Mr. Rajagopalachari’s
departure will necessitate a change.
3. We might have to consider a new arrangement of portfolios somewhat
later. Thus Food and Agriculture might be combined. Planning will have to
be given some place.
Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
333
Mr Anderson to Mr Harris
LjF 17)2870: j]' 135-6
4 August ig47
Private Secretary,
You asked for a brief note 011 what our attitude should be to a proposition that,
in view of the balance of payments emergency, the United Kingdom should
now suspend, or greatly reduce, the availability of the sterling balances.
AUGUST 1947
503
So far as India is concerned, the position is that there exists on paper the
probability of a deficit on current account amounting to nearly -£50 million
(of which about -£40 million is attributable to payments for foodgrains)
during the half-year July-December, 1947. This is arrived at after taking
account of severe cuts in the import of consumers’ goods which have recent¬
ly been imposed, and includes provision for capital goods and industrial
supplies which is by no means lavish. It is, of course, not a scientifically exact
figure, and we ourselves think it is a bit on the high side, though we have
not succeeded in persuading the Indians to agree that any appreciable re¬
duction in the estimate would be justified. But certainly all the indications
are that a big deficit — say of ^35-45 million — is inevitable even if all goes
according to plan. Against this we have offered the Indians a release of -£35
million, plus special treatment of a further jf6 or 7 million, together with a
working balance (which in the long run they are supposed to maintain more
or less intact) of -£30 million. They have put these proposals to their Govern¬
ment, whose reply is awaited. We hope to conclude the agreement this week.
I must admit to having felt some surprise that in the prevailing circumstances
the Chancellor was prepared to go as far as this. The proposals are, in my view,
generous (though not more so than the terms of the recent agreement with
Egypt). There has in fact been a genuine desire on the part of the Treasury to
do everything possible at this juncture to ease the constitutional transition and
avoid prejudicing its chances by what would otherwise be an acute economic
crisis. This is important from the point of view both of India’s well-being and of
good relations between ourselves and the new Dominions. (Mr. Nehru’s
message1 on the point to the Prime Minister will be recalled.) For the Indians
the sterling balances are in fact precisely the equivalent of what the American
loan has been for us. If we do not continue to help them in their present
difficulties, they might, it is true, be able to do something to help themselves
in the short run by taking what, for them, is the extreme step of liquidating the
Reserve Bank’s gold holding and by drawing against their International Mone¬
tary Fund quota. But essentially what we should force them to do would be to
attempt to raise credits on their own in the United States. If they did not succeed
in this a first-class crisis in the spheres of food, production and currency is
likely to eventuate. We can be sure that in any event if we left them thus
to sink or swim they would deeply resent it and permanent damage to the
prospects of economic collaboration between ourselves and them would ensue
both as a psychological consequence and because of the impetus that would in
practice be given to the building up of other economic affiliations.
It is possible that we ought now to go to the Indian Delegation again and
explain (if we can) that for reasons not apparent a fortnight ago we cannot
implement our original offer in full, though clearly this will not be an easy case
1 See No. 1 19, note i.
504
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
to put over in the circumstances. But that we should entirely abandon the
responsibility of helping them through would surely be inconsistent with the
position which we occupy as the head of the British Commonwealth (in the
advantages of which we desire them to believe) and the mainspring of an im¬
portant economic group (in which again we desire their partnership). In any
case, if we are going to pass on part of our burden to the Indians, it is essential
that similar treatment should be meted out to our other dependants — certainly
including Egypt at one end of the scale, but not omitting the Colonies at the
other end. The effect of anything we do will obviously be much worse if they
feel that we are differentiating against them. The other imperative necessity
will be to convince them that this is no affair of repudi ation or shirking, but that
we ourselves are sparing no reasonable effort or sacrifice. It is inherently diffi¬
cult to get the representatives of a fundamentally poor country hke India to
appreciate our point of view on relative standards of living, but they are much
more likely to react sensibly if any measures which hit them can be seen in
perspective as one incident in a drastic and comprehensive programme, and are
not, for example, too prominently featured as an easy way out of an
obligation which we would like to disclaim.
K. A.
334
Government of Australia to Commonwealth Relations Office
Telegram , L/WS/i I1046: f 127
immediate 4 August ig47, 3. 10 pm
Received: 4 August , g.oo am
No. 21 1. It is understood that it is the intention of the United Kingdom
Government to enter into negotiations1 with the Government of India in due
course with regard to the establishment of bases for defence purposes and of
civil aviation facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
2. It would be appreciated if we could be kept in close touch with the
negotiations when they take place and if full consideration could be given to
the vital concern of Australia in the Indian Ocean line of communications. It
is felt that future political situation in India, Ceylon and Burma and the growing
nationalist tendences in Malaya may greatly increase the strategic importance
of the Andamans and Nicobars as both offensive and defensive bases in the Bay
of Bengal. This would particularly be case against an aggressor strong in land
but weak in sea and air power.
3. It is considered that as sovereignty of the Islands has passed to India the
AUGUST 1947
505
securing of long term leases would be the best solution and the minimum
defence requirement would be the right to station forces on the Islands and to
mention [Pmaintain] naval and air facilities.2
1 See Vol. XI, Nos. 244, Minute 4, 347, Minute 3, and 365, para. 8.
2 The Commonwealth Relations Office replied in tel. 174 of 11 August noting the Australian Govern¬
ment’s views and promising to keep in touch with them about future negotiations. L/WS/1/1046: f 123.
335
Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten
of Burma and the Nawab of Bhopal and the Maharaja of Indore
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy’s Interview No. 1 771
4 August 1947, 3.30 pm
the viceroy stated that he had devoted the major part of his time
recently to his duties, as Crown Representative, of looking after the interests of
the States; he had made great efforts to produce the best possible terms for their
future relationship with the two Dominion Governments. The success
attending his efforts had considerably exceeded any expectations which he had
had on arrival in India. He explained that all the Princes, with one exception,
had, during the course of the last few days, either come to Delhi themselves
in connection with the discussions on the Instrument of Accession, or sent their
own representatives or shared together to send a representative. There were
three States which were in a particular quandary. These were Hyderabad,
Bhopal and Kashmir, in which the Ruler and the Government and Army
were of the opposite community to the majority of the people. Nevertheless,
the representatives of these three had been in close touch with him and every
effort was being made to fmd a solution to their difficulties.
his excellency said that the only State which had done nothing at all was
Indore. He had done his best to ensure that the lack of responsibility towards
his people and courtesy towards the Crown Representative on the part of the
Maharaja of Indore would not result in the people of his State suffering. Four
of the six Mahratta Princes who had gone to see him had made personal reports2
which were not edifying. He had sent an account of their report to the Secretary
of State. He also understood that the Prime Minister of Indore had told the
Maharajas of Baroda and Gwalior that the letter3 of invitation which he
(The Viceroy) had written to H.H., represented a threat. He emphasised that
the letter contained no hint of threatening or coercing in this matter at all and
1 Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum was also present at this interview and dictated the record.
2 See No. 302, paras. 49-51. 3 No. 266.
50 6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
he resented this deliberate misrepresentation. The way in which the Maharaja
of Indore might behave was a matter of indifference to him. It was quite clear
from His Majesty’s Government’s statement4 on the States, that they were at
liberty to do anything they liked. They could either take no steps at all, or they
could sign standstill agreements and accede to one or other Dominion. There
was complete liberty for each State to do exactly what it liked, and he did not
intend to take any step which could be represented as coercion.
the maharaja of indore said that he did not understand why His
Excellency considered that he had been in any way discourteous, the viceroy
replied that he had taken immense trouble during the last few weeks about the
future of the States. He had devoted a large proportion of his time to con¬
sideration of the problem. All the States had received a clear invitation to send
representatives to Delhi for discussions. They had all replied and all sent
representatives, with the exception of Indore. Could that be called courtesy?
the maharaja of indore replied that he and his Prime Minister had
been in London when this invitation had been received. It had presumably
been considered by his Cabinet, who had come to the conclusion that they
could not take the responsibility for sending a representative to Delhi when
they knew that he would be returning soon.
the viceroy asked the Maharaja of Indore when he had got back to
India, the maharaja of indore replied that he had returned on the
29th July, the viceroy suggested that the 24th July might be a more
truthful date. This the maharaja of indore admitted.
the viceroy asked what happened in Indore when the Maharaja was
away. Was there no one to send advice to him? Was there no one to reply to the
invitation with information that he was absent?
the maharaja of indore asked why His Excellency was using such a
tone, the viceroy replied that he was doing this advisedly; he considered
that the behaviour of Indore should be recorded.
the maharaja of indore then stated that His Highness of Baroda had
brought to him a letter from the Viceroy.5 He had given his personal word
to the Nawab of Bhopal to do nothing without first consulting him. He had
gone to see him and had telegraphed immediately to the Viceroy saying that he
would come to Delhi.6 He had not been well. He was still not well. He had
been asking, since his return from London, for a revised Instrument of
Accession. Two telegrams had been sent by the Resident requesting this. A
letter had arrived, but the Instrument of Accession had not been enclosed.
the viceroy pointed out that the draft Instrument of Accession7 had been
available for many days past in Delhi. The original had been drafted by him¬
self.8 This had been revised by a Committee of Rulers in a way to suit their
wishes. Presumably it was being revised at the time that the Maharaja of Indore
asked for a copy to be sent. All the other States, he repeated, had either been
AUGUST 1947
507
represented at the Meetings, or had discussed the matter independently. The
Instrument had not been finalised until three days previously.
the maharaja of in d ore said that he had sent his Deputy Prime Minister
to Delhi as early as possible, the viceroy pointed out that the Deputy
Prime Minister had not arrived until the negotiations were over.9
the maharaja of indore then handed to The Viceroy a letter (copy
attached).10 This contained a large number of extracts from Hansard.
the viceroy read this letter out aloud, paragraph by paragraph, and
commented on each of the points raised in this letter. He pointed out that he
had been the first to get the Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum of 12th May,
1946,11 accepted by both Congress and the Muslim League. Until this had been
accepted, as it was in the 3rd June Statement,12 there had been no basis on
which to negotiate. He emphasised that he was in no way putting pressure on
the Maharaja of Indore as to what course he should pursue. He was not in fact
even expressing a view. Sardar Patel had incidentally informed him that he was
indifferent to the action to be taken by Indore. Sufficient States had already
decided to accede to the Dominion of India for Sardar Patel’s purposes.
the viceroy pointed out that two months previously, the terms and
conditions, which the future Government of India intended to offer to the
States, had been very different. Congress spokesmen, some of whom were
members of the Interim Government, had made many most disturbing state¬
ments.13 The Congress Leaders had in fact been envisaging a very close Union
in which there would have been financial control and interference in the internal
affairs of States. He (The Viceroy) had then “gone to battle” and succeeded
first in securing the creation of States Departments for both Dominions. These
Departments were in the hands of realists and statesmen who were prepared to
negotiate with him as Crown Representative, on a reasonable basis. He had
finally succeeded in persuading them to agree to a plan whereby the States
would accede on the three central subjects of the Cabinet Mission Plan only.
This plan involved complete internal autonomy for the States.
4 Vol. XI, No. 45, para. 18. 5 No. 266; see also No. 295, note 1. 6 See No. 302, note 36.
7 Enclosure 1 to No. 313.
8 The Instrument of Accession had in fact been drafted by Mr V. P. Menon; see No. 228, para. 26.
9 Sir G. Abell minuted as follows to Lord Mountbatten on 5 August: ‘The Prime Minister. Dy P.M. of
Indore [the same individual — Mr Horton] called on me this evening toexplain that H.H. had done his
best to get here on time but had been delayed by a series of misfortunes. After his friendly letter of
invitation [No. 295] he had been shocked to receive so cold a reception here. He was most anxious
that Y.E. should not think there had been the least intention of discourtesy. I said I would do my best
to “put things right” for him.’ Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence files: Interviews (2).
10 Not printed. The letter, which was presented in the form of an Aide-Memoire, consisted of extracts
from the debates on the Indian Independence Bill in the House of Lords and House of Commons on
16 and 14 July respectively. It proceeded to assert that immediate consideration of the question of
accession ‘savours irresistibly of coercion and undue pressure on [the] States’ and maintained that it was
‘neither fair nor feasible’ to expect them to convey their decision before 15 August. R/3/1/139: ff 131-7.
11 Vol. VII, No. 262. 12 Vol. XI, No. 45, para. 18.
13 See eg Vol. X, No. 181, note 2.
5°8
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
his excellency pointed out that his responsibility as Crown Representa¬
tive would end on 15th August. He reiterated that he had no intention of
applying pressure; but he pointed out that, whereas he could guarantee the
terms of the present Instrument up to 15th August, he could do nothing to
help after that date. There was no other reason for speed. If the Maharaja of
Indore thought that he would get better terms after 15th August, it was open
to him to wait until then.
the nawab of bhopal pointed out that the Cabinet Missions Memoran¬
dum of 12th May, 1946, had given an option to the States to enter into political
or treaty relationships with the successor authorities. Now Congress were
saying that they would not accept standstill arrangements with those States
which did not accede.
the viceroy said that he had no official information that this was indeed
the Congress policy, although he had heard a rumour to the effect the previous
day. He pointed out that, after 15th August, the decision on whether or not
to enter into agreements would be for the new Governments and the States
only. There would be no Crown Representative to help them. Perhaps the
reason for this reported intention on the part of Congress was that they pre¬
sumed that the standstill arrangements covered under Clause 7 of the Indian
Independence BUI14 were adequate and sufficient to maintain the life of India
and to prevent chaos. It was clearly impossible to compel the new Governments
to enter into treaties, or even standstill agreements against their will.
the viceroy explained that he was being attacked as “pro-Prince” for
having produced the present plan. Sardar Patel was similarly being attacked.
It was touch and go whether Sardar Patel would get it through, but he had
accepted all that he (The Viceroy) had suggested, most loyally. Presumably it
was essential for Sardar Patel to retain some bargaining power with the Party
extremists, the viceroy asked the Nawab of Bhopal whether he admitted
that a month previously neither of them had dreamed that he would get as far
as he had done with Congress. With this the nawab of bhopal heartily
agreed.
the viceroy added that it was his private opinion that Sardar Patel would
not be able to afford to remain conciliatory after 15th August.
the nawab of bhopal asked whether the Viceroy considered it probable
that the Government of the Dominion of India would, in the future, honour
the Instruments of Accession which were being signed now. the viceroy
replied that, if they did not, he would be in an extremely strong position to
expose them, since he was remaining as Governor-General of India until
April.
On a further point raised in the Maharaja of Indore’s letter, the viceroy
stated that His Majesty’s Government had not yet given him any decision on
whether or not they would recognise the States which stood out as international
AUGUST 1947
509
entities. The question of whether Dominion status would be granted to In¬
dependent States had already been argued ad nauseam and turned down.15
In his view the States would have had a good case for this if they had all stuck
together originally.
the viceroy stated that those States which did not accede would, so far as
he knew, no longer retain the advantages of connection with the British
Commonwealth. The subjects of those States, he had been advised, would no
longer be British protected persons. Surely the difference between treaty
relationship and accession lay primarily in this point, since the treaty would not
be with the Crown. He had in fact convinced Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar that
treaties might well prove far more disadvantageous than accession.16
the viceroy went on to say that he fully realised the difficulties peculiar
to Bhopal. They arose also in the cases of Kashmir and Hyderabad, though not
so seriously with Kashmir, which was so placed geographically that it could
join either Dominion, provided part of Gurdaspur were put into East Punjab
by the Boundary Commission.
the viceroy emphasised that when the new Constitution of the Dominion
of India was made and put into effect, it would include clauses dealing with the
States, which the representatives of the acceding States would have helped in
framing. If these did not suit the Rulers, it was specifically laid down in the
present Instrument of Accession that they could think again. This second choice
was not, on the other hand, given to the Dominion of India.
14 No. 164.
15 See Vol. X, Nos. 176, para. 6, 517, Minute 6, 523, 533 and 553, Minute 4.
16 See No. 228, para. 18.
336
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl oj Listowel
Telegram , LIWSI1I1046: f 136
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 4 August 1947, 5.4O pm
Received: 4 August , 5.40 pm
No. 3138-S. Your telegram 9980 August 1st1
North West Frontier policy. Jinnah put out a statement2 on July 30th in which
he assured the tribal areas on behalf of Pakistan that the Pakistan Government
would like to continue after August 15th all treaties, agreements and allowances
until such time as representatives of the tribes and of Pakistan Government
1 No. 309.
2 See The Times of India, 31 July 1947. For the text of Mr Jinnah’s statement regarding the tribal areas,
see No. 349.
5io
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
have negotiated new arrangements. He added that Pakistan had no desire
whatever to interfere in any way with traditional independence of the Tribal
Areas and also said “We have every intention and desire to have most
friendly relations with the Government of Afghanistan”.
I do not think it would be useful for me to carry matter further at the
moment. It would be much better to leave Pakistan to ask for consultation and
help from India in due course with view to deciding a common policy towards
the Afghan Government. At the moment the atmosphere is not at all favourable
here for discussions of this kind.
Both Jinnah and Nehru have agreed that the Joint Defence Council should
hold discussion with representatives of Chiefs of Staff on Commonwealth
defence problems which will probably include the North West Frontier.
337
Sir E. Jenkins [Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rfr liftoff 212-37
SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE,
no. 699 4 August 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
Your Excellency asked me on 20th July to prepare a memorandum on the
main criticisms against the Punjab Government for its handling ot the current
disturbances.1 I enclose a memorandum which is, I am afraid, rather sketchy;
I have a good deal of other work on my hands, and though most of the material
required for a full survey is on record, it takes time to get it arranged.
2. I have not dealt in the memorandum with the allegations of partiality
made at different times against me personally by the Congress and the Muslim
League. Indian politicians and journalists seldom realise that a Governor main¬
tains very close touch with the Governor-General, and takes no important
action without the Go vemor-Generafs knowledge. I am content to leave it
to Lord Wavell and Your Excellency to decide whether my letters and tele¬
grams since I took charge in the Punjab on 8th April 1946 have disclosed a bias
for or against any party. These documents give a complete account of political
conditions in the Punjab as they appeared to me from time to time, and my
appreciations and recommendations for action were generally approved both
by Lord Wavell and by Your Excellency. In only one case has a critic dared to
make a specific allegation — in a recent editorial in “Dawn” it was stated that
the editor “had reason to believe” that I was attempting to influence the higher
authorities and the Chairman of the Boundary Commission in favour of the
Sikhs. The words “the higher authorities” in this context can only mean the
AUGUST 1947
511
Governor-General and Cabinet Ministers in the United Kingdom. I have
certainly kept Your Excellency informed of the Sikh view, but I have never
advised that it should be accepted, and I have no direct contacts of any kind
with Cabinet Ministers at home — except that during disturbed periods I have,
in accordance with the standing orders, sent a daily factual telegram describing
events to the Secretary of State. Nor have I discussed the boundary problem
with the Chairman of the Boundary Commission or attempted to influence
him or his colleagues in any way, directly or indirectly. These facts can be
proved, and the falsity of this specific allegation indicates the quality of the
more general allegations of partiality.
Yours sincerely,
E. M. JENKINS
Enclosure to No. 337
MEMORANDUM
There have been many criticisms of the Punjab Government’s handling of the
disturbances of 1947. During his visit to Lahore on 20th July His Excellency
the Governor-General suggested that I should record them and add my
comments.
2. The main criticisms are: —
(i) that while the British were able to crush without difficulty the distur¬
bances of 1942, they failed to deal in the same way with the disturbances
of 1947 (Congress — particularly Nehru and Patel).2
(ii) that British officials [have been callous and incompetent, and have taken
the line that since the British are going, massacre, arson and looting are
of no consequence (Congress — particularly Nehru and Patel).3
(iii) that in the Punjab the worst districts have been those staffed by British
officials — Indian officials have managed to maintain order (Congress —
Nehru).4
(iv) that Congress Governments have had no difficulty in suppressing dis¬
turbances — the worst Province of all has been the Punjab, which is still
“under British rule” (Congress — Nehru).5
(v) that the fire services in the cities, particularly in Lahore and Amritsar,
have been inefficient and useless (Congress).6
(vi) that the Magistrates and Police have been both incompetent and partial,
and that the Police have connived at and actually participated in murder,
arson, and looting (Congress).7
1 cf. No. 228, note 21.
2 cf. Vol. XI, Nos. 218 and 369, para. 5.
3 cf. ibid. 4 cf. ibid., No. 218. 5 cf. ibid.
7 cf. ibid., Nos. 218, 300 and 338, Case No. 155/32/47.
6 cf. ibid., No. 300.
512
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(vii) that Martial Law should have been declared at least in Lahore and pos¬
sibly elsewhere (Congress).8
Attacks on the administration were not confined to the Congress Party —
the Muslim League were equally severe,9 though less precise except in their
constant allegations 1 0 of partiality against myself.
3. There are two short answers to most of these criticisms.
In the first place, the critics have missed the significance of what is happening
in the Punjab. We are faced not with an ordinary exhibition of political or
communal violence, but with a struggle between the communities for the
power we are shortly to abandon. Normal standards cannot be applied to this
communal war of succession, which has subjected all sections of the population
to unprecedented strains, has dissolved old loyalties and created new ones, and
has produced many of the symptoms oi a revolution.
Secondly, the critics are themselves participants in the events which they
profess to deplore. During the disturbances Nehru, Patel, and Baldev Singh
have visited various parts of the Punjab. They have done so nominally as
Members of the Central Government, but in fact as communal leaders. To the
best of my belief not one of them made during these visits any contact of
importance with any Muslim. Nehru11 was balanced and sensible; but Baldev
Singh12 on at least two occasions went in for most violent communal publicity,
and Patel’s visit13 to Gurgaon was used to make it appear that Hindus in that
district were the victims of Muslim aggression, whereas broadly the contrary
was the case. Conversely when Liaquat Ali Khan14 or Ghazanfar Ali Khan
visited the Punjab, they did so not to assist the administration, but to assist the
Muslims. When a Hindu leader talks about “utter ruthlessness” or “martial
law”, he means that he wants as many Muslims as possible shot out of hand;
Muslims are less fond of these terms, but all communities, Muslim, Hindu,
and Sikh persist in regarding themselves as blameless. Moreover, there is very
little doubt that the disturbances have in some degree been organised and paid
for by persons or bodies directly or indirectly under the control of the
Mushm League, the Congress, and the Akali party. The evidence of this is to
be found in the daily intelligence summaries, and in the solicitude with which
prominent men — particularly among the Hindus — take up the cases of suspects
belonging to their own community.
Criticisms which are based upon a genuine or studied misconception of the
real situation, and which are made by people with an intense personal
interest in the communal struggle cannot be accepted at their face value.
4. Before the criticisms are examined individually, some understanding of
the Punjab background is essential. From 1921 to the end of 1942 the Punjab
was dominated by home-grown Muslim leaders powerful enough to control,
or at least to influence very greatly, the policy of the Muslim League as a whole.
AUGUST 1947
513
These leaders saw clearly that the Punjab as it stood then, and still stands until
15th August, could not be governed by a communal party, Muslim or non-
Muslim. They therefore developed the Unionist idea — a United Punjab, with
a Unionist Party open to members of all communities, under Muslim leader¬
ship. As the Muslim League gained strength, the Muslim Unionists were driven
to equivocation. They could not deny Pakistan and endeavoured to treat it as
a matter external to the Punjab ; but it was clear from the first that Pakistan was
a vital internal issue and that sooner or later the Punjabi Muslims would have
to accept it fully and join the League, or reject it and maintain the Unionist
idea. With the death of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan at the end of 1942, the
Unionist Party began to disintegrate. The last Unionist Ministry under Malik
Sir Khizar Hay at Khan Tiwana continued uneasily until the General Election
of 1945-46, which was fought on the most bitter communal lines.
Only eight or nine Muslim Unionists survived; with one or two exceptions
Hindu Unionists were defeated or absorbed by the Congress party; and Sikh
Unionists joined the Panthic Party. The Punjab had reached the worst possible
position, so long avoided, in which practically all Muslims were on one side
of the fence and practically all non-Muslims on the other.
The situation might have been saved by a genuine coalition between the
Muslim League on the one hand and the Congress or the Panthic Party on the
other. But communal feeling was too strong, and both the Muslim League and
the Congress were under orders from outside the Punjab. A country with thirty
million inhabitants was sucked into the vortex of all-India politics; Punjabis
ceased to be Punjabis and became Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs — the Sikhs alone
retaining their political independence. In the upshot a makeshift coalition was
formed between the Congress, the Panthic Party, and the small Unionist
remnant, under the leadership of Malik Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana.
The new Coalition Ministry took office in March 1946. When I assumed
charge as Governor on 8th April 1946, it had just weathered the Budget Session
of the Assembly, but had attempted no legislation. The Ministers lacked con¬
fidence in themselves and in one another. They were cordially hated by the
Muslim League Opposition, and had no contacts with the Opposition. In fact
until the Ministry resigned in March 1947, I was the only member of the
Government who could meet members of the Opposition naturally and with¬
out constraint.
During the remainder of 1946 the Coalition Ministry managed better than
might have been expected. The Ministers were terrified of the Legislature,
and when, in July 1946, a Session became inevitable for the elections to the
8 cf. ibid., No. 320. 9 cf. ibid., Nos. 455 and 472.
10 cf. ibid., Nos. 305, note 1, 339, para. 8 and 506, para. 7.
11 and 12 cf. ibid., No. 12, paras. 4 and 5.
13 No record has been traced of Sardar Patel’s visit to Gurgaon in the India Office Records.
*4 cf. Vol. XI, No. 11.
514
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Constituent Assembly, they used their small majority to secure the adjourn¬
ment as soon as the obligatory business was over. They were most ingenious
in avoiding legislation, thus depriving the Opposition of opportunities of
constitutional combat; they were equally ingenious in annoying members of
the Opposition in various small ways. Many of the Muslim League complaints
against the Ministry were exaggerated or untrue; but the tactics and conduct
of the Coalition Ministry were intensely annoying to the Muslim League, and
with some reason. The largest single party had been shut out of office, and
might have to wait indefinitely for its turn.
In these highly explosive conditions, the news of communal disorders on an
unprecedented scale in Bombay, Calcutta, Noakhali, Bihar, the Western
United Provinces and the N.W.F. Province caused great alarm. The Coalition
Ministry took strong action. Minor trouble which occurred in Amritsar and
Multan early in the summer had been effectively dealt with; and more serious
disturbances at Ludhiana and Rohtak later in the year were quickly suppressed.
The Rohtak disturbances were directly connected with those in the Western
United Provinces, and were extremely dangerous. A “civil war” atmosphere
was at this stage developing throughout the Punjab, and all communities were
arming for a struggle which seemed inevitable. The Punjab Public Safety Ordi¬
nance,15 promulgated in November 1946, reflected the views of the Ministry
on the situation.
The Ministry saw that “private armies” might play a large part in communal
strife. Two of these — the Muslim League National Guards and the Rashtriya
Sway am Sewak Sangh — were prominent and were growing rapidly. The
Sikhs had disbanded their Akali Sena about 1940, and it was thought undesirable
that they should have an excuse for reviving it. In January 1947 the Ministry
accordingly banned the Muslim League National Guards and the Rashtriya
Sway am Sewak Sangh under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908. I
had advocated this action some months earlier, and concurred in the January
decision.16
The banning of the Muslim League National Guards was the signal for a
Civil Disobediance movement by the Muslim League. This movement was
modelled on the Congress movements of the nineteen-twenties, and its object
being to dislodge a “popular” Ministry, it was clearly unconstitutional. The
“defence of civil liberties” was an inadequate cloak for the real intentions of the
demonstrators. By the middle of February the Coalition Ministry decided to
compromise with the Muslim League, and did so on about 26th February. The
movement had induced a universal contempt for law and order, and the ex¬
treme arrogance of the demonstrators had alarmed the non-Muslims to the
point of hysteria.
In the meantime on 20th February His Majesty’s Government had announced
their intention of leaving India not later than 30th June 1948, and of transferring
AUGUST 1947
515
power to a successor Government or to successor Governments whose identity
was unknown. The Muslims were anxious, and apparently almost ready, to
seize the whole of the Punjab for Pakistan; the non-Muslims were passionately
determined that they should not do so.
The Coalition Ministry, shaken by the Civil Disobedience Movement, and
profoundly depressed by the Statement of 20th February, decided initially to
see the Budget session through, and to attempt during or after the Session some
party adjustments. That at least was the Premier’s intention, in which his
colleagues concurred. But quite suddenly, and for reasons not fully known to
me, the Premier decided on 2nd March to resign. He did so late in the evening,
and on 3rd March after seeing the Finance and Development Ministers (to
whom the Premier’s decision had been a considerable shock), I sent for Mamdot
and asked him to form a Ministry.17
The non-Muslims believed that a Muslim League Ministry would destroy
them, and there was little hope of a Coalition, without which Mamdot could
not count on a majority in the Assembly. To clinch the matter the Congress
and Panthic Sikhs held a large meeting in Lahore on the evening of 3rd March
at which very violent speeches were made. On the morning of 4th March
rioting broke out in Lahore.18
On the evening of 4th March, the outgoing Ministers refused to carry on in
accordance with the usual convention; and since on 5th March Mamdot showed
no signs of producing a Ministry, a proclamation19 under section 93 of the
Government of India Act, 1935, was made on the evening of that date.
Thus I assumed direct personal charge of the Punjab with the Muslims intent
upon the communal domination of the whole of it, the non-Muslims deter¬
mined not to submit to Muslim domination, fighting in progress in the princi¬
pal cities, and the prospect of “vacant possession” for some person or persons
unknown not later than 30th June 1948. I was without Advisers, because a
sufficient number of senior officials was not available. It was clear that a com¬
munal Ministry — Muslim or non-Muslim — had no hope of survival. It was
equally clear that a new Coalition was out of the question. Between March
1947 and June 1948 officials would inevitably be driven to take sides, and the
services would disintegrate. The prospects were therefore not encouraging.
It has been represented from time to time that Mamdot could have formed
a Ministry during March. In fact Mamdot showed little eagerness to form a
Ministry — the events of the first half of March were too much for him — and it
is my belief that he has not at any time had the support of a majority in the
Assembly.
16 See ibid., No. 310.
19 See ibid., No. 493.
See Vol. IX, No. 135-
18 See ibid., No. 481.
17 See ibid., No. 476.
5 i6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
5. Rioting broke out in Lahore City on 4th March, as I have said above.
The disturbances since that date have fallen into three main phases: —
(i) 4th March to 20th March. Rioting in Lahore, Amritsar, Multan,
Rawalpindi, Jullundur and Sialkot Cities. Rural massacres of non-
Muslims in Rawalpindi, Attock and Jhelum Districts of the Rawalpindi
Division, and in Multan District, casualties very heavy, and much
burning especially in Multan and Amritsar. I was able to report20 on
2 1 st March that order had been restored everywhere.
(ii) 21st March to gth May. Minor incidents in many districts. Serious rioting
and burning in Amritsar nth-i3th April with some repercussions in
Lahore. Trouble at Hodal, a small town in Gurgaon district, followed
by the first outbreak along the Mewat in the same district.
(iii) loth May onwards. The communal “war of succession”. Incendiarism,
stabbing, and bombing in Lahore and Amritsar. Serious incidents re¬
ported from various districts, particularly Gujranwala and Hoshiarpur.
Urban rioting almost unknown, and all activities in cities, including
some organised raids, conducted on “cloak and dagger” basis. Village
raiding begins, especially in Amritsar, Lahore, Ferozepore, Jullundur,
and Hoshiarpur districts. Revival of disturbances in Gurgaon with 140
villages burnt and very heavy casualties.
The first phase presented many of the features of normal communal dis¬
turbances of the past. The urban slaughter was without precedent (in Multan
City about 130 non-Muslims were killed in three hours), and the wholesale
burnings both urban and rural, and the rural massacres were new. But on the
whole, the situation yielded to the usual treatment.
The second phase was used by the communities for preparations. It was
relatively quiet, but there was much practising with bombs, and ill-feeling
never really died down in Lahore and Amritsar.
The third phase showed the real dimensions of the problem. The communi¬
ties settled down to do the maximum amount of damage to one another while
exposing the minimum expanse of surface to the troops and police. Mass ter¬
rorism of this kind offers no easy answer — troops and police can act, and
sometimes act decisively, against riotous mobs. They can do little against
burning, stabbing and bombing by individuals. Nor can all the King’s horses
and all the King’s men prevent — though they may be able to punish — conflict
between communities interlocked in villages over wide areas of country.
AUGUST 1947
517
The casualties in all three phases as reported up to 2nd August are: —
Urban
Killed
Seriously injured
Lahore
382
823
Amritsar
3U
666
Multan
131
133
Rawalpindi
99
230
Other cities
117
171
1044
2023
Rural
Killed
Seriously injured
Rawalpindi
2164
167
Attock
620
30
Jhelum
210
2
Multan
58
50
Gurgaon
284
125
Amritsar
no
70
Hoshiarpur
51
19
Jullundur
47
5i
Other districts
44
36
3588
550
C. Total
Urban and
Rural 4632 2573
The figures are clearly incomplete, especially for Gurgaon, where the dead
and wounded are usually removed by their own party. In my opinion not less
than 5000 (and probably not more than 5200) people have been killed in all, and
not more than 3000 seriously injured.
The figures are not classified by communities ; but in the cities the Muslim and
non-Muslim casualties must now be approximately equal. Almost all the
casualties in the rural areas of Rawalpindi, Attock, Jhelum and Multan are
non-Muslim. In the other districts (at a rough guess) two-thirds of the
casualties may be Muslim.
20
See ibid.. No. 558.
5 18
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
On this basis I would put the communal distribution of casualties approximately
as follows: —
A.
Urban
Muslim
Non-Muslim
Killed
522
522
Seriously injured
1011
1012
1044
2023
B.
Rural
Muslim
Non-Muslim
Killed
357
3231
Seriously injured
201
349
3588
550
C.
Total
Muslim
Non-Muslim
879
3753
1212
1361
4632
2573
Since a large proportion of the unknown Gurgaon casualties are Muslim, of
the 5000 persons probably killed perhaps 1200 are Muslims and 3800 non-
Muslims; while of the 3000 persons believed seriously injured about 1500
belong to each community.
The destruction of property by fire has been very great, though less than is
sometimes represented. Among the cities Lahore, Amritsar and Multan have
suffered most. The Deputy Commissioner of Lahore reports21 that up to 28th
July 1947 of 20,256 houses within the walled city 1120 or 5*5 per cent had
been destroyed ; while outside the walled city of 50,519 houses 225 or *4 percent
had been destroyed. The total destruction in the City of Lahore Corporation
Area thus amounts, in terms of houses, to i*8 per cent. A “house” may, how¬
ever, be anything from a large hotel or office building to a thatched hut, and
outside the walled city the damage (except in one or two areas) is not readily
noticeable. Similar figures are not immediately available for Amritsar and
Multan.
In the Rawalpindi Division and the Gurgaon district there has been much
burning of villages. In many Gurgaon villages, however, the mud walls of the
houses are sound, and only the roofs and rafters have been destroyed.
No accurate estimate has been made of the total damage.
Throughout the disturbances efficient liasion and excellent relations were
maintained with the Army and R.A.F. I could not have wished for better
AUGUST 1947
519
cooperation and support on the part of the General Officer Commanding-in-
Chief, Northern Command, and the Commanders employed under him; and
the troops who were required to perform unpleasant tasks in conditions of great
discomfort, behaved admirably.
Special powers for dealing with the disturbances were taken in the Punjab
Disturbed Areas Act, 1947, the Punjab Disturbed Areas (Special Powers of
Armed Forces) Ordinance, 1947, and the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947.
I turn now to a detailed examination of the criticisms set out in paragraph 2
of this memorandum.
6. (i) that while the British were able to crush without difficulty the disturbances of
1942 , they failed to deal in the same way with the disturbances of 1947.
The disturbances of 1942 were most serious in the United Provinces and
Bihar. They were not crushed without difficulty in these Provinces, and I doubt
if Bihar has been completely normal since they took place. In the Punjab, where
the disturbances of 1942 were conducted by a handful of Congressmen, and
the great mass of the people were not opposed to the War effort, they were of
little importance.
The disturbances of 1942 in the Provinces in which they were serious were
(a) initiated by a single political party, against (b) Governments actually at
war, which (c) had at the time no intention whatever of transferring power
to any other authority.
The disturbances of 1947 were (a) initiated by the communities, against
(b) one another in the presence of (c) a Government which was to transfer
power to an unknown successor or successors not later than June 1948.
The object of the disturbances of 1942 was to facilitate the defeat of the
British in war by the Germans and the Japanese.
The object of the disturbances of 1947 was to secure a more favourable
position for one community or the other on the transfer of power (e.g. in the
Rawalpindi Division the underlying idea was to eliminate the non-Muslim
fifth column; in Lahore the Muslims wanted to scare away the non-Muslim
element in the population, and so on.)
In 1942 attacks were concentrated on Government property and Govern¬
ment servants, in other words on points that were largely known.
In 1947 little attention was paid to Government property and Government
servants — the “two nations” fought one another in the streets, in the markets,
in the fields, and in the villages. When it was found that rioting could be
checked, the fighting took the form of mass terrorism.
The critics are evidently not comparing like with like. There is no resem¬
blance whatever between the two situations. A more relevant comparison
is between 1946 and 1947. Throughout 1946 the Punjab was in grave danger.
21
See No. 228, note 21.
520
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
The measures taken to deal with communal trouble were essentially my own,
though constitutionally taken by the Ministry, and I had at my disposal the
same resources as I had in 1947. It was the knowledge that power was to be
transferred that made the disturbances of 1947 so much more widespread
and persistent than those of 1946.
7. (ii) that British officials have been callous and incompetent , and have taken
the line that since the British are going massacre , arson and looting are of no consequence.
This criticism is easy to make, but difficult to prove or to disprove. In two
cases I was informed that British officials had told persons who asked for help
that they should “consult Nehru or Patel”. On enquiry the allegations in
both cases were found to be false. I attribute the criticism to two main causes —
first that the British as a race do not always talk seriously about things which
they take seriously; and secondly that, to use the current psychological jargon,
the average educated Indian is compelled to rationalize the behaviour of his
countrymen. As an example of the first cause, Nehru was evidently shocked at a
reference by the former Deputy Commissioner of Gurgaon to the “score” of
casualties in communal fighting. The analogy from football may sound callous,
but it is a convenient way of expressing a thought always in the mind of an
experienced District officer, namely, that trouble seldom stops when the
number of combatants are roughly equal until casualties are also roughly equal
The second cause is less definite, but the role of scape-goat or whipping boy
is not unfamiliar to officials in India.
I am satisfied that no British official has been callous. There are not many
British officials left, and those actually concerned with the disturbances have
worked with devotion and humanity. They have been incessantly baited by the
politicians.
Competence is a different matter. Two officers of the Indian Police and one
member of the Indian Civil Service22 broke down and either asked or had to be
relieved. The strain of prolonged civil disturbances differs from that of war,
but is not less severe. I have experienced both. I am satisfied that the British
members both of the Indian Civil Service and of the Police maintained the
high traditions of their respective Services. They have certainly not been
influenced by their approaching departure. In particular the Inspector-
General of Police and the few British officers of his headquarters staff— all of
whom are heavily worked — have taken duty voluntarily in Lahore City night
after night, in the control room, on patrol, and extinguishing fires.
The criticism assumes that we have failed, and that the small remaining body
of British officials is responsible for the failure. In fact, nobody who has not
lived through the last six months in the Punjab can conceive of the dangers
we have escaped. To take a Province of thirty million people noted for their
pugnacity, to whip these people into a communal frenzy, to tell them that the
AUGUST 1947
521
authority which has held the ring for nearly a century is going almost im¬
mediately, to divide their Province into two parts by a boundary driven
through an area homogeneous in everything but religion, and to convert its
two principal cities into frontier towns— these are surely no ordinary operations,
and if the critics thought that they would not be attended by disorder, the
critics were wrong. It is largely owing to the steadiness and impartiality of the
British officials that the Punjab has so far got through as well as it has.
8. (iii) that in the Punjab the worst districts have been those staffed by British
officials — Indian officials have managed to maintain order.
The present disturbances are too large and arise from causes too deep-seated
for the personality of individual officials to affect their course decisively.
In the Rawalpindi Division, the Commissioner and Deputy Inspector-
General of Police were British. The Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent
of Police of Rawalpindi were also British. The Deputy Commissioners of
Attock and Jhelum were both Indian when the trouble began (with a British
and an Indian Superintendent of Police, respectively), but I sent a British
member of the I.C.S. to Attock shortly afterwards. The disturbances were so
serious that it was necessary to employ the whole of 7th Indian Division plus
Rawalpindi Area troops. Peace was restored in under fourteen days, and has
since been maintained.
In the Multan Division the Commissioner and Deputy Inspector-General of
Police were both Indian. The Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of
Police of Multan were both British. No district other than Multan was seriously
affected. The disturbances were suppressed within six hours and there has been
no recurrence.
In the Lahore Division, the Commissioner was Indian and the Deputy
Inspector-General of Police British. The Deputy Commissioner and senior
Police officers in the Lahore and Amritsar Districts were British. The disturb¬
ances in Lahore and Amritsar Cities have never been entirely suppressed.
In the Ambala Division, which includes Gurgaon, the Commissioner when
the disturbances of May-June broke out was British and the Deputy Inspector-
General of Police was Indian. The Deputy Commissioner of Gurgaon was
British, and the Superintendent of Police Anglo-Indian.
The fact is that British officials are (and always have been) posted to the dis¬
tricts most likely to give trouble. Until the early nineteen thirties there were
few Indian members of the I.C.S. or Indian Police considered by the then
standards sufficiently senior to hold charge of districts like Lahore and
Amritsar. There has been one Indian Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, and
the City behaved no better and no worse with him than with his British
predecessors and successors. Under the pre-1937 regime it was thought unfair
22 Presumably a reference to Mr P. Brendon. See Vol. XI, Nos. 141, note 1 and 299.
522
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
when British members of the two Services were available to expose Indians to
the political and communal pressures of places like Lahore and Amritsar, and
the Ministers from 1937 onwards seem to have seen advantage in posting
“neutrals” to such districts. To suggest that the Deputy Commissioners of
Lahore and Amritsar have stimulated or connived at communal trouble is
manifest rubbish. Amritsar with its large and turbulent city is clearly more
likely to give serious trouble than (say) Gurdaspur or Hoshiarpur — I happen to
have been Deputy Commissioner of all these districts — and to argue that
because Amritsar under a British Deputy Commissioner is troublesome while
Hoshiarpur under an Indian is not, the British official is responsible for the
trouble in Amritsar is logically unsound. I might as well argue that because at
the moment Hoshiarpur with a completely Indian staff is giving very serious
trouble, while Gurdaspur, with a British Deputy Commissioner and Superin¬
tendent of Police, is relatively steady, the trouble is due to the Indian staff
in Hoshiarpur. The whole criticism is a further example of the psychological
“rationalization” on which I touched in dealing with criticism (ii). As the
award of the Boundary Commission approaches, and the districts without big
cities become affected, it is clear enough that Indian staffs have exactly the same
problems as British staffs, and handle them in the same way.
9. (iv) that Congress Governments have had no difficulty in suppressing dis¬
turbances — the worst province of all has been the Punjab which is still “under British
rule".
During 1946 and/or 1947 very serious disturbances occurred in: —
Bombay under a Congress Government.
Calcutta and Noakhali under a Muslim League Government.
Bihar under a Congress Government.
The N.W.F.P. under a Congress Government.
The United Provinces under a Congress Government.
The disturbances in Bombay have never been entirely suppressed. In Bihar
and the United Provinces they took the form of a massacre (for no discernible
purpose in view of the political supremacy of the non-Muslims) of the Muslim
minority in very considerable areas. In the N.W.F.P. there was a similar
massacre of non-Muslims. In none of these Congress Provinces was there any
question of a struggle for power, and the surprising thing is not that the
disturbances were suppressed (in fact they were not in Bombay and the
N.W.F.P.) but that they occurred at all.
In Bengal conditions are similar to those in the Punjab — there is a genuine
casus belli which makes all the difference.
It is questionable whether the Punjab has been worse than any other Province.
Bihar almost certainly produced the largest butcher’s bill.
The criticism is clearly based on false premises. As for the Punjab being still
AUGUST 1947
523
‘‘under British rule”, I need only point out that “rule” connotes some degree
of permanence. The troubles are due not to “British rule” (British rule in law
and order matters ceased in 1937 and is not restored save in a very technical
sense by a transient Section 93 administration) but to the fact that what remains
of “British rule” is now ending.
10. (v) that the fire services in the Cities particularly in Lahore and Amritsar were
inefficient and useless.
This is partially true. The regular fire services in all Punjab Cities are bad.
During the war a fine Provincial Fire Service was built up— Lahore had 59
trailer fire pumps with accessories, and 20 towing vehicles, and a Fire Brigade
with a nominal strength of 619, though this strength was never actually reached.
Amritsar had 33 pumps, 10 towing vehicles, and a Fire Brigade with a nominal
strength of 356.
In 1943 when the Provincial Fire Service was disbanded (the threat from the
NorthWest which seemed real at one time having disappeared) it was proposed
to put the City Fire Brigades on a sound footing. For Lahore 16 pumps and a
Brigade strength of 172 were recommended; and for Amritsar 9 pumps and a
Brigade strength of 95.
The then Finance Minister (Sir Manohar Lai) decided that the “peace-time”
plan must be abandoned. He argued that serious fires seldom occur in Indian
Cities, and that if there is a fire there are plenty of people to put it out. The
equipment was accordingly sold and the “war-time” Brigades dispersed.
Similar decisions have been repeatedly made in the U.K. since the days of
Pepys, and there was nothing surprising in the democratic desire for economy.
The result was, however, that when the disturbances began the Lahore
Corporation had only three pumps and a Brigade 33 strong. Amritsar was in
the same condition, with a Brigade strength of 39.
As soon as fires began every possible use was made of pumps and teams
belonging to the Army, the R.I.A.F., the North Western Railway, and the
Police in Lahore, and several new pumps were acquired. In Amritsar similar
use was made of local resources — e.g. the equipment at the Central Workshops
of the Irrigation Department.
Experience in Lahore may be taken as typical. Fires fall into three classes —
(i) unsuccessful attempts, when a lighted cloth or incendiary bomb is
thrown into a house or placed against the external wood-work but
fails to cause a fire ;
(ii) “small fires” which are detected and extinguished before extensive
damage is done to the structure concerned, and
(iii) “large fires” which gut a complete building and may spread.
In spite of the difficulty about pumps and the poverty and inaccessibility of
the water supply (a feature of all old Indian Cities) early efforts at control were
524
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
fairly successful. Incendiarism as an essential part of the Communal war did
not really get started until about 14th May. Between 4th March and 14th May
there were 55 fires — including 3 1 attempts, 19 small, and 5 large. In other words
only 5 out of 55 fires were not controlled.
The Deputy Commissioner of Lahore has collected figures for the three
months 14th April to 14th July — a period which includes one month before the
real incendiarism began and two months of incendiarism. The figures are : —
Nature of Fire
Muslim property
Non-Muslim
Property
Attempts
58
112
“Small”
38
149
Large
20
234
Total incidents
116
495
611
During the three months there were 61 1 incidents (during the worst period
sometimes 20 or 30 incidents a day) of which 357 were controlled and 254
were not controlled. The proportion of fires controlled in Muslim buildings is
much higher than that of fires controlled in Hindu buildings. The Muslims
did not leave Lahore, and were extremely active in protecting their own pro¬
perty. The Hindus abandoned a very large number of buildings, and fires in
Hindu property thus tended to become uncontrollable before they were
detected.
I have given in paragraph 5 of this memorandum such particulars as are
available of the damage done by fires in Lahore.
Generally, given the “war” atmosphere, the skill with which fires were
started by individuals using specially prepared incendiary material, the scanty
co-operation of the public, and the physical strain of fire fighting with inade¬
quate equipment in shade temperatures of anything from 108 to 118, I think
the officials concerned and the Fire Brigades did well. The campaign was
intended to make Lahore too hot to hold the Hindus and Sikhs; it raised pro¬
blems similar to those of the fire Blitzes in London and we were ill prepared to
deal with them. Frankly, I do not see how very large losses could have been
prevented, though we may have failed to control some fires which might have
been controlled.
11. (vi) that the Magistrates and Police have been both incompetent and partial ,
and that the Police have connived at and actually participated in murder , arson and
This criticism does not come well from persons who have themselves shown
gross partiality and encouraged it in others.
AUGUST 1947
525
Magistrates and Policemen are human beings and are subject to human
failing. Some of them are impetuous, lacking in judgment, afraid of respon¬
sibility and so on. When any large body of men is employed on duties
connected with large-scale disturbances, there will be a certain number of
personal failures. Critics of the administration never realise this, and attribute
to Communalism or worse occurrences which merely indicate that a man is
timid or lazy or otherwise not up to his work. There have, naturally, been
cases of neglect of duty and indiscipline ; but not more than might be expected
in the circumstances.
The question remains whether, apart from personal failures, the Magistrates
and Police have shown incompetence or partiality.
As regards their alleged incompetence, it must be remembered that the
Punjab has for the better part of a century been a reasonably peaceful Province,
and that the standing establishment of Magistrates and Police is designed to deal
with normal conditions. The average rural Police Station — dealing perhaps
with 100 villages scattered over 100 square miles of country — has a strength
of not much more than a dozen men. In the Rawalpindi Division extravagant
charges of incompetence were made against unfortunate Police Sub-Inspectors,
who could not deal simultaneously with several calls for help. In the same way,
even with reserves thrown in our Police strength in the Cities was inadequate.
On an average, the number of Policemen employed in the Lahore Corporation
area during the disturbances has been 3 ,000 — equivalent to one for 27 acres and
three to 1,160 of the population. Free use has of course been made of troops,
but troops are not, for certain purposes, a complete substitute for Police. I am
satisfied that there has been no general incompetence on the part of the
Magistrates and Police — no country is normally organised to deal with a com¬
munal war, and the best possible use has been made of the somewhat limited
resources available.
Partiahty is a more difficult matter. There is no doubt at all that it was part
of the Congress plan to attack the Police as a Muslim force, and to compel the
administration to replace the Police with non-Muslim troops; also to harry
Muslim Magistrates. The Muslim League were equally determined to shake
the confidence of non-Muslim Magistrates and Policemen. As the disturbances
wore on and partition became a certainty, the Civil Services, including the
Punjab Civil Service and the Police, began to split communally, and there is no
doubt at all that whatever may have been the case on 4th March, every civil
official is now acutely conscious of his community. I believe that the average
Magistrate and the average Policeman still do their work reasonably well from
force of habit ; and there have been many cases in which a man has been
extremely active against his own community. But the critics themselves have
encouraged communalism for their own political ends, and no normal man
will go out of his way to be unpopular with his new masters. No gross case
526
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
of partiality has been proved; I know of one Magistrate who has probably
abused his position, and others who may be unable to suppress their communal
feelings. In view of the incessant stream of complaints, largely false and all
exaggerated, the surprising thing is not that the Services are breaking up but
that they have lasted so long.
That the Police have participated in murder, arson, and looting is untrue.
Individuals have misbehaved in various ways and have been dealt with when
caught; but as a body the Police have not taken sides.
The shortest possible answer to the critics is “ Vous I’avez voulu\
12. (vii) that Martial Law should have been declared at least in Lahore and
possibly elsewhere .
The critics are under a misconception about Martial Law. The Congress
believed that if the Police (largely Muslim because Hindus and Sikhs were
reluctant to enlist in ordinary times) could be withdrawn, and if non-Muslim
troops could be substituted for them, and if Martial Law could be declared —
then the General administering Martial Law would suppress the Muslims with
“utter ruthlessness” and all would be well.
The General Officer Commanding in Chief, Northern Command, the
Lahore Area Commander, and now the Commander, Punjab Boundary
Force, have all advised against the declaration of Martial Law, and I have
myself been opposed to it.
We are not at present dealing with a situation in which Troops can act
decisively — “Cloak and dagger” activities are extremely difficult to control,
and the best method of controlling them is patient investigation combined with
improved intelligence. There is no short-cut by Civil or by military procedure;
for neither a Civil Governor nor a General adminstering Martial Law can
properly shoot innocent people merely because they happen to be, or to live,
near the scene of an outrage.
The only immediate benefit from Martial Law would be the quicker trial
and punishment of offenders. Our performance in this matter has been most
unsatisfactory — owing to the enormous number of cases, the lack of
trained staff, and the general feeling that all cases will be dropped on 15th
August, investigations and trials have been slow, and there have been practically
no death sentences.
On the other hand we have made so much progress with intelligence that
we could probably within another six months break up every active terrorist
gang. The local critics who ask for Martial Law are already alarmed and would
like us to “lay off”. What they would say if Martial Law were declared and
administered properly, I do not know; but so far they have objected to any
drastic action against their own community.
The short answer to this criticism is that Martial Law would in present
AUGUST 1947
527
conditions be inappropriate, and that this is the view of the Senior Military
Commanders, as well as my own view.
13. If I have succeeded in showing that we have in the Punjab the kind of
situation in which people fight — a situation as real as that in Palestine, which
incidentally is about equal in area to, and considerably smaller in population
than, the Multan and Muzaffargarh Districts ; that the critics themselves are in
part responsible for this situation and have given no help to the authorities;
that talk about the inefficiency of British rule ignores the fact that the object of
the present exercise is to eliminate it; and that on the whole we have done our
best in an intolerably difficult situation ; this memorandum will have served its
purpose. The future is unknown and it would be idle to speculate upon it. But
it is a certainty that our present critics will have it both ways — if things go
badly it will be because the British made them so; if things go well it will
be because of Indian efficiency. It is perhaps worth pointing out that the group¬
ing of forces and the problems to be solved will be entirely different from
15 th August, and that neither improvement nor deterioration after that date
will prove anything whatever.
E. M. JENKINS,
GOVERNOR OF THE PUNJAB
4.8.4723
23 Sir G. Abell minuted on 6 August: ‘I am not quite sure how Y.E. intended to use this memorandum,
but I think a copy should certainly be sent to the Secretary of State for record. I have considered whether
it might be shown in strict confidence to one or two foreign correspondents, but it contains criticisms
of Congress leaders, and I think this would be wrong.’ Lord Mountbatten minuted in reply: ‘Copy to
be made (single spacing not too big a margin) in VPR style for sending as an unattached enclosure to
the last VPR. M.’ R/3/1/89: f 238.
338
Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Sir G. Abell
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Punjab , Security Arrangements for Partition
SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE 9 4 August 1947
My dear George,
l am sending Savage down with some papers which I think HE should see
or know of. The principal character1 mentioned seems to me to be cracked.
The question is whether to put him in the bag now, or chance it. Either way is
bad ; on the whole I would chance it.
1 Presumably a reference to Tara Singh; see No. 345.
Yours,
E. M. JENKINS
528
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
339
Cabinet
India and Burma Committee. LB. (4 7) 44th Meeting, Minutes 3 and 4
L/WS/i 1 1092: ff 183-5
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.lV.i, on 4 August 1947
at 4.00 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir S. Cripps, Mr Alexander, the Earl of
Listowel, Mr A. Henderson
Also present were: Mr j. Freeman, Sir H. Brittain, Sir H. Wilson Smith, Sir G.
Laithwaite, Mr A. Dibdin
Minute 3
Role of British Troops in India
the minister of defence drew attention to the Viceroy’s telegram No.
3039-S of 30th July1 which contained the suggested text of an answer which
he might give in the House of Commons on 6th August about the role of
British troops in India after 15 th August. He said that, owing to a leakage2 in
New Delhi, the terms of this answer had now appeared in the Indian press, and
he therefore suggested that it should be amended to read as follows : —
“After 15th August, the Governments of India and Pakistan will be
responsible for the maintenance of law and order in their respective terri¬
tories. British troops will not be available to intervene in case of internal
disorder and will in fact have no operational responsibility.”
The Committee: —
(1) Approved the terms of the answer to be made by the Minister of
Defence.
(2) Invited the Secretary of State for India to communicate the draft of the
answer to the Vicerov for his comments.3
*
Minute 4 4
Messages for Indian Independence Day5
THE secretary of state for India said that a number of Ministers,
had received requests for messages in connection with Indian Independence Day
on 15th August. He suggested that a more appropriate procedure would be for
the Prime Minister, on behalf of all his colleagues, to send messages to the
Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan.
The Committee: —
(1) Invited the Prime Minister to send messages, on behalf of His
AUGUST 1947
529
Majesty’s Government, to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan
on 15th August.
(2) Invited the Secretary of State for India to prepare the drafts of such
messages and to inform members of the Government of (1) above.
1 No. 283.
2 Lord Mountbatten had reported this leakage in tel. 3131-S of 3 August and suggested that in these
circumstances a further announcement through a Parliamentary Question and Answer was not
necessary. L/WS/1/1092: f 189.
3 Lord Listowel informed Lord Mountbatten of the amended answer in tel. 10088 of 4 August.
L/WS/1/1092: f 188. Upon receipt of this telegram Sir G. Abell minuted that a reply was not necessary.
R/3/1/82: f 125.
4 This item has been taken from L/WS/1/1034: f 206.
5 See No. 317, para. 13.
340
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , .R/j/i/iyp: f) 123-4
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 4 August lg 47, 11. 30 pm
secret Received: 3 August, 2.13 pm
No. 3161-S. Your telegram 9947 dated August 1st.1 Menon has sent Patrick
Instrument of Accession2 as finally accepted by rulers as well as Stand-still
Agreement,3 which States Department have now sent round to States for
signature. He has also sent copy of press communique4 announcing decision of
some of the States (with whom I had informal discussions) to accede to
Dominion. States have been shown adaptations proposed to Government of
India Act, 1935. They have thus seen whole picture. I feel that with possible
exception of Hyderabad, Indore, Bhopal and Dholpur, all States will join
Indian Dominion before August 15th. I am having informal discussions with
these States now.
2. I am afraid you have completely misunderstood purport of my speech
and object which I am trying to achieve. There is no question of applying any
pressure on States nor is it likely that in present conditions States will act under
pressure. What I am trying to do is to make them see advantage of offer which
they have now received. I am under no illusion as to what will happen to
States if they stand out after August 15th. Indore for example will not be able
to stand for 24 hours against its own subjects once paramo untcy is lifted. It is
in the interest of States so situated to make friends with Indian Dominion while
they can get good terms and I am sure it is the policy of HMG to help them
1 No. 307. 2 Enclosure i to No. 313. 3 Enclosure 3 to ibid.
4 Enclosure 2 to ibid.
530
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
to do so. This is why the issue is so very urgent. We must face up to the fact
that gap between ruler and ruled in States is so wide that if something is not
done immediately the whole position will be jeopardised. States therefore
cannot afford to wait till they see the new picture. For good or ill, neither
HMG nor I will have any concern with States after August 15th. I am therefore
doing my best while I have bargaining power in my capacity as Crown Re¬
presentative to see that States get fair offer from Government of India and to
induce them to accept it so that conflict which is inevitable if they do not
accede could be avoided. Many States who formerly decided to stand aloof
before have now seen advantages of present plan and have decided to accede.
3. Though Instrument of Accession as finally accepted by Rulers has not
been published, its contents have been given full publicity in Indian press and
there is general criticism that the document is weighted heavily in favour of
States. If I had not taken a hand in this matter I have no doubt that terms which
States now get would not have been offered. I want to finalise this issue before
August 15th. If I am unable to do this, terms that States will get after that date
will be what Dominion Government are prepared to offer at that time.
4. I am trying my very best to create an integrated India which while
securing stability will ensure friendship with Great Britain. If I am allowed to
play my own hand without interference I have no doubt that I will succeed.
5. With reference to last sentence of para 3 of your telegram I may mention
that Government of India have not raised any objection to maintenance of
trade relations between the U.K. and Indian States. This was one of the con¬
ditions made by Travancore and Mysore. At the same time I must warn HMG
of the serious consequences if they disturb present position and supply arms and
ammunition to maritime States who do not accede.
6. I have indicated my views quite frankly and holding these views I cannot
subscribe to the reply which is suggested in para 5 in case any question is asked
in Parliament. As I have mentioned States have received very generous offer.
If disintegration has [?is] to be avoided we have to act very quickly and should
give every encouragement to States to come in and not to stand out. I shall be
most grateful if before replying to any question on this subject you will give
me an opportunity of commenting on the terms of reply.
AUGUST 1947
531
341
Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
Telegram , 8g
important 4 August ig4y, 1 1.55 pm
confidential Received: 5 August, 11.00 pm
No. 214-G. Your telegram 3162-S of August 4th.1
Strength of troops in Greater Lahore exceeds 1 Brigade with tank carriers See.,
including 1 battalion whose duties are practically confined to the City and
immediate environs.
2. This battalion has 4 standing company bases at Kotwali Fort, University
Hall and Civil Lines Police Station.
3. The four company bases find platoon posts at Waterworks, Mohalla
Sarin, Hira Mandi Khati Gate cinema. Patrols go out continuously from these
posts in detachments as small as sections.
4. Commander, Punjab Boundary Force, with whom I am in close personal
touch, hopes to establish more platoon posts as accommodation is arranged
for new platoons. He emphasizes that dispositions are constantly changing
on civil advice or for military reasons and that present arrangements are a
great strain on men employed.
5. Gopi Chand Bhargava seems to want very small military pickets on
standing duty in streets. I think soldiers know their business and are doing it
very well. I do not recommend interference with discretion of Commander,
Punjab Boundary Force and his subordinate Commanders.2
1 See No. 331, note 2.
2 On 6 August Lord Mountbatten wrote to Pandit Nehru enclosing a copy of this telegram and
remarking : ‘I think you will agree that we should be wise to leave the matter to those responsible on
the spot. There would undoubtedly be danger in scattering the military force too much, and they
appear to be available at very short notice at any point inside Lahore.’ R/3/1/91 : f 92.
532
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
342
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , ff 50-51
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 5 August 1947, 1.15 am
SECRET
No. 3170-S. As I reported in last week’s VPR1 the situation in the NWFP is
very difficult. The League insist on the dismissal of the Ministry. Khan Sahib
refuses to resign.
2. I discussed the matter with the members of the Pakistan Provisional
Cabinet.2 We had before us a legal opinion by Spence3 which I repeat in my
next succeeding telegram.4
3. In the end I was formally advised (1) to direct the Governor to ask the
present Ministry to resign and, if they refused, to dismiss them and call on the
leader of the League party to form a new Ministry, or (2) if (1) were uncon¬
stitutional to place the Province in Section 93 and direct the Governor to
appoint Muslim League leaders as advisers with a view to a League Ministry
being installed by the 14th August.
4. I promised to accept the advice rendered me (i.e., either (1) or (2) in that
order of preference) provided I was satisfied I could constitutionally do so.
5. I realise that in any case, I act, constitutionally speaking, in my discretion
but I must insist on publishing the fact that I have in fact taken advice and am
acting on it.
6. The Congress leaders here insist that to dismiss the Ministry or even to go
into Section 93 would be constitutionally improper and Nehru and Patel have
urgently advised me against dismissing a Congress Ministry in this manner.
Jinnah is equally emphatic that the result of the referendum makes it impossible
to leave the present Ministry in office after August 15th, and that if there must
be a change it is far less improper and less dangerous for me to make it now,
and the sooner the better.
7. After August 15th the Governor-General and the Governors will of
course have no special powers and a Section 93 regime will be impossible.
This legal position can only be changed by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.
8. I think the best thing I can do is to accept the second alternative put to me
by the League (para 3 above) but to make the change over about the 12th
August.
AUGUST 1947
533
9. I repeat the Governor’s latest telegram5 to give you the background and
his own views.
10. I should be grateful if you would (1) let me have expert advice on the
constitutional position and (2) show this correspondence to Cunningham and
ask for his views.
1 No. 302, paras. 19-24. 2 No. 301. 3 Enclosure to No. 294.
4 Not printed.
5 No. 327.
343
Viceroy s Conference Paper V.C.P. 133
Mountbatten Papers
SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI,
5 August 1947
THE POSITION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN WITHIN THE
COMMONWEALTH
Attached is a paper prepared by Mr. Morris Jones on the Viceroy’s instructions.1
It will be taken at a future Viceroy’s Meeting.2
V. F. ERSKINE CRUM
Lieutenant-Colonel
Conference Secretary
Enclosure to No. 343
1. Before 1937, most authorities on the constitution of the Commonwealth
were in agreement as to the importance of the Crown as the “symbol of the
free association of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations”.
With the passing in 1931 of the Statute of Westminster and the consequent
breaking of legislative links and with the diminution or disappearance of
judicial bonds through the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the only
tangible mark of unity was the “common allegiance to the Crown”.
2. Even so far as this position was concerned, several inroads had been made
before 1937. In 1931, the Irish Free State obtained by direct communication
1 See No. 256, Item 7.
2 At his 67th Staff Meeting (Item 4) held on 5 August at 3.30 pm Lord Mountbatten said that two points
not covered in the paper deserved consideration, namely :
(a) the possibility of joint nationality between the British and the Indians, and
(b) the possibility of convening a Commonwealth Conference in New Delhi. It was possible that
Pandit Nehru might be attending the Royal Wedding in November and, if so, this proposal
could be put forward officially then.
Lord Mountbatten directed that a copy of V.C.P. 153 should be sent to Sir Walter Monckton for his
comments. Monckton’s note in reply, dated 19 August 1947, is on Monckton Trustees No. 39: f 123.
534
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
with the King authority to use a new seal under the sole control of the Irish
Free State Government — in place of the Great Seal of the Realm. More import¬
ant was the successful insistence of the Irish Free State before the League of
Nations that inter-Dominion relations are strictly international in character.
Further, the claim of the Union of South Africa and of the Irish Free State to
remain neutral in a war declared by the King on the advice of the British
Government emphasised the extent to which “common allegiance” was being
modified in practice. The right of secession claimed by the Union of South
Africa was another pointer in the same direction.
3. It is not, of course, true to say that there were no bonds at all beyond that
of common allegiance. But it certainly was the case that all other bonds were
even more intangible and, further, that in any case they derived from the fact
of common allegiance. In the words of a leading authority written in 1933,
“the constitutional relations of the Commonwealth appear to be those of a
loose confederation, whose members are mainly bound by ill-defined and elastic
conventional understandings based on a common allegiance.” (Prof. Keith).
4. Even this degree of unity was broken in 1937 by the coming into force of
the new constitution in Ireland. Declaring Ireland to be “a sovereign, indepen¬
dent, democratic State” and eliminating the Governor-General, the constitution
amounted to an act of secession. Yet the statement issued by H.M.G. asserted
that they were “prepared to treat the new Constitution as not effecting a
fundamental alteration in the position of the Irish Free State as a member of the
British Commonwealth of Nations”.
5. Now this statement may be regarded merely as what it undoubtedly was
at the time — viz., a formula which put a brave face on an embarrassing situation.
It may, on the other hand, be taken as the first recognition of the new form of
the Commonwealth. That is to say — to translate the matter into terms of
India — “a looser association within the Commonwealth” may be sought, not
by trying by one means or another to recover the bond of common allegiance
to the Crown, but by recognising that even this is no longer necessary as a
basis.
6. What is suggested in fact is that the position of India is bound to approxi¬
mate to that of Ireland and what is required is a reinterpretation of the posi¬
tion of Ireland with a view to its application to India. In this connection, Mr.
De Valera’s statement of July 1945, is important: — “We are an independent
republic, associated as a matter of our external policy with the States of the
British Commonwealth. To mark this association, we avail ourselves of the
procedure of the External Relations Act of 1938 by which the King recognised
by the States of the British Commonwealth acts for us, under advice, in certain
specified matters in the field of our external relations . Are we or are we
AUGUST 1947
535
not a member of the British Commonwealth? That is a question for which the
material necessary for a conclusive answer is not fully available. It depends on
what the essential element is in the constitution of the British Commonwealth.
The British Commonwealth claims to be an elastic, growing, developing
organism and the statesmen of the Commonwealth have, I think, adopted the
view that ‘in all political systems there are relationships which it is wiser to
leave undefined’ ”. From this it is clear that the President himself is not prepared
to say that Ireland is not a member of the Commonwealth. (Adequate reasons
for this attitude may be found in the gains which Ireland may derive from
association with the Commonwealth; but that only means that care has to be
taken to ensure that these gains are always available.)
7. The issue is therefore no longer one of recapturing the lost basis of associa¬
tion but of devising a sign to mark an association which is based simply on
mutual advantages. (This distinction may appear academic but it is of import¬
ance in approaching this question.) It may be agreed that if possible some more
symbolic mark should be devised than that mentioned by Mr. De Valera —
viz., that “the King .... acts for us, under advice, in certain specified matters in
the field of our external relations.” But if that should prove impossible, it does
not follow that association ends.
8. As to what sign may be devised, the nomination by the King of an elected
head of the State may be the most effective. The position will certainly be
novel and indeed anomalous, but there seems to be no reason why such a step
should not be introduced as merely “mark of association”, provided always
that is is politically practicable. As to the exact title, perhaps “Head of the State”
itself would be a simple way out of the difficulty.
9. If H.M.G.’s statement of 1937 is to be taken as the beginning of the new
period, the bringing into force of the new constitution of India may be made
the occasion for putting the relationships into rather more explicit terms. It
may be that it should be stated that there are now two types of States associated
in the Commonwealth, distinguished not by any difference in the degree of
their autonomy but merely by the formal shape of the link. The new type
may be designated “Commonwealth Republics”, the rest remaining
“Commonwealth Dominions’ ’ .
536
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
344
Meeting of the Partition Council , Case No. P.C. 120/ 15/47
Mounthatten Papers. Partition Council Minutes
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting on 5 August 1947 were: Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mounthatten oj Burma, Mr Jinnah , Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , Sardar Patel, Dr Rajendra
Prasad, Lord Ismay, Mr H. M. Patel, Mr Mohamad Ali, Mr K. V. K. Sundaram,
Mr S. B. R. Cooke, Mr Osman Ali, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum.
Case No. P.C. 120/15/47 Indian Independence (Rights, Property and
Liabilities) Order
mr jinnah said that the only question was whether de jure as opposed to
de facto possession should vest in one or both Dominions. As both Dominions
were common beneficiaries until financial adjustments were effected, the de
jure possession should be with both. This would not, however, make any
difference to the user or management of the property which, pending the
decision of the Partition Council or the award of the Arbitral Tribunal,
would rest with the Dominion in which the property was physically located.
In the course of subsequent discussion, the following points were made:
(1) As a matter of theoretical principle, the joint vesting was probably
appropriate, but as a practical solution it would give rise to certain incon¬
veniences in regard to management and administration of the property
while in joint ownership.
(2) Some kind of vesting instrument would have to be issued eventually
covering all the items of property in one Dominion or the other. There was
considerable doubt as to what form that instrument would take.
DECISION
The Council agreed
(1) that Messrs Cooke and Sundaram be directed to prepare for considera¬
tion at the next meeting a note, showing
(a) precedents,
(b) essential differences if any other than legal distinctions, between the
vesting of the property in one or both the Dominions,
(c) the disadvantages that would flow from the fact of the property vesting
in one Dominion to the other Dominion,
(d) the advantages, if any, that would flow to either or both Dominions from
the fact of the property vesting in both.
AUGUST 1947
537
(2) that the Steering Committee should prepare a note for consideration at
the next meeting setting out the pros and cons
( a ) ot liabilities being assumed in their entirety by the Dominion of India,
and
(b) of their being assumed jointly and severally by the two Dominions.1
1 The minute of the discussion on this subject at the next meeting of the Partition Council reads simply
that: ‘No agreement could be reached on the order.’ Mountbatten Papers, Partition Council Minutes,
6 August 1947, Case No. P.C. 126/16/47.
345
Record oj Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma,
Mr Jinnah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Patel and Captain Savage1
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy's Interview No. 178
TOP SECRET 5 August 1947, 12. 45 pm
Captain Savage,2 who was a Police Officer employed in the Punjab C.I.D.
Control, said that he had been sent down by the Governor of the Punjab to
make a personal report to the Viceroy.3 He explained that the C.I.D. Control
co-ordinated investigation of disturbances cases, special interrogation, and
intelligence from all sources.
Captain Savage related that one of the first instigators of disturbances to be
arrested had been one Pritam Singh, an ex-member of the I.N.A. He had been
roped in on 4th June, in possession of a wireless transmitter. This man was well
known to the Punjab C.I.D. as he had been interrogated after arrest on his
return to India some years previously from Chopra’s Penang spy school. He
had been one of the party to be landed in Southern India by submarine.
Pritam Singh had made a long statement which involved Master Tara Singh
in the production of bombs, and a Sikh plan to attack certain headworks.
Captain Savage said that the next incident at which men had been arrested
was an explosion in the Crown Talkies in Lahore. The main arrest in this
incident was of Kuldip Singh, who had joined the R.S.S.S. in February 1947.
He was a bomb maker and incendiarist and had done a lot of successful work.
He was probably involved in six bomb-throwing cases and had specialised in
train wrecking. He had been arrested on 30th July.
The next man to be arrested as a result of the statement made by Kuldip
Singh and his friends of the Crown Talkies and Ly allpur derailing case was
1 Sir G. Abell and Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum, who dictated the record, were also present at this
interview.
2 Gerald R. Savage was a Police Officer and held no military rank.
3 See No. 338.
538
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Goupal Rai Khosla, a clerk in the Secretariat at Lahore. This man had made a
statement which involved Master Tara Singh very deeply. He had seen Tara
Singh towards the end of July and had asked for 700 Rs outstanding for the
purchase of rifles and for grenades already promised by Tara Singh. He had left
one Ram Lai behind with Tara Singh who had got on very intimate terms with
him. Ram Lai gave Goupal a note to take to Tara Singh. This contained in¬
formation concerning trains and was somewhat cryptic. He had asked Tara
Singh when he saw him what it was all about, and the reply had been
that it referred to the Pakistan special trains carrying staff between Delhi and
Karachi. Arrangements had been made to keep Tara Singh informed by wire¬
less of the schedules of the trains.
Captain Savage went on to say that Master Tara Singh had stated that four
or five young Sikhs were planning to blow up the Pakistan Special with
remote control firing apparatus and after wrecking the Special, set it on fire,
and shoot the occupants. Tara Singh had also said that Mr Jinnah should be
killed during the ceremonies at Karachi on 15 th August.
Captain Savage said that independent and highly reliable sources confirmed
Tara Singh’s frame of mind as being completely one-track on the subject of
revenge on Muslims. Tara Singh was collecting arms through Sikh Army
officers and dumping them in States. The Raja of Faridkot had actually given
help with transport and other moral and possibly material aid also. Tara Singh
was reported to believe that the India and Pakistan Governments were sure to
crash immediately.
Sir George Abell gave his opinion that Master Tara Singh should most
certainly be arrested.
Captain Savage said that such a step would certainly create trouble in the
Central Punjab.
Sardar Patel said that he placed no reliance on statements made by arrested
people, particularly ex-members of the I.N.A.
Captain Savage said that so far as one could be certain in these particular
cases, those interrogated had been telling the truth. However, it was very
difficult to produce concrete evidence against Tara Singh; but he could be
detained under Section 3 of the Punjab Safety Act.
Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan stated that he had given directions for all the Pakistan
special trains to take every possible precaution. A report had come through
that a crowd had been collecting at one station and that there was danger of
attack on a particular train. He had insisted that the train should go all the same
but had strengthened its military escort and arranged for the Inspector General
of Police to be informed. In his opinion, the Sikhs were likely to rise in any
case on the announcement of the Boundary Commission’s award.
Captain Savage gave his opinion that the Sikh Leaders had lost control of
AUGUST 1947
539
their people. However, Giani Kartar Singh was more hopeful that they would
get through without major trouble.
The Viceroy, after further considering the matter, decided to recommend
to the Governor of the Punjab that Master Tara Singh and the other ringleaders
of this movement should be arrested at about the time of the Boundary Com¬
mission’s award. He asked Sir George Abell to draft a letter accordingly to Sir
Evan Jenkins.
346
Sir G. Abell to Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab )
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence
Piles : Punjab , Situation in , Part II (b)
secret 4 August 1947
NO 592/98
My dear [Jenkins],
Thank you for the personal letter1 you sent with Savage.
I heard Savage’s story at breakfast and then passed it on to H.E. He was
having a Partition Council this morning and decided at the end to keep back
Jinnah, Liaquat and Patel and get Savage to tell them the story.2
Savage told the story very well and it made a considerable impression. After
some discussion it was agreed that it would be necessary to arrest Tara Singh
and the more hot headed of the Sikhs. The only question was when this should
be done. H.E. suggested that probably it would be best to do it at the same time
as the announcement of the Boundary Commission’s award. He pointed out
that if it was done beforehand the trouble would probably spread and the
announcement of an unfavourable award would make conditions even worse
on 15 August than they will be if these men are arrested on 12th.
It was agreed that there would have to be a common policy in the matter and
H.E. said he would ask you to discuss the matter with Sir Chandulal Trivedi
and in due course with the Premier of East Punjab and the Premier (as soon as
he is chosen) of the West Punjab.
It was recognised that you might wish for a little more time to consider the
matter and possibly after your discussions to make other recommendations,
but it was definitely the view of the meeting that
(a) the arrests should be made, and
(b) that they should not be made for a week or so.
Yours sincerely,
G. E. B. ABELL
No. 338.
1
2 See No. 345.
540
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
347
Cabinet Paper C.P. (47) 213
R/jo/i \i2: f 26
TOP SECRET
Indian Sterling Balances
MEMORANDUM BY THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER
TREASURY CHAMBERS, S . W . I , 3 August I947
The Indian sterling balances amount to -£1,160 millions.
2. As an essential part of the settlement now being negotiated, these balances
will be blocked by agreement, though India, unlike Egypt, will probably
remain a member of the sterling area.
3. The Indians have asked for releases of £48.5 millions from the blocked
account for the remainder of 1947. On my instructions this request has been
rejected, and a figure of £35 millions has been oflered as the maximum which
we can release. The Indians have recommended their Government to accept
this.
4. Fortunately, only about £15 millions of this sum will be spent in dollars,
and nearly all of it on food ; the rest will be used to meet sterling expenditure
on India’s purchases of e.g. Australian wheat, and exports from this country.
5. No commitment for further releases after the end of 1947 has been, or will
be, made in the present negotiations, nor are we committed to recognise the
total, without further cancellation or adjustment.
6. £30 millions of the blocked account will be available to the Reserve
Bank of India, as necessary, as a working balance. But this sum will not be a
“release” to meet current expenditure and it will be the Bank’s liability to keep
it replenished as part of its reserves mainly to cover the note issue.
7. The rate of interest on the balances will not be allowed to increase. More
than three-quarters of them earn only one-half per cent. The rest are in long¬
term British Government Securities.
8. I do not regard the proposed interim settlement as too generous, either in
relation to the total of the balances, or in the very exceptional political
circumstances of India to-day.
II. D.
AUGUST 1947
541
348
Mr Bcvin to Sir G. Squire (Kabul)
LjP &SI12I1812: f 2og
CONFIDENTIAL FOREIGN OFFICE, $ August IQ 47
NO. II
CONVERSATION WITH THE AFGHAN PRIME MINISTER
Sir,
I had a conversation on 31st July with the Afghan Prime Minister, who has
been received during his short stay in London as the guest of His Majesty’s
Government.
2. His Royal Highness appeared pleased with the hospitality shown to him
here. He again raised, however, the vexed question of Afghanistan’s interest in
the North West Frontier Province. He reiterated the familiar arguments about
the Afghan character of the inhabitants of the province, who should, he thought
have been offered the choice during the recent referendum of joining
Afghanistan or ot forming a separate Pakistan [PPathanistan] instead of merely
being called upon to decide on what was in effect a religious issue, namely,
whether they wished to be associated with Moslems or Hindus. Naturally,
being Moslems, they had chosen Pakistan. He also mentioned the dissatisfaction
of the Afghan Government with the reply they had received to their recent
note1 on this subject (my despatch No. 9 of 19th June2 and my telegram No.
56 of 1st July),3 more particularly in regard to the assertion that the North
West Frontier Province was an integral part of India.
3 . It was notable, however, that His Royal Highness did not press the specific
Afghan claims mentioned in the preceding paragraph and put forward by them
in their note of 13 th June.4 On the contrary he made it clear that the primary
anxiety of the Government of Afghanistan was that their kinsmen in the
province should continue to be well treated and be given every opportunity of
preserving their cultural integrity after the transfer of power in India. In reply
to a reference to the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 His Royal Highness
indicated that, since this treaty was concluded with His Majesty’s Government,
the Afghan Government could no longer regard it as valid after the transfer of
power by His Majesty’s Government in India. They would, however, regard
as equally valid, and be prepared to abide by, any treaty subsequently nego¬
tiated, e.g. with Pakistan.
4. I pointed out to the Prime Minister the great importance for Afghanistan,
1 See Vol. XI, No. 272. 2 Not traced. 3 Vol. XI, No. 453.
4 See Vol. XI, No. 272.
542
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
as well as for India, of avoiding any disturbances on the frontier at this crucial
time and any possible interference with her vital trade routes through India.
Although His Majesty’s Government were handing over power in India they
had hitherto been successful in avoiding widespread bloodshed and they were
very much concerned to see that this transfer of authority was carried out
smoothly. With their close friendship with Afghanistan, and the influence they
would continue to exercise in India, His Majesty’s Government would be
equally concerned to ensure that peace and friendship should in future prevail
on the frontier, and between Afghanistan and the successor Governments in
India. Our good offices would indeed always be available to Afghanistan should
trouble arise and we would do all in our power to ensure that the cultural
heritage and general welfare of those whom Afghanistan regarded as her
kinsmen across the border was maintained. As regards the words in our note
to which the Afghan Government had taken exception about the North West
Frontier Province being an integral part of India I would be prepared to
examine once again the expression we had used.
5. At the conclusion of our talk, which was most cordial throughout, I
referred to the contretemps which had prevented His Royal Highness from meet¬
ing the Viceroy on his way to this country and expressed the hope that he would
be able to see Lord Mountbatten on his return, since I felt sure that this meeting
would be of the greatest value.
6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Viceroy of India and the
United Kingdom High Commissioner at New Delhi.
I am, &c.
ERNEST BEVIN
349
Government of India , External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
Department to H.M. Minister at Kabul
Telegram, LfP &S/ 12/ 181 2: f 234
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, j August 1Q47, 7.30 pm
Received in India Office : 3 August , 6.43 pm
No. 183. Your telegram No. 60 of July nth.1 Tribal Agreements.
Please refer the Afghan Government to paragraph No. 3 and paragraph No. 4
of Mrjinnah’s press statement of July 31st2 text of which is as follows. “ Begins :
As regards the tribal areas, I am very happy to acknowledge the great support
they have freely given to their fellow Moslems in their demand for an inde¬
pendent State. I wish to assure them on behalf of the Provisional Government
AUGUST 1947
543
of Pakistan that we would like to continue after August 15th all treaties,
agreements and allowances until such time as representatives of tribes and of
Pakistan Government have met and negotiated new arrangements. The
Government of Pakistan have no desire whatsoever to interfere in any way
with the traditional independence of the tribal areas. On the contrary we feel
that as a Moslem State we can always count on active support and sympathy
of tribes.
We have every intention and desire to have most friendly relations with the
Government of Afghanistan, our immediate neighbour and other Moslem
countries, where before long we hope to have our own diplomatic and com¬
mercial representatives. Ends”
Repeated to Secretary of State for India (copy by post to Government
of the North West Frontier Province, Peshawar)
1 Enquiring whether, ‘in order to allay Afghan anxieties’, it would be possible ‘to assure them that the
existing tribal agreements, e.g., that ot 1 8 8 1 for Khyber Pass, would remain valid after 15th August
until either denounced or revised’. L/P &S/12/1712: f 305.
2 ct. No. 336. The date of the statement should be 30 July.
350
Government of India , External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
Department to H.M. Minister at Kabul
Telegram, L/P &S/ 12/ 1812: f 233
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 3 August 1 947, 8. 03 pm
Received in India Office: 3 August , 6.10 pm
No. 182. Your telegram No. 60 of July nth.1 Tribal agreements.
2. Legal view held here is that effect of section one (c) of clause 7 of Indian
Independence Bill will be to terminate with effect from August 15th 1947 all
treaties and engagements with Tribes except those relating to Customs,
transit and communications, posts and telegraphs and other like matters.
Agreements relating to Passes such as Khyber agreement of 1881 apparently fall
under transit and communications and will not be affected until specifically
denounced. Subject to H.M. Government comments the Government of
India see no objection to your informing the Afghans informally in this sense.
The views of Government of Pakistan are repeated in my immediately fol¬
lowing telegram.2
1 See No. 349, note 1.
2 In tel. 188 of 8 August (repeated to Secretary of State for India as No. 6477) the Government of India,
External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Department, informed Sir G. Squire that: ‘Govern¬
ment of Pakistan would be grateful if you would not repeat nor inform the Afghans even informally
in sense mentioned.’ L/P &S/12/18 12 : f 229.
544
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
3. Delay in answering your telegram is deeply regretted.
Repeated to Secretary of State for India No. 6325 (copy by post to
N.W.F.P. Peshawar)
351
Mr Jinnah to Lord Istnay
R/j/i /i66: f 57
IO AURANGZEB ROAD, NEW DELHI, 5 August I947
Dear Lord Ismay,
1 have received your two letters of 4th1 and 5 th2 August and the Draft Com¬
munique you sent and I propose the following amendments :
Clause 1: after the words “sovereign State” add “as per treaties between
the British Government and Kalat State”.
Clause 2: after “treaties” add “and agreements of leases”
Clause 3: at the end add the words “at Karachi”.
Clause 3: after the words “discussion will take place between Pakistan
and Kalat” add “at Karachi”.
1 am now sending you a fair draft in the light of these alterations.
With regard to Kalat’s proposed amendment to clause 2 that “agreements
of leases”3 should be substituted for “treaties”, I suggest that after “treaties” be
inserted the following words: “and agreements of leases”.
I am enclosing the fair copy4 for you so that you can conveniently see what
my amendments are.
Yours sincerely,
M. A. JINNAH
1 Sending Mr Jinnah a copy of the Appendix to No. 330 for his approval or comments. R/3/1/166: f 51
2 No. 330, note 7.
3 The Khan of Kalat’s amendment read ‘agreements for leases’ ; see ibid.
4 Not printed.
AUGUST 1947
545
352
Meeting of the Provisional Joint Defence Council ,
Case Nos.J.D.C. 44/7147 > 47/7/47
Mountbatten Papers. Provisional Joint Defence Council Minutes
SECRET
7 'hose present at this Meeting on 6 August 1947 were: Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mountbatten of Burma , Mr Jinnah , Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , Sardar Patel , Dr
Rajendra Prasad , Sardar Baldev Singh , Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck , Lord
Ismay , Mr 77. M. Pdte/, Mr Mohamad Ali , Brigadier Elliott , Mr Osman Ali ,
Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
Case No. J. D.C. 44/7/47 Terms of service for British officers and men volun¬
teering to serve on after the 15th August, 1947.1
the commander-in-chief mentioned that returns to date showed that the
proportion of those volunteering to serve and those who had decided to go was
roughly 60 140.
The Provisional Joint Defence Council approved the recommendation of
the A.F.R.C. for the variation in terms of service for officers and men of RN,
British Army and BA.F.
Case No. J. D.C. 47/7/47 Statement by the Chief of Staff to His Excellency
the Viceroy
“When I was in England, I had two long meetings2 with the Minister for
Defence, Mr. Alexander, and the British Chiefs of Staff; and His Excellency the
Viceroy has asked me to give the Joint Defence Council a brief account of
them.
2. The Chiefs of Staff were anxious that as soon as possible there should be
discussions with the Indian and Pakistan Governments on what may be called
long-term defence arrangements. The object of such discussions would be
two-fold ; first to ensure that the necessary assistance could at once be given to
India and Pakistan by the United Kingdom and other members of the
Commonwealth, in the event of either of the new Dominions being victims
of aggression, and secondly to give to both India and Pakistan, as full and free
members of the British Commonwealth, the opportunity to offer assistance to
any other member or members of the Commonwealth, if they themselves
should so desire.
1 The meeting had under consideration a note, dated 5 August, by the Steering Committee 011
‘Recommendations of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee’ which outlined the variation in
terms of service for British officers and men volunteering to serve on after 15 August 1947.
Mountbatten Papers, Provisional Joint Defence Council Papers.
2 See Nos. 41, 49 and 143.
546
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
3. The British Chiefs of Staff made the following points: —
(i) The sub-continent of India has a dominating geographical position from
the point of view of defence. India’s security affects all the countries in
S.E. Asia, and all the countries which are dependent on sea communi¬
cations through the Indian Ocean.
(ii) The security of both India and Pakistan has been prejudiced for the
moment — firstly by the withdrawal of British forces ; secondly by the
fact that the Indian Army has been partitioned, and that the two new
armies will not, for some time, be so strong as was the unified Army of
India, and thirdly that neither India nor Pakistan have yet had time to
develop Naval and Air defences adequate for their own protection.
(iii) Of recent years mass destruction weapons such as the heavy bomber and
the atomic bomb have greatly increased the vulnerability of India and
Pakistan, with their dense population and concentrated industries.
(iv) In modern war things move so fast that, unless plans are made in advance
they cannot be brought to fruition in time. We have only to remember
the scythe-like movement of the Germans through France in 1940 when
their Armoured Divisions accomplished in one month what they had
failed to accomplish in 4 years in the first World War. Since then the
pace of war has increased out of all recognition .
(v) It is the desire of the United Kingdom, and undoubtedly of the other
members of the Commonwealth, to be in a position to come to the
rescue of India and Pakistan if they are the victims of foreign aggression.
(vi) The long experience of the United Kingdom in defence organisation and
training, and their resources in scientific research and industrial pro¬
duction, will be available to the two new Dominions.
4. Throughout the discussions, the Chiefs of Staff stressed the point that the
the mutual arrangements which they contemplated would not in any sense
represent a commitment either to India or to Pakistan, or necessarily to H.M.G.
They would not, for example, be comparable to the treaty which Great Britain
had with France before the last war under which each nation bound itself to
come to the other’s assistance. When the last war broke out, all the Dominions
were free as air to decide whether they would or would not enter the war, and
it was not until their Parliaments had so decided that we in Great Britain knew
where we stood. On the other hand, plans had been prepared which enabled
concerted action between all the partners in the Commonwealth to be taken
at once.
5. I pointed out to the Chiefs of Staff that neither India nor Pakistan were as
yet in a position to discuss these questions. Their defence machinery had not
yet been fully set up, and they were frantically busy on other matters. The
AUGUST 1947
547
Chiefs of Staff appreciated this and said that they would be prepared to send
a high-ranking military delegation to India to discuss these arrangements when¬
ever India and Pakistan were ready to do so. It will be remembered that the
provisional Joint Defence Council have agreed to the Viceroy’s suggestion
that the proposed delegation should, in the first instance, have discussions with
the Joint Defence Council.3
6. The Chiefs of Staff asked me to make one further point. It is little use
having discussions which lead to mutual defence arrangements, unless these
arrangements are kept under constant review in the light of the ever-changing
world situation. Consequently, we have, with the rest of the partners of the
Commonwealth, a system of liaison staffs. For example, the British have a
liaison staff under their High Commissioner at Ottawa; while the Canadians
have a liaison staff under their High Commissioner in London. These liaison
staffs are in constant touch with the Chiefs of Staff of the countries to which
they are accredited. The British Chiefs of Staff hope that when their delegation
comes to India, the Governments of India and Pakistan will be ready to have
liaison arrangements.”
The leaders on both sides took note of Lord Ismay’s statement, agreed in
principle to initiating discussions, and agreed that the delegation should visit
India as soon as the present pressure of business and slackened.4
3 cf. the final paragraph of No. 336.
4 In his letter of 1 1 August to Sir T. Shone, Lord Ismay referred to his statement to the Joint Defence
Council and commented: ‘I ought to add that I do not see any possibility of any connection whatsoever
between the Joint Defence Council as such and the Chiefs of Staff at home.’ Mountbatten Papers,
Official Correspondence Files: Governors-General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of —
Part (3).
353
Meeting of the Partition Council , Case Nos . P.C. 142/ 16/47,
146I16I47
Mountbatten Papers. Partition Council Minutes
SECRET
Those present at this meeting on 6 August 1947 were: Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mountbatten of Burma , Mr Jinnah , Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , Sardar Patel , Dr
Rajendra Prased , Lord Ismay , Mr H. M. Patel, Mr Mohamad Ali, Mr Osman Ali ,
Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum.
Case No. P. C. 142/16/47 The juridical position regarding international per¬
sonality and treaty obligations.
548
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
pus excellency said that he had just received a telegram1 from the Secretary
of State pointing out that it was essential for Pakistan to apply for membership
of U.N.O. before the ioth August, so that her application could be considered
at the next session in September. His Excellency offered to forward the applica¬
tion which would, of course, have to be ratified by the Dominion of Pakistan
after the 15th August. His Excellency’s offer was accepted by the Pakistan
members.
his excellency said the H.M.G. were not anxious to interfere in what
they considered to be a domestic matter between India and Pakistan, but they
had felt it necessary to point out that there was a grave objection to India’s
national identity being extinguished by reason of the partition. To do so would
be to create an awkward international precedent. The fear was that a country
might borrow money much in excess of her needs, then go through a formal
partition and claim that neither part of the divided country was responsible for
the debts incurred prior to that partition. H.M.G. welcomed India’s offer to
take over the international obligations and liabilities of the country as they
existed on the 15th August and expressed the view that this would not affect
Pakistan’s international stature etc.
mr mohamad ali said that according to the formula he had suggested2
India would continue her membership of International Organisations like
U.N.O. on behalf of the Dominion of India as from the 15th August, while
Pakistan would apply for membership of such International Organisations as
she desired to join. As regards obligations and rights in respect of treaties which
run with the land, it was agreed that these would devolve only on the
Dominion concerned. Pakistan’s viewpoint was, however, that both Dominions
should assume all international obligations and enjoy all rights arising out of
treaties and agreements negotiated by the existing Government of India or by
H.M.G. acting on behalf of the Dominions overseas. The practical advantage
of this course would be that Pakistan would not have to negotiate afresh
in regard to such matters.
his excellency suggested that Mr. Cooke, the Constitutional Adviser,
should be asked to evolve, if possible, a formula which would meet the case of
both sides. He would place this formula before the Pakistan and India Cabinets
for consideration when they met, to consider the Adaptation Orders.
DECISION
The Council agreed that the Constitutional Adviser should be requested to
evolve, if possible, a formula which would meet the case of both sides. Such a
formula, if evolved, would be placed before the Pakistan and India Cabinets for
their approval.
Case No. P.C. 146/16/47 Titles3
his excellency recalled that both Mr Jinnah, on behalf of the future
AUGUST 1947
549
Government of Pakistan, and Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel, on behalf of the
future Government of India, had agreed to the suggestion that, in States which
acceded to one or other Dominion, the Princes, and those whom they re¬
commended, might continue to receive decorations from His Majesty, his
excellency proposed that the Order of the Indian Empire should no longer
be used for this purpose, but that the Order of the Star of India (to which,
both in name and design, there were no political objections), should continue
to be awarded. His Excellency also proposed that Princes should continue to
be allowed to hold honorary ranks and to become Honarary Aides de Camp
to the King. He explained that these proposals would not involve any undue
increase in the number to whom honours would be given. It would normally
be on the death of a present holder or on the expiry of his time as an Honorary
A.D.C. that a new award would be made. Both Mr Jinnah, on behalf of the
future Government of Pakistan, and Sardar Patel, on behalf of the future
Government of India, agreed with His Excellency’s suggestions set out above,
which he undertook to convey to His Majesty.
1 No. 328. 2 Not traced.
3 cf. No. 228, para. 23.
354
Sardar Patel to Vice-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten
of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy s Conference Papers 1
NEW DELHI, 6 August 1947
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I write this because I feel that at to-day’s meeting of the Partition Council2
it was not fully appreciated what the consequences of the failure to agree to
issue the Properties, Rights and Liabilities Order would be.
In so far as lands and buildings and other property are concerned, it would be
open to India to issue an Order on the 15th making it clear that all property
within its territories would be their absolute property. Pakistan would pre¬
sumably do the same in respect of property situated in its territories. This
would of course have the effect of abrogating all the various agreements that
have been reached for the division of assets between the two Dominions, and
since the agreements cover almost the entire field, such abrogation would
obviously be most unfortunate.
In regard, however, to the vesting of the responsibility for the Pubhc Debt,
1 The text of this letter was circulated on 7 August as V.C.P. 157 for consideration at the next Viceroy’s
Staff Meeting.
2 See No. 344, note 1.
550
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
the consequences would not merely be unfortunate but extremely grave and
would put in jeopardy the possibility of a peaceful implementation of Parti¬
tion. India would again be compelled to issue an Order on the 15 th assuming
full responsibility for payment of interest and principal on the outstanding
Public Debt. It would do so, however, without having any assurance from
Pakistan that it would assume responsibility for its share of the Public Debt.
Pakistan, on the other hand, may decide to say that it is prepared to accept
joint responsibility for the present Government of India’s Public Debt, or it
may decide to repudiate liability for the Public Debt altogether, or it may
decide just to keep quiet. If it takes the first step, nothing very much would
happen except perhaps a little confusion. In the case, however, ot a forthright
repudiation, India would be constrained immediately to take counter¬
action. That would take the shape of refusal to refer any matter to Arbitration
Tribunal or to part with any assets (including any share in the cash balances)
until Pakistan agreed to accept a proportionate share of the liability. If Pakistan
chooses to keep silent, again India would be compelled to ask for a definite
statement from Pakistan regarding its attitude towards the Public Debt and if a
satisfactory reply was not forthcoming, the position would be much the same
as if there had been a repudiation .
These developments would be unfortunate, the more so as I feel convinced
that Mr. Jinnah has not fully appreciated (a) the consequences of not reaching
an agreement, and (b) the fact that Pakistan’s interests were fully safeguarded
under the proposed Order. Were I not convinced of the fact that no harm
whatever would come to Pakistan under these proposals, I would not have
been so firm in my attitude towards this Order. I may add that I have just
consulted again the Governor of the Reserve Bank on the question of assump¬
tion of joint financial liability and his reaction is decidedly against such a
course on purely financial grounds.
Until the 15th August, it is, I suggest, your duty to take whatever steps are
necessary in the interests of the country as a whole, irrespective of what one
party or the other may think. If either party is dissatisfied with the Order you
issue, it will of course be open to either party to override it in so far as its own
territory is concerned. May I suggest that this is a matter of sufficient impor¬
tance for you to come to an independent decision with whatever advice you
can obtain from your own advisers and to issue an Order immediately. This is
an avoidable conflict and in my view the issue of the Order in the terms pro¬
posed would safeguard the interests of both the Dominions.
Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL
AUGUST 1947
551
355
Note by Mr Cooke
Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy s Conference Papers 1
6 August 1947
The Partition Council having failed to come to an agreement this morning2
in regard to the division of certain material assets between the two Dominions,
and in regard to responsibility for the public debt, it becomes urgently neces¬
sary for H.E. to consider what action he should take.
2. In this connection it is important to remember at the outset that until the
15th August H.E. is not in the position of the constitutional Governor-General
of a Dominion. His powers to make orders under section 9 of the Indian Inde¬
dependence Act include power to make such an order notwithstanding that he
has been unable to carry the representatives of one or the other Dominion with
him in the Council. Indeed, circumstances may arise in which H.E. may con¬
sider it his positive duty to make an order under section 9, even though the
agreement of one party or the other has not been obtained.
3 . Three courses, therefore, are open : —
(1) H.E. may decide to make no order on these subjects before the 15th
August.
(2) H.E. may decide to make an order before the 15th August in the terms
contended for by the representatives of the Indian Dominion. That is,
the order would provide for the vesting of material assets according to
location, and for the allocation of responsibility for the whole of the
public debt to the Dominion of India.
(3) H.E. may decide to make an order before the 15 th August in the terms
contended for by the representatives of Pakistan. That is, the order would
provide for the joint vesting in the two Dominions of material assets, and
for making the present public debt of India a joint responsibility of the
two Dominions.
4. As to ( 1 ) —
So far as the vesting of material assets is concerned, the proposed order was
to relate only to the residue of the material assets after effect had been given to
the specific decisions of the Partition Council in regard to assets of particular
classes. It might therefore seem that the consequences of failing to make an
order before August the 15th in regard to this residue of assets would not be
1 The text of this note was circulated on 7 August as V.C.P. 158 for consideration at the next Viceroy’s
Staff Meeting.
2 See No. 344, note 1.
552
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
serious. But if no order is made before August 15th, each Dominion will almost
certainly be compelled to pass a law of its own dealing with the property in
so much of the assets concerned as is within the control of that Dominion. The
danger is that once the Dominions begin to make their own laws in regard
to the vesting of assets, they may be tempted to upset the decisions of the Parti¬
tion Council in regard to the vesting of assets of particular classes.
In regard to the vesting of responsibility for the public debt, it is obvious to
any lawyer, even though he is not a financial expert, that if no order is made
before the 15th August the consequences are certain to be serious and may be
disastrous. If the public at large does not know on and indeed before the 15th
August where responsibility for the public debt of India is to he, there is the
gravest danger that the value of Indian securities will fall catastrophically.
Therefore the Ministers representing the interests of the future Dominion of
India would probably feel compelled, for their own protection, to announce
on or before the 15th August that India intends to take over full liability for the
existing public debt. If Pakistan were unwilling to accept this position, it
would have two courses open to it: —
(a) The first possible course would be to issue a counter-statement to the
effect that Pakistan is proposing to accept joint liability with the
Dominion of India for the present public debt. It is doubtful whether
any such statement on the part of the Pakistan Government would have
any effect except to make that Government look somewhat ridiculous.
In practice, the creditor would almost certainly look to the Dominion
of India for payment, and the position arrived at would in effect be that
which was proposed to be embodied in the draft order.
(b) The second possible course would be for the Pakistan Government to
say that the announcement made by the Indian Dominion was made
without the agreement of Pakistan; that Pakistan had always been will¬
ing to bear its fair share of the public debt provided that the liability
was joint; but that in view of the unilateral action of the Dominion of
India, Pakistan must regard itself as discharged from all liability in
regard to the Indian public debt, and in particular, must regard itself
as free from any liability to make any financial contribution to the
Dominion of India in respect of the debt. This would clearly be the
signal for a general repudiation by each Dominion of all the agree¬
ments which have been so laboriously secured during the past two
months under the auspices of the Partition Council.
5. As to ( 2 )
The course suggested by the representatives of India provides what in my
view is the only satisfactory interim solution of the problem. The advantages
of this course are set out in my note which was before the Partition Council
AUGUST 1947
553
at today’s meeting. ( A copy of the note is appended hereto).3 If, without the
consent of Pakistan, H.E. makes an order in these terms before the 15 th August,
it is necessary to consider what the reactions of Pakistan would be. For the
reason I have given in paragraph 2, 1 do not think that Pakistan could challenge
the right of H.E. to make orders before the 15 th August in terms not approved
by both sides of the Partition Council. But without challenging the right of
H.E. to make the order, Pakistan might seek to show their displeasure in other
ways. For instance, they might repudiate some if not all of the agreements
which have been reached in the Partition Council. While I cannot advise that
there would be no risk of Pakistan taking this course, I think it is unlikely,
because the position appears to be that Pakistan has far more to lose than to
gain by the repudiation of these agreements.
6. As to (3)
The relative advantages and disadvantages of the course suggested by the
representatives of Pakistan are again set out in the attached note.
So far as vesting of material assets is concerned, the disadvantages of the
course proposed by Pakistan are serious, but not, in my opinion, fatal. But, if
H.E. should seriously consider accepting this course, there is one further con¬
sideration to be borne in mind. After the 15th August, each Dominion will
be free to make what laws it pleases in regard to property within its physical
control. If the alternative of joint vesting is unacceptable to the Dominion of
India, it will be possible for that Dominion to pass a law on the 15th August
providing that all property which under H.E.’s order is to be jointly vested in
the two Dominions shall, if it happens to be in India, be vested solely in India.
Thus, if H.E. were to make an order in the terms suggested by Pakistan, it will
be open to the Dominion of India to make this order ineffective from the out¬
set.
So far as the vesting of responsibility for the public debt is concerned, the
course suggested by Pakistan appears to me to be almost completely impractic¬
able.
7. In these circumstances, I think that the least unsatisfactory of the three
courses open to H.E. is the second. I suggest that he decides upon this course,
but before actually making the order, he writes to Mr. Jinnah and Sardar Patel
informing them of the decision which he has taken and the considerations
which have led him to that view.
s. B. R. COOKE
3 Not traced.
554
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
356
The Maharaja of Indore to Pandit Nehru
R/3l1l139: ff it 3~4
PERSONAL CAMP DELHI, 6 August I947
My dear Panditji,
Many thanks for your letter1 which I got in Indore just before proceeding to
England on the 2nd of July. I had no opportunity of replying to it earlier as I
only returned to this country and my State on July the 25th. Now that I am
back I propose to reply briefly, as I have been very rushed with work and have
also been laid up with fever.
You asked me what my attitude was regarding entering the Constituent
Assembly. Lord Mountbatten’s plan of June the 3rd2 and subsequent develop¬
ments which have now split India into two, a Dominion of India and a
Dominion of Pakistan, plus the revised draft Instrument of Accession for such
States as may wish to enter the Dominion of India, need very careful study
and the fullest consideration that they deserve.
I wish to remind you that the Indian States, as a whole, were the only body
that stuck strictly to the Cabinet Mission’s Plan of May the 16th, 1946, 3 which
was a plan for a united India. In such a plan the States were willing, and are
even now willing, to adhere to a common policy for Defence, Foreign relations
and Communications. I also wish to remind you that we have not as yet seen
Pakistan’s terms for an Instrument of Accession by which States, that so desire,
could enter into relations with Pakistan. I do not want you to misunderstand
me that Indore would join with the Dominion of Pakistan when set up but I
do think it fair to the States to see Pakistan’s attitude first. Equally important do
I consider it to be, that before the States make up their minds finally to accede
to a Dominion or Dominions, we should be aware of the joint policy, for
matters such as Defence and Foreign relations between the two Dominions of
India and Pakistan. I am aware that there exists at present a Council for common
defence purposes between India and Pakistan. Will this Council continue
to function amicably with a common policy after the setting up of the two
new Dominions? I venture to suggest that such vital matters of importance are
made clear to the States before they are asked to accede to a Dominion. There¬
fore the relevancy of whether we join the Constituent Assembly now is clearly
minimised. I am sure that in all fairness to the States, and here I can assure you,
that they in no way are less patriotic or show lack of national honour. My
personal suggestion, and I write this to you as a friend, is that the States enter
now, as soon as possible into Standstill agreements, which will prevent the
chaos that is so widely feared, until such time as the States can see the con-
AUGUST 1947
555
stitutions of the two new Dominions emerge and can study them with the
consideration that they deserve.
I am accused of being an obstructionist. I can assure you that nothing is
further from my mind or could be further from the truth. I have a responsibility
towards my people and my State which I cannot lightly discharge and, there¬
fore, I cannot be rushed into accession which may later turn into a bombshell.
A written assurance from you and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who is in charge
of the States Department, would allay our fears and clear the way for immediate
co-operation on the lines I have suggested above.
I shall eagerly await your reactions to my letter which, I hope, will be forth¬
coming soon.4 May I make a further personal suggestion that Sardar Patel
writes a letter, on the lines suggested above, to the Nawab Ruler of Bhopal.
As you are aware, Indore and Bhopal are in close co-operation and will follow
a common policy. I am proud, to be able to show, a practical demonstration
of Hindu-Muslim co-operation, which has so far, alluded [ ? eluded] British
India. It is my fervent hope that the Dominions of India and Pakistan may
eventually unite, and if and when they do so, you will find the States no less
patriotic and willing to be partners of such unity. I close with my best wishes
and warmest regards.
Sincerely Yours,
YESHWANT RAO HOLKAR
1 Not traced. 2 Vol. XI, No. 45. 3 Vol. VII, No. 303.
4 cf. No. 385, para. 13.
357
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir F. Bourne ( Central Provinces)
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files:
Governors-General and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of—
Part (3)
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 6 August ig 47
PERSONAL
No. 3197-S. Jinnah asks me to enquire whether you would serve temporarily
as Governor of E. Bengal.
2. He first asked Lord Killearn to be permanent Governor but he had to
refuse.1 He has now invited Sir A. Rowlands whose reply is delayed owing to
his absence in Germany.
1 See Vol. XI, No. 478, note 3.
556
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
3. It is probable that HMG will be unable to spare Rowlands2 in which case
time will be very short to find new permanent Governor.
4. If Rowlands cannot join in time would you consent to serve for a month
or two in this emergency? I do hope you will agree.
5. Secondly would you be prepared to be considered for permanent appoint¬
ment if necessary?
6. E. Bengal contains more than half the population of Pakistan and is so
remote from Karachi that the Governor will have a very special position. It is
vital that there should be a really good British administrator as Governor to
start off the new province. Pay will be Rs 72,000 p.a. with usual allowances.
7. Please telegraph reply urgently.3
2 See Nos. 140, note 2 and 291, note 3.
3 No reply to this telegram has been traced. However, in tel. 3230-S of 7 August Lord Mountbatten
indicated that Sir F. Bourne would serve as Governor of East Bengal ‘for a month or two’ and that
neither Bourne nor Mr Jinnah were committed to any understanding about the appointment becoming
permanent. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Governors-General and Governors of
Provinces, Appointment of — Part (3). In the event, Bourne served from 15 August 1947 until 1950.
358
Mr Anderson to Mr Harris
L/F/7I2870: f 133
6 August 1947
Private Secretary,
I should be glad if you would treat my note of 4th August1 (in connection with
yesterday’s Cabinet meeting) as saying most of what I have to say on this
subject. Briefly my view is that, on the one hand, it is impossible to press the
Chancellor to do more for India, since the total Indian request must not be
taken too literally, and we have already gone even further to meet them than the
Chancellor’s note2 indicates, owing to the special treatment which is intended
for certain items, the effect of which will be an additional release of some £6- 7
million, making -£41-42 million in all. On the other hand one’s main fear at
the moment is that Ministers may feel that the Chancellor has gone too far,
having regard to the economic emergency in which this country finds itself. On
this, paragraph 8 of the Chancellor’s note seems to indicate that he himself will
be prepared to defend his proposals, but naturally the Secretary of State will
wish to back him up on political grounds.
1 No. 333.
2 No. 347.
K . A .
AUGUST 1947
557
359
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab )
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from Provincial Governors
6 August ig47
My dear Jenkins,
Thank you for your fortnightly letter dated the 30th July.1
2. I am afraid the great strain on you and your officers continues, and the
new Governments will certainly have a very difficult task in maintaining
security. Your letter has to some extent been over-taken by the new informa¬
tion which was provided when Savage came down here from Lahore. I
approved Abell’s letter2 to you, in which he informed you of the result of the
meeting3 which Savage attended.
3 . A telegram4 has been sent to you informing you what is suggested by the
Central Partition Council for the partition set-up in the Punjab and Bengal
after the 15th August. I hope the local leaders will agree to this. Both parties
have suggested that Sir George Spence should serve as Chairman of the
Partition Council after the 15th August. Though this was a great compliment
to him, he is now a sick man, and I could not press him to stay.
4. I am sorry your partition work is not going well, but I suppose both
Dominion Governments will have to learn by their mistakes, and come to
reahse that it will not pay to mix up administration too much with politics.
5. I have not forgotten your request5 that you should be given advance
warning of the nature of the Boundary Commission’s award, and I will
try to secure this.
6. I see that Mamdot has been elected leader of the Muslim League party
for the West Punjab, which I suppose means that he will be Premier.
Yours very sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 No. 292. 2 No. 346. 3 No. 345.
4 Not traced. For the decision of the Central Partition Council on this matter, see Mountbatten Papers,
Partition Council Minutes, 5 August 1947, Case No. P.C. 1 19/15/47.
5 See No. 190; see also Nos 200 and 209.
558
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
The Khan of Kalat to Lord Ismay
Rfe/i/rfd: f 60
6 August ig47
I thank you for your letter No. 1446/57 of yesterday’s date.1
2. I have been somewhat surprised to see Mr. Jimiah’s comments on the draft
communique. The addition of the words “as per treaties between the British
Government and Kalat State” to my mind is unnecessary and factually wrong.
It will be seen that Kalat State was an Independent Sovereign State before it
entered into treaty relationship with the British Government and this fact is
fully recongised in the Treaty of 1876 itself. As far as I can say (and it is on that
basis that the discussions2 took place between the Pakistan representatives and
ourselves on two days before His Excellency) there are only two outstanding
questions between Pakistan and Kalat State. These are, firstly, the future of the
Leased Areas and, secondly, discussions that will be necessary between the two
States with a view to reaching decisions on Defence, External Affairs and
Communications. The first item is governed not by any treaty but by the
various agreements for leases 3 that were executed by the Khan in favour of the
British Government on certain conditions. The second item will have to be the
subject matter of a new treaty that has to be concluded between Pakistan and
Kalat State.
3 . Thus my existing Treaty with the British Government has little to do with
Pakistan, and the future relations of Kalat State with Pakistan will solely be
governed by a separate Treaty.
4. I therefore earnestly request, and strongly hope that Mr. Jinnah will
agree, that there should be no mention of treaties in the communique at all,
and that the words added by Mr. Jinnah in clause 1 as mentioned above, as well
as the word “Treaties” in clause 2, should be deleted altogether.
1 Communicating the amendments suggested by Mr Jinnah in No. 351. R/3/1/166: f 59.
2 See Nos. 303 and 330.
3 Emphasis throughout in original.
AUGUST 1947
559
361
Sir G . Abell to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Punjab , Security Arrangements for Partition
[H.E.
I had
6 August 1947
lalf an hour with Mr. Jinnah this evening about the Punjab.
2. He says that he thinks it would be unwise to wait to see the reactions of
the Sikhs after the announcement of the award. He is personally in favour of
arresting the more extreme Sikhs at once.1 He only agreed to simultaneous
action on the announcement of the award in order to meet the point of view
of Sardar Patel.
3 . He does not think it would be any use having a further meeting with Y. E.
and Sardar Patel nor has he really got time to do so before he leaves.
4. If Y.E. cannot agree to what he suggests he must leave it to your own
judgment.
5. He said that he thought Sardar Patel would welcome trouble from the
Sikhs in the Central Punjab and only accepted the arrangement at the meeting
because, in the light of the facts as reported, he had no alternative.
6. I think the matter is important enough to get the Governor of the Punjab
down here for discussion.
G. E. B. ABELL
1 See Nos. 345 and 346.
362
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl oj Listowel
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence
Files: International Status of India
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 6 August 1 947, 8. 50 pm1
secret Received: 6 August 7.50 pm
No. 3205-S. 1. Your No. 10078 of 3rd August.2 Mr Jinnah and Mr Liaquat Ali
Khan have recognised the necessity for Pakistan to apply for membership of
1 Date and time of despatch taken from recipient’s copy on L/E/9/1514.
2 No. 328.
560
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
U.N.O. As application has to be in by ioth August, by which time the new
Pakistan Government will not be set up, they have asked that H.M. Govern¬
ment should put in this application on their behalf. Pakistan will confirm it
immediately after the 15 th August.
2. I have sent a copy of this telegram to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan.
363
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Lieutenant-General
Sir R. Lockhart (. North-West Frontier Province)
Telegram , R/j 11/165:/ 55
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 6 August 1 947
No. 3206-S. Your telegram CA 158 of 3rd August.1
2. I have been formally advised by the Pakistan Provisional Cabinet
(i) to direct you to ask the present Ministry to resign, and if they refuse,
to dismiss them, and call on the leader of the Muslim League to form a
new Ministry; or
(ii) if (i) is unconstitutional, to place the province in Section 93 , and direct
you to appoint Muslim League leaders as Advisers with a view to a
League Ministry being installed by the 14th August.
3 . I promised to accept the advice tendered me provided I was satisfied that I
could constitutionally do so. The Congress leaders maintain that either course
of action would be constitutionally improper.
4. I am consulting2 the Secretary of State in regard to the constitutional
position, and have sent him a copy of your telegram. I have also asked that the
correspondence should be shown to Cunningham, and his views obtained. I
shall let you know further as soon as I receive a reply.
1 No. 327.
2 See No. 342.
AUGUST 1947
364
Sir F. Burrows [Bengal) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence
Files: Bengal , Situation in , Part II
IMPORTANT 6 August I947, 1 1.00 pm
confidential Received: 7 August, 1.00 am
No. 235-C. Please refer to paragraph entitled “internal security” at page 1 of
minutes of your informal meeting with Bengal Separation Council1 and to
paragraph No. 4 of your note2 to Central Partition Council. At a discussion
today with Dr. P. C. Ghosh, Suhrawardy and Kwaja Nazimuddin (newly
elected Muslim League leader for East Bengal) about internal security in Bengal
at time of announcement of Boundary Commission award Suhrawardy
disputed having agreed to or acquiesced in having no repeat no joint command
organisation of troops. No one here suggests at this stage such an organisation
for any part of Bengal outside Calcutta but Suhrawardy and Kwaja Nazimuddin
pressed strongly this afternoon for such an organisation to control the troops in
Calcutta area. Dr. Ghosh has strongly disagreed. You already know my view
which is unchanged and that of the Military.3 This is for your information in
view of attitude now taken up by the leaders on the Muslim side.
1 No. 287.
2 This note summarised Lord Mountbatten’s discussions during his visit to Bengal (see Nos. 287, 289,
290 and 291) . Para. 4 read : ‘ Internal Security. I am glad to be able to report that the Governor, the military
commanders and the Chief Ministers all considered that the setting-up in Bengal of a joint command
organisation similar to that in the Punjab is unnecessary. The general opinion is that sufficient forces
are available to deal with the troubles that are likely to occur. A full plan has been prepared to cater
for all likely contingencies.’ Mountbatten Papers, V.C.P. 143, 31 July 1947.
3 See No. 289.
365
Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart (. North-West Frontier Province ) to
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , f 36
IMMEDIATE 6 August 1947 , II.40 pm
secret Received: 7 August, 1.00 am
No. CA-162. Reference my telegram CA-158 dated 3rd August.1
Khan Sahib came to see me today. He attended the meeting of Party Leaders at
Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s house on the fifth. Although he expressed satisfaction
1 No. 327.
562
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
with meeting Khan Sahib said there was no advance on information he gave
me on 2nd.2 Abdul Ghaffar and Qazi had seen Liaquat Ali in Delhi and latter
had been conciliatory. In fact from his attitude and Jinnah’s appeal to let
bygones be bygones in statement on 30th July3 they had hoped Jinnah might
accept Ministry’s cooperation. However, from other sources of information
Khan Sahib and party learned that Ministry might be dismissed before fifteenth.
For that reason his party decided to keep away from celebrations on 15th
August. They did not intend violence.
2. Later in discussing arrangements for 15th August Khan Sahib said he
thought Ministers should attend official ceremony such as Flag hoisting.
3. Incidentally it is very difficult to settle celebrations on 15th August not
knowing who is to be in power.
4. Khan Sahib reiterated statement that his party is prepared to accept
Pakistan and cooperate provided that
(a) province is autonomous all matters except External Affairs (I much doubt
whether Premier includes tribes under this), Defence and Communications.
(b) no prohibition is placed on party programmes provided that they are
advocated and executed in constitutional manner.
5. It might help towards solution if Liaquat Ah and/or Ismay or Abell could
fly here and discuss with me and Khan Sahib.4
2 See ibid.
3 In his statement on 30 July Mr Jinnah appealed ‘to all the different elements in the Frontier Province
and in the tribal areas to forget past differences and join hands with the Government of Pakistan in
setting up a truly democratic Islamic State.’ The Times of India, 31 July 1947.
4 In tel. 3264-S of 7 August Lord Mountbatten notified Sir R. Lockhart that he was repeating No. 374
to him which recommended a course of action which he understood would not cause much trouble
with either side, and asked him to send any comments he might have and if he agreed to ‘work on
Khan Sahib to resign on nth/i2th August’. R/3/1/165: f 59.
366
The Nawab of Bhopal to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rhl i/ 139: ff 172-3
camp: travancore house, new delhi, 7 August 1947
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I am writing to you this more formal letter to express to you my very deep
thanks and gratitude to Your Excellency for the great personal trouble you
have all along taken in my affairs, and for the patience and great courtesy you
have so very kindly shown throughout the protracted discussions and
AUGUST 1947
563
negotiations, I have personally had to conduct with you in regard to the future
of my State.
I fully appreciate the present situation which Your Excellency explained to
ine yesterday1 namely that it is difficult for Sardar Patel to make any special
alterations in the Instrument of Accession for Bhopal. That may have been
perhaps possible, as you added, if I had been present during the formal dis¬
cussions you had with other States a short while ago on these matters. Your
Excellency knows the reason why I was unable to accept your invitation to
those conferences. I also fully appreciate what Your Excellency said that
Sardar Patel is now indifferent whether Bhopal accedes or not though, as you
added, he would like Bhopal to join on the terms already approved by him in
regard to other States.
It is necessary for me to go to Bhopal for a day or two for consultations, and
I am leaving this morning for my State and hope to return here, if necessary,
in two or three days’ time. But I have asked Sir Zafarullah Khan, who is
remaining behind, to meet V. P. Menon and obtain a confirmation from him
of the clarifications of the terms of the Instrument of Accession and its
implications which Your Excellency so kindly made yesterday. Sir Zafarullah
proposes to discuss with him this matter some time today.
I am anxious to await the decision of Kashmir and Hyderabad before taking
my final decision in regard to my State. I hope there would be no objection
to my doing so.
With my renewed grateful thanks to you and my very best wishes.
Yours very sincerely,
HAMIDULLAH
1 No record of an interview has been traced but see No. 385, paras. 7-8.
367
The Maharaja of Patiala to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rhl il 157: ff 251-2
RANBIR VILLA PALACE, CH AIL, 7 August IQ 41/
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I have before this had the pleasure of discussing1 with you the boundary line
of division in the Punjab when I took the opportunity of expressing what to
my mind appeared to be the most reasonable solution of this difficult problem.
The Commission has held its sittings in the Punjab and the decision of the
Chairman will probably be put up to Your Excellency very shortly. Before
this happens, I am anxious to apprise you once again of my views, more
1 See Vol. X, No. 354, paras. 22-5.
564
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
especially because I understand that both sides have put up claims before the
Commission which appear to me to be irrational.
The claim for a sort of wedge into the Lyallpur District consisting of the
area beginning from Shahdra up to Toba Teksingh cannot be justified because
any boundary line with such wedges protruding beyond it is sure to prove
most unsatisfactory. I think, therefore, that it would meet the just claim of the
Sikhs if Okara, Depalpur and part of Pakpattan and Montgomery Tehsils are
allowed to remain in the Eastern Punjab, and the rest of the area, which is
contiguous to Pakistan, attached to it.
I should like to mention here the special claim of Okara tract in which I am
interested particularly, because most of this area is inhabited by Sikh soldiers
who fought in the last and the previous World War and in whose recruitment
the Patiala State took great interest.
There is one area which has the greatest importance for the Sikh community
and which they would value even more than anything else. I am referring to
Nankana Sahib, the birth place of Guru Nanak, the Founder of the Sikh Faith.
The Sikh sentiment about this place is so strong that it would be most
dangerous to minimise it, as under no circumstances can they be persuaded to
allow this to go into foreign territory. I would therefore most strongly urge
that this area should remain within the Eastern Punjab, even though this area
juts straight across.
There are undoubtedly pockets in both Western and Eastern Punjab with
predominantly non-Muslim and Muslim population, but it is impossible to
connect them by means of corridors to either of them. Such an arrangement
would be administratively wrong and even otherwise most undesirable. The
areas should in both cases be determined by blocks so as to form a natural
boundary as far as it is possible. But I feel that in due course of time transfer of
population from predominantly non-Muslim inhabited areas in Pakistan and
Muslim inhabited areas in Eastern Punjab would have to be undertaken to
produce a satisfactory result. I have been advocating these views ever since
this question has arisen, and I am strongly of opinion that to undergo this
inconvenience in the beginning for a short while would be much better than
to allow the whole thing to continue to simmer indefinitely and be a cause of
trouble for ever.
As I have said before, I do not consider the claims put forward by both the
parties before the Commission as justifiable, and I would not mind even if you
told the Sikhs my opinion in this matter, if you are so inclined. But I would
strongly urge that the boundary line should be so drawn as to satisfy the
reasonable claims of the non-Muslims, and this to my mind can be done in the
manner I have suggested above.
Yours sincerely,
YADAVINDRA SINGH
AUGUST 1947
565
368
Cabinet C.M. (47) 70th Conclusions , Minute 7
R/^oj l/ 12: ff 27-8
SECRET
Those present during discussion oj Item 7 at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street ,
S.W.i. , on 7 August 1947 at 10 am were: Mr Attlee ( in the Chair), Mr Herbert
Morrison, Mr Ernest Benin, Mr Arthur Greenwood, Mr Hugh Dalton, Mr
Alexander, Viscount Jowitt, Mr J. Chuter Ede, Viscount Addison, Mr A. Creech
Jones, the Earl of Listowel, Mr G. A. Isaacs, Mr E. Shinwell, Mr Aneurin
Bevan, Mr Williams, Mr G . Tomlinson.
Also present: Mr John Strachey.
Indian Sterling Balances
(Previous Reference: C.M. (47) 58th Conclusions, Minute)1
7. The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer
(C.P. (47) 213 )2 outlining the terms on which it was proposed to make an
interim settlement of the question of the Indian sterling balances.
the chancellor of the exchequer explained that, as a result of the
recent negotiations, the Indian Delegation had advised their Government to
accept an interim settlement covering the period up to the end of 1947, under
which all but -£35 millions of the outstanding Indian sterling balances,
amounting to -£1,160 millions, would be blocked. Only about -£15 millions
of the -£35 millions released would be spent in dollars, the rest being used to
meet sterling expenditure on Indian imports from Australia and the United
Kingdom. No commitment for further releases after the end of 1947 had been
or would be made in the present negotiations, nor were His Majesty’s
Government committed to recognise the total of -£1,160 millions. Moreover,
the rate of interest on the balances would not be allowed to increase. In the
exceptional political circumstances of India at the present time, he did not
regard the proposed settlement as too generous, and he hoped the Cabinet
would authorise him to announce it within the next few days.
the secretary of state for India supported the proposals made in
C.P. (47) 213. India badly needed food imports and, if His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment did not agree to the use of a reasonable amount of the accumulated sterling
balances for the purchase of food, the prospects of retaining the Indian
Dominions within the Commonwealth would be jeopardised.
The Cabinet —
Approved the interim settlement of the question of the Indian sterling
balances proposed in C.P. (47) 213 and took note that the Chancellor of
1 P.R.O. Cabinet Conclusions.
2. No. 347.
566
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
the Exchequer would announce the terms of the settlement at an early
date.3
3 An Agreement, which applied to India and Pakistan jointly, was signed on 14 August. It remained
valid until 31 December 1947. It was specifically agreed by an exchange of letters that both Govern¬
ments were uncommitted as to the subsequent period. Under the Agreement, the balances of the Reserve
Bank of India (some £> 1,160 million as of 15 July) were transferred to a new account, known as No. II
Account, at the Bank of England. With certain agreed exceptions, the balances in this account were
blocked for the period of the Agreement and were not available for current transactions. A second
account, known as No. I Account, was opened to which was transferred from No. II Account a sum ol
^35 million plus a working balance of ^30 million. The ^35 million represented the agreed amount
of sterling releases for the period of the Agreement. Material on Sterling Balances may be found on
L/F/7/2867-2875. The minutes, from the British side, of meetings with the Indian Delegation are on
L/F/7/2871. The White Paper, Cmd. 7195 dated 14 August 1947, is on L/F/7/2870. A ‘Note on the
Indian Sterling Balances’, which reviews the subject from the origins, size and legal ownership of the
Sterling Balances through to the Agreement of 14 August, is on L/F/7/2867.
369
Minutes of Viceroy s Sixty Eighth Staff Meeting, Items 1, 4, 6 and 8
Mountbatten Papers
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s House, New Delhi , on
7 August 1947 at 4.00 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma,
Lord Ismay, Sir G. Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Colonel Currie, Mr Christie,
Mr I. D. Scott, Mr Cooke, Mr A. Campbell-Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel
Erskine Crum
Item 1
ASTROLOGY
the viceroy said that he had just seem Mr. Mangaldas Pakwasa, the
Governor-Designate of the Central Provinces, and suggested that he should go
down on 13 th August to start taking over from Sir Frederick Bourne, (who
incidentally, was going to be temporary Governor of East Bengal)1 rather than
on 14th. Mr Mangaldas Pakwasa had said that this was out of the question on
astrological grounds, the viceroy pointed out that there was a complete
lack on his staff of high-level advisers on astrology. This would be remedied
forthwith.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY'.—
appointed Press Attache to the additional and honorary post of Astrologer
to the Governor-General.
Item 4
THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE (PROPERTIES, RIGHTS AND
LIABILITIES) ORDER
The Meeting considered a letter2 from Sardar Patel, drawing attention to the
AUGUST 1947
567
consequences of the failure to reach agreement at the Partition Council the
previous day on the Indian Independence (Properties, Rights and Liabilities)
Order ; and a note3 prepared by Mr Cooke setting out the courses which were
now open.
MR. cooke explained that this Order would be issued under Clause 9 of the
Indian Independence Act. It would not be an Order-in-Council. A possible
compromise might be to accept India’s view (i.e. vesting of material assets
according to location) in one case and Pakistan’s view (i.e. to make the
present Public Debt a joint responsibility of the two new Dominions) in the
other.
mr scott suggested another compromise — namely that material assets
should be vested according to location; and that the Public Debt should be
legally vested in India, but managed by her on behalf of both Dominions.
mr. cooke gave his opinion that this was not far divorced from what India
desired in both cases.
sir George abell said that Mr. Mohd. Ali had suggested that the whole
issue should be referred to the Arbitral Tribunal, the viceroy said that he
considered that there were grave objections to this course as it was highly
desirable that a decision one way or the other should be taken before
15 th August.
mr. cooke pointed out that Pakistan’s main objection to the allocation of
responsibility for the whole of the Public Debt to the Dominion of India was
the fear that the latter would take into account, during the settlement of assets,
the 200 crores which were Pakistan’s share of this debt.
the viceroy asked whether legislation to set this fear at rest could be
covered in the Order itself. This was confirmed as possible by mr. cooke and
RAO BAHADUR MENON.
the viceroy said that, whatever decision was finally reached, he intended
to obtain the Secretary of State’s covering approval. This was necessitated by
the fact that it might not be fully acceptable to Pakistan and might compromise
his position as future Governor-General of India.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY: —
(i) directed Reforms Commissioner, in conjunction with Mr. H. M. Patel,
Mr. Mohd. Ali, Mr Sundaram and Mr. Cooke, further to consider the
possibility of a compromise solution such as he had suggested above ;
(ii) directed Reforms Commissioner, after having decided on a recom¬
mendation on this question, to draft a reply to Sardar Patel’s letter
contained in V.C.P. 157;
(iii) directed P.S.V., after the consultation in (i) above had taken place, to
See No. 357 and its note 3.
1
2 See No. 354.
3. See No. 355.
568
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
prepare a draft telegram to the Secretary of State, containing the
suggested recommendation, and asking for approval.
Item 6
BHOPAL
the vicero y said that, during the recent conversations,4 which he had had
with the Nawab of Bhopal, he had emphasised above all that the Nawab
should not abdicate, anyhow for a period of six months.
lord ismay said that he had spoken to Sir Zafrulla Khan, the Dewan of
Bhopal, who had given his opinion that the State would accede before
15th August. The Nawab, however, wanted certain reservations, including the
recruitment of Pathans, to be included in any arrangements which might
be made.
In discussion of this, it was pointed out: —
(a) that the two new Dominions had agreed not to recruit persons of their
own minority communities resident in the other Dominion;
(b) that this had originally been put up by Mr. Jinnah;
(c) it was most desirable that this gesture should, if possible, be made to the
Nawab of Bhopal;
(d) that States Forces did not come under the Defence Department, and that
there would be no objection if the Pathans were privately recruited;
(e) that His Excellency could not commit himself in writing on this point
to the Nawab of Bhopal, but a letter might be sent by Lord Ismay to
which Bhopal could refer in any future dealings with the States
Department.
his excellency: —
directed C.V.S. and Reforms Commissioner to despatch a reply to the
Nawab of Bhopal’s request to be allowed to continue to recruit Pathans, on
the lines indicated above.5
Item 8
HYDERABAD
the viceroy explained that the main reason why the Nizam of Hyderabad
had not yet decided to accede to the Dominion of India was because, although
the Muslims in his State represented only 15% of the population, they filled
almost all the Government, Police and Military posts. Therefore it was
against a revolt by them rather than against a revolt by the non-Muslims
(although the latter represented the vast majority of the State’s population) that
he had to guard. The Nizam felt, and it was to be acknowledged, that it would
take time to educate the all-powerful minority to the step of accession.
AUGUST 1947
569
Nevertheless, Sir Walter Monckton had reported that his conversations with
the Nizam were going well. He was coming round slowly.
4 See No. 385, paras. 7-8.
5 A reply along these lines to the Nawab of Bhopal has not been traced.
370
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , R/jli/i4y:ff 184-5
MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, J August 1947, 6.00 pm
confidential Received: 7 August, 5.50 pm
No. 3237-S. Gurkhas. Reference my immediately preceding telegram,1
following is text of communique, begins. Subject to negotiations regarding
terms and conditions, agreement has been reached in principle between the
Governments concerned about the future of the Gurkha units which now form
part of the Indian Army.
The first and second battalions of 2nd Gurkha Rifles, 6th Gurkha Rifles,
7th Gurkha Rifles and 10th Gurkha Rifles and their Regimental Centres have
been allotted for service under H.M.G. All other existing Gurkha Battalions
remain in the Army of the Dominion of India, but the continuance of the
(war raised) 3rd and 4th battalions of any regiment may only be of a temporary
nature. No Gurkha will be compelled to serve against his will either under the
Dominion of India or HMG.
The agreement whereby the eight battalions of 2nd, 6th, 7th and 10th
Gurkha Rifles are allotted for service under the British Government is in
anticipation of satisfactory arrangements regarding conditions of service, and
without prejudice to negotiations in this respect. Missions representing the
Government of India and HMG are shortly proceeding to Nepal to discuss
details.
From the 15th August all Gurkha battalions serving in the Dominion of
India will be under the command of the C-in-C of the Army of India, and those
in Pakistan under the command of the C-in-C of the Army of Pakistan until
they can be moved into India. Gurkha battalions overseas will remain under the
command of the Supreme Commander.
Until such time as Army Headquarters of the Dominion of India is able to
take over the full administration of all Dominion troops (including Gurkha
units) located in the Dominion, the Supreme Commander will be responsible
1 In tel. 3236-S of 7 August Lord Mountbatten stated that the communique had ‘been approved by all
concerned here’ and would be given to the press for publication on 9 August. He presumed Lord
Listowel would make an announcement in Parliament. R/3/1/147: f 186.
570
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
for the general overall administration of Gurkha units in the same way as he
remains temporarily responsible for the general administration of all units of
the armies of India and Pakistan as well as of British Troops still located in the
two Dominions, ends.2
2 In tel. 10247 of 8 August Lord Listowel explained that a parliamentary announcement could not be
arranged and that the announcement would now be released as a press communique for publication
in the London papers on 9 August with an embargo against previous broadcasting. R/3/1/147: f 190.
371
Foreign Office to Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations
Telegram, L/E/g/ 1514: f 185
MOST IMMEDIATE 7 August 1947, 4. 3° Pm
SECRET
No. 2513. My telegram No. 24621 [of 4th August].
Pakistan and United Nations.
Viceroy now telegraphs2 that Moslem leaders recognise need for Pakistan to
apply for membership of United Nations. They have asked that United
Kingdom should put in an application on behalf of Pakistan immediately,
which will be confirmed by Pakistan herself directly she becomes an indepen¬
dent state on August 15 th (repeat August 15 th).
2. It seems to us that if action can be deferred till August 15th (when,
though Membership Committee will have reported to Security Council,
Council will itself still be considering question of new admissions) it would be
much preferable to do so, since it would clearly be awkward for us to make an
application on behalf of a state which is not yet technically in existence, and
precedent might be an embarrassing one. If you think that it is safe to wait
until then and that this would not impair chances of favourable consideration
of Pakistan’s candidature, we should propose to advise Viceroy accordingly.
3 . If, however, you think that some action before Membership Committee
makes its report is essential, there seem two possible courses, either (a) for us
to give notice in Membership Committee itself, that Security Council may
expect a formal application by Pakistan on August 15 th or (b) for Moslem
leaders to telegraph at once in the same sense to Secretary General. Or con¬
ceivably the two courses (a) and (b) could be combined.
4. We should be grateful for your views by most immediate telegram in
order that we may advise Viceroy. If you think that course at paragraph 3 (a)
above is the right one, please act immediately in that sense.
Repeated to Viceroy, New Delhi.
1 Repeating No. 328.
2 No. 362.
AUGUST 1947
571
372
Political Agent at Jaipur to the Secretary to the Crown Representative
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official
Correspondence Files: Refugees, Part 1(a)
CONFIDENTIAL 7 August 1 947, 10. JO pm
Received: 8 August, 6.00 pm
No. 1 133/2. Reference Polindia telegram No. 3196 dated August 5th.1
I visited Alwar today and made enquiries. Situation is still serious but H.H. the
Maharaja hopes to control it within a few days. H.H. considers State Forces
and police adequate for present but if situation deteriorates he will ask Jaipur
for help.
He claims that 50,000 Meos entered Alwar from Gurgaon and Bharatpur
and were given shelter for several months and gave no trouble. These Meos
became restive and started looting which led to present disturbances. Hindus
retaliated and these Meos started to leave Alwar. Almost all Alwar City
Muslims have left but will come back. H.H. vouches loyalty and impartiality
of army and civil officials but admits number of Muslims in army deserted with
arms and had to be rounded up. Meetings with view to establishing [?] posts
being held but exodus of Meos and other Muslims continues. Prime Minister
supports H.H’s views.
On the other hand General Abdul Rehman Khan until recently Army
Minister and now Minister of Supply maintains all major incidents perpetrated
by Hindus and Muslims treated very badly and subjected to many atrocities.
All Muslim officials and others thoroughly demoralised and leaving Alwar.
Also many forcible conversions to Hinduism.
My personal view is that although H.H. genuine in impartial attitude he is
receiving misleading reports and this borne out by hundreds of Muslim
refugees seen on all stations and also by desertions of Muslims from State
Forces and desertions of posts by Muslim civil officials. True facts can only
come to light by impartial enquiry when disturbances end but this impossible
in present circumstances.
Casualty figures not available but many villages of both communities burnt
and incidents reported every day. Conversions to Hinduism continuing on big
scale and admitted by both Hindus and Muslims but different motives attributed.
General panic prevails and I consider it will take some time for situation to
return to normal.
Police Adviser of Resident who visited Alwar with me agrees generally with
me. Addressed Rajputana and repeated to Polindia New Delhi.
1 Explaining that concern had been expressed in Delhi over Muslim refugees entering British India from
Alwar, and requesting a report on the situation. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files:
Refugees, Part I (a).
572
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
373
Government of Pakistan , External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
Department to Secretary oj State
Telegram , L/P &S/ 12/4724: f 102
CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, 7 August 1 947, 10. 55 pm
Received: 7 August, 11.15 pm
No. 6420. We have approached the governments of U.S.A., China, Iran,
Afghanistan and Egypt with a proposal for exchange of Ambassadors with
Pakistan. Channel of communication in the case of U.S.A. and China was their
Ambassadors in New Delhi, in the case of Afghanistan and Iran Consul General ;
while Egyptian Foreign Office has been approached informally through
Indian Government Trade Commissioner Alexandria with instructions to
inform His Majesty’s Ambassador Cairo.
Australia and Canada have been approached through their High Com¬
missioners in New Delhi for appointment of High Commissioners.
Replies when received will be communicated.
374
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , R/j/ 1/ 165: f 60
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 8 August 1947, 00. JO am
secret Received: 8 August, 1.15 am
No. 3265-S. I spoke to Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan yesterday1 and agreed to
submit following programme to you for the Frontier Province : —
(1) I would instruct Lockhart to dismiss his Ministry on the afternoon of
the nth or the morning of August 12th;
(2) Cunningham should take over as Governor on the evening of the
1 2th or morning of the 13 th and ask the Leader of the Muslim League party
in the Assembly to form a new Ministry. This will mean that Cunningham
will have to be sworn in as Governor using the old form of oath See. I
should be grateful if you could have his Commission sent to me as soon as
possible by telegram;
(3) Lockhart to arrange for military precautions to be taken to prevent
trouble by the Red Shirts over the dismissal of the Ministry and the formation
of a Muslim League Government.
AUGUST 1947
573
2. Liaquat Ali Khan states that Dr Khan Sahib, if he remains in office,
proposes to declare an independent Pathanistan on August 15th. This must
obviously be avoided if there is to be peace on the Frontier.
3. I should be grateful for your agreement to this course with least possible
delay.
Repeated to Governor N.W.F.P.2
1 No record of this interview has been traced. 2 See No. 365, note 4.
375
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Mr Jinnah
Rhl i/ 166: ff 61-3
8 August 1947
Dear Mr Jinnah,
I am most exercised that no agreement has yet been reached about the terms of
the Pakistan-Kalat communique, and I very much hope that you will be able
to accept the suggestions contained in the attached letter by General Ismay.
I myself entirely agree with them and consider that your position would be
fully safe-guarded. Further, I am so certain that His Highness will agree that,
subject to your concurrence, I will publish the communique without further
reference to him.
It will be most embarrassing for everyone if this point is not settled quickly
and 1 am therefore sending this by safe hand of pilot. If your secretary could
telegraph or telephone your concurrence a good deal of time would be saved.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
Enclosure 1 to No. 375
8 August 1947
Dear Mr. Jinnah,
On the 5th August1 you were kind enough to send me a revised draft com¬
munique on the subject of relations between Pakistan and Kalat, and I sent
a copy of your draft to His Highness the Khan.
I now attach a copy of his reply,2 from which you will see that he finds
difficulty in accepting your amendments to clauses 1 and 2 of the original
draft.
Accordingly, so far as clause 1 is concerned, would you consider the follow¬
ing re-draft, which accurately records the position which was agreed to by
1 No. 351.
2 No. 360.
574
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
both parties at the meeting on 19th July,3 which was presided over by His
Excellency, and at which the Pakistan States Department was represented by
Mr. Rab Nishtar and Mr. Akhtar Hussain:
“1. The Government of Pakistan recognises Kalat as an independent
sovereign State in treaty relations with the British Government, with a status
different from that of Indian States.”
So far as clause 2 is concerned, may I suggest that it would be as well to limit
legal opinion to the specific question at issue, i.e. the position of the leased
areas as from August 15th. If you accept this suggestion, clause 2 would read
as follows :
“2. Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not agreements of leases
between the British Government and Kalat will be inherited by the Pakistan
Go verimient”.
His Highness the Khan has already left Delhi, but I believe that he would
agree to the two clauses as re-drafted above, provided, of course, that you
yourself feel able to accept them.
It is obviously of the first importance to get this matter settled at once since,
if no standstill agreement is reached the consequences might be most
embarrassing to everybody.
There is a further point. Assuming that a standstill agreement is reached, on
the above basis, it will be necessary for action to be taken which will ensure the
continuance of laws at present in force in the leased areas. I have, therefore,
drafted a notification which will, I think, achieve what is wanted, without
prejudice to subsequent negotiations between Pakistan and Kalat.
I attach a copy of this draft notification and would be glad to know whether
you would be prepared to have it issued on 15th August.
I am extremely sorry to trouble you direct with this matter when you must
be under tremendous pressure of work, but in view of the urgency, I have
no alternative.
I have sent a copy of this letter to His Highness the Khan of Kalat, so that
he may know what is afoot.4
Yours sincerely,
ISMAY
Enclosure 2 to No. 375
NOTIFICATION TO BE ISSUED ON I5TH AUGUST 1947 BY THE
HEAD OF THE BALUCHISTAN ADMINISTRATION
In virtue of an agreement reached between the Governor General of
Pakistan and the Khan of Kalat, it is hereby directed that all laws and enact¬
ments which on the fourteenth day of August 1947 were in the areas of
AUGUST 1947
575
Baluchistan leased by the Khan of Kalat to the British Government shall for
the time being continue in force.
3 No. 174.
4 In his letter of 8 August to the Khan of Kalat, Lord Ismay commented: ‘If, as I hope will be the case,
Mr Jinnah accepts the amendment to clause 1, I am advised that Your Highness would do likewise.’
Ismay added that Lord Mountbatten had written to Jinnah endorsing his (Ismay’s) suggestions and
expressing the hope that this urgent matter would be settled immediately. R/3/1/166: f 65.
376
The Nizam oj Hyderabad to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Hyderabad , Part 1(b)
HYDERABAD, DECCAN, 8 August I947
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I am writing to you to make plain the position of my State in the negotiations
which are in progress at Delhi. It has always been my desire and the desire of
Hyderabad to make the fullest contribution to the prosperity and welfare of
India as a whoJe. Indeed I recognise that the States have a great opportunity to
exercise a stabilising influence; both because of their relative freedom from
communal strife and because the States represent the section of India which at
present has the greatest experience of administration. When it was con¬
templated that India, on gaining its independence, would become a single
Union, I was quite ready to take my share in the defence of the sub-continent
and to make arrangements for the foreign policy of Hyderabad to be directed
in general conformity with the foreign policy of India. The partition of India,
however, has gravely complicated the problem for my State. As Your
Excellency knows, while Hyderabad is necessarily closely concerned in
various ways with what will now become the Dominion of India, there are
also many ties between my State and the future Pakistan Dominion. It will be
within Your Excellency’s knowledge also that in this State, which my ancestors
and I have ruled for more than two centuries, there has been little communal
disturbance and the cleavage on religious grounds has always been much less
acute than in British India. It is my earnest wish to pursue a policy which will
enable this freedom from discord and disorder to continue, and for this
purpose I must take into account the importance of maintaining good relations
with both the new Dominions. It is not yet clear how far or in what manner the
Indian Dominion and the Pakistan Dominion will consult and co-operate on
matters of common concern or how closely their policies can be integrated
on the essential subjects of External Affairs and Defence. I understand that this
is a matter which, it is recognised, cannot be resolved before the 15th August.
It is not possible for me to contemplate an organic union with either of the
576
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Dominions until I am more fully informed on these matters. I am bound at
this stao;e to wait and see how the relations between the two Dominions are
regulated and developed.
(2) I was happy to observe that in the recent debates in Parliament on the
Indian Independence Bill the difficulties of the immediate position for such
States as Hyderabad did not pass unnoticed. I need only remind Your
Excellency, by way of illustration, of three speeches for the Government
which recognised that the States ought not to be asked for hurried decisions at
this juncture and that a treaty rather than a federal relationship might be the
solution in present circumstances. Lord Lis towel in the House of Lords stated
that from the date when the new Dominions are set up ‘‘the appointments and
functions of the Crown Representative and his officers will terminate and the
States will be the masters of their own fate. They will then be entirely free to
choose whether to associate with one or other of the Dominion Governments
or to stand alone and His Majesty’s Government will not use the slightest
pressure to influence their momentous and voluntary decision”.1 A little later
he observed: — ‘‘Whatever the future relationship between the new
Dominions and the States may be, it will require prolonged consideration and
discussion before the final adjustment can be made.”2 The Prime Minister,
Mr. Attlee, in the House of Commons, pointed out that “until the constitution
of the Dominions has been framed in such a way as to include the States as
willing partners, there must be a less organic form of relationship between them
and there must be a period before a comprehensive system can be worked
out.”3 Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney-General, in the course of the same
debate, while expressing the hope that no irrevocable decision to stay out would
be taken prematurely, said that the Government realised that “it is bound to be
some time before the States will have all the information before them to make
their final decision.”4
(3) In a later and, as I think, a most helpful passage in his speech the Attorney-
General said: “We hope . . . that the States will associate themselves with one
or other of the new Dominions in a federal or treaty relationship on fair terms
fairly and amicably negotiated.”5 I am fully in accord with the spirit of this
suggestion. For I have always been resolutely opposed to a policy of isolation
for my State and although in present circumstances I cannot contemplate
bringing Hyderabad into organic union with either of the two new Dominions,
I am still ready and willing to see Hyderabad play its proper part in the defence
of the Indian sub-continent and to have the conduct of the External Affairs of
my State undertaken in general conformity with the Foreign Affairs of the
whole sub-continent. My difficulty is how to accomplish this purpose in
friendly co-operation with both the new Dominions. I have naturally and
necessarily taken into account the fact that the Dominion of India is my
AUGUST 1947
577
neighbour and I am fully prepared (in accordance with the Attorney-General’s
suggestion) to enter into a treaty with them whereby a suitable arrangement
is made in respect of land communication, so that all-India standards are
recognised, and through communications and mutual interchange facilities are
assured, and Hyderabad contributes an agreed number of troops to the defence
of the Dominion. Moreover, I should be willing to agree in this treaty to
conduct the External Affairs of my State in general conformity with the foreign
policy of the Dominion of India. But it would be necessary for me to provide
against the possibility, which I earnestly hope will never arise in fact, that the
two new Dominions might pursue a mutually hostile policy. In that case, it
would be unthinkable for my State to pursue a hostile policy towards the
Dominion of Pakistan and it would have to be provided that Hyderabad in
such an event would remain neutral. Further, Hyderabad already has an
Agent-General6 in the United Kingdom and must reserve the right to appoint
representatives to act for Hyderabad elsewhere if and when it wishes to do so.
(4) It is a matter of deep satisfaction to me that both the new Dominions
will be within the family of the British Commonwealth of Nations. I should
want a provision inserted in the Treaty whereby if unhappily either party
should at some future date decide to secede from the Commonwealth the other
party should be free to review the provisions of the Treaty. For, in spite of the
provisions of Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act7 I cannot believe that,
after more than a century of faithful alliance, it is the intention of the British
Government to throw my State out of the Empire against my will.
(5) Before I turn to other provisions which would need to be included in
such a Treaty, I must record my astonishment and regret that though
Hyderabad’s Negotiating Committee was available in Delhi for a fortnight
until the 5th August those who will be responsible for the Dominion of India
refused to negotiate with them on any subject, even including Standstill
Agreements and Berar, unless as an essential preliminary Hyderabad was
prepared to agree to accede.8 It was made absolutely plain by my Committee
that, short of accession, Hyderabad was ready and willing to enter into Treaty
relationship. Political relationship other than accession was expressly included
as an alternative open to States, in the Memorandum of the 12th May 19469
which was re-affirmed in the Statement of the 3rd June 194710 accepted both
by Congress and the Muslim League. The reason why Standstill arrangements
were recommended by the Government of India was to avoid administrative
1 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of L., vol. 150, 16 July 1947, col. 812. 2 Ibid.
3 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 439, 10 July 1947. col. 2452.
4 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 440, 14 July 1947, col. 100. 5 Ibid., col. 103.
6 Hyderabad had a Trade Commissioner in the United Kingdom, not an Agent-General; see Nos. 11S,
para. 2 and 176.
7 No. 164. 8 cf. No. 329.
^ Vol. VII, No. 262. 10 Vol. XI, No. 45, para. 18.
578
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
chaos. It is recognised that Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act does not
cover the whole ground. For this very reason Hyderabad was anxious to
negotiate a standstill agreement but those responsible for the Dominion of
India entirely declined to take part in such negotiations. My State will neverthe¬
less do its best, even without such an agreement, to avoid any administrative
deadlock which is bound to cause inconvenience to both. If any such deadlock or
inconvenience should occur the fault will rest squarely on the Dominion of India.
(6) It is even more surprising that negotiations should be refused on the
subject of Berar. His Majesty’s Government and the new States Department
have unequivocally recognised my sovereignty over Berar and also my legal
right to the reversion of administration over that territory on the 15th August
1947. I should be prepared to arrange for the continuance of the status quo for
the time being to enable the whole problem to be reasonably and amicably
settled. But those responsible for the new Dominion wholly refuse to negotiate
in the matter, unless I first agree to accede and this, for reasons which I have
already explained, I decline to do. I learn (though I find it hard to believe) that
in defiance of my admitted rights the new Dominion of India mean to start
their career by seizing my territory.
(7) I cannot but regard this refusal to negotiate except on terms that
Hyderabad first agrees to accede as coercion and pressure to join and a
compulsion to a hurried decision. And I hope that even at this late hour,
through the good offices of Your Excellency as Crown Representative with
special responsibilities to see that His Majesty’s Government’s pledges to the
States are honourably fulfilled, this policy may be reversed. For it is utterly
inconsistent with the declared pledges and policy of His Majesty’s Government.
(8) Such a Treaty as I have suggested would have to cover various other
matters, among them a Customs Agreement which would take into account
the provisions of the Commercial Treaty of 1802 which has long been a matter
of dispute between His Majesty’s Government and myself. But it is not necess¬
ary to elaborate such provisions in this letter, because if the principle of a treaty
on the basis of my proposals in this letter is accepted, I do not doubt that with
anxiety on both sides to resolve our difficulties in a spirit of reasonable accom¬
modation, we shall be able to reach a concluded agreement without undue
difficulty or delay.
(9) If, however, those who will be responsible for the Government of the
Indian Dominion are unwilling to enter into negotiations on the basis of such
a treaty as I am proposing, I shall nevertheless deem it necessary to publish this
offer, in order that the policy which I feel bound to adopt and which I have no
desire to hide, may be fully understood both within my State and outside it.
Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN
AUGUST 1947
579
111
Sir G. Abell to Mr Abbott
Rhl 1/157: f 255
TOP SECRET 8 August 1947
My dear Abbott,
I enclose a map1 showing roughly the boundary which Sir Cyril Radcliffe
proposes to demarcate in his award, and a note by Christopher Beaumont
describing it. There will not be any great changes from this boundary, but it
will have to be accurately defined with reference to village and zail boundaries
in Lahore district.
The award itself is expected within the next 48 hours, and I will let you know
later about the probable time of announcement. Perhaps you would ring me
up if H.E the Governor has any views on this point?
Yours sincerely,
G. E, B. ABELL
1 No copy of this map, or of the note by Mr Beaumont describing it, is on the file. In April 1948, in
a telegram to Lord Ismay discussing points of controversy which had arisen over the Punjab Boundary
Award, Lord Mountbatten made the following comment about Sir G. Abell’s letter to Mr Abbott:
‘The point that arises here was that Abell sent the letter concerned without my knowledge. It may be
hard to convince people that that was so. It will look to have been an odd procedure.’ L/P &J/10/119:
f hi. It may also be noted that in a letter dated 19th November 1968 to Sir F. Mudie, S. Ghias Uddin
Ahmed stated, on behalf of the Government of Pakistan, that both the map and the descriptive note
were in the possession of the Pakistan Government. See MSS. EUR. F. 164/63, where also may be
found an account of how these documents came to be transferred.
Sir E. Jenkins, in a letter dated April 1948 to Lord Mountbatten in which he too discussed points of
controversy which had arisen over the Punjab Award, described the two documents in question as
follows: ‘The enclosures were a schedule (I think typed) and a section of a printed map with a line
drawn thereon, together showing a Boundary which included in Pakistan a sharp salient in the
Ferozepore District. This salient enclosed the whole of the Ferozepore and Zira Tahsils.’ Jenkins also
stated that: ‘About the 10th or nth August, when we were still expecting the award on 13th August
at latest, I received a secraphone message from Viceroy’s House containing the words “Eliminate
Salient” . . . The change caused some surprise, not because the Ferozepore salient had been regarded
as inevitable or even probable, but because it seemed odd that any advance information had been given
by the Commission if the award was not substantially complete.’ L/P &J/10/119: ff 104-6.
It may be noted that Sir C. Radcliffe confirmed, in a letter now in the possession of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office Research Department, that he had destroyed his own notes and drafts in
connection with the proceedings of the Boundary Commission and that he had in fact brought nothing
at all of this sort home with him from India.
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
378
Notes by Sir G. Abell and Mr C. P. Scott
R/3lili57:ff 253 and 271
[H.E.]
Letter1 below from H.H. the Maharaja of Patiala. This was enclosed with a
personal letter to me. As it is impossible for Y.E. to undertake to make any
representation to the Chairman of the Boundary Commission (who has, in
fact, already dictated his award), I think it would be best not to send a reply.
I have already acknowledged the personal letter to me, and said that Y.E. will
consider the matters mentioned by H.H 2
G. E. B. ABELL
8th August 1947
[P.S.V.]
H.E. mentioned this morning that he had had a letter from H.H. Patiala about
the Boundary Commission’s award in the Punjab. H.E. said that he was
inclined to answer this letter although you had advised that he should ignore it.
He said that he had had letters from all the Sikh rulers now, and felt that he
should explain the position at great length to Patiala, pointing out that the
Leaders had appointed the Boundary Commission, had settled its terms of
reference, and that he himself was in no way able to influence the Commission’s
findings. I have not seen this letter. If it is with you and you can send it down,
I will draft.3
c. P. SCOTT
nth August 1947
1 No. 367. 2 Lord Mountbatten minuted in reply ‘I agree. M.’
3 For the letter as sent, see No. 441.
379
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab)
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: Punjab ,
Situation in, Part 11(b)
MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 8 August ig47, 2.00 pm
SECRET
No. 3269-S. I discussed1 with Trivedi matter of the Sikhs2 and sent Abell to
Jinnah3 to see whether he saw any objection to postponing action till results of
the Boundary Commission’s award were known.
AUGUST 1947
581
2. As I expected, Jinnah said he had only agreed to simultaneous arrests as
a compromise. What he would have liked was immediate action. He added
that clearly Patel on the other hand would have liked to postpone action as
proposed by you, and Trivedi after seeing Patel confirms this.
3 . Jinnah added that though a common policy agreed by the two successor
authorities was desirable it was useless to discuss the matter further and he must
leave the decision to me.
4. You now have Mudie with you and will have discussed matter with him.
5. You are the best judge of the situation. If you advise waiting to see
reactions to the award I agree, but presume you will put out a very complete
net so as to pull in the most dangerous people promptly.
1 No record of this interview has been traced. 2 See No. 345. 3 See No. 361.
380
Cabinet Office to U.K. High Commissioner , New Delhi
Telegram, L/P &S/ 13/ 1839: ff 22-3
secret 8 August 1947, 12.31 pm
ukri 540. Following repeats Foreign Office Circular No. 48 of 6th August,
1947.1
begins. Under Indian Independence Act paramountcy over Indian States
lapses with effect from 15th August and technically their connection by special
treaty relationship with the Crown will terminate. But as was made clear in
House of Commons by Prime Minister2 on 10th July and Attorney General3
on 14th July and in House of Lords by Secretary of State4 for India on
1 6th July, His Majesty’s Government believe that future of Indian States
inevitably lies in association with British India with whose territories their
own are inextricably intertwined. We therefore hope that all Indian States will
enter into a federal relationship with one or other of the new Dominions of
India and Pakistan or, failing this, enter into particular political arrangements
with them and thus retain their connection with the Commonwealth.
2. Some time may elapse before all do this and some, particularly Hyderabad,5
have so far declared their intention not to federate with either Dominion. Thus
1 A message to the same effect was sent to Dominion Governments in tel. D. No. 687 of 12 August.
L/P&S/13/1839: f 18.
2 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 439, col. 2452.
3 Ibid., vol. 440, col. 103.
4 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of L., vol. 150, col. 812 5 See No. 376.
582
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
there is likely to be a period during which international status of some at least
of the Indian States will be undetermined. In practice we expect that diplomatic
representatives of India or (when they are appointed) of Pakistan, will continue
to look after the interests of the Indian States even in advance of the time when
by accession to one or other Dominion they merge themselves for international
purposes with that Dominion. Most Indian States have already sent representa¬
tives to Constituent Assembly of Dominion of India, and negotiations are now
in progress between all States and the new Dominions regarding their future
relationship.
3. His Majesty’s Government are not prepared to define what in the event
of these negotiations failing their attitude would be towards any Indian States
which claim to be independent. In any case His Majesty’s Government do not
propose to recognise any Indian State as a separate international entity on
15th August. It would be most unfortunate if any other Power gave such
recognition to any State at this stage as this would prejudice the negotiations
now in progress between the Indian States and the new Dominions.
4. I would be grateful if you would deal with any enquiries you receive on
this subject on the above lines and report any indications which reach you of the
attitude of the Government to which you are accredited.
5. For your own information we understand that United States Govern¬
ment have received reports that certain Arab States may be contemplating
diplomatic recognition of certain Indian States after 15th August. State
Department have accordingly instructed their posts in Egypt and Middle
East to inform Governments to which they are accredited that United States
Government share desire of His Majesty’s Government that Indian States
should associate themselves with one or other of the new Dominions and that
United States Government have no intention of according any Indian State
diplomatic recognition, ends.
381
Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart ( North-West Frontier Province ) to
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , R/j/ 1/ 165: f 62
immediate 8 August 1947, 4.30 pm
secret Received: 8 August, 9.00 pm
No. CA/166. Your telegrams 3265-S1 dated August 8th and 3264-S2 dated
August 7th.
AUGUST 1947
583
In view of possibility of serious disturbances if Ministry is dismissed consider
it essential that new Ministry should come into power as soon as possible after
Act of dismissal. Consider therefore Governor should invite League Leaders to
form Ministry immediately he dismisses the old.
2. Will try again to persuade Khan Sahib.
1 No. 374. 2 Asking for comments on No. 374. R/3/1/165: f 59.
382
Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab,
Situation in, Part 11(b)
IMMEDIATE 8 August I947 , 5.1 5 pm
secret Received: 8 August, 10.45 pm
No. 219-G. Situation is now most serious and I have discussed it this morning
with Commander Punjab Boundary Force and Inspector General of Police.
2. In rural areas of Amritsar, Hoshiarpur and Jullundur we have for some
days had both casual attacks and organised raids in most of which Sikhs are
aggressors and Moslems the victims. Rural areas of Lahore, Ferozepore and
Ludhiana have all reported similar outrages including organised raids though
trouble there seems less widespread so far. Amritsar and Lahore cities continue
to give trouble. So does Gujranwala and there have been bomb explosions in
Lyallpur followed by 15 casualties from stabbing. Gurdaspur (both towns and
districts) may blow up at any time. 9 of the 12 boundary districts1 are thus
already involved. Daily casualties running between 50 and 100.
3. Our civil side of picture is not encouraging. Transfers and postings
connected with partition are in progress. Standard of reporting of incidents has
fallen off. Police in East Punjab are unsteady and Moslem policemen in Amritsar
intend to desert to West Punjab on 15th August. Similar intention may exist
in other districts since extreme communal feeling has been fostered both by
leaders and press. With new teams getting into position, confused information,
unsteadiness of services, particularly police in East Punjab, prospects of good
start for new governments particularly East Punjab Government are poor. We
are dealing with all this as well as we can and Inspector General of Police is
informing Amristsar police today that West Punjab will in no circumstances
employ deserters.
1 See Nos. 184 and 205, Case No. P.C. 74/8/47.
5*4
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
4. Commander Punjab Boundary Force tells me strength of his 5 Brigade
groups average 1500 effective rifles. This means that in addition to police we
have a strength of say 7500 effective rifles to control 12 districts with a popu¬
lation of no less than 12 million. Use of training centres and static troops will
add another 1500 but even so strength will not be large. Rural raiding in
areas in which communities are inextricably mixed cannot be checked except
by display and use of force on massive scale. I am satisfied everything possible
is being done with resources available and have told Commander Punjab
Boundary Force that all ranks will be backed up in any bona fide action to dis¬
perse unlawful assemblies under section 5 of Punjab Disturbed Areas Act and
connected Central Ordinance.2 Interception and immediate dispersal of raiders
is vital.
5. Following action by Centre would help (1) reinforcement of Punjab
Boundary Force if possible. I camiot recommend withdrawal of troops from
Gurgaon or from Eastern Punjab where reprisals highly probable. (2) Attach¬
ment of tactical reconnaissance squadron or at least flights to Punjab Boundary
Force. This is most urgent. (3) Release of 200 provincial additional police now
lent to Delhi Province. East Punjab cannot afford to lend these men and they
should be returned immediately. I understand official move has been made.
(4) Earliest possible advance information of Boundary Commission’s award.
2 See Nos. 286 and 299.
383
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
&l3l*l*39:ff*79-te
8 August 1947
Dear Listowel,
With reference to your telegram No. 9947 of the 1st August,1 and my reply
No. 3161-S of the 4th August,2 I cannot help feeling that things are moving
so fast out here that the India Office have been unable to keep abreast of them.
For when your telegram was taken at my daily Staff Meeting3 at which all the
senior members of my Staff were present, everyone without exception
expressed their amazement at the view taken by the India Office. I therefore
feel that it is only right that I should write a rather fuller letter giving the whole
background of recent negotiations and to try and put you into the picture and
to give you the situation as I now see it.
2. My address to the Conference of Rulers and States Representatives on
July 25th,4 which was the particular subject of your criticism, has been held by
AUGUST 1947
585
everyone else, except the extreme Congress leaders, as a most statesmanlike
statement; and, so far as I can make out, all the Princes and States representa¬
tives warmly welcomed it, many of them having taken the trouble to write or
see me personally to tell me so. On the other hand both Sardar Patel and I have
been attacked in the more extreme Congress Press for selling the position to
the Princes.
3. I took the opportunity, on the 25th July, to advise the Princes to align
themselves with one or the other of the two Dominions, while I, in my
capacity as Crown Representative, was still in a postition to safeguard their
interests and to obtain fair, and even generous terms from Sardar Patel, the
Member in charge of the States Department and the man who can deliver the
goods on behalf of the Dominion Government that will come into existence
on the 15th.
4. As soon as I turned my attention to the problem of the States, it became
evident to me that their independence, based on the Cabinet Mission memo¬
randum of May 12, i946,s read with our June 3 statement,6 would not be
worth a moment’s purchase unless they had the support of one or the other of
the two Dominions, principally because of the wide gap that prevails, between
the Rulers and the ruled. Barring a few States, the rest have no real military
forces of their own, and such police as they possess, are hardly adequate even
to deal with the internal situation. This has been proved conclusively by the
recent riots in the Rampur State7 where the Muslim subjects of the Muslim
Ruler, though in a minority, organised widespread riots and destruction of
Government property and offices, by way of a protest against the decision of the
Rampur Ruler to accede to the Indian Dominion, and where he had to call
in aid from the Government of India. The aid was promptly given and the
situation there is now rapidly returning to normal. You can imagine what
would have been the position in Rampur, if this had occurred after 15 th August
and they had declared their independence, particularly if the riots had been
organised by the Hindus who form nearly 90% of the population !
5. I foresaw the possibility of such a situation developing after August 15 th
and felt that the States in their own interests, must align themselves with one
or the other of the two Dominions, the alignment being determined, as stated
in Parliament, with due regard to geographical compulsions. I laid stress on
these facts in my advice to the Rulers and told them that if they wanted me to
use my good offices to obtain the best terms possible from the leaders of the
1 No. 307. 1 2 * 4 No. 340.
3 There is no record of a discussion of Lord Listowel’s telegram in the minutes of the Viceroy’s Staff
Meetings in the Mountbatten Papers.
4 No. 234. 5 Vol. VII, No. 262.
7 cf. No. 385, paras. 4-6.
6 Vol. XI, No. 4s, para. 18.
586
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Congress party, I would be available to them only up to August 15th. In order
to achieve this object, I devised an Instrument of Accession under which
States could surrender their sovereignty in respect of three minimum subjects
of defence, external affairs and communications and yet retain their sovereignty
in all other matters as also complete internal autonomy. All that the States
were asked to surrender were powers which they never exercised during their
entire association with the British Government and which they were not, by
virtue of their limited resources and isolated situation, in a position to discharge
effectively. Simultaneously with Accession, the Rulers were advised to enter
into standstill agreements with the new Governments so that the existing
arrangements could be continued until modified by mutual consent, thus
avoiding the risk of chaos, dislocation or confusion.
6. In these efforts of mine to secure the best possible terms for the Indian
States, I found a welcome accommodating attitude on the part of both Pandit
Nehru and Sardar Patel. It is known that these leaders have never been
reconciled to the plan of partition, and they were naturally most anxious that
the process of disintegration should not go further. This proved to be a strong
bargaining factor in my hand and I played it so as to secure terms of accession
which many Rulers told me in private that they had never expected. At the
same time the terms are not unfair to the Indian Dominion and must tend
towards integration of the country as well as internal stability which are so
essential for progress and development in the difficult years ahead.
7. In all these negotiations and discussions there has been, of course, no
question of any pressure or undue influence, but it would be doing a disservice
to a friendly set of people like the Princes not to put before them a clear picture
of what is likely to happen after August 15 th, if they do not make friends with
the contiguous Dominion, knowing as I do, their helplessness, as also the
mounting momentum of agitation on the part of the people of most of these
States.
8. I am glad to be able to say that even Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Iyer who was
the most truculent of the representatives of the Indian States until a short while
ag°> and who is placed hi a better position than most of the States owing to the
situation of Travancore, saw the unwisdom of standing out or of delay in
making a decision on this vital matter, and agreed in his interview with me
that Travancore would accede to the Indian Dominion on terms secured by
me.7 8 9 The States that have not yet made up their minds so far are Hyderabad,
Bhopal, Kashmir and Indore. Hyderabad sees the force of the wisdom of
joining the Indian Union but is afraid of the reactions of its Muslim subjects
who though only 13% are organised and powerful.
9. I strongly feel that if we leave the States without association with one or
AUGUST 1947
587
the other of the two Dominions, there will be plenty of justification for the
allegation against us that while we unilaterally terminated all treaties and
agreements, we took no steps for the safety and security of the States from either
internal troubles or external aggression. It is therefore impossible for me to ask
Patel to agree to an arrangement which while affording complete security to
States, would not result in anything by way of quid pro quo to the Dominion;
and all that Patel asks for is the integration of the country and stability which,
I feel, he is entitled to have and which is not a high price to ask ol the Indian
States.
10. There is still another aspect from which we may look at the case. The
Indian Dominion, consisting nearly of 3 / 4ths of India, and with its immense
resources and its important strategic position in the Indian Ocean, is a Dominion
which we cannot afford to estrange for the sake of the so-called independence
of the States. I have no doubt that you will agree with me that we should
leave no stone unturned to convince the Indian Dominion that although we
had to agree to the plan of partition, we had no intention to leave it balkanised
or to weaken it both internally and externally.
11. The accession of Princes is bound to exercise a steadying influence on
British Indian politics, and this by itself is by no means a small gain. Further,
the Princes have without any exception been consistently pressing for the
retention of their connection with the Crown and their association with
British India cannot but help in the direction of retaining India within the
Commonwealth.
12. There appears to be one more misapprehension about the Instrument of
Accession which I must clear away here and now. It has been said that it may
not be possible for States to accede unless they can see the entire picture of
the constitution of the country. That however is not the position. Accession
is for a temporary period while the Constituent Assembly is engaged in the
constitution-making which is likely to take some months and during which
period, however short it may be, we camiot expect the country to remain
broken up and in a state of perpetual disturbance. But when the constitution is
framed, the States will have another opportunity of judging how they fit in
and whether they would like to adhere to the new constitution. The Instrument
of Accession which the States are now asked to sign makes it clear that they
are not committed to the constitution of the Union of India or even to any
amendment of the Indian Independence Act or the Government of India Act,
1:93 5, which may be carried out subsequent to the accession. The States will
accede to the Dominion now knowing what the position is and thus there is
no question of a State being called upon to accede in darkness or without a
clear picture.
8 cf. Nos. 228, paras. 16-19 and 284.
588
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
13. The importance of completing these negotiations by the 15th August is
that I shall cease to be Crown Representative on that day and the States will
have thereafter to make their own terms with the Dominion. It is clear that
the compulsion of events will sooner or later force them into the arms of the
Dominions. It is equally clear that once the present chance is missed the terms
which the Princes will receive will not anywhere be as generous as the terms
which I can secure for them now, while I am still Crown Representative. It will
thus be seen that it is the States which stand to lose if they do not come under
one or the other of the two Dominions by August 15th, regard being had to
the explosive situation caused by suppression of their subjects for long years and
to the disparity in the standard of prosperity between the people of the States
and the people in the contiguous areas of British India.
Yours sincerely
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
384
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary of State
PRIVATE AND TOP SECRET 8 August lp 47
My dear Listowel,
Thank you for your letter of the 2nd August.1 Amongst the points that you
mention is the question whether or not Kalat is legally an Indian State. On this
point I have always been very careful not to commit myself personally. It has
been made quite clear that it is only Kalat itself and the Pakistan Government
which consider, for the purposes of negotiation, that Kalat is not an Indian
State. In this week’s Personal Report I give an account2 of my latest meeting
with the Khan of Kalat.
2. I enclose the draft communique3 which was agreed in principle between
Jinnab, the Khan and myself, but with the words underlined (which Jinnah
wishes included and the Khan does not wish included) still a matter of
negotiation between the three of us — unfortunately by letter as Jinnah and
His Highness have now left Delhi.
3 . I was invited by the Khan of Kalat to add to the communique that 1 also
recognised he was an independent sovereign ruler. I replied that so far as
H.M.G. were concerned they considered Kalat to be an Indian State, but since
the two interested parties both agree I did not propose to interfere with this
agreement.4
AUGUST 1947
589
4. I have been sent by the Maharaja of Sikkim a memorandum5 regarding
the cession of Darjeeling. I have not yet received the advice of the External
Affairs Department on this memorandum, but I enclose a copy of it for your
information.
5. On the issues raised in my speech6 to the Chamber of Princes, we have
already exchanged telegrams.7 But I feel that, especially with regard to your
mention of this in your letter of 2nd August, I should somewhat elaborate my
view-point, and am addressing a separate letter8 on this subject to you.
6. In my last week’s Report, I referred9 to the continued rumours that die
Sikhs were likely to make trouble after the Boundary Commission’s award
has been announced. On 5th August, Jenkins sent down a Police Officer with
a verbal report. I took advantage of the fact that there was a Partition Council
Meeting the morning he arrived to keep back Mr. Jinnah, Mr. Liaquat Ali
Khan and Sardar Patel so that they could hear what he had to say. This Police
Officer is a member of the Punjab C.I.D. Control Staff, which co-ordinates
investigation of disturbances cases, special interrogation and intelligence from
all sources. He gave an account10 of the statements which had been made by
various instigators of disturbances who had been arrested after incidents. The
man who had given away most information was an ex-member of the I.N.A.,
and had during the war been at the Japanese spy school at Penang and sent to
India by submarine. This man’s statement involved Master Tara Singh in the
production of bombs and a Sikh plan to attack a certain headworks. State¬
ments of other men who had been arrested involved Tara Singh in plans to
wreck the trains carrying the Pakistan Governmental staff from Delhi to
Karachi and in plans to assassinate Mr. Jinnah during the celebrations in
Karachi on 15th August. The evidence produced was so incriminating that
Jenkins may have to arrest Tara Singh and the more hot-headed of his
confederates shortly before 15th August.
7. I have recently been in communication with Wylie concerning the future
of the Mutiny Memorials in the U.P. It is a matter on which the Metropolitan
of India, who was staying with me last week, is much concerned. Wylie has
suggested —
(a) The Residency at Lucknow. This should continue under the present
arrangements whereby the proprietory rights vest in the Defence
Department (who bear the cost of maintenance) and the management is
entrusted to a small Committee of which the Area Commander is
Chairman ;
1 No. 317. 2 See No. 385, para. 2.
3 Not printed. See Appendix ‘A’ to No. 330; see also Nos. 351, 360 and 375.
4 cf. No. 330, para. 6. 5 Not printed. 6 No. 234.
7 See Nos. 307 and 340. 8 No. 383.
9 No. 302, para. 2. 10 No. 345; see also Nos. 346, 361 and 379.
590
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(b) The Memorial Well and Gardens at Caumpore. These are the property of
a regular Trust composed of European business men. They have agreed
to offer 30 acres of the site to the Municipality free of cost on condition
that it should be kept for ever as a space and not be built upon. They
are considering Wylie’s suggestion that the remaining 10 acres, including
the Well and the Graveyard, should be enclosed and handed over to the
Allahabad Diocese Trust; but may prefer to go on managing the Well
and Graveyard area themselves.
(c) The Massacre Ghat at Caumpore. The Cross on this is not a conspicuous
object and Wylie is inclined to leave it alone.
These suggestions seem to me to be sound and 1 propose to tell Wylie when
he comes to pay me his farewell visit tomorrow that I agree with him.
8. The Maharaja of Bundi (a gallant young soldier who won the M.C. under
me in the 14th Army) is an Honorary A.D.C. to the King, and most anxious
to be invited to attend Princess Elizabeth’s wedding. The other three
Honorary As.D.C. I believe are the Maharajas of Patiala and Kolhapur and the
Nawab of Bhopal. Not more than one or two of these would be likely to
attend if they received invitations, so the total number would be unlikely to
exceed three. It would, I feel, be an excellent thing if His Majesty could see
his way to issuing invitations to them.
9. I also hope that Dominion Prime Ministers will be invited, for it would
be a great thing if we could get Nehru to come to London at such a time of
national rejoicing. As I have been invited I could bring him with me in our
York. He is an inveterate sentimentalist, and 1 feel it would greatly help to
strengthen Anglo-Indian bonds if he went. It would also give him an
opportunity of meeting the other Dominion Prime Ministers.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
385
Viceroy's Personal Report No. 1 6
LIPO/6/ 123: ff 224-41
TOP SECRET 8 August ig 47
AND PERSONAL
Although I presided over the joint Defence and Partition Council meetings on
Saturday, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday and took the Pakistan Cabinet on
AUGUST 1947
591
Friday and die India Cabinet on the following Thursday, my main pre¬
occupation outside these meetings has been the States problems. This Report,
therefore, is inevitably largely concerned with these. I might point out that
both Patel and I have been accused in the more extreme Congress Press of
proposing terms which were far too favourable to the States ; which encourages
me to feel that I have faithfully discharged my duties as Crown Representative.
2. I had a satisfactory meeting with the Khan of Kalat on the 4th August1
and with his Wazir and legal advisers. Towards the end of the meeting, I
brought in Jinnah and Liaquat, who had arrived for a Partition Council
meeting, and I got all parties to agree to the issue of a press communique2
setting out the latest position on the negotiations between Pakistan and Kalat;
but Jinnah and the Khan are still haggling over the precise wording.3
3 . Immediately after this meeting, Jinnah told me that the Khan of Kalat
would not have been so difficult if “the other side” Avere not encouraging him to
make difficulties for Pakistan. Whatever the truth ofjinnah’s allegation, I think
there is little doubt that he himself has been guilty of bringing grossly improper
pressure to bear on the States with Muslim rulers who are geographically
linked with the Dominion of India, i.e. Hyderabad, Bhopal and Rampur.
4. O11 the 5 th August, the Nawab of Rampur came to see me with his Chief
Minister, Zaidi.4 They arrived in a very harassed condition having driven
through rioting mobs in Rampur to appeal to me for help. The Nawab is an
old friend with whom I have stayed twice in the hast four years, and he told me
that Jinnah had been bringing every possible pressure to bear on him personally
to stop him from acceding to the Dominion of India. Zaidi even gave a
categorical account of a meeting with Liaquat and other Muslim Leaguers at
which grave threats were uttered as to what would happen to Rampur if
he deserted Pakistan and joined India. Zaidi had replied that if the League
could arrange to have Rampur transferred to the Pakistan area, they would
gladly join Pakistan; otherwise they had no option but to join India. Liaquat
was adamant, whereupon Zaidi asked him specifically how Pakistan Avould
help Rampur if it came to a showdown with India. The reply was “by moral
support”. Zaidi said this was insufficient, and that he had no choice but to
advise his Ruler to join India.
5. They have now carried out their threats and the League organisations in
Rampur have staged riots which have become serious, several Government
buildings having been set on fire and the servant of an Inspector of Police
having been burnt alive. I immediately despatched 300 of my Crown
Representative’s Police and half a battalion of troops.
1 No. 330. 2 Ibid., Appendix ‘A’. 3 See Nos. 351, 360 and 375.
4 No record of this meeting has been traced.
592
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
6. The only satisfactory part about this sordid story is that Patel entirely
endorsed my action and told the Nawab that after the 15th August the States
Department would continue to help the States in this manner. Patel has now
decided to take over the whole of my Police as a Federal Police Force for the
Dominion as a whole and for loan to any Ruler who requires internal help.
7. Bhopal is still giving me a lot of trouble. I suppose I have spent more time
on Bhopal’s case than on all the other States put together, because he is such
a charming and high principled man that it would be a tragedy if he were to
wreck his State by failing to come in now. His Adviser, Zafruhah Khan, told
Ismay yesterday that the Nawab had been really badly shaken for the first
time by the z\ hour conversation5 I had had with him the day before, and he
was now seriously considering acceding after all.
8. His Highness threatened to abdicate in favour of his 23-year-old daughter;
but I told him that I considered this would be a cowardly act and unfair to his
daughter, and that he must stay for at least a year. The Nawab is thinking of
taking service in Pakistan, presumably as a Governor and possibly as an eventual
successor to Jinnah as Governor-General. I do not feel, however, that I can
allow him to abdicate if I can possibly avoid this, since it would look as though
I was bringing undue pressure to bear on him, which is far from being the
case as he himself is the first to admit.
9. In paragraphs 49 to 51 of my last Report,6 I told the story of the Maharaja
of Indore’s behaviour when I sent down six brother Mahratta Princes to ask
him to come and see me. Indore eventually arrived five days later, on Monday
afternoon, to see me,7 and gave as his excuse for the delay that he had been ill.
He brought with him (or, to be more accurate, was brought by) the Nawab of
Bhopal. I had my Conference Secretary present to record the meeting and
informed His Highness that I proposed to send a report of this meeting to His
Majesty, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, since I considered that
he had shown a lamentable lack of sense of responsibility towards his people,
quite apart from the discourtesy shown to the Crown Representative.
10. I pointed out that all the Princes with the sole exception of himself had
been in close consultation with me and the States’ Departments in connection
with discussions on the Instrument of Accession and Standstill Agreement. I
said that even States like Hyderabad, Bhopal and Kashmir, who were in
a quandary because the Ruler and Government are of the opposite community
to the majority of the people, had come or sent their Prime Ministers. The
only reason that I had made a special effort in the case of Indore was that I felt
sorry for the people of Indore whose interests do not seem to have been looked
after in this connection at all.
11. I made it very clear to the Maharaja that I had not the least intention of
AUGUST 1947
593
coercing him or hurrying him in any way and that it was a matter of indiffer¬
ence to me whether such an irresponsible Ruler acceded or not. I told him he
was free to do exactly as he wished.
12. The Maharaja made a number of extremely lame excuses and handed
me a long letter containing a large number of extracts from Hansard, which
had evidently been prepared by Bhopal. 1 went through his letter paragraph
by paragraph in the presence of both of them, and was able to demonstrate to
their own satisfaction that nothing which has been said in either House conflicts
with the policy which I am trying to carry out on behalf of the States.
13. The Maharaja was visible shaken, and has been trying to get various
people to intercede on his behalf. Bhopal came the next day to see me,
Zafrullah came to see Ismay, the Indore Chief Minister, Horton, to see Abell
and the Deputy Prime Minister to see Menon; added to which the Maharaja
himself has written8 to Nehru. Everyone has given the same answer, that it is
a matter of indifference to myself and to the Government of India what
Indore does.
14. It seems pretty clear that if the Maharaja does not accede the people of
Indore will rise against him and ask to join the Dominion of India. So that the
interests of the people are not likely to suffer by their Ruler’s ridiculous
behaviour.
15. Hyderabad is still my biggest headache. I sent Walter Monckton down
on Saturday to obtain the Nizam’s agreement to the nomination of Pakwasa
as Governor of the Central Provinces and Berar, to which the Nizam agreed.
This position is thus fortunately legalised for the time being.
16. Monckton came back with Chhatari (the Prime Minister) and they
reported9 that although the Nizam himself was advancing towards the idea of
a treaty on exactly the same terms as the Instrument of Accession, the Ittihad-
ul-Muslimin, backed by Jinnah, were hardening in their attitude and bringing
every pressure to bear on His Exalted Highness to prevent him from agreeing
to a treaty. I made it clear to them both that the Dominion of India would not
accept a treaty and would insist on accession. Monckton thought that once the
Nizam got as far as accepting the idea of a treaty, he could be induced to take
the extra step and accept accession. What he did point out was that time was
too short not only to bring about this attitude of mind in the Nizam by the
15th August, but to give adequate opportunity for preparations in the way of
propaganda and other steps to meet the trouble which the Muslim organisations
would make in the State.
5 cf. No. 366 and its note i. 6 No. 302. 7 See No. 335.
8 No. 356. 9 cf. No. 329.
594
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
17. Although only 15 per cent of the population is Muslim, practically the
whole of the Government, Army and Police are Muslims. Thus, if the Nizam
were to try and join Pakistan and the 85 per cent Hindus rose, he would have
no difficulty in putting down a revolution. But if he joins India before all the
necessary steps have been taken he will have a rebellion from die Muslims
without any means of putting it down.
18. I gathered Patel did not feel he would be able to get Congress to agree
to granting an extension to the Nizam after the 15th August to accede on the
same terms. But I pleaded the Nizam’s case at the India Cabinet meeting,
which I took yesterday morning, and pointed out that unless they authorised
me to continue to handle the negotiations with Hyderabad on the basis of the
present terms with an extended date, they would have such trouble in Central
India as to threaten the whole stability of the new Dominion. I offered my
services (although I shall no longer be Crown Representative) to continue
these negotiations in the manner I thought best, and to my great surprise and
relief the Cabinet unanimously gave me the necessary authority. So that
immediate danger appears to have been staved oft.
19. In my last week’s Report10 I gave an account in paragraphs 25 to 33 of
the conversations which resulted in the decision that Gandhi should visit
Kashmir. Before he went I asked him particularly to refrain from any speeches
or political action which might prove embarrassing. I am glad to say that he
lived up to this request. He did not even hold, during his visit, his daily prayer
meeting followed by a speech which is a part of his normal routine. It was
only on his return journey, at Rawalpindi, that he made a statement. This is
comparatively harmless, and he has been good enough to give Kashmir (or
rather the “will of the people of Kashmir” as he says) the choice of joining
either Dominion. He is now off to Noakhali. I can only hope that his presence
there will not result in disturbances. But of this Burrows is not too sure.
20. Gandhi’s absence from the celebrations in Delhi on the 15th August is,
of course, intentional. He has never given the 3rd June plan his unqualified
blessing and his position might be difficult. He also realises that it would not be
possible to fit him into the programme in the way to which he would feel
himself entitled. Arrangements for these celebrations are going well; and I
think that they will be worthy of the occasion.
21. Gandhi has announced his decision to spend the rest of his life in Pakistan
looking after the minorities. This will infuriate Jinnah, but will be a great relief
to Congress for, as I have said before, his influence is largely negative or even
destructive and directed against the only man who has his feet firmly on the
ground, Vallabhbhai Patel.
AUGUST 1947
595
22. The astrologers are being rather tiresome since both the 13th and 15th
have been declared inauspicious days, whereas the 14th is auspicious. I was not
warned that I ought to consult the astrologers before fixing the day for the
transfer of power, but luckily this has been got over by the Constituent
Assembly deciding to meet before midnight on the auspicious 14th and take
over power as midnight strikes which is apparently still an auspicious moment.
23. They then proposed to send a delegation to Viceroy’s House (which
a few minutes previously will have become Government House) to invite me
to accept the Governor-Generalship of India. The fact that the King will
already have legally appointed me had been overlooked, but a formula has
been found to overcome this and I gather the resolution will merely be to
endorse what has already been done.11
24. One or two of the more superstitious members of the Cabinet wished
to have all the ceremony done at midnight in the Durbar Hall, but as,
fortunately, the older members of the Cabinet usually go to bed at 9 o’clock,
Sleep won the swearing-in battle over Superstitition; and we are now going
to have the swearing-in ceremony in the presence of 500 people at 8.30 on the
morning of the 15 th, after which we will all proceed to the Constituent
Assembly which I am to address in their new capacity as the Legislative
Assembly for India.
25. It has been very difficult to find a Governor for East Bengal, owing to
both Killeam and Rowlands turning down Jinnah’s invitation. But Bourne,
the Governor of the Central Provinces, in a very public-spirited way, responded
to my personal appeal12 to oblige Jinnah by taking over East Bengal tem¬
porarily on the 15th.
26. When I saw Mr. Pakwasa, Bourne’s relief in the Central Provinces,
yesterday, I asked if he would mind flying from Bombay to Nagpur 011 the
13th to enable Bourne to fly to Dacca on the 14th. He regretted that the
astrologers would not permit him to undertake any journey on the 13 th, so is
now going to fly to Nagpur 011 the 12th for turnover discussions with Bourne,
and fly back that evening to Bombay, and then fly over on the 14th again to
Nagpur, thus spending the inauspicious day at home.
27. The Meetings of the Joint Defence Council and the Partition Council
on Monday 4th August, went off well owing to the excellent preparatory work
of the Steering Committee. There were ten items on the Agenda of the former,
and three on the Agenda of the latter; the Meetings took 18 minutes and
11 minutes respectively. One of the papers for the Partition Council Meeting
consisted of 226 pages, some of which were huge brief sheets stuck together.
10 No. 302. 11 cf. Nos. 308 and 323. 12 See No. 357 and its note 3.
596
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
After this meeting I came to the conclusion that the longer the papers and the
larger the agenda the quicker the Meetings go. But this belief was shattered on
the following two days ; the meetings lasted nearly three hours on each day.
28. I got the Partition Council to agree to issue a statement on refugees.
I attach a copy of this at Appendix I, in case it has not been reported in the
British Press. I think that it is eminently satisfactory. I cannot believe that either
Government will try to wriggle out of these pledges which they have made in
statements issued by the Partition Council. The problem of refugees is a very
serious one which has perhaps so far not received the attention which it
deserves.
29. I have previously reported13 to the Secretary of State that the Indian
leaders agreed that the Union Jack should be flown together with the
Dominion flag on public buildings on certain days of the year. I now attach
as Appendix II a list of the agreed dates. This list, when it came up for discussion
at the Partition Council meeting, included Anzac Day. The reason for the
deletion of this day, which I and my staff did not previously spot, is of course
that it commemorates a victory over the Turks, a Muslim nation whom
Pakistan naturally does not want to embarrass in any way. I also originally had
“Empire Day” down against 24th May. There was unanimous feeling among
all the leaders that this was an unfortunate expression so far as India is concerned,
but they would accept the date if the title were changed to “Commonwealth
Day”. I had put down the 15th August as Indpendence Day for India and
Pakistan; but Nehru wrote pointing out that this was the least suitable day in
the year to fly the Union Jack. Liaquat suggested that each Dominion might
fly the flag of the sister dominion on this day. Congress would not give an
immediate agreement, but undertook to consider the matter in the summer
of 1948.
30. Another matter which I cleared with the Partition Council was that
Princes might continue to be awarded the Star of India, be granted military
ranks and be appointed Honorary Aides-de-Camp to the King. So many
Princes made a point of this that I used it as an added attraction to join one of
the two Dominions. An extract of the minutes concerned is attached as
Appendix III.
31. At Tuesday’s and Wednesday’s meeting14 of the Partition Council we
considered a draft Order dealing with the provisional allocation between the
two Dominions of the rights, property and liabilities of the Governor-General
in Council. The final allocation of rights, property and liabilities will be made,
either by agreement between the two new Dominions on the basis of decisions
already reached in Council, or by an award of the Arbitral Tribunal. But this
final allocation will take time, and on August 15th there must be some interim
AUGUST 1947
597
arrangement in force to avoid chaos. It is over this interim arrangement that
a deadlock was reached just before the departure of Jinnah and Liaquat for
Karachi.
32. The draft Order is being telegraphed to the Secretary of State. It
embodies the following provisional scheme: —
(a) Immovable property and goods, equipment, and stores to vest in the
Dominion in which they are situated.
(b) Bank balances and securities to be held jointly.
(c) Contracts exclusively referable to Pakistan to devolve upon Pakistan.
Other contracts to devolve upon India.
(d) National debt to devolve upon India.
(e) Liability for actionable wrongs other than breach of contract to devolve
according to the place where the cause of action arose.
33. The Order also provides for making the appropriate Dominion a party
to pending proceedings. It includes corresponding provisions for each of the
divided Provinces. The Order is expressly stated to be without prejudice to the
fmal allocation.
34. It is not disputed by either side that a holding Order is essential. Without
it, responsibility for public debt would be in doubt with disastrous effects upon
credit, existing Government contracts would come to an end, and nobody
would have authority to deal with Government property.
3 5. I am confident that if only the Steering Committee had raised this issue
in time, I could have got agreement from both sides on the terms of the Order.
As it is, the terms of the proposed draft have been agreed by India, but it was
impossible at the last two meetings of the Partition Council before 15 th August
to obtain the agreement of Pakistan. They have two objections: —
(a) They think that the provisional vesting of real and personal property
should be a joint vesting in both Dominions. I am satisfied that this would
cause considerable administrative inconvenience in the management of
property without any material advantage to Pakistan.
(b) Their more serious objection is to the proposal that India should take
over liability for the whole national debt. Under such an arrangement
Pakistan would become debtor of the Dominion of India for Pakistan’s
proportionate share of the whole debt. Pakistan advisers feel that this
would put them in a weak bargaining position in any dispute about the
ultimate distribution of assets, and in particular would weaken their
claims on the existing cash balances of the Government of India. They
13 cf. No. 162, para. 27.
14 See No. 344 and its note 1; see also Nos. 354, 355 and 369, Item 4.
598
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
also suggest that the proposal amounts to a reflection on the credit of
Pakistan.
36. I am myself satisfied that arguments of commonsense and convenience
are overwhelmingly in favour of India’s taking over sole liability for the
national debt.
37. 1 therefore propose, subject to concurrence of the Secretary of State when
he has received my telegram giving the draft Order, to make an Order in my
discretion in terms of the draft. But I am anxious, if possible, to convince
finnah that this is the right course. I think it may be possible to carry him with
me when I go to Karachi on two conditions. The first is that he is satisfied that
reasonable terms will be arranged for the repayment by Pakistan to India of
a sum representing Pakistan’s share of the national debt. I hope to be able to
bring this about. The second is that India should agree to allocate to Pakistan
a reasonable share of the existing cash balances in order to tide Pakistan over its
initial financial difficulties. At the moment, India has agreed to allocate 20 crores
only and if this sum is not increased the matter will go to the Arbitral Tribunal.
I am proposing to approach Sardar Patel in an effort to get this sum increased
by agreement to a figure acceptable to Pakistan.
38. While I feel certain that the scheme I propose is the best, I am anxious
as Governor-General Designate of India not to be thought to have favoured
the interests of that Dominion. It is for this reason that I attach particular
importance to being able to say that the Order has the authority of the
Secretary of State as an impartial judge.
39. It has not yet been decided who is to be Chairman of the Partition
Council after the transfer of power. 1 have made it quite clear that I am not
a volunteer for this job, and this position has been accepted. I obtained the
agreement of both parties to the name of Sir George Spence,1 5 but unfortunately
he, who has been doing most exellent work in the Reforms Secretariat since
he ceased to be Secretary of the Legislative Department, is now a sick man,
and has got to return home straight away. It is now left to the members of the
Partition Council to choose their own Chairman. I hope that they will be able
to come to some decision on this, as there is no doubt that, at meetings such as
these, an independent Chairman can do an enormous amount of good in
keeping discussion on the right lines.
40. At the Joint Defence Council Meeting on 6th August, it was decided
that the Auxiliary Force (India) should be abolished. This is a pity in a way, as
there is no doubt that this force has done much good in the past. It consists, of
course, entirely of Europeans and Anglo-Indians. However, the Political
leaders were all set on its disbandment and their opinion was supported by
AUGUST 1947
599
Auchinleck. It is to be hoped that some type of territorial force will be set up in
its place. I am going to write a letter to the Colonels of all the Regiments
involved explaining the reasons for the decision and thanking them for what
they have done.
41. At the last Joint Defence Council meeting, Ismay made a verbal state¬
ment16 on the conversations which he had had in London with the Chiefs of
Staff, and said that their view was that the sooner meetings could be arranged
in India the better. He emphasised particularly that the arrangements reached
between representatives of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff and representa¬
tives of the two new Dominions would be less binding than formal treaties in
so far as there is no compulsion on members of the Commonwealth to enter
a war together. The Joint Defence Council decided that the Mission sent out
by the Chiefs of Staff should negotiate with it in the first instance in Delhi. As
I shall continue to be Chairman of the Joint Defence Council after 15 th August,
I shall hope to be able to regulate these discussions and trust that the desired
objects will be achieved.
42. In my last week’s Report17 (paragraphs 12 to 16) I explained the
difficulty which had arisen in regard to the division of the R.I.A.F. and the
compromise solution which I put forward. I am glad to say that this solution,
namely the establishment of a ninth fighter squadron out of the reserves and
the allocation thereof to Pakistan has been found workable (as instructed) and
was accepted by the Joint Defence Council.
43. I have been discussing the defence of the North West Frontier with
Messervy, who is going to be Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army. He
has now sent me a most disturbing paper on the probable military situation in
Pakistan immediately after 15th August. He points out that the total number
of battalions available will be reduced from the present figure of 67 (which
includes 5 British battalions) to 35. A number of these, moreover, will initially
be at half strength owing to the removal of their Hindu/Sikh companies
without Muslim companies being available in replacement. Messervy suggested
the following steps to mitigate the immediate danger: —
(a) that the Pakistan Government should make a statement, appealing to the
tribes to remain peaceful and orderly until new agreements can be made
and assuring them of no reduction in their allowances;
(b) that the Pakistan Government should make it clear to Afghanistan that
there is 110 question of any readjustment of the boundary now or in the
future ;
15 cf. No. 359, para. 3.
16 No. 352, Case No. J.D.C. 47/7/47.
17 No. 302.
6oo
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(c) that the Civil Armed Forces on the Frontier should be increased in
strength; and
(d) that up to 10,000 demobilised Punjabi Mussalmen and Pathan infantry¬
men should be re-enlisted for the Regular Army as soon as possible.
I considered that, as I am at the moment still responsible for the situation on
the Frontier, I should bring these facts to the notice of Jinnah. I am accordingly
sending him a bowdlerised version of Messervy’s paper. There is no doubt but
that it is impossible to avoid a very considerable risk on the Frontier during the
period immediately after the transfer of power.
44. Recently I have been very worried about the attitude of Congress in
general, and Baldev Singh, in particular, towards Auchinleck.18 They had got
it firmly into their heads that he had become definitely anti-Congress and it
almost reached a point at which they were going to refuse to have him as
Supreme Commander on the 15 th. Auchinleck, for his part, told me that
Baldev Singh was so impossible that he could scarcely carry on with him and
was prepared to resign if it would help me. The position was therefore very
delicate.
45. I pointed out to Nehru19 that Auchinleck had only a few weeks ago been
strongly criticised by jinnah and Liaquat as being anti-League, and further that
he had also been subjected to a good deal of criticism by his own countrymen
on the grounds of his alleged partiality towards the Indians as a whole at the
expense of the British officers. I added that I was absolutely positive of
Auchinleck’s integrity and military competence, but I confessed that he seemed
to me lacking in political sense.
46. I got the invaluable Trivedi down from Orissa, and he and Ismay at
once put their heads together to try to bring about a rapprochement. Trivedi
saw Nehru and Patel and impressed Auchinleck’s sterling qualities on them;
while Ismay was going to try to persuade Baldev Singh to talk it out in a
friendly way with Auchinleck. However, the former surprised him by saying
that he had, on his own initiative, been to see Auchinleck that very afternoon
and that he told him that he was extremely sorry if he was responsible for the
present state of their relationship; further that he admired Auchinleck very
much and that he would have no wish to be Defence Member unless he felt
that he had his (Auchinleck’s) confidence. Apparently, Auchinleck was very
touched by this generous approach, and everything in the garden is now lovely,
until the next storm flattens the flowers out again.
47. The trouble is that I had already told Nehru that Baldev Singh was not
a very good Defence Member and ought not to have that portfolio in the new
Cabinet. As a result I heard privately from V. P. Menon that Shyama Prasad
AUGUST 1947
60I
Mukerji was likely to be appointed Defence Member and that Baldev Singh
was to have another portfolio.
48. It is of course admirable that they should have got an important member
of the Hindu Mahasabha to join the Government, and Mukerji is an intelligent
man (whom they wanted to remove from Bengal) ; but Burrows, who knows
him well, described him to me recently as being so low that a snake could not
crawl under his belly. I therefore felt that this would be going out of the frying
pan into the fire and, fortified by the reconciliation between Auchinleck and
Baldev Singh, I had no hesitation in eating my words about the latter. It now
appears certain that Baldev Singh will be Defence Member. He seems slow
in the uptake, but he has had a hard row to hoe, and I am inclined to think
that he means well.
49. Nehru has now sent me his proposed list of Cabinet Ministers. I attach
a copy of this as Appendix IV.20 He has taken my advice (which I outlined in
paragraphs 36 to 39 of my last Report)21 so far as new members of the Cabinet
are concerned, having changed four of them since I spoke. I understand that
Gandhi has written to Maulana Azad asking him as a gesture to Congress to
make way for a younger man; but the old Maulana has not yet taken the hint
and they cannot drop him until he does. Gandhi’s secretary, Rajkumari Amrit
Kaur is a delightful person, included at Gandhi’s insistence. She is earmarked
for Health. She admits she knows nothing about health, and I rather doubt her
competence as a Minister. But she is a great friend of my wife’s and has written
asking if she may lean on her. The full allocation of portfolios has not yet been
decided; but Nehru says that he does not intend to make any change among the
eight members of the existing Cabinet who will continue in office.
50. Of the new members, Sir Shanmukham Chetty is a man of great
administrative experience and was until recently President of the Tariff Board.
I did not expect Ambedkar would find a place and his selection has given me
great satisfaction. Gadgil is a Congressman and a student of economics, and
people think highly of his abilities. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai is now a Minister in
the United Provinces.
51. The Cabinet is still far from being an ideal selection but the requirements
of party politics could not entirely be done away with. On the whole, it must
be conceded that Congress have been very generous and have included as large
a proportion of non-Congressmen as one could possibly expect. Sir
Shanmukham Chetty in particular has been a bitter critic of the Congress for
a long time. He will probably hold charge of the portfolio of Finance.
18 cf. No. 247. 19 See No. 270.
20 Not printed. See No. 332. 21 No. 302.
602
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
52. The appointments of Governors, which have been officially announced
this week, have, on the whole, been welcomed. The only exception to this is
an attack by Sarat Chandra Bose (brother of the I.N.A. leader) on the appoint¬
ment of Rajagopalachari as Governor of West Bengal, as “an insult to West
Bengal and her people and indeed to all fighters for freedom in the country”.
This attack is mainly founded on the accusations that Rajagopalachari advocated
at one time that Bengal and the Punjab should be “forsaken” on the ground
that these two Provinces were obstacles in the way of the rest of India attaining
independence ; that his record as an administrator is bad ; and that his record as
a Congress-man during the war period was “miserable”. On the other hand,
I am delighted with this appointment; for I think he will make a much better
Governor than a Minister.
53. I referred to the problem of the North-West Frontier Province in
paragraphs 19 to 23 of my last Report.22 Just before Jinnah left for Pakistan
(in my aircraft) he and Liaquat asked me what I was doing about the N.W.F.P.
Ministry, as they were getting very worried. I replied that I had referred the
matter to London as I did not wish to act in an unconstitutional manner.
Liaquat then told me that he had evidence that Khan Sahib intended to declare
the independence of “Pathanistan” on the morning of the i5thifstillinpower;23
but I have not heard any supporting evidence of this from any other source.
I told them that I had it in mind to tell Lockhart to call on the Ministry to
resign on the nth and that if they failed to do so to dismiss them on the 12th.
The new Governor, Cunningham (who was of course the Governor up to
1945) is seeing Jinnah in Karachi on the nth, and me in Delhi on the 12th, and
arrives at Peshawar on the evening of the 12th. Fie will be swom-in on the
morning of the 13 th and his first act can be to form a new Ministry in accord¬
ance with Jinnah’s instructions in anticipation of the transfer of power on the
15th August. This proposal has been telegraphed24 to the Secretary of State for
approval. Jinnah did not like this delay, but finally shrugged his shoulders and
said “I am in your hands in this matter”.
54. I wrote to Pandit Nehru three weeks ago, concerning the staff which
I should retain after the transfer of power.25 It is only now that he has given
me a definite reply. So far as my Personal Staff is concerned, he is happy that
I should use my own discretion. He says, however, how glad he is that Ismay
will be staying on. In my original letter I offered to move into a smaller house,26
should it be considered that this would help politically. He has replied to the
effect that such a move would certainly create a considerable impression in
peoples’ minds, and would be generally welcomed by them as an indication
of the New Order. But he says that an immediate change-over would add to
his difficulties rather than lessen them. He, therefore, wants me to continue to
live in Viceroy’s House — or rather “Government House” as it will be called
AUGUST 1947
603
after the 15th August. He has asked me whether I would be willing to put up
Government guests and arrange government entertaining. I of course replied
that I should be delighted to do this. (He evidently does not know that his own
External Affairs Department already ring up freely when they want important
travellers put up and entertained.)
55. Both the India and Pakistan Cabinets have, during the course of the
week, reconsidered the suggestion (referred to in paragraph 18 of my last
Report)27 that the Indian contingent should not be withdrawn from Japan
until after the Peace Treaty is signed. They both came to the conclusion that
they would after all adhere to the original Cabinet decision on this matter, and
that the contingent should be withdrawn straight away. I regret this decision
in so far as the international prestige of the two new Dominions is concerned,
though it will be administratively far more convenient. The leaders were
clearly influenced by Auchinleck’s suggestion that there might be trouble
within the contingent if it stayed on, after having been informed it was to be
withdrawn shortly to be partitioned.
56. Returns so far received show that 614 officers and 145 other ranks of the
British personnel in the Indian Army have volunteered to stay, and that 199
officers and 11 other ranks have declined. These figures are better than I
personally had expected.
57. My ‘titbit’ this week comes from London where The Times of the
29th July announced:
VICEROY VISITS CALCUTTA
MEETING WITH PETITITON COUNCIL
58. Since dictating this report, this morning, a letter28 has come from the
Prime Minister of Jodhpur, Venkatachar (an I.C.S. man from the U.P.) saying
that no sooner had the young Maharaja of Jodhpur assured me at the Princes’
luncheon that he intended to accede to the Dominion of India than the Dholpur
group persuaded him not to join the Union. Jodhpur was taken to see Jinnah
in the presence of Bhopal and Zafrullah. Jinnah offered Jodhpur the use of
Karachi as a free port; the free import of arms; jurisdiction over the Jodphur-
Hyderabad (Sind) railway; and a supply of grain to famine threatened districts,
on condition that Jodhpur would declare its independence on August 15 th and
then join Pakistan.
59. A family Council, attended by some headmen, was held on the
5th August, where the majority were against joining Pakistan. The Maharaja
still thinks Jinnah’s offer the best and has wired to Bhopal saying that at Iris
22 Ibid. 23 See No. 374.
24 Ibid. 25 cf. No. 162, para. 20. 26 cf. ibid., para. 22. 27 No. 302.
28 Not traced.
604
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
end die situation is satisfactory and that he will meet Bhopal in Delhi on the
nth. On the 7th August he left for Baroda to try and persuade the Gaekwar
not to sign the Instrument of Accession. Meanwhile Bhopal is making attempts
to prevent Jaipur and Cutch and Udaipur from signing the Instrument. I saw
the Maharaj Kumar of Cutch this morning, and in return for certain assurances
he has undertaken to sign the Instrument of Accession on behalf of his father,
who had somewhat lightheartedly left for a visit to England on the day of my
meeting with the Rulers in Delhi on the 25th July. What irresponsible people
some of these Rulers are!
60. I have sent a telegram29 to the Maharaja of Jodhpur saying that I wish
to see him at once. But what disturbs me most is that Bhopal should apparently
be behaving as a friend to my face whilst engineering a break-up of my scheme
behind my back. I shall confront him with this when he comes to Delhi.
M. OF B.
Midnight Stop Press
Jinnah has just telephoned his flat refusal to agree to the proposals in paragraphs
31 to 38, so my Constitutional Draftsman, Cooke, and the Pakistan Cabinet
Secretary, Mohamad Ali, are flying down to Karachi tomorrow morning to
try and convince Jinnah that unless he agrees an economic war may start
which would be disastrous to Pakistan.
Appendix I to No. 385
STATEMENT BY PARTITION COUNCIL
At their Meeting on Wednesday, 6th August,30 the Partition Council con¬
sidered the problem of Refugees.
As is well known, a large number of Muslims and non-Muslims have
migrated from their homes in consequence of communal disturbances. Most
of the Muslim refugees are from Bihar and Eastern Punjab ; and most of the
non-Muslims from Bengal, the North-West Frontier Province and Western
Apart from those who have actually migrated, there is a considerable number
of people in all these areas who have been rendered destitute, and are living in
camps organised by Provincial Governments and charitable organisations.
The Members of the Partition Council, representing the future Governments
of India and Pakistan, have decided to take the following action with a view
to arresting further exodus of refugees and to encouraging the return of those
who have already left.
(1) The two Governments have decided to retain the refugee camps for
Muslims in India and for non-Muslims in Pakistan, and themselves to
undertake responsibility for the purpose of both administration and
finance.
AUGUST 1947
605
(2) Arrangements will be made to enable officers of the two Governments to
visit the affected areas and the refugees in the two Dominions, and to
discuss from time to time with local officers, matters relating to any
problem of relief and rehabilitation that may be evolved.
(3) In view of the fact that no arrangements have so far been made for the
management of refugees’ property, and because, so long as the local
population and the majority community in villages and towns maintain
a hostile attitude, the refugees will be unable to return and look after
their property, the two Governments have decided to appoint managers,
at a suitable level, for the administration of refugees’ property in the
various areas. The expenses of these managers will be paid out of the
proceeds of the properties which they are appointed to look after.
(4) They have further decided that Provincial Governments should be asked
to set up machinery, where this has not already been done, for the
assessment of damage to both movable and immovable property of the
minorities ; and to consider what grant of relief or compensation should
be given to those who have suffered.
(5) The two Governments have also decided on the following steps, designed
to restore confidence among the minorities: —
(a) Speedy investigation of cases and prosecution of offenders.
(b) Village officials, e.g., Zaildars, Safaid Poshis, Lambardars and
local officials such as Tehsildars and Sub-Inspectors of Police will
be made personally responsible for the safety and protection of
minorities resident in their respective areas.
(c) Every effort will be made to persuade shop keepers, traders,
professional people such as lawyers, doctors, etc., to remain and
carry on their businesses.
(6) Rehabilitation measures will be initiated by the two Governments so
as to encourage the return of refugees and evacuees to their respective
homes.
Appendix II to No. 385
PROPOSED DATES ON WHICH THE UNION JACK WILL BE
FLOWN ON PUBLIC BUILDINGS
1st January Army Day (India)
1st April Air Force Day (India)
24th May Commonwealth Day
1 2th June (May be varied) King’s Official Birthday
29 No. 3271-S of 8 August, sent via the Resident in Rajputana. R/3/1/139: f 186.
30 See Mountbatten Papers, Partition Council Minutes, 6 August 1947, Case No. P.C. 149/16/47.
6o6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
14th June
4th August
7th November
nth November (May be varied)
United Nations Flag Day
Queen’s Birthday
Navy Day (India)
Remembrance Day for both
World Wars.
Optional on other Dominion days, particularly those who have High Com¬
missioners in Delhi or Karachi. These are : —
26th January
3 1st May
1st July
24th September
Foundation Day, Australia
Union Day, South Africa
Dominion Day, Canada
Dominion Day, New Zealand
Appendix III to No. 383
EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE
PARTITION COUNCIL HELD ON WEDNESDAY 6TH AUGUST, I94731
His Excellency recalled that both Mr Jinnah, on behalf of the future Govern¬
ment of Pakistan, and Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel, on behalf of the future
Government of India, had agreed to the suggestion that, in States which
acceded to one or other Dominion, the Princes, and those whom they
recommended, might continue to receive decorations from His Majesty. His
Excellency proposed that the Order of the Indian Empire should no longer be
used for this purpose, but that the Order of the Star of India, (to which, both
in name and design, there were no political objections), should continue to be
awarded. His Excellency also proposed that Princes should continue to be
allowed to hold Honorary ranks and to become Honorary Aides de Camp to
the King. He explained that these proposals would not involve any undue
increase in the number to whom honours would be given. It would normally
be on the death of a present holder or on the expiry of his time as an Honorary
A.D.C. that a new award would be made. Both Mr Jinnah, on behalf of the
future Government of Pakistan, and Sardar Patel, on behalf of the future
Government of India, agreed with His Excellency’s suggestions set out above,
which he undertook to convey to His Majesty the King.
31 See No. 353, Case No. P.C. 146/16/47.
AUGUST 1947
607
386
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram, L/E/g/ 1514: ff 177-8
IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 8 August 1947, 7.4O pm
Received: 9 August, 1 0.30 am
No. 10280. Your telegram 3205-S of 6tli August.1 International position of
new Dominions You will already have seen copy of Foreign Office telegram
25 1 3 2 to New York which was repeated to you as No. 10242. United Kingdom
Representative in New York now reports3 that matter has been discussed with
United Nations Secretariat who intend to act on view that new India will
continue international personality of old India and will not themselves at any
rate raise question of continued membership of India. They consider that
Pakistan should apply for membership but do not think that it is essential that
action in this sense should be taken before August 15th in view of provision
under Rule 60 for waiving of time limits (precedent for this already exists in
case of Siam).
2. In these circumstances United Kingdom Representative suggests that best
course would be for Pakistan itself to apply as soon as it comes into existence.
He does not favour idea that United Kingdom Delegation should apply on
Pakistan’s behalf, nor does he think that it would be regarded as very reasonable
that Pakistan should put in application before it comes into existence. Moreover,
Indian Delegation, who have been consulted informally, are inclined to fear
that any such action taken by His Majesty’s Government might conceivably
prejudice Pakistan’s chances as well as precipitate discussion of validity of their
own representation.
3. We should be grateful if you could explain position to Mr. Liaquat Ali
Khan and inform him that soundings we have taken lead us to think that best
course would be for Pakistan itself to submit application on 15 th August. This
application should, of course, be sent by telegram to Secretary-General and
should include declaration of readiness to accept obligations contained in the
Charter.4
1 No. 362. 2 No. 371. 3 Tel. 2152 of 7 August. L/E/9/1514: f 179.
4 Lord Mountbatten replied in tel. 3310-S of 10 August that he had advised Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and
the United Kingdom High Commissioners for India and Pakistan accordingly. L/E/9/1514: f 174.
6o8
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
387
The Earl of Listen'd to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , L/P &Jf 8/ 660: fj 12-13
MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 8 August 1947, 8.30 pm
Received: 9 August , 1.00 am
No. 10278. Your telegrams Nos. 3170,1 31712 and 31723 of 5th August and
No. 32654 of 8th August. NorthWest Frontier Province. 1 have considered two
alternatives given in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 3170. With regard to
(1) present position as I understand it is that Ministry have suffered no defeat
in Legislature and still retain confidence of majority of its members; and that
although Governor may have very good reason to believe that Legislature as
at present constituted no longer represents majority of electorate general
election is ruled out for security reasons. Dismissal of Ministry in these
circumstances with no choice of dissolution would be unconstitutional,
particularly in view of injunction in Governor’s Instrument of Instructions to
appoint as Ministers those best in position to command confidence of
Legislature.
2. As regards second alternative Governor does not appear to consider that
present situation in Province, in respect either of law and order or of Ministry’s
position, is such that in words of Section 93 government of Province cannot be
carried on in accordance with provisions of Act. Furthermore withdrawal of
Section 93 regime as soon as Muslim League were installed in office would be
evidence that resort to it had been merely a device.
3. Thus (subject to paragraph 6 below) both your alternatives would be
unconstitutional, although of course either would be legal in the sense that
it could not be challenged in courts.
4. On information before me I am not convinced that removal of present
Ministry by us before 15th August however much desired by provisional
Pakistan Government would really be wise particularly as it could be done only
by unconstitutional action. Even though you could state that you had acted on
advice of Pakistan Provisional Government and Mr. Jinnah, responsibility both
legal and moral would be that of H.M.G. Governor evidently does not con¬
sider that disappearance of Ministry would necessarily bring about improve¬
ment in local situation on 15th August (see paragraphs 4 and 6 of his telegram
repeated in your telegram No. 3172). Pressure for action to be taken before
15th August appears to come wholly from Muslim League Fiigh Command.
5. My inclination therefore would be to leave problem to be resolved after
15th August and accordingly without the intervention of yourself and H.M’s
AUGUST 1947
609
Government. Resolving of the difficulty in a constitutional manner after
15th August might possibly involve urgent action by the Pakistan Constituent
Assembly under Section 8(1) of Indian Independence Act so as to confer special
powers on Governor of Province or on Governor-General of Dominion to
deal with it. We have no information here as to what adaptations if any you
have made or are making before 15 th August or Jinnah contemplates on or
after 15 th August under Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act in relation
to either Provincial Executive itself or relationship between Pakistan Central
Executive and Provincial Executive. Accordingly we are not in a position to
judge whether after 15th August any special action desired by Jinnah in
relation to N.W.F.P. Executive could be taken constitutionally without bring¬
ing in his Constituent Assembly as suggested.
6. Of course if you or Governor were satisfied that information quoted in
paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 3265 is correct the position would be
different and you would I think be entitled to adopt course you propose in that
telegram or to impose Section 93 regime. But have you any information
confirming Liaquat Ali Khan’s fears? He is very interested party and I do not
think that we ought to accept his unsupported assertion regarding Khan
Sahib’s intentions, particularly as you in India presumably and we in
Parliament certainly would have to justify our action by reference to our
knowledge that Khan Sahib was about to declare independent Pathanistan.
7. Even if there appears to be fairly good ground for believing that Khan
Sahib might take such a course, I am still not sure that action by you before
15 th August is the wisest course. Cunningham will have taken over just before
15 th August and if he believes that there is the slightest risk of such a step by
Khan Sahib he could warn the latter that such action would be unconstitutional
as being entirely outside powers of N.W.F.P. Government, and that if
Khan Sahib made any attempt to issue any such a declaration without the
Governor’s approval it would be followed by instant dismissal of Khan Sahib
and his Ministry.
8. Possibly a friendly warning to Khan Sahib at once by Lockhart on the
lines of the preceding paragraph might be useful but as to the wisdom of that
I must leave you to judge.
9. Cunningham has seen this telegram and fully agrees. Indeed he had
independently come to much the same conclusion before the matter was
discussed with him.
1 No. 342.
2 This telegram repeated Sir G. Spence’s legal opinion in the Enclosure to No. 294.
3 Repeating No. 327. 4 No. 374.
6io
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
10. I shall telegraph to Lockhart Cunningham’s Commission as acting
Governor from I2th-i5th August.
11. I should be grateful for an urgent reply.
The Nizam of Hyderabad to Sir W. Monckton
Monckton Trustees No. 30: f 35
PRIVATE HYDERABAD, DECCAN, 9 August 1947
My dear Sir Walter Monckton,
In the letter1 addressed to His Excellency the Viceroy, which you are taking
to Delhi tomorrow morning, I said that in case the Indian Dominion does not
accept my offer (contained in the above letter) I shall be compelled to publish
it, in order that the people inside and outside the country (even beyond the
seas) may know how just and proper my offer was But on the second thought
I consider it essential to publish this under all circumstances (which means
whether it is accepted or rejected) under the fear that the Indian Dominion
may say something detrimental to Hyderabad interests on the 14th August
in their broadcast by simply hiding from the public what I said in my letter
to His Excellency the Viceroy about my offer. So in view of all these things,
I must publish this letter of mine by the 12th or 13 th August at the latest in
order to clear my position before the whole world. I trust you will tell His
Excellency the Viceroy what I wrote to you in this letter.
Yours sincerely,
NIZAM VII
1 No. 376.
389
Minutes of Viceroy s Sixty Ninth Staff Meeting , Items 1 and 3
Mountbatten Papers
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at the Viceroy s House , New Delhi , on 9 August
1947 at 11.00 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Lord Ismay,
Sir G. Abell, Mr Christie, Mr I. D. Scott, Mr A. Campbell-Johnson, Lieutenant-
Colonel Erskine Crum.
AUGUST 1947
6 II
Item 1
THE PUNJAB
It was stated that Sir Cyril Radcliffe would be ready by that evening to
announce the award of the Punjab Boundary Commission, the viceroy
recalled that he had asked for the award to be ready by 10th August.1 However,
it was now for reconsideration whether it would in fact be desirable to publish
it straight away. Without question, the earlier it was published, the more the
British would have to bear the responsibility for the disturbances which would
undoubtedly result.
lord ismay gave his opinion that it would be best to defer publication of
the award until the 14th August.
sir george abell said that he had already asked Sir Evan Jenkins for an
opinion as to the best date for the announcement.2 He pointed out that there
were administrative advantages from early publication.
the viceroy emphasised the necessity for maintaining secrecy, not only
on the terms of the award, but also on the fact that it would be ready that day.3
Reference was made to a telegram4 from the Governor of the Punjab
concerning the situation in the Boundary Area, which was described as most
serious. Sir Evan Jenkins asked for Army reinforcements, if possible; for a
Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron; for the release of 200 provisional additional
Police at present lent to Delhi; and for the earliest possible advance information
of the Boundary Commission’s award.
lord ismay said that he had spoken about the first three of these requests
with the Commander-in-Chief that morning. As regards reinforcement troops,
Field Marshal Auchinleck had already received a similar request from Major-
General Rees, and was trying his best to raise these. He had pointed out,
however, the necessity for the Units being mixed; and it was mixed Units
which Pakistan were wanting for the North-W est Frontier. Most of the other
available troops were committed in other directions. Field Marshal Auchinleck
1 See Nos. 200 and 209. 2 cf. No. 377.
3 Mr A. Campbell-Johnson made the following record of this discussion: ‘Various points of view about
publication were put forward. On administrative grounds it was argued that earliest possible announce¬
ment would be of help to Jenkins and would enable last-minute troop movements to be made into the
affected areas in advance of the transfer of power. Alternatively, it was suggested that in so far as the
Award would in any case be bound to touch off trouble, the best date to release it would be on the
14th August. Mountbatten said that if he could exercise some discretion in the matter he would much
prefer to postpone its appearance until after the Independence Day celebrations, feeling that the
problem of its timing was really one of psychology, and that the controversy and grief that it was bound
to arouse on both sides should not be allowed to mar Independence Day itself.’ Alan Campbell-
Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, London, 1951, p. 152. An entry in Mr Christie’s diary for 9 August
reads as follows: ‘Staff Meeting to-day concerned with Boundary Commission timing of announce¬
ment and precautions — George [Sir G. Abell] tells me H.E. is in a tired flap, & is having to be strenu¬
ously dissuaded from asking Radcliffe to alter his award.’ MSS.EUR.D 718/3, Part 2. cf. Nos. 454
and 489, para. 11.
4 No. 382.
6 12
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
was fairly certain that the provision of some Tactical Reconnaissance aircraft
was in hand; and he would expedite this.
lord ism ay said that he had also spoken to the Commander-in-Chief
about the loyalty of Sikhs in the Army. Field Marshal Auchinleck had stated
that there was a proportion of Sikhs in nearly all the Units in the Punjab
Boundary Force. He was having the question of their loyalty examined,
the viceroy said that steps should be taken to ensure the loyalty of the
Sikhs in the Governor-General’s Bodyguard. Sir George Abell should see
Major Massey and ask him to make it clear to the Bodyguard that he (The
Viceroy) had had nothing to do with the award of the Boundary Commission;
and to ensure that any members of the Bodyguard whose loyalty was doubtful,
should not attend the August 15th parades.
the viceroy said that the award of the Boundary Commission should not
be put out in a communique from Viceroy’s House, but rather published as
a Gazette Extraordinary.
his excellency the viceroy: —
(i) directed P.S.V. further to discuss with the Governor of the Punjab the
timing of the announcement of the Boundary Commission’s award;
(ii) directed P.S.V. to arrange for the Boundary Commission’s award,
when published, to be contained in a Gazette Extraordinary;
(iii) directed P.S.V. to tell Major Massey to take the steps in connection
with the Governor-General’s Bodyguard detailed above.
Item 3
HYDERABAD
lord is may said that Sir Walter Monckton was returning to Delhi from
Hyderabad the following day. He had telegraphed5 to the effect that the
situation was critical, the viceroy stated that, at a meeting on Thursday,
7th August, he had persuaded the India Cabinet to grant an extension to
Hyderabad of the time limit by which they must accede.6
5 Sir W. Monckton’s telegram of 8 August simply stated: ‘Could His Excellency please give me
interview Sunday ioth 5.30. Walter Monckton.’ Mr C. P. Scott conveyed Lord Mountbatten’s reply
on 9 August in the following manner: ‘Following from H.E. Begins. Certainly. Am obtaining reprieve.
Ends.’ R/3/1/139: If 196 and 197.
6 cf. No. 385, para. 18.
AUGUST 1947
613
390
Sir W. Monckton to Mr W. Churchill , Lord Salisbury , Mr Eden and
Mr R. A. Butler 1
Monckton Trustees No. 30: f) 43-3
nizam’s guest house, new delhi, g August 1947
1. I am writing you this letter, because it may be difficult for me to get into
touch with you hereafter. I am enclosing a letter,2 which is a copy of one
written by the Nizam of Hyderabad to the Crown Representative explaining
the attitude of his State and making his offer of co-operation.
2. You will see from the terms of that letter references to statements made
by His Majesty’s Government making it clear that the States ought not to be
hurried to a decision and that it might well be that some form of treaty relation¬
ship would be appropriate, at least for a time, until fuller information was
available about the constitutions of the new Dominions and their mutual
relations.
3 . So far as the terms of the Instrument of Accession offered to States by the
Dominion of India are concerned, they are, in my judgement, more favourable
to the States than any hitherto offered to them. This is largely due to the
personal efforts of the Viceroy. I have not failed to make my opinion on this
matter clear to those Princes, both Moslem and Hindu, who have sought my
advice. But the special circumstances of Hyderabad, which has had Moslem
rule for something like seven centuries and the present dynasty for more than
two, and yet has a large preponderance of Hindu subjects, are such that its
problem is not whether the terms of the Instrument are more favourable than
ever before, so much as whether it can or should accede at all at this stage. As
you know, I have been closely concerned with this State for 15 years, and in
the last 4 months during which I have been in India and mostly in Hyderabad.
I have not been without reliable sources of information. In my considered
judgement, if the Nizam were to decide to accede now, there would be an
uprising and bloodshed on a large scale caused by his Moslem subjects who,
would resent, as they would think, the southern bastion of the Moslem world
in India being abandoned after all these centuries to the Hindus without a
struggle. Nor can the Nizam contemplate such an uprising without anxious
misgiving. His Government and his administration are largely in Moslem
hands and the Army, a by no means negligible force, and his Police are largely
1 The original of this letter is in type with the intended recipients inserted in pencil at the top. A pencilled
note also indicates that it was not delivered, presumably as a result of Sir W. Monckton’s interviews
with Lord Mountbatten on io and n August. See Nos. 420 and 434; also No. 419.
2 No. 376.
614
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Moslem. I can well understand it if, in these circumstances, he decides that, if
he must reach a conclusion at this moment, he will not accede to the Dominion
of India. Nevertheless, I hope, when you read the accompanying letter, you
will think that he has made a reasonable offer of co-operation in full accord
with the policy propounded in the recent debates in Parliament by His Majesty’s
Government.
4. It is not the case that Congress object in principle to a State remaining
independent for some tune after 15 August. They are ready to acquiesce in the
independence of Kashmir, where there is a Hindu Maharajah and a pre¬
dominantly Moslem population.
5. The reason for this letter is that I gravely apprehend that on and after
the 15th August the Congress Government of the new Dominion intend to
treat failure by Hyderabad to accede before that date as a hostile act and to
apply all-out economic sanctions, including cutting Hyderabad communications
with the outer world and even denying them social contacts. I have learnt
myself that this is intended from the States Department of the new Government
and of the likelihood of it from the Viceroy.3 My fear that these threats of
coercion and pressure will really be carried out has greatly increased as a result
of information given to me by several Rulers who intend to accede and who,
in the course of discussions, have shown me notes of interviews with rep¬
resentatives of the States Department and others, in the course of which the
threats I have mentioned above were used and it was anticipated in terms that
Hyderabad would be compelled to accede by these methods within one month.
6. I am sure that it is within the knowledge of the Viceroy that money was
spent by Congress to subvert the Government of Travancore and that he
anticipates that larger sums will be spent for the same purpose in Hyderabad.4
7. I shall remind the Viceroy of the pledges of His Majesty’s Government
to which I have referred and I shall ask him for assurances that these threats will
not be put into effect while he is content to remain as Governor-General of the
new Dominion. If these assurances are refused and the threats are carried out,
I have means of communicating such an event to you.
8. I have been reading Ciano’s Diary and I am bound to say that the present
exhibition of power politics seems an exact replica of those in which Hitler
and Mussolini indulged. I am going back to share the experiences of the
Nizam and his Government who after all these years have become my friends
as well as my clients and to render them such advice and assistance as lie in
my power.
9. It may well be that you will not hear from me again upon this matter
apart from a short message to let you know that the German tactic on the old
European model has been adopted in India. But I rely on you in the name of
AUGUST 1947
615
our old friendship to see to it that if this shameful betrayal of our old friends
and allies cannot be prevented, at least it does not go uncastigated before the
conscience of the world.
3 cf. No. 329. 4 cf. Nos. 288 and 434, para. 1.
391
Mr Abbott to Sir G. Abell
Telegram , R/3I 1/157: f 261
IMMEDIATE £ August 19 4 7, 12.00 pm
confidential Received: 9 August, 2.00 pm
No. 221-S. Your letter of August 8th.1 Governor is taking law and order
action on preliminary information given. He trusts final version will be very
precise and will be related as far as possible to existing administrative units and
boundaries. To enable us to arrange publicity and to make administrative
arrangements he would like the document in final form 24 hours before its
release e.g. if it could be flown U(sic) 10th evening it could be released nth
evening in New Delhi.
1 No. 377.
392
Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart (. North-West Frontier Province) to
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram, Rfjlifi6s: J 70
MOST IMMEDIATE 9 August I947 , 12. JO pm
secret Received: 9 August, 7.30 pm
No. CA/167. Addressed Viceroy repeated Secretary of State.
I have had further consultation with Area Commander and Inspector-General
of Police with reference to your recent telegrams.1
They are both gravely perturbed at prospect of dismissal at this particular
juncture and foresee very serious and widespread disturbances. Area Com¬
mander is emphatic that owing to partition of troops movements of forces at
his disposal are inadequate and some of doubtful temper.
Both consider that we shall be in better position in two months time when
Cunningham will have had chance to exert his influence. We are going ahead
1 See correspondence ending with Nos. 363 and 374.
6i6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
with preparations to act at once but in the circumstances I feel compelled to
recommend delay and that you should ask Jinnali to urge patience on League.
My information is that any League repercussions to temporary retention of
present Ministry would be less dangerous.
Dissolution might still save situation.
393
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listoivel
Telegram , f 66
MOST IMMEDIATE NEW D ELHI, p August 1 947, 1.00 pm
secret Received: 9 August , 3.20 pm
No. 3284-S. Your 10278 of 8th August.1
I note your instruction that it would be unconstitutional to dismiss the
Ministry. I propose to inform Jinnah that I have had this instruction from you
and to ask him to discuss with Cunningham at Karachi what action should be
taken about a change of Ministry on or after 15 th August. I shall send a letter
to Jinnah and make a copy available for Cunningham when he arrives at
Karachi.
2. If possible please contact Cunningham, and tell him the situation before
he leaves.2
1 No. 387.
2 Lord Listowel replied in tel. 10439 of 9 August (repeated to Governor, N.W.F.P.) that tel. 3284-S had
been received and Sir G. Cunningham informed. R/3/1/165: f 68.
394
Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart ( North-West Frontier Province ) to
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma (Extract)
Mountbatten Papers . Letters to and from Provincial Governors
SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PESHAWAR, 9 August I947
NO. GH-I5I
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I am afraid this letter is a little late.
GENERAL SITUATION
2. The general situation remains much as it was when I saw1 Your Excellency
a week ago. Members of the Congress party organisations continue to make
AUGUST 1947
617
threatening and sometimes provocative speeches in public and to individuals.
‘Pathanistan’ is being vigorously advocated and the idea is, I think, proving
attractive to many Pathans. Rumours and reports of continued activity by the
Faqir of Ipi flow in daily. There is no doubt that Congress are in touch with
him and that he may initiate some form of trouble, but probably not until
after the Id. He has apparently had no success with the Mahsuds or Wana
Wazirs and his efforts to create trouble seem likely to be confined to North
Waziristan, although he has some following in the Bannu District.
3. There is a feeling of expectancy of impending changes amongst the tribes
in general. Although it is considered that Mr Jinnah’s announcement on
30th July,2 that existing agreements and arrangements are to continue in force,
will have a good effect, it is possible that the idea, held by some, that everyone
will be free to do what he likes after 15th August may lead to some light¬
heartedness on the part of irresponsible elements after that date.
4. The revival of talks on the Kabul Radio and articles in the Afghan Press,
after the recent lull, is also a disturbing feature.3 It is I think significant that this
revived interest coincided with a visit to Kabul of one Puri, the Peshawar
correspondent of the Hindustan Times and the Deputy Speaker of the
Province’s Legislative Assembly. He is commonly supposed to be the main
link here with Gandhi. In articles to the Hindustan Times from Kabul he has
made the most of Afghan interest in Pathanistan. I cannot help feeling that his
visit to Kabul at this particular time was not accidental.
5. I have seen Dr Khan Sahib several times since my return from New Delhi.
On the first two occasions on which he visited me his manner was pre-occupied
and somewhat downcast, although he said nothing to explain this. When
however he came to see me on the 6th, after attending a meeting of Congress
Party leaders at Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s house on the fifth, his manner was most
cheerful. He said 'it was a very nice meeting’. I signalled my report of my talk
with him to Your Excellency that day.4
He still adheres to his intention not to resign. I will try again, in accordance
with your instructions5 to persuade him to do so, though I fear there is little
chance of my success.
He has in recent talks seemed more inclined to co-operation with the
Pakistan Government than he has done previously, although he still doesn’t
like the idea of a coalition. As I telegraphed to you he even said he would
co-operate and accept Pakistan if Jinnah would agree to full Provincial
autonomy and to placing no prohibition on political party programmes provid¬
ed they are advocated and executed constitutionally.
However, I fear that though he himself may have some inclination towards
1 See No. 278. 2 cf. Nos. 336 and 349. 3 See No. 321.
4 No. 365. s See ibid., note 4.
6 1 8
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
the constitutional conduct of the political differences between his party and the
League, the Congress Party here as a whole are determined to fight for power
with any means at their disposal, and have their plans ready.
6. The Muslim League are aware of all the Congress activities and are
reported to be preparing to deal with any action the latter may take. They are
as insistent as ever that Dr Khan Sahib’s Ministry must go before the
15 th August. I, and the officials 1 have consulted here, would prefer that the
Pakistan Government should take the necessary action to do this.6 I can see the
argument against it, i.e., that it would be hard on the Pakistan Government to
have as its first act to dismiss the present Ministry and face the probable
ensuing trouble. On the other hand it can be said that it is the Pakistan Govern¬
ment, by its insistence on not dissolving the Legislative Assembly, that has led
to the present situation, where Dr Khan Sahib refuses to resign.
7. There are dissensions amongst the local League leaders. Some disapprove
of the appointment of a British Governor, some are disappointed with Jinnah’s
choice of Ministers for the League Ministry here and some are annoyed because
Jinnah said he could not establish ‘Shariat’ law. (I understand that Mr Jinnah
has selected Abdul Qaiyum, Habibullah Khan of Lakki Marwat in the Bannu
District and Abhas Khan of Hazara as Ministers).
There is I think little doubt that the League will deal firmly with their
opponents and I am concerned as to how one can protect the present Ministers
from bad treatment.
★ ★ ★
6 cF. No. 392.
395
Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rhl 1/157:/ 258-9
SECRET
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI,
9 August 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
Mr. A. N. Kliosla, Chairman, Central Waterways, Irrigation and Navigation
Commission, has sent me a note about the canal system in the Punjab. As he
has been chiefly concerned with this system and knows all about it, I take it
that his views have a certain value and importance. I am, therefore, sending this
AUGUST 1947
619
note to you. If you feel that this might be sent on to Sir Cyril Radcliffe,
perhaps this might be done.
Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
Enclosure to No. 393
SECRET
It is gathered that at the luncheon at Simla Sir Cyril Radcliffe suggested to the
four Judges the desirability of recommending joint control of the canal system
and electricity (presumably over the areas where this distribution is common to
Pakistan and India). It is gathered that one or two of the Judges said that this
did not form part of the terms of reference of the Boundary Commission, and,
therefore, it was not within the jurisdiction of the Boundary Commission to
take any action in that respect. Sir Cyril Radcliffe is understood to have
inquired if the Judges will have any objection to this recommendation being
entered as a recommendation only. The reply of the Judges to this is not known.
So far as the canal system in West Punjab is concerned, that serves exclusively
the Pakistan area and, therefore, the question of joint control will not arise in
their case; but the Upper Bari Doab canal which runs through Gurdaspur,
Amritsar and Lahore districts will be irrigating areas both in east and west
Punjab and even if Gurdaspur is given to East Punjab, it will still be doing
irrigation in Lahore district, unless the whole of that district is given to East
Punjab.
The next common system of canals is the Sutlej valley canals, taking the
supplies from the joint waters of the Beas and the Sutlej. The first headworks of
this system is at Ferozepore from which irrigation water is taken to Bikaner.
The second headworks is at Sulaimanki, which is also in Ferozepore district.
According to notional division bodi these headworks would fall in East
Punjab. It, however, appears that Sir Cyril Radcliffe’s mind may be working
in the direction of giving Ferozepore and Zira tahsils having a small muslim
majority east of the Sutlej to Pakistan in return for giving Gurdaspur and part
of Lahore district to East Punjab. That will be disastrous from the point of
view of East Punjab and Bikaner State from the irrigation point of view and
disastrous to India as a whole from the strategic point of view, because the only
line of defence, that is the Sutlej, will have been pierced by the bridge at
Ferozepore and between this and Delhi there is no natural barrier. On the
other hand, if Ferozepore and Sulaimanki remain in East Punjab according
to the notional division and because they are Flindu majority areas, then the
only point where the Sutlej could be crossed would be in Bahawalpur State
adjoining Bikaner territory.
Both from the strategic and irrigation point of view it will be most dangerous
to let Ferozepore go to Pakistan. Whatever may be the decision about area
620
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
west of Sutlej, no area east of the Sutlej must oil any account go to Pakistan.
The joint control of irrigation canals must on no account be accepted, even
as a recommendation of the Boundary Commission — this aspect is outside the
terms of their reference. Any acceptance, even in a remote way, of joint
control of the irrigation system will kill all hope of irrigation development in
the Punjab. Even the construction of the Bhakhra dam may be affected.
Similarly no joint control of electricity must be accepted.
I shall be glad to come for discussion, if there is any point to be clarified.
A. N. KHOSLA
8.8.47.
396
Mr Jinnah to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
RI3I1I166: f 68
GOVERNMENT HOUSE, KARA CPU, Q August 1Q4 7
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
Many thanks for your letter dated the 8th of August1 along with a letter of
Lord Ismay.
1 have accepted the draft agreement between Pakistan and Kalat, and you
may now issue the communique accordingly.
I am also writing2 to Lord Ismay informing him that I have accepted his
suggestions with regard to clauses i and 2. The remaining clauses will stand as
amended by me to which I find that there is no objection because they merely
specify the place — ‘at Karachi’.
Also I agree with Lord Ismay that he should issue a notification on the
15th of August as drafted by him which runs as follows: —
[There follows the text of the draft notification attached to the Enclosure to
No. 375.]
Yours sincerely,
M. A. JINNAH
1 No. 375.
2 R/3/1/166: f 66. There is no reply from the Khan of Kalat to Lord Ismay’s letter (see No. 375, note 4)
on the file. However, a note by Ismay dated 10 August indicates that Sir Sultan Ahmed was informed (1)
that Mr Jinnah agreed to Ismay’s proposals, and (2) that the communique was to be published on
12 August. Ibid., f 67. The communique was in fact published on 11 August, see No. 488, para. 10.
AUGUST 1947
621
397
Mr Harris to Principal Ganga Singh
L/P &JI71 12465: f 68
INDIA OFFICE, 9 August 1 9 47
I have been asked by Lord Listowel (who is keeping an engagement elsewhere
today) to let you know that he has received the letter which you and Meherban
Singh Dhupia sent him on August 6th and also the letter from Master Tara
Singh which you despatched separately.1
In your letter you ask that Lord Listowel should see you, before the
Boundary Commission gives its award, in regard to the partition of the
Punjab. Lord Listowel understands that you have already seen Sir Paul Patrick,
one of his Assistant Under-Secretaries of State, regarding this matter and that
he has explained to you that it no longer rests with H.M.G. to take decisions
affecting the boundaries of the two new Provinces of East and West Punjab.
Sir Paul Patrick has informed Lord Listowel that at your interview with him
you stated that you recognised that this matter had been entrusted wholly to
the Boundary Commission, whose award, under Section 4(2) of the Indian
Independence Act, will be final. You also expressed your confidence in the
selection of Sir Cyril Radcliffe as Chairman of the Boundary Commission and
agreed that there was no question as to the integrity and impartiality of the
Commissioners.
Lord Listowel also understands that, in a statement issued on July 22nd,2
the members of the Partition Council at New Delhi, including Sardar Baldev
Singh on behalf of the Sikh community, pledged the Governments of the two
future Dominions to accept the awards of the Commission whatever these
might be.
Lord Listowel feels sure that you will, therefore, appreciate that the matter is
out of his hands and he could only repeat to you what has already been said to
you by Sir Paul Patrick. If, however, you and your colleagues would still wish
to see Lord Listowel, he would, of course, be happy to meet such distinguished
representatives of the great Sikh community and make your acquaintances.
Should you and your colleagues desire to be received by Lord Listowel,
perhaps you would be good enough to telephone me at this office (Whitehall
8140) on Monday morning in order that we may fix a mutually convenient
time on Monday afternoon or Tuesday morning.3
R. M. J. HARRIS
1 See No. 230 and its note 1. 2 No. 224.
3 A note dated 13 August by Mr Rumbold states that Principal Ganga Singh telephoned to say that,
having been in Scotland, he had only received the letter that day and that, since the Boundary Com¬
mission would be giving its Award that day, he did not wish to trouble Lord Listowel for an interview.
622
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
398
The Earl oj Listowel to Maulana Ahul Kalam Azad
LI 1/ 1/626: f 22
INDIA OFFICE, 9 August I94 J
I have received your letter of 26th July1 about the return to India of certain
articles of historical interest in this country. As you point out, you first raised
this with my predecessor in March last. I am sorry we have not been able to
make any progress with this matter but you will understand how preoccupied
we have been with the constitutional changes.
I am consulting some of my Cabinet colleagues and expect that we shall,
shortly after the 15th August, be communicating officially with the Indian and
Pakistan Governments on this subject.
I fancy that a good deal of detailed discussion may be involved since much
that is of interest to India is of no less interest to people in this country.
I have little doubt that it will be necessary for a small party to come from
India to explore the whole question with us.
LISTOWEL
1 This letter drew Lord Listowel’s attention to Maulana Azad’s letter of 19 March (Vol. IX, No. 547) to
Lord Pethick-Lawrence on the same subject. In the letter of 26 July Azad referred to ‘the return to
India, at an early date, of old books and articles of historical interest in the India Office and in various
museums in Great Britain.’ L/I/1/626: f 21.
399
The Earl of Listowel to Mr Attlee
RI30I1I12: ff 29-34
INDIA OFFICE, 9 August I947
Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 144/47
Prime Minister,
I attach a copy of a memorandum prepared by my department on the future of
the India Office and its contents. I am wondering whether, as it is now unlikely
that there will be a further meeting of the India and Burma Committee before
Ministers disperse, you could see your way to authorising the action proposed
in the memorandum which might perhaps be circulated to the Committee
with a note to that effect.
I am sending a copy of this minute and of the memorandum to the Chancellor
of the Exchequer.1
L
AUGUST 1947
623
Enclosure to No. 399
Cabinet
India and Burma Committee. Paper i.b.(47)
The Future of the India Office and its Contents
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA
INDIA OFFICE, 9 August 1 9 47
The India Office and die land on which it stands and its “contents” (which
does not include ordinary modern office furniture) are vested in Fler Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom subject to the important proviso that,
except with the consent of the Government of India (after the 15 th August the
Government of India and the Government of Pakistan), there shall be no sale
of these properties nor any diversion “to uses not connected with the discharge
of the functions of the Crown in relation to India or Burma” (vide Section 172
of the Government of India Act, 1935).
2. The I. &. B. Committee decided on the 30th June2 last, after reconsider¬
ation at the instance of the Minister of Works, to reaffirm its conclusion that
the important proviso referred to above should be left unchanged by the Indian
Independence Act.
This was, of course, only a decision not to alter the statutory position.
Obviously, with the consent of the Governments of India and Pakistan, some
practical solution must be found; otherwise the effect of the proviso would
before long become intolerable.
3. So far as the India Office building is concerned, we are after 15th August
for the time being retaining a facade of keeping the main part of the building
in use for Burma business and to some extent Indian business, but this is rather
embarrassing and before many months are out would become extremely
awkward. Quite obviously we must aim at freeing the whole building to be
used in whatever way seems best to H.M.G. It is accordingly proposed that
shortly after the 15th August we should approach the two Indian Governments
and ask for their consent to divert the building to other uses. This will no
doubt produce a claim from the two Indian Governments for a repayment of
the cost. In round figures this was -£620,000 against which may be set a sum
of about -£160,000 raised by the sale of East India House and part of its
contents. Probably, however, the Indian claim would be based on modern value.
No attempt has ever been made to assess this.
4. The Treasury have no objection to the action proposed. Whatever sum
may eventually be agreed as a fair refund to the two Indian Governments would,
1 Mr Attlee minuted : T think we should get Mountbatten to settle this. Draft to S. of S. India accordingly.
CRA.’
2 Vol XI, No. 421, Minute 1.
624
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
in the Treasury view, be treated as a capital transaction and merely added to
the enormous sum we already owe to India. It is, of course, possible that the
two Indian Governments would press for an immediate cash settlement but
this would have to be resisted.
5. The “contents” consist of exceedingly valuable old records (which merge
imperceptibly into modern records and modern files), valuable pictures and
furniture and, perhaps most important of all, the India Office Library which is
an Oriental Library of international repute.
6. In March last Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in his capacity as Member of
the Government of India for Education wrote my predecessor a letter3 (which
was acknowledged)4 saying that he understood that there was a collection of
articles of historical and national interest to India, including painting and
statuary, in India House and the India Office and asking for the return of
some of those for a national cultural museum which is to be established in
India. (So far as there may be anything of this kind at India House its disposal
is, of course, entirely within the control of the Governments of India and
Pakistan). Some of the articles which Azad wants are probably in the British
Museum, the South Kensington Museum and possibly elsewhere and not in
the India Office at all. A reminder was received from Azad a few days ago and
I have sent a further acknowledgment5 saying that I am consulting my
colleagues in the Cabinet and hope that shortly we shall be in a position to
take the matter up officially with the Governments of India and Pakistan.
7. I question very much whether the Indians realise what the contents of
the India Office are, how they have been acquired and the extent to which they
are of British as distinct from Indian interest.
8. Apart from the Indian request there will be many in this country who will
desire some of the India Office “contents”. The Zetland Report of 1945,
which pressed the desirability of establishing a Centre of Oriental Culture in
London after the war, assumed that the India Office Library would form part
of it. This was a grandiose scheme on which nothing has been done. The
Scarbrough Report of April, 19466 which examined the question of facilities
for Oriental study supported the Zetland Report’s idea of an Oriental Centre
in London, though this only indirectly affected the main recommendations of
the Scarbrough Report. This Report is at the moment under consideration.
It again involves very considerable expenditure which it is unlikely could be
embarked upon at the present time.
9. It seems improbable that any very early decision can be taken on the
question of an eventual Oriental Centre in London. The India Office Library
could, of course, in the meantime (subject to Indian claims) remain where it is
but this may not be the best solution. It has not, for a good many years past,
AUGUST 1947
625
actually been required for the official work of the India Office and it will seem
even more strange, except perhaps as a purely temporary expedient, to leave
it attached to the Commonwealth Relations Office.
10. We cannot very long delay talks with representatives of the Indian
Governments on this subject, and it is proposed that we should shortly after
the 15 th August approach the Government of India saying we are willing to
discuss Azad’s suggestion and make a similar intimation to the Pakistan
Government.
11. It seems, however, wise to set out from the start certain broad principles
on which we should proceed. It is suggested that these should be :
(1) Records should remain in this country and, indeed, the attached
answer (Appendix) which I gave in the House of Lords on Wednesday
23rd July already sets out this position. Possibly all records earlier than a
certain date should be transferred en masse to the Public Record Office. It
has been suggested that, legally, they should already be regarded as vested
in the Master of the Rolls. The precise legal position has, however, not yet
been investigated.
(2) Anything acquired from the East India Company before 1857 should
remain ours and also anything acquired by gift since that date. (This probably
covers all the more valuable part of the India Office Library, though
probably not the greater part of it in bulk.)
(3) As regards anything acquired at the cost of Indian Reven ues since 1857
we should be ready to admit that there is a prima facie Indian claim so far as
the finance is concerned. We might nevertheless (apart from incidence of cost)
have a stronger case than India has to retain much of such property. In
particular, it would be a disaster to start splitting up the India Office Library
whatever its ultimate destination may be. It is proposed that for anything
which we wish to keep, acquired at the cost of Indian Revenues since 1857,
we should admit financial liability, regarding such sums, however, as a
capital transaction to be added on to the debt to India for the India Office
itself. Exceptions in individual instances to the above general principles may
well prove desirable.
12. The whole of this business may prove troublesome and complicated;
and, although certain general principles are suggested above as a starting-off
point for any talks with India, actually it is not possible to discuss the problem
very intelligently unless it is handled with close reference to detail. There is
3 Vol. IX, No. 547. 4 Ibid., note 1. 5 No. 398.
6 Report of the Interdepartmental Commission of Enquiry on Oriental, Slavonic, East European and
African Studies. H.M.S.O., 1947. The report of the Commission, which was chaired by the Earl of
Scarbrough, was dated 16 April 1946.
626
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
accordingly much work to be done and I propose that this question should be
handled on the official level by a special committee (to be appointed pre¬
sumably by the Prime Minister). I suggest that the Chairman should be a senior
official of the India and Burma Office and that the other members should be :
(i) A University Don who is knowledgeable in such matters without
necessarily being an Oriental Expert. It would probably be impossible
to find an Orientalist who would be quite disinterested.
(ii) A representative of the Ministry of Education.
(iii) A representative of the Treasury. For particular subjects they should
have the power to co-opt or consult experts as may be found necessary.
I suggest that they should be given very simple terms of reference,
namely to consider the disposal of the “contents” of the India Office
(other than ordinary office furniture and equipment).
13 . Actually their task would be rather complicated. Their first job would be
to make a fresh survey of the contents of the India Office. (There are a good
many catalogues and reports on this subject but these are nearly all old and not
always brought up-to-date.) Then, bearing in mind the claims likely to arise
in this country, they should, if the Governments of India and Pakistan respond
to the approaches which it is proposed to make to them, discuss with a small
party of representatives (again on the official level) of the Governments of
India and Pakistan the claims which they may wish to put forward. The Indians
have at the moment probably only the vaguest idea of what, in fact, is in the
India Office and elsewhere in London and would have to be allowed facilities
to find out. After these talks have proceeded to a certain stage, the Committee
would of course have to report to Ministers and we should try and get a
decision between the U.K. Government and the Governments of India and
Pakistan as to what, in fact, was to be allowed to go to India. After that
decision had been taken the Committee should, I suggest, produce proposals for
disposing of whatever properties are not passed back to India. It is doubtful
whether they could make permanent proposals. They would probably have
to be of an interim nature so as not to prejudice too much the eventual
possibilities of a big Oriental Centre in London when money is available for
such a project.
14. So far as furniture and pictures are concerned it is suggested that a few
rooms in the India Office might be left furnished in the old style, whatever may
be the eventual choice of the Government Department to occupy that part of
the building. The Council Room is a precise reproduction of the Council
Room of the Court of the Directors of the East India Company. Furniture,
mantelpiece, panelling and pictures all came from there as did the doors. It is
thus a room of peculiar historic interest which it would be a great pity to
dismantle. The three Committee Rooms, though they have no corresponding
AUGUST 1947
627
historical association, have equally a character of their own. We might keep
these three rooms and the Council Room in their present form with their
present furniture and pictures. If the Commonwealth Relations Office should
ultimately move into the India Office building, it would be appropriate that
the Indian side should make this contribution to the appearance of the
amalgamated office. Even if the Foreign Office take over the accommodation
there is much to be said for a suite of rooms of this character kept on the under¬
standing that the Indian furniture, pictures and fittings would be “frozen” in
them and neither added to nor taken from. The ordinary public, it is true,
would not get much benefit from the contents of these rooms. But there would
be a significant reminder of the work of the East India Company and the India
Office and with very little in any of them that is of special interest to India
or Pakistan. l
Appendix to No. jgg
Extract from Hansard (House of Lords) of Wednesday 22 July, 19477
INDIA OFFICE RECORDS
Lord Hailey: My Lords, I beg to ask His Majesty’s Government the question
standing in my name.
[The question was as follows :
To ask His Majesty’s Government whether they contemplate taking measures
to secure for use in this country the important historical records now in the
custody of the India Office.]
The Secretary of State for India and Burma (The Earl of Listowel) : My
Lords, I am glad to give the noble Lord an assurance that we intend to retain in
this country the historical records which are now in the custody of the India
Office. These records cover the whole period of the British connexion with
India, and are the essential material of the history of the East India Company
and of the British Government in their dealings with their representatives in
India. Though mainly, of course, concerned with India, they are not exclusively
confined to that country. In addition to their importance as documents relating
to matters of public administration, they contain much material relating to the
lives of British individuals and families associated with India. It is obvious that
these records should be available in this country for reference in the future.
Lord Hailey: My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble Earl for his
answer. I am sure it will be received with great relief by historical and other
students who are interested in the use to be made of these records.
7 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of L., vol. 151, col. 179. The date should in fact be 23 July 1947.
628
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
400
Mr Bevir to Mr Helsby
r/30!1 Ii2: f 35
9 August 1947
Mr Helsby,
If this argument gets into the hands of officials it will never end. Isn’t it worth
trying to get Mountbatten to settle it out of hand?
For example on the question of the value of the building, what is the
respective claim of the Government of India and Pakistan on the proceeds ?
As regards the Library how is anyone ever going to divide it up? Surely the
best thing to do, even if anybody knows or realises about it in India, which I
very much doubt, is to try to get the thing settled simply, without wasting
years of time in trying to divide something which is indivisible — though,
heaven knows, the Indians are not bad at that kind of thing.1
A. BEVIR
1 Mr Helsby minuted to Mr Attlee on 10 August: ‘Prime Minister. I share Mr. Bevir’s fear that the India
Office are inclined to make this a complicated and long-drawn affair which might cause more ill-
feeling than it is worth. I think an official Committee may be needed, but it should be small, should
confine itself mainly to fact-finding and should report quickly .’ (Emphasis in original). Mr Attlee
minuted in reply: ‘I agree. C.R.A.’ R/30/1/12: f 35.
401
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rhl 1/139: ff 204-5
INDIA OFFICE, 9 August 1947
Dear Mountbatten,
I was very sorry to learn from your telegram No. 3161-S1 that my telegram
No. 99472 had led you to believe that there was more between us on the question
of policy towards the States than in fact there is. May I say at once with what
profound admiration we have followed your recent handling of the States
and with what immense satisfaction we have learned of the amazing measure
of success that you have achieved. There is, of course, no question but that it is
in the best interests alike of the new Dominions, of the Indian States and of
ourselves that all States should accede to one or other Dominion, according to
their geographical position, as soon as possible on the terms now available to
them. Nor do we doubt for one moment that you are right simultaneously to
urge moderation on Congress and to bring forcibly to the notice of the States
the pressure which would be brought to bear upon them both by British India
and by their own people if they failed to accede.
AUGUST 1947
629
When I sent my telegram we had not seen the draft Instrument of Accession3
and we now appreciate that any changes in the existing constitutions as adopted
which may be made by the Constituent Assemblies after States accede will in
their application to the States require their consent. On this basis I agree that
it was right to advise States to accede by 15th August on the terms now
available to them.
Our treatment of the States has been the subject of a good deal of criticism
in this country and from this point of view we attach importance to sticking
to the policy in the Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum of 12th May 19464 which
we endorsed in the Statement of 3rd June.5 However, we believe your speech
of 25 th July6 to have been entirely consistent with that Memorandum and the
assurances we gave to Parliament that, whatever the Dominions do, we at any
rate would not put pressure on the States.
I need hardly say that it is not the intention in present circumstances to supply
arms from this country to Indian States without consulting the new Dominions.
But that does not mean that we would wish to imply publicly that we would
prevent the export of arms from this country to Indian States that do not
accede in order to put pressure on them at the instance of one other of the new
Dominions.
Yours sincerely,
LISTOWEL
1 No. 340. 2 No. 307. 3 Enclosure i to No. 313.
4 Vol. VII, No. 262. 5 Vol. XI, No. 45, para. 18. 6 No. 234.
402
The Earl ofListowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers . Letters to and from the Secretary oj State
PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE , g August ig 47
Dear Mountbatten,
Thank you for your letter of ist August1 enclosing Personal Report No. 15.2
As this is the last weekly letter I shall be sending you I should like to say (and
I know that all my colleagues (both Ministers and officials) would agree with
me) how immensely valuable and enthrallingly interesting your weekly Personal
Reports have been. They have gone a long way towards eliminating the
effects of distance and have enabled us here to appreciate the atmosphere in
Delhi to a degree which has enormously assisted us in carrying out our part in
the events of the past months. I would like also, if I may be allowed to, to
1 Not printed.
2 No. 302.
630
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
commend die drafting of the reports which has combined lucidity with
graphic description in a high degree. Such touches as paragraph 56 of Report
No. 15 have, moreover, served to reassure us that pressure of work has not
impaired the detachment and sense of humour of yourself and your staff
2. As this will be my last letter to you, I must also endeavour to tidy up any
loose ends from our previous correspondence. Thus, in paragraphs 3 and 4 of
your letter of 10th July3 you referred to the question of appeals to the Privy
Council after the transfer of power. No steps seem necessary here at this
juncture for, until some contrary provision is enacted by one or both
Dominions, appeals will continue to come to the Judicial Committee. We
had already sounded the Lord Chancellor about this question some time ago
and he then held strongly that any move for cessation of appeals should come
from India. It seems unnecessary to pursue the matter with him further until
it is clear that one of the Dominions wishes to stop appeals to the Judicial
Committee. In that event, of course, we may also have to meet a desire that
proceedings pending before the Judicial Committee should be continued to
judgment and, to secure this, it might well be expedient to have a clause in
a Treaty providing for the continuance of the Judicial Committee’s jurisdiction
in respect of those proceedings which could be implemented by legislation if
necessarv at both ends.
J
3. I was interested in what you said in paragraph 3 of your letter of 25 th July4
about some looser form of association within the British Commonwealth to
meet the case of Burma and perhaps later on of India. I can assure you that the
wider implications and possibilities are not being overlooked and that some
hard thinking is being done at this end on the question. But the problem of
devising a form of association which is even looser than that at present binding
the Dominions and which is yet not entirely meaningless or indeed, in the
absence of a real measure of common purpose and interest, even dishonest, is
no easy one. And the reactions of, and on, existing Dominions, and more
particularly Dominions such as S. Africa or Canada, of any weakening of
existing links are material factors. However, I agree as to the importance and
urgency of the issue.
4. So far as concerns the particular and, indeed, somewhat technical aspect
of citizenship to which you refer, as you probably know, following the
Commonwealth Conference of experts earlier this year, a scheme is now being
worked out by the various Commonwealth Governments which would give
the U.K. and each Dominion its own citizenship. The possession of one of these
citizenships would be the only gateway to the status of British subject, which
would remain a common status with, it is to be hoped, common privileges in
each of the Commonwealth countries. From some points of view the creation
of separate citizenships ought to help towards that form of association within
AUGUST 1947
the Commonwealth which you have in mind. In another sense, however, to
hanker after any form of common citizenship is swimming against the stream.
In any case the status of British subject will remain a common status, though
in the last analysis it will now, more than ever, mean simply a common
allegiance to the Crown. And there, I take it, we are back at our starting-point.
5. In paragraph 4 of your letter of 25 th July you said that you supposed that
there was no chance of persuading the new Government of Burma to give
dominion status a trial. I am afraid that the effect of the assassinations5 will have
been rather to accentuate the feeling of the leaders who have survived that,
whatever their own predilections, their position vis-a-vis the rank and file of
their supporters is not strong enough to make it possible for them to give
a lead in the direction of remaining within the Commonwealth. It has to be
recognised, too, that the suspicion (which, I regret to have to say, is not entirely
unfounded) that the assassinations were due in some measure to acts of
commission or omission on the part of members of the British Services is
another factor inevitably tending to reinforce the urge to “cut the painter”.
[Paras 6-8, on compensation for Burma Services, lack of news on a
“Dominions” expert and a letter from Prasad on subject of food, omitted.]
9. I am not surprised at what you say in paragraph 23 of your Personal
Report No. 146 about the desire of the Princes not to be cut off from future
intimate and honorific relations with His Majesty. The Princes’ own feeling is
natural enough but the reactions of Patel and his forecast of the attitude of the
future Government of India are unexpected and, as you say, welcome.
10. As regards the future treatment of the Princes, we feel here that they
cannot expect their existing personal relations with the Crown to continue on
the same basis otherwise than within the Commonwealth and through the
new Dominion Governments. Time alone will show how these will work out.
It is, of course, agreed that the fact that the Indian Orders are to remain in
suspended animation does not preclude the grant of honours by The King to
Indian Princes in the future, should the Dominion Governments recommend
such a course. Therefore the way remains open for the bestowal of decorations.
11. As regards other honours such as appointments as Honorary Aides-de-
Camp to The King and Honorary Ranks in the British Army, the present
position as we see it can remain undisturbed. There is no idea of cancelling exist¬
ing appointments.
12. The appointments of Honorary Aides-de-Camp to The King, since
they are so limited in number, are very highly prized. Unless any individual
3 Not printed. 4 No. 227.
5 See ibid., note 3. 6 No. 228.
632
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Prince took it upon himself to relinquish his appointment, it is not proposed to
suggest to His Majesty that He should take any initiative in the matter. On the
other hand it seems doubtful whether any new appointments need be made,
should a vacancy occur by the death of an Honorary A.D.C. to The King.
13. The same applies to Honorary Ranks in the British Army which will
be retained, though no new appointments or promotions would of course be
made save on the recommendation of the Dominion Governments. I am not
sure, however, that these may not wish future grants of honorary rank to be
in their own Forces.
14. Possibly you will think it desirable to say something about this to
Jinnah, though the Muslim League attitude towards Honours for Princes may
not correspond with that of Patel.
15. Fortunately, Krishna Menon did not have to go to New York and was
able to be present at the Luncheon which I arranged for 5th August and which
proved a very successful occasion. Apart from Henderson and Pethick-
Lawrence I invited R. A. Butler, Godfrey Nicholson, Samuel and Hopkin-
Morris. I am sorry to say that a certain amount of opposition to Menon’s
appointment is showing itself here, more particularly in Indian circles in
London. Menon certainly has a past to live down, but we will do all we
possibly can to help him establish his position.
16. You revert again, in paragraph 4 of your letter of 1st August,7 to the
case of the civilian ex-service clerks serving in G.H.Q.(I). I hope you appreciate
that I entirely recognise that their’s is a very hard case but the old adage about
hard cases and bad law remains true, and I concur in the unanimous opinion
of my Department that a concession in this case, however much one may be
tempted to make it on compassionate grounds, would make a dangerous
breach in the general principles upon which these matters have been settled.
[Paras. 17-25, on service questions and passage through India for Addison and
Cripps, omitted.]
26. It is a pity that none of jinnah’s high level choices for the governorship
of East Bengal have materialised but the temporary appointment of Bourne
should give more time for the right selection to be made.8 It is encouraging to
read in paragraph n of Personal Report No. 159 of the progress being made
with the establishment of the new capital at Dacca. The provision of suitable
accommodation for the Governor seems a necessary condition of obtaining
a man of the necessary calibre for the post.
27. Your account in Personal Report No. 15 of your dealings with Nehru,
Patel and Gandhi over Nehru’s emotional urge to visit Kashmir is illuminating,
if somewhat disturbing.10 Clearly, Gandhi will have a safe passage in Kashmir,
AUGUST 1947
633
even though the Maharaja finds himself bound to join Pakistan. The realistic
attitude of Patel is a great asset to the Congress Party but one cannot suppose
that it will be possible for all time to prevent an open clash between such
differing temperaments.
28. What you say in paragraph 34 of the same report about the readiness of
both Nehru and Jiimah to receive the Chiefs of Staff or high powered
representatives of them for discussions with the Joint Defence Council is most
encouraging. I will see that the Chiefs of Staff are informed.
29. Your first and last contact with the Chamber of Princes seems to have
been a fairly exhausting experience.11 No doubt the Rulers and Dewans of the
bigger States are most of them capable of appreciating the great risks they run
in attempting to hold aloof from the Dominion of India. They will have had
time to appreciate that they cannot count on active support from the outside
world in staking out a claim to independence. We are full of admiration at your
success in having overcome the hesitations of so many States about acceptance
of the terms of accession offered by Pate). To do them justice, the States have
had little reason up to now to assume that the Congress and their friends have
any intention of offering them a square deal. Their experiences while Congress
was in power in the Provinces before the war and Nehru’s repeated abuse12 of
their Governments since he came into power have at least given cause for their
adopting an attitude of caution about throwing in their lot for good and all
with the Dominion of India. However, having come to realise their weakness
if they attempt to stand alone and the growing sympathies of their subjects
with the more progressive elements in British India, the more enlightened
Rulers and their Ministers seem to have at last accepted the inevitable. I am
sorry to hear that C. P. Ramaswami Aiyyer should have been so severely
mauled13 on his return to Travancore, but no doubt his going out of business
at any rate temporarily has had the valuable effect of deciding the Maharaja
to call off his bid for independence.
30. The personal equation seems for the time being to have dictated the
choice of Bhopal, Indore and Dholpui. If your own diplomacy succeeds in
persuading them to throw in their lot with their brother Rulers, you will
have achieved something which we at this end would not have thought possible
a few weeks ago. Even so, there still remains the problem of Hyderabad and
its most unaccountable Ruler. It still seems to me that in the case of this State
Patel could afford to accept an interim political arrangement of the kind
I referred to in paragraph 8 of my letter of 2nd August.14 So many considerations
7 Not printed. 8 See No. 357 and its note 3. 9 No. 302.
10 Ibid., paras. 25-33. 11 See No. 234.
12 cf. Vol. X, No. 181, note 2. 13 See No. 239, note 8. 14 No. 317.
634
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
are necessarily involved in acceding to a constitution which has yet to be
finalised, even for the limited range of subjects in question, that I cannot
withhold some sympathy from the Nizam in being told that he has to make
up his mind to sign on the dotted line by 15 th August. However, by the time
this letter reaches you it may well be that your efforts and those of Monckton
will have prevailed against the pressure brought to bear on the Nizam by his
Muslim subjects, without it being necessary for the Dominion Government to
grant him a locus pcenitentiae. 15
31. With reference to paragaph 54 of Personal Report No. 15, one cannot
but regret on grounds of principle that the remaining I.N.A. prisoners will
appear to have had their brutality condoned but, taking all in all, the arrange¬
ment now proposed for dealing with them is probably the most satisfactory
one possible. At the same time it does seem important that the scheme should
be put into effect as inconspicuously as possible, and that great care should be
exercised to prevent publicity, which might have a serious effect on the morale
of the army.
32. You will no doubt like to know how things are shaping administratively
here. On 15 th August the appointment of Arthur Henderson as Minister of
State for Commonwealth Relations will be announced. It will be announced at
the same time that the staff of the India Office will be amalgamated with that of
the Commonwealth Relations Office and that Carter will serve as an additional
permanent Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. It has been
arranged that as soon as possible after the 15th August Henderson, the Under
Secretaries and nuclei of certain of the key departments of the India Office
should move from their present accommodation into rooms in the Colonial
Office building (immediately adjoining the Commonwealth Relations Office)
which are being evacuated by the Colonial Office and were to have been taken
over by the Foreign Office. It is very difficult to see how things will work out
in practice but this move should help to accelerate the process of integrating
the two departments. You may also like to know that, with the same object
in view, we plan to hold a social party for the staff of both Offices towards the
end of September when the leave season is over.
[Para. 33, on Indian Police Association and Indian Government officers
(Retired) Association, omitted.]
34. The Resolution on the Services quoted in paragraph 10 of my letter of
2nd August16 was moved in both Houses yesterday. In the Lords there were
eloquent speeches by Bobbety Salisbury on behalf of the Conservatives, and
by Reading on behalf of the Liberals. The Bishop of Salisbury, Chetwode, and
Hailey also spoke. In the Commons, where the Prime Minister, Eden and
Clement Davies spoke, the names of Churchill and Eden were associated with
AUGUST 1947
635
those of Ministers in sponsoring the resolution. I hope these resolutions will
give satisfaction to the members of the Services, who will no longer entertain
the slightest doubt about the whole-hearted appreciation of Parliament.
[Para. 35, on Judges, omitted.]
36. I was grateful for your telegram No. 3200-S17 about the proposed
messages to India and Pakistan on the 15th August. The messages will be sent
to the U.K. High Commissioners with the request that they may be passed to
the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan respectively. The draft of the
messages at present runs as follows : —
“My colleagues in the United Kingdom Government join with me in
sending on this historic day greetings and good wishes to the Government
and people of India/Pakistan from the people of the United Kingdom. It is
our earnest wish that India/Pakistan may work out its destiny as a free
country in tranquillity and prosperity and, in so doing, make its full con¬
tribution to world peace and progress.”
37. It seems at the moment as if the Government of India will have reason
to be pleased with the terms of the agreement on sterling balances,18 which
were far more satisfactory than I had dared to hope. Not unnaturally, it
seemed at one moment as if the terms of the projected agreement might have
to be modified to India’s disadvantage in view of the coincidence of the
negotiations with the economic “crisis” in this country, but it now seems
certain that this will not happen.
[Paras. 38-40, on the Exhibition of Indian Art, omitted.]
41. I cannot end this, my last weekly letter, without paying a tribute to all
that you and your staff have achieved in the few months since you left for
Delhi. When one considers the intractability of the problems, great and small,
requiring to be solved, the intensity and bitterness of feeling between the
major communities affected and the sheer weight of the work to be got through,
one realises the magnitude of what has been achieved by you and your staff.
The Indian leaders and officials, civil and military, whose share in the process
of transferring power has been indispensable, have made a remarkable con¬
tribution to the settlement. It must be with a sense of great relief that you see
15 th August approaching; and yet relief not untinged with regret at the ending
of a great chapter, and of concern at the thought of the unchartered [? un¬
charted] seas that he ahead.
Yours sincerely,
LISTOWEL
cf. No. 385, para. 18.
16 No. 317. 17 Not printed. 18 See No. 368, note 3.
636
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
403
Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab,
Security Arrangements for Partition
TOP SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE,
no. 703 9 August 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
Many thanks for Your Excellency’s telegram No. 3269-S dated 8th August
19471 about the subversive activities of Tara Singh and other Sikh leaders.
2. 1 have now discussed this matter both with Trivedi and with Mudie, and
we are all agreed (a) that the arrest of Tara Singh and his friends now or
simultaneously with the announcement of the Boundary Commission’s award
could not improve and might worsen the immediate situation; and (b) that
though it may be necessary for me to make the arrests after the announcement
of the award and before 15th August if the Sikhs give very serious trouble, it
would be far better to leave them to be dealt with by the new Governments
of West Punjab and East Punjab.
3. In amplification of (a), it is clear that the village raiding which is now
causing us so much concern in Amritsar and elsewhere is not specifically
directed by Tara Singh and his associates, though it is undoubtedly the result
of their general propaganda. Their arrests now or simultaneously with the
Boundary Commission’s award would almost certainly lead to a sharp reaction
among the Sikhs and would jeopardise what hopes there are that the Sikhs in
West Punjab will accept the award and settle down quietly. I believe that the
reports2 submitted to Your Excellency on Tara Singh’s personal activities are
substantially true; but 1 doubt if in fact his alleged plans will come to anything.
Turning to (b), if the arrests were made by the Section 93 administration, the
leaders taken in West Punjab would presumably have to be confined in
a Pakistan jail, and the leaders taken in East Punjab would have to be confined
in an Indian jail. We have as yet no evidence to support a criminal prosecution,
and it is impossible to say what the attitude of the new Governments would be.
West Punjab would be anxious to detain their men, but East Punjab, relying
on some Sikh support, would be greatly embarrassed and might decline to take
responsibility for the detention orders. On the other hand, if the two new
Governments have to take decisions of their own, they are more likely to
adhere to them and to make suitable arrangements for the custody of the
prisoners — a matter which may cause considerable embarrassment.
4. I have not discussed the problem with Mamdot or with any political
AUGUST 1947
637
representative of East Punjab, as in the present state of feeling the politicians
would be unable to keep quiet about it; but there is no doubt at all about the
views of Trivedi and Mudie. Trivedi pointed out to me that the logical alterna¬
tives were to make the arrests immediately or to await the results of the
Boundary Commission’s award. Mudie concurred in this view and added that
unless West Punjab could be quite certain of the ultimate attitude of East
Punjab, the confinement of the Sikh leaders, not on criminal charges but under
my emergency powers, might be most embarrassing, and that he was not clear
where I could put the leaders without causing trouble. I could hardly send them
to what will in a few days be a Pakistan jail; on the other hand if I left them in
East Punjab, they would be a centre of agitation.
5. I have accordingly decided to plan the arrests, but not to make them
myself unless my hand is forced. The arrests may be far from easy, as the Sikh
leaders travel a good deal and usually live in places like the Golden Temple
where Police action causes much excitement.
6. This decision will probably be unwelcome to Jinnah, but I believe that in
all the circumstances it is the right one. The whole object of our policy has
been to get as smooth a change-over as we can, even at considerable risk. The
two new Governments may have to fight the Sikhs, but if I start the fight now,
they will inherit it, and I do not think that this would be fair to them unless
the arrests before the transfer of power are quite unavoidable.3
Yours sincerely,
E. M. JENKINS
1 No. 379. 2 See No. 345.
3 On 10 August Sir G. Abell minuted to Lord Mountbatten as follows:
‘Letter below from the Governor Punjab. It is clearly necessary to accept his view, especially as
it is backed by both Sir C. Trivedi and Sir F. Mudie.
2. Sardar Patel who was at the original meeting [see No. 345 J will accept it without question. The
only point remains whether we should inform Mr Jinnah who will not be pleased. On the whole, I
think it would be best to telegraph to the Governor of the Punjab as in the draft below.’
Lord Mountbatten minuted in reply :
‘I approve. No need to tell Patel and Jinnah since it is solely my business until 15th. If asked I shall
say — ‘I left it to Jenkins to decide when.’ If he decides ‘after 15th’ that is his concern. Put a brief
account in VPR. M.’
Mountbatten telegraphed his acceptance of Sir E. Jenkins’ view in tel. 3 3 13— S of 10 August. Mount¬
batten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Security Arrangements for Partition.
63 8
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
404
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab)
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab ,
Situation in, Part 11(b)
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, p August lp47, 6.00 pm
SECRET
No. 3290-S. Your telegram 219-G of 8th August.1 Para. 5. Commander-in-
Chief is looking into the question of reinforcements for Punjab Boundary
Force, and hopes to be able to produce some reconnaissance aircraft.
2. Additional police lent to Delhi are on railway security under military
control, and I am trying to arrange to get them relieved.2
1 No. 382.
2 Upon receipt of this telegram, Sir E. Jenkins noted: ‘Good. E.M.J. 10.8.47.’ R/3/1/176: f 260.
405
The Maharaja of Bikaner to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma1
Telegram
10 August 1Q47
It is strongly rumoured that Boundary Commission is likely to award Ferozepur
Tehsil to Western Punjab. This Telisil contains Headworks of Bikaner Gang
Canal and under existing agreement State is entitled to receive for its perennial
canal specified amount of water. Fear greatly that administration and regulation
of this water exclusively by Western Punjab may gravely prejudice interest of
Bikaner State as its economic life is to very large extent dependent on water
supply from Gang Canal. Have every confidence that Your Excellency in
finally arriving at decision on award of Boundary Commission will be good
enough to safeguard interests of Bikaner State especially as we as one of the
parties to the Agreement were not consulted in arrangements that are being
made. Request Your Excellency to very kindly give an opportunity to my
Prime Minister and Chief Engineer Irrigation, to place facts before Your
AUGUST 1947
639
Excellency prior to final decision being arrived at. They are reaching Delhi
011 morning Monday eleventh.
MAHARAJA BIKANER
1 No copy of this telegram has been traced either in the Mountbatten Papers or in the India Office
Records. However, a telegram purporting to be the one sent by the Maharaja of Bikaner has been
quoted in a publication by Kanwar Sain who was, in 1947, Bikaner’s Chief Engineer Irrigation. The
above telegram has been taken from this source: Kanwar Sain, Reminiscences of an Engineer, New Delhi,
1978, p. 1 19. For Lord Mountbatten’s reply to this telegram, see No. 427.
I11 the same publication, the author says that he saw Mountbatten with Sardar Panikkar (Bikaner’s
Prime Minister) on the morning of 11 August. Mountbatten is said to have declined to discuss the
Boundary Commission at which point Kanwar Sain responded that he and Panikkar had been asked
by Bikaner to convey that if the Ferozepur Headworks and the Gang Canal were allocated to Pakistan,
Bikaner would have no option but to join Pakistan. Mountbatten is said to have ‘said nothing.’ No
record of this interview has been traced and there is no entry referring to it in Mountbatten’s Personal
Diary.
406
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru
R/jI if 157: f 266
no. 1446/17 10 August 1947
Dear Mr. Nehru,
Thank you for your secret letter of the 9th August1 about the irrigation system
of the Punjab and the Boundary Commission’s award.
2. I hope you will agree that it is most important that I should not do any¬
thing to prejudice the independence of the Boundary Commission, and that,
therefore, it would be wrong for me even to forward any memorandum,
especially at this stage.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 No. 395.
640
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
407
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan *
Rfcl 1/165:/ 72
10 August 1947
Dear Mr Liaquat Ali Khan,
You will remember that we discussed in Executive Council the problem of the
North-West Frontier Province Ministry, and my Pakistan colleagues advised
me to direct the Governor to ask the Ministry to resign and if it refused to
dismiss it.1 Secondly, if the first course was considered unconstitutional, I was
advised to direct the Governor to go into section 93 so that the new Governor
could appoint a new Ministry on the 15th August. I undertook to accept this
advice provided I was assured that it would be constitutional for me to do so,
about which I had grave doubts, and informed you 1 was referring the matter
to the Secretary of State.
2. The Secretary of State has now sent me instructions2 that both of these
courses of action would in the present circumstances be unconstitutional and
it is, therefore, impossible for me to accept the advice tendered, since in this
case I have to act in my discretion, which means taking the advice of the
Secretary of State and not the Executive Council.
3. What action should be taken by Sir George Cunningham on or after the
15th August is a matter which I expect you or Mr. Jinnah will wish to discuss
with him when he comes through Karachi.
4. I am sending this letter by the hand of Ian Scott, who is joining the office
of the U.K. Eligh Commissioner, Pakistan. He will be in Kaiachi from the
nth August, and will be in touch with Birnie about the arrangements for my
visit. If you should wish to ask him any questions he will be at your service.
Yours very sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
P.S. I have just received a telegram3 from Lockhart. I enclose a copy as you
will want to have the latest view of the situation in the N.W.F.P.4
1 See No. 301. 2 No. 387. 3 No. 392.
4 On 10 August Lord Mountbatten enclosed a copy of this letter with a letter of welcome to Sir G.
Cunningham upon his return to India. Mountbatten added: \ . . I have no doubt you will have dis¬
cussions with him [Liaquat] and Mr. Jinnah on this subject. I am looking forward to seeing you, and
hearing what you have decided.’ R/3/1/165: f 73.
AUGUST 1947
641
408
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab )
Rl 3/1 1 89:/ 239
10 August 1947
My dear Jenkins,
Thank you for your secret letter, No. 699 of the 4th August,1 with which you
enclosed the memorandum on the criticism against the Punjab Government,
which I asked you for during my visit.
2. I appreciated fully before that the criticisms from outside were largely
evidence of the impartiality of your regime. I do not see how, in the circum¬
stances as they have been since March, you and your officers could possibly
have avoided criticism. It was only in order to leave on record the facts as you
saw them that I bothered you to write the memorandum. I am glad I did so in
spite of the burden of other work on you, because this admirable record will
be of value to the historians and protect the reputation of the British in the last
period of their rule in India.
3. I am sending copies to the King, the Prime Minister and the India-Burma
Cabinet Committee as an enclosure to my final weekly report.
Yours very sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 No. 337.
409
Sir F. Wylie ( United Provinces ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of
Burma [Extract)
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from Provincial Governors
no. U.P.-89 governor’s camp, united provinces,
10 August 1947
2. As soon as I saw para 2 (iii) of our circular letter No. 7796/XIX of
July 29th,1 I spotted the insidious phrase “replacement of the old flag”. I sent
1 Entitled ‘Celebrations on August 15, 1947’ and circulated to all District Officers in the United Provinces.
L/P&J/5/276: f 28. Lord Mountbatten had commented on this phrase in his letter of 5 August to
Sir F. Wylie as follows : ‘I hope you will somehow be able to secure that there is no question of a replace¬
ment ceremony, for Nehru entirely agrees that there should be no lowering of the Union Jack which
should not appear at all on 15th August. I hope they will agree to hoist the Governor’s flag at Govern¬
ment House either simultaneously on the same flagstaff or on another, or as soon after as they will
agree.’ Mountbatten Papers, Letters to and from Provincial Governors: United Provinces.
642
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
for the Inspector-General of Police immediately and using him as a simple
seeker after truth, we got a definite ruling from the Provincial Government
that the Union Jack is everywhere to come down quite normally at retreat on
the 14th and not to be in evidence at all on the 15th. There will be no jubilant
pulling down of “the old flag” therefore anywhere in the United Provinces.
410
Sir F. Wylie ( United Provinces) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj
Burma (Extract)
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from Provincial Governors
no. u.p-90 governor’s camp, united provinces,
10 August 1947
2. There is something which I have to say about the work of British Governors
in Indian Provinces during the last year and more. This should, I feel, be on
record. The times were hard. Particularly in the period April 1st 1946 to, say,
February or March 1947. During all these months it was quite impossible to
see where we were going. The practical dilemma which this provided for
a Provincial Governor was that he simply had to support the services at the
cost of bad blood with his Ministers, lest the Ministers might walk out on some
pretext or another, when the Governor would once again have had to take over
the administration. If we had given the Ministry their heads over Service
questions at that stage of our affairs, our cadres would have wilted and it would
have been impossible to make the high call on them which a Section 93 regime
requires, — a call which very fortunately never had to be made. It was during
this period and very much for these reasons, that I had my most painful
quarrels with my Ministers. And Governors in other Congress Provinces were,
I dare say, in the same shape. I mention the point particularly lest it be thought,
so rapid is the pace of things nowadays, that Governors’ quarrels with Ministers
in 1946 and the early part of 1947 were meaningless anachronisms. Then came
the announcement that we were going in June 1948, followed by your own
plan put out on June 3rd. These two great decisions of policy made things
infinitely easier for us in the Provinces. We knew where we were going and
could adjust ourselves accordingly.
AUGUST 1947
643
411
The Gaekwar oj Baroda to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten oj Burma
R/31 1/139:/ 213
JAYAMAHAL PALACE, BOMBAY, 10 August I947
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I have received two copies of the Instrument of Accession sent by Mr. V. P.
Menon with his letter dated the ist August. I return them duly signed by me
subject to the limitations mentioned in the accompanying statement.1 I shall
be grateful if Your Excellency will kindly issue a collateral letter giving an
assurance that my accession to the Dominion of India will be subject to the
limitations referred to therein.
2. In this connection I may refer to Your Excellency’s speech2 addressed to
the Conference of Princes on the 25 th of July in Delhi in which you have
mentioned that
“I am sure you will agree that these three subjects have got to be handled for
you for your convenience and advantage by a larger organisation. This seems
so obvious that I was at a loss to undei stand why some rulers were reluctant
to accept the position. One explanation probably was that some of you were
apprehensive that the Central Government would attempt to impose a financial
liability on the States or encroach in other ways on their sovereignty.
“If I am right in this assumption at any rate so far as some Princes are con¬
cerned, I think I must dispel their apprehensions and misgivings. The draft
Instrument of Accession which I have caused to be circulated as a basis for
discussion and not for publication to the representatives of the States provides
that the States accede to the appropriate Dominion on three subjects only with¬
out any financial liability”.
3 . I may make it clear that I am acceding to the Dominion of India on the
assurance contained in the above statement that there is not going to be any
financial liability 3 on the acceding States. I shall appreciate deeply if this is also
kindly confirmed in the collateral letter referred to in paragraph 1.
4. I may also add that I would like that an agreement according to Clause 4
of the Instrument of Accession4 will be duly executed.
5. I further wish to make it clear that the accession of my State for the
subjects mentioned in the Schedule to the Instrument of Accession will be for
1 See R/3/1/139: ff 214-6 for the statement of limitations.
2 No. 234.
3 Emphasis in original.
4 Enclosure 1 to No. 313.
644
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
the purposes of legislation and policy only and that the functions in relation
to the administration in this State of laws of the Union Legislature which apply
therein shall be exercised by the Ruler of this State and the persons authorised
by him to the extent agreed between the Governor-General and the Ruler of
the State.
6. When I was in Delhi last I was given to understand that a memorandum
confirming the existing personal privileges of the Rulers and members of their
family will be issued in due course. I am awaiting this memorandum.5
Yours Sincerely,
P. GAEKWAR6
s There is no reference on the file to a memorandum of this nature.
6 There is no reply to this letter on the file, but see No. 489. paras. 44-6 for the outcome. See also, with
reference to para. 3 of the Gaekwar’s letter, Nos. 201, p. 296, 297, para. 4 and 424 and its note 3. Mr. V.
P. Menon later recalled the issues raised by the Gaekwar in the following manner: ‘Some rulers signed
the Instrument of Accession and forwarded it with covering letters which laid down conditions subject
to which the accession had been signed. They were told that the execution of the Instrument of
Accession must be unconditional and they subsequently complied.’ V. P. Menon, The Story of the
Integration of the Indian States, Orient Longmans, 3rd edn., 1961, p. 115.
412
The Nawab of Bhopal to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rj3l 1/139:/ 210
SECRET Q A S R-I-S U L T A N I, BH O P AL, 1 0 August 1Q4 J
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
In the event of my deciding to abdicate on or just before the 15th August,
would it be possible to extend for about ten days the time limit for signing the
Instrument of Accession?1 This would, I think, be only fair to my Successor,
Princess Abida Sultaan, who naturally would want a breathing time for the
purpose.
I am not doing this, I assure you, to gain time. I am delaying my final act
with the intention of doing everything possible in finding a solution which
would enable me to sign our death warrant with a clear conscience. If I fail
to find such a solution, I must abdicate rather than take any action which, in
my judgment, is not in the true interests of my dynasty and my people.
Yours sincerely,
PIAMIDULLAH
1 cf. No. 385, paras, 7-8.
AUGUST 1947
645
413
The Maharaja of Bikaner to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rf3l 1/139: ff 208-9
LALLGARH, BIKANER, RAJPUTANA, 10 August 1947
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I much regret that in the rush of the last few weeks I was not able to
acknowledge Your Excellency’s letter to me dated the 6th July.1
There was one point in that letter about which I desire especially to convey
my most grateful thanks to you. I refer to the action which you so kindly and
promptly took after your talk with Mr. Panikkar in regard to the protection
of the interests of the States in the matter of our agreements with British India.
Your Excellency can well appreciate how vitally this affects my State and
people in particular in regard specially to the maintenance of our water agree¬
ments with the Punjab. The clause in the Indian Independence Act [? Bill]
that all agreements were thereby abrogated caused us great uneasiness and
anxiety. The Princes had not intended that in asking for the elimination of
paramountcy in the new Constitution commercial and administrative agree¬
ments should also cease. The amendment gives us statutory protection in this
respect which will now be supplemented by the Standstill Agreements which
the States will enter into with the Dominion of India.
I repeat that I and my Government are indeed extremely grateful to Your
Excellency for the immediate action you were pleased to take which has, I am
happy to feel, greatly helped to safeguard the interests of my State.
With kindest regards,
Yours very sincerely,
SADUL SINGH
1 In this letter Lord Mountbatten mentioned that he had had an interesting talk with Sardar Panikkar
(see Vol. XI, No. 446), that he realised the difficulty about the repudiation of some of the administrative
agreements with the States, and that a proviso had been inserted in Clause 7 of the Bill (see No. 164,
Clause 7 (1) for this proviso in the Act) which met the Maharaja’s point to some extent without
affecting the lapse of paramountcy. R/3/1/138: f 83.
646
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
414
Sir F. Burrows [Bengal) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , R/jf ij 137: j 268
important 10 August ig47, io. $o am
confidential Received : 10 August, 3.14 pm
No. 249-C. Award of Bengal Boundary Commission. It is essential that we
should have at least 24 hours notice for putting on the ground effectively our
internal security arrangements in Calcutta on publication of award. I should
be most grateful if you could let me know the date, time and method of
publication.
415
The Resident at Hyderabad to the Secretary
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Hyderabad, Part 1(b)
immediate 10 August 1947, 1.40 pm
confidential Received : 10 August, 3.00 pm
No. 87/P. Hyderabad State Forces have not yet received 2,51,758 rounds of
ammunition for which they have forwarded indents. Their Chief of Staff
certifies that indents are to complete scale and that State Army holds an
equivalent number of fired cases. The State Police have also not yet received
1,83,883 rounds of various ammunition for which they have indented.
2. State Government point out that they are now faced with emergency
owing to likelihood of widespread disturbances in State and to enable them to
meet situation have applied for 2,00,000 rounds of SAA and 48,700 rounds of
.410 ammunition from reserve maintained in Secunderabad Ordnance Depot
on their behalf against emergency.
3. In view of acute communal tension in State I consider Nizam of
Hyderabad Government’s apprehension of widespread disorder in State to be
well founded and to enable them to meet emergency am passing on their
present indent to Secunderabad Sub Area for compliance.1
1 No reply to this telegram has been traced but cf. No. 179.
AUGUST 1947
647
416
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Governors-General and Governors oj Provinces ,
Appointment of — Part (3)
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 10 August 1 947, 4. 10 pm
confidential Received : 1 o August , 3.40 pm
No. 3311-S. My 3285-S dated August 9th.1 Oaths of office etc. Following is
form of combined oaths of Allegiance and Office for Governor-General
suggested by Jinnah which he hopes will be acceptable.
Begins: I, Muhammad Ali jinnah, do solemnly affirm true faith and
allegiance to Constitution of Pakistan as by law established, and that I will be
faithful to His Majesty King George 6, his heirs and successors, in office of
Governor General of Pakistan. Ends.
2. Only alterations suggested by Jinnah for Governors and Ministers in
oaths of Allegiance and Office and Secrecy,2 substitution of “solemnly affirm”
for “swear” and omission of words “so help me God.”
3. Please telegraph immediately whether this is accepted and alter forms of
Commission for Pakistan accordingly.3 I propose to keep to forms already
agreed for India.4
1 Explaining that he believed Mr Jinnah intended to suggest a slightly different form of oath for the
Governor-General of Pakistan. L/P &J/10/142 : f 20. See also Nos. 215 and 257, para. 2.
2 See Nos. 273 and 274. For Governors and Ministers of Pakistan, read ‘Constitution of Pakistan’ in
place of ‘Constitution of India’ in formulas A and B in No. 274.
3 Lord Listowel replied in tel. 10450 of 12 August that he was submitting to the King the form of oath
for Pakistan. L/P &J/10/142: f 9.
4 See Nos. 215, 273 and 274.
417
Sir A. Hydari (. Assam ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram, Rf3f if 137: f 269
MOST IMMEDIATE 10 August 1 947, 9. 40 pm
confidential Received: 11 August, 6.00 am
No. 175-MSG. Sylhet Boundary Commission. If I am in order please consider
the following representation from my Government. Begins: The road to
Chachar and Lushai Hills from Khasi Hills skirts northern fringe of Sylhet
District. Unless we build an alternative route through difficult hilly country
648
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
which will be expensive this road is Assam’s only present means of com¬
munication to these two districts. Assam should therefore under term “other
factors” mentioned in terms of reference be allotted this road with a narrow
strip on either side sufficient to enable road being kept in operation. This narrow
strip of territory inhabited predominantly by non-Muslims. Ends. My personal
view is that this road is so vital to Assam’s communications that if Govern¬
ment’s request granted by Chairman of Boundary Commission I would be
able to persuade my Ministers to abate (gr: cor:) their claims to some other
parts of Sylhet District. Such concession would also I think assist growth of
good feeling between Assam and East Bengal which it is in economic interests
of both Provinces to foster.1
1 Lord Mountbattern replied in tel. 3329-S of 11 August: ‘RadclifFe’s Secretary has seen your telegram
and it has been verified that Commission is fully seized of the point made by you on behalf of your
Government.’ R/3/1/157: f 275.
418
Sir G. Abell to Governor s Secretary , Sind
Telegram , Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Pakistan
immediate 1 o August 1 947, 11.00 pm
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 3312-S. Please pass following to Hon’ble Home Member in reply to his
telephone enquiry this morning.
Begins. At 2100 hours on August 9th a Pakistan special train ran over a mine
on the track 15 miles west of Bhatinda in East Punjab. The mine exploded,
blowing 11 feet out of the track and derailing the engine and six coaches.
Casualties 1 women and 1 child killed, 10 persons slightly injured. Relief
trains have gone out from both directions and the passengers have been moved
on. Punjab Government have been asked to make special arrangements for
guarding the track in future. Ends.
419
Record of Interview between Sir W. Monckton and Lord Ismay
Monckton Trustees No. 39: f 122
SECRET new DELHI, 10 August 1 947
I arrived in Delhi at 4 and had an interview with Lord Ismay before seeing the
Viceroy at 5.30. I explained to Lord Ismay that the position was made intoler-
AUGUST 1947
649
able by the refusal of Congress to negotiate unless we first agreed to accede.
I drew his attention to the paragraph1 in H.E.H.’s letter to the Viceroy in
which complaints were made about the refusal to negotiate about Berar or
Standstill Agreements I also showed Lord Ismay the letters2 I had written to
my old colleagues in the Conservative Party and told him that these letters
were on their way to Engl and and would be delivered, unless we were satisfied that
this improper pressure would stop. I particularly stressed to him the threats
that Hyderabad would be blockaded on the 15th August. He said he could not
believe this was really intended. If it was, it was intolerable.
1 See No. 376, para. 5. 2 See No. 390.
420
Record o f Interview between Sir W. Monckton and Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mountbatten of Burma
Monckton Trustees No. 30: ff 31-2
SECRET NEW DELHI, 10 August ig 47
1. Lord Ismay and V. P. Menon were present when I delivered H.E.H.’s
letter1 to the Viceroy in an interview from 5.30 to 6.30. The letterwas not read,
but I explained its contents and asked the Viceroy to study it afterwards. He
assured me that he would not be a party to any improper pressure by blockade
or otherwise of Hyderabad. He had already explained to his Cabinet the special
difficulties in which the Nizam was placed and he thought, without committing
himself, that an offer of co-operation on the lines which I had described would
justify the continuance of negotiations for a month or two.2 During this period
the offer of accession would still be kept open on the terms which would no
longer be available for other States (with one exception) after the 15th August.
The one exception was Bhopal where there was a possibility of a ten-day
extension for special reasons.
2. I asked for an assurance of the continuance of the status quo in Berar during
the progress of negotiations after the 15th August. H.E. said he was prepared
to consider this which seems to him reasonable. I also asked for an assurance
that, during the extended period for negotiations, existing administrative
arrangements would continue whether or not formal agreements were reached.
H.E. said that he would endeavour to include an assurance to this effect in his
reply to the Nizam’s letter. I told the Viceroy that the Nizam and his Govern¬
ment had heard from many sources of an intention to blockade the State and
1 No. 376; see also No. 389, Item 3 and its note 5.
2 cf. No. 385, para. 18.
650
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
cut it off from outside contacts on the 15 th August. He said that he would be all
against such a policy which would be, he agreed, contrary to the policy of
H.M.G. V. P. Menon added his assurance that such a blockade was not intended
in the case of Hyderabad.
3. H.E. also said that he proposed in his speech which would be broadcast
throughout the world to explain that Hyderabad had special problems which
made it desirable to extend in its case the period open for negotiations about the
future relationship with the Indian Union.
4. The interview ended with the suggestion by the Viceroy that I should
have discussions separately with V. P. Menon and himself tomorrow, Monday,
the nth August, and I agreed to make the necessary arrangements.
421
Sir W. Monckton to the Nizam of Hyderabad
Telegram , Monckton Trustees No. 30: f 64
in code 10 August 1947
Delivered Your Exalted Highness letter1 to Viceroy2 and am having further
interview tomorrow. Suggest no publicity for letters till after tomorrow’s
interview when I will telegraph. Do not anticipate immediate rejection of
offer. Have asked for assurances about status quo in Berar and continuance of
existing administrative arrangements whether or not formal standstill agree¬
ments are made. Shall have to remain in Delhi till Tuesday3 but will send report
by Ali Yawar Jung to reach you tomorrow night. Respects.
WALTER MONCKTON4
1 No. 376. 2 See No. 420. 3 ie 12 August.
4 The Nizam of Hyderabad replied in a coded telegram dated 11 August that he would not publish his
letter at No. 376 until Sir W. Monckton returned to Hyderabad. He added: ‘Please tell Viceroy that
this is my last offer which means that if it is not accepted I shall publish it along [with] my letter to
him dated ninth July [see No. 33 and its note 5] and will be ready to face any crisis that may arise in
future.’ The telegram concluded: ‘I appreciate your loyal services. I am glad Jinnah approved our draft
letter to Viceroy.’ Monckton Trustees No. 30: f 65.
AUGUST 1947
651
422
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence
Files: Pakistan
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 10 August I947, 1 1.55 pm
secret Received: 11 August , 8.30 am
No. 3322-S. In my last VPR1 I reported the difficulty that has arisen about the
order governing the vesting of assets and liabilities. After the final meeting of
the Partition Council2 it became quite clear that we could not accept a break¬
down without making a further effort, but it was extremely difficult to see
where the solution lay.
2. After discussions here I sent Cooke, who has handled this matter
splendidly, to Karachi with Mohammad Ah. On the assets issue they drafted a
revised formula which merely vests the control repeat control in the Dominion
where the assets are, and defines control as including all the incidentals of
ownership. This is a face saving device which both sides now accept.
3. Liabilities are more difficult. Jinnah maintains his opposition to any
settlement by which Pakistan becomes indebted to India to the extent of her
share of the present public debt (about Rs. 200 crores).
4. He and his Government have however been given to understand that if
no agreement is reached I am likely to put the matter to you since I am advised
that to pass no order will involve a grave and unnecessary risk to the credit of
India and Pakistan. On the other hand I do not wish to pass the order on my
own responsibility because I am to be Governor-General of India.
5. After much discussion here the India Government have been persuaded
to accept a scheme of repayment of the 200 crores which is very fair and reason¬
able. There will be a three year moratorium and the debt will then be repayable
in equated3 instalments over the next 50 years the rate of interest being not
greater than the average rate paid by India on the public debt outstanding.
6. There is one further point. Pakistan claimed Rs. 100 (half of 200) crores
from the cash balances as their minimum requirements for the rest of this finan¬
cial year. India would only agree to 20 (half of 40) crores as a payment on
account. It had been agreed to refer the balance to arbitration but India now
say that they will not force Pakistan to arbitration and are prepared to discuss
the matter further.
1 No. 385, paras. 31-38. 2 See No. 344, note 1.
3 ‘equated’ deciphered as ‘graduated’ in recipient’s copy.
652
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
7. India’s attitude will be stated in a letter from Sardar Patel to me.4 There
is no further time to negotiate with Jinnah even if he were open to further
negotiation. I propose to inform him of the contents of the letter, saying that I
think the terms reasonable, and add that I have referred to you the question
whether I should pass an order or not.
8. I am convinced that an order is necessary and I must ask you to instruct
me to issue one. Cooke is flying home tomorrow morning by York service
and will arrive Heathrow about 11 am on the 13 th. Please arrange special
facilities to get him to you as quickly as possible. He will bring the revised
formula on assets for incorporation in the draft order which was telegraphed5
to you this morning, and he can explain whole background, since he has been
present at every negotiation.
9. The short point is that we shall run a grave risk, and offend India, if I pass
no order. If on the other hand I do pass an order as now proposed I believe
Pakistan will acquiesce, and I am firmly convinced that their essential interests
are not prejudiced. On the contrary I think they have been very bad judges of
their own interest in opposing issue of this order. Though it is open to
Pakistan to pass an inconsistent or contradictory order on the 15th I doubt
whether they will do so. In any case we shall have done our best.
10. Please telegraph most immediate as soon as you have discussed with
Cooke. I must sign the order before August 15th though it may not be pub¬
lished till afterwards.
4 See No. 423.
5 Not printed. The draft order, which was transmitted in tel. 643-GT of 10 August, is on L/P &J/10/128 :
ff 60-62.
423
Sardar Patel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten
of Burma
L/P &J 1 10 1 128: f 63
11 August ig47
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
Since I wrote to you on Wednesday last,1 I understand that there have been
further conversations between Mr. Mohammad Ah, H. M. Patel, V. P. Menon
and Cooke, on the proposal that the Dominion of India should take over full
responsibility for the present National Debt. Apparently thePakistan spokesmen
apprehend that if the liability which will fall to their share is converted into an
inter-Governmental debt, then India as a creditor country would have an unfair
advantage. I am quite convinced that this apprehension is illfounded.
AUGUST 1947
653
It might be of some assistance to you in considering this matter further and
coming to a decision if I set out here, briefly, the lines on which India would
propose that it should be dealt with. Assuming that Pakistan’s share of the
National Debt is converted into a loan from India to Pakistan, the loan would
be repayable in 50 annual equated payments, which would commence three
or four years after the 15th August, 1947. The capital amount of the loan would
be settled by agreement or arbitration. For the purpose of working out the
equated payments, interest would be charged at a figure as nearly as possible
equal to what India herself would be paying on the various public loans
involved.
You will agree, however, that these financial arrangements are technical
matters which will have to be carefully examined and worked out in detail by
the technical experts. Moreover, they are of such great importance that they
will have to be considered formally by the full Cabinet. But I can take it upon
myself to assure you that we should not ask for terms more onerous than those
I have roughly outlined above.
I was told that the question of allocation of the cash balances to Pakistan was
also raised in this connection. My own view has always been that this is a
separate issue. We have already decided in the Partition Council2 that 20 crores
should be allocated to Pakistan at once, and the view of the Indian side is that
this decision takes account of all the factors and should not require revision. It
is, however, open to revision by the Arbitration Tribunal, who will be at
liberty to make any award they consider just and reasonable. If Pakistan,
however, would like us to reconsider the matter before it is referred to the
Arbitration Tribunal, we shall be perfectly prepared to do so.
Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL
1 No. 354.
2 Mountbatten Papers, Partition Council Minutes, 6 August 1947, Case No. P.C. 143/16/47.
424
The Maharaja of Kolhapur to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
R/3M139:ff 264-7
D.O. NO. H-4(2)/47 NEW PALACE, KOLHAPUR, 11 August I947
Your Excellency,
Yesterday I wired to Your Excellency as follows: —
“I am glad to inform Your Excellency that I have now decided that
Kolhapur State will accede to the Dominion of India according to the
final draft of Instrument of Accession and I also agree to the “Standstill”
654
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
agreement stop I have informed telegraphically today the States Depart¬
ment Delhi accordingly stop”
I write this to confirm the telegram.
I have already decided, as I have said above, that my State should accede to
the Dominion of India. But although I do not wish to lay down any conditions
for acceding to the Dominion, I must make one point which is in the minds of
many Princes very clear to Your Excellency. In the course of your speech at the
Conference of Princes and Ministers which met at New Delhi on the 25th
March,1 Your Excellency very clearly stated that the States were being
invited to accede without any financial obligations whatsoever. I am enclosing
an extract from that speech for ready reference. I feel sure that this assurance
from Your Excellency persuaded many of us, Princes, to accept the invitation
to accede.2 At the time the draft of the Instrument of Accession was under
consideration in Delhi, my Prime Minister and some other members of the
Committee desired that the Instrument should contain a clause embodying the
assurance given by Your Excellency in the course of your speech. But the
Secretary of the States Department took the view that this would be quite
unnecessary in view of the fact, as he put it, that the States were not acceding
in respect of any taxable items. I have thought over this question with the
utmost care and discussed it with eminent lawyers and feel that if a future
legislature of the Dominion sought to tax our States for meeting expenditure on
the subjects in respect of which the States have acceded, the natural result
would be to force the States to go to the Federal Court for a judicial pro¬
nouncement regarding the legality of such taxation. That the States should
thus be compelled to seek the aid of law in a matter of this kind, in connection
with which we rely on the solemn word of His Excellency the Crown
Representative, would itself be unfair. But apart from this, I am advised by
eminent lawyers that in the absence of a clause in the Instrument itself or in the
absence of a definite undertaking by Your Excellency in a more formal manner
than in the course of the speech, there is a possibility of a court interpreting
the instrument to mean that the acceding States undertake by implication the
responsibility for providing funds for the performance of duties which by that
instrument they assign to the Dominion Government. Such an interpretation
would of course be in contravention of Your Excellency’s statement and I feel
no doubt in my mind that Your Excellency will take the earliest opportunity
to clarify the point so that the assurance already given by Your Excellency may
have to be treated in future as part of the agreement (or as binding as such a
part) by which the State accedes to the Dominion of India.
I do not mean that the interpretation I have referred to above would be an
absolute certainty. But no one knows what course a court may take and I
therefore earnestly request Your Excellency to remove all possibility of doubts
ever arising on the point on which Your Excellency has specifically and gra-
AUGUST 1947
655
ciously given a clear assurance. Perhaps a statement from Your Excellency with
a specific reference to the Instruments of Accession signed by the Rulers of
States would meet the requirements of this situation.3
With kindest regards,
Your Excellency’s very sincerely
SHAHAJI CHHATRAPATI
1 The date should be 25 July; see No. 234.
2 cf. Nos. 201, p. 296, 297, para. 4 and 41 1.
3 Lord Mountbatten replied on 19 August explaining that as he was now a constitutional Governor-
General of the new Dominion of India, and thus unable to make further statements on the matter in
question, he had referred the Maharaja of Kolhapur’s letter to the States Department. R/3/1/139: f 270.
Mr V. P. Menon later recalled the question of the financial implications of accession in the following
maimer : ‘It was in view of the reluctance of the rulers to part with their financial independence and also
because of the shortness of time at our disposal, that we found it expedient, while inviting them to
accede on defence, external affairs and communications, not to ask them for any financial commit¬
ments.’ V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, Orient Longmans, 3rd edn., 1961,
P- 433-
425
The Gazette of India Extraordinary
L/WS/i /ioo6: f 9
NEW DELHI, 11 August I947
SECRETARIAT OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL (REFORMS)
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi , the nth August , 1947
No. G.G.O. 2. — The following Order made by the Governor-General is
published for general information : —
THE JOINT DEFENCE COUNCIL ORDER, 1947-
In the exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (i) of section 9 of the
Indian Independence Act, 1947, and in pursuance of sub-section (1) of section 1 1
thereof, the Governor-General is pleased to make the following Order : —
1. (1) This Order may be cited as the Joint Defence Council Order, 1947.
(2) It shall come into force at once,
(3) It shall cease to have effect on the first day of April, 1948:
Provided that the Governor-General of India and the Governor-General of
Pakistan, acting jointly, may direct that this Order shall remain in force for
such further period as may be specified in the direction.
2. (1) The Interpretation Act, 1889, shall apply for the interpretation of this
Order as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of Parliament.
656
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(2) In this Order, —
“Indian forces” has the same meaning as in the Indian Independence Act,
1947 ;
“Dominion forces” means the armed forces of the Dominion of India or of
Pakistan.
3. (1) As from the 15th day of August, 1947, there shall be set up a Council
known as the Joint Defence Council for India and Pakistan.
(2) The said Council, hereinafter referred to as the Joint Defence Council,
shall consist of —
(i) the Governor-General of India,
(ii) the Defence Minister of India,
(iii) the Defence Minister of Pakistan, and
(iv) the Supreme Commander of His Majesty’s Forces in India and Pakistan
(hereinafter referred to as the Supreme Commander).
4. The Governor-General of India shall be the independent Chairman of the
Joint Defence Council.
5. The person who at the date of the commencement of this Order is the
Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty’s Forces in India shall be the Supreme
Commander.
6. (1) If a Defence Minister is for any reason unable to attend any meeting
of the Joint Defence Council, he shall be entitled to depute another Minister
or the High Commissioner for the Dominion concerned to attend the meeting
in his place, and such other Minister or High Commissioner shall have for the
purposes of that meeting all the powers of the Defence Minister.
(2) If the Supreme Commander is for any reason unable to attend any
meeting of the Joint Defence Council, he shall be entitled to depute a member
of his “Chiefs of Staff” committee to attend the meeting in his place, and such
member shall have for the purposes of that meeting all the powers of the
Supreme Commander.
7. At any meeting of the Joint Defence Council, —
(a) a Defence Minister may be accompanied by another Minister ;
(b) a Defence Minister or the Supreme Commander may call in to assist him
at the meeting in an advisory capacity one or more experts.
8. The Joint Defence Council shall be in exclusive control of —
(a) the division of the Indian forces between the Dominions and their
reconstitution as two separate Dominion forces ;
AUGUST 1947
657
(b) the allocation, transfer and movement of officers and men belonging to
the Indian forces for the purposes of such reconstitution;
(c) the allocation, transfer and movement for the purposes of such reconsti¬
tution of plant, machinery, equipment and stores held by the Governor-
General in Council immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947, for the
purposes of the Indian forces ;
(d) such naval, military and air force establishments as the Joint Defence
Council may specify, for such temporary period as that Council may consider
necessary or expedient;
(e) the general administration of naval, military and air force law, and the
maintenance of discipline, in the armed forces of each of the two Dominions ;
(f) the general arrangements for the payment, food, clothing, medical atten¬
dance and equipment of the armed forces of each of the two Dominions ;
(g) any armed force which may be operating, or may hereafter be sent to
operate, under joint command in such areas near the boundaries between the
two Dominions as are for the time being declared by or under a Provincial
law to be disturbed areas;
(h) any Indian forces which are for the time being overseas ;
Provided that the control of the Joint Defence Council shall not extend,—
(i) except in relation to the forces mentioned in paragraphs (g) and (h) of this
Article, to the disposition and operational control within the Dominion, and the
local administration, of the armed forces of either Dominion, or
(ii) to the selection and recruitment of officers and men for the armed forces
of either Dominion and their training, when such training takes place elsewhere
than in a training establishment specified by the Joint Defence Council under
paragraph (d) of this Article ;
Provided further that the Joint Defence Council shall cause such measures to
be taken as will enable them gradually to withdraw their control in respect of
all or any of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of this Article
with a view to the cessation of control as early as may be practicable and in any
event before the 1st day of April 1948.
9. The executive authority of each of the two dominions shall be so exercised
as to give full effect to any orders or directions that may be made or given by the
Joint Defence Council in the exercise of the powers conferred on them by this
Order.
10. The Supreme Commander shall be responsible for giving effect to the
decisions of the Joint Defence Council and shall act in conformity with such
directions as may be given to him in that behalf by the Joint Defence Council.
658
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
11. The posting and promotion of any officer of His Majesty’s forces who is
not a member of, but is attached to or serving with, any of the Dominion
forces, shall be made only in consultation with the Supreme Commander.
12. Where by virtue of the provisions of this Order any members of the
Indian Forces are for the time being subject to the command or control of the
Supreme Commander, the Supreme Commander shall exercise —
(a) in the case of such members as are subject to the Indian Army Act, 191 1,
the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under that Act ; and
(b) in the case of such members as are subject to the Indian Air Force Act,
1932, the powers of the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief under that Act;
and when any such powers are so exercised by the Supreme Commander, the
powers of the Central Government under the Indian Army Act, 1911, or as the
case may be, the Indian Air Force Act, 1932, shall be exercisable by the Joint
Defence Council.
13. There shall be two Joint Secretaries of the Joint Defence Council
nominated, respectively, by the Governor-General of India and the Governor-
General of Pakistan, and such other secretarial staff as may be appointed by or
under the authority of the Joint Defence Council.
14. There shall be set up by order of the Joint Defence Council a financial
and accounting organisation charged with the duty of scrutinising and advising
on proposals involving expenditure, giving financial sanction thereto and
accounting for all the expenses referred to in the next succeeding Article.
15. All expenses incurred by or under authority derived from the Joint
Defence Council or the Supreme Commander for carrying into effect the
purposes of this Order shall be borne by the Dominions of India and Pakistan
in such proportion as may be determined by the Joint Defence Council.
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA,
Governor-General.
K. V. K. SUNDARAM,
Officer on Special Duty.
AUGUST 1947
659
426
Memorandum by Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence
Files: Bhopal
viceroy’s HOUSE, NEW DELHI,
11 August 1947
His Highness came to see me at 11 o’clock this morning.
I showed His Highness my draft reply to his letters of the 10th August1 and
he was kind enough to say that he would gladly write to put on record that I
had at no time brought any form of pressure to bear on him as to his future
course of action, and that he remembered that on the 23 rd March, the day of
my swearing-in, he had forecast the possibility of his abdicating in favour of his
daughter at some time in the near future. He assured me, therefore, that his
abdication had nothing whatever to do with any pressure on my part.
We agreed that I should split my letter into two parts, one part dealing with
the extension he had asked for, which was awaiting confirmation from Mr.
V. P. Menon, which would remain private; and the other, an open letter about
the abdication to which he would reply also by an open letter, which would
be suitable for publication should the occasion for publication arise.2
He made it very clear to me that the fact that he was perfectly satisfied with
my handling of the situation as I had found it, did not mean to say that he was
satisfied with the situation that HMG had created for him and the Princes.
I pointed out to the Nawab that I could not send off any letters until I had
seen Sardar Patel this afternoon and obtained his agreement to the 10-day
extension which H.H. had asked for; and that with his concurrence Mr.
Menon should send the letter requested. I said, however, that although hitherto
Sardar Patel had never refused any single demand I had put forward in dealing
with any State, I had been warned only this morning by Mr. V. P. Menon that
Sardar Patel had received information which would make it most unlikely that
he would accede to my request for an extension.
I told H.H. the story that Sardar Patel had received was to the effect that H.H.
had made contact with the young Maharaja of Jodhpur and induced him to
come with him to Mr. Jinnah.3 That at this meeting Mr. Jinnah had offered
extemely favourable terms on condition that they did not sign the Instrument
of Accession, and that he had even gone so far as to turn round and say to the
1 See No. 412. In another letter dated io August the Nawab of Bhopal referred to the record of his dis¬
cussion on 6 August with Lord Mountbatten, Mr Menon and Sir Zafarullah Khan, and mentioned that
he wanted an extension of the time-limit for signing the Instrument of Accession to enable Bhopal
State to see what decision Kashmir and Hyderabad would take. R/3/1/139: f 211. No record of an
interview on 6 August has been traced but cf. Nos. 366 and 385, paras. 7-8.
2 See No. 435 and its Enclosure for the letters as issued. 3 cf. No. 385, paras. 58-60.
66o
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Maharaja of Jodhpur: “Here’s my fountain pen; write your terms and I will
• ”
sign it.
The story continued that after I had sent for the Maharaja ofjodhpur and had
a discussion4 with him and had sent him to see Sardar Patel who had satisfied
all his demands, the Maharaja had flown back to Jodhpur promising to come
back that night or the following morning and to go straight to Sardar Patel to
give him his decision.
The story goes that the Maharaja ofjodhpur returned on Sunday morning,
but it was uncertain as to which airfield he would land at. H.H. of Bhopal was
supposed, therefore, to have sent a staff officer in a car to each airfield — Palam
and Willingdon — to make quite certain that the Maharaja should be found and
taken straight to his house. He had been virtually a “prisoner” in this house and
had not yet been released to keep his word and see Sardar Patel.
I pointed out to His Highness that no amount of friendship would enable
me to protect either himself or his State or the new Ruler of the State if the
future Government of India thought that he was acting in a manner hostile to
that Government by trying to induce an all-Hindu State to join Pakistan.
His Highness then offered to tell me the true version of events, which he gave
me to understand on his word of honour would be the whole truth and nothing
but the truth. I gladly accepted this assurance, for having been his friend and
known him for years as a man of honour I had no reason to doubt that he
would tell me the truth. The following is His Highness’s account, dictated in
his presence:
“About the 6th August the Maharaja of Dholpur and one or two other
Rulers informed me that the Maharaja ofjodhpur wished to see me.5 I said I
would gladly see him at my house. When the Maharaja came he told me that he
was particularly anxious to meet Mr. Jinnah as quickly as possible to know
what terms Mr. Jinnah would offer.
“As Mr. Jinnah was very busy and on the eve of his departure from Delhi to
Karachi and I had fortunately secured an interview with him that afternoon, I
invited the Maharaja ofjodhpur to come along with me. The Maharaja there¬
fore came back to my house and we drove together to Mr. Jinnah’ s house.
“At this interview His Highness asked Mr. Jinnah what terms he was offering
to those States who wished to establish a relationship with Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah
said: ‘I have made my position quite clear; we are ready to come to treaty
relations with the States and we shall give them very good terms, and we shall
treat them as independent States.’ They then discussed certain details about
port facilities, railway jurisdiction and the supply of food, arms and ammuni¬
tion. The question of whether he should or should not sign an instrument of
accession never arose.
“I returned to Bhopal and while I was there I received a telephone message
from Delhi, from H.H. of Dholpur and other Rulers, to the effect that His
AUGUST 1947
66l
Highness of Jodhpur was returning to Delhi on Saturday and that he wanted
to meet me. I replied that I was in any case coming back to Delhi on Saturday.
“I arrived back in Delhi on Saturday morning and received a message at the
airfield from H.H. of Dholpur asking me to come straight to him. On arrival
he told me to wait with him since the Maharaja of Jodhpur was at present in
with the Viceroy and was expected to come straight back at the conclusion of
the interview. The Viceroy however kept him longer than was expected,
so that H.H. of Jodhpur did not have time to come to the house but sent a
telephone message to say he was going direct to the airfield to fly back to
Jodhpur but was returning that evening.
“Since the message did not say which airfield he was taking off from, H.H.
of Dholpur sent two ADCs in two cars to Palam and Willingdon respectively,
to try and catch H.H. of Jodhpur before he left. It is possible that one of these
two cars may have been mine because mine was waiting outside the door, but I
am still unable to confirm that it was used.
“One of the ADCs caught H.H. of Jodhpur who sent back a message to the
effect that he was coming back that evening. I then went back to my house.
His Highness of Dholpur came to see me on Saturday evening to say that H.H.
of Jodhpur had not come back that night. On Sunday morning it appears that
H.H. of Jodhpur got back, but I do not know what time as he never communi¬
cated with me.
“At about 1.30 p.m. I received a message from H.H. of Dholpur inviting me
to lunch. I replied that I did not wish to have lunch but would come at 2 o’clock.
On arrival I found H.H. of Jodhpur there and he had brought with him his
Guru whom he introduced as his philosopher and guide. This was the first time
I had seen H.H. of Jodhpur since our meeting with Mr. Jinnah.
“H.H. invited us all to have discussions with his Guru and H.H. of Dholpur
and other Rulers entered into a lengthy discussion with him, but I myself only
contributed a few words to the conversation.
“As I was leaving, His Highness of Jodhpur said he was coming to see me on
Monday morning at 10 o’clock. This morning (Monday) he kept his promise
and came at 10. He told me that his Guru had been unable to make up his mind
but that he himself had decided that he would not leave the Union of India. I
4 No record of an interview at this time between Lord Mountbatten and the Maharaja of Jodhpur has
been traced.
5 In his letter of 12 August to Lord Mountbatten, the Nawab of Bhopal corrected a ‘slight error of facts’
in this sentence by pointing out that the Maharaja of Dholpur was not one of those who had spoken
to him and that the message had been delivered by two or three other Princes. He added: ‘The rest of
my whole account with you is correct.’ In the same letter, Bhopal commented on an ‘allegation’ that
he had been involved in the attempt ‘to make Baroda change his mind’ (cf. No. 3S5, para. 59). He
denied this, emphasising that he had never suggested to the Maharaja of Jodhpur that he should try
to persuade the Gaekwar to change his mind and that he had not known that Jodhpur intended to go to
Bombay to meet the Gaekwar. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Bhopal.
662
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
replied that I considered His Highness was the master of his own State and I
would not attempt to influence his choice one way or the other.”
427
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Maharaja of Bikaner
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Punjab, Situation in, Part 11(h)
express new Delhi, ii August igqy, 11. 3 ° am
EN CLAIR
No. 646-GT. Your Highness’ telegram of August ioth1 about the Punjab
Boundary award.
2. This matter is not one in which I can intervene or attempt to influence
the decision of the Chairman. The award will shortly be published, and it will
then be necessary for your state to make any consequential arrangements
necessary with either or both governments.
3 . I am. afraid I cannot see your Prime Minister and Chief Engineer on this
subject since I have absolutely nothing to do with the findings of the Boundary
Commission.
4. Thank you for your letter of August 8th.2 I am following this up.
1 See No. 405 and its note i. 2 Not traced.
428
Lord Ismay to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
^hl1 1157: f 274
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL 11 August igq?
My dear Mr. Liaquat,
1 was dumbfounded to receive the private message1 which you have sent me
through Mahommed Ali. As I understand it, the gist of the message is as
follows : —
(1) Gurdaspur or a large portion of it has been given to East Punjab by the
award of the Boundary Commission. The report is that this is a political
decision, and not a judicial one:
(2) If this is so, it is a grave injustice which will amount to a breach of faith
on the part of the British.
AUGUST 1947
663
Before giving you my comments on these points, let me state the background
as I see it.
(1) The Viceroy has from the outset made it absolutely clear that he himself
must have nothing to do either with arbitration of any kind or with the
Boundary Commissions.
(2) The Indian leaders themselves selected all the Boundary Commissions,
drafted their terms of reference and undertook to implement the award, what¬
ever it might be.
(3) The Viceroy has always been, and is determined to keep clear of the
whole business. As I told you only last week, his reply to Sir Cyril Radclifle’s
enquiry about the interpretation of a certain point in his terms of reference was
that the Viceroy did not feel justified in even expressing a view.2
Thus, I am at a loss to know what action you wish me to take on your
message. In the first place, I am told that the final report of Sir Cyril Radcliffe
is not yet ready, and therefore I do not know what grounds you have for saying
that Gurdaspur has been 3 allotted to the East Punjab.
Secondly, if this should be the case, you surely do not expect the Viceroy
to suggest to Sir Cyril Radcliffe that he should make any alteration. Still less
can I believe that you intend to imply that the Viceroy has influenced this
award. I am well aware that some uninformed sections of public opinion
imagine that the award will not be Sir Cyril Radcliffe’s but the Viceroy’s,4
but I never for one moment thought that you, who are completely in the know,
should ever imagine that he could do such a thing.
Yours very sincerely,
ISMAY
1 This was a verbal message; see No. 485, para 4.
2 Presumably a reference to No. 318 and its Enclosures.
3 Emphasis in original. 4 cf. No. 326.
429
Lord Ismay to Sir F. Messervy
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Armed Forces , Indian, Volume I, Part II
SECRET AND PERSONAL 1 1 August 1 947
My dear Frank,
The Viceroy has asked me to thank you for your secret and personal letter
No. 19/GOC of 6th August1 and to reply to it.
1 Not traced.
664
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
It was made clear at the Partition Council that India would almost certainly
not require the five Animal Transport Regiments and two Mountain Regi¬
ments, but their representatives were not in the least bit shaken and insisted
on their full pound of flesh. It therefore seems to me that your only chance of
getting hold of these animals and equipment would be to suggest a swop for
something that India did need, e.g. field artillery and motor transport.
As for the question of persuading India to allow their four battalions to
remain on the Frontier for a moment longer than is necessary, or of their
recognising that they have any share of the responsibility for watch and ward
on the North West Frontier, I am afraid that, in the present state of feelings,
there is not even a shadow of hope.
The Viceroy suggested the other day to the Indian representatives on the
Joint Defence Council that they might assist in the defence of the Frontier with
their air forces, but their reply was an emphatic negative.
I still cling to the hope that the Joint Defence Council, which is for the
moment merely charged with the reconstruction of the Armed Forces, may
in time2 develop into a body which will foster unity of doctrine, unity of
equipment and unity of policy between India and Pakistan.
Meanwhile, the only thing that we, who are left in India, can do is to strive
to get them to co-operate in any way that we can.
Yours ever
PUG
2 Emphasis in original.
430
Note by Mr Morris-] ones1
Rl3l1/i52:ff26-7
11 August 1947
NOTE ON THE RIGHT OF SECESSION
i. In considering first the position as regards the right of secession in the case
of existing Dominions, it is clear that the Statute of Westminster contains two
contradictory pointers : —
(a) The statement in the preamble that “it would be in accord with the
established constitutional position of all the members of the Commonwealth
in relation to one another that any alteration in the law touching the Succession
to the Throne or the Royal Style and Titles shall hereafter require the assent as
well of the Parliaments of all the Dominions as of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom” does clearly mean, as Prof. Keith insists, that unilateral action to
secede is contrary to that portion of the Statute.
AUGUST 1947
665
(b) On the other hand, it is equally clear that Section 2 of the Statute itself
stating that “no law .... made after the commencement of this Act by the
Parliament of a Dominion shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is
repugnant to the law of England or to the provisions of any existing or future
Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom . . . . ” was intended to remove
inequalities of status as between the Dominions and the U.K. and in this way
to confer on Dominion Legislatures powers parallel to those of the U.K.
Parliament.
2. From this it follows that if either part of the Statute is taken by itself, a
case can be made out for or against the right of secession. Prof. Keith has
concentrated his attention on the Preamble and thus reaches a conclusion which
denies the right of secession. Prof. Wheare, on the other hand, in the passage
quoted by Sir B. N. Rau (but not in the general theme of the book) con¬
centrates on Section 2 of the Statute and reaches a conclusion which admits the
right.
3. It is true that it is possible to argue — as C. J. Lord Caldecote did — that
Section 2, while permitting a Dominion to pass legislation repugnant to an
Imperial Act, left untouched the convention stated in the Preamble. But it
would seem to be open to a Dominion to argue that the spirit of the Section is
contrary to the letter of the Preamble.
4. There is, moreover, an important difference between the two passages
of the Statute. The Preamble is a recital of constitutional convention while the
Section is an enactment of strict law. Now, without entering into any discussion
as to the relative sanctity of laws and conventions, it can at least be said that
whereas laws can be repealed or abolished only by new laws, conventions may
be modified by new conventions.
5. It would therefore appear that the issue is even more open than Sir B. N.
Rau has suggested, for there is no real quarrel between the views of Prof. Keith
and Prof. Wheare. The former has pointed out the position according to con¬
vention, the latter that according to law. Granted this, a Dominion would not
be on weak ground if it argued that —
(a) the convention stated in the Preamble, though well-established, is sus¬
ceptible of change and can certainly not be employed to keep within a “free”
association of nations one which wishes to secede.
(b) the entire intention of Section 2 of the Statute is not clear but one im¬
plication is the full equality of status enjoyed by Dominion Legislatures —
which carries with it the corollary that they are not bound except in so far as
they desire to bind themselves.
6. The fact that Eire has never “declared that the right to secede has in fact
1 Mr Morris-Jones had evidently been sent a copy of Sir B. N. Rau’s note (Enclosure to No. 314) by
Sir G. Abell. He returned it on 11 August together with the comments printed here.
666
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
been exercised” may well be due to nothing more than her willingness to
create an obscure situation which might leave her free to claim benefits and
equally to avoid restrictions.
7 . If the position so far as the Statute of Westminster Dominions are con¬
cerned is such as to leave it open for a Dominion to argue on the lines of para 5
above that the right of secession does exist, the factors mentioned by Sir B. N.
Rau in his last para as pecuhar to the new Dominions make the existence of the
right in their case almost beyond question. It is also important to note that in
the interpretation of the India Independence Act, account would have to be
taken of HMG’s June 3 Statement2 — especially the last sentence of para 20
which grants the right of secession.
M. j.
2 Vol. XI, No. 45.
431
Mr Attlee to the Earl of Listowel
RI30I1I12: f 36
11 August 1947
Prime Minister’s Personal Minute: Serial No. M307/47
Secretary of State for India,
I have received your Minute Serial No. 144/47 of the 9th August1 about the
future of the India Office and its contents.
It is important that this matter should not be allowed to become the subject
of a long-drawn argument which might create ill-feeling. I should like the
question to be put to Mountbatten to see whether it is possible for him to get
a quick settlement.
Possibly an Official Committee will be needed to ascertain the facts of the
position, but if so, the Committee should be small, should confine itself mainly
to fact-finding and should be instructed to report quickly.2
C . R . A .
1 No. 399; see also No. 400.
2 In tel. 10669 of 14 August Lord Listowel explained that the Prime Minister was anxious to obtain
Lord Mountbatten’s views on the future of the India Office and its contents and suggested that when they
were ready they should be communicated privately to Sir T. Shone who would transmit them to the
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. In tel. 640 of 21 August Shone transmitted, on behalf
of the Governor-General of India, the following recommendations: (1) that H.M.G. should undertake
immediately the preparation of lists of assets etc; (2) that the U.K. High Commissioners of India and
Pakistan should receive instructions to raise the question of disposal of these assets with the respective
governments at an early date; (3) the High Commissioners should try to get agreement in principle
that the question should be examined first by a Joint Fact Finding Committee, with the India and
Pakistan High Commissioners in the U.K. as possible members; (4) that once agreement to (3) above
had been obtained, a public announcement agreed between the three governments concerned should
be issued to the effect that the disposal of the assets of India and Pakistan in the U.K., eg buildings,
records and articles of historical and cultural value, would be discussed by a special Inter-Government
Committee. L/S & G/7/927: ff 302-5 and 282.
AUGUST 1947
667
432
Note by Major General D. C. Hawthorn 1
RI3/1I171: ff 51-2
TOP SECRET 11 August I947
1. The Civil arrangements for splitting the Punjab are proceeding rapidly
and a few days ago a new Hindu Supdt of Police arrived in Amritsar to take
over. His first act was to disarm the Muslim members of the Police Force.
This has created considerable alarm and despondency. The Police Force in
Amritsar has decreased by 30%. The Muslim Police are most anxious for their
own safety and for that of their families. The Governor has taken prompt
action and this Hindu Supdt of Police has been transferred to the Kangra
Valley. The Muslim Police are being evacuated under Civil arrangements to
Western Punjab. The harm has however been done and with this reduction in
the efficiency of the Police Force more and more calls are being made on the
troops of the Punjab Boundary Force.
2. The refugee problem mainly from Eastern Punjab to Western Punjab is
becoming increasingly difficult and more and more of the population is on
the move; naturally the Civil are demanding escorts from the Punjab Boundary
Force to protect these defenceless refugees as they move and the Commander,
Punjab Boundary Force is doing what he can.
3. The disturbances are producing an average daily killing of about 100
people with occasional large raids in which 70 to 80 people are killed at one
fell swoop. There have been two of these in the last few days, one in which the
victims were Muslims and the other in which the victims were Sikhs and
Hindus. A Lieut in 3 Mahar who went on a few days leave to his home was
liquidated with his entire family. The GOC did not know his name.
4. The bigger raids are usually carried out by well armed and well led
Gangs. Information is generally being received too late. This is due to the
“sources” of information drying up and the general pull-out of Europeans.
5. There is no doubt that but for the presence of troops an uncontrolled
massacre would now be taking place.
6. The Government of Eastern Punjab which is setting up is of course a very
creaky machine at present.
7. The troops are unaffected2 by the communal tension and are carrying out
all that is asked of them magnificently.
1 This note summarised a report which Major General D. C. Hawthorn received by telephone from the
Commander of the Punjab Boundary Force at 3.30 pm on 11 August.
2 Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck commented in the margin: ‘How long? C.J.A.’
668
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
8. The GOC pressed for the arrival of the Fighter Recce Sqn which was
promised him. So far it has not arrived and he is being forced to use his AOP
Flight for inter-communication and recce purposes. He stresses the importance
of the Air from the morale aspect and says the appearance of aircraft quietens
down the neighbourhood at once. Railway authorities are pressing for aircraft
to be allowed to fly up and down the railway lines as they consider this will
prevent, to a large extent, damage to the track by keeping saboteurs well away
from the lines.3
9. The derailment of the train two nights ago,4 he attributes to Sikhs and the
Jeep containing the saboteurs which was chased disappeared into the State
territory of Faridkot.
I am taking action re F/Recce Sqn.5
D. C. HAWTHORN
Maj Gen
dcgs(a)
3 Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck commented in the margin: ‘There are very few aircraft for the job
required of them. It is quite impossible to provide air “standing patrols”. C .J.A.’
4 See No. 418.
5 On 12 August Lord Ismay minuted to Lord Mountbatten: ‘I have just received the attached privately
from the Commander-in-Chief. The only really encouraging passage is paragraph 7.’ In reply,
Mountbatten requested a draft summary for the V.P.R. embodying paras. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7. R/3/1/171 :
f 50.
433
Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart (North-West Frontier Province) to Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , R/j/f/165:/ 74
IMMEDIATE 11 August 1Q47, S-3° Pm
secret Received: 11 August, 11.00 pm
No. CA/172. Addressed Viceroy, repeated Secretary of State.
Your telegram 3265-S,1 para 2 and Secretary of State’s 10278, 2 para 8, both
dated August 8th.
I saw Khan Sahib today at normal routine interview. I referred to rumours
and press reports of proposals to declare Pathanistan on 15th. Khan Sahib
assured me they were nonsense and there was no question of this or any other
unconstitutional action. His party would not participate in celebrations of
August 15th but would not interfere with them. Ministers if still in power
would however attend.
AUGUST 1947
669
2. In view of his assurances I gave no warning nor did I refer to resignation
(your 3264 dated August 8th).3
3. Have informed Cunningham.
1 No. 374. 2 No. 387.
3 No. 365, note 4. The date should be August 7th.
434
Record oj Interview between Sir W. Monckton and Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mountbatten of Burma
Monckton Trustees No. 39: ff 130-2
secret 11 August 1947, 5 pm-y pm
During part of my discussion, Lord Ismay was present: during a further part
Mr. Rahim was present in addition. Later V. P. Menon came in. In the early
part of the discussion, I told H.E. how genuinely afraid I was that either now or
in two months’ time the Government of Indian Dominion might blockade
Hyderabad and even make it incommunicado. I made it plain in Lord Ismay’ s
presence that, if anything like that occurred, I should go in for the Dominion
Government beginning with H.E. in that event. H.E. told me that, though he
would not deal with this matter in writing, because he felt he could not in
fairness to the future Government of the Dominion, I could assure H.E.H. that
he (the Viceroy), even when he ceased to be Crown Representative, would
never be a party to improper pressure or coercion of the kind I had indicated
being applied to Hyderabad. He added and repeated in Mr. Rahim’s presence
that the Dominion Government would be extremely foolish to indulge in such
action which would put them wrong in the eyes of the whole world. On the
other hand, both the Viceroy and Lord Ismay pointed out that a more
dangerous and likely event would be that, on the Russian model, not the
Dominion Government, but the Congress party might spend time and money
in creating disorderly movements inside the State and this the Governor-
General could not guard against. H.E. gave the instance to Mr. Rahim of Rs.
5 lakhs having been poured into Travancore. He further added that the
Congress might adopt the same measures and start the subversive movement
in Hyderabad. Mr. Rahim pointed out to the Viceroy that the Congress
movement in Hyderabad was not so effective, organized and on such a scale
as it was in Travancore. The Viceroy replied that they would now1 organize
670
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
and overthrow the Government. He repeated, however, that he did not think
that the Indian Cabinet would have selected him as Governor-General if they
wished to indulge themselves in the practice which I had described.
2. He said that in his speech on the 15th August he would say that Hyderabad
as the premier State, had a unique position by reason of its size, population and
resources and that it had its special problems. He would go on to say that the
Nizam, while not proposing to accede to the Dominion of Pakistan, had not
up to the present felt able to accede to the Dominion of India but that H.E.H.
had assured him of his anxiety to co-operate with the Dominion in which his
State lay. He would add that, with the assent of his Government, he was
continuing negotiations and hoped that a solution would be found satisfactory
to all. He did not seem quite certain whether he would mention in his speech
that extra period would be roughly two months.
3. In his letter2 to H.E.H. which he would have to compose after discussion
with the States Department, he expected to take the line that he welcomed the
Nizam’s offer to co-operate by treaty with the Dominion of India in the three
essential fields. He would point out that the Dominion felt that they could get
stability only if all the States within their borders were prepared to accede and
he (the Viceroy) as he had already explained to the Hyderabad Negotiating
Committee and the Nizam’s Adviser, was of opinion that accession would be
to the mutual advantage of the Dominion and Hyderabad. He would go on to
say that negotiations would continue in the hope of finding a reconciliation
of the views of the Dominion and the Nizam and that the Dominion Govern¬
ment had agreed as a single exception to the terms offered in the proposed
Instrument of Accession remaining open for a further two months. I think
he will also deal with our criticism of the Congress attitude to Berar
by referring to the consultation of the Nizam on the recent appointment
of a new Governor in C. P. and Berar which he will suggest is inconsistent
with the threat to annex that territory on the 15th August. In the same sense,
he will show that the Dominion Government will prepare adaptations of the
1935 Act in respect of Berar which do not, I gather, flout Constitutional law.
I do not quite see how he is going to handle the question of Standstill Agree¬
ments except by expressing readiness for the continuance of existing adminis¬
trative arrangments. Mr. Rahim made it clear in the course of the discussion
that H.E.H. was not prepared to execute an Instrument of Accession and the
Viceroy said that he understood that from the letter but that he still hoped we
should find a mutually satisfactory solution.
4. The Viceroy is still anxious to go to Hyderabad and see H.E.H. His
behaviour was more sympathetic as compared with the interviews that we
had on the last occasion.3 He (the Viceroy) at the same time feels helpless after
AUGUST 1947
671
the 15th. We felt that the Viceroy appeared to be disgusted with the behaviour
which we thought the Congress would adopt. He suggested that H.E.H.
should take all sections of the public into his confidence.4
1 Emphasis in original.
2 See No. 440 for the letter as sent.
3 See eg No. 329.
4 Sir W. Monckton sent a second telegram in code (see No. 421 for the first) to the Nizam of Hyderabad
on 12 August in which he explained that Lord Mountbatten understood that Hyderabad must be free
to publish the Nizam’s letter at No. 376 and added: ‘We are already free to publish letter ninth July
[see No. 33 and its note 5] when we wish.’ Monckton also stated that while he did not expect Mount-
batten, who it was said still hoped to persuade Hyderabad to accede, to accept a treaty, he (Mountbatten)
appreciated the Nizam’s readiness to co-operate in the three essential fields and thought it worthwhile
to continue negotiations for two months more. Monckton Trustees No. 30: f 66.
435
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Nawab of Bhopal
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Bhopal
PERSONAL 11 August 1947
Dear Hamidullah,
I have had a long interview1 with Sardar Patel today. I promised to let you
know bis reactions to the proposals that Bhopal should have an extension of
ten days in which to sign the Instrument of Accession and Standstill Agreement
and that you might abdicate any time from now on within the next twelve
months.2
As regards the extension, Sardar Patel pointed out that he had refused an
extension to every single Ruler and Dewan who had asked him for one and
that he therefore could not himself make an exception. There were two courses
open to me: either to seek Cabinet approval in person or to take the matter
into my own hands.
Sir Walter Monckton put in a request on behalf of Hyderabad for an exten¬
sion which Sardar Patel was unable to agree to; but with his agreement I took
the matter up at my last meeting with the India Cabinet. I asked them to
authorise me to grant an extension to the Nizam to enable the negotiations to be
continued after the 15th August. For your private information I can tell you
I was successful in obtaining authority for this extension as a special exception.3
It would be almost impossible for me to take your case to the Cabinet since
there is not further opportunity for a meeting before the 15th August, and in
any case I could hardly expect to have such a success a second time, particularly
as the magnitude of the problems of the two States is, as you would be the
first to admit, of a different order.
1 Not traced.
2 See Nos. 412 and 426.
3 See No. 385, para. 18.
6j2
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
I have therefore obtained Sardar Patel’s consent to the second course,namely
that if you will sign and date the Instrument of Accession and Standstill
Agreement before midnight on the 14th August and then hand them personally
to me I will lock them up in my private case and undertake not to deliver them
to the States’ Department until 25th August, unless you authorise me to deliver
them earlier. I will further undertake to hand them back to you any time up to
the 25th August should you change your mind and not wish to accede. I hope
you will agree that this will in effect give you your ten days extension, whilst
not embarrassing Sardar Patel. I need hardly point out the absolute need for
complete secrecy over this special treatment which you are being accorded. I
have asked Sardar Patel equally to maintain secrecy.
As regards abdication I feel myself that it would be unfair to your daughter
and put you in a very bad light in the eyes of the world if you were to abdicate
on any date near the 15th August, as it would appear to put an unfair burden
on so young a girl ruler at such a very critical time — (a sort of “escape” at her
expense). As regards my own position, this would be adequately covered by
your kind undertaking to exchange letters for publication. Therefore it is
entirely a matter of what the world would think of you and the chances that
you give your daughter of making a success of her new position.
I think that the best compromise would be if you were to abdicate any time
during the month of October. This I feel would cover all the objections which
I have raised above whilst releasing you at the earliest reasonable moment.
Sardar Patel has given me his personal assurance that your continuation as
Ruler of Bhopal in the early stages, so far from damaging the prospects of
Bhopal, will make the India Government far better disposed towards your
state since they will realise that you are trying to avoid embarrassing them by
not choosing an awkward date for your abdication.
Therefore my private but most earnest advice, Hamidullah, is that you
should sign the Instrument of Accession and Standstill Agreement as soon as
possible and give it to me to keep until you have made up your mind one way
or the other ; and that if you decide to abdicate, you should not do this until
October.
No one can make up your mind but you and whatever your decision I need
hardly assure you that it will not affect our friendship.
Yours ever,
DICKIE
P.S.
I enclose an official letter which I should like to publish in the event of your not
taking my advice and after all abdicating on or about the 15th August. I am
grateful to you for saying that you will send me a reply, which I can also
publish, making it clear that I have not at any time exerted any form of pressure
on you in this matter.
AUGUST 1947
673
I shall be away from Delhi (visiting Karachi) from about noon on Wednesday
1 3 th until after lunch on Thursday 14th. Come and see me whenever conven¬
ient and let me have the two documents as proposed. No meeting with Patel
is now necessary as he agrees to all my proposals.
D
Enclosure to No. 435
11 August 1947
My dear Nawab Sahib,
You mentioned to me that you might abdicate in favour of your daughter
one day. You will remember that I urged you strongly not to take any such
drastic step at such a very critical moment in the history of your State.
In speaking to me you were kind enough to assure me that if you did abdicate
your decision would be quite unconnected with the negotiations which you
and I have been carrying on about the accession of your State to one of the
Dominions. I am glad of this since I have been at pains to point out that you are
a completely free and unfettered agent and that no one can compel you to take
any decision against your will. You are one of my oldest friends in India and
whatever decision you take my only desire is that it should be in the best
interests of yourself and the people of your State.
I remain Your Highness's sincere friend,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
436
Minutes oj Viceroy’s Seventieth Staff Meeting , Item 4
Mounthatten Papers
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s House , New Delhi , on 12 August
at 3.00 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma , Lord Ismay,
Sir G Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Captain Brockman, Mr Christie, Mr A.
Campbell-Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
Item 4
THE BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS
The meeting discussed the action necessary as a result of the fact that it appeared
impossible to publish the awards of the Boundary Commissions as early as had
been hoped.1
1 cf. No. 389, Item i.
674
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY: —
(i) directed P.S.V. to inform the Governors of the Punjab and Bengal of the
delay in this matter;
(ii) directed J.P.S.V. to take all other action consequent upon the decisions
reached, including a telegram to the Secretary of State.2
2 An entry in Mr Christie’s diary for 12 August reads as follows:
‘The Staff Meeting, twice postponed, began at 5 and went on for 2 J hours . . .
Then we got on to the Boundary Commission — V.P. showed a quite unexpected flare up of
communal bias when he heard about the C[hittagong] H [ill] T[racts]. H.E. most anxious to postpone
publication till after 15th. Pug [Lord Ismay] against this for administrative reasons. H.E. adamant:
sent Alan [Mr Campbell-Johnson] and me to Sir C. R[adcliffe] to arrange the dates. C.R. refused
flat — too many people know its ready. Stretched a point to redate 13th; will arrive complete after
H.E. has gone to Karachi. Back to H.E. who had had a couple. Didn’t like it, but swallowed it.
MSS. EUR. D718/3, Part 2.
Campbell-Johnson in his account of the visit to Radcliffe says that Radcliffe explained that both the
Punjab and Bengal awards were complete and ready, but that the Sylhet award was not. He also states
that Mountbatten was ‘greatly relieved’ when advised that it would therefore be physically very
difficult for all three awards to come into his possession before his return to Delhi from Karachi on
the evening of 14 August, or for the texts to be printed and available before the 16th — -Independence
Day itself being a national holiday. Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, London, 195 T
P- 153-
437
Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Punjab , Situation in, Part 11(b)
IMMEDIATE 12 August I947, 9.20 am
confidential Received: 12 August, 12.00 am
No. 228-G. Addressed to Viceroy, repeated to Secretary of State for India.
My immediately preceeding telegram.1 Today very serious disorders in
Lahore appear to be due (a) Derailment of Pakistan Special2 (b) Continued
outragin g Sikhs in Amritsar District and elsewhere and (c) Disarming of Muslim
Policemen in Amritsar.3 This last action was taken under verbal instructions
of Superintendent of Police designate without approval of actual Super¬
intendent of Police and without orders of any higher authority. The officer
concerned is Hindu selected by East Punjab and I have suspended him and
removed him from district with knowledge of Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava.
Muslim policemen will be indispensable in East Punjab for some time and our
policy was to get them to stay at their posts. Recent visit by Inspector-General
seemed to have assured this but precipitate action of Superintendent of Police
designate has had very serious consequences. Men have been told by West
AUGUST 1947
675
Punjab that they will not be employed if they desert and they appear to have
returned to duty including about 50 who arrived in Lahore this morning.
2. Feeling in Lahore city is now unbelievably bad and Inspector-General
tells me that Muslim League National Guard appearing in uniform and that
Police are most unsteady.
3. Strength of Punjab Boundary Force is not adequate to present and future
tasks. I have already reported this.4
1 Possibly an unnumbered situation report despatched at 11.30 Pm 011 11 August but apparently dealing
with disturbances during the 24 hours ending 4 am on n August. L/P &J/8/663 : f 30.
2 See Nos. 418 and 432, para. 9.
3 See No. 432, para. 1. 4 See No. 382.
438
The Gazette of India Extraordinary
NEW DELHI, 12 August lg 47
SECRETARIAT OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL (REFORMS)
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi , the 12th August , 1947
No. G. G. O. 9. — The following Order made by the Governor-General is
published for general information : —
THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL ORDER, I947
In exercise of the powers conferred by section 9 of the Indian Independence
Act, 1947, and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf the Governor-
General is pleased to make the following Order: —
1. (1) This Order may be cited as the Arbitral Tribunal Order, 1947.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. The Interpretation Act, 1889, shall apply for the interpretation of this
Order as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of Parliament.
3. (1) As from the fourteenth day of August, 1947, there shall be set up
an Arbitral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) consisting of
a Chairman who shall be nominated by the Governor-General and two mem¬
bers who shall be so nominated, one to represent the future Dominion of India
and the other to represent the future Dominion of Pakistan.
(2) If the office of the Chairman becomes vacant it shall be filled by such
person as the Governors-General of the two Dominions may agree to nominate
as Chairman, and if the office of a member becomes vacant it shall be filled by
676
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
such person as the Governor-General of the Dominion concerned may nomi¬
nate as member.
4. (1) The Tribunal shall have power to make awards in respect of references
made to it before the first day of December, 1947, or with the permission
of the Chairman before the first day of January, 1948, by any of the bodies
hereinafter mentioned being references relating to any of the following matters,
namely : —
(a) the division between the Dominions of India and Pakistan, of the assets
and liabilities of the Governor-General in Council ;
(b) the apportionment between the Dominions of India and Pakistan
of expenses incurred by or under authority derived from the Joint
Defence Council or the Supreme Commander for carrying into
effect the purposes of the Joint Defence Council Order, 1947;
(c) the amount of assets and liabilities of the Reserve Bank of India to be
transferred to Pakistan when the Reserve Bank of India ceases to be the
bank of issue for Pakistan or the Central Bank of Pakistan;
(d) the apportionment between the Dominions of India and Pakistan of
the current earnings of foreign exchange including current releases
of sterling by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom,
during the period when the Reserve Bank of India administers common
exchange controls on behalf of both the Dominions ;
(e) the division between the new Provinces of East Bengal and West
Bengal, of the assets and liabilities of the existing Province of Bengal;
(f) the allocation to the new Province of East Bengal of any of the assets
and liabilities of the Province of Assam;
(g) the division between the new Provinces of West Punjab and East
Punjab, of the assets and liabilities of the existing Province of the
Punjab; and
(h) any other matter arising directly out of partition.
(2) The bodies referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article are the bodies
which on the date of the commencement of this Order are known as —
(a) the Partition Council,
(b) the Provisional Joint Defence Council,
(c) the Bengal Separation Council,
(d) the Punjab Partition Committee, and
(e) the Assam Separation Council.
and the corresponding bodies which are to be set up as from the date of the
establishment of the Dominions of India and Pakistan.
AUGUST 1947
677
(3) Whenever the appropriate body mentioned in paragraph (2) of this
Article is unable to reach an agreed decision in regard to a matter mentioned
in sub-paragraphs (a) to (g) of paragraph (1) thereof, that body shall make a
reference to the Tribunal, but before the first day of December, 1947, or with
the permission of the Chairman before the 1st day of January, 1948, setting
out as clearly as may be the matter or matters in difference.
(4) Whenever any of the bodies mentioned in paragraph (2) of this Article
is unable to reach an agreed decision in regard to a matter mentioned in sub-
paragraph (h) of paragraph (1) thereof, but is agreed that a reference should
be made to the Tribunal, that body may make a reference before the first day
of December, 1947, or with the permission of the Chairman before the first
day of January, 1948, setting out as clearly as may be the matter or matters
in difference.
5. (1) Whenever any of the bodies mentioned in paragraph (2) of Article
4 is unable to agree whether or not a matter is one in regard to which that
body is required by paragraph (3) of that Article to make a reference in the
contingency mentioned therein, that question shall be referred to the Tribunal
whose decision thereon shall be final.
(2) Where a question has been referred to the Tribunal under this Article —
(a) if the two members of the Tribunal are agreed as to the decision to be
given, such decision shall be the decision of the Tribunal; and
(b) if the two members are not agreed, the Chairman shall decide the ques¬
tion and his decision shall be the decision of the Tribunal.
6. In respect of any reference made to the Tribunal under Article 4, —
(a) if the two members of the Tribunal are agreed as to the terms of the
award to be made, the Chairman shall make the award in those terms; and
(b) in the event of disagreement between the two members with regard
to any matter arising out of the reference, the Chairman shall decide such
matter and make the award accordingly.
Provided that the body making the reference may, at any time before the
award is made, withdraw the reference by notice in writing to the Tribunal.
7. (1) Every award made in accordance with the provisions of Article 6
shall be binding on the two Dominions and all Provinces and other parts
thereof, and on all persons directly or indirectly concerned in or affected by
the award.
(2) Every such award shall be communicated forthwith by the Chairman
to the body by which the reference was made, the Governments of the two
Dominions, and the Governments of the Provinces concerned, if any.
678
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
8. (1) The Tribunal shall have power —
(a) to make an award conditional or in the alternative ;
(b) to correct any clerical mistake or error, arising from any accidental
slip or omission;
(c) subject to the provisions of this Order, to determine its own proce¬
dure; and
(d) to appoint such ministerial officers as it may find necessary.
(2) The Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil court for the purpose
of receiving evidence, administering oaths, enforcing the attendance of
witnesses and compelling the discovery and production of documents, and
shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
9. Nothing contained in the Arbitration Act, 1940, shall apply to proceedings
before the Tribunal.
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA,
Governor-General .
K. V. K. SUNDARAM,
Officer on Special Duty,
439
U.K, High Commissioner in India to Cabinet Office
Telegram , LlWSli/1023: f 210
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 1 2 August 1 947, 1.40 pm
secret Received: 12 August, 3.07 pm
IRKU 600. IRKU 591, paragraph 4.1 Gurkhas.
Following repeats telegram No. 123 August 9th from H.M. Minister
Nepal to Foreign New Delhi in reply to their telegram conveying text of
Press communique.2 Copy has just been passed to me by External Affairs
Department.
begins. I have explained position to His Highness the Maharaja and in
the circumstances he has no objection to eight units named being earmarked
now for subsequent transfer to British Army as proposed.
He asked me how many units it is proposed to retain in Armies of new
Dominion of India as he has no definite information on this point other than
obviously unofficial reports which have appeared in Press from time to time.
Can you now give me this information for His Highness?
AUGUST 1947
679
Following for Mr Jawahar Lai Nehru. His Highness the Maharaja has asked
me to convey to you expressions of great pleasure at agreement reached
between His Majesty’s Government in United Kingdom and Government of
India in regard to future employment of Gurkha troops, ends.
1 L/WS/1/1025: ff 211-12. 2 No. 370.
440
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Nizam of Hyderabad
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files : Hyderabad , Part I (b)
12 August ig47
I have received Your Exalted Highness’ letter of 8th August 19471 in which
you offer to negotiate with the Dominion of India for a treaty in which you
would make provision for the conduct of Hyderabad’s foreign policy in
general conformity with that of the Dominion of India and for the contribution
of troops to the defence of the Dominion and for suitable agreements about
Communications. I recognise Your Exalted Highness’ special problems in
Hyderabad and your willingness to co-operate with the Dominion of India
in these three essential fields. As you know, the anxiety of the Dominion is to
achieve stability which they feel cannot be adequately secured unless all the
States which are situated within their borders are prepared to come into
organic union with them. I myself, as I have told Your Negotiating Committee
and your Adviser, believe that accession to the Union would be to the mutual
advantage of the Dominion and your State.2 But I fully understand your
difficulties and I have no wish to hurry you to a decision. In the circumstances,
although I shall cease to be Crown Representative on the 15th August, I have
secured the assent of those who will be responsible for the Government of the
Dominion to my continuing negotiations with Your Exalted Highness for a
further period of two months, during which I hope we shall be able to reconcile
our views.3 During this period the offer to accede on the terms which I have
already proposed will (as a special exception) remain open in the case of
Hyderabad.
2. I have noted what Your Exalted Highness writes about Standstill Agree¬
ments and Berar and I am in a position to assure you that the Dominion of
India are quite agreeable to the continuance of the status quo in Berar for the
time being, while negotiations continue, and to the continuance of existing
administrative arrangements, whether or not a formal agreement is reached
dealing with this subject. I learn that Your Exalted Highness is concerned lest
a decision not in present circumstances to accede would be treated as a hostile
1 No. 376. 2 See eg No. 61. 3 See No. 385, para. 18.
68o
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
act by the Dominion and your State might be subjected to blockade,4 but I am
satisfied that the leaders of the new Dominion have no intention of applying
such pressure.
On the contrary the fact that recently they consented to my consulting Your
Exalted Highness before appointing a new Governor of the Central Provinces
and Berar5 shows how carefully they have been to respect the constitutional
position. Further they intend to continue to maintain the correct constitutional
position after the 15th August 1947, as appears from this proposed adaptation
of the 1935 Act in this respect; the adaptation has been shown to your Con¬
stitutional Adviser.
4 See Nos. 419, 420 and 434. 5 See Nos. 293 and 385, para. 15.
441
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Maharaja
oj Patiala
R/j/i I137: f 272
12 August 1947
I received Your Highness’s letter of the 7th August1 about the partition of the
Punjab.
There seems to be widespread belief2 that the boundary line on which the
Boundary Commission decides will, in some way, have been approved by
myself, that I can interfere with the Boundary Commission, and that I shall
be responsible for the result. Nothing can be further from the truth. The
Boundary Commission is a judicial body, and I have made it clear from the
start that I did not frame its terms of reference, and that I should not intervene
in any way in the deliberations of the Commission.
I am afraid, therefore, it has been quite impossible for me to consider handing
on to the Boundary Commission the representation that Your Highness has
made in your letter to me. I am sure you will understand, and I hope that you
will tell others what the true position is.
With all good wishes.
1 No. 367; see also No. 378.
2 cf. No. 326.
AUGUST 1947
68l
442
Sir F. Wylie ( United Provinces ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten
of Burma
RUI 1/140: ff 39~42
PERSONAL GOVERNOR’S CAMP, UNITED PROVINCES,
U.P.-91 12 August 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
When I was in New Delhi to say good-bye Your Excellency put me a question
about Corfield. Even at the time I knew that I had replied inadequately. The
story goes back a good deal, however, and you may care to know the back¬
ground.
2. Lord Linlithgow, towards the end of his Viceroyalty, reached the con¬
clusion that the person who was to be appointed as Political Adviser should
have some experience of conditions in British India and should not be a man
who had spent his entire official life in the Indian States. If I may be allowed to
say so, this conclusion was very wise. The political pace in India has always
been set by British India, while, on the other hand, no full settlement of the
Indian constitutional problem is possible unless the problem of the States is
solved simultaneously. It is my personal opinion that the great defect of the
Cripps plan of 1942 was that the States only got mention as an after-thought,
whereas they are in fact an integral part of the case. To illustrate the importance
which I have always attached to the States’ aspect of the Indian problem, I
venture to enclose with this letter a copy of a paper1 which I gave to Stafford
Cripps when he came out to India the second time on the Cabinet Mission. I
do not ask you to read the whole of this paper. The main proposals in it got
nobody’s concurrence. If you will kindly glance at paras 1, 2 and 4 of the paper,
however, you will see that the States issue is heavily emphasised. Later on in a
letter to Stafford Cripps dated April 5th 1946 I wrote this about the Indian
States : —
“The best service in fact that we can render to the Indian States to-day is
to negotiate the 20 or so important states into an Indian federation on the
best terms available, securing at the same time the best possible “mediatisa-
tion” (cf. Germany after Napoleon) terms for the small States which are
totally incompetent whether viewed as federal units or as sovereign states”.
I quote this because of our talk2 about “mediatisation” the other day in New
Delhi.
1 Not printed. Sir F. Wylie’s paper is on R/3/1/140: ff 43-7.
2 No record of an interview on this subject between Lord Mountbatten and Sir F. Wylie has been traced.
682
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
3. Acting on his own principle Lord Linlithgow in 1940 removed me from
the Central Provinces where I was Governor to New Delhi as Political Adviser.
Unfortunately there was an excursion to Afghanistan for two years in the
middle of my tenure, so very little was achieved in the way of relegating the
Indian States to their real position in the Indian scheme of things. The war too
was on at the time. The Princes, some of them, were giving us plenty of help
and it was a poor time to be planning their liquidation. In December 1944
Lord Wavell told me that he wanted me to go to the U.P. The question of a
successor arose and turned out to be very difficult. Lord Wavell did not want
to put Corfield in for the very reasons that Lord Linlithgow had emphasised.
We consulted the India Office who suggested Eric Mieville’s name. We
jumped at this suggestion not only because of Mieville’s well-known ability
but because we thought that his close contact with the Palace might help him
in inducing the Princes, especially the little Princes, to be realistic. Mieville
refused the offer and we were back where we were.3 Lord Wavell in the end,
but it was very much faute de mieux , decided to give the post to Corfield.4
4. By none of this do I mean any real reflection on Corfield’ s quality. He is
a very able person indeed, but his cast of mind is for these days excessively
conservative. He has been all his life in Indian States and has imbibed, perhaps
too successfully, the Princely point of view. He does not agree with present
day political developments in British India which made his task as Adviser to
the Crown Representative very difficult indeed. For the obvious duty of the
Political Adviser is to watch the Viceroy’s intentions in British India and then
to help bring the Viceroy’s relations with the Princes into accord with those
intentions.
5. Knowing these facts I was not myself surprised to hear that Princely
intransigence had not decreased during Corfield’s regime. His was never an
ideal appointment, but for that no one was to blame. We combed the British
Indian Provinces at the time, but there was no senior British Officer in any
Provincial cadre who could have filled the post. Nobody suitable was forth¬
coming from home and so, as I have already described, the appointment was
made.
6. I have given you this summary because I failed to do justice to your
question when you put it to me in New Delhi. May I at the same time say how
much I admire the very realistic approach which you are now making to the
States problem? This approach is exactly what the situation needs, and indeed
has always needed. Five years ago, however, nobody could have persuaded
London to allow us to do this. Even now the Princes will certainly try to beat
up sympathy for their case in England. I doubt however if they will succeed.
The interests in England which used to champion their cause have, I think,
AUGUST 1947
683
begun to realise that our job in India is not finished unless the Indian Princes
are all of them accommodated in one or other of the new Dominions. And
here geographical considerations must be allowed to prevail. Sooner or later
too, the little Princes must be made to surrender their administrative authority
— in short must agree to be mediatised.5 It is not perhaps possible to do this
immediately, but it should be done soon. Otherwise the administrative in¬
competence which characterises all the small States without exception may
create a situation which will be highly unpleasant both for the little States and
for the new Dominions.
Yours sincerely,
F. V. WYLIE
3 cf. Vol. V, No. 259, para. 17. 4 cf. ibid., No. 310, para. 16.
5 Lord Mountbatten sidelined this sentence and noted: ‘Bfring] U [p] 1st Jan.’ The file was duly brought
up on 1 January 1948 and Lord Mountbatten then noted: ‘Press Att[ache] and Con/Sec to see. I have
always held this view and I am glad V.P. has started to implement it’. R/3/1/140: f 122.
443
The Earl of Listowel to Mr Attlee
LIWS/1I1046: ff 129-32
INDIA OFFICE, 12 August 1 9 47
Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 147/47
Prime Minister,
EXTERNAL DEFENCE OF INDIA AND BRITISH STRATEGIC
REQUIREMENTS
You will remember that, in paragraph 3 of his telegram No. iSoo-S1 of 7th
July (copy attached), the Viceroy suggested: —
(a) that, after the transfer of power, the Chiefs of Staff should send a delega¬
tion to India and Pakistan to conduct negotiations ;
(b) that the negotiations should be conducted with the two new Dominion
Governments — (there was a possibility that these Governments might
accept the Joint Defence Council as a negotiating body) ;
(c) that the negotiations should, if possible, take place concurrently with
economic and other negotiations.
In his telegram No. 3138-S2 (copy also attached) the Viceroy reports that
both Nehru and Jinnah have now agreed that the Joint Defence Council
should hold discussions with representatives of the Chiefs of Staff on Com¬
monwealth Defence problems. While the despatch of a suitable mission to
2 See No. 336, last paragraph.
1 Vol. XI, No. 556.
684
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
India is not a matter of the first urgency, a great deal of preliminary planning
will certainly be required and there are one or two points on which decisions
are necessary before this planning can proceed. The points to be settled are: —
(1) Whether the mission should be headed by a Minister;
(2) Whether the negotiations should be confined to defence matters or
should embrace economic and other problems.
As regards (1) above I am myself not in favour of a Minister going with the
mission. I think it would be better that the mission should be composed of
senior representatives of the Chiefs of Staff and that such pohtical advice as they
require on the spot should be sought from the United Kingdom High Com¬
missioners of the two new Dominions.
As regards (2) I feel strongly that the negotiations ought to be confined to
defence matters and that these should be handled separately from the many
other issues requiring to be discussed with the two new Dominion Govern¬
ments. It would for example, be most undesirable to delay the negotiation of
an agreement about defence until we are in a position to negotiate a commercial
treaty.
I should be grateful to know if you concur with my views on the points at
issue in order that the selection of the members of the mission and the prepara¬
tion of the necessary briefs may be proceeded with.
I am sending copies of this Minute to the Minister of Defence and the Secre¬
tary of State for Commonwealth Relations and am asking them to let you know
whether they concur in my views.3
LISTOWEL
3 In a letter to Mr Addis dated 16 August, Mr Wood explained that at their meeting on the evening of
12 August Mr Attlee and Mr Alexander had confirmed the proposals in Lord Listowel’s minute and
that Alexander had subsequently arranged for the Chiefs of Staff to submit the names of their proposed
representatives for the Mission. The question of giving information about the proposed discussions to
other Commonwealth Governments (cf. No. 334) had not been raised at the meeting. Alexander,
however, had asked Wood to say that his personal view would be that they should not be informed
initially, but that the Commonwealth Relations Office should be kept in close touch with the discussions
and should raise the question of communication with the other Dominions as soon as a little progress
had been made. L/WS/1/1046: f 114.
AUGUST 1947
685
444
United Nations Secretariat Memorandum on Membership Status of
India and Pakistan
L\P &JI7/12520: f 2
PRESS RELEASE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION PRESS
PM/473 DIVISION, LAKE SUCCESS, NASSAU COUNTY,
NEW YORK, 12 August ig 47
(The following memorandum reflects the opinion of the Secretary-General
with respect to the question of India’s status in the United Nations after August
15 when the Indian Independence Act becomes effective. The memorandum
was prepared by Dr. Ivan Kerno, Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs,
and has been approved by Mr Lie)
EFFECT OF INDIAN INDEPENDENCE ACT, 1947
ON MEMBERSHIP AND REPRESENTATION OF INDIA IN
THE UNITED NATIONS
The Indian Independence Act provides that on the fifteenth day of August,
1947, two Independent Dominions shall be set up in India to be known res¬
pectively as India and Pakistan. Under this act, the new Dominion of India
will consist of all the territories of British India except certain designated
territories which will constitute Pakistan.
What is the effect of this development on membership and representation
of India in the United Nations?
From the legal standpoint, the Indian Independence Act may be analysed
as effecting two separate and distinct changes :
1. From the viewpoint of international law, the situation is one in which a
part of an existing state breaks off and becomes a new state. On this analysis,
there is no change in the international status of India; it continues as a state with
all treaty rights and obligations, and consequently with all the rights and
obligations of membership in the United Nations. The territory which breaks
off, Pakistan, will be a new state; it will not have the treaty rights and obliga¬
tions of the old state, and it will not, of course, have membership in the United
Nations.
In international law, the situation is analogous to the separation of the Irish
Free State from Great Britain, and of Belgium from the Netherlands. In these
cases, the portion which separated was considered a new state; the remaining
portion continued as an existing state with all of the rights and duties which it
had before.
686
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
2. Apart from the question of separation, the Independence Act has effected
a basic constitutional change in India. The existing State of India has become a
Dominion, and consequently, has a new status in the British Commonwealth
of Nations, independence in external affairs, and a new form of government. It
is clear, however, that this basic constitutional change does not affect the inter¬
national personality of India, or its status in the United Nations.
The only question it raises is whether new credentials should be requested
for the Indian representatives in the organs of the United Nations. Although
there is no precedent for this situation in the United Nations, there is some
basis in diplomatic practice for requesting new credentials in cases of States
which have undergone a change of sovereignty, as from a monarchy to a
republic. It would, therefore, seem appropriate for the Secretary-General to
suggest to the Government of India that in view of the change in sovereignty,
it would be desirable to have new credentials issued to the India representatives
by the Head of the Government or the Foreign Minister of the new Dominion
of India.
In conclusion, the effect of the Independence Act may be summarised as
follows :
1. The new Dominion of India continues as an original member state of the
United Nations with all rights and obligations of membership.
2. Pakistan will be a new non-member state. In order for it to become a
member of the United Nations, it would have to apply for admission
pursuant to Article 4 of the Charter, and its application would be handled
under the pertinent Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly and the
Security Council.
3. The representatives of India on the Economic and Social Council and the
representative of India participating in the discussion of the Indonesian
case in the Security Council should be requested to submit new creden¬
tials after August 1 5 issued by the Head of the Government, or the Foreign
Minister of the new Dominion of India.
445
Government of Pakistan, External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
Department to the Secretary of State for India
Telegram , LjP &SI12I4724: f 91
IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 12 August I947, 8.33 pm
Received: 13 August, 6.40 am
No. 6617. Your telegram 10348 dated 9th August.1 Government of Pakistan
AUGUST 1947
687
would be grateful if U.K. Ambassador and not his Indian Colleague would
represent Pakistan after 15th August at Washington and other posts where
there are U.K. and Indian Embassies.
2. Baig of Indian Embassy Washington will act for us and organise staff of
proposed mission. We should be grateful if U.K. Ambassador Washington
would kindly advance him 10,000 dollars forthwith for immediate needs and
also handle telegraph cypher traffic for us temporarily.2
Repeated to Washington, Nanking, Moscow, Tokyo
(Secretary of State please repeat)
U.K. High Commissioners, New Delhi, and Karachi
1 Asking whether the U.K. or the Indian Ambassador should represent Pakistan after 15 August at
Washington and other posts where there were separate Indian Embassies. L/P &S/ 12/4724: f 97.
2 Indian posts in Moscow, Nanking, Washington, Tokyo, Bangkok and Saigon were subsequently
informed that as from 15 August they would not be concerned with Pakistan affairs. Tel. 6643 of
12 August. L/P &S/12/4724: f 96.
446
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab)
Telegram , R/5/1/157: f 279
IMMEDIATE 12 August, 1Q47, 11,1$ pm
SECRET
No. 3366-S. It is now clear that the complete awards for Punjab and Bengal
will not be ready for publication till 15th evening or 16th morning.1
2. I have explained to Trivedi, who agrees, that the two Governments of
East and West Punjab must take charge according to the notional boundaries
on 15th and adjust later where necessary.2
1 See No. 436 and its note 2.
2 A similar telegram, No. 3365-S of 12 August, was sent to Sir F. Burrows explaining that the two
Governments of East and West Bengal would have to take charge according to the notional boundaries
on the 15th and adjust later where necessary. R/3/1/157: f 280.
688
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
447
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram, L/P &J/ 10/128: f S3
MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 12 August 1947, 7-55 Pm
Received: 13 August, 7.00 am
No. 10491. Your telegram No. 3322-S of nth August.1 We shall discuss the
matter with Cooke tomorrow. Meanwhile I notice from paragraphs 31-38
of your Personal Report of 8th August2 that question of national debt is
linked with that of cash balances and it occurs to me that if we deal with the
former in the way you propose it might help to reduce Pakistan’s objections if
we simultaneously deal with the latter. Please telegraph your views on this
with your recommendation as to how much of the cash balances should be
allocated to Pakistan if I decide to divide them.
1 No. 422. 2 No. 385.
448
Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , i^/3/l/j 71 ; / 55
IMMEDIATE 12 August 1 947, 11.40 pm
confidential Received: 13 August, 9.30 am
No. 230-G. Addressed Viceroy repeated Secretary of State.
My immediately preceding telegram.1 Police in Lahore and Amritsar now
unreliable. There was serious indiscipline at Recruit Training Centre Lahore
today and men concerned numbering between 300 and 500 cannot be used
for emergency duty. I am still awaiting news of state of rural police stations and
Amritsar some of which are said to have ceased functioning. We have not
strength of troops and police required to restore order and railways will not be
safe unless Army can take over “war Department” lines with full railway
security. Muslim League National guards now very active in Lahore City and
exceedingly truculent to non-Muslims.
1 Possibly No. 437.
AUGUST 1947
689
449
Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rl3l*l*57:f286
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI,
13 August 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
Thank you for your letter dated the 10th August1 about the note2 which I sent
regarding the irrigation system of the Punjab. I appreciate your view point and
in any event there is nothing more to be said about it.
Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
1 No. 406. 2 No. 395.
450
U.K. High Commissioner in India to Cabinet Office
Telegram , LIEI8I4875: ff 459-60
CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, 1J August 1947, J. 00 am
Received: 13 August, 10,09 am
IRKU 596. The French Charge D’AfFaires has talked to a Member of my staff
at some length on the French Establishments in India.
2. M. Roux said he was extremely apprehensive of events in the French
Establishments after August 15th, and in particular in Chandemagore, where
he was sure there was going to be trouble. He himself saw the impossibility
of the situation of the French Establishments in the new India. Their existence
had hitherto been dependent on the maintenance of Government in India by a
major European Power and now that this was going, there was no possibility
of the French maintaining any foothold whatsoever. He had been making
representations to the French Government along these lines and had stressed
that since in fact the French possessions in India had no real value, it was of the
utmost importance to surrender them to the Indian Union quickly and with
good grace, so that no ill feelings could be aroused or ultimately left between
the two countries.
3 . Unfortunately the authorities in the French Government with whom he
dealt appeared to be unable to grasp these essentials. They were motivated
solely by reasons of prestige and though they knew nothing of India or the
690
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
situation in the French Establishments there, any withdrawal was looked upon
by them, to put it in Monsieur Roux’s own words, as “trailing the tri-colour
in the mud”. This attitude was very much supported by the average man in
the street in France.
4. Monsieur Roux now found himself being accused from home of being
a defeatist and lacking in patriotism. He was therefore afraid that the French
policy with regard to France’s possessions in India would be one of giving
“too little and too late.”
5. He ended by comparing the position of the French, which at present was
not too bad, with that of the Portuguese who were now extremely unpopular
in India as the result of their somewhat rash and provocative statements with
regard to the future of Goa. He feared that in the very near future France would
be held up to attack in the Press as a second Portugal.
See my immediately following telegram.1
1 No. 451.
451
ZJ.K. High Commissioner in India to Cabinet Office
Telegram , L/£/£/4#75;^ 461-2
CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, 1 3 August I947 , 4.OO am
Received: 13 August , 8.23 am
IRKU 597. My immediately preceding telegram.1
Secretary General of External Affairs Department has told me in confidence
that India was likely to take a stonger line as regards French and Portuguese
possessions after August 15th.
2. As regards the French, he gave me to understand that M. Roux had been
authorised by M. Bidault to put some fresh proposal to Government of India,
that this would of course be considered, but that unless it went a long way
beyond what he called the Baron Plan (which he said provided for Municipal
Councils), it would not be acceptable. I gathered that the Government of
India would not readily acquiesce in the French continuing to enjoy a special
position or exclusive rights in commerce, manufacturing and even cultural
matters in the territories in question.
3 . I gave Sir G. Bajpai a brief account of what had happened in the Levant
States when I was minister there and I emphasised the immense importance
that the French attached to the continuance of their schools, hospitals and
AUGUST 1947
691
cultural influence generally. It seemed to me wise that the Indian authorities
should go as far as possible to meet the French, particularly in these respects.
4. As regards the Portuguese, Sir G. Bajpai said that the Government of
India would probably ask us to take some action with the Portuguese Govern¬
ment. (As I would know, their relations were far from good, as India had
opposed Portugal’s admission to U.N.O.). I said that, speaking personally, I
thought it might be very difficult for H.M. Government to do this on behalf
of India; what action did he contemplate asking us to take? He replied
“soundings”. I suggested that before pursuing the matter of the Portuguese
possessions, it might be advisable for the Government of India to see whether
some accommodation could be reached with the French. But I rather expect
that Nationalist exuberance after August 15th will incline them to push ahead.
1 No. 450.
452
Sardar Patel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
LIPOI6/i23:ff 273-5
MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 1 J August 1 947
AND PERSONAL
A deputation of the Chittagong Hill Tribes saw me this morning and expressed
to me their grave apprehension that their area was going to be included in
East Bengal under the Boundary Commission award. I am unaware of the
source of their information, but they seemed to be well-convinced that this was
going to happen. I have told them that the proposition was so monstrous that
if it should happen they would be justified in resisting to the utmost of their
power and count on our maximum support in such resistance.
2. Personally, I feel it is inconceivable that such a blatant and patent breach
of terms of reference should be perpetrated by the Chairman of the Boundary
Commission. We have all along felt that the future of this area was not at all
in doubt. No fair reading of the terms of reference or appreciation of the factual
position could make a ninety-seven per cent non-Mushm area a part of the
award relating to the boundary of East Bengal. Such a decision would also
jeopardise the position of the adjoining Tripura State which is a Hindu State
with predominantly Hindu population, and which has acceded to the Indian
Dominion and has joined the Union Constituent Assembly.
3. I, therefore, feel bound to draw your attention to the serious con¬
sequences which would follow such a manifestly unjust award. There is no
doubt from the report of the Tribal Areas Committee who collected un-
692
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
impeachable evidence on the spot and whose views I represented to the
Chairman of the Commission in a letter (copy enclosed) which I sent to him
as Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Constituent Assembly, that
the entire population of this area is in favour of remaining in the Indian Union.
4. Any award against the weight of local opinion and of the terms of refer¬
ence, or without any referendum to ascertain the will of the people concerned
must, therefore, be construed a collusive or partisan award and will have,
therefore, to be repudiated by us. I make this statement with a full sense of
responsibility as one who was party to the setting up of the Commission. But
you cannot clearly expect us to submit to a proceeding which would be in
violation of the basic conception underlying the Commission’s terms of
reference.
5. I must also point out that public reaction would wholly and over¬
whelmingly support us in such repudiation. Already there is considerable
doubt whether they would get an impartial award under the novel and strange
procedure adopted by the Chairman of not even hearing the arguments. Many
persons have come and complained to me that he has rendered himself liable,
by this means, to being influenced by circles in your Secretariat whose anti¬
pathies to India and sympathies with the League are well known. The selection,
as Secretary of the Commission, of one of the European officers of the Punjab,
who are generally associated in public mind with pro-League sympathies, had
not mended matters. I have generally adopted an indifferent attitude to these
complaints, but if the award confirms the worst fears entertained by the public,
it is impossible for me to predict the volume of bitterness and rancour which
would be let loose and I am certain that this will create a situation which both
you and I may have to regret.
Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL
Enclosure to No. 432
Copy of letter No. CA/38/COM/47, dated the 25th July, 1947, from the
the Chairman, Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights,
Tribal and Excluded Areas, Constituent Assembly of India, Council House,
New Delhi, to The Chairman, The Bengal Boundary Commission, Calcutta.
Subject: — Chittagong Hill Tracts
I have the honour to address you on behalf of the Advisory Committee set
up in pursuance of paragraph 20 of the Statement of the 16th May 19461 by the
Constituent Assembly of India. A Sub-Committee was set up by the Advisory
Committee to report on a scheme of administration for the Excluded Areas.
This Sub-Committee visited the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which is an Excluded
Area, in April 1947 and took the evidence of local officials, non-officials and
AUGUST 1947
693
associations who were interested in the future administration of the area. The
Sub-Committee have recently considered the future administration of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts and although they are not in a position to send their
complete report yet, they have pointed out that the people of the Chittagong
Hill Tracts were unanimously against the Tracts forming a part of Bengal (as it
then was) and that in view of the predominantly non-Muslim character of its
population the area should in no circumstances be included in East Bengal.
They have also pointed out that the Tracts adjoin and form part of the Lushai
Hills of Assam and that communications exist between them.
2. I have the honour to bring the views of the Sub-Committee on behall of
the Advisory Committee to your notice and to say that I am fully in agreement
with them. A copy of the evidence recorded by the Sub-Committee is enclosed
herewith.2
1 Vol. VII, No. 303. 2 Not printed.
453
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir F. Burrows
(. Bengal !) and Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab). Repeated to Mr Christie ,
New Delhi
Telegram , R/j/ 1/137: f 281
MOST IMMEDIATE CAMP KARACHI, 13 August I947, 9.OO pm
BY TELEPHONE
No. 2907-S. No objection to your announcing that since the award of the
Boundary Commission is unlikely to be READY FOR PUBLICATION
BEFORE 16TH AUGUST1 the Government of East and West Bengal/Punjab
will take charge up to the notional repeat notional boundary pending publication
and implementation of the Award.
(For J.P.S.V. only: Please make similar announcement in Delhi after securing
concurrence of Pandit Nehru. Pakistan Government have agreed).2
1 Emphasis throughout in original.
2 Mr Christie noted on 14 August: ‘Pandit Nehru agrees’. R/3/1/157: f 282.
454
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Pandit Nehru
■R/j/j/w/ 277
NO. 1446/17 14 August 1947
Dear Mr Nehru,
I am advised that Sir Cyril Radcliffe is sending me the Award of the Boundary
694
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Commission in the course of today, but that it cannot arrive before I leave for
Karachi. At present, therefore, I have no idea of its contents.
It had been my intention to publish the Award in a Gazette Extraordinary as
soon as it was received and the maps reproduced; but, to judge from reports
I have heard and the messages1 I have received from leaders in both India and
Pakistan, there is such apprehension about the nature of the findings that I do
not feel that it should be published without an opportunity being given for a
discussion of them between duly authorised representatives of India and Pakis¬
tan. The object of such a discussion would be —
(i a ) To decide upon the timing and method of publication: and
(b) to decide the method of implementing the undertaking of the Partition
Council to accept the Award and to enforce the decisions contained in it.
The meeting would also, if both parties wished, provide an opportunity
for discussing any mutual adjustments in the boundaries by agreement.
I am therefore proposing to Mr. Jinnah2 that he should send a representative
or representatives to Delhi, with a view to a meeting as early as possible on the
morning of Saturday, the 16th August. By that time, copies of the Award and
of the maps will have been reproduced. These will be tabled at the meeting.
I will let you know if Mr. jinnah agrees on my return from Karachi tomorrow.
I am very ready to place Government House at your disposal for the meeting.
It would, of course, be impossible for me to preside, and I think, undesirable
for me to be even present at the meeting: but if both parties ^should wish
to consult me, I shall be available.
I have undertaken to go to Bombay on the 17th for 24 hours to bid farewell
to the first contingent of British Troops, and will have to leave in the early
morning.
I ought to add that the Governors of Bengal and the Punjab have been
informed3 that the Governments of the two halves of each Province will be
responsible for all territory up to the notional boundaries from the 15 th August
until the award is published and implemented.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
1 cf. Nos. 428 and 452.
2 Lord Mountbatten wrote in similar terms to Mr Jinnah. In that letter the fourth paragraph read
T therefore see nothing for it but to ask if you will be so good as to send a ministerial representative or
representatives to Delhi, with a view to a meeting as early as possible on the morning of Saturday, the
1 6th August. By that time, copies of the Award and of the maps will, I hope, have been reproduced.
These will be tabled at the meeting.’ The letter concluded: ‘I have written a similar letter to Pandit
Nehru. I would gladly put your representative up at Government House.’ In a telegram from Karachi
dated 13 August, Sir G. Abell informed Lord Ismay at New Delhi that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan had agreed
to fly to Delhi tor a meeting on the 16th, bringing one other representative with him and staying at
Government House. R/3/1/1 57 : ff 278 and 283
3 See Nos. 446 and its note 2, and 453
AUGUST 1947
695
455
Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten
of Burma
Rblil82:ff 131-2
17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 1 J August I94J
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I enclose a copy of the message I am sending on the occasion of the departure of
the first contingent of British troops from India. I have sent a copy to Sardar
Baldev Singh and asked him to pass it on to the proper person.1
Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
Enclosure to No . 455
NEW DELHI, 13 August I947
During the last few days vital changes have taken place in the relationship
between India and England. The bonds that tied India to England against the
the wishes of her people have been removed, resulting in a far more friendly
feeling in India towards England than at any time previously. That unnatural
relationship is giving place gradually to a normal and natural relationship
between two countries who desire to cooperate for their mutual advantage
and the common good.
Few things are more significant of this change than the withdrawal of
British troops from India. Foreign armies are the most obvious symbols of
foreign rule. They are essentially armies of occupation and as such their presence
must inevitably be resented. No soldier likes this business, for it is neither war
nor peace but a continuing tension and living in a hostile atmosphere. I am sure
that sensitive British officers and men must have disliked being placed in this
abnormal position.
It is good, therefore, for all concerned that the British Armed Forces in
India are being withdrawn and are going home to serve their country in other
ways. As an Indian I have long demanded the withdrawal of British Forces
for they were a symbol to us of much that we disliked. But I had no grievance
against them as individuals and I liked and admired many whom I came
across. What we disliked was the system which inevitably brought ill-will in
its train apart from other consequences.
I know the good qualities of the British soldier and I should like our own
army to develop those qualities. On the occasion of the departure of the first
contingent of British troops from India I wish them godspeed and trust that
1 Lord Mountbatten acknowledged receipt of this letter of 16 August and added: ‘I personally was very
touched with this message and I am sure that it will help fuither to cement the bonds of friendship
between our two great countries.’ R/3/1/82: f 133.
696
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
between them and the soldiers and people of India there will be goodwill
and friendship which can only subsist between equals who do not fear each
other. We have nothing to fear from each other in the future and there are
many things in which we can cooperate together.
It is rare in history that such a parting takes place not only peacefully but
also with goodwill. We are fortunate that this should have happened in India.
That is a good augury for the future.
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
456
The Resident at Kashmir to Sir G. Abell
Telegram , R/3/1/94: / 62
IMMEDIATE IJ August U)4J, 3. 00 pm
secret Received: 13 August, 9.00 pm
No. 86. Your telegram No. 3352-S of Aug 12th.1 Kak asked for permission to
retire as he felt he had lost confidence of Ruler who he found had been cor¬
responding with Congress through other channels. I believe break came
because of indecision of His Highness to make up his mind either to join one or
other Dominion, or in pecuhar circumstances for Kashmir to come into the
open and ask for agreements with both. His Highness, Do gras and Hindu
communities incline towards India but bulk of population are Moslem and if
consulted would probably favour Pakistan especially Mirpur, Poonch and
Muzaffarabad area. Kak although Hindu clearly saw imphcation and felt that
if Kashmir joined either Dominion especially India it would mean serious
trouble.
2. Kak further was advising His Highness he must fix his Privy Purse and
that autocracy must gradually give place to democracy. Kak unfortunately
had his shortcomings in that he placed his brothers in the way of good business
while Prime Minister thus benefiting whole family. His Highness’s letter accept¬
ing his request for retirement stated that he had lost confidence of people.
3 . I saw new Prime Minister yesterday, and he is aware of the situation and
although inclining towards India as a Hindu, realises bulk of Moslems will not
accept decision. He therefore wishes for agreements with both. Kashmir
Government issued Statement last night that they welcome standstill agree¬
ments pending further negotiations with both Dominions. From this Press note
it is apparent that they are not likely to join either Dominion at present.
AUGUST 1947
697
4. Kashmir Government are in grave dilemma as a decision to join either
Dominion will result in serious trouble that might also have repercussions
outside State.
In tel. 85 of 11 August Lieutenant-Colonel Webb reported that he had just been informed that Pandit
Kak had resigned and that Major-General Janak Singh had been appointed in his place temporarily.
Lord Mountbatten noted on the telegram: ‘please ask Webb for full background to dismissal and whether
Kashmir will now join one of the two Dominions.’ Sir G. Abell transmitted this enquiry in tel. 3352-S
of 12 August. R/3/1/94: ff 61 and 60.
457
Meeting oj the Indian Cabinet, Case No. 21 2 138/47
Mountbatten Papers. Indian Cabinet Minutes, Part II
SECRET
Those present at this Meeting held on 13 August 1947 at 3.00 pm were: Pandit
Nehru, Sardar Patel, Dr Rajendra Prasad, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Sir
Shanmukhan Chetty, Dr John Matthai, Sardar Baldev Singh, Mr C. H. Bhabha;
Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Mr K. V. K. Sundaram, Mr H. M. Patel, Mr
V. H. Coelho ( Secretariat )
Case No. 212/38/47 The India (Provincial Constitution) Order, 1947
The Hon’ble the Vice President recalled that in the discussions at the previous
meeting1 of the Cabinet on The India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947,
two sections, namely, Sections 5 and 47 had been left over for further considera¬
tion.
Section 5 oj the Act.
A revised draft (attached)2 prepared by the Reforms Secretariat in the light
of the previous week’s discussions in Cabinet was handed to the Honourable
Members. It was pointed out that there was the same fundamental objection to
the draft as now revised as to the originally redrafted section 5 of the Act
considered at the previous meeting. The draft gave the impression that
“Dominion” was limited to British India which was an entirely wrong con¬
ception. It was necessary to devise a formula to show clearly that the Dominion
of India would comprise
(1 a ) Governors’ Provinces
( b ) Chief Commissioners’ Provinces
(c) such Indian States as acceded to the Dominion, and
1 Mountbatten Papers, Indian Cabinet Minutes, Part II, 7 August 1947, Case No. 195/37/47.
2 Not traced.
6p 8
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(d) any other areas which by consent of the Dominion would be included in
the territory of the Dominion.
Political and psychological considerations demanded that there should not be
the least doubt that all States that acceded to the Dominion would form an
integral part of the Dominion.
After some further discussion a redraft of section 5 was agreed upon.
Section 47 of the Act.
The revised draft as prepared by the Reforms Secretariat was accepted.
DECISION
The Cabinet agreed that the following redrafts of Section 5 and 47 of the
Act be accepted.
Section 5 of the Act.
“5. Establishment of the Dominion. — (1) The Dominion of India established
by the Independence Act, 1947, shall, as from the fifteenth day of August, 1947,
be a Union comprising—
(. a ) the Provinces hereinafter called Governors’ Provinces,
(b) the Provinces hereinafter called Chief Commissioners’ Provinces,
(c) the Indian States acceding to the Dominion in the manner hereinafter
provided, and
(d) any other areas that may with the consent of the Dominion be included
in the Dominion.
(2) The said Dominion of India is hereafter in this Act referred to as “the
Dominion”, and the said fifteenth day of August is hereafter in this Act referred
to as “the date of the establishment of the Dominion”.
Section 47 of the Act: —
“47. Provisions as to Berar. — Berar shall continue to be governed together
with the Central Provinces as one Governor’s Province under this Act by the
name of Central Provinces and Berar and in the same manner as immediately
before the establishment of the Dominion; and any references in this Act to
the Dominion of India shall be construed as including a reference to Berar”.
AUGUST 1947
699
458
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Telegram , L\P &Sj j 3 / 1849: Jf 8-9
IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, 1J August 1947, 6.00 pm
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 10502. Your telegram No. 2900-P of 23rd July.1
I agree that return of ceded territories is out of the question and that both
H.M.G. and Dominion of India have good legal case under Section 7(i)(b) of
Indian Independence Act for refusing to accept liability to pay cash compen¬
sation to States. Moreover, all except Sangli were found by Davidson Com¬
mittee2 to have parted with territory in exchange for specific military guaran¬
tees. If they now accede for defence without reserving right to have guarantees
continued or to receive cash compensation in lieu Dominion of India appears
entitled to hold that they have waived any claim to the actual rights they were
found to possess.3
2. On the other hand I suggest that if you see no objection you should put
it on record with States Department that H.M.G. consider that it would be
fair and reasonable for the Dominion of India as inheritor of the ceded ter¬
ritories to take the cession of territory into account as one of the factors to be
considered when a final financial settlement is being negotiated with States.
3. As I understand it intention of States Department is to rely on standstill
agreement to regulate for the present Dominion’s financial relations with
States and their accession for three subjects only to existing constitution will
carry with it no other financial obligations. However, if eventually when new
constitution has been adopted by Constituent Assembly States are invited to
accede for some economic subjects it would seem desirable to include pro¬
vision in their Instruments of Accession on lines contemplated in Section 147
of Government of India Act 1935 regarding privileges and immunities. Com¬
pensation for ceded territories might be given in that connection in return for
concession by States in such matters as income and corporation taxes and all-
India excises which would be required to finance defence.
4. As regards your telegram No. 290 1-P4 I do not see how absorption of
1 No. 213.
2 Cmd. 4103. Report of the Indian States [Financial] Enquiry Committee, 1932. Sir John Davidson
chaired the Committee.
3 The original draft of this telegram included the following sentence at the end of the first paragraph :
‘Even Sangli might perhaps be argued to have weakened its case for compensation by accepting offer
of accession for Defence without obligation to provide troops.’ This sentence was omitted at
Mr Rumbold’s suggestion.
* See No. 213, note 2.
700
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
capital sum in general revenues if it has occurred affects liability of Government
of India to Indore. On the other hand Indore has had a pretty good bargain
by avoiding since 1865 annual payment of over Rs.i lakh by lump sum payment
of about Rs. 24 lakhs. Possibly matter could be disposed of amicably if
State is allowed to take over without payment all buildings, equipment etc.,
relating to Malwa Bhil Corps, which I understand it is absorbing as part of its
own forces.
459
Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers . Letters to and from Provincial Governors
SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE,
n o . 704 13 August 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
The communal disturbances have naturally over-shadowed everything else
during the first half of August. For some days Lahore City remained reasonably
quiet, but Amritsar City showed no improvement, and there were serious
incidents in the cities of Gujranwala and Lyallpur. In the meantime the violent
Sikh agitation gained ground in the rural areas of Amritsar, Gurdaspur,
Jullundur and Hoshiarpur, and there were isolated outrages in Ludhiana,
Lahore and Ferozepore.
2. I have submitted daily reports on the situation.1 They are almost certainly
incomplete because raids and murders are now so frequent that it is difficult to
keep track of them all, and the regrouping of the services as a preliminary to
the transfer of power has not improved our organisation for the collection and
analysis of reports. During the past week the Amritsar district, including even
the main roads, has become generally unsafe. There have been several attacks
on trains — the most spectacular being the derailment of one of the Pakistan
Specials near Giddarbaha in the Ferozepore district.2 Most of the rural casualties
— and they have been very heavy — have been caused by Sikhs working in
fairly large bands and raiding Muslim villages or Muslim pockets in mixed
villages. The Muslims in the Amritsar district have occasionally hit back, and
in a village named Jalalabad near the Beas have eliminated a local Hindu
minority, killing probably over 70 people. The Sikhs, as was to be expected,
have behaved with extreme brutality. Parties of unescorted Muslim refugees
have been attacked and butchered, and yesterday, 12th August, a harmless
party of Pathan labourers moving on foot along the Grand Trunk Road near
Amritsar was set upon and 30 Pathans were killed.
AUGUST 1947
701
3. About i oth August trouble began in the Amritsar Police. We knew some
days ago that the Muslim policemen serving in Amritsar intended to desert to
West Punjab on 15th August. The Inspector General obtained written authority
from Khan Qurban Ah Khan, the Inspector General-Designate of West Punjab,
to inform the men concerned that West Punjab would employ no deserters,
and that it was their duty to remain at their posts. The Inspector General spoke
to the men at Amritsar, and we were fairly confident that they would behave
themselves. Two or three days later the Additional Superintendent of Police
(a Hindu named Kaul), who had been posted to the Amritsar district to take
over for East Punjab on 15th August, gave verbal instructions that any Mushms
who wished to transfer to West Punjab should see him at the Police Lines
on Sunday, 10th August. I must explain that the Partition Committee did not
consider it proper to compel every policeman to opt for West or East Punjab —
the orders were that men would be given an opportunity for transfer in writing
if they so desired. The verbal orders mentioned above were put into writing
by a Deputy Superintendent of Police, and before they were cyclostyled some¬
body inserted in them a paragraph to the effect that before reporting at the
Pohce Lines men must hand in their arms.3 The result was that the Muslim
policemen employed in Amritsar City arrived at the Police Lines in a very bad
temper, demanding their immediate transfer to West Punjab and protection
from attack between Amritsar and Lahore. The Additional Superintendent of
Police had at a stroke reduced the strength of his Force in the city by about
two-thirds. He is also alleged to have armed some ex-soldiers, including ex-
I.N.A. men, who were in plain clothes, as substitutes for the men he had with¬
drawn; but I understand that these arms were returned shortly afterwards.
Several of the discontented policemen made their way to Lahore and created
some trouble in the Pohce Lines here. By the efforts of the Inspector General
and Khan Qurban Ali Khan the men have been persuaded to go back to duty,
but the situation is still most obscure, and I am trying to find out what has
actually happened in the rural Pohce Stations. I am told that the Mushms
were withdrawn from the rural area also — if so, the District must be very short
of Pohce. I have suspended Kaul and removed him from the district, but his
action, taken without any authority from above, was most mischievous, and
has had serious consequences.
4. The derailment of the Pakistan Special, the arrival in Lahore of large
numbers of Muslim refugees from Amritsar, and the news of the disarming of
the Muslim Pohce in Amritsar had immediate repercussions in Lahore City.4
On nth and 12th August there were well over a hundred casualties, almost all
1 See e.g. Nos. 382, 437 and 448. 2 See Nos. 418 and 432, para. 9.
3 cf. No. 432, para. 1. 4 See No. 437.
702
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
non-Muslims, and well over fifty fires, almost all affecting non-Muslim
property. For the first time the Police showed open indiscipline.5 They made
little attempt to enforce the curfew which was imposed on nth August, and
the Deputy Commissioner informs me that he met with insolence from some
of the men, who said that they were more concerned with the fate of the
Amritsar Muslims than with the fate of the Lahore non-Muslims; and that
policemen have actually taken part in looting houses. About 15 Sikhs, were
killed in a Gurdwara in Lahore City on nth August, and the Inspector General
reports that the Police almost certainly connived at, if they did not actually
carry out, this massacre. On 12th August there was trouble in the Recruits
Training Centre at Lahore. The Hindu and Sikh recruits, who all belong to
West Punjab districts, said that they could not continue to serve in West
Punjab. Khan Qurban AH Khan visited the Centre and talked to the men, who
impressed him very favourably. They told him that they intended no breach
of discipline, but were genuinely frightened in view of the threats of their
Muslim comrades. Khan Qurban Ali Khan was told on enquiry that there had
been threats and was given the names of four Muslim Constables who were the
ring-leaders on the Muslim side. He sent for them and directed their immediate
discharge. The Muslim recruits then started shouting slogans and advanced on
Khan Qurban Ali Khan, to whom they were most insolent. He explained that
as Inspector General he would have to see that justice was done and he could not
have any of his men bullied. He was able to have the Muslim recruits marched
off — there was no actual violence — but he has decided in consultation with the
Inspector General and one of the Deputy Inspectors General that the Hindu and
Sikh recruits must be sent on short leave at once, and that when they are out of
the way, the Muslim recruits will have to be dealt with and some of them will
have to be discharged. This incident deprives us of a reserve of anything up
to 500 men — not highly trained perhaps, but useful in an emergency. Most of
the recruits are ex-soldiers who are joining the Punjab Additional Police.
5. The Commander, Punjab Boundary Force, has a most difficult task. The
population of the twelve districts in which he is operating is close on 14.5
million, and this population is distributed over 17,932 inhabited towns and
villages. When the possibility of the enforcement of a Boundary award was
first discussed, I estimated that we should need at least two Divisions of full
strength and on a War footing — i.e. a minimum of about 20,000 effective
fighting men. The effective strength of the P.B.F. is at present about 7,500,
or including static troops and training centres about 9,000. Now that the
Police are definitely unreliable in Lahore and Amritsar, the troops have a
rapidly increasing responsibility. Neither the railways nor the main roads are
safe, and the village raiding is quite impossible to control without a very great
display of force. Fire power is really less important than numbers. Until 1946
AUGUST 1947
703
I do not think that we had ever experienced in India any large communal
upheaval outside the cities — the Moplah rebellion5 6 is perhaps an exception to
this general statement. The lesson of the 1947 disturbances in the Punjab is that
once the interlocked communities begin to fight all over the country-side, the
only remedy is to employ a very large number of troops. I should say that the
Amritsar district could at the moment do with two full-strength Brigades in
addition to the old Police force. It has in fact one weak Brigade, and a Police
force which has largely disintegrated.
6. It is impossible to say anything definite about the future. The Sikhs pro¬
bably have two objectives in mind — they wish to take revenge for the Rawal¬
pindi massacre,7 and they wish to assert themselves on the boundary question.
It is impossible to defend their conduct in anyway, but the Muslims have failed
to understand the horror caused by the Rawalpindi affair and seem to think
that by reprisals they can bring the Sikhs to a less violent frame of mind. I very
much doubt this — I beheve that reprisals in Lahore will lead only to further
outrages by the Sikhs, and so on.
The Hindus are thoroughly terrified, and the Muslim movement from the
East is balanced by a similar movement of Hindus from the West. We seem to
have for the moment scotched the main Hindu-Sikh bombing consipiracy,8
and the Hindus are more concerned to get out of Lahore safely than with any¬
thing else.
Many of the Muslims are remarkably smug. They say that as soon as the
British leave peace will be restored. It has long been rumoured that Daultana
and his like intended to make as much trouble as possible during the last few
weeks before the transfer of power so as to discredit the British regime. If this is
so, it does not seem to have been appreciated that if all Muslim outrages stop
in Lahore on the morning of 15th August, it will for practical purposes be
clear that the local butchery was organised by the leaders themselves. More¬
over, the disorders cannot benefit the Government of West Punjab in any way,
and I should have expected the leaders to do everything possible to secure peace
before the transfer of power. Some Muslims are most uneasy, and one very
good Muslim Police officer has just resigned. I am told that he felt unable to
serve in a completely communal regime. The Muslim League National Guards
are now much in evidence in Lahore City, and the new Government may hand
over certain Police duties to them. This will not please the old regular Police
officers, and the less optimistic Muslims think that the leaders are no longer in
5 See No. 448.
6 The Moplahs were a Muslim community of Malabar, among whom there was a serious insurrection
in 1921.
? cf. Vol. IX, Nos. 513 and 540.
8 See correspondence ending with No. 403.
704
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
control and that trouble will continue in West Punjab until the Sikhs are entirely
suppressed.
7. The Punjab Partition Committee completed such work as it was able to
do on nth August, and I am about to issue the formal orders based on our
dehberations. They are a poor collection, put together very hurriedly and
drafted by various hands. I wish I could have made a cleaner job of the parti¬
tion, but the Committee really agreed about very little, and most important
questions were referred to arbitration or left over for the two new Govern¬
ments to settle. We did, however, agree about certain general principles, and
the two new Governments will start with some ready money and the kind of
services they seem to want. Many officers are shocked at the communal com¬
position of the services, and I think it is going to be very difficult to run West
Punjab with practically no non-Muslims in responsible positions, and East
Punjab without Muslims.
8. We have at last had some rain in Lahore, but it is probably too late to
affect the Kharif prospects very much. The Hissar district is in a bad way, and
we are beginning to import fodder. There will not be much of a Kharif
except on irrigated land, and during the disturbances there has been a consider¬
able increase in the cutting of canals.
9. This is, I suppose, the last letter to be sent by a British Governor of the
Punjab to a British Viceroy. It takes with it my very best wishes to Your
Excellency.
Yours sincerely,
E. M. JENKINS
460
Telephone Message 1 from General Messervy and General Rees
Rl3li/i7i:ff53-4
13 August 1947, 7.00 pm
The situation in East Punjab is bad. The Sikhs are operating in large gangs and
we are lucky if we get information in time to intercept them. We have today
intercepted some in the open, and it has been our most successful day. Casual¬
ties to one Sikh Jatha 69 killed and 10 wounded. There are also Muslim gangs
about but not in the same numbers. We have also hit them once or twice. The
situation in Amritsar is deteriorating owing to the disarming of Muslim Police
by Hindu S.P.2 That man has since been removed and arms are being restored
to Muslim Police. The rural Muslim Police also ordered to hand in arms;
AUGUST 1947
705
country-side bereft of Police. Do not know whether any arms have yet come
back. Shaukat Hayat went round starting evacuation. Intention was to evacuate
smaller villages into larger ones. Some casualties amongst refugees on way to
bigger villages. Also killing Muslim refugees (30 to 40) in village near Pati two
or three days ago. Some refugees acted precipitatedly without waiting for
escort or troops, which had been arranged. They met a horse Sikh Patrol,
which led a Jatha on to the crowd and caused casualties. Rumours about
trouble in Amritsar Station grossly exaggerated owing to incidents when small
numbers of shots fired at Frontier Mail. Total casualties on that occasion, 1
man killed. Another killing of 30 Pathan Coolies at Bukka Dam project.
These people intercepted on way to Amritsar Police Station by Sikhs. Some
fled to jungle, fate not known. Effective strength of Police 30%, as 70%
were Muslims, who were disarmed. Tara Singh now said to have issued a
call off.
2. Lahore situation deteriorating owing to the defection of Muslim Police.
Some taking local Muslim population’s side, against Sikhs. British Officers
pulling out tomorrow. Muslim National Guards in Lahore yesterday inter¬
fering where they should not do so. Shooting and arson in Lahore to-day.
Large military force in city.
3. Two brigades supplied by Supreme Commander — one from Pakistan
and one from India, moving to reinforce P.B.F. Postponement of Boundary
Commission’s award causing uncertainty.
4. Troops in good spirits and General Rees gives personal assurance that
they understand that bloodshed does no good to either side. Their action has
been completely impartial.
5. Total Muslim Casualties estimated up to date as not more than 1000.
1 Received in the Viceroy’s Private Office.
2 See Nos. 432, para. 1 and 459, paia. 3.
461
Cabinet Office to U.K. High Commissioner in India
Telegram , L/S &GI7I1285: j 498
IMMEDIATE 1J August 1947 , 4.23 pm
UKRI 556. Please deliver following message from Prime Minister to Prime
Minister of India on 15 th August.
begins. “My colleagues in the United Kingdom Government join with me
7 o6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
in sending on this historic day greetings and good wishes to the Government
and people of India.
It is our earnest wish that India may go forward in tranquility and prosperity
and in so doing contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world.” ends.
2. A similar message is today being passed direct to Grafftey- Smith for
Prime Minister of Pakistan. Grateful if you would warn him by telegram to
look out for this message.
462
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl oj Listowel
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official
Correspondence Files: Pakistan
MOST IMMEDIATE KARACHI, 1 3 August ip47, 8.30 pm
confidential Received : 13 August, 3.43 pm
No. 7-K. Your 10491 of 12th August.1 Assets and liabilities. I fear it is quite out
of the question for you to decide the allocation of cash balances. The matter has
already been discussed here and Congress are prepared to discuss it again with
the League, if necessary, after which arrangements have been made for it to be
referred to Arbitral Tribunal.
1 No. 447.
463
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files:
Hyderabad, Part 1(b)
MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 13 August lp47, 6. 40 pttl
confidential Received : 13 August, 4.34 pm
No. 3384-S. Reference your telegram 9385 dated July 21st.1 1 should be grateful
if you would make an immediate submission to His Majesty recommending
that second son of His Exalted Highness Nizam of Hyderabad be granted title
of His Highness.
2. I am making this submission as H.E. the Crown Representative and would
be grateful if you could obtain His Majesty’s orders before transfer of power.2
AUGUST 1947
707
Patel has no objection. Gazette notification would of course be dated 14th,
though it will appear later,
1 See No. n, note 4.
2 Lord Mountbatten was informed in tel. 10644 of 14 August th?t the King had approved the proposal.
L/P & S/13/1843 : f 121.
464
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram, L/P &f/ 10/127 •' f 90
MOST IMMEDIATE KARACHI, 1 J August 1 947, p. 00 pm
confidential Received: 13 August, 9.35 pm
No. 14-K. At today’s meeting in Karachi Pakistan cabinet urge[d] me to
include in Pakistan Adaptation Order provision retaining Section 93 in
modified form, text of which follows in my immediately succeeding telegram.
2. My Pakistan colleagues claim that this adaptation is neither ultra vires nor
improper because the Governor-General acts on advice. My Reforms Secre¬
tariat, however, are of view that any such adaptation would be a fraud on
Independence Act,1 Section 8(2)(C) of which abolishes discretionary powers.
My Pakistan colleagues rejoin to this that provincial administration on their
scheme would be controlled not by Governor but by Governor-General acting
on advice who would use Governor as a mere agent. My advisers comment
that this argument assuming it to meet objection based on Section 8(2)(C)
only does at cost of producing by a process of ostensible adaptation a position
wholly at variance with Government of India Act 1935 in that geographical
field would be invaded wholesale by Central Government.
3 . I have pointed out that Pakistan Government Constituent Assembly can
pass the desired provision at any time, but my colleagues press for inclusion
thereof in my Adaptation Order. I would be grateful for most immediate
advice on constitutional position.
4. Cooke knows background.
No. 164.
I
708
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
465
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , L/P &J/ 10/ 127: f 91
MOST IMMEDIATE KARACHI, 13 August I947, 9. 00 pm
confidential Received: 13 August, 7.13 pm
No. 15--K. My immediately preceding telegram.1 Begins. Section 93(1).
If at any time the Governor-General is satisfied that a grave emergency exists
whereby the peace or security of Pakistan or any part there or [?thereof] is
threatened or that a situation has arisen in which the Government of a Province
cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Act he may by
Proclamation direct the Governor of a province to assume on behalf of the
Governor General all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by any
provincial body or authority. Any such proclamation may contain such
incidental and consequential provisions as may appear to the Governor
General to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the
Proclamation including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the
operation of any provisions of this Act relating to any provincial body or
authority.
Provided that nothing in this subsection shall authorise the Governor
General to direct the suspension of any of the powers vested in or exercisable
by a High Court or to suspend either in whole or in part the operation of any
provisions of this act relating to High Courts.
(2) Any such proclamation may be revoked or varied by a subsequent
proclamation.
1 No. 464.
466
Sir E Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Punjab , Situation in, Part II (b)
IMMEDIATE 13 August 1 947, 11.40 pm
confidential Received: 14 August, 9.00 am
No. 231-G. Addressed Viceroy repeated to Secretary of State for India,
Governors of the U.P., Sind and N.W.F.P.
Lahore city still very gravely disturbed. Casualties of August 12th numbered
40 including 34 non-Muslims. All victims were stabbed except 1 Muslim who
AUGUST 1947
709
was shot. In addition Muslims attacked Sind Express near Cantonment killing
9 and injuring about 30 non-Muslim passengers. Fires very numerous. Trouble
continues today August 13 th.
2. Amritsar city reports 2 Muslims and 1 Hindu killed by police or troops
on August 1 2th afternoon and 3 Muslims and 5 Hindus stabbed. Also 10 fires
and 4 bomb explosions. Party of Pathan labourers attacked by Sikhs on Grand
Trunk Road near Chheharta and 30 killed. Commander Punjab Boundary
Force informs me that 200 Muslims killed by Sikhs in village near Jandiala.
One of his detachments with tanks encountered Sikh Jatha near Majitha and
opened fire killing 61 and wounding 9. Today civil reports incomplete. Sikhs
are well armed and in another encounter with troops on August 12th caused 2
casualties but lost 9 dead.
3 . Gurdaspur reports 1 Sikh shot by police and 1 Hindu and 4 Muslims killed
in communal incidents. Sialkot reports 2 Sikhs and 1 Muslim fatally stabbed.
Also what is represented as communal clash between police and troops on
Gurdaspur border. This is being investigated. Ludhiana reports village raid with
1 Muslim killed and 2 [group corrupt] killed. Ferozepore has had 2 Muslims
killed and 8 injured by bombs. Also 2 non-Muslims killed.
4. General situation deteriorating.
467
Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
Punjab , Situation in, Part 11(b)
IMMEDIATE 1J August I947, 11. 40 pm
confidential Received: 14 August, 9.00 am
No. 232-G. Addressed to the Viceroy repeated to Secretary of State.
My immediately preceding telegram.1 Lahore urban area and Amritsar
district are out of control. We hope to enforce curfew in Lahore from 2000
hours with the assistance of Punjab Boundary Force. I have authorised search
of Dera Sahib Gurdwara in Lahore city as Sikhs have been firing from it today.
Severe punishment inflicted by troops on Majitha Jatha may have deterrent
effect in Amritsar. Commander Punjab Boundary Force informs me he
hopes to be reinforced by two brigades.
’No. 4 66.
7io
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
468
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Telegram , L/F &JI10I12S: j 38
MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 1 3 August 1 947, 8.00 pm
confidential Received : 14 August, 6.00 am
No. 10595. My telegram No. 10492 of 12th August.1 I have now discussed
matter with Cooke and understand that there is no question of fixing by
Order contribution to be made by Pakistan in respect of national debt or
Pakistan’s share of cash balances.2
2. I agree that you should issue Order in your discretion in form given in
your telegram No. 643 -GT3 subject to the amendments brought home by
Cooke. In doing so you may make it public that you are acting with my
approval.
3. I think that the further amendments set out in my two immediately
following telegrams should also be made and I attach particular importance
to the one about pensions.4 I recognise that you cannot at this late stage get
agreement of either party to these amendments and if for that reason you
find it quite impossible to incorporate them you have discretion not to adopt
them. I must, however, emphasise that if the one about pensions is not included
I shall be placed in an extremely difficult position having regard to the fact
that you are making it public that the Order is being issued with my approval.
4. Some further comments follow in my third succeeding telegram5 which
do not affect issue of Order.
1 Tel. 10492 of 12 August referred to No. 422 and raised a few points on the Draft Order pending the
arrival of Mr Cooke. L/P &J/10/128: If 54-7.
2 cf. Nos. 447 and 462.
3 See No. 422, para. 8 and its note 5.
4 These telegrams are not printed. In tel. 10596 of 13 August Lord Listowel explained that he understood
from Mr Cooke that the Order was not intended to apply to pensions. I11 view of the interest taken in
pensions in the United Kingdom, Listowel emphasised that it would be very difficult for H.M.G. to
justify the exclusion of any provision for the distribution of pension liabilities in an Order which had
been approved by the Secretary of State. He therefore suggested the insertion of a new Article covering
pensions in the Order, the text of which was transmitted in tel. 10597 °f U August. L/P &J/10/128 :
ff 35 and 33. The actual text of Listowel’s Article may be found in the Order as issued; see No. 471,
Article 11.
5 No. 469.
AUGUST 1947
711
469
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
Telegram, L/P &Jfiofi28: f 30
MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 1 3 August 1 947, 8.10 pm
confidential Received: 14 August, 6.00 am
No. 10598. My telegram No. 10597. 1
I do not know whether you will have an opportunity to discuss draft Order
with Jinnah while you are at Karachi. If not you will doubtless explain to him
by telegram or letter factors which have influenced you.
2. We entirely agree with you that an Order of this sort is essential and that as
regards the public debt there is no alternative but to put the responsibility on
the Dominion of India2 as stockholders must know to whom to look for
payment. This course also seems in the best interests of Pakistan as if Pakistan
assumed a joint liability with India for the public debt it may become liable for
very substantial payments in the immediate future.
3. We have considered whether some face saving formula would be possible
which would achieve the substance of what is desired. But no loss of face is
involved and any such formula would inevitably obscure the meaning of a
legal document of this character.
* See No. 468, note 4. 2 cf. Nos. 422 and 423.
470
The Gazette of India Extraordinary
L/P&S 1 12/4638: f 17
NEW DELHI, 14 August 1947
SECRETARIAT OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL (REFORMS)
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi, the 14th August 1947
no. G. G. o. 17. — The following Order made by the Governor-General is
published for general information : —
THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE (INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS)
ORDER, I947
whereas the agreement set out in the Schedule to this Order has been
reached at a meeting of the Partition Council on the 6th day of August, 1947;
712
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
and whereas it is intended that, as from the 15th day of August, 1947,
the said agreement shall have the force and effect of an agreement between the
Dominions of India and Pakistan;
now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by section
9 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and of all other powers enabling him
in that behalf, the Governor-General hereby orders as follows: —
1. This Order may be cited as the Indian Independence (International
Arrangements) Order, 1947.
2. The agreement set out in the Schedule to this Order shall, as from the
appointed day, have the effect of an agreement duly made between the
Dominion of India and the Dominion of Pakistan .
SCHEDULE
AGREEMENT AS TO THE DEVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS UPON THE DOMINIONS OF INDIA AND
PAKISTAN
1. The international rights and obligations to which India is entitled and
subject immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947, will devolve in
accordance with the provisions of this agreement.
2. (1) Membership of all international organisations together with the
rights and obligations attaching to such membership, will devolve solely upon
the Dominion of India.
For the purposes of this paragraph any rights or obligations arising under the
Final Act of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference will be
deemed to be rights or obligations attached to membership of the International
Monetary Fund and to membership of the International Bank for Recon¬
struction and Development.
(2) The Dominion of Pakistan will take such steps as may be necessary to
apply for membership of such international organisations as it chooses to join.
3. (1) Rights and obligations under international agreements having an
exclusive territorial application to an area comprised in the Dominion of
India will devolve upon that Dominion.
(2) Rights and obligations under international agreements having an
exclusive territorial application to an area comprised in the Dominion of
Pakistan will devolve upon that Dominion.
4. Subject to Articles 2 and 3 of this agreement, rights and obligations under
all international agreements to which India is a party immediately before the
appointed day will devolve both upon the Dominion of India and upon the
AUGUST 1947
713
Dominion of Pakistan, and will, if necessary, be apportioned between the two
Dominions.
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA,
Governor-General
K. V. K. SUNDARAM,
Officer on Special Duty
471
The Gazette of India Extraordinary
L/P&JI 10/128: ff8-n
new Delhi, 14 August 1947
SECRETARIAT OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL (REFORMS)
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi , the 14th August , 1947
no. G. G. 0.-18 — The following Order made by the Governor-General is
published for general information : —
THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE (RIGHTS, PROPERTY AND
liabilities) order, 1947.
In exercise of the powers conferred by section 9 of the Indian Independence
Act, 1947, and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, the Governor-
General is pleased to make the following Order: —
1. (1) This Order may be cited as the Indian Independence (Rights, Property
and Liabilities) Order, 1947.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. (1) in this Order, —
“appointed day” means the fifteenth day of August, 1947;
“Arbitral Tribunal” means the Arbitral Tribunal constituted in accord¬
ance with the Arbitral Tribunal Order, 1947;1
“land” includes immovable property of every kind, and any rights in or
over such property.
(2) The Interpretation Act, 1889, applies for the interpretation of this Order
as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of Parliament.
3. (1) The provisions of this Order relate to the initial distribution of rights,
property and liabilities consequential on the setting up of the Dominions of
India and Pakistan, and shall have effect subject to any agreement between the
1 No. 438.
714
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
two Dominions or the Provinces concerned and to any award that may be
made by the Arbitral Tribunal.
(2) Nothing in this Order affects the powers of control over military plant,
machinery, equipment and stores conferred on the Joint Defence Council by
the Joint Defence Council Order, 1947. 2
(3) The powers of control over property conferred upon each of the
Dominions by this Order shall include all the powers of use, consumption,
management and disposition incidental to ownership ; but each Dominion shall
exercise the said powers with due regard to the interests of both Dominions, and
shall carry out the terms of any agreement or award under which the property
is to be transferred to the other Dominion.
4. All land which immediately before the appointed day is vested in His
Majesty for the purposes of the Governor-General in Council shall on that
day,—
(a) in the case of land situated in India or in the tribal areas on the borders
of India, be under the control of the Dominion of India;
(b) in the case of land situated in Pakistan or in the tribal areas on the
borders of Pakistan, be under the control of the Dominion of Pakistan;
(c) in the case of land which immediately before the appointed day is used
for the purposes of any official representative of the Government of India
in any other part of His Majesty’s dominions or in a foreign country, be
under the control of the Dominion of India; and
(d) in any other case, be under the joint control of the Dominions of India
and Pakistan:
Provided that any land which, by virtue of the preceding provisions of this
Article, is to be under the control of the two Dominions, and which i. situated
in an Indian State, shall, if within one month from the appointed day the State
accedes to either of the two Dominions, be under the control of that Dominion
as from the date on which the accession of the State becomes effective.
5. (1) All land which immediately before the appointed day is vested in His
Majesty for the purposes of the Province of Bengal shall on that day —
(a) in the case of land situated in the Province of East Bengal, vest in His
Majesty for the purposes of that Province;
(b) in the case of land situated in the Province of West Bengal, vest in His
Majesty for the purposes of that Province; and
(c) in any other case, vest in His Majesty for the joint purposes of those two
Provinces.
(2) All land which immediately before the appointed day is vested in His
Majesty for the purposes of the Province of the Punjab shall, on that day —
AUGUST 1947
715
(a) in the case of land situated in the Province of West Punjab, vest in His
Majesty for the purposes of that Province ;
(b) in the case of land situated in the Province of East Punjab, vest in His
Majesty for the purposes of that Province; and
(c) in any other case, vest in His Majesty for the joint purposes of those two
Provinces.
(3) All land which immediately before the appointed day is vested in His
Majesty for the purposes of the Province of Assam shall — -
(a) in the case of land situated in that part of the Province which on that day
becomes part of the Province of East Bengal, vest on that day in His
Majesty for the purposes of the Province of East Bengal; and
(b) in any other case, continue to be vested in His Majesty for the purposes
of the Province of Assam.
(4) All land which immediately before the appointed day is vested in His
Majesty for the purposes of any Province other than Bengal, the Punjab or
Assam shall continue to be vested in His Majesty for the purposes of that
Province.
6. The Provisions of Articles 4 and 5 of this Order shall apply in relation to
all goods, coins, bank notes and currency notes which immediately before the
appointed day are vested in His Majesty for the purposes of the Governor-
General in Council or of a Province as they apply in relation to land so vested.
7. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Order relating to certain contractual
rights, this Article shall apply to all property, other than land, goods, coins,
bank notes and currency notes, which immediately before the appointed day
is vested in His Majesty for the purposes of the Governor-General in Council
or of a Province.
(2) All such property shall on the appointed day vest in His Majesty for
the joint purposes of the two Dominions, for the joint purposes of the Provinces
of East Bengal and West Bengal, or for the joint purposes of the Provinces of
East Punjab and West Punjab, or shall, as from that day, continue to be vested
in His Majesty for the purposes of the Province, according as the purposes for
which the property is held immediately before the appointed day are —
(a) purposes of the Governor-General in Council,
(b) purposes of the Province of Bengal,
(c) purposes of the Province of the Punjab, or
(d) purposes of a Province other than Bengal or the Punjab.
2 No. 425.
7i 6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
8. (i) Any contract made on behalf of the Governor-General in Council
before the appointed day shall, as from that day, —
(a) if the contract is for purposes which as from that day are exclusively
purposes of the Dominion of Pakistan, be deemed to have been made on
behalf of the Dominion of Pakistan instead of the Governor-General in
Council; and
(b) in any other case, be deemed to have been made on behalf of the
Dominion of India instead of the Governor-General in Council;
and all rights and liabilities which have accrued or may accrue under any such
contract shall, to the extent to which they would have been rights or liabilities
of the Governor-General in Council, be rights or liabilities of the Dominion
of Pakistan or the Dominion of India, as the case may be.
(2) Any contract made on behalf of the Province of Bengal before the
appointed day shall, as from that day, —
(a) if the contract is for purposes which as from that day are exclusively
purposes of the Province of West Bengal, be deemed to have been made
on behalf of that Province instead of the Province of Bengal; and
(b) in any other case be deemed to have been made on behalf of the Province
of East Bengal instead of the Province of Bengal;
and all rights and liabilities which have accrued or may accrue under any such
contract shall, to the extent to which they would have been rights or liabilities
of the Province of Bengal, be rights or liabilities of the Province of West
Bengal or the Province of East Bengal, as the case may be.
(3) Any contract made on behalf of the Province of the Punjab before the
appointed day shall, as from that day, —
(a) if the contract is for purposes which as from that day are exclusively
purposes of the Province of East Punjab, be deemed to have been made
on behalf of that Province instead of the Province of the Punjab ; and
(b) in any other case be deemed to have been made on behalf of the Province
of West Punjab instead of the Province of the Punjab;
and all rights and liabilities which have accrued or may accrue under any such
contract shall, to the extent to which they would have been rights or liabilities
of the Province of the Punjab, be rights or liabilities of the Province of East
Punjab or the Province of West Punjab, as the case may be.
(4) Any contract made before the appointed day on behalf of the Province
of Assam, being a contract for purposes which, as from that day, are exclusively
purposes of the Province of East Bengal, shall, as fro thatm day be deemed to
have been made on behalf of the Province of East Bengal instead of the Province
of Assam, and all rights and liabilities which have accrued or may accrue under
AUGUST 1947
717
the contract shall, to the extent to which they would have been rights or
liabilities of the Province of Assam, be rights or liabilities of the Province of
East Bengal.
(5) For the purposes of this Article there shall be deemed to be included in
the liabilities which have accrued or may accrue under any contract, —
(a) any liability to satisfy an order or award made by any court or other
tribunal in proceedings relating to the contract; and
(b) any liability in respect of expenses incurred in or in connection with any
such proceedings.
(6) The provisions of this Article shall have effect subject to the provisions
of Article 9 of this Order; and bank balances and securities shall, notwithstand¬
ing that they partake of the nature of contractual rights, be dealt with as
property to which Article 7 of this Order applies.
9. All liabilities in respect of such loans, guarantees and other fmancial
obligations of the Governor-General in Council or of a Province as are
outstanding immediately before the appointed day shall, as from that day, —
(a) in the case of liabilities of the Governor-General in Council, be liabilities
of the Dominion of India ;
(b) in the case of liabilities of the Province of Bengal, be liabilities of the
Province of East Bengal ;
(c) in the case of liabilities of the Province of the Punjab, be liabilities of the
Province of West Punjab; and
(d) in the case of liabilities of any Province other than Bengal, or the Punjab,
continue to be liabilities of that Province.
10. (1) Where immediately before the appointed day the Governor-
General in Council is subject to any liability in respect of an actionable wrong
other than breach of contract, that liability shall, —
(a) where the cause of action arose wholly within the territories which, as
from that day, are the territories of the Dominion of India, be a liability
of that Dominion;
(b) where the cause of action arose wholly within the territories which, as
from that day, are the territories of the Dominion of Pakistan, be a
liability of that Dominion; and
(c) in any other case, be a joint liability of the Dominions of India and
Pakistan.
(2) Where immediately before the appointed day the Province of Bengal is
subject to any such liability as aforesaid, that liability shall,
7i 8
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
(a) where the cause of action arose wholly within the territories which, as
from that day, are the territories of the Province of East Bengal, be
a liability of that Province ;
(b) where the cause of action arose wholly within the territories which, as
from that day, are the territories of the Province of West Bengal, be
a liability of that Province; and
(c) in any other case, be a joint liability of the Provinces of East and West
Bengal.
(3) Where immediately before the appointed day the Province of the
Punjab is subject to any such liability as aforesaid, that liability shall, —
(a) where the cause of action arose wholly within the territories which, as
from that day, are the territories of the Province of West Punjab, be
a liability of that Province ;
(b) where the cause of action arose wholly within the territories which, as
from that day, are the territories of the Province of East Punjab, be
a liability of that Province ; and
(c) in any other case, be a joint liability of the Provinces of East and West
Punjab.
(4) Where immediately before the appointed day the Province of Assam is
subject to any such liability as aforesaid, then, if the cause of action arose wholly
with the territories which, as from that day, are the territories of East Bengal,
the liability shall, as from that day, be a liability of the Province of East Bengal.
11. (1) Nothing in the preceding provisions of this Order aftects the liability
of either Dominion or of any Province in respect of the payment of any pension.
(2) Where before the appointed day the Go vemoi -General in Council or
any Province is subject to any liability in respect of any pension, that liability
shall, as from the appointed day, —
(a) in the case of a liability of the Governor-General in Council, be a liability
of the Dominion of India;
(b) in the case of a liability of the Province of Bengal, be a liability of the
Province of East Bengal ;
(c) in the case of a liability of the Province of the Punjab, be a liability of
the Province of West Punjab; and
(d) in the case of a liability of any Province other than Bengal or the Punjab,
continue to be a liability of that Province.
12. (1) Where immediately befoie the appointed day the Governor-General
in Council is a party to any legal proceedings with respect to any property,
AUGUST 1947
719
rights or liabilities transferred by this Order, the Dominion which succeeds to
the property, rights or liabilities in accordance with the provisions of this
Order shall be deemed to be substituted for the Governor-General in Council
as a party to those proceedings, and the proceedings may continue accordingly.
(2) Where any Province from which property, rights or liabilities are
transferred by this Order is, immediately before the transfer, a party to legal
proceedings with respect to that property or those rights or liabilities, the
Province which succeeds to the property, rights or liabilities in accordance
with the provisions of this Order shall be deemed to be substituted for the
other Province as a party to those proceedings, and the proceedings may
continue accordingly.
(3) Any proceedings which, immediately before the appointed day, are
pending by or against the Secretary of State elsewhere than in the United
Kingdom in respect of any liability of the Governor-General in Council or
a Province shall, —
(a) in the case of proceedings in respect of a liability of the Governor-General
in Council be continued by or against the Dominion which succeeds to
the liability;
(b) in the case of proceedings in respect of a liability of the Province of
Bengal, the Province of the Punjab, or the Province of Assam, be
continued by or against the Province which succeeds to the liability; or
(c) in the case of proceedings in respect of a liability of any other Province,
be continued by or against that Province.
13. (1) Where by virtue of the preceding provisions of this Order either of
the Dominions or any Province becomes entitled to any property or obtains
any other benefits, and it is just and equitable that that property or those benefits
should be transferred or shared with the other Dominion, or with any other
Province, as the case may be, the said property or benefits shall be allocated in
such manner as, in default of agreement, may be determined by the Arbitral
Tribunal.
(2) Where by virtue of the preceding provisions of this Order either of the
Dominions or any Province becomes subject to any liability, and it is just and
equitable that a contribution towards that liability should be made by the
other Dominion, or by another Province, as the case may be, the other
Dominion or Province shall make to the Dominion or Province primarily
subject to the liability such contribution in respect thereof as, in default of an
agreement, may be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal.
(3) In determining what is just and equitable for the purposes of this Article
the parties concerned and the Arbitral Tribunal shall be guided by the
720
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
principles laid down in any relevant decision of any of the bodies referred to
in paragraph (2) of Article 4 of the Arbitral Tribunal Order, 1947.
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA,
Governor-General
K. V. K. SUNDARAM,
Officer on Special Duty
472
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandi Nehru
jR/j/ if 171: f 60
14 August 1947
Dear Mr. Nehru,
With reference to the letter1 which I wrote to you yesterday on the point of
my departure for Karachi, I am delighted to be able to inform you that I have
prevailed on Mr. Jinnah to send up Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and one other
representative to attend this vital meeting on the morning of the 16th in Delhi.2
In view of the difficult military situation which has arisen in the Punjab I am
also proposing to call a meeting of the Joint Defence Council for 10.30 a.m. on
the 1 6th, to enable the Supreme Commander to give the Council an account
of his visit to the area, which I understand he is paying today.3 There would
be no other business on the agenda, and the meeting should not occupy more
than fifteen minutes.
I feel there is nothing to prevent you and Sardar Patel joining the Joint
Defence Council to hear this report from the Supreme Commander, and I
would therefore urge that you and Sardar Patel should come at 10.30.
Field Marshal Auchinleck, Sardar Baldev Singh and I would leave the meeting
as soon as the former’s report was over, and then I would suggest leaving you
and Sardar Patel to have your discussion with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and his
colleague.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA4
I am enclosing an extra copy of this letter to save you the trouble if you wish
to send it on to Sardar Patel inviting him to join this meeting. I have not
communicated with him.
I also enclose a copy of my letter5 to Sardar Baldev Singh.
1 No. 454. 2 See ibid., note 2. 3 See No. 486.
4 O11 15 August, Pandit Nehru acknowledged receipt of this letter and stated that he and Sardar Patel
would be present at the meeting of the Joint Defence Council on 16 August. R/3/1/171 : f 61.
5 Not printed.
AUGUST 1947
721
473
Lieutenant-General Sir A. Smith to Sir G. Abell
Rl3li/i7i:f 57
NO. I90/CGS CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF INDIA,
NEW DELHI, 14 August 1947
My dear George,
Reference telegram from the Governor of the Punjab to the Viceroy No. 230-G
of 12 August.1
Late on the evening of the 12th August, the Secretary, Defence Department,
Pakistan, telephoned to me to say that his Government wished reinforcements
to be sent to the Punjab Boundary Force. The same day I had received a similar
request from General Rees Commanding the Punjab Boundary Force.
As this Force was set up by order of the Joint Defence Council, theoretically
no increase can be made without the approval of the Joint Defence Council.
However, as that would have taken too long, yesterday I got the agreement of
HMD, India, to send reinforcements to General Rees.
We have now selected three battalions from Pakistan and three battalions
from India. A warning order has gone out to these battalions to be ready to
move, and the difficult problem of the railway move is now being studied.
I anticipate that these six battalions should reach the Punjab in about a week’s
time.
I will inform the C-in-C when he returns of the position, but before he left
for Karachi, he had already approved in principle the supply of reinforcements.2
Yours ever,
ARTHUR SMITH
1 No. 448.
2 O11 14 August Lord Ismay minuted: ‘I assume that the Commander-in-Chief will report the facts of
the case to the Joint Defence Council next Saturday [16 August].’ Lord Mountbatten replied: ‘Yes’
R/3/1/171: f 58.
474
The Nizam of Hyderabad to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: Hyderabad, Part 1(b)
HYDERABAD, DECCAN, 1 4 August 1 947
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I am grateful for Your Excellency’s letter of the 12th August 19471 which was
1 No. 440.
722
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
delivered to me by Sir Walter Monckton. I have had a long talk with
Sir Walter on the subject. It is a source of satisfaction to me that Your
Excellency appreciates my readiness to co-operate with the Dominion of India
in the three essential fields of External Affairs, Defence and Communications.
1 am also glad to see from your letter that there is no intention to interfere
with the existing administrative arrangements or to disturb the status quo in
Berar.
(2) I know that Your Excellency will have understood from my letter of the
8 th August 19472 that I am not prepared to execute an Instrument of Accession.
At the same time, I share Your Excellency’s wish to find a solution satisfactory
to us all and I hope that continuance of negotiations will produce this result.
Yours sincerely,
MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN
2 No. 376.
475
Mr Griffin to Sir T. Shone
L/P&S/ 13/ 1 80 7 A : ff 1 43-4
NO. 467/47/R/4 NEW DELHI, 1 4 August ig 47
Dear Shone,
I am writing to you at the request of Menon, Secretary of the States Depart¬
ment of the Government of India, about the records of the Crown Rep¬
resentative which have recently been transferred to your custody. He is
anxious that, if occasion arises to consult these records, his Department should
be given all necessary facilities.
2. In this letter, a copy of which I am sending to Menon, 1 will try to explain
as clearly as I can the position in regard to these records as we view it.
3 . The Government of India or, in appropriate cases, the Government of
Pakistan, are succeeding to the great bulk of the Crown Representative’s
records, which relate to matters of common concern to the States and what is
now British India. There are other records, however, which the Crown
Representative cannot hand over to a Successor Government. Such records are
those containing information which came into the possession of the Crown
Representative because of the Crown’s special relations with Rulers based on
treaties and agreements and was relevant only to the functions of paramountcy
in connection with successions and intervention in the internal affairs of a State.
These functions lapse and cannot be inherited. Moreover, His Majesty’s
AUGUST 1947
723
Government have pledged themselves not to transfer paramountcy in any
circumstances to a Successor Government in India. It would, therefore, be
a grave breach of confidence if the Crown Representative were to transfer to
a Successor Government records containing information regarding the private
lives of Rulers and the internal affairs of States.
4. The decision that records of this nature should be transferred to the
custody of the U.K. High Commissioner for India was taken in consultation
with, and with the full agreement of, those qualified to speak on behalf of the
two Dominions.1 Thus, there has been nothing surreptitious or underhand in
the transfer of these records. It would follow logically from what I have said
above that the States Department could not, without breach of confidence on
the part of the Crown, be allowed access to these records for purposes of
reference. This conclusion must, however, be subject to considerable quali¬
fication in view of two factors. In the first place the sorting of records has
necessarily been done at high speed and there may be among the records
transferred to your custody a small number to which the Government of India
(or Pakistan) have a legitimate right of succession. Secondly, though the
paramountcy of the Crown cannot be inherited or transferred, it may be that
the Government of India (or Pakistan) will assume, in relation to certain
States and with the consent of those States, a position not dissimilar from that
formerly occupied by the paramount power. In such an event, records useful
to the Government of India (or Pakistan) for the performance of what would
thus have become their legitimate functions (e.g. decision of succession cases)
coaid without objection be transferred to those Governments.
5. It would, I think be improper to supply a Dominion Government
with copies of the lists of records transferred to your custody since those lists,
in themselves, contain significant references to matter which it would be
a breach of confidence to disclose. I see no objection however to authorised
representatives of the States Department being shown relevant entries in the
lists when they require information which is not otherwise available ; and there
are, no doubt, records useful to the States Department which it will be possible
to transfer to them without breach of confidence.
6. I should add, in conclusion, that records received by you from Residencies
may, owing to errors of sorting, include records prior to 1880. If so, these can
be transferred at once to the Imperial Record Department who are already in
possession of most of the Crown Representative’s records up to that date.
Indeed, a stage may come when the disclosure of all the confidential records
now in your custody will be justified. When this stage is reached, and no
1 See Vol. XI, No. 175, pp. 325-6 and 327.
724
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
breach of confidence is involved, appropriate arrangements will doubtless be
made between His Majesty’s Government and the Dominion Government
concerned.
Yours sincerely,
C. L. GRIFFIN
476
U.K. High Commissioner in India to Cabinet Office [Extract)
Telegram , L/E/£/4#75: / 491
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 1 4 August 1947, 12. pill
Received: 14 August, 6.25 pm
IRKU 618. UKRI 5561 and S59-2
As it was uncertain when I should be able to see Pandit Nehru tomorrow
(when there is a whole series of ceremonies and celebrations), I gave him
Prime Minister’s and Archbishop of Canterbury’s messages today explaining
that they were to be regarded as given first thing on August 15th. Moreover, it
was desirable to ensure that messages should be published as soon as possible
here, as others will appear in press tomorrow.
2. Pandit Nehru has now sent me following replies for Prime Minister and
Archbishop.3
3. To the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
On behalf of my colleagues in the Government of India and myself I wish
to express our grateful thanks for your message of greeting on this historic day
when India emerges into freedom. That freedom means much to us, but it also
means much to Asia and the world. We hope to utilise that freedom for the
advancement of our own people as well as for the furtherance of the peace
and prosperity of the world. In these great tasks we shall look forward to the
closest co-operation with your Government.
★ ★ ★
1 No. 461.
2 Not printed. UKRI 559 of 13 August transmitted a message, to be delivered on 15 August, from the
Archbishop of Canterbury to Pandit Nehru. L/S &G/7/1285 : f 501.
3 Pandit Nehru’s reply to the Archbishop of Canterbury has not been printed in this extract.
AUGUST 1947
725
477
Sir F. Wylie to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , LfP &J/71 12506: f 79
IMMEDIATE LUCKNOW, 1 4 August 1947 , 2.45pm
unnumbered Received in India Office: 14 August , 12.10 pm
The Union Jack on Lucknow Residency was lowered at 20 hours on
13 August.1
Repeated to Secretary of State for India.
1 It would appear that Sir F. Wylie acted a day early ; cf. Nos. 243, para. 6 and 409. Various applications
were made for custody of the flag before it was agreed, with the King’s approval, that it should be
hung at Windsor Castle. L/P &J/7/12506.
478
Cabinet
India and Burma Committee. Paper LB. (47) 156
Rl3o/ili2:f 37
Letter From Lady Mountbatten
NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA
INDIA OFFICE, 1 4 August I947
I think my colleagues will be interested to see the annexed letter which I have
received from Lady Mountbatten.
L.
Annex to No. 478
LETTER FROM LADY MOUNTBATTEN TO LORD LISTOWEL
DATED 7TH AUGUST 1947
1 have been most touched by your kind and generous references to me, during
the recent Parliamentary Debates on India.1
It has been a great privilege to be here in the last months and in these critical
times, clouded though they have often been with tragedy and obstacle.
The sympathy, understanding and real friendship which we have been
shown by Indians of all denominations and political beliefs, and in all walks of
life, have however made our tasks very happy as well as very inspiring ones.
r In paying tribute to Lord Mountbatten in the debate on the Indian Independence Bill in the House of
Lords on 16 July, Lord Listowel made the following reference to Lady Mountbatten: ‘The gratitude
and affection he has earned from Indians in so short a time are also felt for Lady Mountbatten whose
tireless energy and unfailing tact have been a far from negligible factor in his success.’ Pari Debs.,
5th ser., H. of L., vol. 150, col. 810.
726
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Would you please also tell Lord Samuel2 how much I appreciated his kind
remarks.
We can never be sufficiently grateful for the magnificent support which you
and your colleagues have given us throughout these vital months.
2 In the same debate on 16 July Lord Samuel commented: ‘I think those who are acquainted with the
course of these events will join with the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, in thanking Lady Mountbatten for
the share she has had in fostering that atmosphere of friendship and good will which has so largely
contributed to the results that have been achieved.’ Ibid., col. 829.
479
The Earl oj Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
Telegram , L/P&JI iof 127: Jf 88-g
MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 14 August ig 47, 12.30 pm
No. 10633. Your telegram No. 14K of 13 th August.1 It seems to me of doubtful
legality to amend Section 93 in way desired by Pakistan Government by means
of adaptations under Section 9 of Indian Independence Act.2 It would certainly
seem inconsistent with the spirit of the Indian Independence Act. Decision
whether or not to make it is mainly a political one and its doubtful legality
seems to me conclusive argument against your including it in any adaptation
order issued by you today.
2. I recognise that Pakistan Government genuinely feel this power to be
essential for safety of Pakistan and it is not unreasonable that in conditions of
India special reserve powers should exist for dealing with grave threats to
security of the Dominion or Province or with breakdown of Dominion or
Provincial constitutions. I am however sure that you are right in suggesting
that Pakistan Government’s correct course is to seek such powers as they need
from Pakistan Constituent Assembly which is now in session.
1 No. 464. 2 No. 164.
480
The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , LfPO/ 10/ 18: f 3og
14 August ig47 , 1.00 pm1
No. 109. Private. Following personal from Lord Listowel.
May I say before I leave the India Office what a great privilege it has been for
me to be associated with you in the unique record of British service to India
AUGUST 1947
727
marked by your Viceroyalty. I believe that your outstanding ability and
fearless determination have saved India from unimaginable disaster and that
your achievement will be remembered in time to come as one of the greatest
feats of statesmanship in history. Your brilliant handling of the situation in
India has inspired all my staff for the final effort after many years of patient
endeavour and I should like to thank you on their behalf. I wish you the
utmost success in your new appointment as Governor-General of India.
1 Time of despatch has been taken from the India Office register of outward telegrams.
481
Sir G. Cunningham (. North-West Frontier Province) to
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
RhN^s'-ff 75-77
GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PESHAWAR, N.W.F.P.
14 August 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,
This is to thank Your Excellencies again for your kindness to my wife and
myself at Delhi.1 I appreciated very much the time that you spared to discuss
NWFP affairs when you were so busy, and the background I got thereby has
been very valuable. I am sending with this a brief note I have just dictated of
my talks so far. There is, I think, no doubt that J. will order the dismissal of the
Ministry on 1 6-1 8th Aug.2 but I am not particularly gloomy as to the course
of events thereafter.
I hope you are having a successful and not too tiring visit to Karachi.
With our kindest regards to Your Excellency and our sincere wishes that
your time as Governor General of the new India may be as brilliantly successful
as the Viceroyalty of the old.
Yours sincerely,
GEORGE CUNNINGHAM
Enclosure to No. 481
SECRET 14 August 1947
I
I saw Dr. Khan Sahib on the evening of 13 th August, and told him pretty
frankly everything that had passed between me and Jinnah in Karachi on the
nth. I told him that I had said to Jinnah that as Governor I was of course
bound to carry out loyally such directions as he gave me as Governor-General;
1 See No. 489, para. 28.
2 Dr Khan Sahib’s Ministry was in fact replaced by Abdul Qaiyum’s Ministry on 22 August 1947.
728
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
but that I had to satisfy my own conscience as to any action that I took myself,
and that therefore I had asked to be given a day or two after my ariival in
Peshawar to talk to local leaders and to judge for myself what their attitude
was. I repeated to Khan Sahib what I had said to Jinnah : that the only grounds
on which I considered I would feel justified in dismissing Khan Sahib myself
would be:
(a) if he insisted on declaring that Pathanistan was to be an independent
unit, or
(b) if he could not satisfy me that he meant genuinely to co-operate with the
Pakistan Constitution.
I then said that Jinnah had agreed that I could wait until the 15th August
before sending him my final views.
2. Khan Sahib’s attitude, which emerged only after a great deal of talk, can,
I think, be summarised as follows:
(a) As long as he remains Minister he will do nothing injurious to the
Pakistan Constitution, and that, if the final Constitution decided upon by the
Constituent Assembly was one that he felt he could not support, he would give
up the Ministry.
(b) He has no intention of making any declaration about an independent
Pathanistan.
(c) If Jinnah dismisses his Ministry they would accept that decision and not
give any trouble; when, however, I pressed him on this point, he said that of
course if a Muslim League Ministry were installed in their place there probably
would be trouble. (He seemed to have an idea that something analogous to
Section 93 administration might be imposed until the next General Election).
3. I then told Khan Sahib that I thought I ought to have a talk to Abdul
Qaiyum, as leader of the Opposition, on the 14th, and that I would try to see
Khan Sahib again either on the 14th or the 15th. I decided that it would be
better at this stage not to give him any indication of what I was going to do.
He was in a very friendly frame of mind, and promised that he and the other
Ministers would go to the flag-hoisting ceremony on the 15 th. I asked him
what sort of flag he was going to fly on his house from the 15 th onwards, and
he said that he would pull down his present Congress flag and probably fly
nothing in its place.
11
I saw Abdul Qaiyum on the morning of the 14th. To him, too, I explained,
as I had to Khan Sahib, what had passed between me and Jinnah, and I added
that Jinnah had said that whatever assurance I gave him about Khan Sahib’s
genuineness of intention to co-operate he could not trust it. It seemed probable
AUGUST 1947
729
to me therefore that when I send my report to Jinnah, as I probably would on
the evening of the 15 th, Jinnah would at once take the necessary steps to
dismiss the Congress Ministry and to instal a Muslim League Ministry in their
place. But I said he must say nothing of this to his friends as he must not
not embarrass Jinnah’s decision.
2. Abdul Qaiyum thinks that a great deal of the Congress threat of dis¬
turbance (if they are dismissed) is bluff and he said that if we could show
troops in 3 or 4 of the bad areas there would probably be no serious trouble.
He thought we would probably get away without having to arrest the Red
Shirt leaders. He also talked a good deal of the misdeeds of the Congress
Ministry, their unscrupulous distribution of arms licences, their abuse of
patronage in the matter of supply permits, etc, and their interference with the
law courts. He was certain in his own mind that Congress meant to do their
best to make Pakistan a failure. He promised that if the Muslim League came
into power these abuses would all be shut down with a bang. I think that he
really means this. He said that he thought the sooner the dismissal of the
Congress Ministry was announced the better. I said that I thought that there
was no chance of his hearing anything until the 16th, and that I rather hoped
that it might not be until the 18th, when the roza would be ending and
troops could be moved with less difficulty. I told him that I would probably
see Khan Sahib on the evening of the 15 th, and wire to Jinnah the same
night.
3. Abdul Qaiyum seems to me to have acquired more sense of responsibility
than he was showing 18 months ago. He spoke without any bluster, and I was
generally quite favourably impressed. He told me that he thought his Ministry
would be 3 in number; the other two would be Habibullah Khan of Bannu
(quite a good man) and Abbas Khan of Mansehra (an honest, nice creature, but
rather weak).
G. CUNNINGHAM
Governor, NWFP
482
The Nausab of Bhopal to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
R\3\ 1 1 139: ff 242-4
Q A S R-I-S U L T A N I, BHOPAL, 1 4 August I947, 8.13 pm
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
Please refer to your letter of the nth August 19471 in regard to an extension
of ten days for Bhopal for the signing of the Instrument of Accession.
I am accepting your private advice contained in para. 8 of your letter under
1 No. 435.
730
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
reference, namely that I should sign the Instrument of Accession and Standstill
Agreement as soon as possible (before midnight 14th August 1947) and hand
them to you in a sealed envelope to keep in your personal custody until I have
made up my mind one way or the other.
In accordance with the contents of your letter of the nth August, and the
arrangement arrived at between us at our meeting2 at the Viceroy’s House on
the 1 2th August at 4.30 p.m., I have signed and dated my Instrument of
Accession and Standstill Agreement before midnight August the 14th 1947,
and am sending them, as per agreement between us, in a sealed envelope with
instructions in my own handwriting on the envelope that it shall not be
opened or dehvered to the States’ Department until the evening of the 25th
August 1947, unless I authorise you to deliver it earlier. I shall be grateful if
you will please, as agreed, lock the sealed envelope in your private box and,
in accordance with the undertaking given by you, will not deliver it to the
States’ Department or to any one else before the evening of the 25 th of August,
1947, unless I authorise you to do so earlier. Should I decide not to accede,
Your Excellency will, in accordance with the further undertaking given by you
in your letter of the nth August 1947, return to me any time up to the evening
of 25 th August 1947, the sealed envelope, containing the Instrument of
Accession and Standstill Agreement signed by me and placed in your safe
custody. I note that Sardar Patel has given his consent to these arrangements.
I shall be grateful if a proper acknowledgment and receipt of this letter and the
sealed envelope is kindly given to me by you and handed to the bearer of this
letter.
Complete secrecy shall, as far as humanly possible, be maintained over this
special treatment which my State is being accorded. I note that Sardar Patel
has also agreed equally to maintain secrecy.
As regards my abdication, the situation here is so tense and so highly charged
that if I abdicate at this juncture it will, I now find, lead to most horrible
consequences. The life of a single Hindu or Moslem subject of mine is far more
dear to me than a thousand abdications whatever the reason for the abdication
may be. I have therefore decided not to abdicate at present.3
I will let you know my final decision in regard to the accession of my State
on or before the 25th August, 1947.
I am enclosing in the sealed envelope, which is being sent to you for safe
custody until the 25th August, 1947, copies of the following documents: —
1. Instrument of Accession — signed.
2. Standstill Agreement — signed.
3. Memorandum4 of clarification of Draft Instrument of Instructions as the
result of discussions5 between H.E. the Crown Representative and H.H.
the Ruler of Bhopal on 6th August, 1947, with a copy of the covering
AUGUST 1947
731
letter6 addressed by Sir Zafrulla Khan to Mr. V. P. Menon of the States’
Department.
4. The States’ Department’s reply7 to Sir Zafrulla Khan’s letter confirming
the record of discussion8 between the Viceroy, Mr. Menon and H.H. of
Bhopal and Sir Zafrulla Khan.
5. Your letter dated nth August, 1947, addressed to me.
6. My letter addressed to you dated the 14th August (8.15 p.m.) 1947.
Yours very sincerely,
HAMIDULLAH9
2 Not traced. On 12 August, upon receipt of No. 435 and its Enclosure, the Nawab of Bhopal had written
a personal letter to Lord Mountbatten requesting a brief interview to discuss ‘the abdication part of
your letters’. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Bhopal.
3 The Nawab of Bhopal had also written a personal letter to Lord Mountbatten on 14 August describing
his reception upon arrival in his State from Delhi the previous day. He commented that he had been
greeted at the airfield by a crowd of at least 50,000 Hindus and Muslims ‘all in great excitement and
determined to prevent me from carrying out my intention of voluntarily retiring from the helm of the
State’. Similar scenes awaited him upon arrival at his Palace. Bhopal explained that he had been
‘deeply moved by this demonstration’ and that he had therefore decided, ‘for the present at any rate’,
to shelve the question of his abdication. R/3/1/139: ff 239-41. See also No. 489, para. 47.
4 Not traced. 5 Not traced but cf. Nos. 366 and 385, paras. 7-8.
6 and 7. Not traced. 8 Not traced but cf. No. 426, note 1.
9 Lord Mountbatten acknowledged receipt of this letter and the sealed envelope on 16 August. He added:
‘I am hoping to receive instructions to be allowed to deliver this earlier, since complete secrecy will
not be easy to maintain for the whole of ten days ; and alternatively, of course, I am ready to return it
to you unopened if you so request.’ Mountbatten also stated that he was ‘delighted that you have in
case decided not to abdicate for I know that this is the courageous, wise, and right decision in all the
circumstances’. R/3/1/139: ff 245-6.
483
The Earl of Li stow el to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , L/PO/ io\ 18: J jog
14 August 1947, 4.50 pm 1
No. no. Private. Following personal from Prime Minister.
My warmest thanks to you on this day which sees the successful achievement
of a task of an unexampled difficulty. The continued skill displayed in meeting
every difficulty has been amazing. Your short tenure of the Viceroyalty has
been one of the most memorable in the long list. In this message of thanks I
include Edwina, Ismay and your other helpers.2
1 Time of despatch has been taken from the India Office register of outward telegrams.
2 On 12 August Mr Addis sent a note to Mr Attlee saying that it had been suggested to him that he
(Attlee) might wish to consider sending a short message to the Viceroy to be delivered on 15 August
when his memorable term of office came to an end. Mr Attlee responded with the above message which
is drafted in his own hand. Lord Mountbatten replied on 17 August in tel. 24-EC1 as follows: ‘Thank
you so much for the most encouraging telegram I have ever received and which has given equal pleasure
to Edwina, Ismay and all my staff. My late private secretary Abell left by air yesterday with instructions
to report personally to you and give an account of unprecedented happenings on 15th August.’
PRO. Prem 8/571.
732
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Sir E. Jenkins [Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Telegram , L/P &J/8/66j: f 24
IMMEDIATE LAHORE, 1 4 August 1947> 9-10 Pm
confidential Received in India Office: 15 August , 1.05 am
No. 234 -G. Situation in Lahore City and Amritsar District still most
unsatisfactory. Two trains reported attacked in Rawalpindi area presumably
by Moslems as reprisal for Sikh activities in Central Punjab. Re-arrangement of
personnel as preliminary to partition completed. Situation will now be for new
Governments to deal with.
Repeated to Secretary of State for India.
485
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Telegram , L/P &J/ iof 117: f 108
IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 1 4 August 1947, 10. 13 pm
Received: 15 August , 2.30 am
No. 3408-S. A crisis has arisen over awards of the Boundary Commissions.
I am reporting in full in my weekly report1 the history of events which have
led up to the present situation. In the meantime it is essential that H.M.G.
should be in possession of outline of facts of the case, which are as follows.
2. I personally have scrupulously avoided all connection with Boundary
Commissions, including interpretation of their terms of reference and putting
before them the various points of view forwarded to me.
3. The leaders representing the two future Governments themselves
(a) selected personnel of Commissions, including Radcliffe;2
(b) laid down terms of reference ;3
(c) agreed inclusion of sub-clauses 3(4) and 4(3) of the Indian Independence
Bill which made Chairman’s decision binding ;4
(d) issued a statement5 fiom Partition Council pledging themselves to accept
awards of Commissions whatever these might be: and, as soon as awards
were announced, to enforce them impartially.
4. On nth August Ismay received a verbal message from Liaquat to the
effect that Gurdaspur, or a large portion of it, had been given to East Punjab
AUGUST 1947
733
by Boundary Commission; that it was reported that this was a political decision
and not a judicial one; and that, if it was true, it was a grave injustice which
would amount to a breach of faith on the part of the British.
5. In his answer6 Ismay pointed out that award had not yet been sent in;
and emphasised the points mentioned in paras. 2 and 3 of this telegram.
6. Radcliffe sent in the Bengal award on 12th August. This contained the
allocation of Chittagong Hill Traces to Pakistan and I was warned that there
would be serious reactions amongst Congress leaders at this.
7. O11 13th I received a letter7 from Patel, who had seen a deputation of
Chittagong Hill Tribes and told them that the proposition that Chittagong
Hill Tracts might be included in Pakistan was so monstrous that if it should
happen they would be justified in resisting to utmost of their power and
[ ?could] count on his maximum support in such relations [ ? resistance] . He
adds that any award against weight of local opinion and of terms of reference,
or without any referendum to ascertain will of people concerned must, there¬
fore, be considered a collusive or partisan award and will have to be repudiated.
8. I have taken following action: —
(a) 1 have decided not to publish awards myself;
(b) I have told Governors concerned that new Provinces must carry on on
notional partition boundaries on 15th and until awards are published and
implemented,8
(c) I have arranged a meeting9 of representatives of the two Governments on
the (?work) in order:
(i) to decide upon timing and method of publication and
(ii) to decide method of implementing undertaking of Partition Council to
accept award and to enforce decisions contained in it.
9. My next telegram10 contains a summary of Boundary Commission’s
award.11
1 No. 489, paras. 2-18.
2 See Vol. XI, Nos. 128, 175, Item 2, 207, 317 and 369, para. 11.
3 See ibid.. Nos. 158 and 311, para. 2.
4 See No. 52, Case No. P.C. 26/4/47 and No. 164.
s No. 224. 6 No. 428.
7 No. 452.
8 See No. 446; also No. 453.
9 See No. 454 and its note 2, and No. 472.
10 Not printed. The awards of the Boundary Commissions are printed as Appendices to No. 488.
11 In tel. 579 of 16 August Sir A. Carter asked Sir T. Shone to convey to Lord Ismay a message which
referred to the above telegram from Lord Mountbatten (and the telegraphic summary of the award
which succeeded it) and continued: ‘In view of great importance of this matter could you arrange to
let Shone know privately of any significant developments in this matter up to the time of publication
of the awards, whenever that may be, so that Shone can keep Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations secretly informed of the position.’ L/P &J/10/117: ff 104-5.
734
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
486
Note by Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck
Rhl i/ 171 : ff te-4
SECRET 15 August I947
NOTE ON SITUATION IN PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE AREA
FOR JOINT DEFENCE COUNCIL1
1. I visited Lahore on the 14th August on my way back to Delhi from Karachi
and discussed the situation at length with Sir Evan Jenkins and Major-General
Rees, the Commander of the Punjab Boundary Force.
My conclusions are set out in the following paragraphs and represent my
personal opinion based on my conversations at Lahore and intelligence reports
received in the last week or ten days.
2. Amritsar and vicinity. The strife here was started by the Sikhs who have
formed armed bands of considerable strength which are carrying out raids on
Muslim or preponderantly Muslim villages. Three or four such raids have
been occurring nightly. These bands are well organised and often include
mounted men who are used as scouts to reconnoitre for a favourable
opportunity.
One such band is reliably reported to have killed 200 Muslims in one village
a few days ago. The connivance of subjects of Sikh states is strongly suspected.
There are also Muslim bands organised for the same purpose, but these are
fewer in number, smaller in size and less well organised apparently.
The Army has had some successful encounters with some of these bands and
has caused considerable casualties in some instances where bands have been
caught red handed. The difficulty is always of course to catch the offenders in
the act as lethal weapons can not be used against apparently peaceful villagers
unless these obstruct or themselves attack the troops as has happened in some
cases.
Constant and continuous patrolling is being carried out, but the area is large
and the troops are few in relation to it. There is no remedy foi this, unless the
troops are permanently posted in villages as armed police and this is neither
practicable or desirable.
In Amritsar City the casualties (predominantly Muslim apparently) were
high and largely due to the emasculation of the City Police force by the dis¬
arming by a new Superintendent of Police of the Muslim members of it. This
has since been rectified and the official replaced.2 Several houses were burning
in Amritsar City as I flew over it and four or five villages within ten or fifteen
miles of the City were apparently completely destroyed by fire and still
burning. The Army is occupying the City in some strength.
AUGUST 1947
735
3. Lahore. The aggression here is chiefly by Muslims, said to be in retaliation
for the massacring of Muslims in Amritsar. The most disturbing feature here is
the defection of the Police, particularly the special Police, who are pre¬
dominantly Muslim.1 2 3 There is very strong evidence that the Police are taking
little notice of the orders of their officers (all the remaining European officers
left yesterday) and that they have actually joined hands with the rioters in
certain instances.4
But for the presence of the Army there would by now be a complete
holocaust in the City. Local Muslim leaders are trying to persuade the Muslim
soldiers to follow the bad example of the Police — so far5 without apparent
success.
Muslim League National Guards also appear to be acting in the furtherance
of disorder.6
It is estimated that as many as one tenth of the houses in Lahore City may
have been destroyed by fire, or say about 15% of the total area of the City.
Destruction to this extent was not readily apparent as I flew over the City but
shells of burnt out houses are not always easy to distinguish in a crowded city
like Lahore. A large number of houses were still burning and a thick pall of
smoke hung over the City. There were also many houses on fire in the
neighbouring suburbs and villages. The roads and streets were practically
deserted.
The civilian casualties in the Force Area up to the 13 th were estimated to be
about 1500 killed and wounded, all due to communal strife.7 The troops in
their clashes with riotous mobs are believed to have killed or wounded over
200 Muslims and non-Muslims in the proportion of 1 : 2
In some instances mobs or jathas have resisted the troops and fought back.
The troops have captured mortars, tommy guns and rifles, and the Sikh bands
are some of them armed with light machine guns.
Ex-“I.N.A.” personnel are known to have been involved in the East Punjab
and are said to have been recruited in the Police in the same area.
4. Communications. The usual police arrangements for the protection of the
railways (village chowkidars) have completely broken down and the only
safeguard now is patrolling by troops, but these are too few to provide adequate
protection.8
1 This note formed the basis of Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck’s report to a meeting of the Joint Defence
Council on 16 August. A record of the meeting may be found on R/3/1/171 : ff 66-76. See also Nos. 472,
473 and 489, paras. 19-23.
2 See Nos. 432, para. 1, 437, 459, para. 3 and 460, para. 1.
3 cf. Nos. 448 and 459, para. 4.
4 cf. No. 460, para. 2. 5 Emphasis in original.
7 cf. No. 4 66. 8 cf. No. 448.
6 cf. Nos. 448 and 459, para. 2.
736
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Railway personnel are afraid to leave their houses to go to work, so a break¬
down or at least a severe curtailment of railway services seems inevitable unless
there is an immediate cessation of communal strife. Such a breakdown will
naturally restrict the mobility of the Army and its power to move reserves
rapidly to danger areas and will also largely put a stop to the process of
Reconstitution of the Armed Forces.
5. Boundary Commission . The delay in announcing the award of the
Boundary Commission is having a most disturbing and harmful effect.9 It is
realised of course that the announcement may add fresh fuel to the fire, but
lacking an announcement, the wildest rumours are current, and are being spread
by mischief makers of whom there is no lack.
6. General . The position is thoroughly bad and is getting worse, particularly
as the trouble has now spread to districts Sialkot and Gujranwala, where trains
have been attacked.
Large scale uncontrolled evacuation of Muslims is going on from Amritsar
District.
On morning 15th August train held up three miles from Wazirabad,
casualties estimated 100 killed 200 wounded by stabbing.
Train derailed at Sialkot and attacked by mob of 3000 which was dispersed
by troops opening fire.
Fifteen passengers killed in another train near Wazirabad.
Trains also attacked near Rawalpindi and several killed.10 Train also attacked
outside Lahore — nine killed.
N.W.R. has stopped running trains except Mails, Expresses and Military
Mails. No Goods running as train crews not reporting for duty.
7. Conclusion. Two more brigades (one from India and one from Pakistan)
and one mixed armoured squadron are being sent to reinforce Punjab
Boundary Force,11 but no amount of troops can stop the indiscriminate
butchery which appears to be going on on both sides.
General Rees and his Brigade Commanders are doing all they can and so
far the troops have been completely impartial and extremely well disciplined,
in spite of baseless and mischievous stories to the contrary which are being
spread, in some cases by people in responsible positions. Such stories do the
greatest possible harm and may well result in the troops ceasing to be impartial,
in which event, the situation, bad as it is now, would become truly terrible.
So far as Lahore is concerned, Muslim League leaders are said to claim that
after the 15th August they will be able to control the situation and stop the
butchery and burning now going on. I hope that this is true and that the same
may apply to the East Punjab Districts, because the Army is now stretched to
AUGUST 1947
737
its fullest extent and it is going to be most difficult, if not impossible, to find
any more troops.
C. J. AUCHINLECK
F.M.
g cf. No. 460, para. 3. 10 cf. No. 484.
11 cf. Nos. 382, 437, para. 3 and 473.
487
Minutes 1 of a Meeting between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
and representatives oj India and Pakistan
LfP &JI iof 117: ff 19-22
CONFIDENTIAL
Those present at this Meeting held at Government House , New Delhi , on
16 August 1947 at 5.00 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma ,
Pandit Nehru , Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , Sardar Patel , Mr Fazlur Rahman, Sardar
Baldev Singh; Mr Mohammad Ali, Rao Bahadur, V.P. Menon, Lieutenant-Colonel
Erskine Crum ( Secretariat )
THE AWARDS OF THE BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS
1. The meeting considered the awards2 of the Boundary Commissions, copies
of which had been given to the Ministers after the Joint Defence Council
meeting that morning.
BENGAL
2. pandit nehru said that he had never considered that the allocation of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts to East Bengal was possible under the terms of reference
of the Boundary Commission. Eminent lawyers had confirmed this point of
view. These Tracts were an excluded area, and were not represented in the
Bengal Council. He and his colleagues had given assurances to petty chiefs
from the Chittagong Hill Tracts who had come to see them, that there was
no question of the territory being included in Pakistan. The population of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts, though small (approximately \ million) was 97%
Buddhist and Hindu. There was not the least doubt that the people themselves
would prefer to form part of India. On religious and cultural grounds the
Chittagong Hill Tracts should form part of India. Sir Cyril Radcliffe had had
no business to touch them.
1 In his letter of 19 August to Sir T. Shone, Commander Nicholls explained that he had been asked by
Lord Mountbatten to forward a copy of these minutes and referred to the message from the Common¬
wealth Relations Office (see No. 385, note 11). Shone then forwarded the minutes to Sir A. Carter on
22 August and explained: ‘I am grateful to His Excellency for sending me this paper, but I am sure you
will agree that its contents and the fact that it has been communicated to me and by me to you, should
be treated with the utmost secrecy.’ L/P &J/10/117: ff 18 and 17.
2 See Appendices to No. 488.
738
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
3. the governor general explained die reasons why Sir Cyril Radcliffe
has included die Chittagong Hill Tracts in East Bengal. He emphasized
particularly the economic ties which bound Chittagong District and the Hill
Tracts together. He stressed the importance to Chittagong Port of the proper
supervision of the Karnaphuli River, which ran through the Hill Tracts.
4. mr. fazlur rahman gave his opinion that the Chittagong Hill Tracts
could not exist if separated from Chittagong District. In his view, the
allocation of these Tracts to East Bengal was unquestionably permissible under
the terms of reference. In fact the “contiguity” clause of the terms of reference
would not have permitted their allocation to West Bengal.
5. the governor general said that it had been Sir Frederick Burrows’
view that the whole economy of the Chittagong Hill Tracts would be upset if
they were not left with East Bengal. However, he had confirmed that
Sir Frederick had not expressed any view on this matter to Sir Cyril Radcliffe,
so he could not be said to have influenced the decision.
6. the governor general suggested the possibility of a compromise
whereby the upper waters of the Karnaphuli would be protected through the
allocation of a strip of territory on either side of the river to East Bengal, while
the administration of the rest of the Hill Tracts would be undertaken by India.
7. This was not considered a satisfactory solution by either party, pandit
nehru’s view was that India should undertake the administration of the whole
territory ; a strip on either side of the river allocated to Pakistan would cut the
territory in two. If the Chittagong Hill Tracts were given to India, an agree¬
ment between the two Dominion Governments, whereby Pakistan would
obtain all desired facilities, could well be made.
8. mr. liaquat ali khan said that he could not consider any suggestion
of an adjustment in this territory alone. The awards of both Commissions must
be looked at as a whole. If this was done, it would be found that Sir Cyril
Radcliffe had completely ignored the fundamental basis of his terms of
reference. Moreover, the Chittagong Hill Tracts were the only source of
hydro-electric power in East Bengal.
9. the governor general then suggested that the two Governments
might agree on an exchange of territory, whereby the Chittagong Hill Tracts
would go to India and some predominantly Muslim area which had been
allotted by the Commission to India would go to Pakistan.
10. mr. liaquat ali khan emphasized that the awards of the Com¬
missions, taken as a whole, had been so unfavourable to Pakistan, that he
could not consider any minor modification only, such as had been suggested.
AUGUST 1947
739
11. mr. fazlur rahman protested, strongly against the allocation of the
Districts of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri to India. In his view, Sir Cyril Radcliffe
had violated the basic principle of his terms of reference in making this decision.
PUNJAB
12. pandit nehru said that he considered that the award of the Boundary
Commission in the Punjab was likely to have a bad effect among the Sikhs,
who presented a particularly difficult problem.
13. sardarbaldev singh also considered that the reaction to the award
would be very unfavourable on the Sikh mind.
14. mr. liaquat ali khan said that it would have a similarly unfavour¬
able reaction among the Muslims He emphasized that he, as Prime Minister of
Pakistan, considered it his duty to stand up for the rights of the Sikhs in West
Punjab as much as the India leaders stood up for their rights in East Punjab.
He emphasized that complete religious freedom would be allowed.
15. sardar patels view was that the only solution to the Punjab award
was a transfer of population on a large scale.
16. the governor general said that he had spoken to Mr. Jinnah about
Nankana Sahib. Mr. Jinnah had stated that he had it in mind to give the Sikhs
any religious assurances that were required in connection with their Gurdwara
there. The governor general suggested that a specific statement on
Nankana Sahib might be made by the Pakistan Government at the same time
as the issue of the Boundary Commission award
17 mr liaquat ali khan said that he understood that it was Sir Francis
Mudie’s view that the Punjab Boundary Force should be separated and be put
under the control of the two Governments rather than under joint control. It
was agreed that this suggestion should be considered at the meeting at Ambala
the following day.
18. pandit nehru suggested that he and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan should also
visit Lahore and Amritsar the following day, and this was agreed.
19. pandit nehru said that he had received particularly alarming reports
from Lahore, where many hundreds of Sikhs and Hindus were gathered
together in relief camps without proper protection and without rations, mr.
liaquat ali khan undertook to get into touch with the Prime Minister
of West Punjab and ask him to ensure that full measures were taken for the
protection of refugees. He further suggested that the Punjab Boundary Force
should be asked to assist in the evacuation of refugees.
THE PUBLICATION OF THE AWARDS
20. mr. liaquat ali khan said that lie was opposed to any suggestion
740
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
that adjustments between representatives of the two Governments should be
made at the present meeting. He considered that the awards of the Boundary
Commission should be published as they stood.
21. the governor general suggested that in the communique stating
that the awards had been considered by the Prime Ministers, it might be stated
that they had come to the conclusion that there were certain unsatisfactory
features which they proposed to take up forthwith on a governmental level.
mr. liaquat ali khan was opposed to this suggestion. He considered, and
it was agreed, that the communique should only make mention of the fact of
the meeting, and not draw attention to any dissatisfaction, nor to any proposals
for the transfer of population.
22. pandit nehru finally emphasized that he and his colleagues felt
themselves to be in a moral impasse about the Chittagong Hill Tracts, because,
throughout the previous two or three months, they had given countless
assurances to the representatives of that territory that it could not be included
in Pakistan. Furthermore, this action had been taken after consultation with
lawyers.
23 . It was agreed that the Governor General should issue the awards in the
form of a Gazette Extraordinary the following day, and that copies of the
awards should be sent immediately to the Governors of East and West Bengal
and East and West Punjab.
24. It was further agreed that a draft communique3 handed round at the
meeting should be issued that night, subject to certain amendments which
were made.
VISITS OF MINISTERS OF ONE DOMINION TO THE OTHER DOMINION
25. mr. liaquat ali khan suggested that instructions should be issued
to all officials to the effect that when Ministers of one Dominion wished to visit
the other Dominion, full information of their intentions should be given to
all concerned. With this Pandit Nehru agreed.
3 Not printed.
488
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary of State
PRIVATE AND TOP SECRET 1 6 August lp 47
My dear Listowel,
Thank your for your last weekly letter, dated 9th August.1 Although I under-
AUGUST 1947
741
stand you will have relinquished office as Secretary of State officially on the
15th August, I am addressing this last letter to you in order that you may
decide how the various outstanding points may be dealt with.
2. You asked in paragraph 10 of your letter of 25th July2 that I should use
my influence to persuade the Central and Provincial Governments to reconsider
their attitude on the question of applying the Pensions (Increase) Act 1947 to
pensioners of Indian Services in the U.K.
3. I spoke to Rajagopalachari, while he was still Finance Member, and to
Liaquat Ali Khan,3 but I am afraid it is doubtful whether they will agree as
there is a good deal of feeling against increasing liabilities by way of pensions,
etc. in any form. The matter will, however, be carefully examined.
4. I am sorry that Nehru made his rather embarrassing request to allow
Sir N. R. Pillai, Mr K. P. S. Menon and Mr. K. K. Chettur to receive certain
Peruvian Orders without letting me know. After I received your telegram of
26th July,4 however, I made enquiries and found that Nehru himself was by
no means happy about the telegram which had gone to you. A letter from my
Secretary to the Department, pointing out that the grant of restricted permission
to receive these Orders would be at variance with the practice followed by
His Majesty’s Government, and that it might be difficult to explain to His
Majesty why Indian officials should be permitted to accept Orders from a
foreign Head of State while declining to accept them from him, gave Nehru
the opportunity he needed to withdraw the request. I understand that con¬
siderable pressure had been put upon Nehru to make the original request and
he was glad of an excuse to withdraw it.
5. In my last weekly report5 (paragraph 43) I stated that I was sending to
Mr. Jinnah a bowdlerized version of a paper, prepared by General Messervy,
on the problems facing the Pakistan Army. In fact, I later discovered that
General Messervy himself had sent Mr. Jinnah a copy of his own paper; and
so my version was never despatched.
6. Thank you for the memorandum on the North-West Tribal Area and
Afghanistan which you sent with your letter of August 1st.6 I discussed it with
Cunningham on his way to Peshawar. We agreed that the present is not an
appropriate time for me to open this matter with the Political Leaders.
7. There is nothing in the Frontier situation which made it necessary for me
to speak of it before the 15th August, particularly since Mr. Jinnah made it
clear in a statement to the Press on the 31st July7 that tribal allowances, etc.,
1 No. 402. 2 No. 231.
3 No record of these discussions has been traced but cf. No. 322.
4 Not traced.
5 No. 385. 6 No. 310.
7 See Nos. 336 and 349. The date of the statement should be 30 July.
742
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
will be continued after the 15th August until the Pakistan Government can
negotiate new agreements with the Tribes, and that control in the Political
Agencies would be continued as at present.
8. I am sure it is necessary that the new Governments in Pakistan and India
should start to function, and begin to feel the impact of events before they
can shape their foreign policy.
9. Opportunity will undoubtedly occur in the next few months for consul¬
tation between the Pakistan Government and Afghanistan and also H.M.G’s
representatives, about the Frontier policy.8 At the moment the Government
of India are disinclined to own to any interest in the Frontier, and
disclaim any responsibility for its affairs or defence.9 This attitude will, I hope,
mellow as time goes on, and 1 trust that India, and more particularly, Pakistan,
will come to appreciate the need for a common policy in this region, and will
welcome the interest and support of FI.M.G. in carrying it out. I would suggest
that background should be given to both the U.K. High Commissioners and
they be instructed to pursue the matter as opportunity offers in the next few
months.
10. The communique10 on the negotiations between Kalat and Pakistan,
a draft of which I attached to my last letter,11 was published on nth August
with the following amendments. Paragraph 1 should read: —
“The Government of Pakistan recognises Kalat as an independent sovereign
State in treaty relations with the British Government, with a status different
from that of Indian States.”
In paragraph 2, the words “treaties and” should be omitted.
11. I have referred, in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the attached Report,12 to the
awards of the Boundary Commissions. I do not, however, think that these
would be of sufficient interest to all the recipients of the “V.P.R.”. I am,
therefore, sending you copies of these awards as Appendices 1, II, and III to this
letter.
12. In paragraph 41 of my last Personal Report13 I mentioned that Ismay
had made a statement to the Joint Defence Council about his conversations
with the Chiefs of Staff in England, and it occurs to me that the Chiefs of
Staff might wish to know what he said. I therefore enclose14 (at Appendix IV)
a copy of the notes from which he spoke. You will see that, in agreement
with me, he dealt with the subject on very general lines and made no mention
of Naval or Air Bases, etc. It would have been a mistake to do [so] at this
stage, since it would have merely frightened them off. Even as it was, the
Indian Leaders did not look too happy about the future prospects, and would
not commit themselves further than to say that they would examine Ismay’s
statement carefully and then let us have their reactions.
AUGUST 1947
743
13. I am all in favour of the Chiefs of Staff’s Mission coming as soon as
possible, but I do not want them to come before the two new Governments
have got over their teething troubles, have got their Defence Departments
more or less organised, and have begun to know and trust their British
Commander s-in-Chief. As a rough guess, I should say that a suitable target for
the delegation to arrive would be about the middle of October : but I will, of
course, send a firm recommendation in due course.15
14. I have asked Pandit Nehru’s concurrence to proceed home for about
a fortnight (from about ioth-24th November) to attend the wedding of
Princess Elizabeth and my nephew.
15. I was very touched by your kind farewell telegram16 and deeply
appreciated the very generous remarks that you made. Abell, my late P.S.V.,
left today by air and I asked him to go and see you and give you an account
of the perfectly amazing scenes which occurred on the 15th August,17 and
which I feel demonstrate the real good feelings that now exist between the
British and the Indians.
16. I realise that during these last few weeks we have had to take the bit
between our teeth. It is almost impossible to describe the atmosphere in which
we have been living or the strain to which everyone has been subjected. Of the
six British members of the “operational staff” I brought out with me, four
have been in bed recently for longer or shorter periods under the doctor’s
care. Mieville has been quite seriously ill with thrombosis; Ismay is still in bed
with a very bad go of dysentery; my two “personal” (Navy) secretaries, who
now become my “private” secretaries, have both been in bed, the senior one,
Brockman, having had a relapse through trying to get back to work too
quickly.
17. It is impossible to over-estimate the value which George Abell and his
gallant “P.S.V.” team (John Christie, Ian Scott and Peter Scott) have been to
the “U.K.” team. They had every reason for their noses to be put out of joint
by the new set up, but they played up 100 per cent, and without them we could
never have achieved the success which has come our way.
18. Before coming out I asked for a generous allowance of honours and
I had at the back of my mind that if we made a success of this job I would like
8 See Nos. 309 and 310. 9 cf. No. 429.
10 See Appendix ‘A’ to No. 330 for the original draft and Nos. 351, 360, 375 and 396 for correspondence
on subsequent amendments.
II See No. 384, para. 2. 12 No. 489.
13 No. 385.
14 Not printed; see No. 352, Case No. J.D.C. 47/7/47.
15 cf. No. 443. For the outcome of the proposed mission by the Chiefs of Staff, see L/WS/1/1046-7. See
also H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan, London 1969, pp. 513-6.
16 No. 480. 17 See No. 489, paras. 62-73.
744
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
every member of my small team to receive recognition. Now that I myself
(to my very great surprise) have received an Earldom,18 I feel it is all the more
important that this recognition should be given to my staff. I will be sending
in their names in the ordinary way for the Honours List, but I hope that you
will be able to leave a note to the appropriate authorities that no one on my
special list shall be turned down.
19. Old members of the I.C.S. out here say that never at any time has the
India Office been quite so helpful, quite so quick and quite so valuable as
during the last few weeks. I certainly could not have wished for any better
support.
Again all my most sincere and heartfelt thanks.
Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA
Appendix 1 to No. 488
LIP&JI10/117: ff 30-39
NEW DELHI, 12 August 1947
REPORT
To:—
His Excellency the Governor-General.
1. I have the honour to present the decision and award of the Punjab
Boundary Commission which, by virtue of section 4 of the Indian Independence
Act, 1947, is represented by my decision as Chairman of that Commission.
2. The Punjab Boundary Commission was constituted by the announcement
of the Governor-General dated the 30th of June 1947, Reference No.
D50/7/47R. The members of the Commission thereby appointed were
Mr. Justice Din Muhammad,
Mr. Justice Muhammad Munir,
Mr. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, and
Mr. Justice Teja Singh.
I was subsequently appointed Chairman of this Commission.
3 . The terms of reference of the Commission, as set out in the announcemen t,
were as follows : —
“The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of
the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority
areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into account
AUGUST 1947
745
other factors.” We were desired to arrive at a decision as soon as possible
before the 15th of August.
4. After preliminary meetings, the Commission invited the submission of
memoranda and representations by interested parties. Numerous memoranda
and representations were received.
5. The public sittings of the Commission took place at Lahore, and
extended from Monday the 21st of July 1947, to Thursday the 31st of July
1947, inclusive, with the exception of Sunday, the 27th of July. The main
arguments were conducted by counsel on behalf of the Indian National
Congress, the Muslim League, and the Sikh members of the Punjab
Legislative Assembly: but a number of other interested parties appeared and
argued before the Commission. In view of the fact that I was acting also as
Chairman of the Bengal Boundary Commission, whose proceedings were
taking place simultaneously with the proceedings of the Punjab Boundary
Commission, I did not attend the public sittings in person, but made arrange¬
ments to study daily the record of the proceedings and of all material sub¬
mitted for our consideration.
6. After the close of the public sittings, the Commission adjourned to
Simla where I joined my colleagues, and we entered upon discussions in the
hope of being able to present an agreed decision as to the demarcation of the
boundaries. I am greatly indebted to my colleagues for indispensable assistance
in the clarification of the issues and the marshalling of the arguments for
different views, but it became evident in the course of our discussions that the
divergence of opinion between my colleagues was so wide that an agreed
solution of the boundary problem was not to be obtained. I do not intend to
convey by this that there were not large areas of the Punjab on the west and on
the east respectively which provoked no controversy as to which State they
should be assigned to; but when it came to the extensive but disputed areas in
which the boundary must be drawn, differences of opinion as to the sig¬
nificance of the term “other factors”, which we were directed by our terms of
reference to take into account, and as to the weight and value to be attached
to those factors, made it impossible to arrive at any agreed line.19 In those
circumstances my colleagues, at the close of our discussions, assented to the
conclusion that I must proceed to give my own decision.
7. This I now proceed to do. The demarcation of the boundary line is
described in detail in the schedule which forms Annexure A to this award, and
18 See No. 300.
19 The Reports by the Members of the Punjab Boundary Commission may be consulted at the I.O. L.R.
on a microfilm of Partition Proceedings supplied by the National Documentation Centre, Pakistan.
IOR Pos. 3658.
746
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
in the map attached thereto, Amiexure B.20 The map is annexed for purposes
of illustration, and if there should be any divergence between the boundary
as described in Annexure A and as delineated on the map in Annexure B, the
description in Annexure A is to prevail.
8. Certain representations were addressed to the Commission on behalf of
the States of Bikaner and Bahawalpur, both of which States were interested in
canals whose headworks were situate in the Punjab Province. I have taken the
view that an interest of this sort can not weigh directly in the question before
us as to the division of the Punjab between the Indian Union and Pakistan since
the territorial division of the province does not affect rights of private pro¬
perty, and I think that I am entitled to assume with confidence that any agree¬
ments that either of those States has made with the Provincial Government as to
the sharing of water from these canals or otherwise will be respected by what¬
ever Government hereafter assumes jurisdiction over the headworks concerned.
I wish also to make it plain that no decision that is made by this Commission
is intended to affect whatever territorial claim the State of Bahawalpur may
have in respect of a number of villages lying between Sulemanke Weir
and Gurka Ferry.
9. The task of delimiting a boundary in the Punjab is a difficult one. The
claims of the respective parties ranged over a wide field of territory, but in my
judgment the truly debatable ground in the end proved to lie in and around
the area between the Beas and Sutlej rivers on the one hand, and the river Ravi
on the other. The fixing of a boundary in this area was further complicated by
the existence of canal systems, so vital to the life of the Punjab but developed
only under the conception of a single administration, and of systems of road
and rail communication, which have been planned in the same way. There was
also the stubborn geographical fact of the respective situations of Lahore and
Amritsar, and the claims to each or both of those cities which each side vigor¬
ously maintained. After weighing to the best of my ability such other factors
as appeared to be relevant as affecting the fundamental basis of contiguous
majority areas, 1 have come to the decision set out in the Schedule which thus
becomes the award of the Commission. I am conscious that there are legitimate
criticisms to be made of it: as there are, I think, of any other line that might be
chosen.
10. I have hesitated long over those not inconsiderable areas east of the
Sutlej River and in the angle of the Beas and Sutlej Rivers in which Muslim
majorities are found. But on the whole I have come to the conclusion that it
would be in the true interests of neither State to extend the territories of the
West Punjab to a strip on the far side of the Sutlej and that there are factors
such as the disruption of railway communications and water systems that
AUGUST 1947
747
ought in this instance to displace the primary claims of contiguous majorities.
But I must call attention to the fact that the Dipalpur Canal, which serves
areas in the West Punjab, takes oft from the Ferozepore headworks and I find
it difficult to envisage a satisfactory demarcation of boundary at this point
that is not accompanied by some arrangement for joint control of the intake
of the different canals dependent on these headworks.
11. I have not found it possible to preserve undivided the irrigation system
of the Upper Bari Doab Canal, which extends from Madhopur in the
Pathankot Tahsil to the western border of the district of Lahore, although I
have made small adjustments of the Lahore-Amritsar district boundary to
mitigate some of the consequences of this severance ; nor can I see any means of
preserving under one territorial jurisdiction the Mandi Flydro-electric Scheme
which supplies power in the districts of Kangra, Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Lahore,
Jullundur, Ludhiana, Ferozepore, Sheikhupura, and Lyallpur. I think it only
right to express the hope that, where the drawing of a boundary line cannot
avoid disrupting such unitary services as canal irrigation, railways, and electric
power transmission, a solution may be found by agreement between the two
States for some joint control of what has hitherto been a valuable common
service.
12. I am conscious too that the award cannot go far towards satisfying
sentiments and aspirations deeply held on either side but directly in conflict as
to their bearing on the placing of the boundary. If means are to be found to
gratify to the full those sentiments and aspirations, I think that they must be
found in political arrangements with which I am not concerned, and not in the
decision of a boundary line drawn under the terms of reference of this
Commission.
CYRIL RADCLIFFE
Annexure A to Appendix 1
1. The boundary between the East and West Punjab shall commence on
the north at the point where the west branch of the Ujh river enters the
Punjab Province from the State of Kashmir. The boundary shall follow the
line of that river down the western boundary of the Pathankot Tahsil to
the point where the Pathankot, Shakargarh and Gurdaspur tahsils meet. The
tahsil boundary and not the actual course of the Ujh river shall constitute the
boundary between the East and West Punjab.
20 The original maps attached to the reports of the Boundary Commission have not been traced. The
Boundary Commission maps reproduced at the end of this Volume have been taken from the Report
on the Last Viceroyalty, 22 March-15 August, 1947, copies of which may be found on L/P&J/5/396,
which was written by Earl Mountbatten and is dated September 1948. These maps are reproduced
with the permission of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Research Department which was
responsible for their production. It should be noted that in each of his awards Sir C. Radcliffe stated
that in the event of any divergence between the boundaries as described in the annexures and as
delineated on the maps, the descriptions in the annexures were to prevail, cf. also No. 377, note 1.
748
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
2. From the point of meeting of the three tahsils above mentioned, the
boundary between the East and West Punjab shall follow the line of the Ujh
river to its junction with the river Ravi and thereafter the line of the river
Ravi along the boundary between the tahsils of Gurdaspur and Shakargarh,
the boundary between the tahsils of Batala and Shakargarh, the boundary
between the tashsils of Batala and Narowal, the boundary between the tahsils
of Ajnala and Narowal, and the boundary between the tahsils of Ajnala and
Shadara, to the point on the river Ravi wdiere the district of Amritsar is
divided from the district of Lahore. The tahsil boundaries referred to, and not
the actual course of the river Ujh or the river Ravi, shall constitute the
boundary between the East and West Punjab.
3 . From the point on the river Ravi where the district of Amritsar is divided
from the district of Lahore, the boundary between the East and West Punjab
shall turn southwards following the boundary between the tahsils of Ajnala
and Lahore and then the tahsils of Tam Taran and Lahore, to the point where
the tahsils of Kasur, Lahore and Taran Taran meet. The line will then turn
south-westward along the boundary between the tahsils of Lahore and Kasur
to the point where that boundary meets the north-east corner of village Theh
jharolian. It will then run along the eastern boundary of that village to its
junction with village Chathianwala, turn along the northern boundary of that
village, and then run down its eastern boundary to its junction with village
Waigal. It will then run along the eastern boundary of village Waigal to its
junction with village Kalia, and then along the southern boundary of village
Waigal to its junction with village Panhuwan. The line will then run down the
eastern boundary of village Panhuwan to its junction with village Gaddoke.
The line will then run down the eastern border of village Gaddoke to its
junction with village Nurwala. It will then turn along the southern boundary
of village Gaddoke to its junction with village Katluni Kalan. The line will then
run down the eastern boundary of village Katluni Kalan to its junction with
villages Kals and Mastgarh. It will then run along the southern boundary of
village Katluni Kalan to the north-west corner of village Kals. It will then run
along the western boundary of village Kals to its junction with village Kliem
Karan. The line will then run along the western and southern boundaries of
village Khem Karan to its junction with village Maewala. It will then run
down the western and southern boundaries of village Maewala, proceeding
eastward along the boundaries between village Mahaidepur on the north and
villages Sheikhupura Kuhna, Kamalpuran, Fatehwala and Mahewala. The line
will the turn northward along the western boundary of village Sahjra to its
junction with villages Mahaidepur and Machhike. It will then turn north¬
eastward along the boundaries between villages Machhike and Sahjra and then
proceed along the boundary between villages Rattoke and Sahjra to the
AUGUST 1947
749
junction between villages Rattoke, Sahjra and Mabbuke. The line will then
run north-east between the villages Rattoke and Mabbuke to the junction of
villages Rattoke, Mabbuke, and Gajjal. From that point the line will run along
the boundary between villages Mabbuke and Gajjal, and then turn south along
the eastern boundary of village Mabbuke to its junction with village Nagar
Aimanpur. It will then turn along the north-eastern boundary of village
Nagar Aimanpur, and run along its eastern boundary to its junction with
village Masteke. From there it will run along the eastern boundary of village
Masteke to where it meets the boundary between the tahsils of Kasur and
Ferozepore.
For the purpose of identifying the villages referred to in this paragraph, I
attach a map21 of the Kasur tahsil authorized by the then Settlement Officer,
Lahore District, which was supplied to the Commission by the Provincial
Government,
4. The line will then run in a south-westerly direction down the Sutlej
River on the boundary between the Districts of Lahore and Ferozepore to the
point where the districts of Ferozepore, Lahore and Montgomery meet. It
will continue along the boundary between the districts of Ferozepore and
Montgomery to the point where this boundary meets the border of Bahawalpur
State. The district boundaries, and not the actual course of the Sutlej River,
shall in each case constitute the boundary between the East and West Punjab.
5. It is my intention that this boundary line should ensure that the canal
headworks at Sulemanke will fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the
West Punjab. If the existing delimitation of the boundaries of Montgomery
District does not ensure this, I award to the West Puniab so much of the
territory concerned as covers the headworks, and the boundary shall be
adjusted accordingly.
6. So much of the Punjab Province as lies to the west of the line demarcated
in the preceding paragraphs shall be the territory of the West Punjab. So much
of the territory of the Punjab Province as lies to the east of that line shall be
the territory of the East Punjab.
Appendix II to No. 488
LlP&J/io/ii7:ff 40-47
NEW DELHI, 12 August I947
REPORT
To:—
Elis Excellency the Governor-General.
1. I have the honour to present the decision and award of the Bengal Boundary
21 A photostat of this map may be found in an envelope at the back of L/P &J/10/117. Sir C. Radcliffe
signed the map in the following manner: ‘Attached to my Report d. 12 August 1947 for reference.
Cyril Radcliffe. Chairman, Punjab Boundary Commission.’
750
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Commission, which, by virtue of section 3 of the Indian Independence Act,
1947, is represented by my decision as Chairman of that Commission. This
award relates to the division of the Province of Bengal, and the Commission s
award in respect of the District of Sylhet and areas adjoining thereto will be
recorded in a separate report.
2. The Bengal Boundary Commission was constituted by the announcement
of the Governor-General dated the 30th of June, 1947, Reference No.
D50/7/47R. The members of the Commission thereby appointed were
Mr. Justice Bijan Kuman Mukherjea,
Mr. Justice C. C. Biswas,
Mr Justice Abu Saleh Mohamed Akram, and
Mr. Justice S. A. Rahman.
I was subsequently appointed Chairman of this Commission.
3 . The terms of reference of the Commission, as set out in the announcement,
were as follows : —
“The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of
the two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous [majority]
areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into account
other factors.”
We were desired to arrive at a decision as soon as possible before the
15 th of August.
4. After preliminary meetings, the Commission invited the submission of
memoranda and representations by interested parties. A very large number of
memoranda and representations was received.
5. The public sittings of the Commission took place at Calcutta, and
extended from Wednesday the 16th of July 1947, to Thursday the 24th of
July 1947, inclusive, with the exception of Sunday, the 20th of July. Arguments
were presented to the Commission by numerous parties on both sides, but the
main cases were presented by counsel on behalf of the Indian National Congress,
the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha and the New Bengal Association on
the one hand, and on behalf of the Muslim League on the other. In view of the
fact that 1 was acting also as Chairman of the Punjab Boundary Commission,
whose proceedings were taking place simultaneously with the proceedings of
the Bengal Boundary Commission, I did not attend the public sittings in
person, but made arrangements to study daily the record of the proceedings
and all material submitted for our consideration.
6. After the close of the public sittings, the remainder of the time of the
Commission was devoted to clarification and discussion of the issues involved.
Our discussions took place at Calcutta.
AUGUST 1947
751
7. The question of drawing a satisfactory boundary line under our terms of
reference between East and West Bengal was one to which the parties
concerned propounded the most diverse solutions. The province offers few,
if any, satisfactory natural boundaries, and its development has been on lines
that do not well accord with a division by contiguous majority areas of
Muslim and non-Muslim majorities.
8. In my view, the demarcation of a boundary line between East and West
Bengal depended on the answers to be given to certain basic questions which
may be stated as follows : —
(1) To which State was the City of Calcutta to be assigned, or was it
possible to adopt any method of dividing the City between the two States?
(2) If the City of Calcutta must be assigned as a whole to one or other of the
States, what were its indispensable claims to the control of territory, such as
all or part of the Nadia River system or the Kulti rivers, upon which the life
of Calcutta as a city and port depended ?
(3) Could the attractions of the Ganges-Padma-Madhumati river line dis¬
place the strong claims of the heavy concentration of Muslim majorities in the
districts of Jessore and Nadia without doing too great a violence to the principle
of our terms of reference ?
(4) Could the district of Khulna usefully be held by a State different from
that which held the district of Jessore?
(5) Was it right to assign to Eastern Bengal the considerable block of non-
Muslim majorities in the districts of Malda and Dinajpur?
(6) Which State’s claim ought to prevail in respect of the Districts of
Darj eeling and Jalpaiguri, in which the Muslim population amounted to
2-42 per cent of the whole in the case of Darjeeling, and to 23*08 per cent of the
whole in the case of Jalpaiguri, but which constituted an area not in any
natural sense contiguous to another non-Muslim area of Bengal ?
(7) To which State should the Chittagong Hill Tracts be assigned, an area
in which the Muslim population was only 3 per cent of the whole, but which
it was difficult to assign to a State different from that which controlled the
district of Chittagong itself ?
9. After much discussion, my colleagues found that they were unable to
arrive at an agreed view on any of these major issues.22 There were of course
considerable areas of the Province in the south-west and north-east and east,
which provoked no controversy on either side: but, in the absence of any
22 The Reports by the Members of the Bengal Boundary Commission may be consulted at the I.O.L.R.
on a microfilm of Partition Proceedings supplied by the National Documentation Centre, Pakistan.
IOR Pos. 3658.
752
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
reconciliation on all main questions affecting the drawing of the boundary
itself, my colleagues assented to the view at the close of our discussions that I
had no alternative but to proceed to give my own decision.
io. This I now proceed to do : but I should like at the same time to express
my gratitude to my colleagues for their indispensable assistance in clarifying
and discussing the difficult questions involved. The demarcation of the
boundary line is described in detail in the schedule which forms Annexure A
to this award, and in the map attached thereto, Annexure B. The map is
annexed for purposes of illustration, and if there should be any divergence
between the boundary as described in Annexure A and as delineated on the
map in Amiexure B,23 the description in Annexure A is to prevail.
n. I have done what I can in drawing the line to eliminate any avoidable
cutting of railway communications and of river systems, which are of
importance to the life of the province: but it is quite impossible to draw a
boundary under our terms of reference without causing some interruption of
this sort, and I can only express the hope that arrangements can be made and
maintained between the two States that will minimize the consequences of
this interruption as far as possible.
CYRIL RADCLIFFE
Annexure A to Appendix II
i. A line shall be drawn along the boundary between the Thana of
Phansidewa in the District of Darjeeling and the Thana Tetulia in the District
of Jalpaiguri from the point where that boundary meets the Province of Bihar
and then along the boundary between the Thanas of Tetulia and Rajganj; the
Thanas of Pachagar and Rajganj, and the Thanas of Pachagar and Jalpaiguri,
and shall then continue along the no them corner of the Thana Debiganj to
the boundary of the State of Cooch-Behar. The District of Darjeeling and so
much of the District of jalpaiguri as lies north of this line shall belong to
West Bengal, but the Thana of Patgram and any other portion of Jalpaiguri
District which lies to the east or south shall belong to East Bengal.
2. A line shall then be drawn from the point where the boundary between
the Thanas of Haripur and Raiganj in the District of Dinajpur meets the
border of the Province of Bihar to the point where the boundary between the
Districts of 24 Parganas and Khulna meets the Bay of Bengal. This line shall
follow the course indicated in the following paragraphs. So much of the
Province of Bengal as lies to the west of it shall belong to West Bengal.
Subject to what has been provided in paragraph 1 above with regard to the
Districts of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri, the remainder of the Province of Bengal
shall belong to East Bengal.
AUGUST 1947
753
3. The line shall run along the boundary between the following Thanas:
Haripur and Raiganj; Haripur and Hemtabad; Ranisankail and Hemtabad;
Pirganj and Hemtabad; Pirganj and Kaliganj; Bochaganj and Kaliganj; Biral
and Kabganj; Biral and Kushmundi; Biral and Gangarampur; Dinajpur and
Gangarampur; Dinajpur and Kumarganj; Chirirbandar and Kumarganj;
Phulbari and Kumarganj; Phulbari and Balurghat. It shall teiminate at the
point where the boundary between Phulbari and Balurghat meets the north-
south line of the Bengal-Assam Railway in the eastern corner of the Thana of
Balurghat. The line shall turn down the western edge of the railway lands
belonging to that railway and follow that edge until it meets the boundary
between the Thanas of Balurghat and Panchbibi.
4. From that point the line shall run along the boundary between the
following Thanas:
Balurghat and Panchbibi; Balurghat and Joypurhat; Balurghat and
Dhamairhat; Tapan and Dhamairhat, Tapan and Patnitala; Tapan and Porsha;
Bamangola and Porsha; Habibpur and Porsha; Habibpur and Gomastapur;
Habibpur and Bholahat; Malda and Bholahat; English Bazar and Bholahat;
English Bazar and Shibganj ; Kaliachak and Shibganj ; to the point where the
boundary between the two last mentioned thanas meets the boundary between
the districts of Malda and Murshidabad on the river Ganges.
5. The line shall then turn south-east down the River Ganges along the
boundary between the Districts of Malda and Murshidabad; Rajshahi and
Murshidabad; Rajshahi and Nadia; to the point in the north-western corner of
the District of Nadia where the channel of the River Mathabanga takes off
from the River Ganges. The district boundaries, and not the actual course of the
River Ganges, shall constitute the boundary between East and West Bengal.
6. From the point on the River Ganges where the channel of the River
Mathabanga takes off, the line shall run along that channel to the northern¬
most point where it meets the boundary between the Thanas of Daulatpur and
Karimpur. The middle line of the main channel shall constitute the actual
boundary.
7. From this point the boundary between East and West Bengal shall run
along the boundaries between the Thanas of Daulatpur and Karimpur;
Gangani and Karimpur; Meherpur and Karimpur; Meherpur and Tehatta;
Meherpur and Chapra; Damurhuda and Chapra; Damurhuda and Krishna-
ganj ; Chuadanga and Krishnagani ; Jibannagar and Krishnaganj ; Jibannagar
and Hanskhali ; Maheshpur and Hanskhali; Maheshpur and Ranaghat;
Maheshpur and Bongaon; Jhikargacha and Bongaon; Sarsa and Bongaon;
Sarsa and Gaighata; Gaighata and Kalaroa; to the point where the boundary
23 See above, note 20.
754
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
between those thanas meets the boundary between the districts of Khulna and
24 Parganas.
8. The line shall then run southwards along the boundary between the
Districts of Khulna and 24 Parganas, to the point where that boundary meets
the Bay of Bengal.
Appendix III to No. 488
LIP&JI10I117: ff 48-52
NEW DELHI, 15 August 1Q47
REPORT
To: —
His Excellency the Governor General.
1. I have the honour to present the report of the Bengal Boundary Com¬
mission relating to Sylhet District and the adjoining districts of Assam. By
virtue of Section 3 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the decisions con¬
tained in this report become the decision and award of the Commission.
2. The Bengal Boundary Commission was constituted as stated in my
report dated the 12th of August 1947 with regard to the division of the
Province of Bengal into East and West Bengal. Our terms of reference were
as follows:—
“The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of
the two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority
areas of Mushms and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into
account other factors.
In the event of the referendum in the District of Sylhet resulting in favour
of amalgamation with Eastern Bengal, the Boundary Commission will also
demarcate the Muslim majority areas of Sylhet District and the contiguous
Muslim majority areas of the adjoining districts of Assam.”
3. After the conclusion of the proceedings relating to Bengal, the Com¬
mission invited the submission of memoranda and representations by parties
interested in the Sylhet question. A number of such memoranda and rep¬
resentations was received.
4. The Commission held open sittings at Calcutta on the 4th, 5th and 6th
days of August 1947, for the purpose of hearing arguments. The main
arguments were conducted on the one side by counsel on behalf of the
Government of East Bengal and the Provincial and District Muslim Leagues;
and on the other side, by counsel on behalf of the Government of the Province
of Assam and the Assam Provincial Congress Committee and the Assam
Provincial Hindu Mahasabha. I was not present in person at the open sittings
AUGUST 1947
755
as I was at the time engaged in the proceedings of the Punjab Boundary
Commission which were taking place simultaneously, but 1 was supplied with
the daily record of the Sylhet proceedings and with all material submitted for
the Commission’s consideration. At the close of the open sittings, the members
of the Commission entered into discussions with me as to the issues involved
and the decisions to be come to. These discussions took place at New Delhi.
5. There was an initial diflerence of opinion as to the scope of the reference
entrusted to the Commission.24 Two of my colleagues took the view that the
Commission had been given authority to detach from Assam and to attach to
East Bengal any Muslim majority areas of any part of Assam that could be
described as contiguous to East Bengal, since they construed the words “the
adjoining districts of Assam” as meaning any districts of Assam that adjoined
East Bengal. The other two of my colleagues took the view that the Com¬
mission’s power of detaching areas from Assam and transferring them to East
Bengal was limited to the District of Sylhet and contiguous Muslim majority
areas (if any) of other districts of Assam that adjoined Sylhet. The difference
of opinion was referred to me for my casting vote, and I took the view that the
more limited construction of our terms of reference was the correct one and
that the “adjoining districts of Assam” did not extend to other districts of
Assam than those that adjoined Sylhet. The Commission accordingly proceeded
with its work on this basis.
6. It was argued before the Commission on behalf of the Government of
East Bengal that on the true construction of our terms of reference and
section 3 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the whole of the District of
Sylhet at least must be transferred to East Bengal and the Commission had no
option but to act upon this assumption. All my colleagues agreed in rejecting
this argument, and I concur in their view.
7. We found some difficulty in making up our minds whether, under our
terms of reference, we were to approach the Sylhet question in the same way
as the question of partitioning Bengal, since there were some differences in the
language employed. But all my colleagues came to the conclusion that we
were intended to divide the Sylhet and adjoining districts of Assam between
East Bengal and the Province of Assam on the basis of contiguous majority
areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, but taking into account other factors. I am
glad to adopt this view.
8. The members of the Commission were however unable to arrive at an
agreed view as to how the boundary lines should be drawn, and after discussion
24 See No. 318 and its Enclosures.
75 6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
of their differences,25 they invited me to give my decision. This I now proceed
to do.
9. In my view, the question is limited to the districts of Sylhet and Cachar,
since of the other districts of Assam that can be said to adjoin Sylhet neither the
Garo Hills nor the Khasi and Jaintia Hills nor the Lushai Hills have anything
approaching a Muslim majority of population in respect of which a claim
could be made.
10. Out of 35 thanas in Sylhet, 8 have non-Muslim majorities; but of these
eight, two — Sulla and Ajmiriganj (which is in any event divided almost evenly
between Muslims and non-Muslims), are entirely surrounded by preponder-
atingly Muslim areas and must therefore go with them to East Bengal. The
other six thanas comprising a population of over 530,000 people stretch in
a continuous line along part of the southern border of Sylhet District. They are
divided between two sub-divisions, of which one, South Sylhet, comprising
a population of over 515,000 people, has in fact a non-Muslim majority of
some 40,000; while the other, Karimganj, with a population of over 568,000
people, has a Muslim majority that is a little larger.
11. With regard to the District of Cachar, one thana, Hailakandi, has a
Muslim majority and is contiguous to the Muslim thanas of Badarpur and
Karimganj in the District of Sylhet. This thana forms, with the thana of
Katlichara immediately to its south, the sub-division of Hailakandi, and in the
Sub-division as a whole Muslims enjoy a very small majority being 51% of
the total population. I think that the dependence of Katlichara on Hailakandi
for normal communications makes it important that the area should be under
one jurisdiction, and that the Muslims would have at any rate a strong pre¬
sumptive claim for the transfer of the Sub-division of Hailakandi, com¬
prising a population of 166,536, from the Province of Assam to the Province
of East Bengal.
12. But a study of the map shows, in my judgment, that a division on these
lines would present problems of administration that might gravely affect the
future welfare and happiness of the whole District. Not only would the six
non-Muslim thanas of Sylhet be completely divorced from the rest of Assam
if the Muslim claim to Hailakandi were recognised, but they form a strip
running east and west whereas the natural division of the land is north and
south and they effect an awkward severance of the railway line through
Sylhet, so that, for instance, the junction for the town of Sylhet itself, the
capital of the district, would lie in Assam, not in East Bengal.
13. In those circumstances I think that some exchange of territories must be
effected if a workable division is to result. Some of the non-Muslim thanas
AUGUST 1947
757
must go to East Bengal and some Muslim territory and Hailakandi must be
retained by Assam. Accordingly 1 decide and award as follows: —
A line shall be drawn from the point where the boundary between the
Thanas of Patharkandi and Kulaura meets the frontier of Tripura State and
shall run north along the boundary between those Thanas, then along the
boundary between the Thanas of Patharkandi and Barlekha, then along the
boundary between the Thanas of Karimganj and Barlekha, and then along the
boundary between the Thanas of Karimganj and Beani Bazar to the point
where that boundary meets the River Kusiyara. The line shall then turn to the
east taking the River Kusiyara as the boundary and run to the point where that
river meets the boundary between the Districts of Sylhet and Cachar. The
centre line of the main stream or channel shall constitute the boundary. So
much of the District of Sylhet as lies to the west and north of this line shall be
detached from the Province of Assam and transferred to the Province of East
Bengal. No other part of the Province of Assam shall be transferred.
14. For purposes of illustration a map marked A26 is attached on which the
line is delineated. In the event of any divergence between the line as de¬
lineated on the map and as described in paragraph 13, the written descrip¬
tion is to prevail.
CYRIL RADCLIFFE
25 The Reports by the Members of the Bengal Boundary Connnission relating to Sylhet District and the
adjoining districts of Assam may be consulted at the I.O.L.R. on a microfilm of Partition Proceedings
supplied by the National Documentation Centre, Pakistan. IOR Pos. 3658.
26 See above, note 20.
489
Viceroy s Personal Report No. 1 7
L/POI6I123: ff 243-63
TOP SECRET 16 August 1947
AND PERSONAL
This last week of British rule in India has been the most hectic of any. We have
been working longer hours and under more trying conditions, and with
crises of differing magnitudes arising every day, and sometimes two or three
times a day. The problem of the States continued to occupy most of my time,
particularly of those Rulers who have kept changing their mind up to the last
moment, whether to accede to India, to Pakistan, or to neither. I paid my
farewell visit to Karachi, and took part in unbelievable scenes on the day of the
transfer of power in Delhi. The issue which has created the greatest and most
758
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
serious crisis to date has been the awards of the Boundary Commissions, a
summary of which is given in Appendix I.1
2. I had always anticipated that the awards could not possibly be popular
with either party, and that both would probably accuse the Chairman of the
Boundary Commissions of being biased against them. I have therefore taken
the greatest pains not to get mixed up in the deliberations of the Commissions
in any way. In fact, though I have repeatedly been asked both to interpret the
Boundary Commissions’ terms of reference and to put forward to them certain
points of view (for example on behalf of the Sikh Princes), I have resolutely
refused to do this.2 1 have firmly kept out of the whole business but 1 am afraid
that there is still a large section of public opinion in this country which is
firmly convinced that 1 will settle the matter finally.3 For this reason I made
my position as regards the Boundary awards absolutely clear in my address to
the Indian Constituent Assembly (Appendix II).4
3 . I feel it necessary to put on record a brief review of the history of the
Boundary Commissions, for the crisis that has been caused is in my opinion the
most serious we have ever had to meet, and might have undone all the work of
the past four months — so bitter have been the feelings.
4. On 10th June, Nehru wrote agreeing to the proposal that each Com¬
mission should consist of an independent chairman and four other persons of
whom two would be nominated by the Congress and two by the Muslim
League.5 This proposal was agreed to by Jinnah.6
5. O11 1 2th June, Nehru sent in the proposed terms of reference for the
Boundary Commissions7 which were accepted by Jinnah on 23rd June.8
These were the exact terms which were subsequently issued, namely: —
For the Punjab.
The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of
the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous
majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so it will also take
into account other factors.
For Bengal.
The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of
the two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority
areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so it will also take into account
other factors.
For Sylhet.
In the event of the referendum in Sylhet District of Assam resulting in
favour of amalgamation with Eastern Bengal, the Boundary Commission
AUGUST 1947
759
for Bengal will also demarcate the Muslim majority areas of Sylhet District
and contiguous Muslim Majority areas of adjoining districts.
6. At a Partition Council Meeting on 27th June1 2 3 * * * * * 9 the leaders of both parties
agreed that Sir Cyril Radcliffe, whose name had been put forward as a candi¬
date for the Arbitral Tribunal, should be asked to be Chairman of both
Boundary Commissions. At a Partition Council Meeting on 10th July,10 it was
agreed that no direction in addition to the terms of reference should be given
to the Boundary Commissions; and that it should be left to their own dis¬
cretion to interpret their terms of reference.
7. At this same Partition Council Meeting it was agreed that the Secretary
of State should be asked to add the following sub-clause to the Indian
Independence Bill11 It was added as sub-clause (4) and sub-clause (3) to
Section 3 and 4 respectively: —
“In this section, the expression ‘award’ means, in relation to a boundary
commission, the decisions of the chairman of that commission contained in
his report to the Governor-General at the conclusion of the Commission’s
proceedings.”12
8. At a Meeting on 22nd July,13 the Partition Council issued a statement in
which they pledged themselves to accept the awards of the Boundary Com¬
missions whatever these might be ; and, as soon as the awards were announced,
to enforce them impartially.
9. The first indication that the reception which the awards were likely to
have was going to be even worse than anticipated was contained in a message
given to Ismay on behalf of Liaquat Ali Khan by the Pakistan Cabinet
Secretary (Mohamed Ali) during a vist to Delhi from Karachi. This was
a verbal message, but very strongly worded, to the effect that if indeed it
proved true that the Gurdaspur district in the north Punjab area or even a
large part of it had been given to East Punjab by the Boundary Commission,
this would be regarded as a most serious fact by Jinnah and the Pakistan
Government. If it turned out that this was a political and not a judicial decision,
then this would amount to so grave a breach of faith as to imperil future
friendly relations between Pakistan and the British.
1 Not printed. For the awards of the Boundary Commissions, see Appendices to No. 488.
2 See eg Nos. 367, 378, 405, 427 and 441.
3 cf. No. 326. 4 Reproduced here as Appendix I.
5 Vol. XI, No. 128. 6 See ibid.. No. 175, item 2.
7 Ibid., No. 158. 8 Ibid., No. 311, para. 2.
9 Ibid., No. 369, para. 11 and its note 10.
10 No. 52, Case No. P.C. 30/4/47.
11 Ibid., Case No. 26/4/47.
13 See No. 224.
12
See No. 164.
760
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
10. In answering Liaquat, on nth August,14 lsmay (while pointing out that
even I had not received the award) reminded him that I had had nothing to do
with the Boundary Commissions ; that I was determined to keep clear of the
whole business; and that the Indian leaders themselves had selected the
personnel of the Boundary Commissions, drafted their terms of reference, and
undertaken to implement their awards.
11. It was on Tuesday, 12th August, that I was finally informed by Radcliffe
that his awards would be ready by noon the following day, just too late for me
to see before leaving for Karachi. For some time past, I and my staff had been
considering the question of when and how these awards should be published.15
From the purely administrative point of view, there were considerable advan¬
tages in immediate publication so that the new boundaries could take effect
from 15th August, and the officials of the right Dominion could be in their
places to look after the districts which had been allotted to their side before that
date. Flowever, it had been obvious all along that, the later we postponed
publication, the less would the inevitable odium react upon the British.
12. The matter came to a head at the Meeting which I held with members
of my staff on the evening of the 12th.16 The Bengal award had by then been
sent in but I had deliberately refrained from reading it. I was told however that
it allotted the Chittagong Hill Tracts to Pakistan. My Reforms Commissioner,
V. P. Menon, was present at the meeting and was able to warn me of the
disastrous effects that this was likely to have on the Congress leaders. Fie went
so far as to say that Nehru and Patel were both certain to blow up, since they
had only recently assured a delegation from the Chittagong Hill Tracts that
there was no question of their being allotted to Pakistan. (V.P. Menon admitted
that they had no possible authority for making such a statement.)
13. V P. Menon went on to say that if the details of the award were given
to them before the 15 th he thought they might well refuse to attend the meeting
of the Constituent Assembly which I was to address. If given to them later in
the day he thought they would refuse to come to the State banquet and the
evening party. In any case he said that unless the situation were handled with
the utmost care, Congress would blow up. I have never known V. P. Menon
to mislead me, and I decided that somehow we must prevent the leaders from
knowing the details of the award until after the 15 th August; all our work and
the hope of good Indo-British relations on the day of the transfer of power
would risk being destroyed if we could not do this.
14. On 13th August,17 I therefore wrote to Jinnah and Nehru telling them
that I had not received all the awards by the time I left for Karachi, though
I expected them that afternoon; and suggesting that there should be a meeting
at Government House on the 16th August to decide upon the timing and
AUGUST 1947
761
method of publication, and also the method of implementing the undertak¬
ing of the Partition Council to accept the award and to enforce the decisions
contained in it.
15. Just as I was signing the letter to Nehru a letter arrived from Patel
which is so incredible that 1 attach a copy of the complete letter as
Appendix III.18 From this it will be seen that the one man 1 had regarded as
a real statesman with both feet firmly on the ground, and a man of honour
whose word was his bond, had turned out to be as hysterical as the rest. Here
he was suggesting that if indeed the Chittagong Hill Tracts were put into
East Bengal the people would be justified in resisting this award by force and
that the Central Government would be bound to support them ! So much for
his undertaking on behalf of India to accept and implement the awards what¬
ever they might be.
16. The crazy part about all this is that Burrows had explained to me that
the whole economic life of the people of the Hill Tracts depends upon East
Bengal, that there are only one or two indifferent tracks through the jungle
into Assam, and that it would be disastrous for the people themselves to be cut
off from East Bengal. The population consists of less than a quarter of a million,
nearly all tribesmen who, if they have any religion at all, are Buddhists (and
so are technically non-Muslims, under the terms of the Boundary Commission).
In a sense Chittagong, the only port of East Bengal, also depends upon the
Hill Tracts; for if the jungles of the latter were subjected to unrestricted
felling, I am told that Chittagong port would silt up. Candidly I was amazed
that such a terrific crisis should have blown up over so small a matter. However,
I have been long enough in India to realise that major crises are by no means
confined to big matters.
17. Once more I had cause to thank the invaluable V. P. Menon for deliver¬
ance from the disaster which would have followed on my publishing the
awards in good faith without prior reference to the leaders. Having decided
not to announce the awards before the 15th August I had no alternative but to
send instructions to the Governors19 that the Governments of the two halves
of the split Provinces would have to take charge up to the notional20 boundary
on 15 th August, pending publication and implementation of the awards or of
mutually agreed boundaries.
18. When I was at Karachi, although Liaquat saw the absolute need for him
to come to Delhi on the 16th both to discuss the terrible situation in the
14 No. 428. 15 See No. 389, Item i and its note 3.
16 See No. 436 and its note 2.
17 See No. 454 and its note 2.
18 Not printed; see No. 452.
10 See Nos. 446 and 453.
20 Emphasis in original.
762
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Punjab at a Defence Council meeting, and to discuss the Boundary Commission
Awards, it took me most of that evening and part of the following morning
to persuade Jinnah to let Liaquat come.
19. This joint Defence Council Meeting, to which I had had such difficulty
in getting Jinnah to agree, was duly held this morning. I had both the Prime
Ministers Nehru and Liaquat, both Home Ministers Patel and Abdur Rahman,
Baldev Singh and the Supreme Commander (Auchinleck) present. The latter
reported on his visit to the Punjab on the 14th and gave a horrifying account,21
of which a summary is contained in the following three paragraphs.
20. Rumours as to the decisions of the Boundary Commission in the Punjab
had been sufficient to start large scale rioting which would undoubtedly have
been a real communal war on a big scale if it had not been for the Joint Punjab
Boundary Force (which I had got the Partition Council to set up). In Amritsar
and the vicinity, the Sikhs have formed armed bands of considerable strength
which are carrying out raids on Muslim majority villages at the rate of three or
four each night. These bands are well organised, and often include mounted
men who are used as scouts to reconnoitre for a favourable opportunity. There
are also Muslim bands organised for the same purpose in the Lahore district,
but these are fewer in number, smaller in size, and apparently less well
organised. The army has had some successful encounters with some of these
bands and has inflicted considerable well deserved casualties where bands have
been caught red-handed. One tank alone killed over 60.
21. In Amritsar city, the casualties to Muslims have been alarmingly high
due to the emasculation of the City Police Force caused by the new Hindu
Superintendent of Police disarming the Muslim policemen. Jenkins quickly
rectified this, and removed the official, but the harm has been done.22 In
Lahore, the trouble is due chiefly to the Muslims retaliating for the massacres
in Amritsar. The most disturbing feature here is the defection of the police
who are predominantly Muslim.23 Auchinleck reported that there is strong
evidence that the police are taking little notice of the orders of their Indian
officers (the remaining European officers left on the 14th) and that they have
actually joined hands with the rioters in certain instances.24
22. But for the presence of the Joint Boundary Force there would by now
be a complete holocaust in this city. Local Muslim Leaders are trying to
persuade the Muslim soldiers to follow the example of the police, but so far
without apparent success. Up to the 13th August the civilian casualties in all
the Punjab areas were assumed to be about 1,500 killed and wounded, the total
casualties inflicted by the troops not exceeding 200.
23. Auchinleck gave this account so lucidly, so firmly and with such trans¬
parent integrity that it made a profound impression on everyone round the
AUGUST 1947
763
table and I hope will have gone far to re-establish his position with the
Government of India.
24. It had been proposed that the Governors of East and West Punjab
should meet Major General Rees (the Commander of the Boundary Force) in
Ambala tomorrow ; but I was of the firm opinion that they must bring with
them their Ministers and that the two Prime Ministers of the two Dominion
Governments should also attend. I managed to persuade the meeting (albeit
with some difficulty) that this was the only course to take and then and there
we sent out the necessary telegrams and made the necessary arrangements for
aircraft, etc.
25. It is quite clear and we all agreed, that the soldiers are doing everything
that is humanly possible to try and hold the situation ; and that although it was
decided, among other things, to reinforce the Boundary Force by two more
brigades, some armour and some air, the situation is long past mere military
action and requires political leadership of a high order. It was for this reason
that I felt that nothing less than the Prime Ministers going down themselves
would be effective. We have also arranged that the Sikh leaders, Master Tara
Singh and Giani Kartar Singh, should be available for this meeting.
26. It is my conviction, which is shared by my staff, that if we had not set
up the Joint Defence Council (which was not a very popular move with the
parties originally) ; if we had not set up the Joint Punjab Boundary Force; and
if I had not succeeded in calling this meeting today and arranging the meeting
tomorrow, matters might well have been allowed to drift until a really
dangerous situation had been reached. It is satisfactory to think that these
arrangements should have proved of such good service within one day of the
transfer of power.
27. When I was in Lahore, I was so struck by the admirable work which
Jenkins and his faithful band of officials were performing, that I felt it was only
fair to them and indeed to the British reputation in general, that their story
should be told, and that the libellous charges made against them by the leaders
of both parties should be refuted. I attach as Appendix IV25 the whole of this
report which makes fascinating reading.
28. The new Governor of the N.W.F.P., that old veteran Sir George
Cunningham, spent the night of the nth with Jinnah in Karachi, and the night
of the 12th with me in Delhi, and took over from Lockhart on the 13 th. lie
21 cf. No. 486. In paras. 19 and 76 of the above report Abdur Rahman should read Fazlur Rahman (see
those present at No. 487).
22 See Nos. 432, para. 1, 437, 459, para. 3 and 460, para. 1,
23 cf. Nos. 448 and 459, para. 4.
24 cf. Nos. 459, para. 4 and 460, para. 2.
25 Not printed; see No. 337, also No. 408.
764
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
entirely shared my view that to dismiss the Khan Sahib Ministry would be
unconstitutional and a foolish move. He had persuaded Jinnah (with great
difficulty) to let him try his hand with Khan Sahib to obtain a satisfactory
settlement without having recourse to such drastic means.26
29. In my last week’s report27 (paragraphs 31 to 38) I dealt with the crisis
which had blown up concerning a proposed Order covering the vesting of the
assets and liabilities of the present Government of India. It will be recalled that
this Order had been taken in the Partition Council and no agreement had been
reached there.28 I had then been strongly advised by the officials that an Order
of some sort was essential; and the members of the India Cabinet took the
same view. The Pakistan members, however, refused to shift from their
position and insisted that both assets and liabilities should be vested jointly
until the matter had been decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. The point of view
of the Indian members was that, if no Order was passed, India’s credit would
suffer from the uncertainty about the liability for the Public Debt, while it
would be open to all contractors to repudiate their contract if it suited them
to do so. Much other confusion and much litigation would be caused.
30. In the “Stop Press” to my last report I said that I had decided to send
Cooke, my Constitutional Draftsman, and Mohamed Ali, the Cabinet
Secretary for Pakistan, who was still in Delhi, to Karachi. There they managed
to negotiate a revised formula about the assets, which gave India what it
wanted, while to some extent saving Pakistan’s face. On liabilities it was not
possible to get any agreement, but I managed to arrange for Sardar Vallabhbhai
Patel to send me a letter29 stating that, if an Order was passed that India would
be liable for the Public Debt, India would be content to recover Pakistan’s
proportionate share (which is about 200 crores) from Pakistan over a period of
fifty years, beginning three or four years hence.
31. This seemed to me very reasonable, and I telegraphed30 to the Secretary
of State asking him to decide whether or not, in these circumstances, I should
issue the Order of which the text had already been sent to him, subject to the
formula about the assets being revised on the lines of the agreement between
the Provisional Governments. 1 also sent Cooke to London to explain the
situation verbally. I was sure that 1 ought to be instructed to issue this Order.
It will still be open to Pakistan to repudiate it after the 15th August, but they
will look rather absurd if they do.
32. During my visit to Karachi I discussed this matter first with Liaquat,
and having got him on my side, we both attacked Jinnah. The latter said that he
was too busy and tired to consider the matter now, but would give me an
answer in a week or ten days’ time. I told him that I could not wait, and that
1 did not require his agreement since this was an Order in my discretion. I told
AUGUST 1947
765
him that Cooke had. gone home to the Secretary of State, and that I should issue
whatever Order the Secretary of State wished. Finally, I got Liaquat to support
my contention that, in view of Patel’s letter, Pakistan would not suffer from
such an Order. Indeed, it would probably be saved from economic war with
India. Jinnah ended up by saying “Well if you have put the matter in the
Secretary of State’s hands, there is nothing more I can do about it”. I need
hardly say how relieved I was to receive the Secretary of State’s telegram31
agreeing that I could issue this Order, for I am sure that all the good work of the
Partition Council over the last two months would have been undone if this
Order had not been issued.32
33. I mentioned last week in my letter33 to the Secretary of State that we
had a report on the 5th August that Tara Singh, the Sikh leader, was closely
involved in terrorist plans for wrecking Pakistan special trains from Delhi to
Karachi, for throwing a bomb at Jinnah in the State Drive in Karachi and for
attacking certain canal headworks. The report was circumstantial, and has since
been confirmed to some extent by the derailment of one Pakistan Special by
a mine under the track.
34. Jenkins, Mudie and Trivedi (the present Governor and the two future
Governors of the Punjab) considered the matter together, and unanimously
decided that arrests should not be made until after the Boundary Commission’s
award was announced, and the new Governments were responsible for law
and order. I accepted this decision as it is quite possible that arrests earlier would
have led to even more serious trouble with the Sikhs.34
35. Further to paragraph 56 of my last report, the latest figures show that
2,537 officers and 887 other ranks of the British personnel in the Indian Army
have volunteered to stay; and that 2,568 officers and 53 other ranks have
declined. Although the figures for officers (approximately 49 per cent) are not
so satisfactory as those I quoted last week, the figure for other ranks (94 per
cent) could hardly be better. There have been the usual newspaper attacks
during the last week, but one of these appearing in the Indian News Chronicle
and the National Call was particularly virulent. Under headlines “Subtle
Move to Retain Britishers in Indian Army” articles in these newspapers talk of
“A Device for Retaining Volunteers evolved through the ingenuity of the
Commander in Chief.”
26 cf. No. 481 and its Enclosure.
27 No. 385.
28 See No. 344 and its note 1; see also No. 355
29 No. 354; see also No. 369, Item 4.
3° No. 422; see also Nos. 447 and 462.
31 No. 469.
32 See No. 471 for the Order as issued.
33 No. 384, para. 6. 34 See No. 403.
766
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
36. Some of the Indian Air Force officers nearly succeeded in throwing
a spanner into the works on the flag question. They put up a proposal for an
Indian Air Force ensign consisting of the R.A.F. ensign with the new dominion
flag in place of the Union Jack, and Baldev Singh had actually approved this
without reference to me. 1 had a meeting35 with Baldev and Elmhirst (the new
Air Marshal commanding the R.I.A.F.) and persuaded them to adopt the same
system as the Navy that is to fly the dominion flag at the mast-head and the
R.A.F. ensign at the peak at all R.I.A.F. station masts. I also got this order put
through for Pakistan.
37. At this same interview with Baldev I congratulated him on his moral
courage and commonsense in going to Auchinleck and “making it up” with
him (see paragraphs 44 to 46 of my last report). Baldev said that it was not
until I had spoken to him previously that he had realised how seriously he had
fallen foul of Auchinleck, and that he naturally wished to make it up as he had
a great regard for him and would have felt most unhappy if he had not been
able to regain his confidence.
38. In paragraph 39 of my last report, I expressed the hope that the Partition
Council would be able to choose an independent chairman. They have now
decided not to do this; the members themselves will take the chair in turn.
I have a feeling that the result will be that very few matters not previously
agreed by the Steering Committee will fail to find themselves referred to the
Arbitral Tribunal !
39. There has been considerable informal discussion among the Congress
members of my Cabinet as to how the Cabinet Secretariat should be organised
and its relations with Nehru’s own personal Secretariat. Nehru is most anxious
that he should have a high powered Secretariat under him, with which he may
“swamp” the Cabinet Secretariat. This was opposed by his Cabinet Secretariat
and by V. P. Menon. When these discussions were going on, Id. M. Patel, the
Secretary of the Cabinet, brought a letter to Ismay asking him for his views in
the matter. Ismay, with his valuable experience, sent a reply to H. M. Patel.
This letter was placed informally before Sardai Patel, and one or two other
members of the Cabinet. They were completely convinced by the remarks
contained in Ismay’s letter.
40. The next question was how to convince Nehru. On the suggestion of
Sardar Patel, an informal meeting was held on the 14th between Nehru and
some officials, including H. M. Patel, Secretary to the Cabinet. Nehru heard
patiently the arguments why he should not have a high powered Secretariat.
He listened to the arguments carefully and also read Ismay’s letter. The position
now rests with him, and I very much hope that he will retain and use a proper
Cabinet Secretariat.
AUGUST 1947
767
41. To turn now to the Indian States. The behaviour of some of the Rulers
has really been most extraordinary. I reported in paragraphs 58 to 60 of my
last weekly report that I had sent for the Maharaja of Jodhpur on the afternoon
that this report was written (8th August). He flew up immediately and arrived
late the same night. I saw him the following morning,36 and he came clean
that he had in fact been flirting with Jinnah, and that the details of his negotia¬
tions were substantially as given in paragraph 58.
42. The real significance of this move was that the defection of Jodhpur
would open up opportunities for contiguous States such as Jaipur, Udaipur,
etc., to accede to Pakistan through the contiguity now provided by Jodhpur.
(In fact I understand that both these States were invited to join with Jodhpur and
both refused.) The States Department really got the wind up about this, and
Patel was prepared to go to almost any lengths to prevent it happening. He
thus undertook that Jodhpur should continue to allow his Rajputs to carry and
import arms without restrictions; to provide food for their famine stricken
districts, if necessary even at the expense of some of the other areas in India;
and finally that he would give the highest priority for the building of a railway
from Jodhpur to Cutch to open up a port for them, and to allow Cutch to
enter the customs union with India.37 This satisfied the Maharaja, who realised
he could not really expect to take an all-Hindu State into Pakistan.
43 . The pressure has been so great in Delhi this week that I have sometimes
had two, and once, three, different interviews going on in different rooms. I
left V. P. Menon to get Jodhpur to sign the Instrument of Accession in my
study, whilst 1 was dealing with the Hyderabad delegation in my wife’s study
next door. During my absence, young Jodhpur pulled out a revolver and told
Menon that he would shoot him down like a dog if he betrayed the starving
people of Jodhpur; but he signed it.38
44. Baroda has also been giving difficulty. The Gaekwar had told me he
would like to have the honour of being the first State to accede to the Dominion,
and in our publicity arrangements Baroda was accordingly placed first. But
meanwhile he had left Delhi without signing the Instrument, and Jodhpur who
met him in Bombay told me that he was proposing to impose new conditions
before he would accede. 1 accordingly sent for the Gaekwar who appeared on
the evening of the 12th, with the Instrument signed and dated the 10th. He
explained to me that he had been waiting for the astrologers to appoint an
auspicious day for the signature.
35 Not traced.
36 No record of an interview has been traced but cf. No. 426.
37 cf. H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan, London 1969, pp. 379-80.
38 cf. ibid., note 1 and V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States . Orient Longmans,
3rd edn., 1961, p. 113.
768
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
45. I discovered later that he had sacked his admirable Dewan, Sir B. L.
Mitter,39 who had personally negotiated the Instrument on behalf of Baroda,
and taken the advice of a Bombay lawyer who had helped him to marry his
second wife, Sita Devi, by getting her to become a Muslim, calling upon her
previous husband to embrace her new faith, and, when he refused, to divorce
him ; subsequently she was reconverted to Hinduism and the Gaekwar married
her. (I am probably giving this episode more space than it is worth, but it does
throw an interesting light on the way some of these Rulers make up their
minds, even on the most important matters of public policy).
46 This lawyer had advised the Gaekwar to put in a whole list of reser¬
vations which were of course inaccep table to Patel, who in fact got so angry
that he refused either to see Baroda or to accept his accession. This crisis broke
on the morning of the 13 th, just before I left for Karachi. I sent V. P. Menon off
to see the Gaekwar and bring him to me if necessary; but, as usual, he handled
the situation admirably and the Gaekwar withdrew his reservations, and asked
if he could stay to take part in the ceremonies in Delhi on the 15 th.
47. In paragraphs 7 and 8 of my last report I referred to Bhopal’s threat to
abdicate. I saw him again and urged him not to take such cowardly action at
this moment.40 He has now written to say that on his return to Bhopal some
50,000 of his subjects met him at the airfield and would not release him until
he had promised not to abdicate. He has therefore informed me that he will
not abdicate, at any rate at the present.41
48. He asked me if he could have a ten-day extension to sign the Instrument
of Accession under the same terms as obtained up to the 15th August.42 Patel
said he could make no exception for any State; but he allowed me to make
a private arrangement with Bhopal by which he signed the Instrument of
Accession and Standstill Agreement and left them with me in a sealed envelope
to be retained by me until the 25th August, and then handed to the States
Department, unless he sent me other instructions before this date.43
49. Indore looks as though he has almost missed the bus. He sent telegrams
to most of his brother Rulers urging them not to sign the Instrument of
Accession until the last possible moment, as he thought by so doing they could
improve the terms. When asked in what way he wanted them improved he
was unable to suggest any improvements ! Several of the Rulers, such as the
Jam Saheb, Jodhpur, Bharatpur, etc., sent me copies of Indore’s telegram which
has infuriated Patel. Meanwhile Indore failed to deliver his signed Instrument
of Accession before the 15th, but sent it to me on the 15th dated the 14th.44
Patel was in the mood not to accept this ; but he said he was going to see the
Maharaja to discuss the matter with him personally.45 He is contemplating
AUGUST 1947
769
making a condition that his extremely unsatisfactory British Dewan should be
sacked, and this I feel would be in the best interests of everybody.
50. On the eventing of the 14th my old friend the Maharaj Rana of Dholpur
came to see me to inform me that he had finally decided to sign the Instrument
of Accession, as he thought that this was the best solution for an intolerable
situation. With tears in his eyes he bade me farewell and said “This breaks an
alliance between my ancestors and your King’s ancestor’s which has existed
since 1765”. I pointed out that the King was still the King of the Dominion of
India, and that the Jink was thus not broken but merely changed. However,
he would not be consoled and said he proposed to leave Delhi that night while
I was still Viceroy and Crown Representative.
51. There are thus no States outstanding (taking into account the extension
to the two Muslim Rulers, of Hyderabad46 and Bhopal) beyond Kashmir,
where the Maharaja has at last decided to sack his Dewan, Kak.47 He now talks
of holding a referendum to decide whether to join Pakistan or India, provided
that the Boundary Commission give him land communications between
Kashmir and India. It appears, therefore, as if this great problem of the States
has been satisfactorily solved within the last three weeks of British rule.
52. I would have liked to have done more whilst Crown Representative to
encourage the Rulers to introduce constitutional reforms in their States; but
time did not permit except in the case of Rewa. The previous Ruler of this
State had been deposed for engineering a murder in Bombay. His son, who is
now on the gaddi, told me that he feared his father intended to force a return
on the 15th August and seize power. I advised the young Maharaja to announce
far reaching reforms as the best means of ensuring against his father’s attempt
to seize power. He agreed to do this and my Press Attache laid on the necessary
publicity for these constitutional reforms. I hope they will form a useful
precedent for other States, besides acting as a deterrent to the old Maharaja.
53. My wife and I flew down on the afternoon of the 13 th to Karachi to bid
godspeed and farewell to Pakistan. The route from the airfield was fairly
39 It appears from Sir T. Shone’s letter of 2 September 1947 to Sir P. Patrick, para. 5, that Sir B. L.
Mitter had not in fact been dismissed. Apparently, however the Gaekwar had decided not to renew his
appointment as Dewan which was due to expire ‘in a few weeks time’. It was expected that Mitter
would then be appointed Political Adviser in the States Department. L/P &S/13/1848: f 73.
40 cf. No. 482 and its note 2.
41 See ibid., and its note 3.
42 See No. 412.
43 See Nos. 435 and 482.
44 R/3/1/139: f 238.
45 It was not until 1 September that the Maharaja ot Indore sent a telegram to Lord Mountbatten explain¬
ing that ‘things have been ironed out to the entire mutual satisfaction of Sardar Patel and myself.
I have therefore acceded to the Dominion of India under the same terms as have been offered to other
States.’ R/3/1/140: ff7i-2.
46 See No. 440. 47 See No. 456.
770
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
thickly lined by cheering crowds and Jinnah’s new Military Secretary (Colonel
Birnie) who was in the car with us, stated that the crowd was noticeably larger
than that which had lined the route for Jinnah’s arrival. I found this hard to
believe, but it was confirmed from one or two other sources. Birnie told me
that a plot had been unearthed to throw a bomb at Jinnah in the State procession
on the following day (see also paragraph 33), and that discussions had been
going on as to whether to cancel the drive or alter the route, but that jinnah
had expressed the view that if I was prepared to go through with the drive,
then so was he. So it was agreed to leave everything as it was.
54. That evening I presided over a meeting of the Pakistan Cabinet at which
the final Orders in Council amending the Government of India Act 1935 for
Pakistan were passed. Not, however, without a final disagreement, for the
Pakistan Cabinet wished me to include an Order by which the Governor-
General, on the advice of the central Ministry, could order a Provincial
Governor to dismiss his Ministry and could govern the Province directly by
issuing orders to the Governor. This was so like the much criticised Section 93
that I felt it impossible that the British transfer of power should be associated
with the perpetuation of this system. However they were so insistent that I
could only get out of it without a real row by saying that I would refer the
question to the Secretary of State, fully knowing that he would uphold
my view.48
55. A State banquet of 60 was held on the night of the 13 th at which it had
been agreed that there should be two toasts but no speeches, and this was
confirmed at 7 p.m. Judge then of my horror when Jinnah stood up and
pulled half a dozen closely typed sheets out of his pocket, and proceeded to
deliver a speech, finally proposing the health of the King. I had to make an
impromptu speech proposing the health of Pakistan. This banquet was followed
by a reception which was attended by some 1500 of the leading citizens of
Pakistan, which included some very queer looking “jungly” men.
56. I sat between Miss Jinnah and Begum Liaquat Ali Khan. They both
pulled my leg about the midnight ceremonies in Delhi saying that it was
astounding that a responsible Government could be guided by astrologers in
such an important matter. I refrained from retorting that the whole Karachi
programme had had to change because Jinnah had forgotten that it was
Ramazan and had had to change the lunch party he had himself suggested to
a dinner party.
57. The following day I addressed the Pakistan Constituent Assembly and
enclose a copy of my speech as Appendix V.49 Jinnah had wanted to take the
principal seat himself as President of the Constituent Assembly, but I refused
to give up my rights as Viceroy, and he eventually gave way.
AUGUST 1947
771
58. The State procession took place in open cars, with Jinnah and myself
in the leading car and my wife and Miss Jinnah in the next car. The route was
fairly thickly lined with enthusiastic crowds, which were kept back by troops
and police lining the route. As we turned in at the gates of Government House,
Jinnah put his hand on my knee and said with deep emotion, “Thank God
I have brought you back alive” ! I retorted by pointing out how much more
serious it would have been if he had been bumped oft.
59. On our drive out to the airfield from the town (a different route to the
State procession) the route was lined with very enthusiastic crowds, at least
twice as great as when we arrived the day before. The welcome we have had
from the people of Pakistan has been most surprising. Miss Jinnah literally had
tears in her eyes when she bade us farewell and to my wife’s surprise kissed her
on both cheeks. Even the austere Jinnah himself showed some emotion on
bidding us farewell.
60. The whole Karachi programme was extremely well run, thanks largely
to my own staff who found the British Military Secretary and Comptroller
for him. I gave him my best Indian A.D.C. and the Adjutant of my Bodyguard
(both Muslims). The Muslim members of the Viceregal clerical staff have also
been transferred to Karachi, and so it is fairly certain that this Government
House will be run along the correct traditional lines.
61. We got back from Karachi on the afternoon of the 14th. At twenty
minutes past midnight on that night the President of the Constituent Assembly,
Rajendra Prasad, and the new Prime Minister, Nehru, arrived to tell me that
at the midnight session of the Constituent Assembly they had taken over
power, and had endorsed the request of the leaders that I should become their
first Governor General. The press had been allowed into my study to witness
this historic event and after “Rajen Babu” as Rajendra Prasad is called by his
friends, had delivered his message, Nehru said in ceremonious tones “May I
submit to you the portfolios of the new Cabinet”. He then handed me a
carefully addressed envelope, (on opening it after his departure I found it to
be empty !)
62. The 15th August has certainly turned out to be the most remarkable
and inspiring day of my life. We started at 8.30 with the Swearing-In ceremony
in the Durbar Hall in front of an official audience of some 500, including a
number of ruling Princes. The official guests, including Ambassadors, Princes
and the Cabinet, then drove in procession from Government House (ex-
Viceroy’s House) to the Council Chamber.
48 See Nos. 464 and 479.
49 Reproduced here as Appendix II.
772
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
63. Never have such crowds been seen within the memory of anyone I have
spoken to. Not only did they line every rooftop and vantage point, but they
pressed round so thick as to become finally quite unmanageable. At the
Council Chamber it had fortunately been arranged that there should be two
Guards of Honour (R.I.N. and R.I.A.F.) of 100 men each. These 200 men
joined with the police were just able to keep the crowds back sufficiently to
let us get out of the State coach without being physically lifted out of it by the
crowd.
64. The ceremony in the Council Chamber was extremely dignified and my
speech was well received. It is attached as Appendix II.50 Fortunately two more
Guards of Honour of the Indian Army were due for the departure ceremony,
and I gave orders that the four Guards of Honour were to pile arms inside the
Council Chamber, and then endeavour to keep the crowd back. As we were
about to depart they said that it was doubtful whether the 400 men of the
Guards of Honour could keep the way clear to the coach, so Nehru went on
to the roof and waved to the crowd to go back ; the door was then opened and
surrounded by our staff we fought our way through to the coach.
65. It took us half an hour to go the short distance back, for we had to go
slowly through the crowds. Once we were held up for some five minutes by
the pressure of the crowds. Apart from the usual cries of “Jai Hind” and
“Mahatma Gandhi ki jai” and “Pandit Nehru ki jai”, a surprising number
shouted out “Mountbatten ki jai”, and “Lady Mountbatten ki jai” and more
than once “Pandit Mountbatten ki jai”.
66. After lunch we decided to pay an impromptu visit to the great children’s
fete being held in the Roshnara Park. This was an unqualified success.
Thousands of children gathering all round us cheering and yelling and trying to
shake hands. I felt that it would be a good idea to get out of uniform and into
informal surroundings for at least one of the Independence Day celebrations.
67. At 6 p.m. the great event of the day was to take place — the salutation of
the new Dominion flag. This programme had originally included a ceremonial
lowering of the Union Jack; but when I discussed this with Nehru he entirely
agreed that this was a day they wanted everybody to be happy, and if the
lowering of the Union Jack in any way offended British susceptibilities, he
would certainly see that it did not take place, the more so as the Union Jack
would still be flown on a dozen days a year in the Dominion.
68. A parade had been arranged of the units of the three Services, pages of
orders had been issued, rehearsals had been going on for days, and seats on raised
platforms had been provided. The crowds however were far beyond the
control of the police. Some Indian officials estimate that there were 600,000
AUGUST 1947
773
people there. But personally I doubt if there were more than a quarter of
a million. At all events they thronged the processional route and if possible
gave my wife and myself a greater reception than in the morning.
69. But for the admirable Bodyguard with their wonderfully trained and
patient horses, we should never have been able to get on to the ground. But
at a slow walk they managed to breast a way through the crowd up to the
appointed position opposite the Grand Stand and the Parade. There was,
however, nothing to be seen of the Grand Stand, and although a row of bright
coloured pugrees in the crowd indicated where the troops had been engulfed
there was no other indication of a military parade.
70. Nehru fought his way to the coach and climbed in to tell us that our
daughter Pamela was safe. George Abell (my late Private Secretary) described
how Nehru came to their rescue when they were overwhelmed by the crowd,
fighting like a maniac, striking people right and left and eventually taking the
topee off a man who had annoyed him particularly and smashing it over his
head.
71. Major General Rajendra Singh, the Delhi Area Commander, Nehru and
I had a hurried consultation and we decided that the only thing to do was to
hoist the flag and fire the salute and give up all other idea of the programme.
This was done amid scenes of the most fantastic rejoicing, and as the flag broke
a brilliant rainbow appeared in the sky which was taken by the whole crowd
as a good omen. (I had never noticed how closely a rainbow could resemble
the new Dominion flag of saffron, white and green).
72. Meanwhile danger of a large scale accident was becoming so great that
we decided that the only thing to do was to try and move the coach on through
the crowd and draw the crowd with us. For this reason I invited Nehru to stay
in the coach which he did, sitting like a schoolboy on the front hood above the
seats. Meanwhile refugees who had fainted or had been almost crushed under
the wheels were pulled on board and we ended with four Indian ladies with
their children, the Polish wife of a British officer and an Indian press man who
crawled up behind. The Bodyguard gradually opened a way through the
crowd and then the whole throng began to follow us. Hundreds of thousands
of people all running togther is an impressive sight; several thousands ran the
whole three miles back alongside the coach and behind it, being stopped finally
by the police only at the gates of Government House.
73. No British or Indian whom I have since met has ever remembered
crowd scenes even approaching those that were witnessed yesterday; but the
significant feature is that numerous Indian observers all agreed that the reception
s° Reproduced here as Appendix I.
774
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
which was accorded to us was no whit less enthusiastic than that accorded to
their own leaders. This sounds rather incredible but it appears to be a fact and
was generously referred to by Nehru in his speech last night as the best omen
for the future good relations between our two countries.
74. There are two other significant facts which I feel I should report. The
first is that the President of the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Rajendra Prasad,
invited me on behalf of the Assembly to send back a “loyal” message 51 of
thanks to His Majesty saying that India and Britain even if their precise future
relations were different would always be the greatest of friends. The other
is that at a State banquet of a hundred that night Nehru made a speech in the
most friendly terms possible prior to proposing the toast of the King. I replied
and proposed the Dominion of India.
75. Close on 3,000 people came to our evening party at Government
House and stayed till after two o’clock in the morning. At this dinner and
subsequent party the Ambassadors, the new Cabinet, the senior British and
Indian officers of the Services, and Ruling Princes were freely mixed. I have
never experienced such a day in my life.
76. My meeting52 with the two Prime Ministers, Patel, Baldev, Abdur
Rahman, Mohamed Ali, and V. P. Menon referred to in paragraphs 19 to 23
of this report, continued at 5 p.m. after they had had three hours to read the
Boundary Commissions awards. If it had not been so serious and rather tragic
their mutual indignation would have been amusing. Neither the Congress, the
League, nor the Sikhs were in any way satisfied or grateful for any advantages
they may have got out of the awards; they could only think of the dis¬
advantages and complain bitterly. It was only after they had been complaining
loudly for some time that they appeared to realise that there must be some
advantages to them if the other parties were equally dissatisfied ; and so after
some two hours very delicate handling, we arrived at the conclusion that the
awards must be announced and implemented loyally forthwith.
77. The only sad part is that Nehru and Patel have apparently committed
themselves up to the hilt in promising the people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts
that they would never agree to their being put into Pakistan. I have suggested
that there should be inter-governmental negotiations on this point, and on the
transfer of populations in the Punjab at a later date. But I am afraid Nehru and
Patel feel very sore. Liaquat is spending the night with me, and after dinner
I urged him to be reasonable and say to Nehru tomorrow “I appreciate your
difficulty about your promises to the people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
Leave me the River Kamaphuli and a reasonable area on each side and you can
have the rest in return for Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling or some other material
offer”. He promised he would speak on these lines.
AUGUST 1947
775
78. It is quite clear to me that if we had not brought the leaders together to
hear each others’ indignation and thus regain their sense of proportion, we might
have had as serious a blow up as V. P. Menon feared.
79. One further interesting point is that the respective Governments are so
anxious to assume complete responsibility for their own areas that they are
contemplating tomorrow working out a scheme to rake over military
responsibility for their own areas once the Boundary awards have been
implemented. The two Prime Ministers have also invited each other to visit
Lahore and Amritsar respectively together. Altogether the situation, bad as it is,
is being grappled with in a realistic manner by the new Governments.
80. We are leaving at 5 a.m. tomorrow to fly to Bombay with Auchinleck
for twenty-four hours to say goodbye to the first contingent of British troops
to leave India. Nehru has voluntarily sent them a message which to men of
goodwill should prove a real encouragement. A copy of this is attached as
Appendix VI.53
81. This is the last of my weekly reports to the King, the Prime Minister
and the India-Burma Cabinet Committee. I shall however continue to send
periodical reports direct to His Majesty. For my last ‘‘tail piece” I have selected
an extract from a letter which my wife has received from Lady Colville,
referring to the programme of our visit to Bombay tomorrow.
“We are also getting in touch with the people whom you would like to
meet, and are asking them to Government House (excepting Mrs.
Sukthankar, who it is said may be in prison, but we are finding out about
her)” !
M. OF B.
Postscript telephoned jrotn Bombay on the evening of 17 August
The departure of British troops went off extremely well amidst scenes of
great enthusiasm.
Our reception in Bombay was far more remarkable than in Delhi. The local
police estimated the crowd as the greatest in the history of the city. Several
hundreds of thousands lined the many miles of route, often breaking through
the cordon and stopping our open car through sheer weight of numbers.
31 See below, note 55.
52 See No. 487.
53 See Enclosure to No. 455. It may be noted that owing to a shortage of shipping it proved impossible
to complete the withdrawal of British troops by the end of 1947 as originally contemplated (see Nos.
50, para. 6 and 135). In September 1947 the Joint Defence Council approved a revised programme
providing for the withdrawal of British troops by April 1948. L/WS/1/1092. In the event, however,
the last units of British troops left Karachi and Bombay on 27 February and 1 March 1948 respectively.
776
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
The demonstration was all the more remarkable since the drives from
Government House to the Docks, and later to the Prime Minister’s party were
not intended as events in themselves.
The crowd definitely shouted out, “England Zindabad” and “Jai England”.
Appendix I to No. 489
LjPO/61 123: ft 266-72
TEXT OF THE ADDRESS TO BE DELIVERED BY HIS EXCELLENCY
LORD MOUNTBATTEN TO THE INDIA CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY,
ON I5TH AUGUST, 1947
Mr. President and members of the Constituent Assembly, 1 have a message
from His Majesty the King to deliver to you today. This is His Majesty’s
message54 : —
“On this historic day when India takes her place as a free and independent
Dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations, I send you all my greet-
ings and heartfelt wishes.
Freedom loving people everywhere will wish to share in your celebrations,
for with this transfer of power by consent comes the fulfilment of a great
democratic ideal to which the British and Indian peoples alike are firmly
dedicated. It is inspiring to think that all this has been achieved by means of
peaceful change.
Heavy responsibilities he ahead of you, but when I consider the statesman¬
ship you have already shown and the great sacrifices you have already made,
I am confident that you will be worthy of your destiny.
I pray that the blessings of the Almighty may rest upon you and that your
leaders may continue to be guided with wisdom in the tasks before them. May
the blessings of friendship, tolerance and peace inspire you in your relations
with the nations of the world. Be assured always of my sympathy in all your
efforts to promote the prosperity of your people and the general welfare of
mankind”.55
It is barely six months ago that Mr. Attlee invited me to accept the appoint¬
ment of last Viceroy. He made it clear that this would be no easy task — since
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom had decided to transfer
power to Indian hands by June 1948. At that time it seemed to many that His
Majesty’s Government had set a date far too early. How could this tremendous
operation be completed in 15 months?
However, I had not been more than a week in India before I realised that this
date of June 1948 for the transfer of power was too late rather than too early;
communal tension and rioting had assumed proportions of which I had had no
conception when I left England. It seemed to me that a decision had to be
AUGUST 1947
111
taken at the earliest possible moment unless there was to be risk of a general
conflagration throughout the whole sub-continent.
I entered into discussions with the leaders of all the parties at once — and the
result was the plan of June 3rd.56 Its acceptance has been hailed as an example
of fine statesmanship throughout the world. The plan was evolved at every
stage by a process of open diplomacy with the leaders. The result is chiefly
attributable to them.
I believe that this system of open diplomacy was the only one suited to the
situation in which the problems were so complex and the tension so high.
I would here pay tribute to the wisdom, tolerance and friendly help of the
leaders which have enabled the transfer of power to take place ten and a half
months earlier than originally intended.
At the very meeting57 at which the plan of June 3rd was accepted, the
Leaders agreed to discuss a paper58 which I had laid before them on the
administrative consequences of partition; and then and there we set up
the machinery which was to carry out one of the greatest administrative
operations in history — the partition of a sub-continent of 400 million inhabitants
and the transfer of power to two independent governments in less than two
and a half months. My reason for hastening these processes was that, once the
principle of division had been accepted, it was in the interest of all parties that
it should be carried out with the utmost speed. We set a pace faster in fact than
many at the time thought possible. To the Ministers and officials who have
laboured day and night to produce this astonishing result, the greatest credit
is due.
I know well that the rejoicing which the advent of freedom brings is
tempered in your hearts by the sadness that it could not come to a united India;
and that the pain of division has shorn today’s events of some of its joy. In
supporting your leaders in the difficult decision which they had to take, you
have displayed as much magnanimity and realism as have those patriotic
statesmen themselves.
These statesmen have placed me in their debt for ever by their sympathetic
understanding of my position. They did not, for example, press their original
request that I should be the Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal. Again they
54 See No. 261, note 4.
55 In tel. 5-EC1 of 16 August Lord Mountbatten explained that at the opening of the Constituent
Assembly on 1 5 August he had been asked by the President of the Assembly to convey to the King the
following message :
“ Begins . May I request you to convey to His Majesty a message of loyal greetings from this House
and of thanks for the gracious message which he has been good enough to send us. That message
will serve as an inspiration in the great work on which we launch today and I have no doubt that
we anticipate with great pleasure association with Great Britain of a different kind. I hope and trust
that the interest and sympathy and the kindness which have always inspired His Majesty will con¬
tinue in favour of India and we shall be worthy of them.” Ends. L/P &J/10/136: f 155.
Vol. XI, No. 45.
57 Ibid., No. 39.
58 Ibid., No. 28.
778
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
agreed from the outset to release me from any responsibility whatsoever for
the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. It was they who selected the personnel
of the Boundary Commissions including the Chairman; it was they who drew
up the terms of reference; it is they who shoulder the responsibility for
implementing the award. You will appreciate that had they not done this, I
would have been placed in an impossible position.
Let me now pass to the Indian States. The plan of June 3rd dealt almost
exclusively with the problem of the transfer of power in British India; and the
only reference to the States was a paragraph59 which recognised that on the
transfer of power, all the Indian States — 565 of them — would become
independent. Here then was another gigantic problem and there was
apprehension on all sides. But after the formation of the States Department it
was possible for me, as Crown Representative, to tackle this great question.
Thanks to that far-sighted statesman, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Member in
charge of the States Department, a scheme60 was produced which appeared to
me to be equally in the interests of the States as of the Dominion of India. The
overwhelming majority of States are geographically linked with India, and
therefoie this Dominion had by far the bigger stake in the solution of this
problem. It is a great triumph for the realism and sense of responsibility of the
Rulers and the Governments of the States, as well as for the Government of
India, that it was possible to produce an Instrument of Accession which was
equally acceptable to both sides ; and one, moreover, so simple and so straight¬
forward that within less than three weeks practically all the States concerned
had signed the Instrument of Accession and the Standstill Agreement. There
is thus established a unified political structure covering over 300 million
people and the major part of this great sub-continent.
The only State of the first importance that has not yet acceded is the premier
State, Hyderabad.
Hyderabad occupies a unique position in view of its size, population and
resources, and it has its special problems. The Nizam, while he does not propose
to accede to the Dominion of Pakistan, has not up to the present felt able to
accede to the Dominion of India. His Exalted Highness has, however, assured
me of his wish to co-operate in the three essential subjects of External Affairs,
Defence and Communications with that Dominion whose territories surround
his State. With the assent of the Government, negotiations will be continued
with the Nizam and 1 am hopeful that we shall reach a solution satisfactory
to all.61
From today I am your constitutional Governor-General and I would ask you
to regard me as one of yourselves, devoted wholly to the furtherance of
India’s interests. I am honoured that you have endorsed the invitation originally
made to me by your leaders to remain as your Governor-General. The only
consideration I had in mind in accepting was that I might continue to be of
AUGUST 1947
779
some help to you in the difficult days which lie immediately ahead. When
discussing the Draft of the India Independence Act your leaders selected the
3 1st March 1948 as the end of what may be called the interim period. 1 propose
to ask to be released in April. It is not that I fail to appreciate the honour of
being invited to stay on in your service, but I feel that as soon as possible India
should be at liberty, if you so wish, to have one of her own people as her
Governor-General. Until then my wife and I will consider it a privilege to
continue to work with and amongst you. No words can express our gratitude
for the understanding and co-operation as well as the true sympathy and
generosity of spirit which have been shown to us at all times.
I am glad to announce that “my” Government (as I am now constitutionally
entitled and most proud to call them) have decided to mark this historic
occasion by a generous programme of amnesty. The categories are as wide as
could be consistent with the over-riding consideration of public morality and
safety, and special account has been taken of political moti ves. This policy will
also govern the release of military prisoners undergoing sentences as a result of
trial by courts-martial.
The tasks before you are heavy. The war ended two years ago. In fact it was
on this very day two years ago that I was with that great friend of India,
Mr. Attlee in his Cabinet Room when the news came through that Japan had
surrendered. That was a moment for thankfulness and rejoicing, for it marked
the end of six bitter years of destruction and slaughter. But in India we have
achieved something greater — what has been well described as “A treaty of
Peace without a War”. Nevertheless, the ravages of the war are still apparent
all over the world. India, which played such a valiant part, as I can personally
testify from, my experience in South-East Asia, has also had to pay her price in
the dislocation of her economy and the casualties to her gallant fighting men
with whom I was so proud to be associated. Preoccupations with the political
problem retarded recovery. It is for you to ensure the happiness and ever-
increasing prosperity of the people, to provide against future scarcities of food,
cloth and essential commodities and to build up a balanced economy. The
solution of these problems requires immediate and whole-hearted effort and
far-sighted planning, but I feel confident that with your resources in men,
material and leadership you will prove equal to the task.
What is happening in India is of far more than purely national interest The
emergence of a stable and prosperous state will be a factor of the greatest
international importance for the peace of the world. Its social and economic
development, as well as its strategic situation and its wealth of resources, invest
with great significance the events that take place here. It is for this reason that
59 Ibid., No. 45, para. 18.
60 cf. No. 234.
61 See correspondence ending with No. 474.
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
not only Great Britain and the sister Dominions but all the great nations of the
world will watch with sympathetic expectancy the fortunes of this country and
will wish it all prosperity and success.
At this historic moment, let us not forget all that India owes to Mahatma
Gandhi — the architect of her freedom through non-violence. We miss his
presence here today, and would have him know how much he is in our
thoughts.
Mr. President, I would like you and our other colleagues of the late Interim
Government to know how deeply I have appreciated your unfailing support
and co-operation.
In your first Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, you have a world-
renowned leader of courage and vision. His trust and friendship have helped
me beyond measure in my task. Under his able guidance, assisted by the
colleagues whom he has selected, and with the loyal co-operation of the people,
India will now attain a position of strength and influence and take her rightful
place in the comity of nations.
Appendix II to No. 48 g
L/PO 1 6/ 1 23: ff 2g2-g6
TEXT OF THE ADDRESS TO BE DELIVERED BY HIS EXCELLENCY
LORD MOUNTBATTEN TO THE PAKISTAN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, ON
I4TH AUGUST, 1947
Mr. President and Members of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan :
I have a message from His Majesty the King to deliver to you today. This is
His Majesty’s message:62 “I send you my greetings and warmest wishes on this
great occasion when the new Dominion of Pakistan is about to take its place
in the British Commonwealth of Nations. In thus achieving your independence
by agreement, you have set an example to all freedom-loving people through¬
out the world.
I know that I can speak for all sections of opinion within the British
Commonwealth when I say that their support will not fail you in upholding
democratic principles. I am confident that the statesmanship and the spirit of
co-operation which have led to the historic developments you are now
celebrating will be the best guarantee of your future happiness and prosperity.
Great responsibilities he ahead of you and your leaders. May the blessings of
the Almighty sustain you in all your future tasks. Be assured always of my
sympathy and support as I watch your continuing efloits to advance the cause
of humanity.”
1 am speaking to you today as your Viceroy. Tomorrow the Government
of the new Dominion of Pakistan will rest in your hands and I shall be the
Constitutional head of your neighbour the Dominion of India. The leaders of
AUGUST 1947
both Governments, however, have invited me to be the independent Chairman
of the Joint Defence Council. This is an honour which I shall strive to merit.
Tomorrow two new sovereign states will take their place in the Common¬
wealth: not young nations, but the heirs of old and proud civilisations: fully
independent States, whose leaders are statesmen, already known and respected
throughout the world, whose poets and philosophers, scientists, and warriors
have made their imperishable contribution to the service of mankind: not
immature Governments or weak, but fit to carry their great share of respon¬
sibility for the peace and progress of the world.
The birth of Pakistan is an event in history. We, who are part of history, and
are helping to make it, are not well-placed, even if we wished, to moralise on
the event, to look back and survey the sequence of the past that led to it.
History seems sometimes to move with the infinite slowness of a glacier, and
sometimes to rush forward in a torrent. Just now, in this part of the world our
united efforts have melted the ice and moved some impediments in the stream,
and we are carried onwards in the full flood. There is no time to look back.
There is time only to look forward.
1 wish to pay tribute to the great men, your leaders, who helped to arrive
at a peaceful solution for the transfer of power.
Here I would like to express my tribute to Mr. Jinnah. Our close personal
contact, and the mutual trust and understanding that have grown out of it, are,
I feel, the best of omens for future good relations. He has my sincere good
wishes as your new Governor-General.
Moral courage is the truest attribute of greatness, and the men who have
allowed the paramount need for agreement and a peaceful solution to take
precedence over the hopes and claims they so strongly held and keenly felt,
have shown moral courage in a high degree. I wish to acknowledge, too, the
help of others ; of the men who advised and assisted the process of negotiation ;
of the men who kept the machinery of administration running under great
difficulties, of the men who have worked day and night to solve the innumer¬
able problems of partition. All this has been achieved with toil and sweat. I
wish I could say also without tears and blood, but terrible crimes have been
committed. It is justifiable to reflect, however, that far more terrible things
might have happened if the majority had not proved worthy of the high
endeavour of their leaders, or had not listened to that great appeal63 which
Mr. Jinnah and Mahatma Gandhi together made, and which the respective
future Governments reiterated in a statement64 made by the Partition Council.
May I remind you of the terms of that Statement ? The two Governments
declared that “it is their intention to safeguard the legitimate interests of all
citizens, irrespective of religion, caste or sex. In the exercise of their normal
62 See No. 261, note 4.
63 Vol. X, No. 152. 64 No. 224.
782
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
civic rights all citizens will be regarded as equal and both Governments will
assure to all people within their territories the exercise of liberties such as
freedom of speech, the right to form associations, the right to worship in their
own way and the protection of their language and culture.
Both Governments further undertake that there shall be no discrimination
against those who before August 15th have been political opponents.”
The honouring of these words will mean nothing less than a charter of
liberty for a fifth of the human race.
Some days ago I went to Lahore. From the reports I had received I expected
to witness a scene of unparalleled devastation. Those of you who have not
visited Lahore will be relieved to hear that the destruction is far less than I
expected.65 It amounts to not more than eighteen houses per thousand of the
whole municipal area. I do not say this in extenuation of the madness which
caused even so much wanton damage. Rather I wish to pay my tribute, and
ask you to do the same, to those who have saved Lahore from complete ruin :
to the police and fire services, to the soldiers and the civil administration, and
to all public spirited citizens, who resisted or prevented the powers of
destruction; also to the many who helped to tend and heal the tragic victims
wherever these outrages have occurred. The ideal of public service which
inspired these men and women, the spirit of co-operation and compromise
which inspired your leaders, these are political and civic virtues that make a
nation great, and preserve it in greatness. I pray that you may practise them
always.
Now the time has come to bid you farewell — on behalf of His Majesty’s
Government; on behalf of my country, and on behalf of myself, also on
behalf of my wife, whose thoughts and prayers will be so much with the women
in Pakistan.
This is a parting between friends, who have learned to honour and respect
one another, even in disagreement. It is not an absolute parting, I rejoice to
think, not an end of comradeship. Many of my countrymen for generations
have been born in this country, many lived their lives here; and many have
died here. Some will remain for trade and commerce; and others in Govern¬
ment service and in the armed forces who count it an honour that they have
been invited to serve you.
During the centuries that British and Indians have known one another, the
British mode of life, customs, speech and thought have been profoundly
influenced by those of India — more profoundly than has often been realised.
May I remind you that, at the time when the East India Company received its
Charter, nearly four centuries ago, your great Emperor Akbar was on the
throne, whose reign was marked by perhaps as great a degree of political and
religious tolerance, as has been known before or since. It was an example by
which, I honestly believe, generations of our public men and administrators
AUGUST 1947
783
have been influenced. Akbar’s tradition has not always been consistently
followed, by British or Indians, but I pray, for the world’s sake, that we will
hold fast, in the years to come, to the principles that this great ruler taught us.
May Pakistan prosper always. May her citizens be blessed with health and
happiness; may learning and the arts of peace flourish in her boundaries, and
may she continue in friendship with her neighbours and with all the nations
of the world.
65 cf. No. 228, para. 30.
Glossary
A kali Lit. : Worshipper of the eternal one. Particularly strict devotee of the
Sikh faith. In modern usage, a member of the extreme Sikh nationalist party.
Akali Sena Akali army.
Anzac Australia and New Zealand Army Corps.
Begum A feminine Muslim title, originally of princesses and noblewomen.
Crore ioo lakhs or io million.
Dal Organisation, association.
Darbar (Durbar) Court; ceremonial assembly; government of a
Princely State.
Diwan (Dewan) Minister; in Princely States Chief Minister; also Council
of State; Meeting.
Firman A decree, mandate, command.
Fuhrer German term for leader, used of Hitler.
Gaddi Lit.: cushion; hence throne.
Ghazi Pakhtun A Pathan fighter, hero.
Gian i (Gyani) Title of respect accorded to one learned in the Sikh religion
and scriptures.
Gurdwara Sikh temple.
Gurkha Ruling race of Nepal.
Guru Spiritual adviser, religious preceptor; for Sikh Gurus see sikh.
Hartal Shopkeepers’ strike, strike.
Id A Muslim religious festival or holy observance.
Indian National Army (I.N.A.) Of about 70,000 men of the Indian
Army who became Japanese prisoners of war, some 20,000 defected and joined
the I.N.A. commanded from late 1943 by Subhas Chandra Bose.
Ittihad-Ul-Muslemin (Muslimin) Lit.: Unity of Muslims; the
name given to a political organisation in Hyderabad.
Jagir An assignment of land revenue, sometimes conditional on the main¬
tenance of troops or other service.
J A G 1 R d A r Holder of a Jagir.
Jai England Victory to England.
Jat The great agricultural tribe of north-west India found in the Punjab,
western United Provinces and Rajputana and comprising people of Muslim,
Hindu and Sikh faiths.
Jatha Company, party, organised band of people proceeding somewhere
for the purpose of political demonstration.
Jathedar Leader of a Jatha.
Jirga A Council of Elders.
Kafir An infidel, one who does not believe in the mission of Mohammed.
Khaksars Servants of the Dust; Lit. : like the earth, humble; semi-military
784
GLOSSARY
785
organisation of Muslims armed with spades, under the leadership of Inayatullah
Khan.
Kharif Autumn; autumn harvest.
Khassadar Member of a loose irregular body of police who operated in
the Tribal Area of the N.W.F.P., choosing their own officers and finding their
own rifles.
Ki Jai Victory (Jai) of.
Lakh 100,000.
Lambadar (Lumbadar) Headman of a village.
Mahasabha Lit.: Great Assembly. Hindu Mahasabha: political party
based on militant Hinduism.
Mahsuds A Pathan tribe.
Malik A Muslim title inferior to Khan and Amir. Chief man of one of the
kinship groups into which Pathan tribes are divided.
Maulana Lit.: our Master; title of respect accorded to Muslim judges,
heads of religious orders and persons of great learning.
Maulvi Judge or Doctor of Law. Title of respect often given to learned
Muslims.
Me os A Muslim tribe of cultivators in the south east of the Punjab.
Moplahs A fanatical Muslim sect of Malabar believed to be descended
from Arab immigrants who settled on the west coast of India in the ninth
century A.D.
Muslim National Guards A Muslim para-military organisation.
Nawab Originally a Governor under the Moghul Empire; thence a title of
rank conferred on Muslim nobles.
Nawabzada Son of a Nawab.
Pagree (Pugree) Turban.
Panthic Party (Sikh) Formed spring 1946 in Punjab Assembly to
resist idea of Pakistan .
Par sees Descendants of Zoroastrian refugees who fled from Persia on its
conquest by Muslims in the eighth century A.D.; chiefly settled in western
India; distinguished as merchants, shipbuilders and traders.
Pathan Generic name given to Pushtu-speaking peoples inhabiting North-
West Frontier of India and Afghanistan.
Pathanistan The land or State of the Pathans, the name given to a free
Pathan State envisaged by some Muslims in the N.W.F.P.
Peon An inferior servant of courts of justice and government offices,
usually wearing a badge.
Pindar is Gangs of mounted plunderers who terrorised central India after
the disintegration of the Moghul Empire and were only finally broken up
by large-scale military operations undertaken by Lord Hastings in 1817-19.
786
GLOSSARY
Pir Lit. : an old man. A Muslim spiritual guide, the spiritual head of a group
of Muslims.
Qaid-i-Azam The Supreme Ruler.
Quran (Koran) The sacred book of the Mohammedans, consisting of oral
revelations by Mohammed collected and committed to writing after his death.
Ramzan The ninth month of the Mohammedan year during which all
Mohammedans are expected to fast between sunrise and sunset.
Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (R.S.S.S.) National Volunteer
Service Association. The para-military arm of militant Hindu nationalism.
Red Shirts Members of an anti-government organisation started in the
North-West Frontier Province by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and closely
allied with Congress.
Roza A fast, fasting, used particularly of the fast observed by Mohammedans
in the month of Ramzan.
Sardar (Sirdar) Lit.: a chief, leader. Title borne by all Sikhs, also by
some Muslims and Hindus.
Scheduled Castes or Depressed Classes. At the lower end of the scale
of castes; considered to cause pollution by touch.
Shariat Mohammedan Law.
Shiromani Akali Dal (S.A. Dal) Central Akali Organisation.
Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Committee Central Gurdwara
Management Committee.
Shri (Sri) Sanskrit term used by Hindus to denote ‘Mr’.
Sikh Lit.: disciple. Follower of Guru Nanak (1469-1538), the first of the
line of ten Gurus (religious preceptors) who formulated the Sikh faith and
welded the Sikhs into an independent community.
Sufedposh A headman, paid a small remuneration for giving general
assistance to the administration but lower in rank than a Zaildar. q.v.
Tahsil A revenue sub-division of a district.
Tahsildar Officer in charge of a Tahsil.
Than a Police Station and hence the area of its jurisdiction.
Toddy Liquor distilled from coconut.
Wana Wazirs A Pathan tribe.
Zail A group of villages.
Zaildar A headman chosen to give assistance to the administration in the
collection of land revenue and the detection of crime in a Zail for which he was
given a modest remuneration.
Zalme Pakhtun Pathan youth, the name of an organisation started by
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s son.
Zamindar One holding land as a proprietor but paying land revenue to
the Government; a landowner.
Zindabad Long live.
Appendix I
Supplementary Documentation
Name and Number
Date
Main subject or subjects
1945
June
1
Jenkins to Waved
30
Simla Conference: reviews situations with
Minute
which Viceroy might have to deal in the
selection of members of Executive Council
and their implications
July
2
V. P. Menon to
7
Simla Conference: suggests policy to be followed
Jenkins
in event of League not participating in
Minute
reconstruction of Executive Council ;
emphasises situation unusually propitious for
amicable settlement between Britain and India
3
Jenkins to Waved
10
Simla Conference: lists the matters needing
Minute
consideration by the Viceroy in the knowledge
that ‘a definite line’ would have to be taken on
them when the conference ended
December
4 Attlee to
Pethick-Lawrence
Letter
5 Pethick-Lawrence
to Attlee
Memo
6 Note by Auchinleck
7 Colville to
Pethick-Lawrence
Letter
22 Suggests that Tom Johnston might be sent to
India with full powers from Cabinet to make a
settlement with Indian political leaders while
leaving Wavell free to carry on the Govt of
India; asks Pethick-Lawrence for his reactions
2 6 Outlines pros and cons of Attlee’s suggestion in
No. 4
1946
May
11 A note on the strategic implications of the
inclusion of ‘Pakistan’ in the British
Connonwealth
1947
February
21 Expresses disappointment at manner of Wavell’s
retirement and regret at announcement of date to
demit responsibility; outlines considerations which
have persuaded him to withold his resignation;
asks that his letter be shown to Prime Minister
and explains that he will have no complaint if
Prime Minister and Pethick-Lawrence prefer to
replace him with someone else
Page
798
790
793
797
799
800
807
787
788
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
I
Sir E. Jenkins to Field Marshal Viscount Wavell1
R/3/1/95:/ 20-21
30 June 1945
H.E.
I think Your Excellency should now consider the possible situations with which
you may have to deal during the next fortnight or so.
2. In the first place, lists may come in from all parties including Jinnah;
your provisional selection may be accepted by HMG (I do not think there will
be any difficulty about this), and by the parties; and the Conference on 14 July
may end in complete agreement. If this happens it will remain only for you to
settle the allotment of portfolios, which should not cause much trouble once the
composition of Council is determined; to take leave gracefully of your old
colleagues; and to instal the new Members. A good deal of administrative
work will be involved, e.g. the rearrangement of Departments and so on, but
I think this can be done within a few days.
3. Secondly, all parties may submit lists, including Jinnah ; your provisional
selection may be approved by HMG; but both the Congress and the League
may be quite unable to agree to it. You would then have to report complete
failure to the Conference on 14th July, and it would remain to pick up the
pieces. There would be a violent outburst of communal and probably anti-
British feeling in the Press, and Governors would have to be reminded of the
importance of maintaining law and order. There would be an uneasy period
during which the Congress would prepare for some further mass demonstration,
and in the end “repression” on a big scale would undoubtedly be necessary. At
the Centre you would, I think, have to reconstruct your Executive Council on
the assumption that until the time comes for another attempt at a political
settlement, the main criterion must be efficiency rather than political appeal.
The position would be the same if your provisional selection were accepted by
the Muslim League but rejected by the Congress.
4. Thirdly, Jinnah may refuse to send in a list and may either
(a) withdraw from the Conference, or
(b) attend the next meeting merely in order to express the opposition of the
Muslim League.
5. Fourthly, Jinnah may send in a list but refuse, either before or on 14th
July, to accept your provisional selection.
6. If you have to deal with the third or fourth situation the main question
1 This document falls chronologically between Nos. 548 and 549 in Vol. V.
JUNE 1945
789
will be whether you are prepared to go ahead without the Muslim League. You
would certainly need Cabinet authority in order to do so, and I am doubtful
whether an Executive Council consisting mainly of Congressmen and non-
League Muslims would work. The Congressmen would control the Press and
the Legislature, the non-League Muslims would be entirely dependent upon
them for political support, and the Muslim League would be implacably
hostile. This is a subject on which I think you should get the advice of
Governors now, and I submit a draft.2
7. I have not dealt in detail above with the implications of complete success
or complete failure. For all the apparent reasonableness of Congress, I think
that Congress would cooperate only subject to certain mental reservations.
They will be determined to keep their party organisation in an active state,
and they can do so only by allowing great latitude to leaders who do not take
office. The recent speeches of Nehru and unfriendly comments of Patel are a
foretaste of what may be expected. As long as the leaders outside the Council
confine themselves to bitter abuse of the British, perhaps no great harm will
be done. But if they preach against the Muslim League, or press for revenge
against officials or loyalists, there will be a good deal of trouble. These risks
have always been present, and complete success would undoubtedly be
followed by a most uneasy period of six months or more.
8. Complete failure would lead to great disappointment, and, after a month
or so, to more or less violent reactions both communal and anti-British. If
these negotiations fail there is really no way out until something (e.g. the death
of Gandhi or Jinnah, or both) happens to change the outlook of the Congress
and the League. We should be in for a long period, perhaps a period of five
years or more,3 during which no political move of any importance could be
made. The present Executive Council has never been of any political import¬
ance, and it would be hardly worth while to retain incompetent Members
merely in order to present an ornamental political facade. You would probably
have to propose to HMG a reversion to an Executive Council largely official,
which would take hold of our big administrative problems and really attempt
to deal with them. In the Provinces you would have to delay the restoration of
ministerial government until the attitude of the Congress (as a party in
opposition) to the Japanese war is very much clearer than it is now.4
E. M. JENKINS5
30.6.1945
2 For the telegram as sent to Governors, see Vol. V, No. 549.
3 Lord Wavell underlined the section reading ‘perhaps a period of five years or more’ and inserted a
question mark in the margin.
4 Lord Wavell commented in the margin against the last sentence: ‘Not quite clear’.
5 Lord Wavell commented in reply : ‘I approve draft and agree generally with your note but am doubtful
on one or two points. If I expressed intention to form a Council without League, would there be any
chance of its changing Jinnah’s attitude? W. 30/6/45/
790
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
Mr V. P. Menon to Sir E. Jenkins1
RI3N95: ff 36-8
7 July 1945
P.S.V.
You told, me that you would, like to have my views as to the policy I would
suggest in the event of the Muslim League not participating in the reconstruc¬
tion of the Executive Council.
2. The present situation recalls to my mind, the communal position in 1932.
In 193 1-32 the representatives of parties met in London under the chairmanship
of the Prime Minister. The Congress (represented by Gandhi), the Muslim
League and other minorities could not come to an agreement as to the
representation in the legislatures and the negotiations broke down. It was then
that H.M.G. produced what is known as the Communal Award which was
generally accepted by all parties and forms the basis of representation in the
legislatures under the Government of India Act, 1935.
Thirteen years later, we are confronted with a similar situation — this time
in relation to the composition of the Executive Council at the Centre and the
Ministries in the Provinces.
3. Up to 1935, Muslims, generally speaking, were under the impression that
their interests would be safeguarded if they could get adequate representation
in the legislatures. Thanks to the Congress policy of excluding all the other
parties from the Provincial Executive, the minorities learnt that the majority
party in the legislature could set at nought the wishes of the minorities and that
representation in the legislatures would not alone be a sufficient safeguard. This
was the real motive power behind Jinnah’s cry of Pakistan. Exclusion from a
share in the power was the real foundation on which the present position of the
Muslim League was built up. It is therefore not surprising that the cry of
Pakistan is more vociferous in the Provinces in which the Muslims are in a
minority than in the majority Muslim Provinces.
4. The present situation is different from the position in 1932 in one import¬
ant respect. For the first time in its history Congress has come in for co¬
operation without any conditions. This may be partly influenced by their
recognition of the fact that their past policy has not only not led them any¬
where but that every time the Congress went into the wilderness they had to
face communal demands more strident and far-reaching than before. Further,
there is an all-round desire in the Party to assume the functions of Government
1 This document falls chronologically between Nos. 571 and 572 in Vol. V.
JULY I945
791
not so much in the interests of the efficient prosecution of the war against Japan
as for purposes of post-war reconstruction. Their desire to cooperate may be
genuine, but this can only be tested by future events.
5. From the Muslim point of view the element of parity between them and
the Hindus is an advance on past proportions and is a fulfilment of the demand
made years ago by Jinnah that he would come on a 50:50 basis. That H.E.’s
proposal does not prejudice or prejudge Pakistan is an additional, if negative,
attraction to Jinnah. On the other hand, Jinnah’s fear is that, if he is not allowed
to nominate all the Muslim members to the Council, it will militate against
Muslim solidarity under the League banner and might eventually strike at the
root of the Pakistan demand. This is probably the reason why Congress has
come out and said that the selection of the Executive Council should be on the
basis of talent without any communal bias. Indeed I am told that at one stage
Gandhi suggested to the Congress Working Committee that the entire selec¬
tion could be left to H.E. and whatever Executive Council H.E. nominated
should be accepted by the Congress. But for the Muslim League to accept
membership of the Executive Council without its claim to nominate all the
Muslim members being conceded would amount to an open admission that
the League does not speak for all Muslims. Another result of accepting
membership would be that, since the issue of Pakistan would necessarily have
to be suspended during the continuance of the composite Government, the
League would have no more battle-cry to sustain its fight and would therefore
die of inanition.
6. As against this, the Muslim League has to face the fact that if it does not
now accept office, the Congress with the support of other elements will be able
to govern the country and in the long run the League’s position is bound to
deteriorate.
7. These are the two opposing considerations which may be expected to
sway the decision of the Muslim League; which view will win is difficult to
say, but my own reading of the situation is that the Muslim League would
submit a list and, if a break comes, it will be when H.E. discloses his own
selection.
8. The first question to be considered is whether we should concede the
claim of the Muslim League to nominate all the Muslim members of the
Executive Council. We are in this up against, first the Punjab, and secondly
the nationalist Muslims in the Congress. Having told the Congress that it does
not represent the whole of India, we cannot consistently agree with the Muslim
League that it represents all the Muslims. If then “each Party represents its own
members”, we shall be compelled to recognise that the Muslim League does
not represent all the Muslims, in the same way that the Congress does not
792
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
represent all the interests of Indians. In other words, we cannot accept the
Muslim League claims in their entirety.
9. What then are the alternatives that we have to consider? On the basic
assumption that the Punjab cannot be allowed to go unrepresented, the question
will be whether a Muslim representation of 4 Leaguers and 1 Unionist will be
acceptable to Jinnah. My own feeling is that Jinnah may agree to this, but it may
be unacceptable to the Congress. On the other hand, the Congress may be
prepared to restrict its own members to 3 if the Muslim League does likewise,
the remaining 4 seats in a Council of 15 being filled by 2 non-League Muslims
and 2 non-Congress Hindus. My inclination is to try the second alternative
first, and, if Jinnah resists it to the point of a breakdown, to offer him the first
alternative arrangement provided the Congress is agreeable to it.
10. We still have to reckon with the possibility that Jinnah will agree to
neither of the two alternatives, but will insist upon nominating all the Muslim
members of the Council. This, as I said before, we cannot concede. Are we then
to treat the position as a breakdown of the Conference? The Conference except
for the Muslim League will in all likelihood accept H.E.’s plan, whatever it may
be; and there is a general desire in the country that there should be some sort of
settlement. For the first time since 1917 the Congress, the largest organised
party in India, has unequivocally declared its attitude as one of cooperation.
The attitude of the Congress has always been most in our thoughts in con¬
nection with all constitutional reforms in the past. In all our previous reforms
proposals, from the Minto-Morley reforms up to date, the attitude of the
Congress has in the long run been decisive for the fate of the scheme. If the
Conference breaks down, the Congress will probably turn their attention to the
Provinces and after capturing power in most of them, carry on a fight against
the Centre both inside the Government and outside. Again, I cannot say what
forces the continued political frustration will generate in another 4 or 5 years,
but the situation will undoubtedly be full of peril. Nor would the Muslim
League, if we break with the Congress for its sake, have sufficient strength or
influence to help us out.
11. I venture to think that the issue of the ultimate relationship between
India and England will be decided by the manner in which the present oppor¬
tunity is treated. On a broad view the situation has not for a long time been so
propitious for an amicable settlement between the two countries, and it would
be a tragedy not to take advantage of the opportunity. I therefore feel that we
should not allow the Conference to break and must, if need be, reconstitute the
Executive Council with the help of the Congress and such other elements as
are willing to cooperate.
12. Our next step should be, as soon as the lists are available, to select an
Executive Council on the basis of 3 Congress Hindus, 3 League Muslims, 2
JULY I945
793
non-League Muslims acceptable to the Congress and the Unionists as well as to
the League, 2 non-Congress Hindus, 1 Sikh, 1 Indian Christian and 1
Depressed Class member. With H.E. and the Commander-in-Chief, this will
make up a Council of 15. The selection of the non-League Muslims on this
basis is the most difficult and delicate part of these negotiations. We should then
consult the Party leaders. I am sure that all Parties will accept the list except
Jinnah. If Jinnah could be brought in, I would not consider it too great a
sacrifice to concede him four seats out of five. If H.E. appeals to Gandhi and
Azad that the Conference should not break down on this issue, I have every
reason to think that the Congress will accept it. It is of course possible that
things may not go according to plan, but this is the best estimate we can at
present make of the party reactions.
13 . If even this arrangement is not acceptable to the Muslim League, the plan
you suggested would be the best in the circumstances, namely, that H.E. should
state to the Conference and publicly the composition of the Council he would
be prepared to recommend to H.M.G. for appointment, the representation he is
prepared to give to the Muslim League and the general acceptance his proposal
has had among the other parties, and should also declare that if after one
month the Muslim League does not make up its mind to come in, H.E. would
proceed to reconstruct his Council on the lines he has decided upon.
v. P. MENON
7/7/45
3
Sir E. Jenkins to Field Marshal Viscount Wav ell1
RI3M95: .§'62-7
10 July 1945
H.E.
There is still a faint chance that the Conference will succeed, but it is much
more likely to fail, and I suggest that you now consider the consequences of its
failure and the possible courses of action open to you.
2. The immediate cause of the breakdown will almost certainly be Jinnah’s
refusal to agree to the admission to Council of any Muslim who does not
belong to the Muslim League. It is possible, but I think unlikely, that Jinnah
will accept, and Congress will reject, your list. But even if Congress do reject
it, they will justify themselves by saying that it virtually concedes Jinnah’s
1 This document falls chronologically between Nos. 583 and 584 in Vol. V.
794
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
claim. Jinnah will find it difficult to defend his position abroad and (except
among his own followers) in India. But there is a good deal more in his case
than appears at first sight, and in considering the position we must avoid
being unfair to him.
3. Jinnah and the Muslim League, and all Muslims who are not “nationalist”,
have, for years, been united in their dislike for, and distrust of, the Congress.
They see the Congress as an anti-British and pro-Hindu organization whose
main aim is a united, independent India, dominated by the Hindu community.
However sweet and reasonable the Congress leaders may be, there is much
arrogance and ruthlessness in the organization, and when the Congress Govern¬
ments were in power in many of the Provinces, little regard was paid to Muslim
views and aspirations. That is the general Muslim view. The first Muslim
reactions to HMG’s proposals were favourable because the proposals are, on
paper at least, more generous to the Muslims than any yet made. But as the
Conference proceeded, the idea gained ground that the Congress intended a
further infiltration of the Muslim ranks, and that the new Council would in
practice be a body in which the ordinary Muslim would be in a minority. So
far, I think Jinnah and Khizar would very largely agree. But Jinnah’s position
is complicated by disputes among the Muslims themselves, and he makes no
distinction between the different classes of Muslims outside the League. To him
Unionist Muslims seem to be as offensive, if not more offensive, than Congress
Muslims, and it is this feeling that has led to his extravagant claim. It is, how¬
ever, certain that most Muslims, both inside and outside the League, share his
fear of the Congress, and will approve his refusal to enter the Congress
parlour. It is not realised that HMG’s proposals are based on the sound political
theory that all revolutionary parties must come to earth at some time, and that
extremists in office rapidly cease to be extreme. Nor is it realised that by
entering the new Executive Council the Muslim League would be conceding
no principle, and in view of the right of Members of Council to resign, would
be in no danger of suppression by the Congress. What Jinnah, and with him
his colleagues and the average Muslim, have seen during the past fortnight or
so is an extraordinary output of Congress propaganda, and an apparent deter¬
mination on the part of the Congress to boost the nationalist Muslims at the
expense of the remainder. As I have said above, Jinnah may find his tactics
difficult to defend except to his own followers, but in so far as they are based
on distrust of the Congress, they will receive increasing sympathy from all
Muslims who are not in the nationalist camp. Jinnah’s reputation and power
are based largely on the belief that he is the only Muslim capable of standing up
to Gandhi, and he cannot easily abandon this role.
4. We must therefore expect on the Muslim side a genuine and increasing
sense of grievance. This will be manifested in organized “days” and demon-
JULY I945
795
strations in the towns and demands for a trial of strength with the Congress.
There will be much communal tension, to which Congress leaders will con¬
tribute by a flood of self-righteous propaganda. 1 doubt if the Muslim League
would initiate agitation against H.M.G. or the Viceroy unless an attempt was
made to form Governments at the Centre or in the Provinces without the
League. Should this happen, agitation would almost certainly become both
anti-Hindu and anti-British.
5. The Congress are traditionally a non-communal party. Any directly
communal vendetta will be carried on for them by the Mahasabha. The
Congress leaders will demand in the most reasonable way in the world —
(1) the formation of a political Executive Council without the League;
(2) the formation of Provincial ministries in the section 93 Provinces, also
without the League;
(3) the immediate release of all political prisoners.
Whether they will welcome an immediate trial of strength with the League
at general elections both at the Centre and in the Provinces I do not know.
They may have no strong feelings one way or the other about this. If their
demands are not met quickly and in full, they will revive their anti-British
agitation on familiar lines.
6. I think therefore that the main consequences of the failure of the Con¬
ference will be a period of acute and increasing communal tension, during
which Congress will put forward political demands quite unacceptable to the
Muslim League. If these demands are not conceded within a reasonable time,
Congress will resort to direct action. From Your Excellency’s point of view
there are four main things to be considered :
(i) The composition of the Executive Council.
(ii) Elections to the Central Legislature.
(iii) The formation of ministries in the Section 93 Provinces.
(iv) Elections to the Provincial Legislatures.
7. The composition of the Executive Council. Owing largely to the indiscretions
of its Members, the present Executive Council has almost ceased to function.
Some of the Members will probably wish to resign, and some reconstruction
of Council seems inevitable. The question is whether this reconstruction should
be on an efficiency basis or on a political basis. I do not entirely exclude re¬
construction to include Congressmen and non-League Muslims, but I think
that such a reconstruction would make the position in the Provinces even more
dangerous. It will be difficult enough if Congress ministries return to office
e.g. in the U.P. and Bombay2 in the teeth of League agitation, and if the Central
2 A marginal note by Sir E. Jenkins reads: ‘The Governor is fairly optimistic about Bombay. E.M.J.
10/7/45 •’
796
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
administration is also dominated by the Congress, the League may become
irreconcilable. I have already advised that your line will have to be decided
within, say, a month of the dispersal of the Conference, and the point you have
to bear in mind now is that, if you decide against a political reconstruction,
you will be rejecting what is likely to be the main Congress demand.
8. Central elections. These could be held this winter for the Assembly, and any
time after the budget session next year for the Council of State. I have so far
been opposed to early elections, and after the Conference disperses there is in
theory a good deal to be said against an immediate “trial of strength”. On the
other hand, the present Assembly is such a wretched body that there might be
practical advantages in deciding on Assembly elections this winter. They might
produce a better House, and as we are in for a spate of communal oratory any¬
how, they might not make communal feeling very much worse. I believe
party opinion about elections may be divided. But on the whole there may be
more opinion for, than against them.
9. Formation oj Provincial ministries. So far as I know, this would lead to no
grave difficulties in Madras, Bihar, the Central Provinces, and Orissa. In these
Provinces the Muslim minority is unimportant, and though the Congress
ministries might give the Governors a great deal of trouble, and even impede
the war effort if their main demands had not been met, I doubt if the communal
situation in any of them would be alarming.
On the other hand, in the U.P., Bengal, and possibly Bombay, the return of
Congress ministries to power might have serious communal repercussions.
Governors will of course have to be consulted about this, as about other
matters, when the Conference is over, and the policy towards Congress will
have to be more or less uniform. You will, I think, have to require an un¬
equivocal guarantee about support for the war effort, and also some guarantee
about the attitude of the Congress to the Muslim League. One cannot continue
Section 93 administrations indefinitely, and one of the reasons for HMG’s
proposals was that in the absence of a party settlement ministries would be
restored in the Section 93 Provinces in an extremely bad atmosphere. This is the
position that will now have to be faced.
10. Provincial elections. The holding of Provincial elections will, I think,
depend largely on the decision about Provincial ministries. If ministries return
to office elections will be necessary within the next year or so, and the Gover¬
nors have to settle the dates for them after ascertaining the views of their
respective Premiers. But if ministries do not return to office, elections need not
be held.
11. I have not dealt above with the inevitable Congress demand for the
release of all political prisoners. If a political Executive Council were formed
JULY I945
797
without the League, most of the prisoners would have to be released. But if the
Executive Council were merely reconstructed on an efficiency basis, the Con¬
gress would want the prisoners merely to strengthen their agitation, and I
think we should have to adhere to the present policy of gradual releases. It
will, however, be difficult to do so, as the pressure will be great. There are also
the 1942 cases in which the death sentences have not been executed, and in
most, if not all, of these cases I think you will probably have to commute the
sentences. Provincial Ministers would release most of the prisoners held by the
Provinces.
12. HMG’s proposals came as a shock not only to the present Members of the
Executive Council but to many, members of the Civil Services and “loyalist’ ’
Indians. You must recognise that on a breakdown of the Conference you will,
for a time at least, have lost the confidence of these classes without gaining that
of the political parties. There was much the same feeling during the Cripps
negotiations, but Lord Linlithgow was generally believed to be opposed to a
settlement, and I do not think that he personally lost much ground either with
Council or with the Services. Much Service opinion3 on politics is prejudiced
and unreasonable, but it is a factor to be taken into account.
13. I do not think there is anything we can do at the moment, but I suggest
that Your Excellency turn these matters over in your mind in the knowledge
that a definite line will have to be taken on them immediately after the Con¬
ference ends.
14. I think we should inform Governors of the present position, and I
submit a draft circular telegram.4
E. M. JENKINS
10/7/45
3 A marginal note by Sir E. Jenkins reads: ‘I strongly suspect, though I cannot prove, that there has been
official support for Jinnah’s obstinacy. E.M.J. 10/7/45.’
4 Lord Wavell commented: ‘Draft approved. W. 10/7/45.’ For the telegram as sent, see Vol. V, No. 584.
Mr Attlee to Lord Pethick-Lawrence 1
P.R.O. PREM 8/59
22 December 1943
My dear Pethick,
I have been turning over in my mind the problem of how to handle the Indian
1 This document falls chronologically between Nos. 308 and 312 in Vol. VI. Mr Attlee wrote an identical
letter of the same date to Sir Stafford Cripps. There is no reply from Cripps on the file.
798
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
situation. We are now committed to taking action as soon as the elections2 have
been concluded. Hitherto we have thought along the lines of the Viceroy
dealing with elected representatives. I think you share my doubts as to whether
Wavell has sufficient political nous to deal with this situation. He has not the
political training.
Our problem has been to see who else could do the job. There is one man
in our ranks of outstanding capacity who has the confidence of people of all
political views and who has proved himself a most skilful reconciler of con¬
tending factions, Tom Johnston.
I do not think that he would be prepared to take on the Viceroyalty. He is too
wedded to Scotland but he might, I think, be prepared to take on a special
commission.
Do you consider that it would be possible, while leaving Wavell to carry on
the Government of India, to send Tom Johnston as a special commissioner with
full powers from the Cabinet to make a settlement with the Indian political
leaders ? He would, in fact, be a plenipotentiary.
Such an appointment would, I think, strike the imagination of the Indians.
Tom has, as you know, some experience of India.3 It would strike out an
entirely new line, because he would be divorced from the machine of Indian
administration. It would, I think, make an appeal to Indians as a novel line of
development, in which India is recognised by Britain as a political entity with
which an accommodation has to be reached. We could, of course, provide him
with any technical constitutional advisers, as, for instance, Sir Maurice Gwyer,
who is very widely trusted in India, but essentially it should be a one man job.
I should like to know your reactions to this suggestion.
Yours ever,
CLEM
2 i.e. to the Central Legislative Assembly and to the Provincial Assemblies.
3 No mention is made of such experience in the article on Tom Johnston in the Dictionary of National
Biography, 1961-70, Oxford University Press, 1981.
DECEMBER 1945
799
5
Lord Pethick-Lawrence to Mr Attlee1
Prime Minister,
P.R.O. PREM 8I59
MEMO ON INDIA
26 December 1945
1 am attracted by your idea of sending a plenipotentiary to India. I agree with
you that it is essential to take a bold initiative, and also that there is a grave risk
that the Viceroy (partly owing to his personal qualities and inexperience of
politics, and partly owing to the aloofness of his official position) if left to
himself will fail to bring off a settlement.
I had however hitherto assumed that if we were to send a negotiator
(plenipotentiary or other) from here it would have to be a cabinet minister, or
preferably two2-— not necessarily both present there all the time.
My first reaction to your proposal is to see the following advantages : —
(1) it is a complete novelty
(2) it byepasses officialdom
(3) its failure would not involve the Cabinet
finally — we might still try again.
My question marks are: —
(1) Would T.J. be likely to accept?
(2) Has he or could he acquire the necessary background on India, which
would justify such complete confidence in him [?]
(3) Could the Viceroy submit to being superseded, in effect, by anyone
other than a Cabinet Minister?
Personally though I am aware of the Viceroy’s limitations 1 am told he has
won confidence of Indian leaders because of his sincerity. If he resigned it might
be believed that he was disposed to be more liberal than HMG.
I will give further consideration to your proposal.3
PETHICK-LAWRENCE
1 This document falls chronologically between Nos. 314 and 315 in Vol. VI.
2 Emphasis in original.
3 There is no further correspondence on this subject from Lord Pethick-Lawrence on the file.
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
800
Note by Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck 1
L/WS/ 1/1092 : ff 51-6
TOP SECRET GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, DELHI,
11 May 1946
A NOTE ON THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE
inclusion of “Pakistan” in the British commonwealth
ASSUMPTIONS
1. It is assumed
(a) That India divides into two independent autonomous States — Hindustan
and Pakistan.
(b) That Pakistan may consist of two parts — a Western zone and an Eastern
zone, or of a Western zone only, comprising Sind, Baluchistan, the NWF
Province and the Western Punjab.
(c) That HMG in the United Kingdom decide to leave Hindustan to its own
devices and to have no more intimate dealings with it than the diplomatic and
commercial relations usual between two friendly sovereign powers. HMG
undertake no responsibility for the defence of Hindustan.
(d) On the other hand, HMG in the United Kingdom agree to the inclusion
of Pakistan in the British Commonwealth as an autonomous Dominion
having the same status as Canada, Australia etc, and, at Pakistan’s request, to
lend her British sea, land and air forces and British personnel to aid in her
administration and defence.
COMMONWEALTH STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN
OCEAN AREA
2. Vital Commonwealth strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Area are: —
(a) The oil supplies from Persia and Iraq.
(b) Control of the Western entrance to the Indian Ocean — the Red Sea.
(c) Control of the Eastern entrance to the Indian Ocean — Singapore and the
Malacca Straits.
1 This document falls chronologically between Nos. 249 and 259 in Vol. VII. The note was forwarded with
a letter dated 12 May 1946 from Field Marshal Auchinleck to General Mayne. A map was also enclosed.
Mayne replied on 20 May 1946 and commented as follows in a separate minute of the same date:
T. No copies of this note to be made, and I want no marginal comments other than the few which
I have made myself.
The Appreciation is full of interest and very sound but is, I think, academic, since the one thing that
seems reasonably certain is that the assumption on which the Appreciation is based is wrong. There is not
likely to be an independent Pakistan within the British Commonwealth and an autonomous Hindu¬
stan outside it.’
L/WS/1/1092: ff 58, 49 and 48.
MAY 1946
80I
(d) Ability to use the air routes across Arabia, Iraq, the Arabian Sea, India,
Burma and Malaya.
(e) The control of Ceylon, for use as a port of call and a naval and air base.
Should India2 be unfriendly or liable to be influenced by a power, such as
Russia, China or Japan, hostile to the British Commonwealth, our strategic
position in the Indian Ocean would become untenable and our communica¬
tions with New Zealand and Australia most insecure.
3. A Hindustan outside the British Commonwealth might very well be
tempted, in order to give effect to an inevitable urge to conquer and absorb
Pakistan, and thus restore the unity of India, to throw in her lot with Russia.
Russia with her taste for power politics and gangster methods would be likely
to take full advantage of any such tendency on the part of Hindustan.
A Russian influenced Hindustan might well constitute such a menace to the
security of the British Commonwealth as to cause its early dissolution.
INFLUENCE OF A BRITISH CONTROLLED PAKISTAN ON
HINDUSTAN
4. In theory it might appear that a Pakistan under British influence could
act as a check to the hostile potentialities of an independent Hindustan. Even
if Pakistan comprised North-East as well as North-West India, a proposition
which seems extremely unlikely to materialise owing to the great difficulties
inherent in it, it is very doubtful if Pakistan would have the necessary resources
in raw material, industrial production, manpower, and, above all the requisite
space, to enable it to become a base for warlike operations against a Hindustan,
supported and equipped by a hostile power such as Russia.
If as seems more than likely, Pakistan were to be restricted to North-West
India, it would most certainly not be adequate as a base for operations on a
grand scale.
5. As atomic energy develops and weapons of all sorts, whether on the sea,
on the land or in the air, improve, depth in the defence and adequate space for
the dispersion of base installations, including industrial plants, must become
increasingly essential in war.
A united India has these qualifications, as would an independent Hindustan.
Pakistan even if it includes North-East India, could never possess them.
6. It follows, therefore, that Pakistan, whether it has two zones or the
North-West India zone only, will not provide the means by which the British
Commonwealth can hope to influence or coerce an independent Hindustan
and keep it free of hostile foreign influences, so as to ensure the security of our
communications through the Indian Ocean area.
General Mayne underlined the word India and commented in the margin : ‘Hindustan ?’
802
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
If we cannot secure these vital communications, it would seem that the break
up of the British Commonwealth is likely to follow before very long. 3
THE PROBLEM OF THE DEFENCE OF PAKISTAN
7. (a) Apart from the question of safeguarding our communications in the
Indian Ocean area, must be considered the probable reaction of an independent
Hindustan to a Pakistan under British influence and included in the British
Commonwealth.
(b) The separation of Hindustan from Pakistan instead of eliminating the
fundamental enmity of the Hindu for the Muslim is likely to inflame it. Any
attempt to establish a Pakistan zone in North-East India, which if it is to be
effective at all, must include Calcutta and a very large Hindu population, is
certain to be strenuously resisted by the Hindus.
(c) Should by some means or other, the Hindus be brought to agree to the
setting up of such a zone, they will almost certainly at once start planning and
working for its eventual elimination and reunion with Hindustan. A Hindustan
without Calcutta and the control of the Bay of Bengal is not a practical
proposition and the realisation of this by the Hindus will inevitably lead to war
between Hindustan and Pakistan. In this event, HMG in the United Kingdom
would be committed to fight for the retention of this zone by Pakistan and
might well become involved in a world war4 on this account.
8. (a) The actual defence of North-East Pakistan from the purely military
point of view would be an extremely difficult problem, as the area could in no
sense provide the needs of an army or an air force adequate for its defence, and
these would be almost entirely dependent on sea communications for their
needs. These sea communications would be most vulnerable to attack by sea
and air forces based on Hindustan and could in no sense be considered reliable.
Moreover the attitude of Burma, which would presumably be independent,
cannot be predicted.
Burma influenced by China, as it always must be, might well be hostile to
the British Commonwealth and see, in a quarrel between Hindustan and
Britain, a chance of improving her position. The possibility of North-East
Pakistan having to defend itself from attack from the West as well as from the
East and South cannot be excluded, and would make the problem well nigh
insoluble. There can be little doubt that the drain on the resources of HMG in
the United Kingdom would be immense and incalculable.
(b) Even supposing that Pakistan consisted of a North-Western zone only,
3 General Mayne underlined the section from ‘break up’ to ‘very long’ and commented in the margin:
‘I disagree’.
4 General Mayne underlined the words ‘in a world war’ and commented in the margin: ‘i.e. against
Russia’.
MAY 1946
803
the strategic problems involved in its defence would be many and difficult
to solve.
Ihe North-West Pakistan area is not self-supporting in any way, except
possibly as regards cereals, it has practically no raw material or industrial
capacity and all war material would have to be provided from overseas for
many years to come. It has one port only — Karachi — seaward and landward
approaches to which are constricted and most vulnerable to air attack.
For many years to come, Pakistan cannot hope to produce officers and tech¬
nicians for the land and air forces necessary for her own protection, though it
should be possible to produce sufficient men of the right quality for such forces.
(c) Physically, North-West Pakistan, like most other countries, has
advantages and disadvantages from the defence point of view.
Assuming that it will absorb or at any rate, dominate Kashmir, North-West
Pakistan cannot be seriously threatened from the North, protected as it is by the
Himalayas, though it might be vulnerable to a limited extent to air attack from
bases in Sinkiang.
The deserts of Rajputana and Sind similarly preclude any large scale attack
by land from the South, and this is true also of the approach from the West
through the wastes of Mekran, though the possibility of offensive operations
on these fronts by mobile armoured and mechanised forces supplied by air
cannot be excluded.
Pakistan would, however, be open to attack by land on a large scale from
the North-W est and South-East.
Good communications within a country to be defended are essential to
successful resistance and North-West Pakistan would be reasonably well
provided with railways and roads running towards her Eastern and Western
frontiers, and she would have good lateral railway communications. Her
weakness in respect of communications would lie in the fact that the Indus
and the great rivers of the Punjab run from North-East to South-West at right
angles to her main arteries of communication and because the bridges over
them are few and far between and vulnerable to air attack. This disadvantage
would probably outweigh in modem war any advantage which these rivers
might confer as lines of defence.
No power is now-a-days likely to venture to attack another unless it is
reasonably sure of having initial superiority in the air.
(d) Let us first take the threat from the North-West. The aggressor would be
Russia, supported possibly by Persia and Afghanistan, possibly unwilling but
sovietised and coerced.
The problem of the defence of India against Russian aggression is of course
an old one, and the considerations involved in the problem of resistance to it
have been, and still are, continuously under review.
In the circumstances we are now considering the problem takes a new
8c>4
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
aspect because here we have Pakistan as a sovereign Muslim state controlling
its own destinies, whereas before, the ruling power was Britain, a non-Muslim
state and, therefore, disliked, suspected and feared by Afghanistan, and, also
Persia.
This change of affinities may it is true ease the problem of defence of the
Western frontier of Pakistan to a considerable extent, but in view of the well
known powers of infiltration and seduction possessed by Soviet Russia, it
would be unwise to rely on it as a permanent solvent of the defence problem.
It is true that, in the conditions likely to prevail in any future war, a land
invasion on a large scale of North-West Pakistan, through Northern Afghanis¬
tan over the passes of the Hindu Kush and the defiles of the Khyber and the
Kurram, is most improbable.
Any land offensive against Pakistan from the West is likely to be made via
Kandahar against Quetta and the Bolan Pass with the object of severing the
railways leading from Karachi into the interior of the country and thus
depriving its armies and air forces of their only source of supply of munitions of
war.
It is true that the communications leading from Russia to Kandahar and
beyond it are as yet undeveloped and that their development would take time
and could not pass unnoticed. Nevertheless, given proper preparation a rapid
advance by mechanised and armoured forces supplied partly by air is not an
impossibility, as was proved in the campaigns in the Libya in the recent war.
Quetta is connected with the rest of Pakistan by a single line of railway running
through a narrow defile and extremely vulnerable to air attack, besides being
liable to periodic interruption by flood and earthquake. The approaches to
Quetta from the West are much more suitable to the deployment and move¬
ment of mechanised forces on a wide front than are the approaches from the
East through Sibi, although the Khwaja Amran range just West of Quetta
does provide a defensive position of some value, but of little depth. The total
length of frontier to be watched and defended by Pakistan is about 500 miles
from Peshawar to Kalat. It must be assumed, therefore, that the British will be
required to provide at least fifty squadrons of aircraft and ten divisions5 of
troops to assist in the defence of the Western frontier of Pakistan against a
determined Russian attack, as the forces which Pakistan would be able to main¬
tain from her own very limited resources, must of necessity be small, however
efficient they may be.
All these forces whether provided by Britain or Pakistan would be completely
dependent for their maintenance, except perhaps as regards food, on the one
port of Karachi and on one line of railway leading thence to the main zone of
operations. As already pointed out, Karachi and the approaches to it are very
5 General Mayne underlined the words ‘fifty squadrons of aircraft and ten divisions’ and commented in
the margin: ‘A summary estimate of questionable accuracy’.
MAY 1946
805
open to air attack from the South and North-West, and the sea approaches
would also be liable to submarine and surface attack by craft based in the
Persian Gulf, which in the circumstances we are considering, would almost
certainly be controlled by Russia.
The supply of the forces in the Middle East from 1940 to 1943 was difficult
enough when shipping had to use the Cape route, but it would be easy com¬
pared with the problem of maintaining an army and air force operating on the
Western frontier of Pakistan in a major war.
(e) The frontier between Hindustan and North-West Pakistan must run
through the flat plains of the Central or Eastern Punjab, and thence through the
equally featureless, from the defence point of view, deserts of Northern
Rajputana and the Southern Punjab, until it reaches the sea just South of
Karachi.
Even if it were to follow one of the rivers of the Punjab such as the Ravi or
the Sutlej or even the Jumna, this would not give a really defensible frontier.
The communications running from the interior of Hindustan towards the
frontiers of Pakistan are reasonably good and capable of maintaining consider¬
able land forces in the Northern sector of the common frontier. Though less
good in the Western or Rajputana sector, where they consist of metre gauge
railway lines, they could support light mobile forces capable of striking at the
rich corn producing areas of the South-Western Punjab.
Pakistan then, would be open to heavy attack by land forces on a front of
some 100 miles from Jullundur to Bhatinda, and to lesser attack by light forces
on a front of about 500 miles from Bhatinda to Kotri on the Indus above
Karachi.
As the initiative and choice of the point of attack would lie with the
aggressor, the whole of this long front would have to be watched even though it
might be possible to hold the bulk of the main land forces more or less centrally
in reserve.
The weight of the attack by land which Hindustan would be able to deliver
would depend on the extent to which she had developed her industries and
resources and raw materials, which would certainly be much greater than those
of Pakistan, and on the amount of assistance in personnel, arms and equipment,
she had received from any overseas ally, such as Russia. Hindustan as a base for
warlike operations on a big scale, whether on the sea, on land or in the air, is,
and always must be, vastly superior to Pakistan, while her communications are
far less concentrated and thus far less vulnerable to attack by sea or from the air.
Hindustan in fact, would be an efficient base for modern war, which Pakistan
can never be. Assuming then, that Hindustan is unlikely to attack until she had
organised and equipped adequate air and land forces, which she can do as
quickly if not more quickly than Pakistan, it seems certain, even if Hindustan
8o6
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
attacked Pakistan without the overt aid of Russia, that Britain would have to
provide large air and land forces to ensure the integrity of Pakistan.
All these forces would be dependent for their maintenance on the single
port of Karachi and on the 800 miles of railway thence to Lahore and Bhatinda.
These railways would be exposed to attack throughout their length by mobile
enemy forces operating from bases in Rajputana and by air forces based on
existing airfields in Kathiawar and Rajputana.
(f) If Pakistan were to be attacked simultaneously, as is possible, by Russia
from the North-West and by Hindustan from the South-East, then the air and
land forces which would have to be provided by Britain to ensure its defence,
would be very large indeed, as big if not bigger than those absorbed in the
defence of the Middle East before the forces of the Axis were expelled from
North Africa. It is most unlikely that forces of this size could be maintained
through the solitary port of Karachi, even if they could be provided by the
British Commonwealth when it no longer has the manpower of India to draw
upon as it had in the recent struggle.
CONCLUSION
9. (a) The inclusion of Pakistan in the British Commonwealth of Nations
and the assumption by Britain or the British Commonwealth of the consequent
responsibility for its defence could be justified on the following grounds: —
(i) That it would enable us so to dominate and control an independent
Hindustan as to prevent her or her potential allies from disrupting our sea and
air communications in the Indian Ocean area.
(ii) That it would aid us in maintaining our influence over the Muslim
countries of the Near and Middle East and so assist us to prevent the ad¬
vance of Russia towards the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.
(b) If the arguments contained in this note are being based on correct
surmises, it seems perfectly clear that the first of these objects is unattainable,
because of the large forces which its achievement would require, relative to the
resources likely to be available to the British Commonwealth, at the outbreak
of a major war.
If the first object cannot be achieved, it would be useless to attempt to achieve
the second, because it would be quite obvious to all the Muslim countries, that
Britain had ceased to be a power in Asia.
(c) If we desire to maintain our power to move freely by sea and air in the
Indian Ocean area, which I consider essential to the continued existence of the
British Commonwealth,6 we can do so only by keeping in being a United
India which will be a willing member of that Commonwealth, ready to share in
its defence to the limit of her resources.7
C. J. AUCHINLECK
6 General Mayne underlined the section from ‘which I consider’ to ‘British Commonwealth* and com¬
mented in the margin: ‘I do not’.
7 cf. Vol. VII, No. 295, para. 7.
MAY 1946
Sir J. Colville to Lord Pethick-Lawrence1
L/PO/ 126: ff 7-8
SECRET & PERSONAL THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI,
21 February
My dear Pethick-Lawrence,
This is rather a painful letter to write. I am so unhappy and disappointed about
the manner of Wavell’s retirement, and out of sympathy with the step that has
just been taken, that I must put my thoughts on paper to you. 1 have been
privileged to work fairly closely with Wavell, owing to the fact that I have
been called on several times to act for him, and I admire very greatly his courage,
vision and patience. Whatever may be the ultimate result of H.M.G.’s policy in
India I feel that the Government owe him more than any other public servant.
Further while I agree that the announcement of a date to demit responsibility
whether the main parties have come to an agreement or not might by circum¬
stances be forced on H.M.G., I regret that the statement has been made at this
stage when I think further negotiation was possible, and I am not at all sure
that the statement will have the result that H.M.G. desires.2 My time in Bombay
ends in March 1948 and in the circumstances I have mentioned I would feel
disposed to offer my resignation but for the following considerations. Wavell
to whom I have spoken has strongly urged me not to do so as it would em¬
barrass Mountbatten. A decision having been made, nothing I can do will
alter it, and that being the case I do not want to leave a difficult post. However,
I should be very grateful if you would show this letter to the Prime Minister,
and if you and he feel, knowing my views, that you would prefer to replace me
with someone else, I shall have no complaint to make, but I should be grateful
for an early answer
I return to Bombay tomorrow.3
Yours sincerely,
JOHN COLVILLE
1 This document falls chronologically between Nos. 438 and 446 in Vol. IX.
2 cf. ibid.. No. 403.
3 Upon receipt of this letter and a covering letter (which is not on the file) from Lord Pethick-Lawrence,
Mr Attlee commented: ‘I agree with you that it would be unfortunate if Colville retires at this juncture.
I think, therefore, that you should write to him as you suggest.’ On 4 March Pethick-Lawrence wrote to
Sir J. Colville assuring him that ‘there is no question whatever of our underestimating Wavell’s many
great qualities . . . ’, and explaining that the decision to announce a date to demit responsibility had been
taken ‘only after the most earnest consideration . . . of the problem confronting us in India and with a full
realisation of the magnitude of the issues at stake.’ Pethick-Lawrence also conveyed his and the Prime
Minister’s appreciation of Colville’s readiness to remain as Governor of Bombay and concluded ‘we
have no hesitation whatever in telling you that we are sure that it is in the interests of India that you
should do so.’ Colville replied on 15 March assuring the Prime Minister and Pethick-Lawrence of his
‘readiness to do my utmost as Governor of Bombay in this critical and decisive period’. L/PO/126:
ff 6, 4 and 2.
Appendix II
Errata et Corrigenda
Documents
2, Enclosure (p. 4)
80 (p. 128)
97 (p. 146)
126, Enclosure (p. 172)
144 (p. 196)
146 (p. 202)
460 (p. 574)
547 (p- 689)
Index of Persons
p. 901
Index of Subjects
p. 918
Introduction
p. xi
Documents
101 (p. 146)
332 (p. 466)
VOLUME I
Note 2. Lines 13, 15, 17 and 18. For ‘Sir Srinivasa
Sastri’ read ‘Mr Srinivasa Sastri’. (see also entry on
p. 9n).
Line 22. ‘Lord Sinha was the son of the First Baron
Sinha of Raipur’ should read ‘Dr Sachchidanand
Sinha was a former Vice-Chancellor of Patna
University’.
Note 1. col. refs, should read ‘621-5’.
Note 2. col. refs, should read ‘582-92’.
In the sentence in square brackets at the end of
para. 2, for ‘No. 628’ read ‘No. 640’.
The date of this letter should read ‘29 December
1941’.
Add to note 1 ‘. . . but see reference on p. 197 to
the Manchester Guardian of 18 February.’
Lines 17-18. After ‘next’ insert [? net].
Line 17. After ‘repeating’ insert [? repealing].
Note 3. For ‘Not printed’ read ‘Not traced’.
bose, Subhas Chandra. In line 4, for ‘Jan. 1942’
read ‘Jan. 1941’.
DEFENCE OF INDIA ACT AND RULES. In
line 1, for ‘142’ read ‘143’.
VOLUME 11
First number on last line should read ‘102’.
Note 1. For ‘No. 98’ read ‘No’ 99’.
Note 2. For ‘No. 336’ read ‘No. 320’.
808
APPENDIX II
APPENDIX II 809
Glossary
p. 1009
pa than entry. For ‘Pushto’ read ‘Pushtu’.
Index oj Persons
p. 1021
johnstone, Harcourt, M.P. For ‘(Lab)’ read
‘(Lib)’.
p. 1023
lumley. For ‘Sir Laurence Roger’ read ‘Sir
Lawrence Roger’.
p. 1027
p. 1027
quisling, vidkun . In line 3 , for ‘460’ read ‘455’.
radcliffe, Cyril John. For ‘Q.C.’ read ‘K.C.’.
Abbreviations
VOLUME III
p. XX
The entry for E.C.O. should read ‘Emergency
Commissioned Officer’.
Summaries
315 (p. lxiv)
Line 2. Delete ‘15’.
Index of Persons
p. 1087
For ‘wakeley’ read ‘wakely’.
Index oj Persons
p. 1252
VOLUME IV
barlow, Brigadier Alfred Edmund. In line 2, for
p. 1252
‘Midnapore’ read ‘Khargpur’.
bell, Frank Owen. In line 2, for ‘October 1936’
read ‘April 1943’.
Summaries
VOLUME V
p. xcii
‘472’ should read ‘471’.
Documents
53 (p- 103)
Note 7, last line. The reference should read
‘L/P&S/12/4629’.
412, Enclosure (p. 961)
Note 3, first line. The reference for the War
Cabinet Paper should read W.P. (45) 273 of 26
April 1945’.
556 (p. 1185)
Para. 1, lines 11-2. For ‘Khaliq Zaman’ read
‘ Khali q-uz-Zaman ’ .
8io
APPENDIX II
Index of Persons
p. 1307
P- !323
p- 1323
p. 1330
Index of Subjects
p. 1345
Documents
16 (p. 39)
p. 1097
Documents
380 (p. 678); see also
Introduction (p. xxvii,
lines 13-14)
bose, Subhas Chandra. In line 10, for ‘4 July 1941’
read ‘4 July 1943’.
‘mad an 1, Husain Ahmed 622’ should be inserted
between ‘McNeil, Hector’ and ‘madni, Hasan’.
madni, Hasan. Document reference should read
‘556’ only.
For ‘sharma, Brij Laf read ‘sharma, p.d.’.
Column 2, third entry. For ‘Rowland’s’ read
‘Rowlands’ ’.
VOLUME VII
Note 2. Sir A. Clow’s booklet dated 29 October
1945 on ‘The future Government of the Assam
Tribal Peoples’ (Shillong, Assam Government
Press, 1945, 53 + iv pp.) may be found in the
Cripps Papers at the Public Record Office (P.R.O.
127/88).
j at entry. For ‘north-east’ read ‘north-west’ as
stated in the Glossaries of other Volumes.
VOLUME IX
The text of the Prime Minister’s announcement on
the Viceroyalty as made in the House of Commons
following immediately upon the Statement of 20
February 1947 [No. 438] was as reprinted in No.
3 80 except that :
Lines 3-4 read ‘after having held high military
command in South-East Asia, the Middle East
and India . . . ’.
Line 10, in brackets, read ‘Rear- Admiral the
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma’.
Line 13. After ‘prosperity of India’ the following
was inserted : ‘He will remain on the active list, in
accordance with his wish that his future employ¬
ment in the Royal Navy shall not be prejudiced.
I feel sure that the whole House will wish Lord
Mountbatten well in his great task.’
APPENDIX II
8n
Documents
106 (p. 165)
132 (p. 213)
178 (p. 330)
VOLUME X
Note 2 should read ‘Not traced’. (Document No.
100 is the reply to No. 95).
Insert T between ‘7th December.’ at foot of page
213 and ‘pointed out’ at top of page 214.
The date of this letter should read ‘19 April 1947’.
.
INDEX OF PERSONS
WITH BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
FOR THE PERIOD 8 JULY-15 AUGUST 1947
The extensive correspondence of the Secretary of State (Lord Listowel) and the Viceroy
(Lord Mountbatten), whether written or telegraphed, can be readily followed in the
Summary of Documents at the beginning of the Volume and for that reason it is not
listed again in this Index.
Neither previous nor subsequent changes in office are listed unless they have an immediate
relevance to the contents of this Volume. A list giving the names of principal holders of
office in this period is to be found on pages xxxv-xxxviii.
The references are to Document Numbers
ABBAS KHAN, KHAN MUHAMMAD of
Mansehra, Hazara district, M.L.A.,
N.W.F.P. 1946-7 394, 481
Abbott, Stuart, Evelyn, I.C.S., Secretary
to the Governor of the Punjab 1946-7
3, 131, 299, 305, 306, 377, 391
ABDUL GHAFFAR KHAN S£C GHAFFAR
KHAN
abdul qaiyum khan, Deputy Leader
of Congress in Indian Legislative
Assembly; resigned and joined Muslim
League July/ Aug. 1945 188, 394, 481
enc.
abdul rehman khan, Major-General,
Army Minister, Alwar 1947 372
abdullah, Begum, wife of Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah 280
abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Presi¬
dent, National Conference, Kashmir;
President, All-India States People’s Con¬
ference; later Prime Minister of Kashmir
129, 249, 260, 269
abell, Sir George Edmond Brackenbury,
I.C.S., Private Secretary to the Viceroy
from 1946 ; informs Turnbull of proposed
composition of Arbitral Tribunal 16,
18; at Viceroy’s staff meetings 53, 76,
99, 108, 191, 256, 319, 369, 389, 436;
sent to Calcutta to enquire about
progress of partition work 65 ; and
supply of arms to States 66; his note
on Punjab situation 81, 82; at meet¬
ing of Indian Cabinet 127; and supply
of advance information about Boundary
Award to Punjab Governor 131, 190,
377, 39H his views on proposed
Boundary Force 134; at meeting of
Partition Council 148 ; records Mount-
batten’s interview with Nishtar about
Kalat 159; is to leave India on Inde¬
pendence 162; and distribution of
portfolios in provisional government of
Pakistan 173; and Cunningham’s
appointment as Governor of N.W.F.P.
180; at Viceroy’s twenty first miscel¬
laneous meeting 184; supplied by
V. P. Menon with material for the
Viceroy about Travancore 185;
records Jenkins’ views on action against
Sikh leaders 189; supplies information
to Punjab Boundary Commission 196;
comments on Bhopal’s letter to Mount-
batten 201 n; and Henderson’s remarks
on Boundary Commission’s terms of
reference 206, 216; thinks chance of
Hyderabad acceding to Indian Dominion
small 241 n; addressed by V. P. Menon
about Dholpur 242; and looser asso-
814
INDEX OF PERSONS
ABELL ( cont .):
ciation within the Commonwealth and
right of secession 268, 314, 430; and
return of Political Department’s records
to the States 271, 285 ; and proposal to
put pressure on Kartar Singh 272 n,
298, 305; and visit of Gandhi or Nehru
to Kashmir 280; and threatened Civil
Disobedience in Travancore 288; and
interpretation of Boundary Commis¬
sion’s terms of reference regarding
Sylhet 318; minutes on Kalat 330 n;
minutes on Jenkins’ memorandum of
4 August 337 enc. n; and possible
arrest of Tara Singh 338, 345 n, 346,
359, 403; has talk with Jinnah on
6 August 361 ; and letter from Maharaja
of Patiala 378; and resignation of Kak
456; and reinforcement of Punjab
Boundary Force 473 ; Mountbatten
pays tribute to his services 488; also
8 n, 31 n, 33 n, 40, 54 n, 60 n, 79 n, 98,
no n, 128, 186, 207, 213, 228 n, 234 n,
240, 278 n, 303 n, 307, 315, 317, 355 n,
339 n, 365, 379, 385, 418, 454 n, 483, 489
abida sultaan, Princess, eldest
daughter and heir of the Nawab of
Bhopal 385, 412, 426, 435
addis, John Mansfield, Junior Private
Secretary to the Prime Minister 1945-7
316, 443, 483
addison, 1st Viscount of Stalling-
borough cr. 1945 (Christopher Addison),
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
(later Commonwealth Relations) from
1945 10, 14, 157, 243, 261, 368, 443
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, INDIA S6C
SAVORY
ADVOCATE-GENERAL, N.W.F.P. SCO
KHUDA BAKSH
AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER See ALI
MAHOMED KHAN
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF,
INDIA see W ALMS LEY
aiyar (aiyer, iyer) Sir C. P.
Ramaswami, Diwan of Travancore
from 1936 6, 58, 65, 93, 104, 106, 146,
154, 163, 175, 185, 192, 202, 203, 218,
228, 234, 239, 265, 284, 288, 297, 302,
313, 317, 335, 383, 402
akbar (1542-1605) Moghul Emperor of
India 1556-1605 489 annex II
akhtar husain, i.c.s., Chief Secre¬
tary, Punjab 1947 90
AKHTAR HUSSAIN (HUSAIN), I.C.S.,
Deputy Secretary, States Department
1947 37, 61, 65, 150, 159, 174, 375 enc.
akram, Abu Saleh Mohamed, Judge of
the High Court, Calcutta from 1940;
Member of the Bengal Boundary Com¬
mission 488 annex
Alexander, Albert Victor (later Viscount
and Earl Alexander of Hillsborough),
M.P. (Co-op) for Hillsborough Division
of Sheffield ; First Lord of the Admiralty
1929-31, 1940-May 1945 and July
1945-Oct. 1946; Minister without
Portfolio Oct.-Dec. 1946; Member of
the Cabinet Mission to India 1946
Minister of Defence from Dec. 1 946 10,
14, 41, 49, 68, 166, 339, 352, 368, 443
ALI MAHOMED (MUHAMMAD) KHAN,
Mirza, Foreign Minister, Afghanistan
in 1947 70
altaf husain, Editor of Dawn 1947 337
alwar, Maharaja of 372
amar singh ambalvi, General Secre¬
tary of the Shiromani Akali Dal 17
amar singh d o s an j , Acting President
of the Shiromani Akali Dal 17
AMBEDKAR,Dr Bhimrao Ramji, a spokes¬
man for the Depressed Classes ; Member
for Labour, Viceroy’s Executive Council
July 1942-June 1946 199, 332, 385
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO INDIA
see GRADY
amery, Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett
M.P. (Unionist) for Birmingham,
Sparkbrook until 1945; Secretary of
State for India and for Burma 1940-5
166
amrit kaur, Rajkumari, sometime
Chairman of the All-India Womens’
Conference; worked as a Secretary to
Gandhi 256, 332, 385
Anderson, Kenneth, Assistant Secretary,
Financial Dept, India Office from 1942
333, 358
INDEX OF PERSONS
8i5
ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY see
FISHER
AREA COMMANDER, CALCUTTA see
RANKING
AREA COMMANDER, PESHAWAR see
MCCAY
ARMY COMMANDER, EASTERN COM¬
MAND see TUKER
ARMY COMMANDER, NORTHERN COM¬
MAND see MESSERVY
ataullah khan, qazi, Education
Minister, N.W.F.P. 1945 and Revenue
Minister from 1946 130 enc., 365
attlee, Clement Richard, M.P. (Lab) for
Limehouse; Deputy Prime Minister
1942-5 ; Prime Minister from July 1945 ;
at meetings of Cabinet 10, 261, 339,
368; sees Ismay 14; and withdrawal of
British troops 15, 50; and question of
Mountbatten accepting Governor-
Generalship of India 26, 27, 28, 31, 35,
37, 42, 48, 65; receives two notes from
Jinnah 38; supplied with draft for
statement on Indian States 39; thinks
it untimely to put forward long-term
defence requirements 49 ; and pro¬
posed appointment of Krishna Menon as
High Commissioner 55, 74, 152; ad¬
dressed by Mr Jayakar 91 ; receives
telegram from C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar
106; and adaptation Act for Pakistan
1 17, 122; and sterling balances 119,
221, 333, 368; Krishna Menon calls to
urge amendment of clause in Inde¬
pendence Bill about the States 123, 152
167; personal correspondence with
Mountbatten 153, 237; at meeting of
India and Burma Committee 157; at
meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee
197; approves telegram about an honour
for Jinnah 212, 225; receives letter
from Mr Subbarayan 218; approves
‘brief ’for Ismay on defence requirements
219; and Partition Council’s statement
on protection of minorities 223, 235;
addressed by Tara Singh about Sikh
Deputation 230; approves telegram to
Mountbatten critical of his speech to
Princes 275; and proposal to appoint
Rowlands Governor of East Bengal
291 ; and Earldom for Mountbatten
300; and defence of North West
Frontier 310; and alteration of King’s
title 3 1 1 ; approves telegram about
Indian membership of U.N.O. 316;
his statement in the Commons on
States 376, 380; and future of the
India Office 399, 400, 431, 433;
approves Secretary of State’s minute on
defence negotiations 443 ; sends good
wishes to India 461,476; congratulates
Mountbatten on accomplishment of his
task 483; also 8 n, 41, 60, 72, 113, 140,
146, 147, 166, 216, 262, 307, 308, 317,
385, 408, 489 annex, Appendix I 4, 5,
7
auchinleck, Field Marshal Sir Claude
John Eyre, C.-in-C., India, Jan.-July
1941 and from June 1943 ; C.-in-C.,
Middle East, July 1941-Aug. 1942 36,
41, 44, 46, 50, 52, 61, 66, 79, 80, 88, 102,
113, 124, 134, 135, 148, 157, 161, 162,
184, 205, 227, 228, 247, 256, 267, 270,
27 6, 302, 304, 312, 320, 352, 370, 385,
389, 404, 432, 460, 472, 473, 486, 489,
Appendix I 6
aung san, u, Burmese political and
military leader; Commander, Burma
Independence Army 1942; Minister for
Defence 1943-5 5 President, Anti-Fascist
People’s Freedom League from 1945
152, 227, 231
A YUB KHAN see MOHAMMAD AYUB
KHAN
A z ad , Maulana Abul Kalam, President,
Indian National Congress 1923 and
1939-June 1946; Member, Interim Govt
(Education and Arts) from Jan. 1947
127, 172, 256, 271, 278, 302, 332, 385,
398, 399 enc., 457, Appendix I, 2
baig, Major Mirza Osman Ali, Indian
Political Service; first Secretary to
Agent to the Governor-General in
U.S.A. from 1946 451
bajpai, Sir Girja Shankar, I.C.S. Agent to
the Governor-General in U.S.A. 194 1-7;
Secretary-General of Department of
8i 6
INDEX OF PERSONS
BAJPAI ( cont .);
External Affairs and Commonwealth
Relations from 1947 320 enc., 451
baldev singh, Sardar, Minister of
Development, Punjab 1942-6; Member,
Interim Govt (Defence) from 2 Sept.
1946 12, 17, 52, 56, 60, 64, 65, 66, 79,
80, 109, 113, 127, 172, 179, 195, 199,
205, 207, 208, 224, 228, 256, 272, 276,
292, 298, 302, 326, 332, 337, 352, 385,
397, 455, 457, 472, 473, 487, 489
balfour, 1st Earl (Arthur James Balfour,
1848-1930), Prime Minister 1902-5;
Foreign Secretary 1916-19 228
bapna, Rai Bahadur Sir Seraymal, Prime
Minister, Alwar 1943-7 372
bard o li, Srijit Gopinath, Chief Minister,
Assam 1938-9, and from Feb. 1946 68,
92, 94, 107, 1 14, 208
baring, Sir Evelyn, High Commissioner
for the U.K. in Union of South Africa
3ii
baroda, Maharaja (Gaekwar) of 234,
266, 295, 302, 313 enc., 335, 385, 411,
426, 489
bartley, Herbert Gwyther, Inspector
General of Police, Assam 1945-7 I07
barton, Sir William I.C.S., Resident,
Mysore 1920-25; Resident, Hyderabad
1925-30 45
beaumont, Herbert Christopher, I.C.S.,
Secretary to Sir Cyril Radcliffe 1947
3, 12, 190, 377, 417, 452
bennett, Sir John Thorne Masey,
Inspector-General of Police, Punjab
1945-7 214, 337 enc., 345, 382, 437,
459
bevan, Aneurin, M.P. (Lab.) for Ebbw
Vale Division of Monmouthshire from
1929; Minister of Health from 1945 10,
368
bevin, Ernest, M.P. (Lab.) for Wands¬
worth from 1940; Minister of Labour
and National Service 1940-May 1945;
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
from July 1945 10, 142, 166, 197, 316,
348, 368
bevir, Anthony, Assistant Secretary,
War Cabinet Office 1939; Private
Secretary to the Prime Minister 1940-7
400
bhabha, Cooverji Hormusji, Member,
Interim Govt for Commerce 2 Sept-
26 October 1946 and for Works, Mines
and Power from 26 Oct. 1946-1947
172, 256, 302, 332, 457
bhalja, Goverdhan Shankerlal, I.C.S.,
Secretary, Govt of India, Defence Dept
1946-7 66, 247
BHARATPUR, Maharaja of 489
bhargava, Dr Gopi Chand, Member of
the Legislative Assembly, Punjab and
Punjab Congress leader 341, 437
bhopal, daughter of sccabidasultaan
bhopal, Nawab of, Chancellor of the
Chamber of Princes 1944-7 66, 100,
160, 201, 234, 239, 265, 295, 297, 302,
3U, 325, 335, 356, 366, 369, 384, 385,
402, 412, 426, 435, 482, 489
bid ault, Monsieur Georges, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, France 1947-8; Premier
1949-50 451
bikaner, Maharaja of 234, 313 enc.,
405, 413, 427
birla, Ghanshyam Das, Managing
Director of Birla Brothers Ltd. ; leading
businessman and industrialist 171
birnie, Colonel Eugene St John, Indian
Army, Military Secretary to Governor-
General of Pakistan 1947-8 407, 489
biswas, Charn Chandra, Judge of the
High Court, Calcutta from 1937;
Member of the Bengal Boundary
Commission 488
bonar law, Andrew (1858-1923) Prime
Minister 1922-3 314 enc.
booth, Brigadier John Robert, Indian
Army, in charge of referendum in
N.W.F.P. 101
bose, Sarat Chandra, left-wing Congress
leader of Bengal; a leader of Forward
Bloc Movement; brother of Subhas
Chandra Bose; Member, Interim Govt
(Works, Mines and Power) 2 Sept.-
26 Oct. 1946 201, 385
bottomley, Arthur George, M.P. (Lab.)
for Chatham Division of Rochester from
1945; Member of Parliamentary Dele-
INDEX OF PERSONS
817
gation to India 1946; Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs (Commonwealth Relations)
1946- 7 166
bourne, Sir Frederick Chalmers, I.C.S.,
Chief Secretary to the Govt of the
Punjab 1 94 1-5 ; Acting Governor of the
C.P. May— Oct. 1945 ; Acting Governor
of Assam April-Sept. 1946; Governor
of the C.P. from Sept. 1946-47;
Governor of East Bengal from Aug.
1947- 1950 83, 357, 369, 385, 402, 434,
440
brar, Brigadier Digamber Singh, Indian
Army 184, 224
b rend on, Patrick, I.C.S., Deputy Com¬
missioner, Gurgaon 1946-7 337 enc.
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN
AUSTRALIA see WILLIAMS, EDWARD
JOHN
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN
CANADA see CLUTTERBUCK
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN
India see SHONE
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN
NEW ZEALAND see COSTAR
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN
SOUTH AFRICA see BARING
brittain, Sir Herbert, Third Secretary
in the Treasury from 1942 339
brockman, Captain Ronald Vernon,
R.N., Secretary to Lord Mountbatten as
Supreme Commander in South-East
Asia; Personal Secretary to the Viceroy
from March 1947 12, 32, 35, 37, 53,
7 6, 99, 162, 191, 201, 256, 436, 488
brown, Robert Sidney, Assistant Secre¬
tary (acting) India Office 1946; Com¬
monwealth Relations Office 1947 157
bruce, Major-General John Geoffrey,
G.O.C. Lahore District 1946-7 46,
214, 337 enc.
bund 1, Maharaja of 234, 384
burrows, Sir Frederick John, Governor
of Bengal 1946-7; sometime President
of the National Union of Railwaymen
10, 12, 16, 65, 84, 138, 148, 161, 193, 194,
287, 289, 290, 302, 364, 385, 414, 436,
446, 453, 454, 485, 487, 489
butler, Richard Austen (later Life Peer),
M. P. (Con.) for Saffron Walden Divi¬
sion of Essex since 1929; President of the
Board of Education 1941-5 (Minister
from 1944); Minister of Labour May-
Juky 1945 26, 71, 390, 402
c ado gan, Sir Alexander George, Per¬
manent Representative of the U.K. to
the United Nations 1946-50 371, 386
caldecote, ist Viscount (Thomas
Walker Hobart Inskip), Lord Chief
Justice of England 1940-6 314 enc.,
430
campbell-bannerman, Sir Henry,
Prime Minister 1905-8 91, 218
campbell-johnson, Alan, Press
Attache to the Viceroy from March
1947 224, 256, 265, 319, 369, 389, 436,
442, 489
CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN
DELHI see KEARNEY
caroe, Sir Olaf Kirkpatrick, I.C.S.,
Secretary, External Affairs Dept, Govt
of India 1939-45; Governor of the
N. W.F.P. 1946-7 6
carter, Sir (Richard Henry) Archibald,
Assistant Under-Secretary of State for
India 1936; Permanent Secretary of the
Admiralty 1936-40; Chairman, Eastern
Supply Council, Delhi, 1941-2; Chair¬
man, Board of Customs and Excise
1942-7; Permanent Under-Secretary of
State for India 1947 31, 71, 72 n, 133,
157, 180, 263, 316, 402, 485, 487
cawthorn, Major-General Walter
Joseph, Director of Military Intelligence,
India 1941-5 302
cazenove, Colonel (temp. Brig.) Arnold
de Lerisson, Commander of the 23
Brigade 184
CHANCELLOR OF THE CHAMBER OF
princes see bhopal and patiala
chanda, Asoka Kumar, Indian Audit and
Accounts Service, Additional Financial
Adviser (Supply) 1945-7; Financial
Adviser (Military Finance) July 1947
256
8i8
INDEX OF PERSONS
chaudhuri, Srimati Malati, Member
of the Constituent Assembly 115
chetwode, 1st Baron (Field-Marshal
Sir Philip Walhouse Chetwode), Corn-
man der-in-Chief, India 1930-5 402
chettur, Kirshna Kirshna, Indian Audit
Dept, Joint Secretary, Govt of India,
Commerce Dept from 1946 488
c hetty, Sir R. K. Shanmukhan, Diwan
of Cochin 1935-41; Head of Govt of
India Purchasing Mission in U.S.A.
1941-2; delegate to International Mone¬
tary Conference at Bretton Woods
1944; Chairman Indian Tariff Board
1945 332, 385, 457
chh atari, Lieutenant-Colonel Nawab
Sir Muhammad Ahmad Said Khan,
President, Executive Council of the
Nizam of Hyderabad 1941-6 and 1947
61, 65, 240, 232, 234, 240, 241, 296, 329,
385
CHIEF ENGINEER, BIKANER see
KANWAR SAIN
CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA see SPENS
CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL
STAFF see MONTGOMERY
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (iNDIA)
see smith
CHIEF SECRETARY, CENTRAL
provinces see rau
CHIEF SECRETARY, PUNJAB see
AKHTAR HUSAIN
CHIEFS OF STAFF (u.K.) 15,31,41,43,
49, 118, 143, 219, 302, 336, 352, 385,
402, 443, 488
chisholm, R. G., Principal, India
Office 1947 106 enc., 264 enc.
chopra, Lieutenant-Colonel Mahindar
(Mohinder) Singh, Commander, 1st
battalion, Assam Regiment, and com¬
manding troops in Sylhet 1947 107
chopra, S. N., a schoolmaster in Malay;
organised at Penang the training of
spies in wireless technique and with a
small party was landed in India by
Japanese submarine in 1943 345
chorley, 1st Baron of Kendal cr. 1945
(Robert Samuel Theodore Chorley),
Member of Parliamentary Delegation
to India 1946 261
Christie, Walter Henry John, I.C.S.,
Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy
I939_43 > Joint Secretary to the Govt of
India, Food Dept 1945-7; Joint Private
Secretary to the Viceroy 1947 8, 40,
162, 205, 272, 276, 287, 315, 319, 369,
389, 436, 453, 488
chundrigar, Ismail Ibrahim, Member,
Bombay Legislative Assembly 1939;
President, Provincial Muslim League
1940-5 ; Member, Working Committee,
All-India Muslim League from 1943;
Member, Interim Govt (Commerce)
from 26 Oct. 1946 45, 127, 173, 301
churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer,
M.P. (Con.) for Epping Division of
Essex; Prime Minister and Minister of
Defence 1940-5 ; Leader of the Opposi¬
tion from 1945 26, 27, 38, 68, 222, 390,
402
CIANO D I CORTELLAZZO, Count
Galeazzo, son-in-law of Mussolini;
Italian Foreign Minister 1936-43 390
clark [e], Reginald, Judge of the High
Court, Madras 1944-8 6
clauson, Milesjohn, Assistant Secretary,
Political (States) Department, India
Office 1944-Feb. 1946 and from Sept.
1946; Private Secretary to the Secretary
of State for India Feb. -Sept. 1946 20,
246
cochin, Maharaja of 313 enc.
clutterbuck, Sir (Peter) Alexander,
High Commissioner for the U.K. in
Canada from 1946 311
coates, Charles Leslie, I.C.S., Deputy
Commissioner, Rawalpindi 1946-7 184
coelho, V. H., Under-Secretary, Cabinet
Secretariat, India, 1947 457
coke-wallis, Leonard George, I.C.S.,
Political Agent, Jaipur 1947 372
Colville, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir (David)
John, cr. 1st Baron of Clydesmuir 1947;
M.P. (Unionist) for North Midlothian
1924-43; Governor of Bombay 1943-8
13, 113, 133, 273, 317, Appendix I, 7
Colville, Lady, wife of Sir John
Colville 489
INDEX OF PERSONS
819
COMMANDER, LAHORE AREA see BRUCE
COMMANDER, PESHAWAR AREA see
MCCAY
COMMANDER, PUNJAB BOUNDARY
force see REES
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (iNDIA) see
AUCHINLECK
COMMISSIONER OF LAHORE see
SAID ULL AH KHAN
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE,
CALCUTTA see HARDWICK
Connaught, Field-Marshal the Duke of
(1850-1942) 302
cooke, Samuel Burgess Ridgeway, a
Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury
1945-6; Constitutional Adviser to
Mountbatten 1947 108, 344, 353, 355,
369, 385, 422, 423, 447, 464, 468, 489
c orfield , Sir Conrad Lawrence, I.C.S.,
Political Adviser to the Crown Repre¬
sentative 1945-7 i, 30, 33, 37, 39, 61,
65, 66, 82, 115, 123, 158, 159, 160, 174,
186, 202, 262, 263, 271, 330, 442
co star, Norman Edgar, Acting U.K.
High Commissioner in New Zealand
1947 3 11
courtney, Air Chief Marshal Sir
Christopher Lloyd, Air Member for
Supply and Organisation in the Air
Council 1940-5; retired 1945 118
crawley, Desmond John Chetwode,
I.C.S., Political Agent, Loralai 1946 281
creech jones, Arthur, Secretary of
State for the Colonies from Oct. 1946
10, 368
cripps, Sir (Richard) Stafford, M.P.
(Lab.) for Bristol East; Minister for
Aircraft Production I942~5; carried
constitutional proposals to India March
1942; President of the Board of Trade
from 1945; Member of the Cabinet
Mission to India 1946 9, 10, 14, 33, 35,
60, 68, 154, 157, 166, 167, 218, 261, 326,
339, 442, Appendix I, 4 n
croft, Sir William Dawson, Deputy
Under-Secretary of State, India Office
1 94 1-7 ; on staff of Cabinet Mission 309
crombie, James Ian Cormack, Third
Secretary, H.M. Treasury from 1946 157
CUNNINGHAM, Sir George, I.C.S., Gov¬
ernor of North-West Frontier Province
1937-46 and 1947-8 29, 82, 166, 180,
248, 309, 310, 317, 319, 342, 363, 374,
385, 387, 392, 393, 407, 433, 481, 488,
489
Cunningham, Admiral Sir John Henry
Dacres, Chief of the Naval Staff from
1946 41, 49, 197
currie, Colonel Douglas Hendrie, Mili¬
tary Secretary to the Viceroy from 1944
76, 113, 319, 369
curtis, Gerald Colville Seymour, I.C.S.,
Development Secretary, N.W.F.P. 1947
188
cutch, Maharaja Kumar of, Yuvraj
Kumar Shri Madansinhji 385
dalmia, Seth Ram Krishna, Industrialist
and Financier 228
dalton, Hugh, M.P. (Lab.) for Bishop
Auckland Division of Durham; Chan¬
cellor of the Exchequer from 1945 10,
333, 347, 358, 368, 399
das, Basanta Kumar, Member of the
Council of Ministers, Assam from 1946
68, 95, 107
daultana, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad
Khan, General Secretary of the Punjab
Provincial Muslim League; Member,
Punjab Legislative Assembly from 1946
89, 272, 459
Davidson, 1st Viscount (John Colin
Campbell Davidson), M.P. (Unionist)
for Hemel Hempstead Division of
Hertfordshire 1920-3 and 1924-37;
Chairman, Indian States (Financial)
Enquiry Committee 1932 213, 458
davies, Clement, M.P. (Lib.) for
Montgomery from 1929; Leader of
Liberal Parliamentary Party from 1945
26, 402
davies, T. W., Assistant Secretary
Colonial Office 175
deane, Lancelot Victor, Superintendent
of Police, Amritsar 1947 437
deo, Shankar Rao Dattatraya, Member,
Working Committee, Indian National
Congress 1942-6 201
820
INDEX OF PERSONS
DEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
INDIA see SMITH
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, GURGAON
see BRENDON
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, LAHORE see
EUSTACE, j.C.W.
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SYLHET see
DUMBRECK
DEPUTY INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF
POLICE, LAHORE see LOBB
DEPUTY SECRETARY, STATES DEPART¬
MENT, See AKHTAR HUSSAIN
deshmukh, Sir Chintaman Dwarkanath
I.C.S., Governor, Reserve Bank of
India 1944-49 354
de valera, Eamon, Taoiseach (Prime
Minister) and Minister for External
Affairs, Govt of Eire from 1937 343
enc.
DEVELOPMENT MINISTER, PUNJAB
See SWARAN SINGH
dewas (junior), Maharaja of 302
dhar, Maharaja of 302, 313 enc.
dholpur, Maharaj-Rana of 242, 265,
302, 402, 426, 489
dhupia, Meherban Singh, Member of a
Sikh Delegation to England 397
dibdin, Aubrey, an Assistant Secretary,
India Office from 1936 and Burma
Office from 1945 339
Dickson, Air Marshal Sir William
Forster, Vice-Chief of Air Staff, Air
Ministry 1946-8 41
din mohammed, Khan Bahadur, Judge
of the High Court, Lahore 1936-46;
Member of the Punjab Boundary
Commission 162, 488
DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU
see SMITH, SIR NORMAN
donaldson, Eion Pelly, Assistant Sec¬
retary, External Dept., India Office from
1945 263, 310
dow, Sir Hugh, I.C.S., Governor of
Sind 1941-6; Governor of Bihar 1946-7
34, 279, 317
dundas, Ambrose Dundas Flux, Secre¬
tary, Govt of India, Defence Dept.
1946-7 178, 247
dumbreck, James, I.C.S., Deputy Com¬
missioner, Sylhet 1947 107
dungarpur, Maharwal of 234, 240,
313 enc.
ede, James Chuter, M.P. (Lab.) for
Mitcham Division of Surrey 1923, for
Southwark 1929-31 and from 1935;
Home Secretary from 1945 368
eden, Robert Anthony (later 1st Earl of
Avon), M.P. (Con.) for Warwick and
Leamington; Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs 1940-5 26, 390, 402
EDITOR OF DAWN See ALTAF HUSAIN
edwardes-jones, Group-Captain John
Humphrey, on Planning Staff, Air
Ministry 1947 118
edwards, Lieutenant-Colonel Cosmo
Grant Niven, Indian Political Service,
Resident, Madras States 1944-7 58, 93,
185, 288
Elizabeth, Alexandra Mary, H.R.H.
Princess 384, 488
elliott, Brigadier, James Gordon, Indian
Army; Deputy Secretary (M.I.), Defence
Committee, India 1947-8 52, 148, 205,
27 6, 352
elmhirst, Air Vice Marshal Sir Thomas
Walker, Chief of Inter Service Admini¬
stration in India 1947; Commander-in-
Chief, Royal Indian Air Force 1947-50
253, 302, 489
erskine crum, Lieutenant-Colonel
Vernon Forbes, Conference Secretary
to the Viceroy from March 1947 12,
37, 52, 53, 61, 66, 76, 99, 108, 148, 171,
174, 184, 191, 205, 250, 256, 276, 278,
279, 287, 290, 291, 319, 320, 330, 343,
344, 345, 352, 353, 3^9, 385, 389,436,
442, 487
EUSTACE, John Curtis Wernher, I.C.S.,
Deputy Commissioner, Lahore 1947
228, 337 enc., 459
falconer, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir
George Arthur, Indian Political Service,
H.M. Minister, Nepal 1944-7 439
faridkot, Raja of 313 enc., 345
INDEX OF PERSONS
821
fazl A li, Sir Saiyid, Chief justice, Patna
from 1943 320
fa zlur rahman, Minister for Land and
Land Revenue and Jails, Bengal 1946-7;
Minister for the Interior, Education and
Information, Pakistan from Aug. 1947
487, 489
FINANCE MINISTER, PUNJAB, SC6
SACHAR
FIRST SEA LORD see CUNNINGHAM,
SIR JOHN
fisher, Most Rev. Geoffrey Francis,
Archbishop of Canterbury 1945 476
freeman, John, M.P. (Lab.) for Watford
Division of Herts from 1945; Parlia¬
mentary Under-Secretary of State for
War from April 1947 339
gad gil, Narhar Vishnu, lawyer and
writer on economics 332, 385
gandhi, Devadas, fourth son of Mahatma
Gandhi; Editor of the Hindustan Times
6$, 129
gandfii, Mohandas Karamchand, known
as the Mahatma (Great Soul), called also
Bapu and Bapuji; his visit to Kashmir
4, 62, 78, 149, 255, 259, 260, 269, 277,
280, 302, 385, 402; his interview with
Mountbatten on 9 July 43; and the
Indian States 43 ; reported sympathetic
to establishment of Sikh homeland 56;
welcomes proposal that Ismay should
stay on 162; Ramaswami Aiyar’s
opinion of 228; absence from 15
August celebrations 385; Mountbatten
pays tribute to 389 enc; also 61, 106,
192, 201, 218, 394, Appendix I, 1, 2, 3
ganga singh, Principal, Leader of a
Sikh Deputation to England 1947
230, 397
G.o.c. Peshawar Area see mccay
GEORGE VI, H.M., King-Emperor from
1936 10, 11, 14, 28, 31, 35, 42, 52, 63,
65, 82, 128, 146, 178, 180, 204, 215,
222, 225, 228, 232, 237, 243, 252, 265,
274, 293, 300, 308, 311, 353, 385, 408,
463, 477, 489
ghazanfar ali khan, Raja, Member,
Council of All-India Muslim League;
Member, Interim Govt (Health) from
26 Oct. 1946 173, 301, 337 enc.
ghaffar khan, Khan Abdul, called the
‘Frontier Gandhi’; half-brother of Dr
Khan Sahib; founder in 1930 of the Red
Shirt Movement (the Khudai Khit-
matgars), the Congress Volunteer
Organisation of the N.W.F.P. ; Member,
Congress Working Committee 130,
183, 211, 229, 327, 365, 394
GHIAS UD-DIN AHMED, Syed, I.C.S.,
served in the United Provinces 1939-47;
became an official of the Pakistan Govt
377
ghosh, Dr Profullah Chandra, Member,
of the Constituent Assembly; sometime
Member of the Congress Working
Committee; leader West Bengal Con¬
gress Party from June 1947 161, 194,
290, 291, 301, 302, 364
ghulam faruq , Minister of the Interior,
Afghanistan 1947 321
GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF SOUTH
Africa see van zyl
governor’s secretary, Punjab see
ABBOTT
governor’s secretary, sind see
RAZA
GOVERNOR OF THE RESERVE BANK see
DESHMUKH
grady, Henry Francis, Ambassador of the
U.S.A. to India 1947 65, 231
grafftey-smith, Lawrence Barton,
Minister to Saudi Arabia 1945-7; High
Commissioner for U.K. in Pakistan
from 1947 120, 317, 461
graham-harrison, Francis Laurence
Theodore, Assistant Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister 1946-9 212
greenwood, Arthur, M.P. (Lab.) for
Nelson and Colne (Lancashire) 1922-31
and for Wakefield from 1932; Lord
Privy Seal 1945-7 I0, 368
griffin, Lancelot Cecil Lepel, I.C.S.,
Secretary to the Crown Representative
1944-7 2, 61, 234, 242, 264, 271, 475
822
INDEX OF PERSONS
gurmani, Nawab Mushtaq Ahmad,
Member, Legislative Assembly Punjab
1930-42; Director, Publicity and Re¬
cruitment (Technical), Govt of India
1942-5; Director-General of Resettle¬
ment and Employment 1945-6; Dewan
of Bahawalpur from 1947 240
gwalior, Maharaja of 141, 234, 266,
295, 302, 313 enc., 335
gwyer, Sir Maurice Linford, Chief
Justice of India 1937-43; Vice-
Chancellor of Delhi University 1938-50
Appendix I, 4
habibullah khan, Khan of Bannu dis¬
trict; M.L.A., N.W.F.P. 1946-7 394,48i
hailey, 1st Baron cr. 1936 (William
Malcolm Hailey), I.C.S., Governor of
the Punjab 1924-28; Governor of the
United Provinces 1928-34; Chairman
of Governing Body of School of Orien¬
tal and African Studies 194 1-5 399
enc., 402
Halifax, 1st Earl of cr. 1944 (Edward
Frederick Lindley Wood), Viceroy
1926-3 1 as Lord Irwin; British Ambassa¬
dor, Washington 1941-6 133
hall, Captain John Talbot Savignac,
R.N., Flag Officer Commanding Royal
Indian Navy 1947-8 253
hardwick, Donald Ross, Commis¬
sioner of Police, Calcutta from 1946 65
harnam singh, Sardar, a lawyer from
Lahore; an Akali Sikh 67
Harris, Ronald Montague Joseph,
Private Secretary to the Secretary of the
Cabinet 1939-43; Private Secretary to
the Secretary of State for India 1946-7
16, 38, no, 128, 212, 314, 315, 333, 358,
397
hawthorn, Major-General Douglas
Cyril, Indian Army, Deputy Chief of
the General Staff, India 1947 432
helsby, Lawrence Norman, Assistant
Secretary, Treasury 1946; Principal
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
1947-50 400
henderson, Arthur, M.P. (Lab.) for
Kingswinford Division of Staffordshire
from 1935; Parliamentary Under¬
secretary of State for India and Burma
from 1945 39, 121, 144, 157, 166, 167,
206, 216, 226, 236, 261, 262, 339, 402
henderson, Kenneth Harvey, I.C.S.,
Secretary, Post-W ar Reconstruction
Dept. Punjab 1946-7 184, 293
Herbert, Sir Charles Gordon, I.C.S.,
Resident, Hyderabad 1946-7 264, 415
hidayatullah, Khan Bahadur Sir
Ghulam Hussain, Premier of Sind 1942-
7; Governor of Sind from 15 Aug. 1947
29, 178
hitler, Adolf, Leader and Chancellor of
Germany i933~45 390
HOLKAR see INDORE
hollis, Major-General Sir Leslie Chase-
more, Senior Assistant Secretary in the
Office of the War Cabinet 1939-46;
Chief Staff officer to Minister of Defence
and Deputy-Secretary (Military) to the
Cabinet from 1947 41, 197
HOPKIN-MORRIS see MORRIS
hopkinson, Arthur John, I.C.S., Poli¬
tical Officer in Sikkim 1945-7 59, I26
horton, Ralph Albert, Inspector-
General of Police, United Provinces
1:935-40; Minister for Police, Indore
1 941-2; Deputy Prime Minister, Indore
1943 and Prime Minister 1947 302,
335, 385, 389
hub back, Most Rev. George Clay,
Bishop of Calcutta and Metropolitan of
India from 1945 384
hydari, Sir Muhammad Saleh Akbar,
I.C.S., Secretary, Govt of India, (In¬
dustries and Supplies) 1943-5; Member
for Information and Broadcasting, Vice¬
roy’s Executive Council 1945-6;
Governor of Assam from 4 May 1947
68, 92, 94, 95, 98, 107, 114, 139, 162, 220,
317, 417
Hyderabad, the Nizam of 11, 12, 33,
61, 65, 82, 118, 141, 218, 228, 232, 257,
264, 265, 293, 302, 308, 317, 329, 335,
369, 376, 385, 388, 390, 402, 415, 420,
42I> 434, 435, 44°, 463, 474, 489 enc.
HYDERABAD, PRIME MINISTER OF
see CHHATARI
INDEX OF PERSONS
823
HYDERABAD, RESIDENT see HERBERT
Hyderabad, second son of the Nizam
see SHUJAAT ALI KHAN
HYDERABAD TRADE COMMISSIONER
IN LONDON see NAWAZ JUNG
ikramullah, Mohammad, I.C.S., Joint
Secretary, Commerce Dept, Govt of
India 1947; Secretary, States Dept,
Govt of Pakistan 1947 228, 234
Indore, Maharaja of 213, 256, 265, 266,
295, 302, 313, 325, 335, 340, 356, 385,
402, 489
INSPECTOR-GENERAL
OF
POLICE,
ASSAM See BARTLEY
INSPECTOR-GENERAL
OF
POLICE,
n.w.f.p. see o’neil
SHAW
INSPECTOR-GENERAL
OF
POLICE,
PUNJAB see BENNETT
INSPECTOR-GENERAL
OF
POLICE,
UNITED PROVINCES see PEARCE
inverchapel, ist Baron cr. 1946 of
Loch Eck (Archibald John Kerr Clark.
Kerr), British Ambassador, Washington
from 1946 445
1 pi, Faqir of (Mirza Ali Khan), born about
1897, a religious leader active among
tribes in North Waziristan 45, 211, 394
ISAACS, George Alfred, M.P. (Lab.) for
North Southwark 1929-31 and from
1939; Parliamentary Private Secretary
to the First Lord of the Admiralty
1942-5 ; Minister of Labour and National
Service from 1945 10, 368
ism ay, ist Baron cr. 1947 (General
Hastings Lionel Ismay), Chief of Staff
to Minister of Defence 1940-6; Chief
of the Viceroy’s Staff 1947; addressed in
London by Mountbatten about chair¬
manship of Joint Defence Council 7;
and reconstitution of Interim Govern¬
ment 8, 24, 25, 51; and reference to
appointment of British Provincial
Governors 13, 22; reports discussion
in England on Governor-Generalship
question 14, 26, 31, 35; sends Churchill
two notes from Jinnah 38; attends
meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee
41, 43; reports from London views
expressed about long-term strategical
requirements 49, 143, 219; reports
from London about Short proceeding to
India 60; retention on Mountbatten’s
staff after Independence welcomed by
Indian leaders 112, 162, 231; urges
early announcement of Congress’ reten¬
tion of Colville and Nye 133; points
out need for unified Indo-Pakistan
defence policy 136; addressed regard¬
ing appointment of Rowlands asjinnah’s
Chief Adviser 140; Attlee on ‘great
help’ of having him in England 153;
at meetings of Partition Council 205,
344, 353; has frank talk with Jinnah
222, 228; reports that Nizam will not
accede to Indian Dominion 228 n;
at Viceroy’s staff meetings 256, 319,
369, 389, 436; comments favourably on
order regarding use of British troops
after Independence 267 n; and sug¬
gestion that pressure be put on Kartar
Singh 272 n, 298 ; correspondence with
Jinnah about Kalat 330 n, 351, 375,
396; makes statement on his discussions
with British Chiefs of Staff to Joint
Defence Council 352, 385, 488; ad¬
dressed by Khan of Kalat 360; favours
deferment until 14 August of publica¬
tion of Boundary Commission Awards
389; interview with Monckton about
Hyderabad 419; present at Mount-
batten’s interviews with Monckton
420, 434; his communications with
Liaquat about Punjab Boundary Award
428, 485, 489; writes to Messervy about
Indo-Pakistan military co-operation 429 ;
and reinforcement of Boundary Force
473 n; also 35, 37, 40, 65, 166, 227, 237,
309, 326 n, 365, 377 n, 454 n, 483
jagjivan ram, a Congressman and
President, All-India Depressed Classes
League ; Member, Interim Govt (Labour)
from 2 Sept. 1946 166, 172, 227, 332
janak singh, Major-General, Prime
Minister, Kashmir, Aug.-Oct. 1947
456
824
INDEX OF PERSONS
jawand singh, Lieutenant, a military
grantee of the Montgomery district,
Punjab 210
jayakar, Dr Mukund Ramrao, Judge,
Federal Court of India 1937-9; Member
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council 1939-41 91
jefford, Commodore James Wilfred,
Royal Indian Navy; Flag Officer com¬
manding Pakistan Navy from 1947 25 3
jenkins, Sir Evan Meredith, I.C.S.,
Private Secretary to the Viceroy 1943-5;
Governor of the Punjab 1946-7; seeks
instructions regarding Boundary Com¬
mission’s work and staffing 3, 12, 19;
not willing to accept office after parti¬
tion in part of the Punjab 10; advises
early relief of British troops 46; sets
forth Sikh claims and intentions as
revealed by Giani Kartar Singh 56
and Jathedar Mohan Singh 67; gives
Abell an appreciation of the Punjab
situation 81; submits memoranda pre¬
pared by the Punjab Partition Commit¬
tee 89, 162; comments on issues raised
by these memoranda 90; predicts dis¬
orders in the Punjab over the Boundary
award 103 ; asks for advance informa¬
tion of the content of the Boundary
award 131, 190, 359, 391; at meeting
with Mountbatten in Lahore 184;
thinks Sikh leaders should be allowed to
blow off steam and not be put in jail
189; his note on projected Sikh meeting
at Nankana Sahib 214; discusses
Nankana Sahib meeting with Swaran
Singh 238 ; reports worsening situation
254; reports unwillingness of Sikh
leaders to sign a joint statement under¬
taking to accept Boundary Com¬
mission’s award 272; and question of
declaring certain districts ‘disturbed areas’
286, 299; reports on Nankana Sahib
meeting and outrages in Lahore and
Amritsar 292 ; has talk with Giani
Kartar Singh 292 enc. ; and question of
pressing Sikh leaders to sign joint state¬
ment 298, 305, 306; and proposal to
post small military pickets in Lahore
331, 341; replies to criticisms of the
Punjab Govt 337, 408; and reports of
Tara Singh’s terrorist plots 338, 345,
346, 359; and question of Tara Singh’s
arrest 361, 379, 403, 489; on con¬
troversy arising from Punjab Boundary
award 377 n; requests more military
assistance 382, 389, 404, 473; and
publication of Boundary Commission
awards 436, 446, 453; reports very
serious disturbances in Lahore 437,
448 ; sends final fortnightly report 459 ;
reports deteriorating situation 466, 467,
484; also 17 n, 18, 36, 82, 108, hi, 148,
205, 256, 269, 276, 432, 454, 485, 486,
489, Appendix I, 1, 2, 3
jhalawar, Maharaj Rana of 313 enc.
jinn ah, Mahomed Ali, President All-
India Muslim League 1916, 1920 and
from 1934; called Qaid-i-Azam (the
Great Leader); agrees to Mountbatten
being Chairman of Joint Defence
Council 7, 35; and reconstitution of
Interim Government 8, 12, 21, 24, 51,
63, 65, 82, 99, 108, no, 112, 162; his
desire to be Governor-General of
Pakistan 10, 26, 27, 28, 35, 97, 222; and
appointment of British Governors 13,
22, 29, 82, 158, 180, 227, 291, 317, 357
385; welcomes Mountbatten remaining
as Governor-General of India 14, 100;
and inquiry into Bihar riots 34, 279;
complains that Nishtar is not being
associated with work of States Dept
37; two of his notes to the Prime
Minister transmitted by Ismay to
Churchill 38; and negotiations about
defence 41, 302, 336, 352, 402, 443;
and N.W.F.P. 45, 76, 82, 101, 130, 168,
182, 183, 211, 229, 278, 319, 342, 365,
374, 385, 387, 392, 393, 407, 481, 488,
489 ; expresses concern at Sikh agitation
52; at meetings of Partition Council
52, 148, 171, 205, 224, 344, 353; desires
H.M.G. to ensure a fair division of
assets 71 ; and possible visit to Kashmir
78, 129; and retention of British per¬
sonnel in Armed Forces 79, 80, 112;
suggestion that he should be asked to
INDEX OF PERSONS
825
negotiate with Sikhs out of court 81,
82; his interview with Mountbatten on
12 July 82; and Hyderabad 82, 228,
257> 329, 421; and Kalat 82, 150, 174,
228, 258, 303, 330, 351, 360, 375, 384,
385, 396; feels compelled to decline
G.C.M.G. 82, 125; and the flying of
flags 82, 112, 162, 222, 228, 243, 261,
279 ; desires adaptation order for Pakistan
to be based on Ninth Schedule 86, 117,
122; his views on Kashmir 87; com¬
plains about Sylhet referendum 98,
139, 162; has interview with
Mountbatten on 15 July 112; wel¬
comes proposal that Ismay should stay
on after Independence 112, 162, 231;
promises protection to minorities 113;
and appointment of U.K. High Com¬
missioner in Pakistan 120; protests
against Henderson’s explanation of terms
of reference of Boundary Commission
121, 144; proposal to offer him a Privy
Councillorship 125, 225; proposal that
he should meet Afghan Prime Minister
132, 142, 198, 309; wants Rowlands as
Chief Adviser 140 or as Governor of
East Bengal 291, 357; and oaths of
office 145, 215, 252, 273, 416; and
terms of reference of the Arbitral
Tribunal 148; and proposed appoint¬
ment of Weightman as Governor of
Baluchistan 178, 191; welcomes ap¬
pointment of Cunningham as Governor
of N.W.F.P. 180, 248; and Travancore
192; has interview with Ismay on
24 July 222; wishes to negotiate with
each State separately 234; and appoint¬
ment of Commanders of the Armed
Forces 253 ; at meetings of Joint Defence
Council 276, 352; and Pakistan’s mem¬
bership of U.N.O. 316, 353, 362; and
Tribal Agreements 336, 349, 394, 438;
and division of assets 344, 355, 385,
422, 469; possible implication of Master
Tara Singh in plot to assassinate him
345, 346, 384; favours early arrest of
extremist Sikh leaders, 361, 379, 403;
offers favourable terms to Jodhpur 385,
426; and meeting to discuss Boundary
Commission awards 454, 472; also
42 n, 47, 54, 64 n, 76, 79, 137 n, 147, 159,
167, 184, 292, 301, 308, 312, 320, 326,
369, 487, Appendix I, 1, 2, 3
jinn ah, Miss Fatima 489
jodhpur, Maharaja of 105, 141, 313
enc., 385, 426, 489
johnston, Thomas, M.P. (Lab.) for
West Stirlingshire 1929-31 and 1935-45;
Lord Privy Seal 1931 ; Secretary of State
for Scotland 1941-5 Appendix I, 4, 5
jo witt, 1st Baron cr. 1945 (later 1st
Viscount and 1st Earl, William Allen),
M.P. (Lib.) for the Hartlepools 1922-4;
M.P. (Lab.) for Preston 1930-31 and for
Ashton-under-Lyme 1939-45; Lord
Chancellor from 1945 10, 91, 368, 402
Joyce, Alec Houghton, Adviser on
Publicity at the India Office from 1941;
Principal Information Officer to the
Cabinet Mission 224
J UN AG ADH, CONSTITUTIONAL ADVISER
see NABI BAKSH
jung, bahadur, Nawab Ali Yawar,
Member of the Nizam’s Executive
Council for Constitutional Affairs
1945-7 61, 240, 421
kak, Rai Bahadur Ram Chandra, Prime
Minister of Kashmir 1945-7 87, 149,
259, 260, 280, 302, 456, 489
kalat, Khan of 82, 150, 174, 228, 258,
303, 330, 35T 360, 375, 384, 385, 396
KALAT, WAZIR OF See MOHAMMAD
ASLAM KHAN
kanwar sain, Rai Bahadur Lala, served
in Punjab Irrigation Dept 1922-47;
Chief Engineer, Bikaner 1947 405, 427
kartar singh, Giani, Member, Punjab
Legislative Assembly; a leader of the
Akali party; collaborator with Master
Tara Singh 56, 67, 81, 82, 162, 214,
272, 292, 298, 302, 305, 306, 345, 489
kashmir, Maharaja of 4, 78, 87, 129,
149, 260, 269, 277, 280, 302, 335, 390,
45h, 489
KASHMIR, RESIDENT see WEBB
826
INDEX OF PERSONS
kaul, Pandit Autar Kishen, Supt of
Police (designate), Amritsar 432, 436,
459, 460, 486, 489
kearney, John Doherty, Canadian High
Commissioner in India 1947 317
keith, Arthur Berriedale (1897-1944),
Regius Professor of Sanskrit and Com¬
parative Philology, Edinburgh Univer¬
sity from 1914; Lecturer on Constitution
of the British Empire from 1927 294,
314 enc., 430
kerno, Dr Ivan, Assistant Secretary-
General for Legal Affairs, U.N.O. 444
khairagarh, Raja of 313 enc.
khan, Muhammad Niaz, I.C.S., Director
of Agriculture, Bengal 1944-7 287,
302
khan sahib, Dr, Chief Minister,
N.W.F.P. 1937-9 and from March
1945; half-brother of Abdul Ghaffar
Khan 45, 82, 130, 182, 183, 188, 191,
211, 278, 302, 327, 342, 365, 374, 381,
385, 387, 394, 433, 481, 489
KHIZAR (KHIZR) HAYAT KHAN
tiwana, Nawab Malik Sir, Premier of
the Punjab from Dec. 1942-March 1947
1 1 3, 337 enc., Appendix I, 3
khosla, Gopal Rai, clerk in Secretariat,
Lahore 345
khosla, Rai Bahadur Lala Ajudhia Nath,
served in Punjab Irrigation Dept 1916-
45; Chairman, Central Waterways,
Irrigation and Navigation Commission
from 1945 395
khuda baksh khan , Malik, Advocate-
General and Secretary, Legislative Dept,
N.W.F.P. 1942-7 327
kid w ai, Rafi Ahmad, Secretary, U.P.
Congress Committee 1922-6; Minister
of Revenue and Jails, U.P. 1937-9 and
for Home and Police from April 1946
332, 385
killearn, ist Baron cr. 1943 (Miles
Wedderburn Lampson), British Am¬
bassador to Egypt 1934-46; Special
Commissioner in South-East Asia from
1946 29, 82, 166, 227, 302, 317, 357,
385
killearn, Lady, wife of Lord Killearn
227, 302
KING, THE see GEORGE VI
kolhapur, Maharaja of 256, 266, 295,
384, 424
KOLHAPUR, PRIME MINISTER OF see
SURVE
Korea, Raja of 234
kotah, Maharaja of 313 enc.
krishnamach ari, Sir Vangal
Thiruvenkatachari, Diwan of Baroda
1927-44; Prime Minister of Jaipur
from 1946 234
kudlip singh, Sikh incendiarist 345
LAHORE AREA COMMANDER see BRUCE
laithwaite, Sir (John) Gilbert, Private
Secretary to the Viceroy 1936-43; an
Under-Secretary (Civil) of the War
Cabinet 1944-5; Deputy Under¬
secretary of State for Burma 1945-7
339
lall, Shamaldhari, I.C.S., Secretary,
Labour Dept, Govt of India from 1946
166
LIAQUAT ALI KHAN, BegUlll, wife of
Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan 489
LIAQUAT (LIAQAT) ALI KHAN,
Nawabzada, General-Secretary, All-
India Muslim League from 1936;
Deputy Leader of Muslim League
Party in the Indian Legislative Assembly
from 1940; Member, Interim Govt
(Finance) from 26 Oct. 1946; and
reconstitution of Interim Government
8, 12, 14, 21, 24, 76, 99, no, 112, 127,
162; and Boundary Commission(s) 52,
121, 144, 428, 454 n, 472, 485, 487, 489;
at meetings of Partition Council 52,
148, 171, 205, 344, 353; and reconstitu¬
tion of Armed Forces 64 n ; and
Sylhet referendum 98 n; interviewed
by Mountbatten with Jinnah on
15 July 1 12; and adaptation orders for
Pakistan 112, 147; confirms distribu¬
tion of portfolios in provisional govern¬
ment of Pakistan 173; and N.W.F.P.
191, 278, 301, 374, 385, 387, 407; and
Governor-Generalship of Pakistan 222 ;
INDEX OF PERSONS
827
and Partition Council statement 224,
292 enc, ; comments on tension between
Pakistan and India officials 228; at
meetings of provisional Joint Defence
Council 276, 352; interviewed by
Mountbatten with Jinnah on 29 July
279; and flags 279, 385 ; and governor¬
ship of East Bengal 291 n; and Kalat
303, 330? 385; and jail releases 320;
and criticisms of Punjab administration
337 enc.; and question of arresting
extremist Sikh leaders 345, 346, 384;
and Pakistan’s membership of U.N.O.
362, 386; and division of assets 385,
489; also 302, 488
lie, Trygve Halvdan, Foreign Minister,
Norway 1941-5 ; Secretary-General of
United Nations from 1946 386, 444
Linlithgow, 2nd Marquess of (Victor
Alexander John Hope), Viceroy and
Governor-General of India 1936-43
315, 442, Appendix I, 3
listowel, 5th Earl of (William Francis
Hare), Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State for India and Burma 1944-5;
Secretary of State for India and Burma
from 23 April 1947 see note at head of
this Index
lobb, John Chalice, Deputy Inspector-
General of Police, Lahore 1946-7 292
lockhart, Lieutenant-General Sir Rob
McGregor Macdonald, Indian Army,
Military Secretary, India Office 194 1-3 ;
Deputy Chief of General Staff, India
1944-5 ; Army Commander, India 1945-
7; Acting-Governor of N.W.F.P. June-
13 Aug. 1947 45, 76, 101, 130, 1 66, 182,
183, 191, 198, 211, 227, 229, 253, 278,
301, 302, 327, 342, 363, 365, 374, 381,
385, 387, 392, 394, 407, 433, 489
luke, Stephen Elliot Vyvyan, Under¬
secretary, Cabinet Office from 1947
157
macaulay, Thomas Babington (1800-
59), historian and essayist 91
mccay, Lieutenant-General Ross Cairns,
Commander, Peshawar Area 1946-7
211, 392
macmillan, (Maurice) Harold M.P.
(Con.) for Bromley from 1945; Secre¬
tary of State for Air 1945 26
mahajan, Mehr Chand, Judge of the
High Court, Lahore from 1943 ; Mem¬
ber of the Punjab Boundary Commis¬
sion 488
mahbub ali khan, Nawab Sheikh,
Indian Political Service, Political Agent,
Malakand 1946 6
malan, Dr Daniel Francois, Leader of the
Nationalist Party and of the Opposition
in the Union Parliament of South
Africa; Prime Minister from 1948 1 66
mall am, Lieutenant-Colonel George
Leslie, Indian Political Service, Revenue
and Divisional Commissioner N.W.F.P.
1947 188
mamdot, Iftikhar Husain Khan, Nawab
of, Member of the Punjab Legislative
Assembly; President of the Punjab
Provincial Muslim League; Member,
Muslim League Working Com¬
mittee; Prime Minister, West Punjab
1947 3, 337 enc., 359, 403, 487
mandal, Jogindar Nath, Minister, Judi¬
cial, Works and Buildings, Bengal 1946;
Member, Interim Govt (Law) from
26 Oct. 1946 127, 173, 301
M ANKI , Pir of 130
manohar lal, Sir, Finance Minister,
Punjab 1937-46 337 enc.
massey, Major Patrick, Indian Army,
Commander of the Governor-General’s
Bodyguard 1947 389
matthai, Dr John, Professor of Indian
Economics, Madras University 1922-5 ;
Member, and later President, Indian
Tariff Board 1925-34; Director-General,
Commercial Intelligence and Statistics
1:935-40; joined Tata Son Ltd 1940, a
Director 1944; Member, Interim Govt
for Finance from 2 Sept, and for Indus¬
tries and Supplies from 26 Oct. 1946,
and for Transport and Railways from
13 Jan. 1947 127, 172, 256, 302, 332,
457
828
INDEX OF PERSONS
mayhew, Christopher Paget, M.P. (Lab.)
for South Norfolk from 1945; Parlia¬
mentary Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs from 1945 157, 261
mayne, General Sir (Ashton Gerard
Oswald) Mosley, G.O.C.-in-C., Eastern
Command, India 1943-4; Principal
Staff Officer, India Office 1945-6 Appen¬
dix I, 6 n
MEMBER, STATES DEPARTMENT,
PAKISTAN See NISHTAR
menon, Dewan Bahadur C. P. Karuna-
kara of Cochin 234
menon, Kumar Padma Sivasankara,
I.C.S., Indian Ambassador to China
from 1947 488
menon, Rao Bahadur Vapal Pangunni,
Reforms Commissioner to the Govt of
India from 1942 and also Secretary to the
Governor-General (Public) 1945-6; Sec¬
retary, States Dept 1947 1, 12, 23, 32,
37, 39, 53, 61, 76, 99, 104, 108, no, 115,
127, 141, 151, 159, 162, 185, 191, 201,
213, 227, 228, 234, 240, 242, 244, 256,
281, 282, 307, 312, 313, 317, 319, 329,
335, 340, 366, 369, 385, 411, 420, 423,
424, 426, 434, 436, 442, 457, 475, 482,
487, 489, Appendix I, 2
menon, Vengalil Krishnan Krishna,
Secretary, India League 1929-47;
Borough Councillor, St Pancras 1934-
7; Special Representative of the Govt
of India at U.N.O. General Assembly
1946-7; High Commissioner for India
in the United Kingdom from Aug. 1947
53, 54, 55, 62, 63, 65, 74, 123, 152, 162,
166, 167, 227, 231, 320, 402
messervy, Lieutenant-General Sir Frank
Walter, Indian Army, G.O.C.-in-C.
Northern Command, India from 1946
36, 45, 46, 112, 162, 184, 205, 228, 253,
337 enc., 385, 429, 460, 488
METROPOLITAN OF INDIA See HUBBACK
mieville, Sir Eric Charles, Private
Secretary to the Viceroy 1931-6; Private
Secretary to the Duke of York 1936;
Assistant Private Secretary to King
George VI 1937-45; Principal Secretary
to the Viceroy from March 1947 12,
33, 37, 50, 52, 53, 66, 125, 140, 148, 162,
171, 182, 183, 191, 222, 229, 442, 488
miles, Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey John
Audley, Commander-in-Chief, Royal
Indian Navy from 1946 82
MILITARY SECRETARY TO THE
viceroy see currie
MINISTER AT KABUL see SQUIRE
MINISTER IN NEPAL see FALCONER
minto, 4th Earl of (Gilbert John Elliot-
Murray-Kynynmound, 1845-1914),
Viceroy 1905-10 218
mirza, Major Sahibzada Syed Iskander,
Indian Political Service, Joint Secretary,
Govt of India, War Dept 1946-7;
Defence Secretary, Pakistan Govt 1947;
Governor-General, Pakistan 1955; Pre¬
sident of Pakistan 1956-8 473
mit ter, Sir Brojendra Lai, Advocate-
General of India 1937-45; Diwan of
Baroda 1945-7 105, 141, 234, 489
mohamad ali , Chaudhri, Indian Audit
and Accounts Service, Financial Adviser,
Military Finance 1946-7; Secretary to
the Cabinet, Pakistan 1947; Prime
Minister of Pakistan 1955-6 52, 148,
162, 171, 205, 247, 256, 276, 278, 294,
301, 344, 352, 353, 369, 385, 422, 423,
428, 487, 489
MOHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN, Nawab-
zada, Indian Political Service, Wazir-i-
Azam, Kalat from 1945 174, 233, 303,
330
mohammad ayub khan, Brigadier,
Indian Army; Adviser to the Com¬
mander of the Boundary Force;
Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army
1951; President of Pakistan 1958-69;
Field Marshal 1959 205, 224
mohan singh, Jathedar, President of the
Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Com¬
mittee 67
monckton, Sir Walter Turner (later 1st
Viscount), Director-General, Ministry
of Information 1940-41; Solicitor-
General 1945; advised Govt of
Hyderabad on constitutional matters
11, 12, 33, 60, 65, 228, 232, 257, 264, 293,
302, 323, 329, 330, 343, 369, 385, 388.
INDEX OF PERSONS
829
389, 390, 402, 419, 420, 421, 434, 435,
440, 474
MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN, ISt Vis-
count (Field Marshal Bernard Law
Montgomery), Chief of the Imperial
General Staff from 1946 41, 113
mookerjee (mukherji), Baidyanath,
Member of the Council of Ministers,
Assam, from 1945 68, 107
morley, Alexander Francis, appointed
to India Office 1930; seconded to
Ministry of Aircraft Production 1940-2;
Assistant Secretary in Burma Office
1945-7 157
morris, Rhys Flopkin, M.P. (Lib.) for
Carmathen since 1945; Member of the
Parliamentary Delegation to India 1946
402
morris -jones, Wyndraeth Humphreys,
Lecturer in Political Science, London
School of Economics 1946-55; Con¬
stitutional Adviser to the Viceroy 1947
256, 268, 343, 430
Morrison, Herbert Stanley, M.P. (Lab.)
for Hackney (South); Home Secretary
and Minister of Home Security 1940-5;
Lord President of the Council and
Leader of the House of Commons from
1945 10, 368
mountbatten, Rear-Admiral Viscount
(Lord Louis Francis Albert Victor
Nicholas), Viceroy of India March-Aug.
1947 see note head of this Index
mountbatten, Lieutenant Philip
Mountbatten, R.N., Prince Philip of
Greece, later Duke of Edinburgh 153,
237, 488
mountbatten, Viscountess Edwina,
wife of Viscount Mountbatten 35, 62,
65, 153, 228, 243, 302, 385, 478, 483, 489
mountbatten, Pamela, second
daughter of Viscount Mountbatten
489
mud aliar, Diwan Bahadur Sir A.
Ramaswamy, Member for Commerce,
Viceroy’s Executive Council 1939-42;
for Supply 1943-6; President, U.N.
Economic and Social Council 1946-7;
Diwan of Mysore from 1946 202, 234
mudie, Sir (Robert) Francis, I.C.S.,
Home Member, Viceroy’s Executive
Council 1944-5; Governor of Sind
1946-7; Governor of West Punjab from
15 Aug. 1947 29, 178, 377, 379, 403,
487, 489
muhammad munir, Judge of the High
Court, Lahore from 1942; Member of
the Punjab Boundary Commission 488
mukherjea (mukherji) , Bijan Kumar,
Judge of the High Court, Calcutta from
1936; Member of the Bengal Boundary
Commission 488
mukerji, Dhirendra Narayan, M.L.A.
Bengal 1937 and from 1946; Chief Whip
of the Congress Party in Bengal
Assembly 16, 287
mukerji, Dr Shyama Prasad, Finance
Minister, Bengal 1941-3 ; President,
All-India Hindu Mahasabha 332, 385
mussolini, Benito, Head of Govern¬
ment and Prime Minister of Italy 1926-
43 390
nabi baksh, Khan Bahadur, Constitu¬
tional Adviser to the Nawab ofjunagadh
1947 240
nanak, Guru (1469-1539) the first of the
line of Gurus who formulated the Sikh
faith 367
nanda, Gulzarilal, Minister for Labour,
Bombay, from 1946 166
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE (1769-1821),
Emperor of the French 1804-14 and
March-June 1815 442
narain, Jai Prakash, Founder and some¬
time General-Secretary of the Congress
Socialist Party; Member, Congress
Working Committee 1946-7 14, 201,
302
nawanagar, Maharaja Jam Saheb of,
Chancellor, Chamber of Princes 1937-
44; Pro-Chancellor 1944-March 1946
234, 313 enc., 489
NAWAZ JUNG, Nawab Mir, Trade
Commissioner for Hyderabad in U.K.
118, 176, 376
830
INDEX OF PERSONS
nazimuddin, Khwaja Sir, Member,
Working Committee, All-India Muslim
League, Chief Minister, Bengal 1943-5
16, 287, 364
nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal, President,
Indian National Congress 1929-30,
1936, 1937 and 1946; Member, Interim
Govt (External Affairs and Common¬
wealth Relations) from 2 Sept. 1946;
and Kashmir 4, 129, 149, 249, 255, 259,
260, 269, 277, 280, 302, 402; his in¬
terview with Mountbatten on 8 July
6, 8; his comments on Sir C. P.
Ramaswami Aiyar 6; and reconstitu¬
tion of Interim Government 8, 12, 32,
53, 63, 7 6, 127, 162; agrees to States
adhering on Defence, External Affairs
and Communications only 11, 37, 65;
and announcement of continuance of
Colville and Nye as Governors 13;
approves statement on Mountbatten’s
appointment as Governor-General of
India 37, 42, 43; and Congress com¬
ments on Bill 40; and withdrawal of
British troops 41 ; and retention of
British personnel in the Armed Forces
64, 69, 79, 88, 162; agrees that
Boundary Commission’s work should be
finished by 15 August 65; authorises
Mountbatten to conduct negotiations
with the States 65, 104, 383; wants
Indian officers promoted to the highest
ranks 69, 88, 113 ; correspondence with
Attlee about Krishna Menon’s appoint¬
ment as India’s High Commissioner in
London 74, 152, 167; and Sylhet
referendum 94, 95, 98, 107, 114, 139,
162, 1 81, 195, 208; and Travancore
106; and release of sterling balances
119, 333 5 informed of appointment of
British High Commissioner in Pakistan
120; at meeting of Indian Cabinet on
1 6 July 127; his apprehensions of
disturbances in Calcutta 138, 161, 193,
194; and dying the Union Jack and
other flags 162, 238, 243, 261; shows
interest in the appointment of Indian
Agents in East Africa, the West Indies
etc 166; his provisional arrangements
for a new India Cabinet 172, 302, 332;
presses the early need for separate
administrations for East and West
Bengal 194; wants advantages of
natural barriers and defence aspect kept
in mind in the fixing of boundaries 195,
199, 208; Bhopal on 201; considers
referendum in N.W.F.P. a gross in¬
justice 228; Weightman’s preference
for serving under him rather than
Jinnah 23 3 ; his criticisms of Auchinleck
247, 256, 270, 312, 385; and appointment
of Commanders of Armed Forces 253 ;
and Oaths of Allegiance 273 ; and
release of I.N.A. prisoners 302, 320;
has interview with Mountbatten on
2 August 320; urges posting of mili¬
tary pickets in Lahore 331, 341 n;
agrees to discussion about Common¬
wealth defence problems 336, 443;
his criticisms of the Punjab Govt and
Punjab officials 337 enc. ; advises
against dismissal of Congress Ministry
in N.W.F.P. 342; and possible attend¬
ance at Royal Wedding 343, 384;
agrees to Princes continuing to receive
British decorations 353, 385 enc.;
addressed by the Maharaja of Indore
356; agrees to Mountbatten’s retention
of some of his staff after Independence
385; correspondence with Mountbatten
about Khosla’s note on Punjab irrigation
system 395, 406, 449 ; and employment
of Gurkha troops by H.M.G. 439; and
publication of Boundary Commisions’
awards 453, 454, 472, 487, 489; his
message to departing British troops
455, 489; at meeting of India Cabinet
on 13 August 457; messages and
replies thereto from Prime Minister and
Archbishop of Canterbury 461, 476;
at meeting on 16 August to receive
Boundary Commissions’ awards 487;
and Chittagong Hill Tracts 489; also
14, 35, 40, 47, 62, 68, 81, 150, 196 n,
227, 231, 281, 293 n, 308, 317, 323,
409 n, 488, Appendix I, 1
Nepal, Maharajadhiraja of 439
INDEX OF PERSONS
831
nicholls, Commander George, R.N.,
Deputy Personal Secretary to Lord
Mountbatten from March 1947 12, 53,
76, 99, 108, 191, 487, 488
Nicholson, Godfrey, M.P. (Con.) for
Farnham Division of Surrey from 1937;
Member of the Parliamentary Delega¬
tion to India 1946 402
nishtar, Sardar Abdur Rab Khan,
Member, Legislative Assembly
N.W.F.P. 1937-46; Finance Member
N.W.F.P. 1943-5; Member, Interim
Govt (Posts and Air) from 26 Oct. 1946
37, 82, 127, 150, 151, 158, 159, 173, 174,
186, 217, 228, 234, 301, 303, 330, 375
enc.
nizamuddin, Deputy Secretary, Con¬
stitutional Affairs Dept, Govt of Hydera¬
bad 1947 61
noble, Commander Allan Herbert Percy,
R.N. retd., M.P. (Con.) for Chelsea
from 1945 166
noon, Malik Sir Firoz (Feroz) Khan,
Member for Defence, Viceroy’s Execu¬
tive Council 1942-5 ; Indian representa¬
tive, British War Cabinet 1944-5 45
nye, Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald
Edward, Vice-Chief of the Imperial
General Staff 1941-6; Governor of
Madras 1946-8 13, 62, 106, 133, 273,
3D
o’neil shaw, John Charles Liddell,
Officiating Inspector-General of Police,
N.W.F.P. 1947 45, 392
osman A li, Shujat, I.C.S., Deputy
Secretary, Viceroy’s Executive Council
from 1946 127, 148, 171, 205, 276, 301,
344, 352, 353
pakwasa (pakvasa), Mangaldas
Mancharam, President, Bombay Legis¬
lative Council 1946-7; Governor of
Central Provinces and Berar from
15 Aug. 1947 293, 369, 385, 434
palitana phaltan, Thakur Saheb of
313 enc.
panikkar, Kavalam Madhava, Prime
Minister of Bikaner from 1944 141,
234, 405, 413, 427
panna, Maharaja of 234, 313 enc.
patel, Hiralal Muljibhai, I.C.S., Secre¬
tary, Viceroy’s Executive Council 1947
52, 65, 116, 127, 148, 162, 171, 205, 276,
344, 352, 353, 3^9, 423, 457, 489
patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai Jhaverbhai,
Member, Working Committee, Indian
National Congress, President of Con¬
gress 1931; Chairman, Congress Parlia¬
mentary Sub-Committee 1935-9; Mem¬
ber, Interim Govt (Home) from 2 Sept.
1946; ascribes sinister motives to Jinnah
3 5 ; asks Mountbatten to help India in its
relations with States 37; approves
statement regarding Mountbatten’s ap¬
pointment as Governor-General of India
42; at meetings of Partition Council
52, 148, 171, 205, 224, 344, 353; wants
to get rid of Muslim officials in the Govt
of India 53, 63; reported sympathetic
to establishment of a Sikh homeland
56; takes charge of States Dept 61, 234;
and reconstitution of Interim Govern¬
ment 76; agrees to Mountbatten con¬
ducting negotiations with States 104;
at meetings of India Cabinet 127, 457;
continues as member of reconstituted
India Cabinet 172, 332; V. P. Menon’s
close contact with 227; Mountbatten’s
high opinion of 256, 385; his views on
Gandhi or Nehru visiting Kashmir 269,
302; at meetings of provisional Joint
Defence Council 276, 352; asks for
change in composition of Joint Defence
Council 312; his views on dismissing
N.W.F.P. Ministry 319, 342; un¬
accommodating over Service questions
322; indifferent to Indore 335; criti¬
cisms of Punjab Govt 337 enc., and
Tara Singh’s terrorist plots 345, 346,
361, 379, 384, 403; and responsibility
for Public Debt 354, 355, 369, 422,
423 ; and accession of Bhopal 366, 426,
435, 482; accused of being too favourable
to Princes 383, 385; his violent re¬
action to inclusion of Chittagong Hill
Tracts in East Bengal 452, 485, 489;
832
INDEX OF PERSONS
PATEL ( cont .):
at meeting to receive Boundary Com¬
missions’ awards 487; also 11, 12, 14,
39, 64, 65, 80, 81, 150, 152, 162, 186,
195, 201, 217, 228, 232, 262, 273, 281,
282, 292, 297, 307, 317, 320, 325, 356,
402, 418, 463, 472, Appendix I, 1
patiala, Maharaja of, Pro-Chancellor
of the Chamber of Princes 1946-7
and officiating Chancellor from June
1947 52, 65, 234, 240, 285, 313 enc.,
367, 378, 384, 44i
Patrick, Sir Paul Joseph, Assistant
Under-Secretary of State, India Office
from 1941 1, 23, 39, 141, 157, 158,
230, 261, 262, 263, 313, 330, 340, 397,
489
peacock, Colonel, an employee of John
Mowlem & Co. Ltd. 192
pearce, Sir George Alfred, Inspector-
General of Police, United Provinces
1946-7 409
pepys, Samuel (1633-1703), diarist 337
enc.
PERMANENT U.K. REPRESENTATIVE
TO U.N. see CADOGAN
perry-keene, Air Vice-Marshal Allan
Lancelot Addison, Air Officer, in charge
Administration, Air H.Q., India 1946-
7; Air Commander, Royal Pakistan Air
Force 1947-9 253
pethick-lawrence, ist Baron cr. 1945
(Frederick William Pethick-Lawrence),
Secretary of State for India and Burma
1945-7; Member of the Cabinet Mission
to India 20, 218, 398, 402, Appendix I,
4, 5 , 7
Philip, see mountbatten, Philip
pill ai, Sir (Narayana) Raghavan, I.C.S.,
Secretary, Govt of India, Commerce
Dept from 1942 488
poett, Brigadier Joseph Howard Nigel,
Director of Plans, War Office 1946-8
118
POLITICAL AGENT, JAIPUR See COKE
WALLIS
POLITICAL ADVISER See CORFIELD
POLITICAL OFFICER, SIKKIM see
poulton, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry
Mortimer, Indian Political Service,
Resident for Central India, Indore
1946-7 335
prasad, Dr Rajendra, President, Indian
National Congress 1934 and 1939;
Member, Working Committee, Indian
National Congress; Member, Interim
Govt (Agriculture and Food) from
2 Sept. 1946; President of the Constituent
Assembly 12, 52, 64, 80, 127, 148, 171,
172, 205, 224, 276, 292, 302, 323, 332,
344, 352, 353, 457, 489
PRESIDENT, ALL-INDIA STATES’
people’s conference see
SITARAMAYYA
PRESIDENT OF THE CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLY See PRASAD
PRIME MINISTER, AFGHANISTAN see
SHAH MAHMUD
PRIME MINISTER, ALWAR See BAPNA
PRIME MINISTER, BIKANER See
PANIKKAR
PRIME MINISTER, KASHMIR See KAK
PRIME MINISTER, WEST PUNJAB See
MAMDOT
prince of wales, later King Edward
VIII (abdicated) and Duke of Windsor
162, 201
prior, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Charles
Geoffrey, Indian Political Service, Poli¬
tical Resident, Persian Gulf 1939-46;
A.G.G. Baluchistan 1946-7 29, 178,
258
pritam singh, member of the I.N.A.;
was landed on coast of India by Japanese
submarine in 1943 but arrested soon
after 345,384
PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME
MINISTER see ROWAN
PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE VICEROY
see ABELL
puri, Lala Girdhari Lai, Deputy Speaker,
N.W.F.P. Legislative Assembly 1946-7
321, 394
PURSHOTTAMDAS THAKURDAS, Sir,
Merchant; President, East India Cotton
Association; Director, Reserve Bank of
India 171 n
HOPKINSON
INDEX OF PERSONS
833
QAZI see ATAULLAH KHAN
qurban ali khan, Khan, Inspector-
General of Police (Designate), West
Punjab 459
QURESHi, Shuaib, Minister in Bhopal
State 1932-48 160
radcliffe, Sir Cyril John, Director-
General, Ministry of Information 1941-5 ;
Vice-Chairman, General Council of the
Bar from 1946; Chairman, Punjab and
Bengal Boundary Commissions 1947
3, 5, 12, 19, 52, 65, 67, 81, 103, hi, 121,
162, 166, 200, 207, 209, 216, 231, 236,
256, 318, 337, 367, 377, 378, 389, 395,
417, 428, 436, 452, 454, 485, 487, 488,
489; see also entries under boundary
c o mm 1 s s 1 o n ( s ) in Index of Subjects
rahim, Syed Abdur, Member of the
Nizam’s Executive Council for Local
Govt 1947 61, 240, 264, 434
rahman, Shaikh Abdur, I.C.S., Acting
Judge of the High Court, Lahore from
1946; Member of the Punjab Boundary
Commission 488
RAJ AGOP ALACHARI (-RIA, -RIAR and
the abbreviation rajaji), Chakravarty,
Prime Minister of Madras 1937-9;
resigned from Working Committee,
Indian National Congress April 1942;
Member, Interim Govt for Industries
and Supplies from 2 Sept. 1946, for
Education and Arts from 26 Oct. 1946
and for Industries and Supplies from
31 Jan. 1947; Governor of West Bengal
from 15 Aug. 1947 9, 127, 172, 247,
256, 302, 317, 332, 385, 488
rajendra singh, Major-General
Maharaj, Area Commander, Delhi 1947;
Commander-in-Chief, India 1953 489
rajpipla, Maharaja of 313 enc.
ram chandra, I.C.S., Financial Com¬
missioner (Revenue), Punjab from 1946
3, 19
ramd asia, P. S., Scheduled Caste
Leader from West Punjab 5
ram lal, engaged in plots for derailing
trains 345
rampur, Nawab of 383,385
ramsay, Major Norman, Indian Political
Service, Secretary to the Resident.
Mysore 1946-7 281
rance, Major-General Sir Hubert Elvin,
Director of Civil Affairs, Burma 1945-6;
Governor of Burma 1946-8 227, 231
rankeillour, i st Baron (James Fitzalan
Hope 1870-1949); his son, Sir Arthur
Hope, was Governor of Madras 1940-6
153, 166
ranking, Major-General Robert Philip
Lancaster, Area Commander, Bengal
1946-7 161, 289, 290, 302
rao, B. Shiva, journalist; correspondent
in Delhi of the Hindu and Manchester
Guardian; Member of the Constituent
Assembly 317
rau (rao), Sir Benegal Narsinga, I.C.S.,
Puisne Judge, High Court Bengal
1938-44; Prime Minister, Kashmir 1944-
5 ; on special duty in Governor-General’s
Secretariat (Reforms) 1945-6; Constitu¬
tional Adviser to the Constituent
Assembly of India from July 1946 30,
99, 114, 123, 181, 314, 319, 430
rau, Pendyala Satyanarayana, I.C.S.,
Chief Secretary, Central Provinces
1946-7 83
ray, Satyendra Nath, I.C.S., Food and
Civil Supply Commission, Bengal 1946-
7 287, 302
raza, Saiyid Hashim, I.C.S., Secretary
to the Governor of Sind 1947 418
reading, 2nd Marquess of (Gerald Rufus
Isaacs) 402
reddy, P. Ventakama, Member of the
Nizam’s Executive Council for Supply
1947 61, 240
rees, Major-General Thomas Wynford,
Indian Army, Commander, 4th Indian
Division 1945-7; Commander, Punjab
Boundary Force Aug.-Sept. 1947 148,
162, 184, 224, 276, 337 enc., 341, 382,
389, 432, 459, 460, 466, 467, 473> 486,
489
REFERENDUM COMMISSIONER,
SYLHET, See STORK
reid, James Edward, Deputy Inspector-
General of Police, Assam 1945-7 I07
834
INDEX OF PERSONS
reid, Thomas, M.P. (Lab.) for Swindon
Division of Wilts from 1945 316
RESIDENT, INDORE See POULTON
RESIDENT, KASHMIR see WEBB
RESIDENT, MADRAS STATES See
EDWARDS
RESIDENT, PUNJAB STATES see
WILLIAMS
rewa, Maharaja of 489
Richardson, Hugh Edward, I.C.S.,
British Trade Agent, Gyantse 1946-7
59, 126
roux, Monsieur, French Charge
d’ Affaires in India 1947 450, 451
rowan, Thomas Leslie, Assistant and
later Principal Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister 1 941-7 38, 50, 212
Rowlands, Sir Archibald, Adviser to the
Viceroy on War Adminstration 1943-5;
Finance Member, Viceroy’s Executive
Council 1945-6; Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Supply from 1946; Financial
and Economic Adviser to Governor-
General, Pakistan Aug.-Dee. 1947 140,
291, 357, 385
rum bold, Horace Algernon Fraser,
Assistant Secretary, India Office 1943-7;
Assistant Secretary, Commonwealth
Relations Office 1947 175, 178, 246,
261, 262, 263, 315, 397, 458
s achar, Lala Bhim Sen, Finance Minister,
Punjab Nov. 1946-March 1947 337 enc.
saidullahkhan, I.C.S., Commissioner,
Lahore Division 1945-7 292
Salisbury, Bishop of, Rt. Rev. Geoffrey
Charles Lester Lunt 402
Salisbury, 5th Marquess of (Robert
Arthur James Gascoyne-Cecil), Secre¬
tary of State for Dominion Affairs
1943-5; Leader of the House of Lords
1942-5 26, 390, 402
samuel, 1st Viscount cr. 1937 (Herbert
Louis Samuel), Liberal Leader, House
of Lords from 1944 26, 402, 478
sandur, Raja of 302, 313 enc.
sangli, Raja of 313 enc.
sant singh, Sardar Sahib, Sardar,
Punjab Provincial Civil Service, Chief
Minister, Nabha 1945-7 60
s arker (sarkar) , Nalini Ranjan, Mayor
of Calcutta 1934-5; sometime Finance
Minister Bengal; Member, Viceroy’s
Executive Council 194 1-3 16, 287
sarma, Sir (Ramaswami) Srinvasa,
Founder and Managing Editor of the
Whip, Calcutta weekly political news¬
paper from 1934 154
savage, Gerald Robert, Superintendent
of Police, Criminal Investigation Dept,
Lahore 1947 338, 345, 346, 359, 384
savory, Lieutenant-General Sir Reginald
Arthur, Adjutant-General, India 1946-7
65
scoones, General Sir Geoffry Allen
Percival, G.O.C.-in-C., Central Com¬
mand India 1945-6; Principal Staff
Officer to the Secretary of State for
India 1947 41, 219, 267
scott, Charles Peter, I.C.S., Assistant
Private Secretary to the Viceroy 1946-7
5, 151, 162, 210, 378, 389, 488
scott, Ian Dixon, I.C.S., Deputy Private
Secretary to the Viceroy 1945-7 5, 12,
18, 32, 53, 76, 99, 108, 134, 162, 171,
191, 318, 369, 389, 407, 488
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF UNITED
nations see LIE
SECRETARY, DEFENCE DEPARTMENT,
INDIA see BHALJA
SECRETARY, DEFENCE DEPARTMENT,
PAKISTAN See MIRZA
SECRETARY, STATES DEPARTMENT,
PAKISTAN see IKRAMULLAH
SECRETARY TO THE CROWN RE¬
PRESENTATIVE see GRIFFIN
selborne, 3rd Earl of (Roundell Cecil
Palmer), Minister of Economic Warfare
1942-5 153
sen, Sardar D. K. Chief Minister Mandi
1:933-9; Foreign Minister Patiala 1929-
32 and 1939-45 234
shah mahmud, Sardar, Prime Minister
Afghanistan in 1947 132, 142, 177, 198,
309, 348
shariar (sjahrir), Dr Soetan (Sutan),
first Prime Minister of Indonesian
Republic 1946-7 302
INDEX OF PERSONS
835
SHATTOCK, John Swithun Harvey, I.C.S.,
officer on special duty, Western India
States Agency 1939-40; Deputy Secre¬
tary, Political Dept, Govt of India 1943-
5; Dewan, Chamba State 1946-7 281
shaukat hyat khan, Captain Sardar,
Minister of Public Works, Punjab
1943-4; a son °f Sikander Hyat Khan
460
shawcross, Sir Hartley William, M.P.
(Lab.) for St Helens from 1945;
Attorney-General from 1945 146, 376,
380
shin well, Emmanuel, M.P. (Lab.) for
Seaham Division of Durham from 193 5 ;
Minister of Fuel and Power 1945-7 10,
368
shone, Sir Terence Allen, British High
Commissioner in India from Nov. 1946
106, 113, 120, 126, 137, 281, 317, 32oenc.,
328, 348, 352, 380, 431, 450, 451, 461,
475, 476, 485, 487, 489
short, Major John McLaughlin, Indian
Army; Civil Liaison Officer Punjab
1941-2; Personal Assistant to Sir
Stafford Cripps during the Cabinet
Mission to India 60, 166, 272, 298, 326
SHRI PRAKASH (SRI PRAKASA), High
Commissioner for India in Pakistan
1947-9 320
shujaat ali khan, Mir, second son of
the Nizam of Hyderabad, known as
MU A Z Z AM JAH II, 228, 232, 463
SIKANDER HYAT khan, Sardar Sir,
Premier of the Punjab 1937-42 337
Sikkim, Maharaja of 384
Simpson, Lieutenant-General Sir Frank
Ernest Wallace, Vice-Chief of Imperial
General Staff 41, 197
sirmoor, Maharaja of 234
sit A devi, Maharani, second wife of the
Gaekwar of Baroda 489
SECRETARY, STATES DEPARTMENT,
INDIA See MEN ON V. P.
SITAMAU, Raja of 313 enc.
siTARAMAYYA,DrB. Pattabhi Bhagaraja,
Member, Working Committee, Indian
National Congress 1940-6 106
slim, General (later Field Marshal, 1st
Viscount cr. i960) Sir William Joseph,
G.O.C. -in-Chief, Allied Land Forces,
S.E. Asia 1945-6; Commandant, Im¬
perial Defence College 1946-7 31, 62,
166, 227
smith, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur
Francis, G.O.C. Eastern Command,
India 1945-6; Chief of the General Staff,
India, and Deputy C.-in-C. 1946-7 50,
57, 65, 79, 88, 113, 267, 473
smith, Sir Norman Percival Arthur,
Director, Intelligence Bureau 1945-7
250, 256
smuts, Field Marshal Jan Christiaan,
Prime Minister, Union of South Africa
from 1939 166, 227, 314 enc.
soklal, Chaudhuri, Scheduled Caste
Leader from West Punjab 5
spence, Sir George Hemming, I.C.S.,
Secretary, Govt of India Legislative
Department 1935-47; on special duty
in Governor-General’s Secretariat
(Reforms) June-Aug. 1947 37, 108,
no, 127, 178, 191, 278, 294, 301, 319,
359, 385, 387
spens, Sir (William) Patrick, M.P. (Con.)
for Ashford, Kent 1933-43; Chief
Justice of India 1943-7 16, 65, 84, 97,
112, 148, 157, 279, 287
squire, Sir Giles Frederick, I.C.S.,
Minister to Afghanistan 1943-7 7°,
132, 142, 177, 198, 321, 348, 349, 350
srivasan, Vice-President, Executive
Council, Gwalior 1947 234
Stapleton, Group-Captain Deryck
Cameron, Assistant Secretary (Air), War
Cabinet Office 1945-6; Secretary, Chiefs
of Staff Committee from 1947 197
stevens, Captain John Felgate, R.N.,
Director of Plans, Admiralty 1946-7
118
stork, Herbert Cecil, I.C.S., Secretary,
Legislative Dept and Legal Remem¬
brancer, Assam from 1946; Referendum
Commissioner, Sylhet 1947 107
s trac hey, Evelyn John St Loe, M.P.
(Lab.) for Dundee from 1945; Minister
of Food from 1946 10, 368
836
INDEX OF PERSONS
subbarayan, Dr Paramasiva, Minister
for Law, Madras 1937-9 and 1947-8;
Member, All-India Congress Committee
1937-44 218
suhrawardy, Huseyn Shaheed, Chief
Minister and Home Minister, Bengal
from 1946 16, 161, 287, 290, 291, 301,
302, 364
sultan ahmed, Syed Sir, Law Member,
Viceroy’s Executive Council 1941-3 ;
Member for Information and Broadcast¬
ing 1943-5; Adviser to the Chamber of
Princes from 1945 174, 330, 396
sundaram, Kuther Vaidyanatha Kalyam
I.C.S., Joint Secretary, Legislative Dept,
Govt of India from 1945 and also Officer
on Special Duty, Secretariat of the
Governor-General (Reforms) from 1946
37, 108, 170, 278, 344, 369, 425, 438,
457, 470, 471
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
AMRITSAR See DEANE
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
(DESIGNATE), AMRITSAR see KAUL
SUPREME COMMANDER See
AUCHINLECK
surve, Rai Bahadur D. A., Prime
Minister of Kolhapur 234, 302, 424
swaran singh, Sardar, Minister of
Development, Punjab Sept. 1946-
March 1947 46, 67, 89, 205, 214, 228,
237, 272, 298, 305, 306, 337 enc.
symon, Alexander Colin Burlington,
Deputy High Commissioner for the
U.K. in India from 1946 137, 192, 244,
281, 282
tara singh, Master, Leader of the
Akali Sikhs 52, 214, 230, 292, 298,
305, 338, 345, 346, 384, 397, 403, 460,
489
tedder, i st Baron cr. 1946 of Glenguin
(Arthur William Tedder), Marshal of
the Royal Air Force; Chief of the Air
Staff from 1946 197
tehri garhwal, Maharaja of 313 enc.
teja singh, Sardar, Judge of the High
Court, Lahore from 1943; Member of
the Punjab Boundary Commission 488
thakin nu, Vice-President of A.F.P.F.L.
1945-7; President of Constituent
Assembly, Burma 1947; Prime Minister,
July 1947 231
THAKURDAS see PURSHOTTAMD AS
THAKURDAS
thanga, Lai Biak, Chairman, United
Mizo Freedom Organisation 68 n
Thompson, Joseph Herbert I.C.S., Resi¬
dent Punjab States 1945-7; on special
duty Political Department 1947 61
tiwana, Brigadier, Indian Army 184,
205
TOMLINSON, George, M.P. (Lab.) for
Farnworth Division of Lancashire from
1938; Minister of Works 1945-7;
Minister of Education from 1947 368
travancore, Diwan of see aiyar
travancore, Maharaja of 58, 93, 106,
203, 228, 284, 288, 297, 302, 313, 402
TRI VEDI, Sir Chandulal Madhavlal, I.C.S.,
Secretary, Govt of India, War Depart¬
ment 1942-6; Governor of Orissa 1946-
7; Governor of East Punjab from 15
Aug. 1947 1 15, 166, 227, 270, 302, 312,
317, 346, 379, 403, 446, 489
tuker, Lieutenant-General Sir Francis
Ivan Simms, G.O. C.-in-C. Eastern
Command, India from 1946 161, 289,
290, 302
turnbull, Francis Fearon, Private Sec¬
retary to the Secretary of State for
India 1941-6; Secretary to the Cabinet
Mission to India 1946; Assistant Sec¬
retary, Political Dept, India Office from
Aug. 1946 16, 18, 71
tyson, John Dawson, I.C.S., Secretary,
Govt of India (Education, Health and
Lands) 1940-5; Secretary to the Gover¬
nor of Bengal 1945-7 287, 315
U.K. AMBASSADOR IN U.S.A. see
INVERCHAPEL
U.S. AMBASSADOR, DELHI see GRADY
van ZYL, Gideon Brand, Governor-
General of the Union of South Africa
from 1945-50 225
INDEX OF PERSONS
837
venkatachar, Cadambi Sheshachar,
I.C.S., Prime Minister, Jodhpur 1946-7
234, 385
Wakefield, Edward Birkbeck I.C.S.,
Joint Secretary, Politcal Department,
India 1946-7 61, 174, 213
walmsley, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Hugh
Sidney Porter, Air Officer Commanding-
in-Chief, India 1946-7 135, 137, 302
wavell, Field Marshal Earl (Archibald
Percival Wavell) , Viceroy and Governor-
General of India 1943-7 54, 196, 315,
337, 442, Appendix I, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7
wazir A li, Malik, Under-Secretary,
Cabinet Secretariat, India, 1946-7 5
WAZIR-I-AZAM, K A L A T see MOHAMMAD
ASLAM KHAN
webb, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilfred
Francis, Indian Political Service, Resi¬
dent, Kashmir 1945-7 78, 149, 260, 269,
277, 280, 456
weightman, Hugh, I.C.S., Secretary,
External Affairs Dept, Govt of India
1946-7 158, 178, 233, 317
westwood, Joseph, M.P. (Lab.) for
Stirling and Falkirk from 1935; Secre¬
tary of State for Scotland 1945-7 10
wheare, Professor Kenneth Clinton,
Gladstone Professor of Government
and Public Administration, University
of Oxford from 1944 314 enc., 430
whiteley, William, M.P. (Lab.) for
Blaydon Division of Durham 1922-31
and from 1935; Parliamentary Secretary
to the Treasury and Govt Chief Whip
from 1945 10
williams, Charles Frederick Victor,
I.C.S., Joint Secretary, Home Dept,
Govt of India 1945-7; Secretary to
Governor-General (Public) 1947 20,
246, 322
williams, Edward John, High Com¬
missioner for the U.K. in Australia from
1946 3 11
williams, Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey
Baynton, Indian Political Service, Resi¬
dent Punjab States 1947 271, 285
williams, Tom, M.P. (Lab.) for Don
Valley Division of Yorkshire from 1922;
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries
from 1945 10, 368
wilmot, John, M.P. (Lab.) for East
Fulham 1933-5, Kennington Division
of Lambeth 1939-45, Deptford from
1945; Minister of Supply 1945-7 163
Wilson, Geoffrey Masterman, Assistant
Secretary, Cabinet Office, 1947 157
Wilson smith, Sir Henry, Permanent
Secretary, Ministry of Defence 1947-8
157, 339
wood, Richard Frederick, Private Secre¬
tary to the Minister of Defence 1947
443
woods ballard, Lieutenant-Colonel
Basil, Indian Political Service, Political
Agent, Bhopal 1945-7 160
wylie, Sir Francis Verner, I.C.S., Poli¬
tical Adviser to the Crown Representa¬
tive 1 940- 1 and 1943-5 ; Governor of the
United Provinces 1945-7 324, 384,
409, 410, 442, 477
zafrullah khan, Chaudhuri Sir
Muhammad, Member, Viceroy’s Exe¬
cutive Council 1935-41 ; Judge, Federal
Court of India 1941-7; Constitutional
Adviser to Nawab of Bhopal 366,
369, 385, 426, 482
zahid husain, Indian Audit Dept,
Financial Commissioner, Railways 1943-
6; Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh University
1947 89
zaidi, Bashir Husain, Chief Minister
Rampur I937~49 234, 385
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
The references are to Document Numbers
Aden 164 clause 1 6
AFGHANISTAN
Afghan demands concerning N.W.F.P.
70, 132, 142, 177, 198, 219, enc. 1 para.
6, 309-10, 321, 33 6, 348-50, 394 para. 4,
488 paras. 6 and 9
see also north-west frontier,
defence of
ALWAR
disturbances in 372
AMNESTY (to BE DECLARED ON
15 august) see Indian national
army, release of ex-I.N.A. prisoners
AMRITSAR
disarming of Muslim members of Am¬
ritsar City Police Force 432 para. 1,
437 para, 1, 459, para. 3, 460 para. 1,
486 para. 2, 489 para. 21
see also boundary commission(s)
reports and awards of; Punjab, tension
and disturbances in
ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ISLANDS
Jinnah’s representation against their
inclusion in India 38
and British defence requirements 41
enc., 219 enc. 2 para. 3(f)
views of Australian Govt on 334
ANGLO-AFGHAN TREATY (l92l) 3 10
enc., 348
arab states 380 para. 5
Arabia Appendix I, 6
ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL l6, l8, 38, 8l,
302 paras. 8 and 17, 344, 354, 423, 462,
471, 489 paras. 29 and 38
chairmanship and composition of 65
para. 13, 97, 1 12 item 5, 148, 279 para. 5,
287, 489 annex 1
parliamentary statement explaining why
provision for an Arbitral Tribunal has
not been included in Independence Bill
71-2, 97
question of Order to establish 73, 96
Arbitral Tribunal Order, 1947 438
ARMED FORCES, BRITISH
withdrawal of 15, 31 para. 3, 41, 50,
57 para. 3, 61, 113 para. 6, 135, 219,
489 para. 80 and postscript
question of their use for internal security
purposes 41, 50 n, 57 para. 4, 124,
135 para. 2, 169, 276, 283, 339 minute 3 ;
for role of British officers see bound ary
force
and protection of British lives 41, 267
enc.
Defence Member’s reflections upon in¬
tegrity of Auchinleck and other senior
British officers 113 para. 2; Auch-
inleck’s misunderstanding of new
arrangements 247, 256 item 2, 270;
Auchinleck’s strained relations with
Indian leaders 312, 385 paras. 44-6,
489 para. 37
Nehru’s message to 455
see also entries under armed forces,
INDIAN
ARMED FORCES, INDIAN
continued service of British officers and
other ranks with 13, 22, 41, 64, 65
para. 11, 69, 79-80, 88, 157 minute 1,
162 paras. 16-17, 184, 352, 385 para. 56,
489 para. 35
division (reconstitution) of 36, 41, 57,
65 para. 14, 77, 88, 113 para. 2, 164
clause 11, 166 para. 4, 219, 227 para. 5,
247, 256 item 2, 270, 302 paras. 12-16,
385 para. 42, 429
nationalisation of and promotions with¬
in 41, 69, 79, 88, 113 para. 1
withdrawal of Indian Army troops from
Hyderabad cantonments 61, 65 para.
28, 232 para. 2(iv), 329 para. 1
position of British officers in command
of Dominion troops in event of clashes
with Indian States or between two
Dominions 113 para. 4, 256 item 3
appointment of Commanders of armed
forces of two new Dominions 3 1
para. 4, 41, 112 item 3, 166 para. 7, 227
para. 7, 253
cruiser for Indian navy 166 para. 11,
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
839
ARMED FORCES, INDIAN ( 'cotlt .):
227 para. 10, 231 para. 12
position of Supreme Commander and
his staff during reconstitution 304
Indian contingent in Japan 302 para.
18, 385 para. 55
problems facing Pakistan army 385
para. 43, 488 para. 5, Appendix I, 6
impact of Punjab disturbances on divi¬
sion of 486 para. 4
see also staff colleges (u.k.),
admission of Indian students
ASSAM
referendum in Sylhet 68 paras. 5-7,
94-5, 98, 107, 114 para. 1, 139, 162
paras. 2, 8-9, 181 para. 1
referendum result 92
see also boundary commission(s)
ASSETS (and LIABILITIES), DIVISION
of 10, 32, para. 3, 65 para. 16, 71-2,
81, 97, 344, 354-5, 369 item 4, 385
paras. 31-8 and stop press, 422-3, 447,
462, 468-9, 489 paras. 29-32
League concern over 24 para. 3, 38
Indian Independence (Rights, Property
and Liabilities) Order, 1947 471
astrology (astrologers) 323 para.
3, 369 item 1, 385 paras. 22 and 26,
489 paras. 44 and 56
Australia 368, 373, Appendix I, 6
position of, in relation to Common¬
wealth 314 enc.
see also entries under Andaman and
NICOBAR ISLANDS; DOMINIONS
auxiliary force (india) 385 para.
40
bahawalpur 151 enc., 228 para. 26,
395 enc., 488 annex I para. 8
BALUCHISTAN
question whether it should be made a
Governor’s Province and appointment
of Governor 82, 158, 178, 191 item 6,
233, 258, 317 para. 2
States of 228 para. 26
baroda 141, 213
and question of accession 385 para. 59,
41 1, 489 paras. 44-6
BELGIUM 444
BENARES 167
BENGAL
reconstituted Cabinet in 65 paras.
4-5 see also 301
to avoid friction Nehru proposes
immediate administrative separation 194
disturbances/internal security in see entries
under boundary force ; Calcutta
Mountbatten’s visit to and meetings/
interviews with
Bengal Separation Council 287
Army and Area Commanders and
Governor 289
Ghosh and Suhrawardy 290
Suhrawardy 291
Mountbatten’s report of his visit 302
paras. 4-10, 317 para. 15
see also boundary commission(s) ;
DACCA; PARTITION
berar ii, 43 paras. 8-9, 61 and enc.,
65 para. 28, 232 para. 2(iii), 293, 308,
323 para. 2, 329 paras. 3 and 6, 376 para.
6, 385 para. 15, 419-21, 434 para. 3,
440 para. 2, 457, 474
BHARATPUR 372
BHOPAL
and question of accession ioo, 160,
201, 228 para. 22, 239, 297, 302 para.
52, 313 paras. 2-3, 325, 340 para. 1, 366,
369 item 6, 383 para. 8, 385 paras. 7-8,
402 para. 30, 412, 420 para. 1,426, 435,
482, 489 paras. 47-8
and question of Nawab’s abdication
369 item 6, 385 para. 8, 412, 435, 482,
489 para. 47
Bhutan 126 para. 4, 263
BIHAR
question of requesting local League
leaders to withdraw demand for inquiry
into riots of Nov. 1946 34, 279 para. 4
possibility of reunion with West Bengal
317 para. 12
disturbances in (1942, 1946-7) 337 enc.
paras. 6 and 9
bikaner 141, 395 enc., 405, 488 annex
1 para. 8
BOMBAY
disturbances in (1946-7) 337 enc. para. 9
840
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
BOUNDARY C OMMIS SIOn(s)
administrative arrangements for 3, 12
item 1, 19
supply of information to 3, 12 item 1,
19, 196, 206, 216
selection of personnel/composition of
485 para. 3(a), 488 annex 1 para. 2,
annex 11 para. 2, 489 paras. 4 and 6 and
annex 1
terms of reference for 52, 109, 114,
121, 144, 181, 206, 216, 220, 226, 236,
318, 417, 487, 488 annex 1 para. 3,
annex 11 para. 3, 489 paras. 5-6 and
annex 1
amendment of Bill to indicate that
‘award of a Boundary Commission’
means decision of Chairman 52, 164
clauses 3(4) and 4(3), 181 para. 3, 485
para. 3(c), 489 para. 7
Jenkins advocates negotiation of a
settlement out of court 56, 81 also 82
Jenkins advocates appointment of a
‘Boundary Administration’ 90 para. 4(c),
also hi para. 4
Mountbatten’s dissociation from 5, 52,
65 para. 10, 210, 220, 318, 326, 367, 378,
395, 405-6, 427, 428, 441, 449, 485
para. 2, 489 paras. 2 and 10
Radcliffe’s visits to Lahore and Bengal
103 para. 5, 162 paras. 4-5
Nehru proposes third Boundary Com¬
mission or assessors for Sylhet 114,
181, 195, 208
question of representing defence point
of view 52, 195, 199, 207-8
question of completion and publication
dates for awards of 12 item 1, 52,
65 para. 8, 81, 89-90, 108 item 3, 111
para. 2, 114 para. 2, 166 para. 13,
1 81 para. 3, 200, 209, 377, 389 item 1,
436 item 4, 446, 453-4, 472, 485 para. 8,
489 paras. 17-18 and 76-9
requests from Governors of Bengal and
Punjab for advance information on
date/contents of awards 13 1, 190, 359
para. 5, 377, 382 para. 5(4), 389 item 1,
39U 414
map and note showing roughly the
boundary Radcliffe proposes to de¬
marcate in Punjab 377
concern over delay in announcing
Punjab award 460 para. 3, 486 para. 5
crisis over awards of 428, 452, 485,
489 paras. 2-18
reports and awards of 488 annex
meeting to receive awards of 487,
489 paras. 76-9
see also Bengal, to avoid friction Nehru
proposes immediate administrative
separation; Lahore, question whether
govt of East Punjab should leave
pending report of Boundary Com¬
mission; PARTITION ; SIKHS
BOUNDARY FORCE
plan of action to deal with disturbances
in the neighbourhood of the boundaries
between the two Dominions 88 para.
2, 102, 134, 148 also 286, 299
establishment of, in the Punjab 148,
162 para. 6, 184, 205, 224, 228 para. 12,
276, 302 para. 2
creation of considered but deemed
unnecessary in Bengal 148, 224, 287,
289, 290, 302 paras. 9-10, 364
strength of Punjab Boundary Force and
requests for reinforcements 341, 382,
389 item 1, 404, 432 para. 8, 437 para.
3, 459 para. 5, 460 para. 3, 467, 473, 486,
489 para. 25
Auchinleck’s report of situation in
Punjab Boundary Force area 486, 489
paras. 19-23
suggestion for control of Punjab
Boundary Force after 15 Aug. 487
para. 17
meeting at Ambala to discuss operations
of Punjab Boundary Force 487 para. 17,
489 paras. 24 and 26
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION (iN
india)
High Commissioner’s residence 113
para. 3
Shone to remain as High Commissioner
120
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION (iN
PAKISTAN)
appointment of High Commissioner
120
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
841
BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT
(1867) 314
BRITISH OVERSEAS AIRWAYS COR¬
PORATION 65 para. 17
BURMA
and question of Commonwealth mem¬
bership 152, 166 para. 2, 227 para. 2,
402 paras. 3 and 5
assassination of Aung San 227 para. 4,
231 para. 7
and Commonwealth defence Appen¬
dix I, 6
CABINET, BRITISH
Conclusions 10, 368
Papers 347
see also India and burma com¬
mittee
CABINET, INDIAN (BEFORE RECON¬
STITUTION) 65 para. 16
Minutes 127
for references after reconstitution see India
CABINET; PAKISTAN CABINET
CALCUTTA
dissolution of Calcutta Disturbances
Enquiry Commission 84
disturbances in 65 paras. 2-3, 162 para.
2, 302 para. 11 also 337 enc. para. 9
Nehru’s concern for security of 88
para. 2, 138, 161, 193-4 also 302 para. 9
troop reinforcements in 1 61, 193, 194
paras. 4-5, 289 also 364 n
disposal of Punjabi Mussulmans in
Calcutta armed police 161 para. 3,
194 paras. 4-5, 290
date for departure of Muslim League
from 302 para. 11
see also boundary commission(s),
reports and awards of; boundary
force, creation of considered but
deemed unnecessary in Bengal
CANADA 373
and enquiries into South African and
Indian attitudes at U.N.O. 166 para. 18
position of, in relation to Common¬
wealth 3 1 4 enc. , 402 para. 3 , Appendix
1,6
and messages for new Dominions 3T7
para. 13
see also dominions
CEREMONIES ON TRANSFER OF POWER
145, 162 para. 24, 243, 261, 308, 317
paras. 2 and 13, 339 minute 4, 385
paras. 20 and 22-4, 402 para. 36, 461,
476, 489 paras. 53-75
see also oaths of office; instru¬
ment OF INSTRUCTIONS
ceylon Appendix I, 6
see also travancore, and trade with
Ceylon
CHAMBER OF PRINCES see INDIAN
STATES, CONFERENCE WITH RE¬
PRESENTATIVES OF
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE (u.K.)
Minutes 41, 197
Papers 188
see also armed forces, British,
withdrawal of; defence, British and
Commonwealth military requirements
in India; north-west frontier,
defence of
china (chinese) 65 para. 25, 373,
Appendix I, 6
chitral 228 para. 26
CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS 436n,
452, 485 paras. 6-7, 487, 489 paras.
12, 15-16 and 77
see also boundary commission(s),
reports and awards of
colonial office 402 para. 32
COMMONWEALTH
retention of new Dominions in 43
para. 5, 82, 91, 112 item 2, 180 para. 7,
227 para. 3, 256 item 7, 268, 343, 368,
383 para. 11, 402 para. 3
and question of common citizenship
227 para. 3, 402 para. 4
right of secession from 314 enc., 430
see also burma; defence; north¬
west frontier, defence of
COMMONWEALTH GOVERNORS-
GENERAL 225
COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS’
conference (1946) 219 enc. i para.
II
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS CON¬
FERENCE (in Delhi)
842
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS CON¬
FERENCE (in Delhi) ( cont):
Mountbatten contemplates 43 para. 6,
61, 343 n
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE
166 para. 12, 264n, 399 enc. para. 9,
402 para. 32
communists 106 enc. 1, 185 para. 4,
201, 297
CONGRESS, INDIAN NATIONAL
and Governor(s)-General see gover-
nor(s)-general
and Indian States see Indian states
and PARAMOUNTCY, LAPSE OF
and reconstitution of Interim Govern¬
ment See INTERIM GOVERNMENT
and international status of new
Dominions see India
and Boundary Commission(s) see
BOUNDARY COMMISSIOn(s)
and Partition see partition
rejection of British honours by 125
and criticisms of Punjab administration
337 enc.
Giani Kartar Singh on 56 enc. para. 11
Jathedar Mohan Singh’s statement in¬
dicates distrust of 67 para. 3
Bhopal on 201
Aiyar on 228 para. 16
Monckton on 390, 419
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (iNDIA)
defined in clause 19(3) of Act 164
report of Union Powers Committee 5 8
report of Union Constitution Commit¬
tee 317 para. 11
Advisory Committee on Minorities,
Fundamental Rights, Tribal and Ex¬
cluded Areas 68 para. 2, 452 enc.
Mountbatten’s address to 489 para.
64 and annex
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (PAKISTAN)
defined in clause 19(3) of Act 164
Mountbatten’s address to 489 para.
57 and annex
see also north-west frontier
province, post-referendum problem/
question of ministry in
CORRESPONDENCE
with provincial Governors and Prime
Ministers 320 paras. 4-5
CROWN representative’s POLICE
385 paras. 5-6
cutch 385 para. 59, 489 para. 42
DACCA
provision of facilities/resources for 65
para. 6, 287, 290, 302 para. 11, 402 para.
26 also 1 6 para. 4
Darjeeling 287, 384 para. 4
DAVIDSON COMMITTEE (1932) 213,
458
DAWN 162 para. 30, 222, 337
DEFENCE
British and Commonwealth military
requirements in India 31 para. 3, 41,
43 paras. 3-6, 49, 118, 137, 143, 219,
302 para. 34, 352, 385 para. 41, 402
para. 28, 443, 488 paras. 12-13
Ismay on need for India and Pakistan to
have unified defence policy 136
Auchinleck’s memo (1946) on strategic
implications of inclusion of Pakistan in
British Commonwealth Appendix I, 6
see also Andaman and nicobar
islands; joint defence council;
north-west frontier, defence of
DHOLPUR
and question of accession 228 para.
22, 242, 265, 302 para. 48, 340 para. 1,
402 para. 30, 489 para. 50
Dholpur ‘group’ 385 para. 58
DINNER PARTIES (ON NATIONAL AND
other occasions) 65 para. 25, 162
para. 23, 302 para. 53
see also last reference under ceremonies
ON TRANSFER OF POWER
dir 228 para. 26
DOMINIONS
question of Dominions expert on
Mountbatten’s staff 166 para. 24, 227
para. 13, 317 para. 3
representation of, at ceremonies in
Delhi 243 para. 3
correspondence with, on change in
Royal Title 3 1 1
and Sterling Balances 333
and ministerial visits between new
Dominions 487 para. 25
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
843
EAST INDIA COMPANY see INDIA
office, future of and disposal of its
contents
EGYPT 333, 347, 373 380 para. 5
EIRE (IRELAND, IRISH FREE STATE)
222, 252, 444
position of, in relation to Common¬
wealth 314 enc., 343 enc., 430 para.
6
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL see INTERIM
GOVERNMENT
faridkot 432 para. 9
federal court 65 paras. 12-13, 157
minute 2, 320 para. 6
ferozepore 377 n, 395 enc., 405
see also boundary commission(s) ,
reports and awards of; Punjab, tension
and disturbances in
FLAGS
for new Dominions 82, 112 item 2,
162 paras. 26-9, 222, 228 para. 28, 231
para. 6, 243, 261, 279 para. 7, 385 para.
29, 489 para. 36
FOOD SITUATION
in Bengal 287
in Punjab 292 para. 5, 459 para. 8
FRANCE
French possessions in India 450-1
and Indian States see Hyderabad,
proposal to establish a Diplomatic
Mission in Paris
GOA see PORTUGUESE POSSESSIONS IN
INDIA
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935 see
Pakistan, adaptation orders for
governor(s)-general
for references generally seeCh. i in Summary
of Documents
question whether Mountbatten should
accept Governor-Generalship of India
only io, 14, 26-8, 31 paras. 1-2
Mountbatten’s decision to accept 35,
37 item 1, 42, 48, 65 paras. 20-21, 100,
153, 166 para. 5, 237, 489 annex
Indian press reaction to Mountbatten’s
nomination 65 para. 24
announcement about formal appoint¬
ment of 308, 317 para. 2
Krishna Menon on ‘Mr J’s last effort’ 167
Ismay’s representations to Jinnah on
222
Short believes jinnah has blundered over
326
GOVERNORS, BRITISH
work of 410
GOVERNORS, PROVINCIAL
appointment of, in India 13, 62, 133,
293, 308 para. 3, 317 para. 2, 323, 385
paras. 15, 26 and 52, 440 para. 2
appointment of, in Pakistan 22, 29,
31 para. 5, 82, 166 para. 6, 180, 227
para. 6, 248, 258, 291, 317 para. 2, 324
357, 385 para. 25, 394 para. 7, 402 para.
26 see also Baluchistan
resignations of 47
gurdaspur 335, 395 enc., 428, 485
para. 4, 489 para. 9
see also boundary commission(s),
reports and awards of; Punjab, tension
and disturbances in
gurgaon see Punjab, tension and
disturbances in; alwar, disturbances
in
gurkhas 1 1 3 para. 5, 219 enc. 2 para.
3(g), 320 enc., 370, 439
GWALIOR 141, 213
HINDUSTAN TIMES 65 para. 24
HONOURS
question of, for Jinnah 82, 125, 212,
225
for Princes 228 para. 23, 353, 385
para. 30 and annex, 402 paras. 9-14
for Mountbatten’s staff 488 para. 18
Mountbatten’s Earldom 300, 488 para.
18
HYDERABAD
Nizam’s protest over unilateral repu¬
diation of treaties 33, 232
Mountbatten’s negotiations with re¬
presentatives of 11, 43 paras. 8-9, 61,
844
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
HYDERABAD ( COtlt .) !
65 paras. 27-32, 82, 85 para. 3, 150
para. 2, 166 para. 14, 228 paras. 20-21,
232, 240, 241, 256 item 4, 257, 296, 313
para. 3, 317 para. 7, 329, 340 para. 1,
369 item 8, 383 para. 8, 385 paras. 15-18,
389 item 3, 402 para. 30, 420, 434
question of title for Nizam’s second son
11, 228 para. 21, 232 para. 5, 463
Listo wel’s memorandum on 232
role of Hyderabad delegation at States’
conference 240
Monckton’s difficulties in 257, 264
para. 4, 302 para. 47
Resident’s appreciation of affairs in with
minuting thereon 264
Monckton complains of Congress co¬
ercion 390, 419
grant of extension to 329 para. 5, 385
para. 18, 435 para. 3, 489 para. 51 and
annex 1
Nizam’s offer to negotiate treaty with
Indian Dominion 376, 388, 421, 440,
474
provision of Air Forces for 118
and ceded territory 213
supply of ammunition to 415
see also berar
INDEPENDENCE DAY CELEBRATIONS
See CEREMONIES ON TRANSFER OF
POWER
INDIA
question of international status of new
Dominions 40 para. 3, 65 para. 21,
316, 328, 353, 386, 444, 470
appointment of Indian Agents overseas
166 para. 3
Provisional Constitution Order, 1947
457
see also entries under armed forces,
Indian; assets; commonwealth;
defence; governors, provincial
INDIA AND BURMA COMMITTEE
Minutes 157, 261, 339
Papers 106, 163, 232, 243, 399 enc.,
478
INDIA CABINET
composition of 172, 332
and question of future ministerial
appointments 256 item 6, 302 paras.
36-40, 385 paras. 49-51
Secretariat of 489 paras. 39-40
INDIA OFFICE
future of and disposal of its contents
398-400, 431
Mountbatten compliments 488 para.
19
INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER (iN
London)
appointment of 55, 74, 152, 166 para.
9, 227 para. 8, 231 para. 14, 320 para.
1, 402 para. 15
INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER (iN
Pakistan)
appointment of 320 para. 8
INDIAN INDEPENDENCE ACT
text of 164
INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL
for references generally see Ch. 1 in
Summary of Documents
date for enactment of 8 para. 4, 63
paras. 6-7, 165, 237
general debates on 65 n. 14, 153, 166
para. 15, 227 para. 17
INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY
release of ex-I.N.A. prisoners 279
para. 6, 302 para. 54, 320 para. 3, 402
para. 31
involvement of ex-I.N. A. personnel in
Punjab disturbances 345, 384 para. 6,
459 para. 3, 486 para. 3
INDIAN NEWS CHRONICLE 489 para. 3 5
INDIAN SERVICES
guarantee of terms of service of 20,
164 clause 10, 246
payment of compensation or pensions
to 164 clause 10, 231 para. 10, 322,
488 paras. 2-3
Resolution on 317 para. 10, 402 para.
34
Non-Secretary of State’s/Provincial
Services 20, 322, 402 para. 16
disintegration of, in Punjab 81 enc.
para. 3, 382 para. 3, 432 para. 1, 437
para. 1, 448, 459 paras. 3-4, 460 paras.
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
845
INDIAN SERVICES (1 COflt .):
1-2, 486 para. 3, 489 para. 21
and criticisms of Punjab administration
see entry under Punjab
postings and transfers of officials
at Centre see interim govern¬
ment, reconstitution of also 69 para.
6
in Central Provinces and Berar 83
in Bengal 194, 287, 290
in Punjab 89, 90, 103 para. 4, 148,
184, 205, 228 paras. 8-9, 292 para. 4,
382 para. 3, 432 para. 1, 437 para. 1,
459 paras. 3-4, 484
see also armed forces, Indian;
judges; political department
INDIAN STATES
Jor States generally see Ch. 4 in Summary
of Documents ; for references in context of
lapse of par amountcy see paramountcy,
LAPSE OF
question of H.M.G’s attitude towards
States deciding to remain independent
and international status of, after
15 Aug. 1, 23, 39, 61, 85, 106 para. 3,
262, 317 para. 8, 335, 380, 402 para. 29
agreement that Mountbatten should
conduct negotiations with in first
instance 37 item 2, 43 para. 10, 65
para. 26, 104, 217
Congress attitude and/or policy towards
6, 11, 61, 66 annex, 82, 104, 105, 106
para. 3(a), 201, 228 paras. 24-5, 239, 262,
297, 302 para. 44, 329, 335, 383, 385
para. 1. 390, 401, 402 para. 29, 419, 434
see also entry under paramountcy,
LAPSE OF
accessions of, to Pakistan 30, 37 item 2,
87, 151 enc., 159, 228 para. 26, 317 para.
9 see also entries under kal at ; Pakistan
Gandhi on 43 para. 7
Cripps on 154
Subbarayan on 218
and British military requirements in
India 118
text of Instrument of Accession 313
enc.
communique on accessions 313 enc.
issue of arms and ammunition to 66,
88 para. 3, 179, 262, 307 para. 3, 340
para. 5, 401, 415
mediatisation of small States 442
question of constitutional reforms in
489 para. 52
CONFERENCE WITH REPRESENTA¬
TIVES of (25 July)
agenda for 2, 75, 85
representation at 186, 217
Mountbatten’s address to 234
Princes’ reactions to 237, 302 paras.
43-4, 41 1, 424
India Office reactions to 262, 275,
307, 317 para. 8, 340, 383, 384 para. 5,
401, 402 para. 29
role of Hyderabad delegation at 240
see also states department(s)
Indonesia ( Indonesians) 302 paras.
41 and 55
Indore 213, 458
and question of accession 256 item 4,
266, 295, 302 paras. 49-51, 313 paras.
2-3, 335, 340 para. 1, 356, 383 para. 8,
385 paras. 9-14, 402 para. 30, 489 para.
49
INSTRUMENT OF INSTRUCTIONS
to Governors-General and Governors
204, 252
INTERIM GOVERNMENT
reconstitution of 8, 12 item 3, 21,
24-5, 32, 51, 53-4, 62, 63, 65 para. 18,
76 item 1, 82, 99, 108 item 1 and encs.,
no, 112, 116 encs., 127, 128, 147, 155-6,
162 paras. 10-15, 166 para. 8, 168, 228
para. 27, 231 para. 3
Executive Council (Transitional Pro¬
visions) Order, 1947 170
Auchinleck’s confusion over 247, 256
item 1, 270
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
333
iran (persia) 373, Appendix I, 6
iraq Appendix I, 6
ITTEHAD-UL-MUSLIMIN 257, 264, 302
para. 47, 385 para. 16
jail releases 320 para. 2
Jaipur 141, 372, 385 para. 59
846
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
japan Appendix I, 6
see also entry under armed forces,
INDIAN
jodhpur 141, 385 paras. 58-9, 426, 489
paras. 41-3
JOINT DEFENCE COUNCIL
chairmanship and/or composition of
7, 14 para. 2, 28, 35, 41, 205, 312, 425,
489 annex 11
establishment of provisional Joint
Defence Council 148, 302 para. 1
functions of 425; in context of future
defence relationship between India and
Pakistan 43 para. 4, 61, 297, 356 see
also ARMED FORCES, INDIAN , division
(reconstitution) of; boundary force;
defence, British and Commonwealth
military requirements in India; north¬
west frontier, defence of
provisional Joint Defence Council
minutes 276, 352
Auchinleck’s report to, of his visit to
Punjab 472, 486, 489 paras. 19-23
Mountbatten comments on establish¬
ment of 489 para. 26
JUDGES
terms of service of 65 para. 12, 157
minute 2, 164 clause 10, 245
kalat Appendix I, 6 para. 8(d)
negotiations of, with Pakistan 82, 150
para. 3, 159, 174, 228 para. 15, 258, 303,
33°, 3 5 1 > 360, 375, 384 paras. 1-3, 385
para. 2, 396, 488 para. 10
Menon’s views on 15 1 enc.
India Office views on status of 263, 317
para. 6
kashmir Appendix I, 6 para. 8(c)
question of visit to, by Gandhi or
Nehru 4, 62, 78, 129, 149, 249, 255,
259-60; decision that Gandhi should go
269, 277, 280; Resident’s reports of
visit 280 n also 385 para. 19; Mount-
batten’s account of background to visit
302 paras. 25-33, 402 para. 27
Jinnah’s statement on 87
question of accession of, to India or
Pakistan 4, 78, 15 1 enc., 228 para. 26,
280, 302 para. 53, 317 para. 9, 335, 383
para. 8, 456, 489 para. 51
Monckton on Congress attitude towards
390 para. 4
khairpur 151 enc., 228 para. 26
KOLHAPUR 424
LAHORE
question whether govt of East Punjab
should leave pending report of Boundary
Commission 46, 81, 89-90, 111 para.
3, 148, 162 para. 3, 228 paras. 6-7, 292
para. 4
extent of destruction in 191 item 2,
228 para. 30, 337 enc. paras. 5 and 10,
486 para. 3, 489 annex II
see also boundary commission(s),
reports and awards of; Punjab, tension
and disturbances in
lucknow residency 243 para. 6,
384 paras. 7(a), 477
mahasabha 83, 302 para. 40, 385
para. 48
malaya 334, Appendix I, 6
MESSAGES (FOR INDIAN INDEPEN¬
DENCE day) see ceremonies on
TRANSFER OF POWER
MOPLAH REBELLION (l92l) 459 para. 5
MUSLIM LEAGUE
and reconstitution of Interim Govern¬
ment See INTERIM GOVERNMENT
and Go vernor(s) -General see govern-
or(s)-general
and international status of new
Dominions see india
and Boundary Commission(s) see
boundary commission(s)
and partition see partition
resolution rejecting British honours
82, 125
and Bihar riots inquiry 34, 279 para. 4
and criticisms of Punjab administration
337 enc.
election of party leader for West
Punjab 359 para. 6
and Rampur 385 paras. 4-5
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
847
MUSLIM LEAGUE (font) \
see also north-west frontier
province, post-referendum problem/
question of ministry in
MUSLIM LEAGUE NATIONAL GUARDS
45 para, s(iii) (a), 94, 95, 107, 114 para. 1,
337 enc. para. 4, 437 para. 2, 448, 460
para. 2, 486 para. 3
MUTINY MEMORIALS 384 para. 7
Mysore i, 141, 167, 228 para. 22, 340
para. 5
NANKANA SAHIB
Giani Kartar Singh on Sikh claims to
56 enc. paras. 6-7, 292 enc. paras. 1 and
8; Patiala on Sikh claims to 367
Sikh demonstration at 214, 238, 256
item 8, 272, 276, 292 para. 12, 302 para. 2
and Boundary Commission award 250,
256 item 8, 487 para. 16
NETHERLANDS 444
new Zealand Appendix I, 6
see also dominions
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER
defence of 41, 44, 302 paras. 13-15,
309-10, 336, 385 para. 43, 429, 488
paras. 6, 7 and 9, Appendix I, 6
see also tribal areas
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE
referendum in 17, 162 para. 2, 187,
228 paras. 2-5
post-referendum problem/question of
ministry in 45, 76 item 5, 82, 101,
130, 147 para. 3, 168 para. 5, 182-3, 188,
191 item 4, 21 1, 229, 278, 294, 301, 302
paras. 19-24, 319, 327, 342, 363, 365,
374, 381, 385 para. 53, 387, 392-4, 4°7,
433, 481, 489 para. 28
question of Pathanistan option 45
para. 3(h), 278, 321 para. 3, 348 para. 2,
374 para. 2, 385 para. 53, 387 paras. 6-7,
394 para. 2, 433, 481 enc.
disturbances in (1946-7) 337 enc. para. 9
see also Afghanistan, Afghan de¬
mands concerning n . w . f . p .
NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY 486 para.
6
OATHS OF OFFICE 145, 215, 25I-2,
273-4, 416
OPPOSITION (PARLIAMENTARY)
and Governor-Generalship 26-7, 35,
42
and question of Arbitral Tribunal 71-2
and debates on Bill 153, 166 para. 15,
167
and question of States 262, 275 also
307 para. 5, 317 para. 9, 401
ORISSA STATES II5
PAKISTAN
adaptation orders for 86, no para. 5,
112 item 1, 117, 122, 158 para. 3, 159
para. 3, 162 para. 14, 464-5, 479, 489
para. 54
appointment of U.K. High Commis¬
sioner to 120
future economic relations with India
171
appointment of Chief Adviser to Jinnah
see Rowlands in Index of Persons
diplomatic representation of 159 para.
5, 373, 445
question of application for membership
of U.N.O. 316, 328, 353, 362, 371,
386, 444 also 470
Bhopal contemplates service in 385
para. 8
mentioned in context of negotiations;
with Hyderabad 61, 228 para. 20, 232
para. 2 (i) and (ii), 264 para. 3, 317 n. 10,
376 paras. 1 and 3, 385 para. 17, 434
para. 2; with Jodhpur 385 paras.
58-9, 426, 489 para. 42; with Rampur
385 paras. 3-4
and question of Kashmir see entry under
KASHMIR
exchange of representatives and agree¬
ment with Travancore 106, 192 paras.
4-5
see also entries under armed forces,
INDIAN; COM MONWEALTH; DEFENCE,
GOVERNORS, PROVINCIAL; INDIAN
states; interim government;
kalat; north-west frontier
PROVINCE
848
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
PAKISTAN CABINET
Minutes 301
PAKISTAN HIGH COMMISSIONER (iN
india)
accommodation for 112 item 7
appointment of 320 para. 7
PARAMOUNTCY, LAPSE OF
proviso to clause 7(1) of Bill, Congress
representations on 9, 30, 37 item 2, 40,
62, 123, 152, 167; Attlee’s statement
refers to 39 enc. para. 4, 262 n.3 ;
Mountbatten explains to conference of
States’ representatives 234; Bikaner
welcomes 413
Nizam’s views on clause 7 33
Menon explains to Aiyar 104
and question of monazite agreement
between U.K. and Travancore 106
para. 3(c)
and question of ceded territories 213,
458
and negotiation of standstill agreements
37 item 2, 43 para. 9, 61, 75, 93, 104, 115,
160, 234, 239, 240, 241, 242, 295, 296,
297, 329 para. 4, 330, 356, 376 para. 5,
390, 419 para. 2, 420, 421, 434 para. 3,
440 para. 2, 474
text of standstill agreement 313 enc.
PARTITION
administrative arrangements for, at
centre 54
Liaquat on timing of 228 para. 27
partition in Bengal 16, 65 paras. 4-7,
194, 287, 290, 291, 302 paras. 3-1 1
partition in the Punjab 18, 36, 46 para.
2, 81, 89-90, 103 para. 4, 108 item 3, 111,
148, 162 para. 3, 191 item 2, 205, 228
paras. 6-13, 292 para. 4, 359 para. 4,
459 para. 7 see also sikhs
PARTITION COUNCIL
Minutes 52, 148, 171, 205, 344, 353,
385 annex
Steering Committee of 162 para. 18,
385 para. 27
difficult meeting of 302 para. 12
question of successor body to 112
item 6, 148, 287
chairmanship of, after 15 Aug. 359
para. 3, 385 para. 39, 489 para. 38
statement on minorities, law and order
and Boundary Commission award
1 1 3 para. 8, 148, 162 para. 7, 205,
223-4, 228 para. 14, 231 para. 2, 235,
485 para. 3(d), 489 para. 8 and annex
11
statement on refugees 385 para. 28
and annex
see also arbitral tribunal; armed
forces, Indian, division (reconsti¬
tution) of; assets ; boundary com¬
mission^); INDIAN SERVICES, post¬
ings and transfers of officials
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
and lapse of paramountcy 30, 37 item
2, 115 n, 123, 213, 458
and supply of arms to States 66, 179
employment of ex-Political Dept
officers by British High Commission
in India 244, 281-2
Wylie’s account of Corfield’s appoint¬
ment as Political Adviser 442
see also records, disposal of, of
Crown Representative
PORTUGUESE POSSESSIONS IN INDIA
450-451
PRESS, BRITISH
and Governor-Generalship question
65 n.14
and Mounthatten’s speech to States’
representatives 262
see also TIMES, THE
PRESS, INDIAN
Mountbatten’s reception for representa¬
tives of 65 paras. 22-4
association of Indian journalists in
London 231 para. 13
reactions of, to Instrument of Accession
for States 340 para. 3, 383 para. 2
see also DAWN; INDIAN NEWS CHRONICLE
PRIVY COUNCIL
appeals to 91, 402 para. 2
public record office 399 enc. para.
PUNJAB
relief of British troops in 46, 134
possibility of Ministry in 81
tension and disturbances in 65 para.
2, 81 enc., 103 para. 5, 108 item 3, 162
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
849
Punjab ( cont .):
para. 2, 214, 238, 250, 254, 256 item 8.
276, 292, 302 para. 2, 306, 331, 359 para,
2, 382, 389 item 1, 418, 432, 437, 448,
459-60, 466-7, 484, 486, 489 paras. 20-6
special powers for dealing with dis¬
turbances 286, 299, 337 enc. para. 5
Punjab Boundary Force see boundary
force
Jenkins’ memorandum on criticisms
against Punjab administration for its
handling of 1947 disturbances 288
n.21, 337, 408, 489 para. 27
see also entries under amritsar;
BOUNDARY COMMISSION(s) JINDIAN
services; LAHORE; partition;
SIKHS
PUNJAB HILL STATES 302 para. 53
PUNJAB PUBLIC HEALTH SCHOOL 228
para. 29
rampur 383 para. 4, 385 paras. 4-5
RASHTRI Y A SWAYAM SEWAK SANGH
337 enc. para. 4, 345 para. 3
RECORDS, DISPOSAL OF
of Crown Representative 271, 285, 475
disposal of Governors’ letters and
destruction of records 315
refugees 432 para. 2, 459 para. 2, 460,
487 para. 19
see also entry under partition
COUNCIL
rewa 489 para. 52
ROYAL ENGAGEMENT AND WEDDING
153, 237, 343 n, 384 paras. 8-9, 488
para. 14
ROYAL TITLE 52, 82, 222, 3II
Russia (Russians) see union of
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
SANGLI 213, 458
SCARBROUGH REPORT (1946) 399
enc. para. 8
SEPARATE ELECTORATES 2l8
SHIROMANI AKA LI DAL 17, 23O, 272
SIKHS
partition of the Punjab and the Boundary
Commission 17, 46, 52, 56, 65 paras.
9-10, 67, 81, 82, 89-90, 103, 108 item 3,
121, 144, 162 para. 6, 166 para. 13, 196,
214, 216, 224, 226, 228 paras. 10 and 14,
230, 236, 238, 250, 254, 256 item 8, 272,
276, 292, 298, 302 paras. 2 and 10, 305-6,
326, 337, 367, 378, 397, 459 para. 6, 487,
489 para. 76
employment of Short as expert on 60
general policy of letting Sikhs blow off
steam 189
alleged terorist activities of Sikh leaders
and question of arrests 338, 345-6, 359
para. 2, 361, 379, 384 para. 6, 403, 489
paras. 33-4
question of loyalty of Sikhs in Army
and Governor-General’s bodyguard 389
item 1
see also Punjab, tension and distur¬
bances in
Simla conference (1945) Appendix
I, 1, 2, 3
socialist party 302 para. 40
SOUTH AFRICA
position of Indians in 1 66 paras. 17-18,
227 para. 11
position of, in relation to Common¬
wealth 314 enc., 343 enc. para. 2, 402
para. 3
see also dominions
STAFF COLLEGES (u.K.)
admission of Indian students 197
STATES DEPARTMENT(s)
establishment of 39 enc. para. 6, 61,
104, 105, 150 para. 1, 234, 335
and negotiations on accession 1, 2, 11,
37 item 2, 61, 65 paras. 27, 28 and 31,
75, 85, 93, 104, 141, 160 enc., 1 79 para. 4,
185, 201, 242, 313, 329, 356, 369 item 6,
383, 385 para. 10, 411 n.5, 420, 424, 434,
482, 489 para. 42
see also kalat; paramountcy,
lapse of, and question of ceded
territories
STATES, INDIAN see INDIAN STATES
STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER (1931) 314
enc., 430
STERLING BALANCES 71, II9, 221, 333
347, 358, 368, 402 para. 32
850
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
swat 228 para. 26
sylhet see entries under assam;
BOUNDARY COMMISSIOn(s)
TIBET 59, 126
TIMES, THE 167, 317 para. 7
TRAVANCORE
Dewan's statements asserting that
Travancore will become independent
after 15 Aug. 58, 106 enc. 1 para. 3,
146 also 154, 218
and negotiations on accession 43 para.
10, 65 para. 33, 93, 104, 166 para. 14,
185, 202-3, 22$ paras. 16-19, 256 item 4,
317 para. 7
accession of, to Indian Dominion 284,
302 para. 46, 313 para. 2, 383 para. 8
Listowel’s memorandum on 106
Wilmofs memorandum on 163
British deputy High Commissioner’s
interview with Dewan of 192
and trade with Ceylon 175
attempt on Dewan’s life 239, 297 p.s.,
302 para. 46, 402 para. 29
Congress finance to subvert govt of
390 para. 6, 434 para. 1
TRAVANCORE STATE CONGRESS
(people’s movement) 228 para. 18,
288, 302 para. 46
tribal areas 45 para. 3(v), 68 para. 2,
198, 211 para. 10, 302 paras. 14-15,
309-10, 336, 349, 350, 394 para. 3, 471
para. 4, 488 paras. 6-7
see also Chittagong hill tracts
TRIPURA STATE 452
turkey (turks) 192 para. 5, 385 para.
29
udaipur 385 para. 59, 489 para. 42
UNION JACK
agreement that it should be flown by
new dominions on certain days of year
1 12 item 2, 162 para. 27, 385 para. 29
and annex
lowering of, at Lucknow Residency
243 para. 6, 409, 477
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST RE¬
PUBLICS 6 para. 4, 65 para. 25, 106
enc. 1, 152, 310 enc., 328 para. 4,
Appendix I, 6
UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION 219
enc. 1 para, i
see also India, question of international
status of new Dominions; Pakistan;
south Africa, position of Indians in
UNITED PROVINCES
disturbances in (1942, 1946-7) 337 enc.
paras. 6 and 9
see also mutiny memorials
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and Afghan claims concerning
n.w.f.p. 142
and position of Indians in South Africa
166 para. 18
and admission of Indian students to
U.K. Staff Colleges 197
and Indian States 106 enc. 1 para. 2,
118, 231 para. 8, 380 para. 5
and question of new dominions raising
credits in 333 also 65 para. 16
viceroy’s conference papers
66, 250, 343, 354-5
viceroy’s interviews
with Auchinleck 1 1 3
Bhopal and Indore 335
Burrows, Tuker and Ranking 289
Gandhi 43
Gandhi, Nehru and Patel 269
Ghosh and Suhrawardy 290
Jinnah 82
Jinnah and Liaquat 112, 279
Jinnah, Liaquat, Patel and Savage
345
Kalat 258
Mitter and Jodhpur 105
Monckton 11, 420, 434
Monckton and Chhatari 329
Nehru 6, 270, 320
Nishtar and Akhtar Hussain 159
Suhrawardy 291
viceroy’s miscellaneous meet¬
ings 61, 174, 184, 278, 287, 330, 487
viceroy’s personal reports 65,
162, 228, 302, 385, 489
Mountbatten discusses with Nehru 302
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
85I
viceroy’s personal reports (cont) :
para. 35
Listowel comments on 402 para. 1
viceroy’s staff
arrangements for, after transfer of
power 37 item i(ii), 112 item 4, 162
paras. 20-21, 231 para. 5, 385 para. 54
strain on 166 para. 10, 488 para. 16
Listowel pays tribute to 402 para. 41
viceroy’s staff meetings 12, 37,
53, 76, 99, 108, 191, 256, 319, 369, 389,
436
zalme pakhtoon 45 para. 3(iii), 211
para. 5
ZETLAND REPORT (1945) 399 eilC.
para. 8
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A new series of documents from the Historical Section
of the India Office Records
Constitutional Relations between Britain and Burma
Burma: the Struggle for Independence: in two volumes
Edited by Hugh Tinker; assisted by Andrew Griffin
Volume I: to be published in 1983
From Military Occupation to Civil Government, 1 January 1944
to 31 August 1946
Covers the period during which Burma was formally
granted independence by Japan, a Burmese anti-Japanese
resistance movement developed, the Fourteenth Army
expelled the Japanese, a British military administration was
established, the civil government of Sir Reginald Dorman-
Smith returned to implement the White Paper on Burma’s
future, the AFPFL mounted an opposition campaign,
Dorman-Smith’s policies failed to satisfy the Prime Minister
leading to his recall and replacement, while discontent in the
police and other services mounted to crisis point.
The documents include, on the British side, the
correspondence of Winston Churchill, L. S. Amery,
Clement Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Pethick-Lawrence,
Admiral Mountbatten, General Slim and many others, with
Bogyoke Aung San, Bo Ne Win, Thakin Nu, Thakin Than
Tun, U Tin Tut, and Dr Ba Maw among the Burmese
whose letters, statements and other appearances are
reproduced.
The volume also incorporates passages from the memoirs of
British administrators, including an account by Sir Hubert
Ranee of his experiences as Director of Civil Administration
under Admiral Mountbatten.
Volume II. From General Strike to Independence, 1 September
1946 to 4 January 1948 is due for publication in 1984.
Published by
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office
Government Bookshops
49 High Holborn, London WCiV 6HB
13a Castle Street, Edinburgh EH2 3AR
Brazcnnose Street, Manchester M60 8AS
Southey House, Wine Street, Bristol BSi 2BQ
258 Broad Street, Birmingham Bi 2HE
80 Chichester Street, Belfast BTi 4JY
Printed in England
ISBN o 11 580087 5*
Other published volumes in the series
I The Cripps Mission January — April 1942
II ‘Quit India’ 30 April — 21 September 1942
III Gandhi’s fast and the succession to the Viceroyalty 21 September 1942 —
12 June 1943
IV The Bengal Famine and the New Viceroyalty 13 June 1943 — 31 August
1944
V The Simla Conference Background and Proceedings 1 September
1944—28 July 1943
VI The post-war phase: new moves by the Labour Government
1 August 1943 — 22 March 1946
VII The Cabinet Mission 23 March — 29 June 1946
VIII The Interim Government 3 July — 1 November 1946
IX The fixing of a time limit 4 November 1946 — 22 March 1943
X The Mountbatten Viceroyalty: Formulation of a Plan 22 March —
30 May 1947
XI The Mountbatten Viceroyalty: Announcement and Reception of the
3 June Plan 31 May — 7 July 1943
Some opitiions of the series
‘As a closing testimony to the British connexion with the Indian sub-continent there could be few more fitting
memorials than this series of documents . . the first volume evokes something of the grandeur that attached to the Raj
even in its expiring moments, a sense of the hugeness of issues at stake . . . and of the elevation of mind it lent to the
leaders of a small island people handling power for almost the last time on a world historical scale/ Professor E. T.
Stokes in The Historical Journal
‘The result is a coherence so effective that the volumes afford probably the most complete evidence published for the
decision-making process in government anywhere.’ W. Golant in History
‘Like its predecessors, it is a source of incalculable value and an example of great academic and technical craftsmanship’.
The Economist on Vol. VII
‘This fascinating new instalment of the Transfer of Power saga is very different in tone from the volumes that preceded
it. It is shot through with the personality of the new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten.’ Professor P. }. Marshall in The
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History on Vol. X
‘For all those engaged in plumbing the depths of current Indian history, this volume is an indispensable compendium,
a kind of interpretative gospel, a sutra series, to spur our imagination for a solution of future issues in the Indian
subcontinent.’ The Indian Express on Vol. X
‘Britain’s outstanding contributions to the study of India have been in the realm of Indian history. During the first
fifty years of the Raj British scholars, from Sir William Jones to James Prinsep, retrieved from oblivion the ancient
history and civilization of India . . . The second great contribution is the Transfer of Power which has helped me
immeasurably towards an understanding of British responses to India’s demand for freedom.’ B. N. Pandey in The
Times Eiterary Supplement
Free lists of titles ( state subject /s) are available from Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
PMIC Atlantic House, Holborn Viaduct, London EClP iBN.
HMSO Government Publications can be bought from the Government Bookshops in London
BOOKS N . orders to PO Box 369, SEi 9NH), Edinburgh, Belfast, Manchester,
Birmingham and Bristol ( full addresses listed on back flap), HMSO agents [see yellow
pages) or through other booksellers.
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